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Attitudes Towards Globalization Barriers and Implications for Voting: Evidence from Sweden

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Attitudes Towards Globalization Barriers and Implications for Voting: Evidence from Sweden

Abstract

Using six waves of the Swedish National Election Studies (SNES) survey data, we investigate the determinants of attitudes towards globalization barriers (trade and immigration) and how important these attitudes are in how people vote. In line with the existing results in the literature, we find that more educated and richer voters support freer trade and more immigration. We also find that conservative voters in Sweden are more likely to prefer freer trade but higher immigration barriers. Once various economic and demographic determinants of globalization barrier preferences along with voters' ideologies on a liberal-conservative spectrum are controlled for in the analysis of voting behavior, trade barrier preferences lose their statistical significance while attitudes towards immigration barriers remain significant. This suggests that immigration attitudes affect voting behavior through channels involving identity-driven factors that are different from the channels through which more traditional electoral issues, such as trade barriers, work. Focusing on the anti-globalization Swedish Democrats, we confirm that voters with a greater preference for barriers to immigration were more likely to switch their votes to this party from the 2014 to the 2018 election.

JEL-Codes: D720, F160, J610.

Keywords: globalization, trade, immigration, elections, voting, survey data, Sweden.

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1 Introduction

Voters without doubt consider the economic implications of candidates' platforms for themselves when deciding whom to vote for. This kind of voting can often be observationally equivalent to voting along class lines. For example, more openness in trade benefits the owners of a country's abundant factor while hurting the owners of the scarce factor. Therefore, in a developed country, we can expect the more skilled or educated people, as well as capitalists or business owners, to support freer trade but the low-skilled or unskilled workers there to oppose it. If factors of production are not mobile across sectors, then a person's industry affiliation will also be important in determining whom they vote for. People working in or owning assets employed in import-competing sectors will be against free trade, while those in export sectors will support it. Similarly, the young and the old might vote differently: While the young can change locations and acquire new skills for a job in another sector more easily due to their greater mobility, acquisition of new skills will be more difficult and will make less economic sense for older people close to retirement. On the other hand, older people who have already retired might have a fixed pension not affected by trade barriers and freer trade might provide them with cheaper consumer goods, thereby reducing their cost of living.

Similar effects are at play with regards to immigration. If, on average, immigrants are lower skilled, one would expect both high-skilled workers and capitalists to be in favor of immigration as it would complement their inputs in the production process. However, low-skilled natives will be against such immigration as it provides substitutes for their services. Industry affiliation can also matter. For example, a country's medical association might control the immigration of physicians. While educated workers currently employed might be in favor of low-skilled labor immigration, older or retired workers may not be so. They may view new immigrants as a burden on the existing tax payers and as competition for public services.

In addition to economic factors and those working through certain individual characteristics, there also exist ideological considerations that might affect an individual's attitudes towards globalization. In a standard framework, ideological factors work through what, an individual believes, is good for the economy. On the one hand, an economically conservative person believes in the virtues of free trade, free markets, lower taxes etc. in that these will lead to higher economic growth, which in turn will lift all boats. On the other hand, recent experience suggests that an ideologically conservative individual often might be against open immigration policies. Relatively closed borders have recently been part of the ideology of many right-leaning political parties all over the world.

A third category of factors determining an individual’s globalization preferences is based on identity. The politics related to identity is often referred to as identity politics, which is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “politics in which groups of people having a particular racial, religious, ethnic, social or cultural identity tend to promote their own specific interests or concerns.” While people who are described as nativist prefer a society of people similar to them in appearance and culture, globalists enjoy greater cultural, racial and ethnic diversity. Strong preferences of this kind can lead to a liberal or progressive voter choosing a conservative candidate and a conservative voter choosing a liberal candidate. Such preferences can also drive one’s globalization attitudes, especially attitudes towards immigration or inflows of refugees. Identity can also drive preferences for trade policies, albeit in a less direct way. Often associated with identity politics is economic nationalism. With such attitudes, people derive pride from consuming goods and services produced within the geographical boundaries of the country they are citizens of, and consuming goods produced in foreign countries and by foreigners gives them disutility. Thus, individuals practicing economic nationalism will normally oppose freer trade.

It is possible that preferences related to globalization barriers do not matter for whom people vote for. For instance, voters might be hyper-partisan and wedded to their respective parties, or, may be, they vote only based on policies related to taxes (tax cuts and hikes) and social programs (health and education). However, in 2016, we observed President Trump run mainly on an anti-immigration and anti-trade platform, consisting of building a wall, travel bans, repealing NAFTA, slapping high tariffs on imports from China, etc. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to speculate that these were important factors that led to his election. Similarly, the Brexit vote was important in deciding who came to power in the UK.

In this paper, we use six waves of the Swedish National Election Studies (SNES) survey data¹, with the waves corresponding to the 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 parliamentary elections, to address the various questions raised above. Instead of a general question on how respondents view globalization, the survey asks the respondents about their attitudes towards trade and immigration barriers separately. In particular, the respondents are asked to evaluate certain policy proposals related to free trade, labour immigration, inflows of refugees, economic support for immigrants, a multicultural society and greater internationalism. The resulting richness of the dataset allows us to disentangle the different ways

¹Doi for the 1998 wave: <https://doi.org/10.5878/002515>. Doi for the 2002 wave: <https://doi.org/10.5878/002643>. Doi for the 2006 wave: <https://doi.org/10.5878/002526>. Doi for the 2010 wave: <https://doi.org/10.5878/002905>. Doi for the 2014 wave: <https://doi.org/10.5878/qhzhg-x011>. Doi for the 2018 wave: <https://doi.org/10.5878/p9eq-2883>. Official references are Holmberg (2002), Holmberg and Oscarsson (2006), Holmberg and Oscarsson (2012), Holmberg and Oscarsson (2017), Oscarsson et al. (2021), and Andersson et al. (2021), respectively.

in which these attitudes can affect voting and the parties' vote shares. We believe that this constitutes one of the major contributions of our paper.

First, we investigate the determinants of individual attitudes (or preferences) towards various components of globalization barriers, namely trade barriers and the five different forms of immigration barriers listed in the above paragraph. The determinants we consider include education, gender, age, income, whether the individual is an urban or rural resident, whether s/he is a homeowner or not, whether s/he is a business owner or not, whether s/he is an immigrant or not, his/her degree of inequality aversion and his/her ideology on a spectrum ranging from very conservative to very liberal. We carefully address the endogeneity issues associated with the ideology variable by using appropriate instrumental variables. This analysis allows us to observe the extent to which individual-level characteristics determine attitudes towards globalization barriers.

