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Racial Diversity and Racial Policy Preferences: The Great Migration and Civil Rights

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ABSTRACT

Racial Diversity and Racial Policy Preferences: The Great Migration and Civil Rights*

Between 1940 and 1970, more than 4 million African Americans moved from the South to the North of the United States, during the Second Great Migration. This same period witnessed the struggle and eventual success of the civil rights movement in ending institutionalized racial discrimination. This paper shows that the Great Migration and support for civil rights are causally linked. Predicting Black inflows with a shift-share instrument, we find that the Great Migration increased support for the Democratic Party and encouraged pro-civil rights activism in northern and western counties. These effects were not only driven by Black voters, but also by progressive and working class segments of the white population. We identify the salience of conditions prevailing in the South, measured through increased reporting of southern lynchings in northern newspapers, as a possible channel through which the Great Migration increased whites' support for civil rights. Mirroring the changes in the electorate, non-southern Congress members became more likely to promote civil rights legislation, but also grew increasingly polarized along party lines on racial issues.

JEL Classification: D72, J15, N92

Keywords: race, diversity, civil rights, Great Migration

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1 Introduction

Racial inequality is a pervasive feature of US society, encompassing most of its domains – from earnings to employment opportunities, from intergenerational mobility to incarceration rates.¹ One of the potential causes of the racial gap and of its unwavering persistence is the lack of political empowerment of Black Americans who, for a major part of American history, have been denied even the most fundamental civil right in a democracy, namely the right to vote. Black political oppression was particularly strong in the US South. Writing in 1944, Swedish economist and Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal argued that migrating outside the region represented the most effective strategy for Black Americans to achieve racial equality and finally gain political rights (Myrdal, 1944). According to Myrdal, “[t]he average Northerner does not understand the reality and the effects of such [Southern] discriminations”, and “[t]o get publicity is of the highest strategic importance to [Blacks]”.

Around the time of Myrdal’s statement, many African Americans had already started to move from the South to the North and West of the US, hoping to reach a “Promised Land” (Boustan, 2016) and to leave behind them the system of disenfranchisement, violence, and discrimination perpetuated by the infamous Jim Crow laws. Eventually, more than 4 million Black Americans migrated between 1940 and 1970 in what is known as the Second Great Migration (henceforth, Great Migration).

The Great Migration temporally coincided with the development and eventual success of the civil rights movement – a turning point in the history of race relations, which culminated in the passage of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. Given the resistance of southern politicians to extend the franchise to Black Americans, northern legislators and grassroots organizations based in the North, such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), played a key role in the process of enfranchisement (Lawson, 1976). Was Myrdal right? Did northward migration allow African Americans to gain political power?

In this paper, we study this question, analyzing the political effects of Black immigration to the US North and West between 1940 and 1970. First, we examine how the Great Migration affected demand for civil rights and racial equality among northern

¹See, among others, recent works by Bayer and Charles (2018) and Chetty et al. (2020). Previous important contributions on this topic include Smith and Welch (1989) and Neal and Johnson (1996). See also the review in Altonji and Blank (1999).

voters. We measure support for civil rights in several ways, but use as main proxies the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections and the frequency of non-violent pro-civil rights demonstrations organized by grassroots organizations in the North. Even though the Democratic Party was openly segregationist and stubbornly defended white supremacy in the South until the early 1960s (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Lawson, 1976), by the end of the 1930s in the North and West it had unambiguously become the party defending Black people’s interests and pushing for racial equality (Schickler, 2016; Wasow, 2020).² Second, we analyze the effects of Black in-migration on the ideology and behavior of members of the House on race-related issues.

The political effects of the Great Migration are far from obvious. On the one hand, recent work in economics has documented that the Great Migration had substantial negative effects on African Americans in the long run. Black in-migration to northern cities increased racial residential segregation, as white residents fled urban areas for the suburbs (Boustan, 2010). In turn, whites’ residential choices, coupled with changes in the allocation of local public goods away from education and towards policing, drastically limited opportunities for economic and social mobility of African Americans (Derenoncourt, 2018). Racial residential segregation and lower economic opportunities may have been accompanied by whites’ political backlash, which reduced Black Americans’ political efficacy.

On the other hand, the Great Migration might have promoted Black Americans’ political empowerment for at least two reasons. First, around 1940, Black individuals were *de facto* or *de jure* prevented from voting in most southern states (Cascio and Washington, 2014), whereas no restrictions to their political participation existed in the North. The inflow of Black voters may have thus shifted northern politicians’ incentives to introduce civil rights legislation. Second, Black arrivals may have moved the preferences of at least some white voters in a more liberal direction. This might have happened either because the Great Migration increased whites’ awareness of the conditions prevailing in the South, as envisioned by Myrdal (1944), or because progressive segments of the Democratic coalition saw an opportunity to jointly promote racial equality and economic goals by forming a cross-race alliance, as suggested by the political science literature (Adams, 1966; Frymer and Grumbach, 2020; Schickler, 2016).

²Below, we corroborate this idea providing evidence consistent with the existing literature (Feinstein and Schickler, 2008; Schickler, 2016). On party realignment during this historical period, see also Caughey et al. (2020).

To study the political effects of the Great Migration we estimate stacked first difference regressions, controlling for state time-varying unobservable characteristics, and allowing counties to be on differential trends depending on their initial Black share and political conditions. To further account for potentially endogenous migration, we construct a version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001; Boustan, 2010) that assigns Black outflows from each southern state to northern counties based on pre-existing settlements of African Americans outside the South.

The shift-share instrument combines two separate sources of variation. First, it leverages time-series variation in Black emigration rates from different southern states for each decade between 1940 and 1970. Second, it allocates those southern outflows to northern counties based on the “mix” – in terms of southern state composition – of Black individuals living there in 1940. Since we always condition on the 1940 Black share of the population, the instrument only exploits variation in the composition of Black migrants across southern states over time.

Several recent papers discuss identification in shift-share designs (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2021; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020; Jaeger et al., 2018). As formalized in Borusyak et al. (2021), a large number of shocks across southern counties that are orthogonal to the evolution of the political landscape in northern counties would represent a sufficient condition for the shift-share instrument to be valid. We construct versions of the instrument for which these conditions are likely to hold, and show that our results are unchanged when using these alternative designs.

First, as in Boustan (2010), we exploit only variation in local push factors across southern counties to predict Black outflows from the South.³ Second, similar to Derenoncourt (2018), we construct a version of the instrument based on a linked sample of Black migrants between 1910 and 1930 from Abramitzky et al. (2020), which allows us to use a county-to-county migration matrix to construct “initial shares” for early Black residents in the US North. This instrument rests on variation in predicted migration – based on factors plausibly exogenous to political change in northern counties – from more than 1,200 southern counties.⁴

The alternative push instruments just described also mitigate concerns that pull shocks in northern counties both influenced the local political landscape and caused

³Examples of such plausibly exogenous push shocks are WWII spending or the mechanization of cotton, which occurred in the 1950s and impacted southern counties differentially depending on their 1940 cotton acreage.

⁴This strategy also assuages potential concerns over serial correlation in migration flows from the same location to the same destination (Jaeger et al., 2018).

out-migration from southern states that already had large enclaves in those counties before 1940. We provide further evidence against this idea in two ways. First, we show that the instrument is uncorrelated with WWII spending and New Deal relief programs (Boustan et al., 2010; Boustan, 2016). Second, we replicate the analysis separately controlling for a measure of labor demand predicted using the 1940 industry composition of northern counties.

We conduct a number of additional robustness checks to address the possibility that the characteristics of northern areas where a different mix of southern born African Americans settled before 1940 had persistent effects both on changes in racial attitudes and on migration patterns (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). First, we document that the instrument is not correlated with the pre-1940 change in political conditions across northern counties. Second, we allow counties to be on differential trends by interacting period dummies with several 1940 local characteristics, such as the Black and the urban share of the population, initial support for the Democratic Party, distance from the Mason-Dixon line, geographic coordinates, and the employment share in manufacturing.

Given existing evidence that the Great Migration caused “white flight” (Boustan, 2010; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019), we verify that Black inflows did not lead to white out-migration or to changes in the composition of white residents at the county level. These results are not in contrast with previous work (Boustan, 2010). Since county boundaries do not overlap with city-suburbs divides, and counties often include both central cities and suburban rings, changes in population triggered by Black inflows occurred within (and not between) the jurisdictions considered in our analysis.

Turning to our main results, we find that Black in-migration had a strong, positive impact on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. Our estimates imply that one percentage point increase in the Black share raised the Democratic vote share by 1.8 percentage points, or 4% relative to the 1940 mean. This is a large effect: even under the aggressive assumption that all Black migrants immediately voted for the Democratic Party upon arrival, support for the Democrats must have increased among northern residents because of Black inflows. Complementing our electoral results, we find that Black arrivals increased both the frequency of non-violent pro-civil rights demonstrations organized by CORE and the presence of local NAACP chapters.

Consistent with the view that African Americans were quickly incorporated in the political life of northern cities (Moon, 1948), we find that Black in-migration had a

positive but quantitatively small impact on turnout. This indicates that Black inflows likely induced existing voters to switch away from the GOP. Since not all Black residents were already voting for the Democratic Party in the early 1940s, some switchers were African Americans. However, the magnitude of our estimates implies that some segments of the white electorate likely joined the Democratic voting bloc as well. Using a subset of the data on pro-civil rights demonstrations, which reports the race of participants, we indeed find that not only Black but also white individuals joined pro-civil rights demonstrations.

We provide additional, suggestive evidence that Black in-migration increased support for civil rights among northern whites by using historical survey data. State level cross-sectional regressions reveal that, in the years preceding the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA), white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants between 1940 and 1960 held more favorable views on race relations, considered racial equality as one of the most fundamental issues for the country, and were more likely to vote for the Democratic Party.

To understand which segments of the white electorate became more supportive of civil rights, we explore heterogeneity patterns in our results. Focusing on pro-civil rights demonstrations, we exploit variation in county 1940 composition and historical characteristics. First, we document that CORE demonstrations were more frequent where the share of whites employed in manufacturing was higher, where the presence of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) – the main force behind industrial unionism – was stronger, and where elections were more competitive. These places may have offered fertile grounds for the formation of a liberal cross-race coalition along political and economic lines, as discussed extensively in Schickler (2016). Consistent with labor unions supporting a cross-race coalition only, or especially, when labor markets were tight (Bailer, 1944), pro-civil rights demonstrations occurred only where labor demand, predicted using a Bartik-style approach, was stronger.

Second, we consider the possibility that the Great Migration raised support for civil rights among socially progressive whites by increasing the salience of the “race problem” and activating their latent demand for racial equality (Allport, 1954; Myrdal, 1944). We document that pro-civil rights demonstrations were concentrated in counties with a history of lower racial discrimination. Dippel and Heblich (2021) show that the presence of the Forty-Eighters – socialist leaders expelled from Germany to the US after the failed revolution of 1848-1849 – had long-lasting effects on support for civil rights

and racial equality. We find that CORE demonstrations increased more in counties closer to the cities where the Forty-Eighters initially settled, where one would expect Black arrivals to induce a stronger sensitization of the white electorate.

To more rigorously test the “information mechanism” envisioned by Myrdal (1944), we compiled the list of all known lynchings committed by white offenders against Black Americans in the US South between 1940 and 1964. Then, we searched for such episodes in local newspapers of non-southern counties, identifying them with the joint mention of the name of the victim and the place of the lynching. By conducting a series of event studies, we document that, in the weeks following a lynching, northern local newspapers were more likely to report the episode in counties that had received more African Americans in previous years. Results are driven by white newspapers, and the higher reporting lasts for more than one month after a lynching. These patterns resonate with the idea that the Great Migration increased the salience of racial oppression prevailing in the South, thereby raising support for civil rights among at least some segments of the white electorate.

Our findings may seem at odds with the literature on white flight and the detrimental consequences that the latter had on Black migrants and their offspring in the long run (Boustan, 2010; Derenoncourt, 2018).⁵ However, Black political empowerment and white flight are not necessarily in contrast with each other. For one, there is extensive evidence that the Great Migration did economically benefit Black migrants (Baran et al., 2020; Boustan, 2016; Collins and Wanamaker, 2014). In addition, whites may have supported civil rights, while at the same time moving from central cities to the suburbs. From the lens of a Tiebout (1956) framework, whites may have expressed their preferences regarding neighborhood-level diversity and school mixing with their feet, while using the ballot box to express their more abstract ideological preferences about racial equality. Supporting this conjecture, we show that whites living in counties with higher 1940 residential segregation were more likely to both support civil rights and create more school districts, potentially to separate themselves from incoming Black migrants.⁶

In the second part of the paper, we turn to the ideology and behavior on racial issues of legislators representing non-southern congressional districts (CDs). Similar to Autor

⁵The Great Migration also increased racial disparities in incarceration rates (Eriksson, 2019; Muller, 2012), and worsened public finances in northern cities (Tabellini, 2018). See Collins (2021) for a thorough review.

⁶Consistent with polarization within the white electorate, historical survey data also suggest that the Great Migration increased support for racial equality among white Democrats, but reduced it among Republicans.

et al. (2020), we construct a cross-walk that matches counties to CDs, and develop a procedure that assigns CD boundaries, which changed over time due to redistricting, to the geography of a baseline, the 78th, Congress. We measure legislators’ ideology on race-related issues using the scores from Bateman et al. (2017), which are based on past voting behavior on civil rights bills, and take more negative values for more liberal ideology.

We find that, over time, CDs that received more African Americans were represented by legislators with a more liberal ideology on racial issues who were also more likely to sign discharge petitions aimed at promoting civil rights bills (Pearson and Schickler, 2009; Schickler, 2016). These average effects, however, mask substantial heterogeneity, as legislators of either party became increasingly polarized on racial issues.

Our results are related to the literature on the civil rights movement. Several papers have studied the consequences of the Civil Rights and the Voting Rights Acts (Aneja and Avenancio-Leon, 2019; Bernini et al., 2018; Cascio et al., 2010; Cascio and Washington, 2014; Reber, 2011), while many others, building on Carmines and Stimson (1989), have investigated the causes of the southern “dealignment” (Besley et al., 2010; Kousser, 2010; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Trende, 2012; Wright, 2013). We contribute to this literature by examining one of the causes of the civil rights movement, and showing that the Great Migration likely influenced the latter. Our findings are also consistent with and complement Schickler (2016) and Grant (2020) who, respectively, argue that the incorporation of African Americans into the Democratic coalition after the New Deal and the rising pivotal role of Black voters at the national level due to the Great Migration were important mechanisms behind party realignment in American politics.

We also complement the growing literature on the political effects of migration and the broader literature on inter-group relations (Alesina and Tabellini, 2020). Several papers find that immigration and a larger size of the minority group can lead to backlash among natives or majority members (Arzheimer, 2009; Enos, 2016; Dustmann et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2020). We instead show that, under certain conditions, inter-group contact can favor the formation of cross-race social or political coalitions, raising demand for racial equality also among members of the majority group.⁷ Several factors can explain the difference between our findings and those in the existing

⁷Our findings are consistent with those in Lowe (2021), Rao (2019), and Steinmayr (2020) from India and Austria respectively. We complement them by providing evidence from the US and in an instance where group boundaries are defined by race rather than by caste, income, or refugee status.

literature. First, as the evidence from newspapers’ reporting of southern Black lynchings suggests, Black in-migration likely increased whites’ awareness of the conditions prevailing in the South (Myrdal, 1944). Second, the civil rights legislation was, by and large, about the South, and northern whites would have been only indirectly – if at all – affected, at least before 1965. Third, labor unions had incentives to incorporate African Americans in their rank and files (Adams, 1966; Bailer, 1944; Schickler, 2016), forging a shared working class identity and pursuing common goals – conditions that contributed to positive inter-group contact (Allport, 1954). Finally, our average effects mask substantial heterogeneity, indicating that the Great Migration did not improve racial attitudes among all northern whites, and led to higher polarization both among voters and among legislators.

Our work also speaks to the literature on the relationship between voters’ demand and politicians’ behavior (Caughey and Warshaw, 2018; Jones and Walsh, 2018; Kroth et al., 2016; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Mian et al., 2010; Miller, 2008). Closest to our paper, Cascio and Washington (2014) document that the Voting Rights Act (VRA) shifted the distribution of local spending across southern counties towards Black Americans’ preferences, once the latter became eligible to vote. We expand on their findings by focusing on the US North rather than the South, and by analyzing one of the potential causes, rather than consequences, of the VRA – i.e., the response of northern politicians to the change in the characteristics, and thus in the demands, of their constituency due to Black in-migration.

Finally, we complement the vast literature on the Great Migration (Collins, 2021). Although several papers in economics have studied the effects of the Great Migration on whites’ residential decisions, intergenerational mobility, immigrant assimilation, and public finance (Boustan, 2010; Derenoncourt, 2018; Fouka et al., 2021; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019; Tabellini, 2018), little evidence exists on its political effects.

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Great Migration

Between 1940 and 1970, more than 4 million African Americans left the US South for northern and western destinations. This unprecedented migration episode is usually referred to as the Second Great Migration. From 1915 to 1930, the First Great Migration brought to the North 1.5 million Black Americans. However, the Second

Great Migration – from now onwards the Great Migration – was substantially larger in magnitude and had more profound implications for American politics and race relations (Boustan, 2016). Most Black migrants moved to urban centers in the Northeast and mid-West, but the Great Migration was a geographically widespread phenomenon, which affected also the West and less urbanized areas outside the South (Figure 1).⁸

Black migrants were pulled to the North and West by economic opportunities and pushed out of the South by racial oppression, political disenfranchisement, and poor working conditions (Boustan, 2016). On the one hand, the outbreak of WWII increased demand for labor in northern and western factories, raising the potential gains from migration. Even after the WWII-related labor demand shock was over, higher expectations of upward social and economic mobility kept attracting African Americans to the North at least until the late 1960s. On the other hand, widespread violence and disenfranchisement, together with a separate and unequal school system, provided strong incentives for Black Americans to leave the South (Feigenbaum et al., 2020; Margo, 1991). Moreover, the mechanization of agricultural harvest in the 1940s and 1950s reduced demand for labor in the already depressed southern agricultural sector, further increasing the pool of prospective migrants (Grove and Heinicke, 2003; Whatley, 1985).

Out-migration from the South was strongest during the 1940s, with a Black emigration rate of almost 15%, but remained high until the late 1960s (Figure A.1). As a consequence of this migration episode, during which the US South lost 40% of its 1940 Black population, the racial profile of the United States changed dramatically. While only 25% of African Americans were living outside the South in 1940, this figure had increased to more than 50% by 1970. On average, the Black share of the population in northern and western cities moved from less than 4% to more than 15% in just three decades. These numbers were an order of magnitude higher for main hubs like Chicago, Detroit, or St. Louis, where the Black share moved from 8, 9, and 11% to 32, 43, and 41% respectively (Gibson and Jung, 2005).⁹

⁸When defining the US South, we follow the Census classification but, as in Boustan (2010), we exclude Maryland and Delaware – two states that received net Black inflows during the Great Migration (Table A.1). As Figure 1 makes clear, most California’s counties are missing from our sample due to the lack of data on Congressional elections at the county level for this historical period. We return to this point in Section 3 and in Appendix D.

⁹In rural counties, the Black share remained substantially lower and rarely exceeded 2 or 3%.

2.2 Black Migrants and Northern Politics

The demographic change induced by the Great Migration had the potential to alter the political equilibrium, especially in industrial and urban centers. In the US South, Black Americans faced *de jure* disenfranchisement through the use of literacy tests, poll taxes, and grandfather clauses (Cascio and Washington, 2014; Lawson, 1976). On the contrary, they could, and in fact did, vote in the North (Moon, 1948). The literature on social movements has documented that the enfranchisement of Black migrants increased both the organizational capacity of the civil rights movement and pressure on local politicians (McAdam, 1982). During the First Great Migration, both Democrats and Republicans had tried to include African Americans in their voting bloc. However, since the New Deal, the Democratic Party had emerged as the party better equipped to address the demands of Black Americans outside the US South (Caughey et al., 2020; Schickler, 2016).

Figure A.2 plots the share of northern Democrats (blue bars) and Republicans (red bars) voting in favor of civil rights bills between Congresses 78 and 88 (see Table A.2 for the detailed list of bills). Both in the 1940s and in the 1950s, Democrats in the North were more likely to support civil rights bills.¹⁰ Using data from Pearson and Schickler (2009), Figure A.4 confirms these patterns by focusing on signatures on pro-civil rights discharge petitions – another, more direct, measure of legislators’ commitment to racial equality (Schickler, 2016).¹¹ Non-southern Democratic Congress members were at least 30 percentage points more likely than their Republican counterparts to sign a discharge petition to promote civil rights legislation between Congress 78 and Congress 82. The gap rose to more than 50 percentage points in the following decade (Table A.3).

Northern Black residents were significantly more likely to support the Democratic Party. Existing evidence indicates that at least 70% of registered Black voters outside the South were voting Democratic already in 1936 – a share that gradually increased over time (Bositis, 2012). Democrats also benefited from the behavior of labor unions – the CIO in particular – that, since the late 1930s, started to actively incorporate African Americans in their ranks.¹² This represented a shift away from the segrega-

¹⁰Figure A.3 documents that the pattern is reversed once the US South is included.

¹¹At a time when southern Democrats could block any proposed civil rights-related bill even before it reached the floor of the House, discharge petitions were filed by northern legislators to circumvent congressional committees, and move bills to the floor for a vote (Beth et al., 2003). For more details see Section 3 and Appendix C.

¹²Using data from Gallup, Farber et al. (2021) document that, while non-southern white men were significantly more likely than Black men to be union members in 1940, this pattern had been reversed by 1960.

tionist practices prevailing before 1940, and was not true for all unions.¹³ Abundant anecdotal evidence exists that labor unions openly endorsed civil rights and backed African Americans in their fight for racial equality (Adams, 1966; Bailer, 1944). For instance, CIO leader J. Brophy declared in 1944 that “behind every lynching is the figure of the labor exploiter...who would deny labor its fundamental rights”. Similarly, in 1942 Walter Reuther, a highly influential figure in the United Automobile Workers (UAW), declared that “[racial discrimination] must be put on top of the list with union security and other major union demands” (Zieger, 2000). In line with these statements, evidence from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac shows that, for the 42 cases in which the NAACP took a clear position on a proposed piece of legislation between 1946 and 1955, the CIO openly took the very same position in 38 cases, and never took a position conflicting with that of the NAACP (Schickler, 2016). As a result, a class-based coalition, pushing for both racial and economic liberalism, emerged. This gave additional leverage to Black activists and organizations such as the NAACP and the CORE to exert pressure on northern Democrats to pursue the civil rights agenda.

3 Data

This section briefly describes the key outcomes of the paper. Appendix B presents the time-invariant cross-walk used to map counties to CDs, fixing CD boundaries to the baseline Congress of 1944 (Congress 78). Appendix C provides a more detailed description of all data sources.

Demand for civil rights. We measure demand for civil rights using two main outcomes: the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections, and the frequency of pro-civil rights demonstrations. We complement these with data on the local presence of NAACP chapters, on whites’ attitudes obtained from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and Gallup public opinion polls, and on references to lynchings against Black Americans occurring in the US South reported in non-southern local newspapers. Our focus on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections is motivated by the fact that, by 1940, Democrats had become the main supporters of racial equality outside the US South (see Section 2.2) and that such support was more likely to emerge in Congressional rather than Presidential elections (Caughey et al.,

¹³For instance, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) remained openly segregationist.

2020; Schickler, 2016).¹⁴ To more directly capture demand for racial equality, we use the dataset assembled by Gregory and Hermida (2019) combining a variety of sources on the number of non-violent demonstrations organized between 1942 and 1970 by the CORE – a major inter-racial civil rights organizations that coordinated sit-ins and similar forms of civil disobedience.

Supply of civil rights. To measure legislators’ support for civil rights we use the ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) and signatures on discharge petitions to promote civil rights legislation from Pearson and Schickler (2009). Ideology scores are a function of legislators’ past voting behavior on race-related bills and, as the commonly used DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), take more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) positions. Discharge petitions represented an effective tool at the disposal of non-southern legislators for overcoming the gatekeeping behavior of southern Democrats. The latter – due to the seniority system prevailing at the time – frequently controlled committees that could block bills aimed at increasing racial equality before they reached the floor of the House (Schickler, 2016).¹⁵

Our final dataset is composed of the 1,263 non-southern counties (and, for the analysis on legislators, 285 CDs) for which all outcomes are available for all Census years. Since data on Congressional elections are not available for all years in several counties in California, our baseline analysis excludes most of the state (Figures 1 and A.5). Reassuringly, Appendix D shows that all results are unchanged when considering the unbalanced sample, which includes California.