One of the main results from this analysis, in line with the existing literature, is that more educated as well as richer voters support freer trade and are against immigration barriers. The support for free trade is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin model. At the same time, the result on immigration barriers follows from the fact that immigration is mainly of relatively low-skilled workers in Sweden, an input complementary to high-skilled workers.² While a female voter is relatively anti-trade, she supports inflows of refugees. Older voters support freer trade but oppose refugee inflows. An interesting finding is that more inequality-averse individuals have a lower preference for trade and immigration barriers, possibly applying their inequality aversion more globally. Urban citizens prefer freer trade and lower immigration barriers relative to the less cosmopolitan rural residents. Importantly, the relatively conservative voters in Sweden are more likely to prefer freer trade but higher immigration barriers. Home ownership and business ownership do not have any meaningful relationship with trade barrier preferences. However, business owners in our sample are less likely to prefer a multicultural society. As we noted above, for the variables that the existing studies have also looked at, our results using a more extensive data set are broadly supportive of their results. The only exceptions are our findings on the impacts of inequality aversion and home ownership.

²While the share of the high-skilled foreign-born population is high in Sweden according to the OECD, language and certification requirements effectively impede the smooth transition of immigrants with high-skilled employment in their native countries into similar jobs in Sweden. Such impediments imply that the foreign-born population with high-skills are often unable to transfer their skills to the Swedish labor market, effectively turning them into low-skilled immigrants. According to the OECD, over 40 percent of the low-skilled jobs in Sweden are filled by immigrants, a higher share than the OECD average. Similarly higher than the OECD average is the share of the foreign-born population in Sweden with insufficient literacy (35 percent) due to Sweden's greater share of refugees as opposed to labor migrants in its total immigrant population.

Second, we investigate whether globalization barrier preferences determine how one votes by looking at how attitudes towards trade and immigration barriers translate into an individual's vote for a conservative or a liberal party. We show that the more a voter is against trade barriers, the more likely s/he is to vote conservative. At the same time, the greater is a voter's preference for barriers to inflows of refugees, for restrictions on support to immigrants and for limits to multiculturalism, the greater is his/her propensity to vote conservative. This result alone suggests that identity factors might be guiding voters' immigration-related attitudes and consequently their voting behavior. Crucially, controlling for various individual determinants of globalization barriers and a voter's ideology (conservative or liberal) leaves the trade barrier preference variable statistically insignificant while the preferences for immigration barriers remain significant with the same earlier sign. In other words, while a voter's preference for trade barriers predominantly works through her individual characteristics and her ideology in affecting her choice of a conservative versus a liberal party, this is not the case for immigration-related preferences. This result indicates that after controlling for economic and demographic determinants of globalization attitudes along with ideology, certain aspects of attitudes towards immigration barriers are still significant. Unlike trade barrier preferences, immigration barrier preferences impact voting choice through channels other than the standard individual characteristics or ideology. This is highly suggestive that identity-driven channels determine how people vote by contributing to the formation of their immigration barrier preferences.

While an individual-level analysis as described in the above paragraph is informative on how globalization barrier preferences affect voting behavior, a deeper understanding of political and institutional implications requires an analysis of the parties' actual vote shares. Thus, we next investigate whether variations in globalization barrier preferences at the county level bring about changes in parties' vote shares. We conduct this analysis with a special focus on Sweden's right-wing, anti-globalization party, Swedish Democrats. We find that those Swedish counties with higher average labor immigration or refugee barrier preferences were more likely to yield a higher vote share for Swedish Democrats. Furthermore, we show that voters with greater preferences for immigration barriers were more likely to switch their votes from another party to Swedish Democrats from the 2014 to the 2018 parliamentary elections. In addition, Swedish Democrats win lower vote shares in richer counties and those with older residents, and higher vote shares in counties with higher import penetration and immigrant penetration. These findings further confirm the importance of globalization barriers as an electoral issue, in particular with regards to immigration and the surrounding identity politics for which we find evidence.

Our paper makes advances over the existing literature by studying a more detailed set

of determinants of people's attitudes towards globalization barriers. We also look at a much broader set of components of globalization barriers, in particular immigration barriers. We recognize that while simultaneity problems associated with ideology as a determinant of individual attitudes exist in our model, we address this issue by using appropriate instrumental variables, as we describe later. We also address other econometric issues and find our results to be robust to these corrections. In addition, we believe that documenting the relationship between greater immigration barrier preferences and the rise of the extreme right-wing party Swedish Democrats is an important contribution of our paper.

In addition to confirming the standard drivers of voting choice as established in the literature, including various individual characteristics and ideology, our results indicate that attitudes on trade and immigration barriers affect voting behavior through separate channels. While the fact that a voter's ideology on a conservative-liberal spectrum along with individual factor endowment and demographic characteristics can explain her stand on trade barriers suggests that voters view trade as primarily a pocket book-driven issue, the same cannot be said of immigration. Our results suggest that the social and cultural implications of immigration that impact voters through identity-driven channels are an important factor in how people vote, as we document for the case of Swedish Democrats. This is because a voter's individual characteristics along with her ideology can account for her preferences on trade barriers but not on immigration barriers, implying that there are differences in how these two types of preferences are formed. Thus, we argue that globalization-barriers are not a monolithic election issue without nuances over the specific issues that comprise them. Presenting evidence for this, we believe, is a significant advance over the existing literature that can contribute to the debates on shifting voter-political party alignments as immigration becomes a more salient electoral issue.

2 Literature Review

People differ in their preferences for or against barriers to international trade and other aspects of globalization, such as immigration. Trade and immigration theorists have derived these preferences from individuals' factor endowments, industry affiliation, their consumption preferences, etc. The next step in predicting actual trade and immigration policies is to aggregate these preferences for and against globalization barriers. For example, Mayer (1984) uses the median voter theorem (in the context of electoral competition within a Heckscher-Ohlin model) to aggregate such preferences (after deriving them at the individual level). Mayer shows the existence of restrictive trade policies in capital-abundant countries (like Sweden) and relatively open trade policies in capital-scarce economies. This arises from the

heterogeneous distribution (or inequality) of capital ownership within any economy. Other approaches include lobbying or political contributions models, such as in Grossman and Helpman (1994).

More recent models study ideology and social aspects as people directly care about inequality. One example is Pástor and Veronesi (forthcoming) who model each individual's utility as not only a function of one's own consumption but also of the inequality (in consumption). With an increase in inequality, these authors show that rich-country voters can elect a populist promising the end of globalization. Similarly, Grossman and Helpman (2020), starting from special individual-level utility functions, show that inequality within a country is one of the main drivers of trade barriers. Their alternative utility function includes arguments for one's own consumption and a psychological component, where the difference between one's own consumption and the average consumption of the group one belongs to matters.

There is an analogous set of papers on endogenous immigration policy, where policy preferences are derived from first principles as a function of factor endowments and skill type. These preferences are then aggregated across individuals either through majority voting or lobbying to determine the equilibrium policy (in many cases through the maximization of a weighted sum of individual utilities). An example of such a paper with majority voting is Benhabib (1996), with Bilal et al. (2003) building on it by adding terms of trade and technological change considerations. If the import-competing sector is intensive in the use of low-skilled labor in a country with three factors of production, namely high-skilled labor, low-skilled labor and capital, an improvement in the country's terms of trade or neutral technical progress in the exporting sector leads natives to oppose the entry of low skilled and capital-poor immigrants. Thinking along factor-proportion lines, in countries like Sweden, high skilled individuals are expected to be favorable to reducing immigration barriers, with immigrant labor being primarily low-skilled. This is consistent with the evidence in Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) and Hanson and Slaughter (2002) for the US.

There is also a literature on immigration pioneered by labor economists that uses a local labor market approach to analyzing immigration inflows. Under this approach, an inflow of immigration can be regarded as a shock to labor supply, which, through its negative wage effects, is expected to hurt natives. Seminal papers in this literature such as Card (1990) and LaLonde and Topel (1991) arrive at the hypothesis that workers with different levels of skills will have conflicting attitudes to immigration policy. Borjas et al.(1996) and Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) refer to this approach as the Area-Analysis model. If we use the logic of this model in the context of a skill-abundant nation like Sweden, low skilled workers in "gateway communities" should prefer policies that lower immigration inflows in cases where

such inflows are primarily of low-skill individuals.³

There is, by now, a fairly well-developed empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy. Cross-country empirical studies on trade restrictions in the factor-proportions context include Dutt and Mitra (2002, 2005). Both papers use a Heckscher-Ohlin framework. Dutt and Mitra (2002) perform a comparative static exercise with respect to asset inequality within the Mayer (1984) median-voter model (with a Heckscher-Ohlin set up) and take the prediction to cross country data to find considerable support for it: for capital-abundant countries, greater inequality leads to higher tariffs. In Dutt and Mitra (2005), while the same dependent variable of trade restrictions is used, the authors replace the inequality measure of the previous paper with the government's political ideology (right wing, centrist or left wing). There are also several other papers now in the literature studying Congressional voting behavior such as Conconi et al. (2020), but due to space constraints we are unable to do justice to this literature.

Individual-level empirical evidence on trade policy preferences is also available based on survey data. Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) use US survey data to find support for the predictions on individual trade policy preferences derived within a Heckscher-Ohlin context, while Balistreri (1997) and Beaulieu (2002) perform similar empirical investigations using Canadian surveys. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) use cross-country individual-level survey data to investigate whether individual preferences on trade are consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin or a specific-factors world, i.e., whether preferences are determined by their factor ownership (and type) or industry affiliation. All of these papers find that one's factor endowment is the main determinant of one's trade policy preference. Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) find that home ownership is another important determinant. There is also support for industry affiliation being an important determinant in Beaulieu (2002). Mayda and Rodrik (2005) show that their empirical results are robust to controlling for individual noneconomic characteristics such as county attachment, town attachment, national attachment or pride in democracy.

There also exist a small number of empirical studies that employ standard trade models to investigate individuals' attitudes towards immigration. Using survey data from the US, Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) test not only the Heckscher-Ohlin model's implications for individuals' attitudes but also the difference between gateway community residents and non-gateway community residents. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) emphasize the high correlation between restrictive immigration attitudes and isolationist sentiments. Dustmann and Preston (2001, 2007) use survey data from the UK to look at concerns related to the labor market, welfare, race and culture. Using cross-country individual-level surveys, Mayda

³A gateway community is one that experiences high immigration penetration.

(2006) finds support for the prediction on individual immigration barrier preferences arising within a factor endowments framework. The author employs noneconomic control variables, such as national pride and religious adherence, as robustness checks. Brücker et al. (2002), using international survey data, point out that racially motivated concerns can be the most important factor even though predictions from a factor-endowments framework still hold.

Compared to the existing literature, we consider in greater detail the roles of individual factor ownership and type, attitudes towards inequality, and most importantly political ideology in attitudes towards both trade and immigration. We study various aspects of immigration, such as general labor immigration, inflows of refugees, support for immigrants and multiculturalism. In addition to analyzing the determinants of individual globalization barrier preferences, we also take the next step by analyzing individual voting choices in order to gain a better understanding of how individuals' globalization barrier preferences translate into voting behavior. We find that even voters who share a political ideology (liberal or conservative) can vote for different political parties with different ideologies. The literature on the relationship between globalization barriers and voting has primarily focused on establishing causality between actual immigration or trade penetration (as opposed to attitudes) and voting for a specific party. Examples include Barone, D'Ignazio, de Blasio and Naticchioni (2016), Colantone and Stanig (2018a, 2018b, 2019), Mayda, Peri and Steingress (2018), Moriconi, Peri and Turati (2018), Dustmann, Vasiljeva and Damm (2019), Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Majlesi (2019), Dal Bo, Finan, Folke, Persson and Rickne (2021) and Caselli, Fracasso and Traverso (2020).⁴ Our exploration of the link between globalization preferences and voting behavior, we, thus, believe, is an important contribution of our paper.

Among the papers discussed in this section, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and Mayda (2006) are the most closely-related to our paper. These two studies both consider non-economic variables such as county attachment, town attachment, national attachment and pride in democracy to explain support for free trade or protectionism (similar to our dependent variable on attitudes towards globalization). As our model's use of these variables would suffer from possible endogeneity bias due to the simultaneity between individual globalization barrier preferences and ideology, we use an instrumental variables approach as the comprehensive

⁴Of these papers, Colantone and Stanig (2018a) and Caselli, Fracasso and Traverso (2020) deserve special mention, as they study the impact on political outcomes of trade and immigration exposure simultaneously. Colantone and Stanig (2018a) do not find immigration overall to be an important driver of the vote for Brexit. However, they do find a positive effect when they focus on immigration from EU accession countries. Caselli, Fracasso and Traverso (2020) do find that greater immigration penetration has increased the vote shares of anti-globalization right-wing parties in Italy. While our focus is on how immigration attitudes, and not immigration itself, drives voting decisions, these results are broadly consistent with our findings, especially in light of the fact that immigration from EU accession countries into Britain is more likely to be low-skilled compared to immigration from non-EU accession countries (as the debates on the labor market impact of Polish plumbers demonstrated during the Brexit campaign).

survey questionnaires we use are able to provide us with good instruments.