Table 1 presents summary statistics for our main variables, reporting 1940 levels in Panel A and their (decadal) changes in Panel B. The Black share in the average county in our sample was around 3.5% in 1940, and increased to almost 9% in 1970 (not shown). These average values, however, mask substantial heterogeneity. Figure A.5 plots the 1940 Black share for the counties in our sample, and shows that, in 1940, Black migrants living outside the South were concentrated in the urban centers of the Northeast and the Midwest, in border states, and in the Southwest. In 1940, the Black share was already as high as 8% in Cook County (IL), and rose to 21.5% by 1970. Similarly, the Black share in Philadelphia County (PA) increased from around 12% in

¹⁴Data on Congressional elections come from Clubb et al. (1990). See Appendix C for more details.

¹⁵If a proposed bill remained stuck in the Rules Committee (resp. a legislative committee) for more than seven (resp. twenty) days, a discharge petition could be filed and, were it to receive at least 218 signatures, the bill could move to the floor of the House (Beth et al., 2003).

1940 to almost 35% in 1970, whereas that in Clark County (NV) rose from less than 3% to about 10% during the same period (Figure A.6).

The 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was on average 46.5%; in the 78th Congress, civil rights scores were on average negative (-0.87), indicating that northern legislators were relatively liberal on racial issues already by 1940. The average decadal change in ideology scores was very close to zero, even though this masks important differences both between parties and between Congress periods (Bateman et al., 2017; Schickler, 2016). Signatures on discharge petitions were significantly more common in the 78th- 82nd than in the 83rd- 88th Congress period (Table A.4), and their subjects changed markedly over time. While the poll tax and anti-discrimination employment (FECP) legislation were the most common topics during the 1940s, 5 of the 8 discharge petitions filed between the 83rd and the 88th Congress concerned the CRA.¹⁶

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Estimating Equation

Our empirical analysis is divided in two parts. First, we estimate the effects of the Great Migration on demand for civil rights legislation; second, we analyze the response of northern legislators to changes in the composition and preferences of their electorate. To be clear: we do not attempt to isolate the impact of changes in voters’ demand, due to Black inflows, on legislators’ behavior. In fact, both parties likely re-optimized their platforms strategically because of the Great Migration, in turn influencing the actions of voters – both Black and white. Our goal is instead to estimate the “reduced form” effect of Black in-migration on voters’ demand and politicians’ supply without taking a stance on how the two influenced each other.

Starting from the demand side and stacking the data for the three decades between 1940 and 1970, we estimate

$$\Delta y_{c\tau} = \delta_{s\tau} + \beta \Delta Bl_{c\tau} + \gamma X_{c\tau} + u_{c\tau} \quad (1)$$

where $\Delta y_{c\tau}$ is the change in the outcome of interest in county c during decade τ . When focusing on electoral outcomes, $y_{c\tau}$ refers to the Democratic vote share and turnout in

¹⁶See Appendix C for the list of discharge petitions on civil rights by topic and Congress (Table C.1).

Congressional elections. When considering grassroots activism, $y_{c\tau}$ is the probability of pro-civil rights demonstrations organized by the CORE and the presence of local NAACP chapters. In order to identify the effects for the average county, we weigh regressions by 1940 county population, but results are robust to estimating unweighted regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

The key regressor of interest, $\Delta Bl_{c\tau}$, is the change in the Black share in county c during decade τ . $\delta_{s\tau}$ includes interactions between decade and state dummies, and $X_{c\tau}$ is a vector of interactions between decade dummies and 1940 county characteristics. Our preferred specification includes the 1940 Black share and a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940 Congressional elections. In Appendix D, we add more interactions to probe the robustness of our results. Since equation (1) is taken in stacked first differences and always controls for interactions between period and state dummies, the coefficient of interest, β , is estimated from changes in the Black share within the same county over time, as compared to other counties in the same state in a given period.

Turning to the supply of civil rights, c no longer refers to the county but, instead, to the CD.¹⁷ When considering ideology scores, we restrict attention to two – rather than three – periods, so as to end our analysis with the Congress that passed the CRA (Congress 88). Instead, for signatures on discharge petitions, we are forced to estimate equation (1) only for the 78-82 Congress period, when a sufficient number of petitions were filed both at the beginning and at the end of the decade.

4.2 Instrument for Changes in Black Population

The key empirical challenge for our analysis is that Black migrants might have sorted in places that were already undergoing economic and political changes. To overcome these and similar concerns, we predict Black inflows in northern area c during decade τ using a version of the shift-share instrument commonly adopted in the migration literature (Boustan, 2010; Card, 2001). The instrument predicts the change in the Black population in county c during decade τ by interacting the share of Black migrants born in southern state j and living in northern county c in 1940 (relative to all Black migrants born in state j living outside that state in 1940), sh_{jc} , with the number of Black migrants who left state j during period τ , $Bl_{j\tau}$:

¹⁷We construct a time-invariant unit, described in Appendix B, to deal with redistricting. Regressions are weighed by CD population, and standard errors are clustered at the CD level.

$$Z_{c\tau} = \sum_{j \in South} sh_{jc} Bl_{j\tau} \quad (2)$$

Since we are interested in the effects of changes in the Black share, we scale $Z_{c\tau}$ by 1940 county population.

As discussed in Boustan (2010) among others, Black settlements in the North were highly persistent over time. At the turn of the twentieth century, as African Americans started to move northwards, migration patterns were influenced by the newly constructed railroad network. For instance, the presence of the *Illinois Central*, which connected several Mississippi counties to Chicago and a number of southern railroads to northern hubs in Missouri and Illinois, explains why Black migrants from Mississippi were disproportionately concentrated in Chicago or St. Louis (Grossman, 1991). The stability of Black enclaves was further reinforced by the process of chain migration during the First Great Migration (Collins and Wanamaker, 2015). Figure A.7 plots the share of Black migrants born in Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas living in selected northern counties in 1940, documenting the wide variation in settlement patterns across both destination and origin areas.

4.2.1 Identifying Assumptions and Instrument Validity

Several recent papers discuss the conditions for the validity of shift-share designs (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2021; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020; Jaeger et al., 2018). One way to express the identifying assumption behind the instrument is as follows. Conditional on controls, third factors affecting the trajectories of political conditions after 1940 must not be simultaneously correlated with both: *i*) the 1940 mix, in terms of southern state of origin, of Black enclaves across non-southern counties, and *ii*) emigration rates from different southern states after 1940.

As formalized in Borusyak et al. (2021), a large number of shocks that are orthogonal to changes in outcomes in the destination (in our setting, support for racial equality in non-southern counties) guarantee the validity of the shift-share design. Our instrument combines actual out-migration flows with a (southern) state to (northern) county migration matrix. For these reasons, we cannot immediately invoke the result in Borusyak et al. (2021). However, as described in detail in Appendix D, we verify that our results are unchanged when using versions of the instrument that are likely to meet the conditions in Borusyak et al. (2021).

First, as in Boustan (2010), we replace actual out-migration from southern states with that estimated by exploiting only conditions across southern counties (and then aggregated up to the state level), such as WWII spending, 1940 cotton acreage, and 1940 employment share in agriculture, manufacturing, and mining.¹⁸ Second, and similar to Derenoncourt (2018), we develop an alternative version of the shift-share instrument, based on a linked sample of African American migrants between 1910 and 1930 from Abramitzky et al. (2020). This instrument, which is based on a county-to-county (rather than state-to-county) migration matrix, effectively exploits variation in predicted migration from more than 1,200 southern counties. Since conditions across southern counties are plausibly orthogonal to the evolution of political ideology in northern counties (Derenoncourt, 2018), the identifying assumption is likely to hold in this case (Borusyak et al., 2021).¹⁹

Push instruments already reduce concerns about spurious correlation with specific shocks hitting northern counties that both affected local conditions and influenced out-migration across southern states over time. We provide two additional pieces of evidence against this possibility. First, we document that the instrument is uncorrelated with either WWII spending or the generosity of New Deal relief programs. Second, similar to Sequeira et al. (2020), we replicate the analysis by separately controlling for a measure of predicted labor demand, constructed by interacting the 1940 industrial county composition with the national growth rate of different industries between 1940 and 1970.

We also perform a number of additional robustness checks. First, we show that pre-period changes in the outcomes of interest are not correlated with the instrument. Second, we interact period dummies with several 1940 county characteristics (e.g., the Black and the urban share of the population, support for the Democratic Party, and the share of employment in manufacturing) and with time-invariant geographic controls (e.g., distance from the Mason-Dixon line, latitude and longitude, distance from the closest city where the Forty-Eighters settled).²⁰

These exercises assuage the concern that the characteristics of counties where Black

¹⁸Predicting out-migration using southern push factors also assuages the potential concern of serial correlation in migration flows from the same location to the same destination (Jaeger et al., 2018) over time.

¹⁹In Appendix D, we also present standard errors corrected using the procedure from Adao et al. (2019).

²⁰Dippel and Heblich (2021) show that the Forty-Eighters – leaders of the failed 1848-1849 German revolution who migrated to the US – had long-lasting and profound effects on support for racial equality. One may thus be worried that distance from cities where the Forty-Eighters settled might be correlated both with enclaves of Black individuals born in southern states that sent more migrants after 1940 and with the evolution of political preferences in the US North and West.

migrants from specific states settled before 1940 may be correlated both with post-1940 Black migration and with changes in support for civil rights in northern counties (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). In particular, controlling for the interaction between the 1940 Black share and period dummies, as we do in our preferred specification, implies that the instrument only exploits variation in the (southern state) composition of African Americans’ enclaves across counties, holding constant the size of their Black populations.

5 Demand for Civil Rights

5.1 Main Results

5.1.1 Congressional Elections

We start by studying the effects of the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections, which we interpret as a proxy for voters’ demand for civil rights. Panel A of Table 2 estimates equation (1) with OLS in columns 1 to 3, and with 2SLS from column 4 onwards. Column 1 only includes state by decade fixed effects, while columns 2 and 3 add interactions between decade dummies and, respectively, the 1940 Black share and an indicator for Democratic incumbency in 1940. In all cases, the point estimate on the change in the Black share is positive and statistically significant.

Turning to 2SLS, Panel C shows that the instrument is strong, and the F-stat for weak instruments is always above conventional levels. In our preferred specification – which includes interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) an indicator for Democratic incumbency in 1940 – the first stage coefficient implies that one percentage point increase in the predicted Black share raises the actual Black share by 0.75 percentage points (column 6).

2SLS estimates confirm OLS results, but are larger in magnitude, especially for our preferred specification (column 6) and when estimating long difference regressions (column 7). According to our preferred specification, one percentage point increase in the Black share raised the Democratic vote share by 1.88 percentage points, or 4% relative to the 1940 mean. For large recipient counties such as Cook (IL) or Wayne (MI) county, where the Black share increased by more than 15 percentage points between 1940 and 1970, Black in-migration had the potential to alter the political landscape dramatically. These findings likely reflect a combination of *i*) migrants’ direct political

engagement, and *ii*) changes in the preferences and voting behavior of existing residents. We return to this point in Section 5.3 below, when exploring the mechanisms, but we already note that the 2SLS coefficient in column 6 of Panel A is statistically different from 1 at the 5% level.

The difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates indicates that Black migrants selected areas where support for the Republican Party was rising faster. This might have happened because these counties were experiencing faster income growth.²¹ Another possibility, not in contrast with the previous one, is that the IV identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE) for counties that received more Black migrants because of family networks and not because of economic conditions. If Black individuals moving to a specific location due to the presence of networks were more politically engaged relative to “economic migrants”, this could explain why OLS coefficients are smaller than 2SLS ones.

Panel B of Table 2 estimates the impact of Black in-migration on turnout in Congressional elections. The coefficient from our preferred specification (column 6) is positive and statistically significant, although smaller than for the Democratic vote share. As for the Democratic vote share, OLS coefficients are smaller than 2SLS ones – in this case even negative. The positive effect on turnout is in line with qualitative evidence that Black migrants were quickly incorporated in the political life of northern and western counties (Moon, 1948; Schickler, 2016).

In Appendix E.1.1, we examine how results vary across decades (Table E.1), showing that the effects of the Great Migration were stronger in the 1940s and in the 1960s, and were, instead, muted in the 1950s.²² Appendix E.1.1 also verifies that Black inflows had a positive, but smaller, effect on the Democratic vote share in Presidential elections. This is consistent with Schickler (2016), who documents that support for racial equality was stronger within the local fringes of the Democratic Party.

5.1.2 Pro-Civil Rights Demonstrations and NAACP Chapters

In Table 3, we turn to the frequency of non-violent demonstrations organized by CORE in support of civil rights. The structure of the table mirrors that of Table 2, reporting

²¹Consistent with this idea, in our sample there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the change in the Democratic vote share and a number of proxies for economic growth, such as population growth, population density, and industrial expansion.

²²One interpretation for these patterns is that the economic downturns of the 1950s temporarily halted the progress of race relations, cooling off whites’ support for racial equality (Sugrue, 2014).

OLS and 2SLS estimates in columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 7 respectively, and presenting first stage coefficients in Panel B. For brevity, we focus on our 2SLS preferred specification (column 6).

Black in-migration had a strong, positive effect on the probability of CORE demonstrations. One percentage point increase in the Black share led to a 5.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of protests. CORE was created in 1942, and the frequency of events in our sample of counties between 1942 and 1944 (included) was 0.09. Our estimates thus imply that one percentage point increase in the Black share raised CORE demonstrations by more than 60% relative to their pre-1945 values. Another way to gauge the magnitude of these estimates is to consider that the average change in the probability of CORE-led protests in our sample is 0.138. Hence, one percentage point increase in the Black share explains more than one third of the change in pro-civil rights demonstrations across non-southern counties between 1940 and 1970. We refer the interested reader to Appendix E.1.2, where we use information on the cause and the target of the protest to analyze the heterogeneity of results across type of events (Figures E.1-E.2 and Table E.2).

In Table 4, we focus on the 1940-1960 change in the probability that a county had a NAACP chapter in place.²³ In the full sample, there is no statistically significant effect on the presence of NAACP (column 3). However, the impact of Black in-migration becomes positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively relevant for counties that did not have a chapter in 1940 (column 4).²⁴ The fact that we do not find any effect for counties that already had a chapter in place in 1940 is not surprising. In these places, Black inflows likely increased the number of members of NAACP chapters – something that we are not able to measure in our data. Instead, in counties where the NAACP was not present at baseline, Black in-migration likely created a critical mass of activists that justified the opening of new local chapters.

²³We use this specification because, as noted in Appendix C, data on NAACP chapters are only available for 1940 (or earlier) and 1960.

²⁴In column 4, the F-stat falls below conventional levels, suggesting that results should be interpreted with some caution.

5.2 Robustness Checks

5.2.1 Addressing White Flight

A potential concern with the interpretation of our findings is that Black arrivals induced white residents to move to another county (Boustan, 2010). We provide different pieces of evidence, detailed in Appendix D and briefly summarized here, that our results are not due to white flight. First, we replicate the analysis considering a larger geographic unit, the commuting zone (CZ), which contained both central cities and their suburbs (Tables D.1 and D.2). Any potential white flight induced by Black inflows should thus take place within, and not across, CZs. Second, we replicate the analysis conducted in Boustan (2010), and document that Black in-migration did lead to white departures in central cities, but not in counties in our sample (Tables D.3, D.4, D.5, and D.6). Since the central city-suburb divide does not overlap with county boundaries, the reallocation of whites between cities and suburbs was likely absorbed within counties. Finally, we show that Black inflows were not associated with changes in the composition of white residents and, consistent with Boustan (2009), did not have any impact on whites' labor market outcomes (Tables D.7 and D.8).²⁵

5.2.2 Summary of Additional Robustness Checks

Appendix D performs additional robustness checks. First, we verify that results remain unchanged when constructing versions of the instrument that only exploit variation in push factors across southern counties (Tables D.9 and D.10), and that rely on a county-to-county migration matrix to construct the initial shares (Table D.11). Second, we show that the instrument is uncorrelated with two potential pull factors: WWII spending and New Deal relief programs (Table D.12), and we replicate the analysis controlling for predicted industrialization, constructed by exploiting the 1940 industrial composition of non-southern counties (Table D.13). Third, we check that there are no pre-trends (Tables D.14 and D.24). Fourth, we interact period dummies with several 1940 or time-invariant county characteristics, such as the urban share, the employment share in manufacturing, the employment to population ratio, county geographic coordinates, distance from the Mason-Dixon line and from the closest city where the Forty-Eighters moved to (Tables D.15 and D.16).

²⁵Due to data limitation this exercise is conducted at the CZ level, estimating long difference regressions for the 1940-1960 period.

We also verify that results: *i*) are robust to considering an unbalanced sample that includes all county-decade observations for which outcomes are available, excluding potential outliers, estimating alternative specifications, and measuring electoral outcomes in different ways (Tables D.17, D.18, D.19, D.20, and D.21); *ii*) are not driven by the simultaneous inflow of southern whites (Tables D.18 and D.19); and, *iii*) are robust to clustering standard errors at the CZ level and to using the procedure suggested in Adao et al. (2019) to adjust standard errors (Tables D.22 and D.23).²⁶

5.3 Mechanisms

5.3.1 Black in-Migration and Whites' Attitudes Towards Civil Rights

Bounds on whites' voting behavior. We begin with a back of the envelope calculation that suggests that not only Black but also white voters' behavior changed in a progressive direction in response to Black in-migration. The coefficient reported in Table 2, column 6, indicates that Black in-migration increased the Democratic vote share by more than one for one. This points to the importance of changes in northern residents' voting patterns. In Figure E.3, we compute how many white Republican voters would need to switch to the Democratic Party under different assumptions on Black turnout and voting preferences, in order to explain away our estimated effect on Democratic vote share.²⁷ If Black residents voted for the Democratic Party at a rate of 70%, as estimated by the literature (Bositis, 2012), and if we assume a similar behavior for Black migrants, our 2SLS coefficient implies around three white voters switching from the Republican to the Democratic party for every ten incoming Black migrants.

Because it relies on assumptions about Black voting behavior, this exercise is suggestive. We thus only report it in detail in Appendix E.2.1. Yet, it shows that, under reasonable assumptions, Black migrants alone are not sufficient to explain the increase in the Democratic vote share estimated above, and that at least some northern residents – both Black *and* white – would have to start voting for the Democrats.

Additional evidence from CORE demonstrations. To corroborate the idea that Black in-migration increased support for racial equality among at least some white voters, we exploit the fact that, for a subset of pro-civil rights demonstrations, we can identify the race of participants. In column 7 of Table 3, we estimate our preferred

²⁶Appendix D also performs additional robustness checks on CD results presented in Section 6.

²⁷When performing this exercise, we fix turnout, assuming that the inflow of Black migrants can change the preferences of existing voters but does not alter the number of northern residents (of either race) voting.

specification using as dependent variable the change in the probability of CORE demonstrations with both Black and white participants. This represents a (very conservative) lower-bound for the probability that whites joined pro-civil rights demonstrations, since participants' race was reported only for approximately 40% of CORE events, and we define a protest as having white participants only when their presence was explicitly reported. The point estimate is smaller than that of the baseline specification (column 6), but remains positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.

Evidence from historical survey data. We complement the previous results with historical survey data from the ANES. We are unable to conduct a county-level analysis because of the very limited number of counties and of respondents per county included in the survey (Appendix C). We instead perform this exercise at the state level. Since questions on racial views are available only from the end of the 1950s, we estimate cross-sectional regressions, correlating whites' racial attitudes and political preferences in surveys conducted in years close to the CRA with the (instrumented) 1940-1960 change in the Black share in their state of residence.²⁸ We include survey year and Census region fixed effects and a set of 1940 state (manufacturing share, urban share, share of unionized workers, Black share, and an indicator for Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections) and individual (gender, marital status, and fixed effects for both age and education) controls.²⁹ We restrict attention to white respondents living in non-southern states. To deal with the potential concern that white respondents may have moved across states because of Black in-migration, we further restrict attention to whites living in their state of birth.

In Table 5, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if support for civil rights was considered by respondents as one of the most important problems for the country in 1960 and 1964. In the same survey years, respondents were also asked whether they opposed school and housing or working space integration. Combining these questions, columns 1 to 3 verify that considering civil rights as one of the most important problems is negatively correlated with opposition to racial integration. We thus interpret the dependent variable in Table 5 as a proxy of support for racial equality. Columns

²⁸Although some of these questions were asked also after 1964, we refrain from using any post-CRA survey dataset because of the potential direct effect of the bill on whites' racial attitudes (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Wheaton, 2020).

²⁹Since party identification and union membership may be endogenous to Black inflows, we do not include them in our baseline specification. Adding these controls does not change any of our results. Results are also robust to including further 1940 state level controls such as the immigrant share, the share of unskilled workers, and other socioeconomic or political variables.

4 and 5 turn to the relationship between the 1940-1960 change in the Black share and the dummy for civil rights being the most important issue, using OLS and 2SLS respectively.

2SLS estimates indicate that white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants between 1940 and 1960 were significantly more likely to consider civil rights one of the country’s most important problems. The coefficient reported in column 5 implies that one percentage point increase in the Black share between 1940 and 1960 is associated with a 3.4 percentage points (or, 30%) higher probability of reporting civil rights as the most important problem in the two ANES surveys asked before the CRA.

We also consider whites’ political preferences. Focusing on survey waves between 1956 and 1964 and estimating 2SLS regressions, Table A.5 documents that white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants between 1940 and 1960 were significantly more likely to vote for the Democratic Party. This relationship becomes an order of magnitude stronger when restricting attention to 1964 (columns 2 and 4). The fact that coefficients are higher for 1964 is consistent with the civil rights issue featuring more prominently during the year that led to the passage of the CRA.³⁰

Appendix E.2.3 explores the heterogeneity of racial attitudes across white respondents. It shows that the positive relationship between whites’ attitudes towards racial equality and Black in-migration was stronger among union members (Figure E.4). It also reveals that self-identified Democrats were more supportive of civil rights in states that received more African Americans between 1940 and 1960, while the opposite was true for self-identified Republicans. Given the potential endogeneity of partisanship, these patterns are merely suggestive. However, they indicate that the Great Migration might have increased polarization on racial issues within the northern electorate.³¹

5.3.2 Unpacking the Channels Behind Whites’ Support for Civil Rights

At least two mechanisms can explain the positive effects of Black in-migration on support for racial equality among (at least some) northern whites. First, progressive Democrats and labor unions may have made civil rights part of their agenda in order to attract Black migrants, forging a class-based cross-race coalition between white and Black members of the working class (Adams, 1966; Sugrue, 2008).

³⁰Appendix E.2.2 verifies that similar patterns hold when using data from Gallup (Table E.3).

³¹In Table E.5 we also show that the change in the Black share was positively associated with feelings towards Democrats, African Americans, and the NAACP among white respondents.

Second, as envisioned by Myrdal (1944), exposure to Black migrants might have increased whites’ awareness of the brutal conditions prevailing in the South, in turn fostering demand for more racial equality. Inter-group contact might have also reduced negative stereotypes and prejudice held by whites, changing their attitudes towards Black Americans (Allport, 1954; Schindler and Westcott, 2020).

Economic and social factors may have interacted, reinforcing each other. For instance, frequent contacts in an environment where Black and white workers had common goals and where they shared a common, class-based, identity may have reduced some of the barriers that traditionally inhibited the formation of a racially diverse coalition.³²

Political and economic forces. As discussed in Section 2.2, starting in the late 1930s, some of the most important labor unions, such as the CIO, became a crucial ally to African Americans’ struggle for equality. Often, unions coordinated with grassroots movements such as the NAACP, jointly pushing for civil rights and progressive economic policy (Schickler, 2016). To test the role of the labor movement, we split counties above and below different proxies for the presence and strength of organized labor, or for its incentives to incorporate African Americans. We report results in Figure 2 and Table A.6, always defining the variables so that higher values refer to stronger presence of, or incentives for, unions to support the civil rights movement.

The surge in civil rights protests was concentrated in counties with a higher share of white workers in manufacturing – the sector where unions were most widespread (Bailer, 1944; Farber et al., 2021). In line with these results, the effects of the Great Migration were stronger, although not statistically different, in counties belonging to states where CIO membership rates were higher.³³ Pro-civil rights protests were also more frequent where political competition – defined as one minus the absolute value of the margin of victory in 1940 Congressional elections – was higher. This finding is consistent with labor unions (and the Democratic Party) having stronger incentives to coordinate events where the Black vote was more valuable. Precisely in these areas, a better organized political machine could have made a difference in attracting and mobilizing pivotal, Black and white, voters (McAdam, 1982; Pons, 2018).

Labor unions, and white workers more generally, should have supported racial equal-

³²Using recent data, Frymer and Grumbach (2020) find that white union members hold more liberal attitudes towards minorities in the US.