We believe that one of our paper's contributions comes from our ability to decompose an individual's immigration barrier preference into five different components based on our data: attitudes towards labor immigration, accepting refugees, supporting immigrants, multiculturalism, and internationalism. Therefore, we are able to analyze which aspects of immigration preferences are the most important determinants of voting behavior, after controlling for economic and ideological determinants of preferences for these barriers. At the same time, we can test whether factor ownership and type remain statistically significant determinants of these different aspects in the manner we expect from standard factor proportions models. Moreover, various kinds of robustness checks that we implement guarantee that our empirical findings are not sensitive to the econometric specification.

3 Theoretical Motivation

This paper first investigates the determinants of individuals' attitudes towards globalization. The Heckscher-Ohlin model tells us that individuals owning a country's abundant factor will be in favor of more openness in trade. By the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, trade makes the owners of the country's abundant factor better off. As a result, capital owners and the more educated are expected to support more open trade in a country like Sweden that is abundant in physical and human capital (educated workers). A specific-factors model, however, says that it is the industry-affiliation of an individual that determines one's preferences related to trade. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed information on the industry affiliation of people surveyed.

Regarding immigration, a Heckscher-Ohlin type model will suggest no impact on the welfare of the various factor owners under standard conditions. The real factor rewards are unchanged as long as the country remains within the same factor price equalization zone. This idea is called the factor price insensitivity theorem. Studying a one-sector aggregate economy, it is clear that inflows of a particular factor will hurt the native owners of the same factor. This is also true of industry-specific factors within a specific-factors trade model. Of course, cultural and social identity factors also shape an individual's preferences related to immigration issues. For instance, citizens can be globalists, i.e., they may like more cultural diversity, or they could be nativists, i.e., they may like greater cultural homogeneity and may be unwelcome to foreigners not sharing their culture.

This paper goes on to investigate whether and to what extent voters' preferences on issues related to globalization affect their voting behavior. More specifically, we ask whether voters' stands on trade barriers and immigration restrictions are merely a reflection of their existing

ideologies on a traditional left-right spectrum, or if these issues are salient for economic or cultural reasons that are different from those that shape the voters' ideological stands, especially in the context of whom to vote for.

To motivate this empirical question, consider a simple model of electoral competition between two candidates L and R , where each candidate $j \in \{L, R\}$ has a fixed ideology σ_j and strategically chooses a policy p_j . We let $\sigma_L < \sigma_R$, and interpret σ_j as candidate j 's fixed stand on a traditionally-salient electoral issue such as redistribution (or gun control or abortion). Each voter i has an ideological bliss point denoted by σ_i . On the other hand, the policy p_j reflects a different issue on which candidates may not be, for historical or other reasons, bound to a fixed stand.

Voters vote sincerely for their preferred candidate upon observing the candidates' fixed ideologies and policy proposals. Specifically, voter i chooses candidate L over R if and only if $u_i^L(p_L; \sigma_L) \geq u_i^R(p_R; \sigma_R)$, where $u_i^j(p_j; \sigma_j)$ denotes the utility that voter i receives from candidate j 's election and takes the form

$$u_i^j(p_j; \sigma_j) = -\lambda(\sigma_j - \sigma_i)^2 + v_{ij}(p_j). \quad (1)$$

In equation (1), the parameter $\lambda > 0$ represents the relative importance of ideology to policy, and the function $v_{ij}(p_j)$ is the policy utility voter i derives from candidate j . Note that the function $v_{ij}(p_j)$ may differ based both on the voter and the candidate.⁵

If the voters' stands on a globalization-related policy (trade or immigration barriers) are mainly determined by their ideologies, then we would expect the policy p_j to represent a non-globalization-related issue and the voters' payoffs from the election of candidate j to be captured by equation (1). Empirically, this should imply that the voters' attitudes on barriers to globalization lose significance for how they vote when their ideologies are controlled for.

On the other hand, if voters evaluate the candidates' positions on trade or immigration barriers through a lens separate from their ideologies, then equation (1) may imply one of the following about such globalization-related issues: If the salience of globalization-related policies in elections are a relatively new phenomenon so that the candidates are not tied to a fixed stand, then the policy p_j can be interpreted as a policy of trade or immigration restrictions. Alternatively, it may be that while the candidates' stands on such issues are fixed, these stands are separate from existing ideological positions so that equation (1) should be written as

$$u_i^j(p_j; \sigma_j) = -\lambda[(\sigma_j - \sigma_i)^2 + (g_j - g_i)^2] + v_{ij}(p_j), \quad (2)$$

⁵For example, see Karakas and Mitra (2021) for a model in which voters are divided based on their cultural identities related to nativism and the candidates differ in how the immigration policies they propose translate into voter payoffs.

where g_j and g_i respectively denote candidate j 's and voter i 's fixed positions on the globalization policy, and $\lambda > 0$ now represents the relative importance of a candidate's fixed positions to her strategic policy. Empirically, either of these two possibilities would imply that the voters' positions on trade or immigration barriers remain significant for their candidate choice after the specification controls for their ideologies.

The next step is to try to decompose the impact of one's attitude towards (or preferences related to) globalization-related policies on voting behavior into two different types of channels through which it works, in addition to the channel for ideological beliefs. The first type consists of economic (and demographic) channels, while the second category consists of what works through social and cultural channels, mainly through identity politics. Since we do not have information on the latter, we can only infer its role in our voting behavior regressions by controlling for ideology and all the economic (and demographic) determinants of preferences related to globalization barriers when attitude towards globalization barriers itself is also a right-hand side variable. If globalization preferences are still statistically significant, then social and cultural factors including identity politics (through their impact on globalization preferences) can be inferred to have a likely role in determining how people vote.