³³CIO membership rates are not available at the county level in a systematic way. We thus rely on 1939 state-level CIO membership from Troy (1957).

ity more when labor markets were tighter. Indeed, inter-group contact is more likely to lead to cooperation when it happens in contexts with no competition over scarce resources (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967).³⁴ Consistent with this idea, Black in-migration led to more demonstrations only where predicted labor demand was stronger. Instead, when predicted labor demand was low, Black inflows significantly reduced the probability of pro-civil rights demonstrations.³⁵ These findings are in line with anecdotal accounts noting that backlash was more likely to emerge during economic downturns (Bailer, 1943; Sugrue, 2014). They are also in line with the electoral results discussed in Appendix E.1.1 (Table E.1), which document that the Great Migration had no effect on the Democratic vote share in the 1950s – a decade characterized by slack labor markets and economic recession.

Social forces. It is possible that Black in-migration increased the salience of brutal conditions and racial violence prevailing in the US South (Myrdal, 1944), leading to greater sensitization of northern whites with liberal tendencies. If that was true, one might expect attitudinal shifts to be more pronounced in counties that were already more socially progressive. To test this idea, we split the sample above and below the median of different proxies for progressive attitudes in the local electorate. We report results in Figure 3, rescaling the variables so that higher values refer to socially more progressive counties.

First, we consider the discrimination index constructed in Qian and Tabellini (2020) using historical data from a variety of sources, such as local presence of the KKK and the lynching of Black Americans up to 1939. Results are an order of magnitude larger in counties with lower historical discrimination. The same pattern, though less pronounced, is evident when splitting counties as belonging to states with (blue bars) and without (orange bars) miscegenation laws (Dahis et al., 2020). Second, pro-civil rights demonstrations increased more in counties that were closer to one of the cities where the Forty-Eighters originally settled. As shown in Dippel and Heblich (2021), the presence of the Forty-Eighters was associated with stronger support for racial equality; hence, whites in these places may have been more responsive to news about racial oppression in the South.³⁶

³⁴Several papers document that anti-minority sentiments are more likely to arise during times of hardship (Grosfeld et al., 2020; Oster, 2004; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012).

³⁵We predict labor demand using a Bartik-style approach, interacting 1940 industry shares at the county level with national growth rates of each industry in each subsequent decade.

³⁶In a few instances, as documented in Table A.6, the F-stat falls below conventional levels, suggesting that results should be interpreted with caution. This problem is particularly pronounced when focusing on counties

Evidence on information transmission. To more directly test Myrdal’s “information hypothesis”, we obtained the list of (known) lynchings against African Americans between 1940 and 1964 in the US South, compiled from the Monroe Works Today project.³⁷ Then, we searched for mentions of such episodes in any non-southern newspaper that we could locate on the website Newspapers.com. To identify a lynching, we search for the joint appearance in the same page of the name and surname of the victim and the place where the lynching occurred. We restrict attention to a window of 4 weeks before and 26 weeks after each episode, and focus on the subsample of 492 counties for which newspaper data is available.³⁸ We could locate a total of 1,041 newspapers, only 5 of which explicitly targeted an African American public. In what follows, we consider all newspapers, but results are unchanged when excluding from our sample the 5 African American ones.

We organize the data at the (northern) county-week-episode level, defining as “week 0” the week in which the lynching occurred (in a southern state). We create an indicator variable if, in a given week, at least one mention of the lynching was found in a county’s local newspapers. Focusing on weeks 0 to 26, we regress this indicator against the instrumented 1940-1960 change in the Black share in the county. Since the regressor of interest is defined at the county level, we cannot include county fixed effects. However, we include state, episode, and week fixed effects.³⁹ Results from this exercise are reported in Table 6.

Column 1 considers any lynching that occurred between 1940 and 1964. It shows that, in the weeks following the lynching of a southern Black individual, local newspapers of northern counties were more likely to report the episode in areas that had received more African Americans between 1940 and 1964. Column 2 runs a placebo exercise, restricting attention to lynchings that occurred between 1940 and 1944. The coefficient is no longer statistically significant, and smaller in size. This indicates that

further from the cities of the Forty-Eighters. Reassuringly, however, the pattern depicted in Figures 2 and 3 is consistent across proxies for political and social forces.

³⁷See also <https://plaintalkhistory.com/monroeandflorencework/explore/map2-credits.html>.

³⁸Table A.7 compares the characteristics of the full sample and the counties in the “newspapers’ sample”. Not surprisingly, counties in the newspapers’ sample had a higher total population, a higher Black share, and were more likely to be urban in 1940. They also experienced a slightly larger increase in their (actual and predicted) Black population share. However, reassuringly, the Democratic vote share and turnout – both their 1940 levels and their change – are remarkably similar between the two sets of counties. Table A.8 verifies that our main results are unchanged when focusing on the sample of counties for which local newspapers could be located.

³⁹As in the main analysis, regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Black in-migration, and not other county-specific characteristics, increased the probability that a southern lynching was reported in a northern newspaper. Consistent with an information transmission mechanism driven by migration, columns 3 to 5 show that the coefficient on the change in the Black share becomes larger as we focus on lynchings that happened in later years.

Figure 4 explores the dynamics behind the patterns just described, zooming in on the 12 weeks around the event – 4 weeks before and 8 weeks afterwards. Reassuringly, there is no relationship between the mention of a lynching and the change in the Black share in the weeks before the event. The effect of Black in-migration jumps on the week of the lynching, and then gradually fades away, persisting for at least one month after the event.

Next, in Table 7, we expand the window to include also the 4 weeks before the lynching, and interact the change in the Black share with an indicator equal to one for all weeks after the lynching. We control for a full battery of county, episode, and week by state fixed effects.⁴⁰ Panel A focuses on the 1940-1960 change in the Black share. In line with our previous results, the interaction between the post-event dummy and the change in the Black share is positive and statistically significant when considering years after 1945 (column 3), and this relationship becomes quantitatively larger as we restrict attention to episodes that occurred later (columns 4 to 6). Again, when considering lynchings that occurred between 1940 and 1944, the coefficient is quantitatively small and not statistically significant. Panel B confirms results of Panel A focusing on the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black share in columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6).

Table A.9 compares the effects of Black in-migration when the lynching happened in the southern state that is predicted to have sent more Black Americans into a specific county (columns 1, 3, and 5) relative to the cases in which the lynching took place in another southern state (columns 2, 4, and 6). Results from this exercise are less precise, but suggest stronger effects for lynchings that happened in the largest state of origin of a northern county’s Black migrants – especially for the 1940 to 1950 decade.

Taken together, this evidence is consistent with Myrdal’s hypothesis: Black in-migration increased the salience of southern discrimination among northern whites. This, in turn, could be a factor behind changed whites’ attitudes towards civil rights in Black migrant destinations.

⁴⁰County (resp. state by week) fixed effects absorb the main effect of the change in the Black share (resp. the post-event dummy).

5.3.3 Residential Segregation and Independent Local Governments

Our findings do not necessarily imply that white residents welcomed Black migrants into their neighborhoods. Both existing work (Boustan, 2010) and our own analysis (Table D.5) indicate that the Great Migration increased within-county racial segregation as whites exerted more effort to avoid sharing public goods with Black Americans (Alesina et al., 1999). Segregation responses might have been compatible with support for civil rights. For one, civil rights legislation was, at least until 1965, a matter that affected mostly the US South. Additionally, increased segregation may itself have helped defuse whites’ animosity caused by Black migration into white neighborhoods.

Appendix E.2.4 provides evidence consistent with the latter conjecture (Table E.6). First, Black in-migration increased the frequency of CORE demonstrations only in counties with higher 1940 residential segregation. That is, support for civil rights increased more in counties where inter-group contact in the housing market was lower. Second, Black inflows led to the creation of more school districts in counties where residential segregation was higher.⁴¹ One interpretation of these patterns, consistent with historical evidence (Sugrue, 2008), is that population sorting within counties and the creation of independent jurisdictions might have reduced potential backlash by allowing whites to live in racially homogeneous communities, where the probability of sharing public goods with Black Americans was low. This, in turn, could have facilitated support for civil rights as a national-level policy issue, and progressive voting motivated by abstract principles of racial equality.

6 Legislators’ Behavior

6.1 Ideology Scores and Discharge Petitions

Ideology scores. We begin the analysis of legislators’ behavior by focusing on the ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017), which take more negative values for more liberal voting behavior on civil rights bills. Columns 1 to 3 in Table 8 present results for the change in agnostic ideology scores, stacking the data for the 78-82 and the 82-88 Congress periods, reporting OLS, 2SLS, and first stage coefficients in Panels A, B, and C respectively. Following Autor et al. (2020) and Bonomi et al. (2020), to deal with mean reversion, in addition to the controls included in our preferred specification

⁴¹These results are in line with those in Alesina et al. (2004).

above, we also add the interaction between period dummies and the baseline ideology score of legislators. The 2SLS coefficient reported in column 1 (Panel B) is negative, but quantitatively small and imprecisely estimated.⁴²

When examining results separately by Congress period, a more nuanced picture emerges. Black in-migration had a strong, negative effect on the ideology scores of legislators in the first Congress period (column 2), and a negligible, positive, and not statistically significant effect in the second period (column 3). While the F-stat falls below conventional levels in column 2, suggesting that our estimates should be interpreted with some caution, these findings indicate that legislators' ideology moved to the left between Congress 78 and Congress 82, and did not change significantly afterwards. Results are robust to focusing on the constrained version of the ideology scores (columns 4 to 6).

In our baseline specification, we map the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) Black in-migration to the 78-82 (resp. 82-88) Congress period, so as to both have the longest periods without redistricting and end the analysis with the Congress that passed the CRA. Appendix D.8 verifies that our findings are robust to different timing conventions. It also shows that there are no pre-trends, that results are robust to restricting the sample to CDs that only span the counties from the balanced dataset in Section 5, and that our estimates are not influenced by strategic gerrymandering, possibly induced by Black in-migration (Kaufman et al., 2017).

Signatures on discharge petitions. Due to gatekeeping imposed by southern Democrats, civil rights bills were unlikely to reach the floor of the House, unless northern legislators were willing to undertake non-standard actions. Discharge petitions represent the best example of such non-conventional tools at the disposal of non-southern legislators (Pearson and Schickler, 2009). Since there are not enough discharge petitions filed during the 82-88 Congress period, we focus on the 1940s, when several discharge petitions were filed and signed on the same topics – fair employment legislation (FEPC), the poll tax, and anti-lynching legislation – both at the beginning and at the end of the decade.

Although all three topics featured prominently in the political debate during the 1940s, legislation against discrimination in federal employment likely represented the most salient category, where northern legislators may have tried to signal their (pro-civil rights) stance the most. First, the salience of the poll tax and anti-lynching

⁴²As for other tables, the discrepancy between OLS and 2SLS estimates indicates that Black migrants were more likely to move to areas with growing support for Republican, more conservative legislators.

legislation gradually declined relative to that of FEPC during the 1940s.⁴³ Second, anti-lynching legislation and, to a lesser extent, the abolition of the poll tax almost exclusively concerned racial relations in the South; conversely, employment protection legislation had a direct impact both in the South and in the North (Sugrue, 2014).

Figure 5 plots the 2SLS point estimate (with 95% confidence intervals), showing that Black in-migration increased the probability of signing a discharge petition on all topics. Consistent with the previous discussion, the coefficient is larger and more precisely estimated for FEPC legislation than for other categories.⁴⁴

6.2 Political Polarization

We examine the possibility that the Great Migration increased political polarization following the approach used in Autor et al. (2020) and Tabellini (2020) for trade and immigration respectively. We define liberal (resp. moderate) Democrats those legislators with an ideology score below (resp. above) the median score for Democrats in Congress 78. Likewise, moderate (resp. conservative) Republicans are defined as Congress members with an ideology score below (resp. above) the median score for Republicans in Congress 78. Table A.11 estimates our baseline stacked first difference specification, using as dependent variable the change in the probability of electing a liberal Democrat, a moderate Democrat, a moderate Republican, and a conservative Republican in columns 1 to 4 respectively.

In Panel A, we pool both Congress periods together. Black in-migration had a positive, but small and not statistically significant, effect on the probability of electing a liberal Democrat. The remaining coefficients are also imprecisely estimated. However, when considering each Congress period in isolation, a different picture stands out. During the 1940s (Panel B), Black in-migration had a strong, positive effect on the probability of electing a liberal Democrat (column 1), while reducing the probability of electing both moderate Democrats (column 2) and conservative Republicans (column 4). If anything, the probability of electing a moderate Republican (column 3) increased with Black inflows, even though results are not statistically significant. Dur-

⁴³The last discharge petition on either the poll tax or anti-lynching legislation was filed during the 80th Congress, whereas discharge petitions on FEPC were filed also in the early 1950s (Table C.1).

⁴⁴Table A.10 reports the coefficients associated with Figure 5. The change in the probability of signing a petition on FEPC, anti-lynching legislation, and the poll tax is taken over Congresses 81 to 78, 80 to 77, and 79 to 77 respectively. Since petitions on the three topics were not always signed in the same Congress year and were not always comparable with each other (Table C.1), we checked the robustness of our results using alternative time windows. Reassuringly, they always remained similar to those presented in Figure 5.

ing the 1950s (Panel C), in stark contrast with the previous decade, Black in-migration increased the probability of electing a conservative Republican, while reducing that of electing a moderate Republican. The effects of Black in-migration on the probability of electing Democrats with different ideological stances are very small in size and imprecisely estimated.

Figure 6 plots the coefficients reported in Panels B and C of Table A.11. These results suggest that the Great Migration led to changes in legislators’ ideology both between and within parties. In the 1940s, Black inflows triggered a general shift towards a more liberal ideology on racial issues within both parties. Moreover, and in line with a between-party adjustment, the probability of electing a (liberal) Democrat increased more than that of electing a (moderate) Republican. In the 1950s, most of the action came from internal changes within the GOP, with legislators moving to the right. Such rightward shift may have been motivated by strategic considerations, as the GOP tried to win the votes of whites who were becoming increasingly concerned about the racial mixing of their neighborhoods (Sugrue, 2014).

Since results during the 1940s are quantitatively larger than those in the 1950s, on average, legislators’ ideology moved to the left. However, when inspecting these dynamics more carefully, polarization becomes evident. The patterns identified here resemble those appearing in the ANES analysis above, which showed that white Democrats and Republicans had, respectively, more positive and more negative views towards civil rights in states receiving more African Americans. Our findings are also consistent with the possibility that local responses to the Great Migration might have been partly influenced by national considerations. Even though Democrats “lost the South” by promoting the civil rights agenda (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018), this strategy might have allowed them to win urban areas of the West and the North. At the same time, the Republican Party might have tried to strengthen its conservative position at the national level, so as to attract dissatisfied southern whites leaving the Democratic Party.

7 Conclusions

The Great Migration was the single largest episode of internal migration in American history. Between 1940 and 1970, more than 4 million Black Americans left the US South for northern and western destinations. During this same period, the civil rights

movement struggled and eventually succeeded to eliminate institutionalized discrimination and formal impediments to Black political participation. In this paper, we study the effects that Black in-migration had on both voters' demand for and legislators' supply of civil rights.

Using a version of the shift-share instrument, we find that Black in-migration increased the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections and raised the frequency of pro-civil rights demonstrations. Our estimates suggest that these effects were at least in part due to the behavior of white voters, who also joined grassroots civil rights activities. Evidence from local newspapers indicates that migration-induced information transmission likely contributed to the change in whites' racial attitudes. Next, we document that legislators representing CDs that received more African Americans became more liberal on racial issues, and more actively supported civil rights legislation. These average effects, however, mask substantial polarization between parties.

Our paper complements the existing literature on the Great Migration, which has, especially in recent times, emphasized the long run, negative impact that this episode had on both racial residential segregation and economic mobility for African Americans. Our findings, instead, paint a more nuanced picture. They indicate that, as predicted by Gunnar Myrdal in 1944, Black in-migration to the US North and West was instrumental for the development of the civil rights movement, and for the concomitant political changes that led to Black political empowerment and progress towards racial equality in the United States.

When contrasted with other works on the political effects of migration, our results raise an intriguing set of questions. Under what conditions can migration and inter-group contact more broadly lead to the formation of cross-group coalitions? When, instead, is backlash from original residents more likely to prevail? In the specific context of the Great Migration and of the civil rights movement, our evidence suggests that cross-race cooperation can emerge when individuals belonging to different groups share similar goals and identities (in this context, class-based), and when information about discrimination becomes available to majority group members who are already more open to diversity. In contexts where inter-group competition over scarce resources cannot be defused (for instance, by increased segregation in the labor market) majority backlash is instead more likely to emerge.

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
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
Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Change in the Black Share across US Counties, 1940 to 1970




Notes: The map plots the change in the share of Black individuals in the population between 1940 and 1970 for the non-southern counties (1,263) in our sample.

Figure 2. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics – Political and Economic Forces




Notes: The bars report the marginal effect of changes in the Black share (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights for counties with each 1940 variable above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). Section 5.3.2 describes how each variable is constructed. Coefficients and standard errors reported in Table A.6.

Figure 3. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics – Social and Cultural Forces




Notes: The bars report the marginal effect of changes in the Black share (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights for counties that are more (resp. less) socially progressive in orange (resp. blue). Section 5.3.2 describes how each variable is constructed. Coefficients and standard errors reported in Table A.6.

Figure 4. Newspapers – Event Study



Notes: The figure plots 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% intervals) on the 1940-1960 change in the Black share in county-week level regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if any mention about the lynching of a Black individual in the US South appeared in newspapers of the (non-southern) county in each week. Week 0 refers to the week when the lynching occurred. See the main text for more details. All regressions control for state and lynching episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.


Figure 5. Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions




Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of the 1940-1950 change in the Black share on the corresponding change in the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator. The first dot on the left (“All”) includes discharge petitions on employment protection legislation (FEPC), to promote anti-lynching legislation, and to abolish the poll tax. The three remaining dots refer to each of the three issues. Results and details of the specification are reported in Table A.10.

Figure 6. Black in-Migration and Political Polarization

Panel A: 1940s



Panel B: 1950s



Notes: Each bar reports 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effect of changes in the Black share on the change in the probability of electing a member of the House with the corresponding political orientation between Congress 78 and Congress 82 (Panel A) and between Congress 82 and Congress 88 (Panel B). The ideology indicators are defined in the main text (Section 6.2).

Table 1. Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
<i>Panel A: 1940 levels</i>						
Black Share (County)	3.60	2.10	0.04	0	46.50	1,263
Black Share (CD)	6.80	7.20	0.047	0	25.40	285
Democratic Vote Share	46.55	49.00	12.91	0	85.00	1,263
Turnout	69.39	69.60	8.29	23.00	97.90	1,263
Civil Rights Scores	-0.87	-0.81	0.71	-2.01	1.43	285
<i>Panel B: Changes</i>						
Black Share (County)	1.78	0.72	2.53	-11.88	12.79	3,789
Black Share (CD)	5.25	5.58	2.81	-1.26	12.86	570
Democratic Vote Share	1.53	0.67	11.11	-67.19	72.80	3,789
Turnout	-6.49	-13.50	17.06	-64.30	43.00	3,789
Civil Rights Scores	0.07	0	0.71	-2.91	1.95	570

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. When relevant, county variables are collapsed at the Congressional District level, fixing boundaries to Congress 78 as explained in the text. Democratic vote share and turnout refer to Congressional elections, and civil rights scores are the ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017). Panel A presents 1940 values, while Panel B reports decadal changes for each of the variables.

Table 2. Congressional Elections

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
<i>Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share (1940 mean: 46.55)</i>							
Change Black Share	0.537*** (0.108)	0.538*** (0.124)	0.611*** (0.146)	0.712*** (0.162)	1.255*** (0.277)	1.885*** (0.439)	1.938*** (0.464)
<i>Panel B: Change in Turnout (1940 mean: 69.39)</i>							
Change Black Share	-0.274** (0.121)	-0.298*** (0.112)	-0.293*** (0.109)	0.094 (0.187)	0.399* (0.235)	0.756** (0.348)	0.809** (0.356)
<i>Panel C: First stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share				0.976*** (0.261)	1.002*** (0.260)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.803*** (0.249)
Specification	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	LD
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
F-Stat				13.95	14.88	10.57	10.42
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	1,263

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table reports stacked first difference regressions in columns 1 to 6, and long difference regressions in column 7. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in Congressional elections in Panel A (resp. Panel B). Panel C reports the first stage associated with 2SLS regressions. Columns 1 to 3 estimate equation (1) in the text with OLS, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp. 1940 Dem Incumbent) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3. CORE Demonstrations

Dependent Variable	Change in 1[Pro-Civil Rights Demonstration]						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
<i>Panel A: Main Estimates</i>							
Change Black Share	0.033*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.025*** (0.007)	0.075*** (0.014)	0.053*** (0.013)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.033** (0.016)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share				0.976*** (0.261)	1.002*** (0.260)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.233)
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
White Participants							X
F-Stat				13.95	14.88	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights coordinated by the CORE. Columns 1 to 3 estimate equation (1) in the text with OLS, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp. 1940 Dem Incumbent) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 7 includes only those demonstrations that were joined by at least some white participants. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4. NAACP Chapters

Dependent Variable	1940-1960 Change in 1[NAACP Chapter]			
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS
<i>Panel A: Main Estimates</i>				
Change Black Share	-0.022** (0.008)	0.051*** (0.016)	-0.029 (0.024)	0.070** (0.035)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share			0.780*** (0.231)	0.624** (0.247)
F-stat			11.41	6.392
Observations	1,263	1,069	1,263	1,069
Sample	Full sample	No NAACP in 1940	Full sample	No NAACP in 1940

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the change (between 1940 and 1960) in the presence of NAACP chapters. Columns 2 and 4 restrict attention to counties with no NAACP chapter in 1940. Columns 1 and 2 estimate OLS regressions, whereas columns 3 and 4 present 2SLS results. The main regressor of interest is the 1940-1960 Change Black Share, and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument constructed in the text in columns 3 and 4. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5. Whites' Most Important Problem (ANES)

Dependent Variable	1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]				
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS
<i>Panel A: Main Estimates</i>					
1[Pro Segregation]	-0.059** (0.022)				
1[Against School Integration]		-0.071*** (0.024)			
1[Against Housing/Work Integration]			-0.064 (0.038)		
Change Black Share				0.015 (0.013)	0.034** (0.014)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>					
Predicted Change Black Share					2.748*** (0.439)
Geography FE	State	State	State	Region X	Region X
State Controls					
F-Stat					39.20
Observations	909	811	813	927	927
Mean Dependent Variable	0.112	0.113	0.112	0.111	0.111

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North in years 1960 and 1964, and residing in their state of birth. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent reports that supporting civil rights is among the most important issues facing the country at the time of the interview (see online appendix D for exact wording and additional details on the construction of the variable). The regressor of interest in column 2 (resp. column 3) is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is against the integration of schools (resp. of working environment and housing). Pro-segregation in column 1 is a dummy if the respondent is either against school integration or against working-housing integration. *Change Black share* (columns 4 and 5) is the change in the Black share at the state level between 1940 and 1960. Column 4 reports OLS estimates, while column 5 presents 2SLS estimates, instrumenting the change in the Black share with the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 state population. Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions include survey year fixed effects and individual controls of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects and marital status). Columns 1 to 3 control for state fixed effects, while columns 4 and 5 control for region fixed effects and 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). The bottom row reports the average of the dependent variable. F-stat in column 5 is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table 6. Evidence from Northern Newspapers: Cross-sectional Regressions

Dependent Variable	1[Any Mention]				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A: Main Estimates</i>					
Change Black Share	0.253** (0.128)	0.135 (0.086)	0.348** (0.163)	0.532** (0.235)	0.677** (0.301)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>					
Predicted Change Black Share	1.071*** (0.289)	1.032*** (0.287)	1.098*** (0.291)	1.093*** (0.291)	1.081*** (0.289)
F-stat	13.76	12.95	14.26	14.08	13.96
Observations	311,803	141,332	170,471	79,721	59,665
State FE	X	X	X	X	X
Episode FE	X	X	X	X	X
Week FE	X	X	X	X	X
Weeks	0 to 26	0 to 26	0 to 26	0 to 26	0 to 26
Sample	1940+	1940-1944	1945+	1950+	1955+

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 492 counties in our sample for which newspapers' data were available. The table reports county-week-episode level regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one mention about the lynching of a Black individual in the US South appeared in the local newspapers of the county in each week from 0 to 26. Week 0 is defined as the week in which the lynching occurred. The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 change in the Black share in the county, and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions include state, week, and episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. The last row of the table indicates the sample of lynchings considered. When the last year is not specified, it corresponds to 1964 (included). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 7. Evidence from Northern Newspapers: Event-Study Design

Dependent Variable	1[Any Mention]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A. 1940-1960 Change in Black Share</i>						
Change Black Share * POST	0.237* (0.126)	0.113 (0.085)	0.325** (0.162)	0.476** (0.228)	0.691** (0.306)	1.050*** (0.262)
F-stat	13.61	12.76	14.04	13.78	13.5	12.87
Observations	357,979	162,303	195,671	91,544	68,520	22,047
Events	1940+	1940-1944	1945+	1950+	1955+	1960+
<i>Panel B. Decadal Changes in Black Share</i>						
Change Black Share * POST	0.248 (0.161)	0.764** (0.317)	1.127** (0.447)	0.262 (0.189)	1.194* (0.625)	1.825*** (0.534)
F-stat	20.96	22.95	22.51	8.433	8.624	8.227
Observations	162,303	195,671	91,544	266,429	68,520	22,047
Change Black share	1940-1950	1940-1950	1940-1950	1950-1960	1950-1960	1950-1960
Events	1940-1944	1945+	1950+	1940-1949	1955+	1960+
County FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Episode FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State-week FE	X	X	X	X	X	X

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 492 counties in our sample for which newspapers' data were available. The table reports county-week-episode level regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one mention about the lynching of a Black individual in the US South appeared in the local newspapers of the county in each week from -4 to 26. Week 0 is defined as the week in which the lynching occurred. The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 (resp. decadal) change in the Black share in the county in Panel A (resp. Panel B) interacted with an indicator for weeks 0 and above (POST). The change in the Black share is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions include county, state by week, and episode fixed effects, and are weighed by 1940 county population. Columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6) of Panel B consider the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black share. The last row of the table indicates the sample of lynchings considered. When the last year is not specified, it corresponds to 1964 (included). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Table 8. Changes in Legislators' Ideology

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower Values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: OLS</i>						
Change Black Share	0.008 (0.014)	-0.139*** (0.036)	0.049** (0.020)	0.002 (0.015)	-0.150*** (0.041)	0.044** (0.022)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.051 (0.039)	-0.300*** (0.116)	0.046 (0.056)	-0.054 (0.041)	-0.337*** (0.124)	0.058 (0.059)
<i>Panel C: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.570*** (0.438)	1.054*** (0.377)	1.944*** (0.557)	1.553*** (0.442)	1.050*** (0.377)	1.917*** (0.564)
F-Stat	12.87	7.814	12.19	12.35	7.770	11.57
Observations	570	285	285	570	285	285
Congress Period	78-82; 82-88	78-82	82-88	78-82; 82-88	78-82	82-88

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – “Agnostic” scores in columns 1 to 3, and “Constrained” scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress period 78-82 and 82-88). Panel A reports OLS results and Panel B reports 2SLS results, while Panels C presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.


A Additional Figures and Tables - Online Appendix

Figure A.1. Black Emigration Rates from the South, by Decade




Notes: The figure plots the Black emigration rate from the US South for each decade. *Source:* Adapted from Boustan (2016).

Figure A.2. Northern Legislators' Support for Civil Rights Bills, by Party




Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of Congress in the non-South US voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between the 78th and the 88th Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills voted upon in Congress between the 78th and the 88th Congress are listed in Table A.2.

Figure A.3. Overall Support for Civil Rights Bills, by Party




Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of US Congress voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between the 78th and the 88th Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills voted upon between the 78th and the 88th Congress are listed in Table A.2.

Figure A.4. Discharge Petitions on Civil Rights Signed by Northern Legislators




Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of Congress in the non-South US signing discharge petitions in favor of civil rights bills between the 78th and the 88th Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each of the two Congress periods separately.

Figure A.5. 1940 Black Share of the Population




Notes: The map plots the 1940 share of Black Americans (divided by county population) for the non-southern counties in our sample.

Figure A.6. Black Share in Northern Counties, 1940 vs 1970



Notes: Black share of the population for selected non-southern counties in 1940 (light blue) and in 1970 (black). *Source:* Authors' calculation from IPUMS data.

Figure A.7. Share of Southern Born Black Migrants in Northern Counties, 1940



Notes: Share of African Americans born in selected southern states living in non-southern counties in 1940. *Source:* Authors' calculation from IPUMS data.

Table A.1. List of Southern States

Alabama	North Carolina
Arkansas	Oklahoma
Florida	South Carolina
Georgia	Tennessee
Kentucky	Texas
Louisiana	Virginia
Mississippi	West Virginia

Notes: The table presents the list of southern states considered in our analysis. We follow the Census definition except for Delaware and Maryland: as Boustan (2010) we assign these to the North, as they were net recipient of Black migrants during this period.

Table A.2. Civil Rights Bills Voted in the House, 1943-1964

Congress	Year	Bill Number	Northern Democrats Voting Yes	Northern Republicans Voting Yes
78	1943	HR-7	0.830	0.795
79	1945	HR-7	0.842	0.697
80	1947	HR-29	0.913	0.982
81	1949	HR-3199	0.942	0.696
81	1950	HR-4453	0.790	0.720
84	1956	HR-627	0.914	0.875
85	1957	HR-6127	0.927	0.843
86	1960	HR-8601	0.843	0.813
88	1964	HR-7152	0.918	0.817

Notes: The table lists the bills voted upon in the House of Representatives between Congress 78 and Congress 88. The last two columns report the share of northern Democrats (resp. Republicans) who voted in favor of each bill relative to all northern Democrats (resp. Republicans).

Table A.3. Discharge Petitions, by Party

	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
<i>Panel A: Congress period: 78th – 82nd</i>						
Share Democrats	0.564	0.552	0.500	0.138	-	0.422
Share Republicans	0.304	0.239	0.132	0.024	-	0.147
<i>Panel B. Congress period: 83rd – 88th</i>						
Share Democrats	-	-	0.632	-	0.677	0.651
Share Republicans	-	-	0.043	-	0.175	0.154

Notes: The table presents the share of Democrats and Republicans signing discharge petitions on each topic reported in the top row for the 78-82 (resp. 83-88) Congresses in Panel A (resp. Panel B). When no discharge petition of a given type was filed in a congress period, the corresponding entry is left missing. Table A.4 reports additional summary statistics for signatures on discharge petitions. See Table C.1 for the complete list of discharge petitions (by date and by topic). *Source:* authors' calculation from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

Table A.4. Discharge Petitions: Summary Statistics

<i>Panel A: Discharge Petitions by Issue - Congress Period</i>						
	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
78 th to 82 nd	4	3	5	2	0	14
83 rd to 88 th	0	0	2	1	5	8
<i>Panel B: Discharge Petitions by Legislator – Summary Statistics</i>						
	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs.
78 th to 82 nd	0.772	0.600	0.553	0	2.333	285
83 rd to 88 th	0.441	0.385	0.298	0	1.286	285

Notes: Panel A presents the number of discharge petitions filed in the two Congress periods (78-82 and 83-88) by type. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the number of petitions signed per legislator for the Congressional Districts in our sample, in either Congress period.

Table A.5. Whites' Voting Behavior (ANES)

Dependent Variable	1[Vote Democratic]			
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS
<i>Panel A: Main Estimates</i>				
Change Black Share	0.030*** (0.005)	0.080*** (0.018)	0.039*** (0.008)	0.080*** (0.015)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share			2.845*** (0.436)	2.490*** (0.392)
F-Stat			42.63	40.28
Observations	1,648	402	1,648	402
Sample	All	1964	All	1964
Mean Dependent Variable	0.490	0.602	0.490	0.602

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North and residing in their state of birth during survey waves 1956 to 1964. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent voted (resp. intended to vote) for the Democratic Party in the previous (resp. upcoming) election. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include survey year and region fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). Columns 2 and 4 focus on survey wave 1964. Panel B reports the first stage. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.6. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics

Dependent Variable	Change in Pr.(Civil Rights Demonstration)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A:</i>	<i>Above Median</i>			<i>Socially Progressive</i>			
Change Black Share	0.059*** (0.021)	0.061*** (0.020)	0.076*** (0.012)	0.169*** (0.050)	0.171*** (0.055)	0.084*** (0.031)	0.061*** (0.018)
F-Stat	12.75	16.05	17.94	10.98	27.13	4.945	19.33
Observations	1,893	1,848	1,908	1,894	1,869	2,322	1,896
<i>Panel B:</i>	<i>Below Median</i>			<i>Socially Conservative</i>			
Change Black Share	-0.020 (0.023)	0.038** (0.019)	-0.004 (0.025)	-0.089** (0.043)	0.042** (0.018)	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.022 (0.028)
F-Stat	11.40	6.760	6.382	12.80	11.04	2.410	2.410
Observations	1,896	1,941	1,881	1,895	1,866	1,467	1,893
1940 Characteristic	Share in Manufacturing	Share CIO Workers	Political Competition	Predicted Economic Growth	Discrimination Index	Miscegenation Laws	Distance 48ers City

Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights coordinated by the CORE. Columns 1 to 4 (resp. 5 to 7) split the sample according to values of county characteristics above and below the sample median (resp. classified as socially progressive and conservative). See the main text (Section 5.3.2) for more details. The table reports 2SLS results replicating the baseline specification, which includes interactions between period dummies and: *i*) 1940 Black share; *ii*) 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy; *iii*) state dummies. All regressions are weighed by 1940 population. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.7. Summary Statistics for Newspapers and Baseline Samples

Sample	Newspapers Sample			Baseline Sample		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
1940 Total Population	113,680	327,882	492	65,400	215,158	1,263
1940 Black Share	0.043	0.042	492	0.036	0.043	1,263
1940 Urban Share	0.758	0.252	492	0.682	0.292	1,263
1940 Share in Manufacturing	0.281	0.110	492	0.264	0.120	1,263
1940 Congressional Democratic Vote Share	47.49	12.86	492	46.55	12.91	1,263
1940 Congressional Turnout	68.60	7.872	492	69.39	8.298	1,263
Avg. Decadal Change in Black Share	2.432	2.765	1,476	1.778	2.529	3,789
Avg. Decadal Predicted Change in Black Share	1.106	1.212	1,476	0.863	1.155	3,789
Avg. Decadal Change in Democratic Vote Share	1.578	10.66	1,476	1.528	11.12	3,789
Avg. Decadal Change in Turnout	-6.699	16.69	1,476	-6.485	17.07	3,789
1940-1970 Change in Black Share	7.295	7.512	492	5.334	6.949	1,263
1940-1970 Predicted Change in Black Share	3.319	3.587	492	2.589	3.423	1,263
1940-1970 Change in Democratic Vote Share	4.733	15.67	492	4.585	16.38	1,263
1940-1970 Change in Turnout	-20.10	9.661	492	-19.45	9.826	1,263

Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations of selected variables for the 492 counties for which newspapers data were available and for the 1,263 counties in the full sample.

Table A.8. Baseline Estimates in Counties with Newspapers

Dep. Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstrations]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	1.731*** (0.639)	0.756** (0.348)	0.998* (0.536)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.047* (0.027)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.700** (0.308)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.700** (0.308)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.700** (0.308)
F-stat	10.57	5.177	10.57	5.177	10.57	5.177
Observations	3,789	1,476	3,789	1,476	3,789	1,476
Sample	Baseline	Newspapers	Baseline	Newspapers	Baseline	Newspapers

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification (Tables 2 and 3, column 6) by restricting the sample to the counties for which local newspapers could be located in columns 2, 4, and 6 (columns 1, 3, and 5 report results in column 6 of Tables 2 and 3). All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.9. Evidence from Local Newspapers: Heterogeneous Effects

Dependent Variable	1[Any Mention]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Change Black Share*	0.428*** (0.149)	0.210 (0.131)	1.346*** (0.510)	0.652* (0.345)	1.087** (0.434)	1.139 (0.74)
POST						
F-stat	25.04	12.27	16.92	21.63	26.94	5.846
Observations	59,878	298,031	33,385	162,121	14,859	53,644
Change Black Share	1940-1960	1940-1960	1940-1950	1940-1950	1950-1960	1950-1960
Events	1940-1964	1940-1964	1945-1964	1945-1964	1955-1964	1955-1964
County FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Episode FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
State-week FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lynching in	State with Largest Flows	States without Largest Flows	State with Largest Flows	States without Largest Flows	State with Largest Flows	States without Largest Flows

Notes: The sample is restricted to the 492 counties in our sample for which newspapers' data were available. The table reports county-week-episode level regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if at least one mention about the lynching of a Black individual in the US South appeared in the local newspapers of the county in each week from -4 to 26. Week 0 is defined as the week in which the lynching occurred. The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1960 (resp. 1940-1950 and 1950-1960) change in the Black share in columns 1 and 2 (resp. in columns 3-4 and 5-6) interacted with an indicator for weeks 0 and above (POST). The change in the Black share is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions include county, state by week, and episode fixed effects, and are weighted by 1940 county population. Columns 1, 3, and 5 focus on episodes that occurred in the southern states that, according to the instrument, had sent more Black migrants to the county over the period. Columns 2, 4, and 6 restrict attention to episodes happening in any other (southern) state. The penultimate row of the table indicates the window over which lynchings occurred. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.10. Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions

Dependent Variable	Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions per Legislator (1940s)			
	Total (1)	FEPC (2)	Anti-Lynching (3)	Poll-Tax (4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	1.128*** (0.419)	0.668** (0.299)	0.231* (0.126)	0.182* (0.102)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	1.054*** (0.377)	1.054*** (0.377)	1.054*** (0.377)	1.054*** (0.377)
F-stat	7.814	7.814	7.814	7.814
Observations	285	285	285	285
Baseline Dep. Variable Mean	1.752	0.744	0.194	-0.150

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in number of signatures on discharge petition per legislator between the beginning and the end of the 1940 decade (see the main text for more details). Column 1 considers all discharge petitions, while columns 2 to 4 focus on employment protection legislation (FEPC), Anti-Lynching legislation, and Poll Tax discharge petitions respectively. Data on discharge petitions were kindly shared by Kathryn Pearson and Eric Schickler (see also Pearson and Schickler, 2009). Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, include state fixed effects, and control for: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.11. Black in-Migration and Political Polarization

Dependent Variable	Change in Ideology Indicator of Elected Congress Members			
	Liberal Democrat (1)	Moderate Democrat (2)	Moderate Republican (3)	Conservative Republican (4)
<i>Panel A: 78-82; 82-88 Congresses</i>				
Change Black Share	0.065 (0.042)	-0.062 (0.050)	-0.024 (0.029)	0.024 (0.033)
F-Stat	12.87	12.87	12.87	12.87
Observations	570	570	570	570
<i>Panel B: 78-82 Congresses</i>				
Change Black Share	0.322** (0.128)	-0.298* (0.172)	0.164 (0.130)	-0.176** (0.079)
F-Stat	7.814	7.814	7.814	7.814
Observations	285	285	285	285
<i>Panel C: 82-88 Congresses</i>				
Change Black Share	-0.036 (0.045)	0.030 (0.047)	-0.098* (0.053)	0.103** (0.042)
F-Stat	12.19	12.19	12.19	12.19
Observations	285	285	285	285

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the ideology indicator of the Congress member in office. The ideology indicators are defined as: i) liberal (resp. moderate) Democrat if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Democratic Party members in the 78th Congress; ii) moderate (resp. conservative) Republican if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Republican Party members in the 78th Congress. Panel A refers to Congress periods 78-82 and 82-88; Panel B refers to Congress period 78-82; Panel C refers to Congress period 82-88. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Additional Material (Not for publication)

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B Matching Counties to Time-Invariant Congressional Districts

When studying the effects of Black inflows on the behavior of northern legislators, we face two main difficulties. First, while the African American population and other demographic variables are measured at the county level, legislators' behavior is available at the CD level. Second, the boundaries of CDs change over time due to redistricting. We overcome both challenges by first matching counties to CDs, and then by constructing a time-invariant cross-walk to map CDs that get redistricted over time to their baseline geography.


B.1 County-CD Crosswalk

To overcome the first problem, and to assign to each CD the corresponding “Black in-migration shock” we perform a spatial merge of 1940 county maps with CDs, following the procedure used in Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).⁴⁵ Since there is no one-to-one mapping between counties and CDs, two cases can arise. First, some CDs are wholly contained within a single county; in this case, we directly assign county level variables to CDs, assuming that the effect of Black in-migration is uniform within the county. Second, some CDs straddle county boundaries. In such cases, we assign county level values to the CD, weighting them by a county's area share of the CD.⁴⁶ Figure B.1 displays the county (gray lines) to CD (Black lines) mapping just described for the 78th Congress, restricting attention to non-southern states.

⁴⁵The only difference with their procedure is that we use counties rather than CZs.

⁴⁶Following Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), we test the robustness of our results using other weights, such as maximum area.

Figure B.1. CD-County Map



Notes: The figure presents a map of counties (gray lines) and Congressional Districts (black lines) for the non-South US during the 78th Congress.

B.2 Time Invariant CD Crosswalk

Until the early 1960s, there was no pre-determined rule mandating states to redraw CD boundaries after each decennial Census. Moreover, especially in the North, gerrymandering was substantially less common than it is today (Snyder and Ansolabehere, 2008). Between 1900 and 1964, despite major demographic shifts induced by international and internal migration (Boustan et al., 2018), redistricting across non-southern districts was typically non-strategic (Engstrom, 2013). If anything, the lack of systematic redistricting rules likely introduced a pro-rural bias: more densely populated areas (i.e. urban areas) grew gradually under-represented at the CD level, likely diluting the effects of Black inflows, which were concentrated in urban centers (see Figure 1 in the main text).⁴⁷ However, even during the 1940-1965 period, the boundaries of many CDs were changed, often multiple times. To overcome this empirical challenge, we develop a procedure that allows us to match all CDs between 1930 and 1970 to a

⁴⁷This observation suggests that our analysis should identify a lower bound for the effects of Black inflows on legislators' (pro-civil rights) behavior.

baseline Congress.⁴⁸

We define the 78th Congress (January 6, 1943 to December 19, 1944) as our baseline Congress year for two main reasons. First, although the 76th Congress might have been a more natural choice (as it corresponds to the 1940 Census year), several CDs underwent redistricting between this Congress year and the 78th Congress. In contrast, very few states redistricted between the 78th and the 82nd Congress. Second, Congress 78th is the earliest Congress for which CD-level population estimates are available from Adler (2003), thus allowing us to benchmark the population figures estimated in our procedure with other measures. We thus rely on Congress 78 as our baseline year, and consider the following two Congress periods: 78 to 82, which we match to the 1940 to 1950 Census decade; and, 83 to 88, which we match to the 1950 to 1960 year.⁴⁹ We perform a number of robustness checks to show that our results do not depend on the choice of the baseline Congress year, and that they are qualitatively similar when restricting the sample to CDs that did not undergo redistricting over the 78 to 82 Congress period.

Using this timing convention, for every Congress between 71 and 91, we perform a spatial merge between CD maps and the map corresponding to the 78th Congress. Then, political outcomes (e.g. ideology scores, number of discharge petitions signed by legislators, etc.) are collapsed to the 78th Congress using a weighting procedure similar to that adopted when matching counties to CDs. The logic of our strategy is simple: we fix the 1944 (i.e. the 78th Congress) geography of CDs, and we link them to CDs that represented the same geographic area in subsequent (or previous) Congress years.⁵⁰ Then, we calculate a weighed average of political outcomes that correspond to the area originally represented by CDs according to the 1944 map.

To illustrate this procedure, we ask how the 78th Congress would have looked like, had its geography persisted until Congress 86. We now explain how we proceed to collapse the political outcomes corresponding to the geography of Congress 86 “back” to that of Congress 78. Suppose that the area represented by a single CD in Congress 78 gets split in two separate CDs by Congress 86. To assign political variables of new CDs back to the level of the original CD, we adopt a weighting procedure, based on

⁴⁸While our analysis focuses on years after 1940, we also construct the cross-walk for the pre-1940 decade in order to perform several robustness and falsification checks.

⁴⁹The reason to consider the 88th Congress in the second decade is that this was the Congress that approved the CRA.

⁵⁰When states have more than one district, we drop at-large Congressional seats from the spatial merge (e.g. at-large seats for the state of New York are dropped between 1933 and 1945).

weights constructed in four steps. First, we overlay the map of the initial CD to that of the two CDs in Congress 86, and divide the area in cells derived by this spatial merge. Second, we assign the 1940 county population to each cell in proportion to the area share of the cell that is included in the county. Third, we sum over all cells that compose the CD to obtain an estimate of CD population as of Congress 78. Finally, we divide the area of each cell by such estimated CD population.

Political variables corresponding to the geography of the 78th Congress for subsequent Congress years are computed by taking the weighed average of the outcomes of the newly formed CDs, using the weights constructed as explained above. In Appendix D, we validate the accuracy of this approach by replicating our (baseline) county-level results for the Democratic vote share using CD level data from Swift et al. (2000). Reassuringly, when conducting the analysis at the CD level, results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the main text (see Table 2).

C Data Appendix

In what follows we first provide additional details about the data used in the paper (Appendix C.1), and then describe the survey data from the ANES and Gallup (Appendix C.2).

C.1 Additional Details

Black in-migration and demographic variables. Data on Black and total population as well as on other demographic variables for non-southern counties come from the County Databooks, from Haines et al. (2010), and from the 1940 full count Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2015). We also collected data on Black migration rates from Gardner and Cohen (1992) and Bowles et al. (1990) for 1940-1950 and for 1950 to 1970 respectively.

Electoral outcomes. As discussed in the main text, we focus on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. This choice is motivated by the fact that, since the New Deal, Democrats had become the pro-Black party outside the US South (Caughey et al., 2020; Moon, 1948). Such racial realignment was more likely to emerge in Congressional than in nation-wide Presidential elections (Schickler, 2016).⁵¹ In addition to the Democratic vote share, we also consider voter turnout, defined as the share of votes cast in the election over the total number of eligible voters in the county. In Appendix E below, we provide additional results for Presidential elections.

Data for both Congressional and Presidential elections are taken from Clubb et al. (1990). Since Census data are available at the decennial level, and because Congressional elections are held every two years, we focus on electoral returns for exact Census years from 1940 to 1970. In a number of instances, Congressional election results are not available at the county level. As described in the main text, our analysis is restricted to the 1,263 non-southern counties for which Congressional election data are available for all Census decades between 1940 and 1970 (and with at least one Black American in 1940). However, as documented in Appendix D, all results are unchanged when conducting the analysis with the unbalanced sample of counties. When considering Presidential elections, before taking the first difference with the baseline election decade, we assign the 1948 (resp. 1968) elections to Census year 1950 (resp. 1970).⁵²

⁵¹See also the discussion conducted in Section 2.2 of the paper.

⁵²Results remain similar when using different timing conventions.

Local support for civil rights. We obtain measures of local support for the civil rights movement from two sources. First, we use the dataset assembled by Gregory and Hermida (2019) combining a variety of sources that includes the number of non-violent demonstrations organized between 1942 and 1970 by the CORE – an inter-racial group of students from the University of Chicago that coordinated sit-ins and similar forms of civil disobedience mainly across northern cities to protest against segregation in the South. Second, we obtained data on the presence of NAACP chapters from Gregory and Estrada (2019). These data are available only for the early 1940s and the early 1960s. For both CORE and NAACP datasets, we match the geographic coordinates of an event or of a NAACP chapter to the centroid of each county in our sample.

Whites’ attitudes. We collect data on whites’ racial attitudes and stance on civil rights from two, nationally representative surveys: the ANES and Gallup. Both are cross-sectional datasets that report individuals’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as well as their political ideology. Starting from the mid to late 1950s, both surveys began to elicit respondents’ views on racial equality and their support for civil rights. The ANES contains respondents’ county of residence, while Gallup only records their state. However, even in the ANES, we are unable to exploit county-level information, due to the very limited number of counties (56) included in the survey. For this reason, as explained in the main text, we correlate the change in the Black share at the state level with attitudes of white respondents interviewed between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s (when the CRA was passed).⁵³ See Appendix C.2 below for more details.

Local newspapers. When examining the mechanisms (Section 5.3), we use data retrieved from the website Newspapers.com on the mention of lynchings against African Americans happening in the US South between 1940 and 1964. The list of lynchings was retrieved from the Monroe Work Today project.⁵⁴ To identify mentions of a lynching in a non-southern newspaper in our sample, we scrape the pages of newspapers available at Newspapers.com by searching for the joint appearance of the name and surname of the victim and the exact location where the lynching occurred. Data used in our analysis come from 1,041 newspapers (only 5 of which were African American).⁵⁵ We

⁵³Since a more comprehensive set of questions on racial attitudes was asked in the ANES relative to Gallup, we focus most of our analysis on the former, using the latter to validate results.

⁵⁴See also <https://plaintalkhistory.com/monroeandflorencework/explore/map2-credits.html>.

⁵⁵To classify newspapers as “Black” and “non-Black”, we manually searched for the name of the newspaper on the Library of Congress. We defined a newspaper as “Black” if, according to the Library of Congress, it included African American subjects. It is of course possible that a non-Black newspaper had African American

restrict the search window to the 30 days before and the 180 days after the lynching, aggregating the data to the week level so as to reduce noise.