4 Data

We explain here the Swedish National Election Studies (SNES) Program surveys and our variable construction procedure using the responses to these surveys. The SNES data are made available by the Swedish National Data Service and the University of Gothenburg. Sweden has national parliamentary elections (riksdagsvalet) every four years. Starting from the 1956 parliamentary elections, SNES has conducted an election survey for every parliamentary election. Since the key variables of interest to us are only available since 1998, we use the waves of 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 in our analysis.

4.1 Rotating Panel Structure

The SNES survey dataset has a rotating panel structure in that each respondent is interviewed only twice, in two consecutive rounds. In each round, some respondents are in their first round and others in their second round. The latter are replaced with new respondents in the next round. The total number of observations also varies across waves. However, the

attrition rate has been nearly constant for every wave except one.⁶ It is also important to note that the SNES recruited only new respondents for its 2018 wave and accordingly asked these respondents some additional questions in order to be able to at least partially identify trends from 2014. These additional questions include how the respondents voted in the 2014 parliamentary election, which will allow us to analyze the voters switching between parties from the 2014 parliamentary election to the 2018.

Table 1 illustrates the nature of the rotation from 1998 to 2014. In the 2006 wave, there are 3,999 respondents in total. Among them, 1,815 observations were included in the 2002 wave. Those individuals will not appear in the 2010 wave. On the other hand, 1,975 observations go on to be included in the 2010 wave. This leaves 209 observations that appear only in the 2006 wave. The total number of respondents in 2018 is 8,000.

This rotating nature of the survey calls for special attention in handling individual-level heterogeneity. In particular, widely used one-way or two-way fixed-effects specifications can be misleading in this context since each individual in our dataset exists at most twice during all four waves from 1998 to 2018. If we consider the period from 1998 to 2014, when the rotating nature of the data is continuous, 5,426 individuals appear once in our dataset while 6,598 individuals appear twice. The total number of distinct individuals for the period 1998 - 2014 is therefore 12,024, while the total number of observations is 18,622. Consequently, for the whole period 1998 - 2018, the total number of observations is 26,622. We discuss the econometric methods we employ to address this issue in the next section.

4.2 Variable Construction

We categorize our variables into globalization barrier variables, individual background variables, other preference variables, and Swedish county-level variables. Subscript i stands for each respondent in our survey sample. Subscript t stands for the different waves, i.e., $t \in \{1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018\}$.

4.2.1 Individual Globalization Barrier Preferences

Variables in this category are key for our analysis. The coding is uniform across the various barrier preference variables such that individuals with higher values have greater preference for trade and immigration barriers. We have one variable for trade barrier and five variables for immigration barrier preferences. Of these six variables related to individual globalization barrier preferences, some appear in all six waves of the SNES while the rest appear in only

⁶The attrition rates in the 1998, 2006, and 2010 waves are close to 45 percent, while in the case of the 2002 wave it is 33 percent.

four or five waves. This is visually summarized in the first appendix table, Table A.1. As we describe these variables, the heterogeneous frequency of each variable will once again be clarified.

- *TradeBar_{it}*: This variable measures a respondent’s attitude towards Sweden’s trade policy. The 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 questionnaires all have the following proposal: “Sweden should campaign for increased free trade across the whole world.” Respondents choose an integer from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating the strongest support for the idea and 5 the strongest opposition. While this question is not specifically about Sweden’s trade policy, it tells us about the respondent’s views on free trade versus protectionism in general. Therefore, we interpret an individual’s response as follows: As the value of *TradeBar_{it}* increases, the respondent has a stronger preference for trade barriers.

The remaining five variables focus on preferences on immigration barriers.

- *LaborIm_{it}*: The proposal states: “Sweden should increase labour immigration.” As in the previous question, respondents have to choose an integer from 1 to 5, with 1 representing the strongest support for the idea and 5 the strongest opposition. Like *TradeBar_{it}*, *LaborIm_{it}* is not available for the 1998 and 2018 wave.

- *Refugee_{it}*: The proposal states: “Sweden should accept fewer refugees into Sweden.” The respondent again had to choose an integer between 1 and 5, with the strength of support for the proposal decreasing in the integer chosen. We re-coded this as 6 minus the integer so that as *Refugee_{it}* increases in value, the respondent is more in favor of tightening restrictions to the entry of refugees into Sweden. This question is asked in every wave of the SNES that we study.

- *ImmiSupp_{it}*: Every wave of the SNES except 2014 asked respondents to evaluate the following proposal: “Sweden should increase economic support to immigrants so they can maintain their own culture.” Again, it is a 1-5 scale, with 1 indicating the most favorable opinion of the proposal and 5 indicating the least.

- *Multicul_{it}*: The proposal states: “Sweden should work towards a multicultural society, with high level of tolerance towards people from other countries with other religions and lifestyles.” Respondents had to choose an integer in the interval [0,10], where higher values indicate more favorable opinions of the proposal. Accordingly, we performed a transfor-

mation (11 minus the integer from the response) so that the variable $Multicul_{it}$ measures preference in favor of an immigration barrier. $Multicul_{it}$ can be constructed in every wave of the SNES that we analyze.

- $Interna_{it}$: The proposal states: “Sweden should work towards a society with more emphasis on internationalism and less of borders between people and countries.” The grading scale, 1-10 is the same as the multiculturalism proposal above, and we make a similar transformation to obtain $Interna_{it}$ as a measure of preference for a less international society, i.e. a greater preference for an immigration barrier. The SNES of 2018 did not ask respondents to evaluate this proposal. Consequently, we only have $Interna_{it}$ for the waves from 1998 to 2014.

To summarize, higher values imply a greater preference for globalization barriers (trade or immigration) for all six variables above.

4.2.2 Social and Economic Backgrounds

We include a large number of control variables in our analysis, including income, education, gender, age, whether the respondent is an immigrant, whether s/he is an urban resident, and whether s/he owns a business or a home. Details on these variables are presented in Appendix A. We also include two additional variables related to the respondent’s attitudes on income inequality and redistribution (also detailed in Appendix A).

4.2.3 Ideology and Voting Behavior

To investigate whether attitudes towards globalization can explain individual voting behavior, we use the following variables from the SNES.

- $Ideology_{it}$: Respondents choose an integer between 0 and 10, with 0 representing the extreme left and 10 the extreme right. We also use this variable in our analysis of the determinants of globalization attitudes.

- $VoteCons_{it}$: This variable is a binary dummy variable with $VoteCons_{it} = 1$ if, according to the respondent, s/he voted for one of the conservative parties in the parliamentary elections. Otherwise, $VoteCons_{it} = 0$. We classify Swedish parties as conservative or progressive based on the respondents’ judgments on the same 0 to 10 scale. If the mean score from these responses is greater than 5 for a party, then this party is regarded as conservative for that wave. Conversely, if the mean score is less than 5, that party is classified

as progressive (liberal). Note that there was no party with an average score exactly equal to 5.⁷ This classification takes into account the actual election alliances in Sweden. For instance, $VoteCons_{it} = 0$ includes every party in the progressive alliance.⁸ Symmetrically, $VoteCons_{it} = 1$ includes all parties in the conservative electoral alliance.⁹ Even though we are able to observe each individual’s vote for each election year, a binary variable restricts fluctuations in the ideology of any party within a broad range.

- $VoteOrNot_{it}$: We construct a binary variable for voter turnout in order to analyze its determinants. $VoteOrNot_{it} = 1$ if a respondent voted in the parliamentary elections and 0 otherwise. We present the relevant results in Appendix B.

- $Switcher_i$: The fact that the SNES recruited completely new respondents in 2018 allows us to study voters that switched parties in the 2014 and 2018 elections. As discussed earlier, the SNES asked the respondents in 2018 who they voted for in the 2014 parliamentary election, allowing us to identify those individuals who changed their votes between 2014 and 2018. The rise of Swedish Democrats, widely recognized as a right-wing populist party, is the relevant phenomenon in Swedish politics in between these years. Accordingly, we define $Switcher_i$ as a binary dummy variable, where $Switcher_i = 1$ if individual i voted for Swedish Democrats in the 2018 parliamentary election while voting for a different party in 2014. All other respondents are set to 0. Related methodological details for this analysis will be covered in the next section.¹⁰ 3,060 respondents answered this question about their choice in the 2014 parliamentary elections. Among them, 135 respondents are switchers: they switched to Swedish Democrats from another party.

⁷For the 2014 and 2018 waves, the conservative parties are People’s Party Liberals, Moderate Party, Centre Party, Christian Democrats and Swedish Democrats. Progressive parties are Left Party, Social Democrats, Green Party, and Feminist Initiative. For the 2010 wave, conservative parties are the People’s Party Liberals, Moderate Party, Centre Party, Christian Democrats, and Sweden Democrats. Progressive parties are Left Party, Social Democrats, Green Party, Feminist Initiative, and Pirate Party. For the 2006 wave, conservative parties are the People’s Party Liberals, Moderate Party, Centre Party, Christian Democrats, and June List. Progressive parties are Left Party, Social Democrats, and Green Party. For the 1998 and 2002 waves, conservative parties are the People’s Party Liberals, Moderate Party, Centre Party, Christian Democrats while the progressive parties are the Left Party, Social Democrats, and Green Party.

⁸Centre-Left in the 1998, 2002 and 2006 elections, and Red-Greens in the 2010, 2014 and 2018 elections.

⁹Centre-Right in the 1998 and 2002 elections, and the Alliance in the 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 elections.

¹⁰For previous waves, despite the rotating nature of the dataset, it is almost impossible to find any information on those switching to vote for Swedish Democrats (away from other parties) either because people did not vote for this party at all or extremely few people voted for them or because those who voted for this party and provide this information do not provide information on our other important right-hand side variables. That is why we limit our focus to 2018 to investigate this question.

4.2.4 County-level variables

The SNES contains each respondent’s local residence information. 21 Swedish counties are part of the SNES and almost all of the respondents reported their county of residence. Based on this geographical information that the SNES provides, we perform some county-level panel estimations using the variables described below:

- IP_{bt}^{cs} : Following Autor et al. (2020), this variable measures the penetration of imports from China into Swedish county b in election year t . Superscripts c and s stand for China and Sweden, respectively. The variable IP_{bt}^{cs} represents levels of penetration, to maintain consistency with our key dependent variables constructed in levels. We consider the weighted average of imports from China, where the weight is determined by the initial employment shares in various industries within a county. Along with trade flows, key pieces in constructing this proxy are county-level employment by industry and industrial output level. The ‘Household Market and Nonmarket Activities’ (HUS) data set includes the employment composition by industry of each district in Sweden across 31 industries.¹¹ For industrial output, we use EU KLEMS. Trade flow data is retrieved from the UN Comtrade’s SITC Rev.3.¹² The equation below illustrates the construction of our proxy for import penetration in 21 Swedish counties:

$$IP_{bt}^{cs} = \sum_k \frac{L_{bk}}{L_b} IP_{kt}^{cs}, \quad (3)$$

where subscript k stands for industry. Thus, IP_{bt}^{cs} measures the magnitude of Chinese import penetration in the Swedish county b in election year t , where $IP_{kt}^{cs} = M_{kt}^{cs} / (Y_{k0} + M_{k0} - X_{k0})$. Here, Y_{k0} , M_{k0} and X_{k0} respectively indicate industrial output, industry-level imports from China, and industry-level exports towards China in base year 0. In other words, IP_{kt}^{cs} is, for industry k , magnitude of Sweden’s imports from China in the election year t , M_{kt}^{cs} , divided by initial absorption (Sweden’s industry shipments plus net imports, $(Y_{k0} + M_{k0} - X_{k0})$, in the base year 0.) Similar to Autor et al. (2020) and Autor et al. (2014), we use 1991 as the base year 0, which is close to the start of China’s export boom. The fraction L_{bk}/L_b is the employment share of industry k in Swedish county b . Both this fraction and IP_{bt}^{cs} are expressed in percentage points. We provide further details on the construction of this

¹¹The doi for the HUS dataset is <https://doi.org/10.5878/003049>. The official reference is Klevmarcken and Flood (1991).

¹²As Swedish industrial classification of the KLEMS data follows NACE Rev.1, concordance between SITC Rev.3 and NACE Rev.1 is required. The HUS’s classification for 31 industries is consistent with the industry code of NACE Rev.1, and we matched these two industrial classifications. SITC Rev.3 is aggregated based on its 5-digit industries.

variable in Appendix A.

- $ImmiShare_{bt}$: This variable measures the number of people born abroad (excluding EU / EFTA) divided by the number of inhabitants. As in the variable IP_{bt}^{cs} introduced above, the subscript b stands for the Swedish county. The source of this information is Sweden’s Total Population Register (RTB). $ImmiShare_{bt}$ is in percentage points and serves as a proxy for the immigration penetration of each Swedish county b .