Legislators’ ideology. As explained in the main text, we measure the ideology of northern legislators on civil rights using the scores constructed by Bateman et al. (2017). As for the commonly used DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), legislators are assigned a score that is a function of their past voting behavior and takes more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) positions. We rely on the Bateman et al. (2017) scores for two reasons. First, they are calculated by restricting attention solely to civil rights bills, as classified by Katznelson and Lapinski (2006). Second, they allow the policy content to be Congress specific and to vary over time. Bateman et al. (2017) develop two versions of the scores – one that assumes that the ideal points of legislators remain constant over time, and one that instead does not make such assumption. As shown in the paper, all results are robust to using either of the two versions.

Signatures on discharge petitions. During the historical period considered in our analysis, the prevailing seniority system gave southern committee chairs substantial control over the type of bills that were discussed in the House. In particular, since southern Democrats controlled key committees, such as the Rules Committee, they could block any proposed civil rights-related bill (Schickler, 2016). In most cases, civil rights bills reached the floor and were voted in the House only when a discharge petition was successful at collecting at least 218 signatures. A discharge petition can be filed if a bill or a resolution has remained stuck in the Rules Committee for at least seven days or in a legislative committee for at least twenty days. Once a petition is filed, it moves to the floor, where it can be voted on, if it is signed by at least 218 Congress members (Beth et al., 2003). We rely on the dataset assembled by Pearson and Schickler (2009), who were able to locate the names of legislators who signed any discharge petition between the 71st and the 94th Congress.⁵⁶ Following the definition used in Pearson and Schickler (2009) and Schickler (2016), we restrict attention to discharge petitions relating to racial issues filed between Congress 78 and Congress 88, and use signatures on such petitions as a proxy for a legislator’s involvement with (and support for) civil

subject, so our definition of Black newspapers might include some “false positive”. Since we are interested in understanding whether non-Black newspapers were more vocal on civil rights, this type of bias would go against us. 58 newspapers retrieved on Newspapers.com were not found in the Library of Congress. In these instances, we manually searched for these newspapers – none of them was African American.

⁵⁶Except for this recently assembled dataset, the names of congressmen who sign the discharge petitions are made public only when the petition is able to collect at least 218 signatures. We thank the authors for kindly agreeing to share their data with us.

rights. Table C.1 reports the list of discharge petitions on civil rights from Pearson and Schickler (2009) filed between Congress 73 and Congress 91, by Congress and topic. The last column presents the number of signatures on the corresponding petition.

Table C.1. Discharge Petitions by Type and Date

Congress	Number	Topic	Total Signatures
73	14	House Restaurant Desegregation	145
74	32	Lynching	218
75	1	Lynching	75
75	5	Lynching	218
76	10	Lynching	218
76	12	Lynching	59
76	34	Poll Tax	49
77	1	Poll Tax	218
77	3	Lynching	59
77	4	Poll Tax	31
77	15	Lynching	29
78	1	Poll Tax	10
78	3	Poll Tax	219
78	5	Lynching	82
78	18	FEPC	41
79	1	Poll Tax	218
79	3	Lynching	150
79	4	FEPC	187
79	24	Public Accommodation	6
80	2	Poll Tax	41
80	9	Lynching	80
81	7	Housing Discrimination	24
81	20	FEPC	110
81	21	FEPC	100
82	6	FEPC	16
83	4	Public Accommodation	71
83	5	FEPC	72
84	5	Civil Rights Act	148
85	1	Civil Rights Act	105
85	6	Civil Rights Act	3
86	3	Civil Rights Act	214
88	2	Anti-Discrimination	4
88	5	Civil Rights Act	174
91	11	Fair Employment	136

Notes: The table reports the list of all pro-civil rights discharge petitions filed between Congresses 73 and 91. Source: adapted from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

C.2 Survey Data

C.2.1 The American National Election Studies (ANES)

The American National Election Studies (ANES) is a cross-sectional, nationally representative survey conducted since 1948 by the University of Michigan every two or four years depending on the waves. As noted in Gentzkow (2016), the ANES is considered the “gold standard” when it comes to measure political ideology and cultural or social attitudes of Americans in the second part of the twentieth century. The ANES asks questions on demographics, party affiliation, political attitudes, and ideology. Moreover, and crucially for our purposes, since the mid-late 1950s, respondents are asked about their views on civil rights legislation and racial equality and, in some instances, about their attitudes towards integration.⁵⁷

In each wave, between 1,500 and 2,000 respondents were interviewed. We restrict the sample to whites living in non-southern states and who did not move from their state of birth (to reduce concerns of endogenous migration response). This leaves us with an average of roughly 850-900 individuals for whom we can consistently include the following controls: marital status, gender, and fixed effects for education and age.⁵⁸ In principle, additional characteristics, such as union status, party affiliation and identification are available. Since these may be endogenous to Black migration, however, we do not control for them in our baseline specification. Most of our analysis uses data from the surveys of 1960 and 1964, but, in a few cases, we were able to obtain data also from other years. As noted above, the ANES reports also the county of respondents. However, due to the very limited number of counties (56), we cannot conduct the analysis at this level. We instead estimate state-level regressions, as explained in the main text.

Table C.2 presents the questions considered to measure racial attitudes and views towards civil rights. The first column presents the name of the variable; the second one includes the exact wording of the question; the last column lists the years for which the question was available. The first variable listed, “Most Important Problem” refers to an open-ended question in which respondents were asked what they considered (up to) the three most important problems for the US in the year of the survey. From such

⁵⁷More details on ANES sampling methodology and data are available at <http://www.electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/nes012492.pdf>

⁵⁸We create dummies for: high school dropouts; high school graduates; having at least some college; having at least a college degree.

open-ended question the ANES created one specific category that includes racial and public order related issues. For 1960 and 1964, the ANES coded respondents' answers in categories that reflected their attitudes towards civil rights and integration.⁵⁹ We use the ANES pre-classified category "Pro integration - anti discrimination in schools, employment, etc." to create a dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that promoting integration in schools, employment, etc. is one of the top three problems facing the country in that survey year. This is the variable *1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]* considered in Table 5 in the main text.

Table 5 verifies that the variable *1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]* is negatively correlated with opposition to school and housing or work integration. Again for 1960 and 1964, from the ANES survey, we created dummies (reported in the second and third row of Table C.2) equal to one if the respondent, respectively, agreed that the federal government should not intervene to promote racial integration in schools and disagreed with the idea that the government should promote racial integration in housing and labor markets.

As discussed in the main text, we exploit ANES questions concerning political preferences in surveys in years between 1956 and 1964. In particular, individuals were asked to indicate the party they had voted (resp. intended to vote) in the previous (resp. upcoming) elections. From this variable, we create a dummy equal to one if respondents answered that they voted or intended to vote for the Democratic Party (*Vote Democratic*).

Finally, for 1964 only, ANES respondents were asked about their feeling thermometers towards different political and socio-demographic groups, including the Democratic Party, labor unions, Blacks and the NAACP. Thermometer values are such that higher values refer to warmer feelings towards members of the group.⁶⁰ We use the answers given by respondents in Appendix Table E.5.

C.2.2 Gallup

We validate the results obtained using the ANES with Gallup, which elicited respondents' views about salient political and social issues since 1935.⁶¹ As for the ANES,

⁵⁹Unfortunately, for other years, it was not possible to tell whether the respondent identified civil rights as something to promote or instead as an issue that was undesirable to her.

⁶⁰The ANES asked respondents about their feeling thermometers towards the two parties also in years other than 1964. However, since we are interested in studying whites' racial attitudes, we limit our analysis to 1964, i.e. the only year for which both political and racial groups or organizations were included.

⁶¹See also <https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/featured-collections/gallup-data-collection>.

also Gallup is a repeated cross-sectional dataset from which individual level characteristics are available.⁶² Starting from the mid-1950s, Gallup asked questions about racial attitudes. As discussed extensively in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), Gallup data have been only recently made available due to the efforts of the Roper Center, which digitized hundreds of historical surveys.⁶³ As for the ANES, we restricted attention to white respondents living in non-southern states in years before 1965.⁶⁴ In practice, so as to keep the sample consistent across questions, we focused on years 1963 and 1964, when different questions, comparable to those from the ANES, were asked. We report the wording and the survey years for which these two questions are available in Panel B of Table C.2.

Starting from the top of Panel B, Gallup respondents who had at least one child in school were asked whether they would object to send their kids to a school with few, half, and more than half Black pupils. Parents who responded that they would not object to sending their kids to a school with few Black students were subsequently asked if they would object to a situation with half Black pupils in the school. If they had no objections to such question, they were asked about a situation in which the school was more than half Black. Most parents (90%) did not object to send their kids to schools with only a few Black pupils. Instead, more heterogeneity existed when parents were asked about a situation in which half or more than half of the school were racially mixed. Specifically, 30% of parents who did not object to send a kid to a school that had few Black pupils were against sending their kid to a school where half of the pupils were Black. Of those that did not object to send their kid to a school where half of the pupils were Black 38% were against a situation in which more than half of the pupils in the school were Black.

Given these patterns, we decided to focus on the answer to the scenario in which half of the pupils in the school were Black. In our view, and consistent with existing evidence (Sugrue, 2008, 2014), racial mixing was not perceived as a threat when (school or neighborhood) integration entailed only a limited number of Black migrants. Instead, racial animosity and whites' backlash was more likely to emerge as the share of Black Americans in the local (white) community increased. The variable *1[Object to Half*

⁶²With the exception of union membership, marital status, and state of birth, all individual characteristics available in the ANES (see Appendix C.2.1) are available for Gallup as well.

⁶³More information about Roper Center data can be found here: <https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/>. We thank Kathleen Joyce Weldon for invaluable help in the data collection and data cleaning process.

⁶⁴Since state of birth was not consistently asked, we cannot restrict attention to non-movers when using Gallup data.

Black Pupils in School] at the top of column 1 in Table E.3 is thus a dummy equal to 1 if parents did object to sending their kids to a school with at least half of students being Black.⁶⁵

The second question used in our analysis is meant to capture whites respondents' acceptance of racial diversity in politics. Specifically, as in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), we consider whether respondents would vote for a Black candidate had their party nominated the individual for the Presidential race (see second row in Panel B of Table C.2).⁶⁶ In column 2 of Table E.3, we create a dummy equal to one if respondents answered that they would vote for a Black candidate, *1/Vote for Black Candidate*.⁶⁷

In 1964, given the prominence of the issue, Gallup questionnaires included a question about the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Among the about 1,000 respondents, approximately 70% of them did approve the law just passed by Congress. We create a dummy equal to one if a respondent supported the CRA (*Approve Civil Rights Act* in Panel B of Table C.2). This variable is considered as outcome in column 3 of Table E.3.

Finally, we consider a question that elicits respondents' view on how the Kennedy Administration was handling the process of racial integration. Specifically, we create a dummy equal to one if an individual stated that in her view, racial integration was proceeding "at the right pace or not fast enough" (see the last row in Table C.2, Panel B). This variable is used as outcome in column 4 of Table E.3.⁶⁸

⁶⁵The sample size is relatively small – 851 respondents – since only parents with kids in school were asked this question.

⁶⁶In 1963 this question was asked to around 2,000 respondents.

⁶⁷Kuziemko and Washington (2018) investigate whites' respondents to this question also for years after 1965. Instead, in order not to confound our results with potential whites' backlash we stop in 1963 – the last year before the passage of the CRA.

⁶⁸As it appears from Table E.3, this question is available for a significantly larger number of respondents (more than 17,000) relative to all other questions. This is because the question was asked repeatedly in 1963.

Table C.2. Questions from Survey Data

Variable Name	Wording	Years
Panel A. ANES		
Most Important Problem	What would you personally feel are the most important problems the government should try to take care of when the new president and congress take office in January. (Do you think of any other problems important to you)	1960 and 1964
Against School Integration	The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and [Black] children go to the same school.	1960 and 1964
Against Work and Residential Integration	If [Blacks] are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do.	1960 and 1964
Vote Democratic	1 if voted/intend to vote for the Democratic Party in the last/upcoming Presidential Elections	1956-1964
Feeling Thermometer Towards [Group]	There are many groups in America that try to get the government of the American people to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these groups... Where would you put (group) on the thermometer?	1964
Panel B. Gallup		
Object to Half Black Pupils in School	Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where half of the children are [Black]	1963
Black Candidate	There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a [Black] would you vote for him	1963
Approve Civil Rights Act	As you know, a civil rights law was recently passed by Congress and signed by the President. In general, do you approve or disapprove this law?	1964
Racial Integration at the Right Pace/Not Fast Enough	Do you think the Kennedy Administration is pushing racial integration too fast or not fast enough?	1963

Notes: Panel A (resp. B) lists variables and questions taken from the ANES (resp. Gallup). The wording reported for variables *Most Important Problem*, *Against School Integration*, and *Against Work and Residential Integration* in Panel A is taken from the 1960 survey, but remains almost identical in all other years considered.

D Robustness Checks

In this section, we present a variety of robustness checks. First, we show that Black in-migration did not systematically trigger white out-migration in the counties in our sample, and that there was no change either in the characteristics of white residents or in their labor market outcomes. Second, we construct alternative versions of the instrument that predict Black out-migration from each southern state exploiting only variation across local push factors and that rely on a county-to-county (instead of state-to-county) migration matrix. The latter exercise allows us to invoke the result obtained in Borusyak et al. (2021) for the validity of shift-share instruments in the presence of a high number of plausibly exogenous “shifts”.

Third, we document that the instrument is uncorrelated with county-specific pull factors that might have influenced pre-1940 Black settlements, and that results are unchanged when simultaneously controlling for local economic growth, predicted using a Bartik methodology. Fourth, we verify that our findings are not driven either by pre-existing trends or by the simultaneous inflow of southern born white migrants.

Fifth, we show that results are robust to *i*) interacting period dummies with a variety of 1940 county characteristics; *ii*) extending the analysis to the unbalanced sample of counties for which electoral outcomes were not consistently available; *iii*) omitting potential outliers; *iv*) considering alternative proxies for support for the Democratic Party; *v*) estimating different specifications (including stacked panel regressions in “levels” rather than a model in stacked first differences); and, *vi*) clustering standard errors at the CZ level or applying the correction procedure in Adao et al. (2019).

Finally, we document that CD-level results: *i*) are not influenced by pre-existing trends; *ii*) are robust to using different timing conventions to map Black inflows to Congress periods; *iii*) are unchanged when restricting the sample to CDs that span only the counties included in our balanced sample; and, *iv*) are unlikely to be driven by strategic gerrymandering.

D.1 Addressing White Flight

As discussed in the main text, a potential concern with our findings is that Black in-migration triggered white flight among northern residents (Boustan, 2010). This scenario would be problematic because our estimates would conflate the causal effect of the Great Migration with compositional changes in the county electorate due to

whites’ out-migration. In what follows, we provide different pieces of evidence that, in our sample, the Great Migration was not associated with white departures at the county level.

We begin by replicating the analysis conducted in the main text by focusing on a larger geographic unit, the commuting zone (CZ), which contains both central cities and the neighboring suburbs.⁶⁹ Table D.1 replicates Table 2, documenting that the effects of the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share remain statistically significant and become, if anything, larger in magnitude.⁷⁰ In Table D.2, we conduct a similar exercise for CORE demonstrations. As for the Democratic vote share, 2SLS coefficients remain statistically significant, albeit somewhat less precisely estimated, and quantitatively close to those reported in the county-level specification of Table 3. Tables D.1 and D.2 suggest that our main results are unlikely to be driven by white out-migration systematically triggered by Black in-migration.

Next, to more directly inspect the presence of white flight, we replicate the analysis conducted in Boustan (2010) for the counties in our sample. We regress the decadal change in white population against the corresponding change in Black population. We consider the number of white and Black residents both to make our analysis directly comparable to that in Boustan (2010) and because this is the most appropriate specification to examine the migration response of northern residents (see also Peri and Sparber, 2011, and Shertzer and Walsh, 2019). We report 2SLS results in Panel A of Table D.3, presenting the associated first stage in Panel B.

We start from a parsimonious specification, which only includes interactions between state and period dummies (column 1). Panel B verifies that the instrument is strong, and the F-stat is well above conventional levels.⁷¹ Turning to Panel A, 2SLS coefficients are positive, quantitatively small, and imprecisely estimated. In column 2, we include the same set of controls as in our preferred specification (see Section 5.1 in the paper). Also in this case, Black in-migration is associated with a small, positive, and imprecisely estimated effect on white population.

The bottom rows of Table D.3 report the average 1940 white population and the

⁶⁹CZs have become the standard measure of “labor markets” in the US since the work by Autor and Dorn (2013). CZs were developed by Tolbert and Sizer (1996) using commuting patterns to create clusters of counties characterized by strong commuting ties within CZs and weak commuting ties across CZs.

⁷⁰Panels B and C report, respectively, results for turnout and the first stage. Coefficients for turnout are no longer statistically significant, but the point estimate remains close to that reported in the main text.

⁷¹The point estimate in Panel B indicates that one additional predicted Black migrant is associated with 2.5 more Black residents in the county. The magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than, but in line with, that reported in Boustan (2010).

average change in Black and white population during the period for the counties in our sample. The coefficient in column 2 (Panel A) implies that 1,000 more Black residents in a county – or, half of the average change in Black population over the period – were associated with around 300 more white residents. Considering that, on average, the 1940 white population was 62,760, this represents a negligible change (0.4% relative to the baseline white population). Columns 3 and 4 show that results are robust to including only counties with baseline urban share of the population above the sample median (0.320), and to interacting the 1940 urban share of the population with period dummies. Results are also unchanged when estimating long-difference regressions (Table D.4).

Two observations help reconcile our findings with those in Boustan (2010). First, Boustan (2010) focuses on central city to suburb migration, fixing city boundaries to 1940, whereas we consider counties. Second, the (historical) central city-suburb divide does not overlap with county boundaries; hence, the reallocation of white population *between* central cities and suburbs was likely absorbed *within* counties. Table D.5 provides evidence consistent with this conjecture. Specifically, in columns 1 and 2, we restrict attention to the 110 counties that are included in the MSAs considered in Boustan (2010), and replicate our previous analysis. Also in this sample, the Great Migration had no effect on changes in white population. In columns 3 and 4, we instead focus on central cities, and define the dependent variable as the change in white population living there. Now, as in Boustan (2010), Black in-migration becomes strongly associated with white out-migration.⁷²

This analysis indicates that, at the county level, Black in-migration did not trigger white out-migration. However, one may still be concerned that the Great Migration led to selective white departures, which altered the composition of white residents. To address this possibility we proceed as follows. First, we collect data from the 5% sample of the 1960 Census of Population and from the full count Census of 1940.⁷³ Given the limited sample size and geographic coverage of the 1960 Census, we aggregate the data to the CZ and conduct the analysis at this level.⁷⁴ Next, restricting attention to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school, we create the share of residents in

⁷²Results are unchanged when estimating long difference regressions (Table D.6).

⁷³For 1950 and 1970, only a 1% sample is available, limiting substantially the geographic coverage of the datasets.

⁷⁴Not all CZs spanning the counties in our sample can be identified in the 1960 Census. Table D.7 shows that restricting attention to the sample of CZs that can be identified in the 1960 Census leaves our political results unchanged.

this group who were: *i*) high skilled; *ii*) employed in manufacturing; *iii*) in the labor force; and, *iv*) above the age of 65. Finally, we estimate long difference regressions, where the 1940 to 1960 change in each of the variables above is regressed against the corresponding (instrumented) change in the Black share, including our preferred set of controls. 2SLS and first stage results are reported, respectively, in Panels A and B of Table D.8. The coefficient on the change in the Black share is always imprecisely estimated, quantitatively small, and does not display any consistent pattern across outcomes.

Using the approach just described, in columns 5 to 7 of Table D.8, we also show that Black inflows did not increase labor market competition for white residents.⁷⁵ This confirms existing evidence that northern labor markets were highly segmented along racial lines, and African Americans rarely – if at all – directly competed for jobs with whites (Boustan, 2009).

⁷⁵As before, we restrict attention to men of age 18 or more who were not in school. Since data on employment, occupation, or wages are separately available by race (and gender or age) only from micro-censuses, we focus on years 1940 and 1960, and conduct the analysis at the CZ level.

Table D.1. Congressional Elections (CZ)

Dependent Variable	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS
<i>Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share</i>							
Change Black Share	0.689*** (0.172)	0.801** (0.319)	0.820** (0.346)	0.787*** (0.162)	1.549*** (0.486)	2.015*** (0.626)	2.166*** (0.702)
<i>Panel B: Change in Turnout</i>							
Change Black Share	-0.307*** (0.107)	-0.295** (0.136)	-0.273** (0.128)	-0.246* (0.132)	0.435 (0.344)	0.665 (0.459)	0.732 (0.470)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share				1.486*** (0.186)	1.001*** (0.300)	0.859*** (0.283)	0.883*** (0.296)
Specification	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	LD
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
F-stat				63.89	11.16	9.209	8.912
Observations	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	400

Notes: The table replicates Table 2 by aggregating the unit of analysis to the commuting zone (CZ). The dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (resp. turnout) in Panel A (resp. in Panel B). Panel C reports first stage coefficients. Columns 1 to 3 estimate OLS regressions, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp. 1940 Dem Incumbent) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.2. CORE Demonstrations (CZ)

Dependent Variable	Change in Pr.(Pro-Civil Rights Demonstration)						
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>							
Change Black Share	0.035** (0.014)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.000 (0.018)	0.072*** (0.010)	0.047* (0.025)	0.054* (0.031)	0.055** (0.022)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share				1.486*** (0.186)	1.001*** (0.300)	0.859*** (0.283)	0.859*** (0.283)
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
White Participants							X
F-stat				63.89	11.16	9.209	9.209
Observations	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200

Notes: This table replicates Table 3 by aggregating the unit of analysis to the commuting zone (CZ). The dependent variable is the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights coordinated by the CORE. Columns 1 to 3 estimate equation (1) in the text with OLS, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp 1940 Dem dummy) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 7 includes only those demonstrations that were joined by at least some white participants. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.3. Black in-Migration and Change in White Population

Dependent Variable	Change White Population			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Population	0.349 (0.349)	0.339 (0.349)	0.307 (0.347)	0.270 (0.365)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Population	2.436*** (0.352)	2.459*** (0.341)	2.475*** (0.330)	2.436*** (0.344)
F-Stat	47.87	51.88	56.26	50.15
Observations	3,789	3,789	1,896	3,789
Baseline Controls		X	X	X
High Urban			X	
Urban Share				X
Avg. Change Black Pop.	1,942	1,942	3,750	1,942
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	62,760	62,760	107,291	62,760
Avg. Change White Pop.	9,362	9,362	15,951	9,362

Notes: The sample is a panel of the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table estimates stacked first difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B respectively. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county, instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects. Columns 2 to 4 further include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 3 restricts attention to counties with 1940 urban share of the population above the sample median (0.320). Column 4 replicates column 2 by including interactions between period dummies and the 1940 urban share of the population. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.4. Black in-Migration and Change in White Population (Long Differences)

Dependent Variable	Change White Population			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A. 2SLS</i>				
Change Black population	0.364 (0.326)	0.353 (0.325)	0.321 (0.324)	0.286 (0.341)
<i>Panel B. First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black population	2.460*** (0.340)	2.484*** (0.330)	2.501*** (0.319)	2.461*** (0.332)
F-Stat	52.30	56.76	61.50	55.06
Observations	1,263	1,263	632	1,263
Baseline controls		X	X	X
High urban			X	
Urban share				X
Avg. Change Black Pop.	5,828	5,828	11,251	5,828
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	62,760	62,760	107,291	62,760
Avg. Change White Pop.	28,086	28,086	47,853	28,086

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table estimates long difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B respectively. The dependent variable is the 1940-1970 change in the white population in the county. The main regressor of interest is the corresponding change in the Black population, instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions control for state fixed effects. Columns 2 to 4 further include i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 3 restricts attention to counties with 1940 urban share of the population above the sample median (0.320). Column 4 replicates column 2 by including the 1940 urban share of the population. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.5. Black in-Migration and White Flight

Dependent Variable	Change White Population in the County		Change White Population in Central Cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Population	0.238 (0.324)	0.342 (0.305)	-2.103*** (0.413)	-2.161*** (0.431)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Population	2.821*** (0.280)	2.753*** (0.295)	1.432*** (0.150)	1.443*** (0.174)
F-stat	101.4	87.18	91.27	68.81
Observations	330	330	153	153
Baseline Controls		X		X
Geography	County	County	MSA	MSA
Avg. Change Black Pop.	18,554	18,554	23,745	23,745
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	368,851	368,851	584,749	584,749
Avg. Change White Pop.	55,003	55,003	-21,961	-21,961

Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the sample includes a panel of the 110 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) contained in the 52 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) included in Boustan (2010), for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the 51 central cities contained in the 52 MSAs included in Boustan (2010). The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4). The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4), instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The table estimates stacked first difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B, respectively. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level (resp. MSA level), in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.6. Black in-Migration and White Flight (Long Differences)

Dependent Variable	Change White Population in the County		Change White Population in Central Cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Population	0.247 (0.307)	0.347 (0.288)	-1.784*** (0.295)	-1.682*** (0.279)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Population	2.828*** (0.294)	2.762*** (0.312)	1.584*** (0.151)	1.748*** (0.181)
F-stat	92.81	78.30	109.4	93.66
Observations	110	110	51	51
Baseline Controls		X		X
Geography	County	County	MSA	MSA
Avg. Change Black Pop.	55,662	55,662	120,055	120,055
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	368,851	368,851	584,749	584,749
Avg. Change White Pop.	165,009	165,009	-65,884	-65,884

Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the sample includes a panel of the 110 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of Southern states) contained in the 52 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) included in Boustan (2010), for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the 51 central cities contained in the 52 MSAs included in Boustan (2010). The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4). The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. 3 and 4), instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The table estimates long difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A, and B, respectively. All regressions control for state fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include: i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level (resp. MSA level), in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.7. Congressional Elections (CZ), Restricted Sample

Dependent Variable	Change in			
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	2.015*** (0.626)	2.083*** (0.620)	0.665 (0.459)	0.901* (0.492)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.859*** (0.283)	0.996*** (0.319)	0.859*** (0.283)	0.996*** (0.319)
Sample	Baseline	Restricted (1960 Census)	Baseline	Restricted (1960 Census)
F-Stat	9.209	9.765	9.209	9.765
Observations	1,200	351	1,200	351

Notes: The table replicates the CZ level results reported in Table D.1 by restricting the sample to CZs for which 1960 US Census data are available. Columns 2 and 4 report the results for the restricted sample while columns 1 and 3 show results in column 6 of Table D.1. The dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (resp. turnout) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. in columns 3 and 4). Panel B reports first stage coefficients. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented in columns 2 and 4 with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.8. Black in-Migration and Changes in Whites' Characteristics

	(1) High Skilled	(2) In Manufacture	(3) In Labor Force	(4) 65+	(5) Employed	(6) Log Occupational Scores	(7) Log Wages
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>							
Change Black Share	0.466 (0.380)	0.213 (0.584)	0.116 (0.297)	-0.027 (0.243)	0.081 (0.348)	0.001 (0.006)	0.019 (0.056)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share	0.904*** (0.272)	0.904*** (0.272)	0.904*** (0.272)	0.904*** (0.272)	0.904*** (0.272)	0.904*** (0.272)	0.904*** (0.272)
F-stat	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42	13.42
Observations	117	117	117	117	117	117	117
1940 Mean Dep. Variable	13.48	21.38	85.80	10.25	78.33	3.113	6.045
Avg. Change Black Share	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895	3.895

Notes: In columns 1 to 5 the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the share of white men above 18 not enrolled in school who are: i) high skilled (column 1); ii) employed in manufacturing (column 2); iii) in the labor force (column 3); iv) above the age of 65 (column 4); and v) employed (column 5). In columns 6 and 7, the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the log occupational score and in log wages for white men above 18 not enrolled in school. The table reports 2SLS results for the 1940-1960 change in the Black share, instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The analysis is restricted to the 117 CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. All regressions are weighted by 1940 population, control for state fixed effects, and include i) the 1940 Black share, and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D.2 Push Factors Instrument

D.2.1 Instrument Construction and Zeroth Stage

Borusyak et al. (2021) note that the validity of shift-share designs can be guaranteed if the “shifts” – in our case, decadal Black migration from each southern state – are exogenous to local conditions. They propose a correction method, where the “shift-share” instrument is expressed in terms of the “shift” components. This method, however, can be implemented only when the number of “shifts” is large. Unfortunately, in our setting, we can only rely on 14 southern states, and so we cannot directly implement the transformation proposed in Borusyak et al. (2021).

Nevertheless, we provide evidence that southern (state) migration flows are orthogonal to northern (county) conditions. We construct a modified version of the instrument that, rather than using actual Black out-migration, estimates it exploiting variation solely induced by local push factors. Following Boustan (2010, 2016) and Derenoncourt (2018), we model emigration from each southern county for each decade between 1940 and 1970 as a function of local push factors. In particular, we estimate an equation of the form

$$mig_{kj\tau} = \alpha_j + \beta_\tau Push_{kjt_0} + u_{kj\tau} \quad (3)$$

where $mig_{kj\tau}$ is the Black net migration rate in county k of southern state j during decade τ , and $Push_{kjt_0}$ is a vector of economic and political conditions at baseline, which we allow to have a time-varying effect across decades. These include the 1940: share of land cultivated in cotton; share of farms operated by tenants; share of the labor force in, respectively, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. As in Boustan (2016), we also include WWII spending per capita and the 1948 vote share of Strom Thurmond in Presidential elections.⁷⁶

Our most preferred specification includes state fixed effects, α_j , but results are unchanged when omitting them (see also Boustan, 2016). Finally, in contrast with Boustan (2010, 2016), we fix the characteristics of southern counties to 1940 (or, for Thurmond vote share, 1948) rather than using the beginning of each decade to reduce concerns of correlated shocks between northern and southern counties.⁷⁷ As an

⁷⁶Data on the cotton share comes from the Census of Agriculture, the vote share of Thurmond was taken from David Leip’s Atlas, while all remaining variables were collected from the County Databooks.

⁷⁷Following Boustan (2016), in counties where the Black migration rate was above 100, we replace it with the latter value. We also exclude counties with less than 30 Black residents in 1940. All results are robust to omitting these restrictions.

additional robustness check, we also selected the southern county characteristics to predict Black out-migration using the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (“LASSO”), as done in Derenoncourt (2018). Below, we report results obtained using this alternative procedure to construct the push version of the instrument.

Results from equation (3) are reported in Table D.9. Columns 1 to 3 refer to, respectively, the 1940-1950, the 1950-1960, and the 1960-1970 decade. All coefficients have the expected sign. A higher share of land in cotton in 1940 is associated with subsequent emigration. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the coefficient is not statistically significant for the 1940-1950 decade, possibly because cotton mechanization was more prevalent in the 1950s (Grove and Heinicke, 2003). As in Boustan (2016), a higher share of the labor force in mining and agriculture is associated with a larger emigration rate in all decades. Similarly, reflecting a more hostile political environment, counties with a higher vote share for Thurmond in 1948 are predicted to have a higher emigration rate, even though the coefficient is not statistically significant for the 1950s. Finally, consistent with WWII spending increasing labor demand, the Black in-migration rate is higher in counties with more WWII contracts during the 1940s (but, as expected, not in subsequent decades).⁷⁸

After estimating equation (3), we construct the predicted number of migrants by multiplying the fitted values from (3) by the beginning of decade Black population. We then aggregate these (predicted) flows to obtain the predicted number of Black migrants from each state in each decade, $\hat{Bl}_{s\tau}$. Finally, we replace the actual number of Black migrants, $Bl_{s\tau}$, with this predicted value to construct a modified version of the shift-share instrument in equation (2) in the main text.

D.2.2 Results

Table D.10 replicates our preferred specification for the Democratic vote share (columns 1-2), turnout (columns 3-4), and CORE demonstrations (columns 5-6) using the push-factor version of the instrument. In Panel A, we present 2SLS estimates, while in panel B we present the associated first stage. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report results obtained using the push instrument constructed with the southern characteristics described above in the zeroth stage. Columns 2, 4, and 6 turn to the version of the push instrument obtained by selecting predictors of southern Black out-migration with the LASSO procedure (Derenoncourt, 2018).

⁷⁸All other coefficients have the expected signs.

Reassuringly, both versions of the instrument are strong, with the KP F-stat above conventional levels. Moreover, the 2SLS estimates are in line with – in fact, for the Democratic vote share and CORE demonstrations, stronger than – those presented in the main text. Also in this case, Black in-migration has a positive and statistically significant effect on all outcomes. In the case of the Democratic vote share and CORE demonstrations, point estimates are somewhat larger than those in our baseline specification.

Table D.9. Zeroth Stage

Dependent Variable	Net Black Migration Rate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share Land in Cotton	-0.191 (0.119)	-0.271** (0.125)	-0.324*** (0.094)
Share Farms with Tenants	0.056 (0.074)	-0.009 (0.071)	-0.158** (0.064)
WWII Spending per Capita	1.984*** (0.331)	0.361 (0.364)	-0.216 (0.299)
Thurmond Vote Share	-0.163*** (0.049)	-0.042 (0.040)	-0.254*** (0.051)
Share LF in Manufacturing	-0.342*** (0.097)	-0.195** (0.080)	-0.111 (0.081)
Share LF in Mining	-0.326 (0.218)	-0.506*** (0.181)	-0.536*** (0.206)
Share LF in Agriculture	-0.447*** (0.060)	-0.446*** (0.053)	-0.174*** (0.054)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.226	0.212	0.164
Observations	1,235	1,235	1,235
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970

Notes: The dependent variable is the net Black migration rate for southern counties for each decade indicated at the bottom of the table. All regressors refer to 1940, except for Thurmond vote share, which is the vote share of Thurmond in 1948 Presidential elections, and WWII spending per capita, which is measured over the entire WWII period. All regressions include state fixed effects. See the appendix for the definition and source of variables included in the table. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.10. Replicating Results with Push Instrument

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstration]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	2.196*** (0.519)	2.590*** (0.662)	0.791** (0.334)	0.690** (0.326)	0.062*** (0.018)	0.065*** (0.018)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.848*** (0.260)	0.781*** (0.247)	0.848*** (0.260)	0.781*** (0.247)	0.848*** (0.260)	0.781*** (0.247)
F-stat	10.65	10.02	10.65	10.02	10.65	10.02
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Push Instrument	Baseline	LASSO	Baseline	LASSO	Baseline	LASSO

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification using the version of the instrument constructed with southern specific “push” factors. Columns 1, 3, and 5 (resp. columns 2-4-6) report results for the “push” instrument constructed using the baseline (resp. LASSO) procedure. The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.3 Alternative Instrument: Linked Data Initial Black Shares

In this section, we construct an alternative instrument using a county-to-county (rather than a state-to-county) migration matrix. Using the linked dataset made available by Abramitzky et al. (2020), we consider African Americans who were living in a southern county in 1910 and who had moved to another county by 1930. We choose this time frame because it spans the two decades during which the First Great Migration occurred, but results are robust to using other time windows as well.⁷⁹ For each (non-southern) county in our sample, we then compute the number of African Americans who were living in that county in 1930 and originated from any southern county.⁸⁰ We scale this by the total number of African Americans who were living in the (southern) origin county in 1910 and moved to another

⁷⁹This approach is similar to that used in Derenoncourt (2018), but has the advantage of including migrants that moved between 1910 and 1930, rather than only between 1935 and 1940.

⁸⁰As documented in Dahis et al. (2020), this time period was characterized by a high “passing rate”, with African Americans changing their racial identity so as to “pass for whites”. We keep only African Americans whose race was coded as “Black” in both 1910 and 1930.

county by 1930. We take these as our “initial Black settlements”. They are identical, in spirit, to those used to construct the baseline instrument, but vary at the county-to-county (rather than state-to-county) level.⁸¹

Then, we proceed as before: for each origin, we interact the initial share of African Americans in each non-southern county in our sample with the decadal number of Black migrants who left the southern county in each decade between 1940 and 1970. We thus obtain the predicted number of Black migrants who moved to a non-southern county in each decade from each southern county. Aggregating this across all origins, we obtain the decadal predicted number of African American migrants, which we then scale by the 1940 (non-southern) county population to recover the predicted change in the Black share. We construct two versions of this alternative instrument: one that uses actual migration flows; and, one that instead uses the predicted flows computed in Appendix D.2 above.

While this instrument rests on initial shares that are constructed using a linked sample, and may thus be at least partly “selected” (Bailey et al., 2020), it has a key advantage: it implies that the shift-share instrument now depends on a very large (more than 1,200) number of shifts. As discussed above, Borusyak et al. (2021) note that the validity of shift-share designs can be guaranteed if the “shifts” – in our case, decadal Black migration from each southern origin – are exogenous to local conditions. Thus, as long as out-migration flows across southern counties are uncorrelated with changes in the political conditions of specific non-southern counties, the identifying assumption of the instrument is not violated. Using predicted rather than actual county out-migration flows further corroborates support for the validity of this condition.

In Table D.11 (Panel A), we replicate our baseline results using the two versions of the alternative instrument just described, focusing on the Democratic vote share, turnout, and CORE demonstrations in columns 1 to 3, 4 to 6, and 7 to 9 respectively.⁸² Columns 1, 4, and 7 replicate the baseline specification reported in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) in the main text. Columns 2, 5, and 8 (resp. columns 3, 6, and 9) show that results remain similar when considering the alternative version, constructed with the actual (resp. predicted) southern decadal migration flows.

Together with results in Appendix D.2, this exercise increases the confidence that our main findings are not driven by local pull shocks simultaneously correlated with the pre-1940 distribution of Black settlements across northern counties.

⁸¹As for the baseline instrument, the denominator of the initial shares of African Americans includes all individuals from the origin county who were living in any other county – in or out the US South – by 1930.

⁸²Panel B reports the first stage. When using the alternative instrument that relies on predicted migration flows, the F-stat falls slightly below conventional levels.

Table D.11. Replicating Results with IV based on Linked Data

Dependent Variable	Change in								
	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout			1[CORE Demonstration]		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>									
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	1.660*** (0.316)	1.911*** (0.378)	0.756** (0.348)	0.678** (0.339)	0.689** (0.338)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.042*** (0.015)	0.053*** (0.016)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>									
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	1.693*** (0.511)	1.870*** (0.646)	0.758*** (0.233)	1.693*** (0.511)	1.870*** (0.646)	0.758*** (0.233)	1.693*** (0.511)	1.870*** (0.646)
F-stat	10.57	10.95	8.385	10.57	10.95	8.385	10.57	10.95	8.385
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Instrument	Baseline	Linked Actual	Linked Predicted	Baseline	Linked Actual	Linked Predicted	Baseline	Linked Actual	Linked Predicted

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification using the version of the instrument constructed with the linked sample from Abramitzky et al. (2020), for which a county-to-county migration matrix is used to define the initial Black shares. Columns 1, 4, and 7 replicate the baseline specification reported in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6). Columns 2, 5, and 8 (resp. columns 3, 6, and 9) report results with the alternative instrument using actual (resp. predicted) migration flows. The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 for Democratic incumbency in 1940 Congressional elections. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D.4 Local Pull Shocks and Predicted Economic Growth

In Table D.12, we investigate if the instrument constructed in equation (2) in the main text is correlated with county-specific pull factors. We consider two such factors that might have been particularly relevant in this context: WWII contracts and New Deal spending. As discussed in Boustan (2016), the surge in demand across northern and western factories triggered by WWII was one of the pull factors of the Great Migration. Similarly, the generosity of New Deal spending might have influenced the location decision of African Americans prior to 1940, while at the same time having long-lasting effects on political conditions across northern counties.

The dependent variable in Table D.12 is the change in predicted Black in-migration, scaled by 1940 county population. The main regressor of interest is WWII spending per capita (Panel A) and generosity of New Deal (Panel B). Columns 1 to 3 consider each decade separately, whereas column 4 focuses on the long difference (1940-1970) change in predicted Black in-migration. We always include the set of controls used in our most preferred specification – i.e., state dummies, the 1940 Black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if in 1940 the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republican vote share in Congressional elections – and weigh regressions by 1940 county population. Reassuringly, in all cases the coefficient is imprecisely estimated and quantitatively small.

To further mitigate concerns that the instrument may be spuriously correlated with economic pull shocks, in Table D.13, we augment the baseline specification by separately controlling for a measure of labor demand growth predicted using a Bartik-type approach (similar to e.g. Sequeira et al., 2020, and Tabellini, 2020). Restricting attention to non-southern counties, we first compute the 1940 share of employment in each 1-digit industry in each county; then, we interact these initial shares with the national growth rate of employment in that industry.⁸³ To ease comparison, we report the baseline 2SLS specification in columns 1, 3, and 5 for Democratic vote share, turnout, and civil rights demonstrations, respectively. Columns 2, 4, and 6 verify that results remain quantitatively similar, in fact slightly larger, when including the Bartik measure of predicted labor demand.

⁸³To more precisely proxy for labor demand shocks in non-southern industries, we compute the national growth rate for the non-South only. Results are unchanged when including the US South to compute national demand growth.

Table D.12. Placebo Checks

Dependent Variable	Predicted Change in Black Share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: WWII</i>				
Spending Per Capita	0.049 (0.037)	0.033 (0.042)	0.026 (0.037)	0.108 (0.116)
<i>Panel B: New Deal</i>				
Spending Per Capita	-0.122 (0.087)	-0.103 (0.092)	-0.057 (0.084)	-0.283 (0.250)
Observations	1,263	1,263	1,263	1,263
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970	1940-1970

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 county population. Each column considers the period specific to the decade reported at the bottom of the table. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and control for state dummies, for the 1940 Black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. In Panels A and B, the regressor of interest is WWII spending per capita and New Deal spending per capita, respectively. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.13. Replicating Results Controlling for Predicted Economic Growth

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstration]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	2.135*** (0.584)	0.756** (0.348)	1.010** (0.459)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.056*** (0.022)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.781*** (0.247)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.781*** (0.247)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.781*** (0.247)
F-stat	10.57	10.02	10.57	10.02	10.57	10.02
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Control	Baseline	Economic Growth	Baseline	Economic Growth	Baseline	Economic Growth

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Tables 2 and 3, column 6 controlling for a measure of labor demand growth predicted using a Bartik type approach, as described in the main text. To ease comparisons, columns 1, 3, and 5 report the baseline specification. Columns 2, 4, and 6 augment the regressions with the additional Bartik control. The dependent variable is the change in: Democratic vote share, turnout, and the probability of CORE demonstrations in columns 1-2, 3-4, and 5-6 respectively. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.5 Testing for Pre-Trends

In Table D.14, we perform a key placebo check, and show that there is no correlation between pre-period changes in the outcomes of interest and the (instrumented) change in the Black share. Since 1942 is the first year in which CORE demonstrations occurred, we conduct this exercise only for the Democratic vote share and for turnout in Congressional elections.⁸⁴ Table D.14 reports results for the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6). To ease comparisons, columns 1 and 4 present the baseline specification (Table 2, column 6); next, in columns 2 and 5, we replicate our analysis restricting attention to counties for which “pre-trends” regressions can be estimated.⁸⁵ Results remain very similar to those in the baseline sample. Finally, in columns 3 and 6, we turn to the formal test for pre-trends, regressing the 1930 to 1940 change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout against the 1940 to 1970 instrumented change in the Black share. Reassuringly, the coefficient is not statistically significant and very different from that estimated in the baseline specification.

⁸⁴Appendix D.8 below conducts a similar test (at the CD level) for legislators’ ideology.

⁸⁵18 counties in our sample did not have data for Congressional elections in 1930.

Table D.14. Testing for Pre-Trends: Congressional Elections

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	1.955*** (0.452)	0.185 (0.369)	0.756** (0.348)	0.734** (0.343)	0.017 (0.255)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.765*** (0.233)	0.842*** (0.250)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.765*** (0.233)	0.842*** (0.250)
F-Stat	10.57	10.77	10.53	10.57	10.77	10.53
Observations	3,789	3,735	1,245	3,789	3,735	1,245
Specification	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends

Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates for the change in the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in Congressional elections in columns 1 and 3 (resp. 4 and 6). Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline specification (see Table 2, column 6), and columns 2 and 5 replicate the baseline specification restricting attention to counties for which the change in the Democratic vote share and turnout between 1934 and 1940 can be computed. Columns 3 and 6 estimate first difference regressions for the 1930-1940 change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout against the 1940 to 1970 instrumented change in the Black share. Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include state dummies, the 1940 Black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. These variables are interacted with period dummies in columns 1-2 and 4-5 (as in the main text). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.6 Differential Trends by County Characteristics

In Tables D.15 and D.16, we address concerns that 1940 Black settlements (from each southern state) might be correlated with county-specific characteristics that had a time varying effect on changes in political conditions. We interact period dummies with several 1940 or time invariant county characteristics. Column 1 replicates the baseline specification estimated in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) in the main text. For completeness, we also report first stage estimates at the bottom of each table. Columns 2, 3, and 4 include a set of time-invariant geographic controls interacted with decade dummies: latitude and longitude of county centroid, distance from the Mason-Dixon line, and distance from the closest city where Forty-Eighters settled (Dippel and Heblich, 2021). In all cases, coefficients remain statistically significant and quantitatively close to those

estimated in the baseline specification. This exercise assuages the potential concern that the instrument may be correlated with distance from key locations (including the US South) that might also influence the evolution of political ideology in northern counties.

Columns 5 to 7 augment the baseline specification by including interactions between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940: *i*) male employment to population ratio; *ii*) share of employment in manufacturing; and, *iii*) urban share. The coefficient remains statistically significant and, for both the Democratic vote share and turnout, increases in magnitude when adding the manufacturing share of employment and the urban share of the population.⁸⁶

⁸⁶Even in these cases, however, the coefficient is not statistically different from that obtained from the baseline specification (column 1). In columns 6 and 7, the KP F-stat falls below conventional levels, due to the stringent nature of the exercise performed, but, again the results are qualitatively unchanged.

Table D.15. Congressional Elections: Controlling for 1940 County Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
<i>Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share</i>							
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	1.929*** (0.476)	1.959*** (0.461)	1.892*** (0.440)	1.841*** (0.423)	2.206*** (0.657)	2.710*** (0.913)
<i>Panel B: Change in Turnout</i>							
Change Black Share	0.756** (0.348)	0.812** (0.396)	0.745** (0.347)	0.759** (0.348)	0.770** (0.349)	0.869* (0.451)	1.456** (0.743)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.723*** (0.232)	0.743*** (0.229)	0.756*** (0.228)	0.761*** (0.234)	0.598*** (0.217)	0.458*** (0.175)
Control	Baseline	Coordinates	Distance Mason	Distance 48ers City	Employment to Population	Manufacturing Share	Urban Share
F-Stat	10.57	9.744	10.53	11.03	10.57	7.614	6.87
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Panel A (resp. Panel B) for the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) results reported in Table 2 (column 6). Column 1 replicates the baseline results. The remaining columns include the interaction between period dummies and, respectively: *i*) latitude and longitude of county centroid (column 2); *ii*) distance from the Mason-Dixon line (column 3); *iii*) distance from the closest city where Forty-Eighters settled (column 4); *iv*) the 1940 male employment to population ratio (column 5); *v*) the 1940 share of employment in manufacturing (column 6); and *vi*) the 1940 urban share (column 7). Panel C reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panels A and B. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table D.16. CORE Demonstrations: Controlling for 1940 County Characteristics

Dependent Variable	Change in 1[CORE Demonstration]						
	(1) 2SLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS	(7) 2SLS
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>							
Change Black Share	0.057*** (0.018)	0.059*** (0.019)	0.055*** (0.018)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.056*** (0.017)	0.067*** (0.022)	0.064*** (0.032)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.723*** (0.232)	0.743*** (0.229)	0.756*** (0.228)	0.761*** (0.234)	0.598*** (0.217)	0.458*** (0.175)
Control	Baseline	Coordinates	Distance Mason	Distance 48ers City	Employment to Population	Manufacturing Share	Urban Share
F-stat	10.57	9.744	10.53	11.03	10.57	7.614	6.870
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification for results reported in Table 3 (column 6). Column 1 replicates the baseline results. The remaining columns include the interaction between period dummies and, respectively: *i*) latitude and longitude of county centroid (column 2); *ii*) distance from the Mason-Dixon line (column 3); *iii*) distance from the closest city where Forty-Eighters settled (column 4); *iv*) the 1940 male employment to population ratio (column 5); *v*) the 1940 share of employment in manufacturing (column 6); and *vi*) the 1940 urban share (column 7). Panel B reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panel A. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D.7 Additional Robustness Checks

D.7.1 Results for the Unbalanced Sample

As discussed in Section 3 of the main text, data on Congressional elections are not consistently available for all counties – a problem that is particular evident for California (see Figure 1 in the main text). In our analysis, we consider a strongly balanced sample, which includes only the counties for which data on Congressional elections were available in all Census decades from 1940 to 1970. We now verify that results are unchanged when including all counties for which outcomes are available in at least one Census decade.