Descriptive statistics for our variables can be found in Table 2. As each respondent can choose not to respond to a given question, some missing observations exist for most variables. The mean value of $Ideology_{it}$ is slightly higher than 5 while its standard deviation is less than 2.5. Nearly 50 percent of respondents in our sample voted for conservative parties, according to the mean value of $VoteCons_{it}$. The turnout in our survey sample is over 90 percent. The distributions of our $VoteCons_{it}$ and $VoteOrNot_{it}$ variables are very similar to the actual voting behavior of Swedish voters. The Swedish political system is well known for its high voter turnout and its multi-party system. Major parties have been able to maintain their ideological affiliations (liberal or conservative) over several decades, with both liberal and conservative parties competing vigorously in national parliamentary elections.

An average Swedish voter’s preference for trade barriers is closer to the minimum value ($Tradebar_{it} = 1$) than to the other extreme ($Tradebar_{it} = 5$). For the five variables representing individual preferences for immigration barriers, we find differences between their mean values. For $LaborIm_{it}$, $Refugee_{it}$ and $ImmiSupp_{it}$, mean values are closer to the maximum level while those of $Multicul_{it}$ and $Interna_{it}$ are closer to minimum level. This inconsistency is interesting but we believe it can be explained. $LaborIm_{it}$, $Refugee_{it}$ and $ImmiSupp_{it}$ are directly related to accepting and supporting immigrants, while $Multicul_{it}$ and $Interna_{it}$ are about providing a broader environment friendly to existing immigrants.

Descriptive statistics of individual basic background variables such as $Income_{it}$, Age_{it} or $Female_{it}$ show that this survey sample is representative of the Swedish voting population. The mean value of $Education_{it}$ tells us that an average respondent in this sample has a high school diploma. Slightly above 12% of respondents in this sample are classified as immigrants. Average county-level share of immigrants measured by $ImmiShare_{bt}$ is around 7 percent. The average value of IP_{bt}^{cs} in our sample is around 87 while its maximum is greater than 200. Thus, the shock related to imports from China experienced by an average Swedish county’s local labor market is fairly high.¹³

¹³When we instead calculate the relative growth in Swedish counties’ Chinese import penetration as in Autor et al. (2020), the consequent average lies between the two averages in Autor et al. (2020). Autor

5 Econometric Specification

We aim to answer two related questions in this paper: First, we study the determinants of individual preferences related to trade and immigration barriers. We investigate whether these preferences are determined by individual-level characteristics, including the individuals' factor endowments. Our analysis is guided by the factor-proportions (Heckscher-Ohlin), specific-factors and local labor market models. We contribute to the existing analyses of this type by analyzing five different aspects of immigration barriers. This novel feature of our model is made possible by the rich data SNES questionnaires provide. Furthermore, we have a more detailed and comprehensive list of determinants compared to existing studies. We also carefully address the endogeneity issues related to the individuals' attitudes towards inequality and ideology.

Second, we examine the relationship between individual globalization barrier preferences and voting behavior, as globalization barrier preferences can potentially be an important driver of electoral trends and party platforms. Our main analysis relates to the voters' choice of party type (liberal or conservative), and whether their attitudes towards globalization barriers play a role in this choice. We also present results on voter turnout in Appendix B.

As part of our analysis of the relationship between globalization barrier preferences and voting choice, we also study those individuals who switched their votes to Swedish Democrats. Given that Swedish Democrats are a right-wing populist party with an anti-globalization platform, we test whether individual attitudes towards globalization can systematically explain this switching. In addition, we test whether such individual voting behavior gets translated into actual election outcomes in Swedish counties.

We implement a two-way error-components model in all estimations. Let subscript i denote a respondent in our survey sample. Subscript t denotes the different survey waves such that $t \in \{1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018\}$. The appearance frequency T for each individual is heterogeneous in the SNES, because this panel data is not balanced. Therefore, implementing a common or universal T is not appropriate here, and we let T_i denote the frequency for individual i to reflect the fact that appearance frequency is heterogeneous across individuals. This approach will be used throughout the paper. Accordingly, given the unbalanced nature of the SNES panel, we utilize the Swamy-Arora random-effects estimator. The error structure of our estimation model is as follows:

et al. (2020) found 71 for this average during the 2002 - 2010 period and 90 for the 2000 - 2008 period. Our sample mean of relative growth in Swedish counties' Chinese import penetration is around 78, which is between the two average figures that Autor et al. (2020) had. Based on this comparison, we can think that Sweden and United States share similar intensities of Chinese import penetration during this outcome period.

$$\epsilon_{it} = \mu_i + \lambda_t + \nu_{it} \quad (4)$$

The full error term ϵ_{it} is decomposed into an unobservable individual effect μ_i , an unobservable time effect λ_t , and the remainder, which is the stochastic disturbance term ν_{it} . This term ν_{it} is independently and identically distributed, $\text{IID}(0, \sigma_\nu^2)$. Since we are using a rotating panel and every individual appears only once or twice in our sample, a fixed-effects analysis can lead to a substantial loss in the degrees of freedom. Factoring in individual-level fixed effects also does not allow for the estimation of the effects of any time-invariant variables (Baltagi, 2013), such as Immigrant_i and Female_i . As Education_{it} , Income_{it} and Age_{it} are categorical variables, they are also very likely to be time-invariant (or close to it) in our rotating sample. The standard approach in this context (heterogeneity in rotating and unbalanced panel) is a random-effects estimation, which we resort to.^{14,15} In particular, we use random effects for individuals and year dummies, and implemented a pooled model as a robustness check (which produces results very similar to those of our random-effects estimation). Correlation coefficients between variables show no signs of a multicollinearity problem.

5.1 Determinants of Attitudes to Globalization Barriers

As discussed in Section 3, owners of relatively abundant factors of production (in Sweden’s case, capitalists or business owners and high-skilled workers) are expected to support freer trade while owners of scarce factors (in Sweden’s case, low-skilled workers) to oppose it according to the Heckscher-Ohlin model. In other words, we would expect the former type of individuals to be against trade barriers and the latter type to support them. Using either a single-sector model or a two-sector trade model with movement out of the factor-price equalization zone through immigration, we expect workers of a particular skill level to oppose immigration of workers of similar skill levels but support workers with other complementary skill levels. In the case of immigration of low-skilled workers or inflows of refugees with low average skills, high-skilled workers will support immigration and oppose immigration barriers. Low skilled individuals will have the opposite attitude. This leads to the following two estimating equations, respectively for trade and immigration barrier preferences:

¹⁴Biørn (1981) and Biørn and Jansen (1983) suggest an alternative GLS estimation approach, which requires a different variance-covariance matrix under this rotating panel context.