Figures D.1, D.2, and D.3 plot the distribution of the 1940-1970 change in the Black share (Panel A) and the 1940 Black share (Panel B) for, respectively: *i*) the balanced sample used in the main paper; *ii*) the unbalanced sample of counties for which electoral outcomes are available in at least one decade; *iii*) the sample without restrictions used for CORE demonstrations.⁸⁷ The sample included in Figures D.2 and D.3 covers a higher number of counties (and, almost the entire state of California, which is instead missing – except for 4 counties – in our baseline sample).

Table D.17 replicates our results including the additional counties. To ease comparisons, columns 1, 3, and 5 report the baseline estimates (Tables 2 and 3, column 6). Columns 2, 4, and 6 show that our results are very similar when considering the unbalanced sample. In the case of turnout (column 4), the coefficient becomes smaller and less precisely estimated. However, and most importantly for us, neither the magnitude nor the precision of coefficients for the Democratic vote share and for civil rights demonstrations is significantly affected.


⁸⁷As noted in the paper, we always restrict attention to counties with at least one African American resident in 1940.

Figure D.1. Balanced Sample

Panel A: 1940-1970 Change in Black Share




Panel B: 1940 Black Share




Notes: The two maps plot the 1940-1970 change in the Black share and the 1940 Black share of the county population in Panels A and B respectively. The sample is restricted to the 1,263 non-southern counties in the fully balanced (baseline) dataset.

Figure D.2. Unbalanced Sample: Electoral Outcomes

Panel A: 1940-1970 Change in Black Share




Panel B: 1940 Black Share




Notes: The two maps plot the 1940-1970 change in the Black share and the 1940 Black share of the county population in Panels A and B respectively. The sample includes the 1,328 non-southern counties for which electoral outcomes are available in at least one decade.

Figure D.3. Unbalanced Sample: CORE Demonstrations

Panel A: 1940-1970 Change in Black Share



Panel B: 1940 Black Share



Notes: The two maps plot the 1940-1970 change in the Black share and the 1940 Black share of the county population in Panels A and B respectively. The sample includes the 1,333 non-southern counties that can be used in the analysis of CORE demonstrations.

Table D.17. Congressional Elections, Unbalanced Sample

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstration]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	1.653*** (0.279)	0.756** (0.348)	0.371* (0.224)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.045*** (0.010)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	1.177*** (0.313)	0.758*** (0.233)	1.177*** (0.313)	0.758*** (0.233)	1.206*** (0.307)
F-stat	10.57	14.17	10.57	14.17	10.57	15.45
Observations	3,789	3,900	3,789	3,900	3,789	3,996
Sample	Balanced	Unbalanced	Balanced	Unbalanced	Balanced	Unbalanced

Notes: The table replicates the main specification in Tables 2 and 3, column 6, (which are reported in columns 1, 3, and 5) focusing on the unbalanced sample (columns 2, 4, and 6). The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.7.2 Controlling for 1940 Democratic Vote Share

In our baseline analysis, we interact period dummies with a dummy equal to 1 if the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was greater than the Republican one to allow counties to be on different trends depending on Democratic incumbency (and potentially deal with mean reversion). To more flexibly account for initial support for the Democratic Party, in column 2 of Tables D.18 and D.19, we replicate the baseline analysis (reported in column 1 to ease comparisons) by interacting the 1940 Democratic vote share with period dummies. Results are virtually unchanged.

D.7.3 Dropping Potential Outliers

As discussed in the main text, some areas of the US North and West, such as Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles, received a disproportionately large inflow of Black migrants between 1940 and 1970. Others, instead, received very few African Americans. In our main analysis we omit counties with zero Black individuals in 1940, so as to compare counties that received

different numbers of migrants with each other (and exclude from this comparison counties that did not have any Black resident in 1940). We now show that all results are robust to restricting the sample in different ways.

First, in columns 3 and 4 of Tables D.18 and D.19, we restrict attention to counties for which the predicted and the actual Black share was strictly positive in all decades between 1940 and 1970. Not surprisingly, results are unchanged. Next, in column 5 (resp. 6), we exclude counties at the top 1st (resp. 5th) and at the bottom 99th (resp. 95th) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration. Also in this case, results remain in line with those of our baseline specification.

D.7.4 Controlling for Southern White In-Migration

Yet another potential concern is that Black in-migration might be correlated with simultaneous white inflows from the South. As documented in Gregory (2006) among others, between 1940 and 1970 even more whites than Black Americans left the US South. The historical evidence suggests that African Americans were significantly more likely than whites to settle in metropolitan areas either in the Northeast or in the West, while white migration was more evenly distributed across the non-South (Gregory, 1995). However, it is still possible that the patterns of white and Black migration from the South were correlated with each other. If this were to be the case, at least part of our findings might be due to the arrival of white – rather than Black – migrants. Due to data limitations, we cannot measure the actual change in southern born white migrants after 1940 at the county level. However, to at least partly overcome this problem, we construct a predicted measure of white in-migration from the US South implementing the same procedure used to construct the instrument for Black in-migration (see equation (2) in the main text).

Specifically, we first compute the share of whites born in each southern state who were living in a non-southern county as of 1940. Next, we interact these shares with the number of white migrants from each southern state in each decade between 1940 and 1970. Finally, for each non-southern county and for each decade, we sum the predicted number of whites moving from each origin over all southern states to obtain the total number of (predicted) white migrants moving to county c during decade τ . In formulas, this measure is given by:

$$ZW_{c\tau} = \sum_{j \in \text{South}} sh_{jc}^w Wh_{j\tau} \quad (4)$$

where sh_{jc}^w is the share of whites born in southern state j and living in non-southern county c in 1940, relative to all whites born in j living outside this state; and $Wh_{j\tau}$ is the number of whites who left southern state j during decade τ .

Then, in column 7 of Tables D.18 and D.19, we augment our baseline specification by separately controlling for the predicted southern white in-migration. Reassuringly, in all cases, results are similar to those in our preferred specification.

Table D.18. Additional Robustness Checks: Congressional Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Change in Democratic Vote Share</i>							
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	1.887*** (0.385)	1.904*** (0.447)	1.895*** (0.442)	2.028*** (0.498)	2.478*** (0.529)	2.168*** (0.510)
<i>Panel B: Change in Turnout</i>							
Change Black Share	0.756** (0.348)	0.637** (0.300)	0.795** (0.356)	0.761** (0.349)	0.675* (0.390)	0.481 (0.354)	0.558* (0.330)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.834*** (0.241)	0.747*** (0.232)	0.755*** (0.233)	0.771*** (0.264)	0.774*** (0.229)	0.710*** (0.233)
F-Stat	10.57	11.97	10.41	10.51	8.512	11.45	9.260
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,129	3,549	3,712	3,446	3,789
Specification	Baseline	1940 Dem Vote Share	Drop IV Equal to 0	Drop Black Share Equal to 0	Trim Top 99 and Bottom 1 Pctile	Trim Top 95 and Bottom 5 Pctile	Southern White In-migration

Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for results reported in Table 2 (column 6) by: *i*) replacing the interaction between period dummies and the 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy with that with the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (column 2); *ii*) considering only counties with predicted (resp. actual) Black share strictly positive in all decades in column 3 (resp. column 4); *iii*) trimming counties at the top 1st (resp. 5th) and at the bottom 99th (resp. 95th) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration in column 5 (resp. column 6); and *iv*) controlling for predicted southern white in-migration (column 7). Panel C reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panels A and B. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table D.19. Additional Robustness Checks: CORE Demonstrations

Dependent Variable	Change in 1[CORE Demonstration]						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>							
Change Black Share	0.057*** (0.018)	0.056*** (0.015)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.062*** (0.020)	0.041* (0.022)	0.037** (0.018)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.834*** (0.241)	0.747*** (0.232)	0.755*** (0.233)	0.771*** (0.264)	0.774*** (0.229)	0.710*** (0.233)
F-Stat	10.57	11.97	10.41	10.51	8.512	11.45	9.260
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,129	3,549	3,712	3,446	3,789
Specification	Baseline	1940 Dem Vote Share	Drop IV Equal to 0	Drop Black Share Equal to 0	Trim Top 99 and Bottom 1 Pctile	Trim Top 95 and Bottom 5 Pctile	Southern White In-migration

Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for results reported in Table 3 (column 6) by: *i*) replacing the interaction between period dummies and the 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy with that with the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (column 2); *ii*) considering only counties with predicted (resp. actual) Black share strictly positive in all decades in column 3 (resp. column 4); *iii*) trimming counties at the top 1st (resp. 5th) and at the bottom 99th (resp. 95th) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration in column 5 (resp. column 6); and *iv*) controlling for predicted southern white in-migration (column 7). Panel B reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panel A. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D.7.5 Additional Outcomes

In the paper, we focus on the Democratic vote share as the main electoral outcome of interest. In Table D.20, we verify that results are unchanged when considering different proxies for support for the Democratic Party in Congressional elections. Column 1 presents our main 2SLS results for the Democratic vote share (Table 2, column 6). Next in columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is defined respectively as the Democratic vote margin and as a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was larger than the Republicans vote share. In both cases, Black in-migration is associated with an increase in support for the Democratic Party.

Table D.20. Additional Outcomes: Congressional Elections

Dependent Variable	Change in		
	Democratic Vote Share (1)	Democrats-Republicans Vote Margin (2)	1[Higher Democratic Vote Share] (3)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>			
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	3.651*** (0.875)	0.050*** (0.013)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>			
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.233)
F-Stat	10.57	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for the effects of changes in the Black share on the Democratic vote share (Table 2, column 6). In columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is, respectively, the Democrats-Republicans vote margin in Congressional elections, and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republicans vote share in Congressional elections. Panel B reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panel A. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D.7.6 Stacked Panel Specification

In this section, we verify that our results are robust to estimating stacked panel regressions separately controlling for county fixed effects, rather than taking the model in (stacked) first differences. Specifically, we stack the data for the four decades between 1940 to 1970 (included), and run a regression of the form:

$$y_{ct} = \xi_c + \delta_{st} + \beta Bl_{ct} + \gamma X_{ct} + u_{ct} \quad (5)$$

where y_{ct} refers to the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections or to the probability of CORE demonstrations in county c in year t , ξ_c and δ_{st} are county and state by year fixed effects, and Bl_{ct} is the Black share in county c in year t . As for the stacked first difference specification, X_{ct} includes interactions between period dummies and baseline Black share and Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections.⁸⁸

In our baseline specification, we used predicted Black inflows in each decade to instrument for the change in Black population. However, when estimating equation (5), an instrument is needed for Black population in each year from 1940 to 1970. That is, 1940 can no longer be used as “baseline” year to predict Black inflows. Also, since we are now interested in Black population (relative county population) rather than in its change, we need an instrument for the stock – and not the change – of Black Americans in the county. We thus modify the baseline instrument constructed in the main text in two ways. First, we use 1930 settlements of African Americans across northern counties to apportion post-1930 out-migration from the South. Second, after predicting the inflow of Black migrants to county c in the ten years prior to year t , we recursively add previous predicted inflows to generate a measure of predicted stock.⁸⁹

With this instrument at hand, we proceed to estimate equation (5) with 2SLS. We report results in Panel A of Table D.21, presenting the first stage in Panel B. Focusing on Democratic vote share, turnout, and CORE demonstrations respectively, we report the baseline (stacked first difference) specification in columns 1, 3, and 5 to ease comparisons, and the stacked panel regressions in columns 2, 4, and 6. The first stage remains strong, with the F-stat becoming slightly larger than in the baseline specifi-

⁸⁸Since in a stacked panel setting 1940 is our first estimation year, we measure the baseline Black share and Democratic incumbency in 1930. Results are unchanged if we measure both variables in 1940.

⁸⁹As before, we scale the predicted number of Black migrants by 1940 county population. Results are unchanged when dividing it by 1930 population.

cation, and results for the Democratic vote share and pro-civil rights demonstrations are again positive and statistically significant. The 2SLS coefficient for turnout is now imprecisely estimated, but the relative instability of coefficients for turnout was already something we noted in the main text.

The point estimates in the stacked panel specification are smaller than those in the stacked first difference specification. However, both the mean and the standard deviation of the Black share differ from those of its change. Thus, it is not possible to directly compare the magnitude of the coefficients in Table D.21.⁹⁰

⁹⁰Consider, for instance that the average Black share in the stacked panel dataset is 6%, and the average change in the Black share is instead 1.78 percentage points.

Table D.21. Stacked Panel Specification

Dependent Variable	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstration]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	1.082*** (0.164)	0.756** (0.348)	0.203 (0.168)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.038*** (0.010)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	1.162*** (0.278)	0.758*** (0.233)	1.162*** (0.278)	0.758*** (0.233)	1.162*** (0.278)
F-stat	10.57	17.08	10.57	17.08	10.57	17.08
Observations	3,789	5,036	3,789	5,036	3,789	5,036
Specification	Stacked First Differences	Stacked Panel	Stacked First Differences	Stacked Panel	Stacked First Differences	Stacked Panel

Notes: The table replicates the baseline stacked first difference specification using a stacked panel specification. The dependent variable is the (resp. the change in) Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations in columns 2, 4, and 6 (resp. in columns 1-3-5). Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighted by 1940 county population. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include county and state by year fixed effects, and control for interactions between period dummies and: *i*) the 1930 Black share; and, *ii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1934 was higher than the Republicans vote share. Results in columns 2, 4, and 6 are unchanged when including interactions using 1940 values (rather than pre-1940 values). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D.7.7 Standard Errors Correction

In Table D.22, we address the potential concern of spatial correlation. To do so, we replicate our baseline results for Democratic vote share, turnout, and CORE demonstrations (reported in columns 1-3-5 to ease comparisons) by clustering standard errors at the CZ level. Reassuringly, the precision of the estimates is barely affected (columns 2-4-6).⁹¹

Next, In Table D.23, we deal with the possibility that standard errors associated with the shift-share instrument may be excessively small – a potential concern recently formalized in Adao et al. (2019). The first row reports the 2SLS coefficient from the baseline specification (Tables 2 and 3, column 6). Subsequent rows present the 95% confidence intervals associated with this specification and those derived using the procedure in Adao et al. (2019).⁹²

Reassuringly, even when applying the correction procedure from Adao et al. (2019), the 95% confidence intervals for the Democratic vote share do not include 0, and the coefficient remains statistically significant at the 5% level. The estimates on the probability of CORE demonstrations become instead less precise, with the p-value increasing to 0.15. Finally, consistent with the relative instability of results for turnout already discussed above, confidence intervals become very large, with an associated p-value of 0.28.

It is important to note that, in our setting, we rely on only 14 “shifters” – the southern states from which Black out-migration is measured. For this reason, one should evaluate the exercise described in Table D.23 with caution. Nevertheless, in light of these results, we conclude that the effects of the Great Migration on support for civil rights estimated in our work are unlikely to be due to noise.

⁹¹Panel B of Table D.22 reports the corresponding first stage.

⁹²This procedure is based on the assumption of independence of the shifters across counties conditional on controls and the initial shares. Adao et al. (2019) show that imposing restrictions on the conditional distribution of the shifters is a sufficient condition for standard errors to remain valid under any correlation structure of the residuals that is not accounted for by other methods.

Table D.22. Correcting for Spatial Correlation

Dependent Variable	Change in					
	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	1.885*** (0.439)	1.885*** (0.444)	0.756** (0.348)	0.756** (0.373)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.057*** (0.017)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.245)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.245)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.245)
F-stat	10.57	9.540	10.57	9.540	10.57	9.540
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789
Specification	Baseline	CZ	Baseline	CZ	Baseline	CZ

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) correcting standard errors for spatial correlation. The dependent variable is the change in, respectively, the Democratic vote share (columns 1-2), turnout (columns 3-4), and probability of CORE demonstrations (columns 5-6). Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the baseline results, and columns 2, 4, and 6 present results obtained with CZ clustered standard errors. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighted by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table D.23. Confidence Intervals Adjusted for Robust Inference

Dependent Variable	Change in		
	Democratic Vote Share	Turnout	1[CORE Demonstration]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Change Black Share	1.885	0.756	0.057
<i>95% Confidence Intervals</i>			
Baseline	(1.024, 2.746)	(0.074, 1.437)	(0.022, 0.091)
Adao et al. (2019) adjustment	(0.479, 3.291)	(-0.634, 2.145)	(-0.021, 0.135)
F-stat	10.57	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification of Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) applying the standard errors correction method developed in Adao et al. (2019). We report the 2SLS point estimate at the top of the table. In subsequent rows, we present the 95% confidence intervals associated with the baseline specification and those obtained applying the procedure in Adao et al. (2019). The dependent variable is the change in, respectively, the Democratic vote share (columns 1), turnout (columns 2), and probability of CORE demonstrations (columns 3). All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments.

D.8 Robustness Checks on CD Results

D.8.1 Testing for Pre-Trends

Table 8 in the main text shows that Black in-migration moved legislators’ ideology to the left between 1940 and 1950. In Table D.24, we check that this pattern does not capture pre-existing trends. Similar to what we did for the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections (Section D.5 above), we construct the pre-period change in the ideology scores, considering the ideology scores prevailing during Congress 71 (corresponding to years 1929-1931). Then, we estimate 2SLS regressions for the pre-period change in the agnostic and the constrained version of the scores against the instrumented change in the Black share, controlling for the same variables included in our baseline specification (i.e. state dummies, and baseline: *i*) Black share; *ii*) Democratic incumbency indicator; and, *iii*) ideology score).⁹³

To ease comparisons, we report the baseline specification for the 78-82 Congress period – when Black in-migration induced a liberal shift in legislators’ ideology – in columns 1 and 4 for the agnostic and the constrained version of the scores respectively. Since the pre-period change in ideology could not be estimated for all CDs, in columns 2 and 5, we replicate columns 1 and 4 restricting attention to CDs for which the pre-trend check can be performed. When doing so, the F-stat falls substantially, suggesting that results should be interpreted with caution. However, the point estimate remains negative, quantitatively close to that obtained for the full sample, and statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.074 and 0.054 for agnostic and constrained scores respectively). Finally, in columns 3 and 6, we turn to the formal test for pre-trends. Reassuringly, the point estimate is positive, close to zero, and imprecisely estimated. Also, note that in this case, the F-stat is again above conventional level, increasing the confidence that the estimated coefficient is a “true zero”. These patterns indicate that the main results documented above are not influenced by a spurious correlation between the instrument and potential pre-existing trends in ideology of legislators.

⁹³As usual, regressions are weighed by baseline CD population.

Table D.24. Testing for Pre-Trends: Ideology Scores

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores			Constrained Scores		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.300*** (0.116)	-0.223* (0.125)	0.016 (0.032)	-0.337*** (0.124)	-0.281* (0.145)	0.029 (0.035)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.054*** (0.377)	1.056** (0.528)	1.851*** (0.562)	1.054*** (0.377)	1.056** (0.528)	1.851*** (0.562)
F-stat	7.814	3.998	10.84	7.770	3.914	10.60
Observations	285	201	201	285	201	201
Specification	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends (1940-1960)	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends (1940-1960)

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – “Agnostic” scores in columns 1 to 3, and “Constrained” scores in columns 4 to 6. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates and Panel B reports first stage estimates. Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline specification for Congress period 78-82 (see Table 8, columns 2 and 5), and columns 2 and 5 replicate this by restricting attention to counties for which the change in the scores for the pre-period can be constructed. Columns 3 and 6 estimate 2SLS regressions for the change in the ideology scores between Congress 71 and Congress 78 against the instrumented 1940-1960 change in the Black share. The pre-period is defined using the Congress 71 (1929-1931). All regressions are weighed by 1940 CD population, and include state dummies, and the baseline: Black share, Democratic incumbency dummy, and ideology score. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.8.2 Alternative Timing Conventions for Congress Periods

In our baseline specification for the effects of the Great Migration on legislators' ideology, we map the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black share to the 78-82 (resp. 82-88) Congress period. This is done in order to include the longest periods without redistricting while at the same time ending the analysis with the Congress that passed the CRA. We now verify that our results are robust to using different timing conventions.

First, in Table D.25, we define the second period as ending with Congress 87 (rather than Congress 88). The structure of the table mirrors that of Table 8 in the main text: columns 1 to 3 consider the agnostic version of the scores, while columns 4 to 6 focus on the constrained one. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, whereas Panel B presents the first stage. Results are in line with those in the main text. Mechanically, estimates for the first Congress period (columns 2 and 5) are unchanged. Results for the second Congress period (columns 3 and 6) become slightly smaller in size, but remain imprecisely estimated and very close to zero. If anything, the stacked specification in columns 1 and 4 is now marginally statistically significant with a p-value of 0.081 and 0.09, respectively.

Second, in Table D.26, we define the end of the first period with Congress 83, in order to have two symmetric periods. While the coefficient on the Great Migration remains highly negative and precisely estimated in the first period, it becomes statistically significant (and positive) in the second period, consistent with results on polarization discussed in Section 6.2 in the main text.

In both tables, the number of observations is slightly different than that in our baseline specification reported in the main text. This is because, in Congresses 83 and 87, ideology scores are missing for 4 and 3 CDs respectively. Since the scores constructed in Bateman et al. (2017) use past voting behavior of legislators, it is possible that in a few instances (as it happens for Congresses 83 and 87) there are not enough data points to estimate the ideology scores. Reassuringly, all our results are identical when replicating the baseline specification (with the original timing convention) omitting the CDs missing in Tables D.25 and D.26.

Table D.25. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Ending Analysis with Congress 87

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.087* (0.050)	-0.300*** (0.116)	-0.004 (0.063)	-0.086* (0.051)	-0.337*** (0.124)	0.013 (0.064)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.571*** (0.438)	1.054*** (0.377)	1.946*** (0.558)	1.554*** (0.442)	1.050*** (0.377)	1.920*** (0.564)
F-Stat	12.88	7.814	12.19	12.36	7.770	11.57
Observations	567	285	282	567	285	282
Congress Period	78-82; 82-87	78-82	82-87	78-82; 82-87	78-82	82-87

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – “Agnostic” scores in columns 1 to 3, and “Constrained” scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress periods 78-82 and 82-87). Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CD population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table D.26. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Symmetric Congress Periods

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.037 (0.036)	-0.444*** (0.156)	0.123*** (0.046)	-0.040 (0.037)	-0.489*** (0.165)	0.139*** (0.049)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.570*** (0.436)	1.054*** (0.376)	1.944*** (0.555)	1.552*** (0.441)	1.050*** (0.375)	1.917*** (0.562)
F-Stat	12.94	7.857	12.25	12.42	7.817	11.62
Observations	562	281	281	562	281	281
Congress Period	78-83; 83-88	78-83	83-88	78-83; 83-88	78-83	83-88

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – “Agnostic” scores in columns 1 to 3, and “Constrained” scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress periods 78-83 and 83-88). Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 black share in the CD; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.8.3 Alternative Samples

Our CD-level analysis is based on the balanced sample of CDs for which outcomes could be systematically found in all Congress periods. However, these CDs slightly differ from those that span the balanced county sample used in Section 5 of the paper. For robustness, we thus replicate the results for ideology scores reported in Table 8 of the paper, restricting attention to the CDs that include only the counties in the balanced sample. Results are reported in Table D.27 (Panel B). Reassuringly, they remain virtually unchanged relative to the baseline ones (reported in Panel A to ease comparisons).

Table D.27. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Alternative Sample

Dependent Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores			Constrained Scores		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Main estimates</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.051 (0.039)	-0.300*** (0.116)	0.046 (0.056)	-0.054 (0.041)	-0.337*** (0.124)	0.058 (0.059)
F-stat	12.87	7.814	12.19	12.35	7.77	11.57
Observations	570	285	285	570	285	285
<i>Panel B: Counties in Main Sample Only</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.056 (0.041)	-0.303*** (0.117)	0.047 (0.059)	-0.059 (0.043)	-0.339*** (0.126)	0.059 (0.063)
F-stat	11.31	7.642	10.32	10.89	7.603	9.837
Observations	566	283	283	566	283	283

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – “Agnostic” scores in columns 1 to 3, and “Constrained” scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress periods 78-82 and 82-88). Panel A reports the main estimates from panel B of Table 8. Panel B replicates the main estimates focusing on the counties from our main sample. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CD population, and include state dummies, and the baseline: Black share, Democratic incumbency dummy, and ideology score. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.8.4 Redistricting, Black Inflows, and Political Outcomes

One potential concern with results in Section 6 is that the decision of redistricting a CD may have been at least partly driven by the arrival of African Americans. If this were to be the case, and if redistricting had an effect on political outcomes, our results may be biased. As noted in Appendix B, until 1964 (i.e. the end of our sample period), redistricting was unlikely to be strategic (Engstrom, 2013), and was typically mandated at the state level. We exploit the fact that between Congress 78 and Congress 82, five states in our sample (Arizona, Illinois, New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) required their CDs to redistrict, and test whether redistricting was systematically correlated with either Black inflows or changes in political conditions (e.g. party switches, changes in legislators' ideology, etc.).⁹⁴

In Table D.28, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a CD belongs to a state

⁹⁴This check cannot be performed between Congress 83 and Congress 88 because most CDs were subject to redistricting in this period.

that did not mandate redistricting, and is regressed against: *i*) changes in the Black share (with OLS in column 1 and with 2SLS in column 2); *ii*) a dummy if the CD underwent a party switch; and, *iii*) the change in the Bateman et al. (2017) ideology score (column 4). Since the dependent variable varies at the state level, we cannot control for state fixed effects; yet, we include (as in our baseline specifications) the 1940 Black share and the 1940 Democratic dummy. Reassuringly, the coefficient is never statistically significant, does not display any systematic pattern, and is always quantitatively small. Overall, this exercise thus suggests that neither changes in the Black share nor changes in political conditions were systematically associated with state-mandated redistricting.

Next, we inspect more directly the possibility that Black inflows led to strategic gerrymandering across CDs. In particular, we rely on the measure of (non-)compactness recently introduced by Kaufman et al. (2017), which is based on the geographic shape of CDs, and captures the “compactness evaluations” made by judges and public officials responsible for redistricting.⁹⁵ We prefer to use this measure, instead of an alternative proxy based on the vote distribution, because it provides evidence of (potential) gerrymandering at the CD level. In turn, this allows us to investigate the relationship between non-compactness and Black inflows. The measure of compactness can take values between 1 and 100, with higher values indicating less compact districts, i.e. a higher probability of gerrymandering.

We start by analyzing descriptively the trends of non-compactness between Congress 71 and Congress 90 in Figure D.4. Consistent with the existing literature discussed in Appendix B, for the period considered in our analysis – between Congress 78 and Congress 88 – average compactness changes very little. Reassuringly, other aggregate measures, such as the standard deviation and the interquantile range, do not show any detectable changes either (not shown). Interestingly, and again consistent with existing studies, non-compactness starts to increase precisely after Congress 88, suggesting that after 1964 strategic gerrymandering might have become gradually more common.

Then, we study the relationship between Black inflows and non-compactness during our sample period. To do so, we proceed as follows. First, we assign the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black share to each Congress in the 78-82 (resp. 83-88) Congress period. Second, we estimate 2SLS regressions where the dependent variable is the measure of non-compactness specific to each Congress number (for the relevant decade) and the main regressor of interest is the instrumented change in the Black share. Figure D.5 reports the implied 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) from previous regressions corresponding to a one standard deviation change in the Black share.

If the arrival of African Americans induced northern politicians to strategically change

⁹⁵We thank the authors for making their codes available to us.


the boundaries of CDs, we would expect the association between changes in the Black share and non-compactness to increase over time. Reassuringly, there is no statistically significant relationship between the change in the Black share and the measure of non-compactness in any Congress year. Our estimates are also quantitatively small. For instance, one standard deviation increase in the Black share (around 2.8 percentage points) increases compactness of Congress 78 by 2 points – a negligible effect when compared to a mean of 45 and to a standard deviation of 16. Moreover, coefficients do not display any increasing trend over time, suggesting that strategic gerrymandering in response to Black arrivals was very unlikely to occur during our sample period.

Table D.28. Redistricting Checks

Dependent Variable	1[Non-Redistricting State]			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change Black Share	0.015 (0.013)	0.043 (0.039)		
Party Switch			0.084 (0.061)	
Change Ideology Scores				-0.008 (0.049)
F-stat		16.41		
Observations	285	285	285	285


Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the CD belongs to a state that did not mandate redistricting between Congress 78 and Congress 82. In columns 1 and 2, the main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share during the 1940-1950 decade. Column 1 (resp. column 2) presents OLS (resp. 2SLS) results. Columns 3 and 4 regress the redistricting state dummy against, respectively, a dummy equal to 1 if the CD experienced a party transition during the 78-82 Congress period, and the change in Bateman et al. (2017) scores. All regressions control for the 1940 Black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Figure D.4. Average Non-Compactness, Congress 71st-90th



Notes: The figure presents the area-weighted average non-compactness for each Congress between Congress 71 and Congress 90. The red, vertical lines, corresponding to Congresses 78 and 88 isolate the sample period considered in our paper.

Figure D.5. Black In-Migration and Non-Compactness



Notes: The figure presents the 2SLS coefficient with the corresponding 95% confidence interval implied by one standard deviation change in the Black share during the corresponding decade. The dependent variable is the CD non-compactness score from Kaufman et al. (2017). The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1950 (resp. 1950 to 1960) change in the Black share for Congresses between 78 and 82 (resp. between 83 and 88), and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text. All regressions control for state dummies, the 1940 Black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in each Congress.

E Additional Results

E.1 Additional Evidence on Demand for Civil Rights

E.1.1 Electoral Outcomes

Columns 1 to 3 of Table E.1 replicate the analysis conducted in the main text (Section 5.1) separately for each of the three decades, focusing on the preferred specification (Table 2, column 6). The Great Migration had a very strong effect on the Democratic vote share in both the 1940-1950 (column 1) and the 1960-1970 (column 3) decades. Conversely, the point estimate becomes smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant for the 1950s (column 2). Turnout follows a similar pattern, with a higher point estimate in the 1940s and in the 1960s, but results are imprecise and never statistically significant.⁹⁶

One interpretation of these findings is that the 1940s saw the dawn of the civil rights movement, which was partly spurred by the Double V Campaign organized by African American activists during WWII (Qian and Tabellini, 2020). The 1960s culminated with the passage of the CRA and the VRA and, even though in the later period whites' backlash erupted in many northern and western cities (Collins and Margo, 2007; Reny and Newman, 2018), this may have been partly offset by greater engagement among Black Americans. The lack of significance and the smaller magnitude of the coefficient for the 1950s is consistent with the idea that the economic downturn at least temporarily halted the progress of race relations, and cooled off whites' support for racial equality (Sugrue, 2014).

As discussed in Schickler (2016), support for racial equality was stronger within the local fringes of the Democratic Party. Moreover, when it came to national politics, African Americans remained more skeptical about the commitment of Democrats to the civil rights cause. Replicating the preferred specification of Table 2 in the main text for Presidential elections, column 4 of Table E.1 confirms this idea. For the Democratic vote share (Panel A), the coefficient on the change in the Black share remains statistically significant and positive, but is one third smaller than for Congressional elections. The point estimate on turnout (Panel B) is instead similar to – if anything slightly larger than – that for Congressional elections.

⁹⁶The F-stat falls below conventional levels for the 1960-1970 decade, suggesting that one should interpret results with some caution.

E.1.2 CORE Demonstrations

Using detailed information on the cause and the target of the protest available in the CORE dataset, we classified the pro-civil rights demonstrations in different categories. Figure E.1 plots the number of events in each of the top four categories – discrimination in access to goods and services (e.g. restaurants or hotels), school segregation, residential segregation, and police brutality – as a share of all demonstrations in our sample.⁹⁷ Each bar in the figure also indicates the share of events within each category that concerned national (dotted bar area) and local (Black bar area) issues. Almost two thirds of the events concerned local issues – such as boycotting a local taxi company for its discriminating hiring process in Seattle or protesting against a white-only barbershop in Chicago – but there existed substantial heterogeneity across categories. For instance, while more than 80% of the events organized to demand a reduction in residential discrimination were focused on local issues, almost 40% of demonstrations in the “access to goods” category were conducted on a more national platform.

Relying on this classification, Figure E.2 replicates the analysis of Table 3 (column 6) in the main text for each category separately. The first four dots from the left report 2SLS coefficients when the dependent variable is the change in the probability of demonstrations for each of the causes reported in Figure E.1. The remaining two crosses on the right report results for the change in the probability of local and national demonstrations respectively.⁹⁸ Even though the point estimate is always positive, it is statistically significant and quantitatively larger for protests against discrimination in access to goods and services and against school segregation. The coefficient is also larger and more precisely estimated for demonstrations with local, rather than national, targets – something to be expected, since the CORE was operating through local branches.

⁹⁷Since events were classified according to either the cause or the target of the demonstration, the categories in Figure E.1 do not add to one.

⁹⁸Table E.2 presents the corresponding 2SLS coefficients.

Table E.1. Congressional Elections by Decade and Presidential Elections

Dependent Variable	Congressional Elections			Presidential Elections
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Democrat Vote Share</i>				
Change Black Share	2.944** (1.480)	0.665 (0.557)	2.495** (1.247)	0.567*** (0.197)
<i>Panel B: Turnout</i>				
Change Black Share	0.979 (0.701)	0.125 (0.642)	1.431 (1.166)	0.805*** (0.282)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.792*** (0.248)	0.755*** (0.218)	0.726** (0.293)	0.758*** (0.233)
F-stat	10.21	11.96	6.128	10.57
Observations	1,263	1,263	1,263	3,789
Decade	1940s	1950s	1960s	All
Avg. Change Black Share	1.350	1.838	2.147	1.778


Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table replicates column 6 of Table 2 for Congressional elections separately for each decade in columns 1 to 3, and for Presidential elections in column 4. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. In column 4, these controls are interacted with period dummies. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table E.2. CORE Demonstrations, by Type

Dependent Variable	Cause			Relevance		
	All	School/ College	Housing	Police Brutality	Access to Goods	Local National
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) (7)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	0.057*** (0.018)	0.037* (0.020)	0.030* (0.017)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.057*** (0.020)	0.068*** (0.018) 0.032** (0.016)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.758*** (0.233)
F-stat	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57	10.57
Observations	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789	3,789


Notes: The sample includes the 1,263 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Panel A (resp. B) reports 2SLS (resp. first stage) estimates. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the probability of a protest in each category occurring over a decade. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Figure E.1. Frequency of CORE Demonstrations, by Type



Notes: The figure plots the number of CORE demonstrations as share of all events occurring in our sample period, for each of the four main categories described in the text. The portion of the bar filled with oblique lines (resp. dots) refers to the share of events of each category that involved local (resp. national) issues.

Figure E.2. Black in-Migration and CORE Demonstrations, by Type



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of the change in the Black share on the change in CORE demonstrations. The first dot from the left considers all demonstrations in our sample; the next four dots refer to each specific cause, reported on the x-axis; the two dots on the right refer to demonstrations that involved, respectively, local and national issues. All regressions are weighed by 1940 population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. The corresponding estimates are reported in Table E.2.

E.2 Additional Evidence on Mechanisms

E.2.1 Bounds on Whites' Voting Behavior

As discussed in Section 5.1 of the paper, the fact that changes in the Black share increased the Democratic vote share by more than one for one points to the importance of changes in northern voters' behavior. While northern Black residents certainly played a role, in order to explain our previous estimates, at least some white residents had to switch to the Democratic Party too. In Figure E.3, we provide bounds on the number of white voters who had to switch from the Republican to the Democratic Party in order to match the 2SLS coefficient estimated in column 6 of Table 2 in the main text for the average county in our sample, under different assumptions on turnout and voting preferences of African Americans.⁹⁹

Red diamonds represent the number of votes for the Democratic Party that are implied by the coefficient in Table 2, column 6, following one percentage point increase in the Black share for the average county in our sample. The light blue (resp. dark blue) parts of each bar represent the number of votes from northern Black (resp. white) residents in 1940, before the inflow of African American migrants. The grey area refers to votes for the Democratic Party cast by Black migrants, whereas the white area stands for the total number of Black voters who, in a given scenario, could theoretically switch to the Democratic party in response to the Great Migration. Whenever the diamond falls within the white area of the bar, there are enough African American voters who can switch from the GOP to the Democratic Party to match the coefficient estimated in our preferred specification. When, instead, there is a gap between the bar and the diamond, at least some white voters would need to change their voting behavior to explain our results.

We consider three different scenarios. In all cases, we fix the turnout rate for Black northern residents at 50%.¹⁰⁰ The first bar from the left assumes that, consistent with Bositis (2012), 70% of African American northern residents voted for the Democratic Party. We instead make the extreme assumption that all Black migrants immediately voted, and that all of them voted for the Democratic Party. Under this (rather unrealistic) scenario, if Black northerners switched first, no white voter would have to change

⁹⁹When performing this exercise, we fix turnout, assuming that the inflow of Black migrants may have changed the preferences of northern residents without altering the number of voters.

¹⁰⁰We chose this number so that it is roughly 30% lower than the average turnout in our sample (70%). The exact figures do not matter for our results.

her voting behavior in order to explain the coefficient in our preferred specification. This is because, under our assumptions about Black voters' behavior, there would still be "enough" African Americans that could potentially switch, before any white does so. Assuming that only 70% of Black migrants voted upon arrival, but that all of them voted for Democrats, yields similar results (second bar from the left). However, in this case, African American northern residents are no longer enough for the white area to reach the red diamond. That is, in this case, also some white northern voter would have to switch, and start voting for the Democratic Party.

Finally, we consider a more realistic scenario, where turnout of both northern Black residents and Black migrants were 50%, and 70% of voters in both groups voted for Democrats. Given the evidence in Bositis (2012), we consider the assumption that 70% of registered Black Americans – both northern residents and migrants – voted Democratic the most preferred one. Also in this case, northern Black voters alone are no longer sufficient to explain our results, and some whites would also have to switch from the GOP to the Democratic Party in response to Black arrivals (third bar from the left).¹⁰¹

In the figure, the number of white switchers corresponds to the gap between the red diamond and the white portion of the bar. Under the second and third scenario, approximately between one and three white voters would have to switch for every ten Black migrants to explain the 2SLS coefficient estimated in Table 2. Clearly, this exercise is not meant to compute the exact number of white and Black voters switching to the Democratic Party for each new Black migrant. Our goal is instead to show that, under reasonable assumptions, Black migrants' behavior alone is not sufficient to explain the increase in the Democratic vote share estimated in Section 5.1, and that at least some northern residents – both Black *and* whites – started to vote for the Democrats.

E.2.2 Evidence from Gallup

Table E.3 complements the analysis presented in Section 5.3.2 of the paper using data from Gallup for the 1963 and 1964 waves (see Appendix C.2.2 for more details on the data). Consistent with results obtained when using data from the ANES, white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants were less likely to object to the idea of racial mixing in schools (column 1) and more supportive of the CRA (col-

¹⁰¹It is also possible that Black in-migration induced previously disengaged whites to start voting.

umn 3). Even though Black in-migration is positively associated with the probability that white respondents would vote for a Black president were their party to nominate one (column 2), this relationship is not statistically significant at conventional levels. There is instead no relationship between the Great Migration and respondents' views on whether the process of racial integration was proceeding at the right pace (column 4).¹⁰²

E.2.3 Evidence on the Role of Labor Unions from the ANES

In Section 5.3.2 of the paper, we discussed the role that labor unions might have played in increasing demand for racial equality in the northern and western electorate. Here, we provide two more pieces of evidence on this mechanism using the ANES data. First, we investigate the heterogeneity behind results presented in column 5 of Table 5, which showed that the Great Migration was positively correlated with the probability that white respondents considered the civil rights issue as the most important problem for the country.

Figure E.4 documents that these patterns are significantly stronger for union members (second, black bar) and for Democrats (fourth, blue bar).¹⁰³ Instead, for Republicans we observe a negative, and statistically significant, relationship between state level increases in the Black share and support for civil rights. Since union status and partisanship may be endogenous to the Great Migration, results in Figure E.4 should be viewed as merely suggestive. However, they paint a picture coherent with our previous discussion. Moreover, they indicate that, even though Black in-migration increased overall support for civil rights among whites, it had very different effects on voters of either party, thereby raising political polarization in the electorate.

Second, we exploit the fact that, in 1964, the ANES included questions on respondents' "feeling thermometers" towards different political, demographic, and socioeconomic groups, with higher values reflecting warmer feelings towards a group. 2SLS estimates in Table E.5 show that Black inflows were positively associated with feelings towards Democrats (column 1), Blacks (column 3), and the NAACP (column 4) among white respondents. The 1940-1960 change in the Black share was also positively correlated with whites' feelings thermometers towards labor unions (column 2), even

¹⁰²The number of observations varies substantially across questions, since some of these were asked repeatedly during 1963 and 1964. This was particularly true for the question on the pace of racial integration (column 4).

¹⁰³See Table E.4 for the 2SLS coefficients plotted in Figure E.4.

though these results are not statistically significant.

E.2.4 Residential Segregation and Independent Local Governments

The lack of (between county) white flight and the higher support for civil rights among some white voters do not imply that all white residents welcomed Black migrants into their neighborhoods. In fact, Black migration may have increased racial segregation and efforts of whites to avoid sharing public goods with Black Americans (Alesina et al., 1999, 2004). In this section, we confirm that these patterns were at play in our context. We also provide evidence that this mechanism may have amplified the positive effect of the Great Migration on demand for civil rights. Notably, higher residential segregation is compatible with higher support for civil rights. For one, until 1965, civil rights legislation was a matter that affected mostly the US South. Furthermore, higher levels of segregation may have helped defuse whites' animosity caused by Black migration into white neighborhoods.

Column 1 of Table E.6 provides evidence consistent with these ideas focusing on CORE demonstrations. Panel A replicates results in Table 3 (column 6), whereas Panels B and C split the sample in counties with 1940 residential segregation (constructed using the procedure in Logan and Parman, 2017) below and above the median, respectively. The pattern that emerges is clear: Black in-migration increased the frequency of pro-civil rights demonstrations only in counties with higher residential segregation. Said differently, support for civil rights increased *more* in counties where inter-group contact in the housing market was *lower*. This may have happened because residents of initially segregated counties had little contact with Black Americans, and were able to further isolate themselves from inter-racial tensions that Black migration may have brought to neighborhoods and housing markets. To achieve this goal, whites could create more homogeneous local jurisdictions.

In columns 2 to 5 of Table E.6, we examine whether the Great Migration increased the number of local jurisdictions using data from the Census of Government. We replicate the regressions in column 1 focusing on the change in the (log of) number of: *i*) total jurisdictions (column 2); *ii*) school districts (column 3); *iii*) special districts (column 4); and, *iv*) municipalities (column 5). In the full sample (Panel A), Black in-migration had a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of local jurisdictions (column 2) – a pattern driven by school districts (column 3) and, to a lesser extent, municipalities (column 5). Yet, this happened only in counties with

residential segregation above the median (Panel C).

One interpretation, consistent with the historical evidence (Sugrue, 2008), is that, since higher residential segregation lowered the probability that Black and white pupils shared the same school district, whites' incentives to create local jurisdictions were stronger in more segregated counties. Coupled with findings in column 1, this suggests that population sorting within counties and the creation of independent jurisdictions might have reduced potential backlash by allowing whites to live in racially homogeneous communities, where the probability of sharing public goods with Black Americans was low.

Table E.3. Additional Evidence on Whites' Attitudes: Gallup

Dependent Variable	1[Object to Half Pupils in School]	1[Vote for Black Candidate]	1[Approve Civil Rights Act]	1[Racial Integration: Right Pace vs Not Fast Enough]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	-0.043** (0.019)	0.072 (0.045)	0.038*** (0.010)	0.000 (0.012)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	2.273*** (0.217)	2.400*** (0.579)	2.202*** (0.348)	2.432*** (0.360)
F-Stat	110.2	17.15	40.07	45.53
Observations	851	2,073	931	17,478
Mean Dependent Variable	0.289	0.525	0.706	0.320

Notes: The sample is restricted to white Gallup respondents living in the US North and to years 1963-1964. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent: i) objects to having half of the classroom composed of Black pupils (column 1); ii) would vote for a Black candidate, were her party nominating one (column 2); iii) approves the Civil Rights Act introduced in 1964 (column 3); and iv) thinks that the process of racial integration is occurring at the right pace or not fast enough (column 4). Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions include region and survey year fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender and age and education fixed effects) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.4. Probability that Civil Rights is Most Important Issue for Whites

Dependent Variable	1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	0.090*** (0.028)	0.033* (0.017)	0.068*** (0.021)	0.013 (0.013)	-0.045*** (0.015)	0.047*** (0.012)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	2.517*** (0.483)	2.749*** (0.396)	2.648*** (0.431)	2.770*** (0.417)	2.874*** (0.412)	2.729*** (0.438)
F-Stat	27.18	48.25	37.79	44.09	48.72	38.81
Observations	277	648	376	551	310	617
Sample	Union Members	Non-Union Members	Identified Democrat	Identified Non-Democrat	Identified Republican	Identified Non-Republican
Mean Dependent Variable	0.119	0.107	0.119	0.105	0.094	0.119

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North in years 1960 and 1964, and residing in their state of birth. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent reports that supporting civil rights is among the most important issues facing the country at the time of the interview (see online Appendix C.2 for exact wording and additional details on the construction of the variable). The regressor of interest is the state level 1940-1960 change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 state population. Each column restricts attention to white respondents who belong to the group reported at the bottom of the table. Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include survey year and region fixed effects and individual controls of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status), and control for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.5. Whites' Feeling Thermometers

Dependent Variable	Feeling Thermometer Towards			
	(1) Democrats	(2) Unions	(3) Blacks	(4) NAACP
<i>Panel A. 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	1.895* (1.041)	0.918 (0.957)	3.262*** (1.169)	2.821** (1.404)
<i>Panel B. First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	2.611*** (0.416)	2.607*** (0.416)	2.609*** (0.415)	2.763*** (0.458)
F-stat	39.36	39.28	39.57	36.47
Observations	562	561	561	453
Mean Dependent Variable	68.91	57.53	62.37	54.93


Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North in 1964, and residing in their state of birth. The dependent variable is the feeling thermometer towards each group at the top of the corresponding column. Higher values of the thermometer refer to warmer feelings. Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include region fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table E.6. Black in-Migration, Residential Segregation, and Local Governments

Dependent Variable	Change Log(Number of Local Governments)				
	Change in 1[Pro-civil rights protest] (1)	Total (2)	School districts (3)	Special districts (4)	Municipalities (5)
<i>Panel A: Full Sample</i>					
Change Black Share	0.057*** (0.018)	0.052*** (0.013)	0.098*** (0.022)	-0.015 (0.020)	0.019** (0.008)
F-stat	10.57	12.91	12.91	12.91	12.91
Observations	3,789	3,777	3,777	3,777	3,777
<i>Panel B: Residential Segregation below Median</i>					
Change Black Share	0.023 (0.024)	-0.051 (0.086)	-0.027 (0.141)	-0.147 (0.147)	0.031 (0.034)
F-stat	9.712	9.712	9.712	9.712	9.712
Observations	1,449	1,449	1,449	1,449	1,449
<i>Panel C: Residential Segregation above Median</i>					
Change Black Share	0.054** (0.022)	0.050*** (0.013)	0.092*** (0.024)	-0.024 (0.022)	0.018* (0.010)
F-stat	7.762	9.677	9.677	9.677	9.677
Observations	1,449	1,437	1,437	1,437	1,437

Notes: The table reports 2SLS results replicating the baseline specification. Panel A estimates the baseline specification from Table 3 (column 6). Panel B (resp. C) estimates the same set of regressions for counties with residential segregation below (resp. above) the sample median. Residential segregation refers to the index constructed in Logan and Parman (2017). In columns 2 to 5 the dependent variable is the (log) number of: *i*) total jurisdictions (column 2); *ii*) school districts (column 3); *iii*) special districts (column 4); and, *iv*) municipalities (column 5). All regressions are weighted by 1940 population and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) 1940 Black share; *ii*) 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy; *iii*) state dummies. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.


Figure E.3. Scenarios on Black Behavior and Implied Number of White Switchers



Notes: The red diamonds indicate the number of votes for the Democratic Party implied by the 2SLS point estimate in column 6 of Table 2 in a county with average native-born population and average change in the share of Black Americans. Bars indicate votes cast for the Democratic Party by different segments of the population under different assumptions about turnout and voting preferences of Black voters. In each scenario, “baseline” refers to voting behavior of Black and white northern residents prior to the arrival of southern Black migrants. “Potential Black switchers” is the total number of Black voters voting for the Republicans (and could thus potentially switch to the Democratic party) in each scenario.

Scenario 1: turnout is 70% for northern voters, all Black migrants voted, 70% of northern Black residents, and all Black migrants voted Democrats. *Scenario 2:* Black turnout rate is 50%, 70% of northern Black residents, and all Black migrants voted for Democrats, given a turnout rate of 70% among migrants. *Scenario 3:* Black turnout rate is 50%, 70% of Black voters (both migrants and northern residents) voted for Democrats.

Figure E.4. Probability that Civil Rights is Most Important Issue for Whites



Notes: The figure plots 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for a regression where the dependent variable is the “pro civil rights” dummy reported in Table 5. The first two bars refer to respondents who are not and who are union members (light and dark colors respectively); the third and fourth (resp. fifth and sixth) bars restrict attention to individuals who are not and who are Democrats (resp. Republicans), with darker colors referring to members of the group. Results and details of the specification are reported in Table E.4.