¹⁵Rotating panels have been widely used in the field of productivity. Heshmati (1994), Heshmati (1998), and Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1995) estimate production function parameters from Swedish farm-level rotating panel data using a random-effects specification. Production parameters estimated with a random-effects specification were superior to those using a fixed-effects specification. Bias in efficiency measures were smaller with a random-effects specification.

$$TradeBar_{it} = X\beta_1 + \mu_i + \lambda_t + \nu_{it} \quad (5)$$

$$ImmiBar_{it} = X\beta_2 + \mu_i + \lambda_t + \nu_{it} \quad (6)$$

In equation 6, $ImmiBar_{it}$ stands for individual attitudes towards barriers to five different aspects of immigration, namely labor immigration, refugee immigration, immigrant support, multiculturalism and internationalism, so that

$$ImmiBar_{it} \in \{LaborIm_{it}, Refugee_{it}, ImmiSupp_{it}, Multicul_{it}, Interna_{it}\} \quad (7)$$

The explanatory variables included in above two models are identical and include $Education_{it}$, $Income_{it}$, and Age_{it} . $Education_{it}$, is a measure for human capital ownership, a key variable. Other variables we study include $Immigrant_i$, $Female_i$, $Ideology_{it}$, $Inequality_{it}$, $BusinessOwn_{it}$, $Urban_{it}$, $HomeOwn_{it}$, IP_{bt}^{cs} , and $ImmiShare_{bt}$. The definitions and sources of these variables have already been explained in the Data section and Appendix A.

An important strength of our work relative to the existing literature is our large set of control variables. For all our regressions, we control for the individual’s county of residence, categorized into 21 geographical regions. In addition, we use a dummy for gateway versus nongateway communities. These geographic fixed effects and the dummy together control for region-specific behavior.¹⁶

Equations 5 and 6 are estimated using a random-effects specification. As mentioned earlier, the frequency of our observations is individual-specific due to the unbalanced nature of the SNES data. Since each dependent variable is restricted to be an integer and higher values are associated with greater barrier preferences, we can also estimate an ordered logistic model with random effects. In this case, using an ordered probit model has also been suggested by the literature. We do that as one of our robustness checks.

Note that the variable $Ideology_{it}$ can be endogenous to our right-hand side variables. In order to address this concern, we use the 2SLS method under a random-effects specification (G2SLS) for an unbalanced panel. There is a set of variables highly correlated with $Ideology_{it}$ and expected to satisfy the exclusion restriction (can be argued not to be correlated with the dependent variable other than through $Ideology_{it}$). Details of these variables are provided in the section on ‘Econometric Concerns and Robustness Checks’. When we focus on the role of factor endowments in explaining individual globalization barrier preferences, there can also exist certain sources of geographical heterogeneity that cannot be captured by county dummies. Following Mayda (2006), we also offer separate estimation results with interac-

¹⁶Random effects are at the individual level.

tion terms between $Education_{it}$ and local county information such as import penetration, immigration penetration and median income.

5.2 Voting Behavior

It is only if individual attitudes towards globalization affect how people vote will trade and immigration policy be affected by these preferences. Therefore, it is important to investigate any role these preferences may play on voting.

To simplify our analysis, we construct the variable $VoteCons_{it}$, as described in the data section. We classify Swedish political parties as conservative or liberal based on the average of the voters' evaluation scores. As this is a binary choice variable and we have many categorical time-invariant explanatory variables such as $Female_i$ and $Immigrant_i$, our preferred model is the logistic model with a random-effects specification, as described below:

$$\begin{aligned} & Prob[VoteCons_{it} = 1 | TradeBar_{it}, ImmiBar_{it}, X_{it}] \\ & = F(\beta_1 TradeBar_{it}, \beta_2 ImmiBar_{it}, X^T \beta + \mu_i + \lambda_t + \nu_{it}), \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

where F is the distribution function of the logistic distribution. The unbalanced nature of the SNES data is properly treated by implementing T_i instead of a universal T . Note that we include only one variant of the $ImmiBar_{it}$ variable at a time, since including more than one variant of $ImmiBar_{it}$ in a single regression would result in a possibility of a multicollinearity problem. X includes the same variables as in the previous analysis except that $Inequality_{it}$ is replaced by Tax_{it} , which represents an individual voter's attitude towards higher taxes. We continue to control for an individual's county of residence.

For robustness, in place of the random-effects logistic estimation, we also test a random-effects probit model as well as a random-effects linear probability model. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged. As the linear probability model can have fitted values outside of the interval $[0,1]$, nonlinear logistic and probit models are our preferred estimation methods.

Using this model, we can test whether and to what extent voters' preferences on issues related to globalization affect their voting behavior. In particular, we ask whether voters' stands on trade barriers and immigration restrictions are merely a reflection of their existing ideologies on a traditional left-right spectrum, or if these issues are salient for economic or cultural reasons that are different from those that shape the voters' ideological stands. That is why, in one specification, we throw in both the ideology and the globalization preference variables (the trade barrier variable and one immigration barrier variable at a time) simultaneously on the right-hand side along with the economic determinants of globalization preferences mentioned above. We aim to decompose the impact of one's attitude towards

(or preferences related to) globalization-related policies on voting behavior into two different types of channels through which it works. The first type consists of whatever works through economic or self-interest channels, while the second category consists of what works through social and cultural channels, mainly through identity politics, in addition to voting for a particular party for purely ideological reasons. Since we do not have information on identity politics, we can only infer its role in our voting behavior regressions by controlling for ideology and all the economic (and demographic) determinants of preferences related to globalization barriers when the attitudes towards globalization barriers themselves are also right-hand side variables. If globalization preferences are still statistically significant, then social and cultural factors, including identity politics (through their impact on globalization preferences) can be inferred to have a role in determining how people vote. We run similar regressions with voter turnout as the dependent variable. Those regression results are presented in Appendix B and briefly discussed at the end of the next section.

By replacing the dependent variable of equation 8, $VoteCons_{it}$, with $Switcher_i$, we test whether there is any systematic relationship between individual attitudes towards globalization and switching to voting for Swedish Democrats. As we clarified in the Data section, we can only identify the switching behavior of respondents in the SNES 2018. This is why we do not have the time subscript t for $Switcher_i$ in this model, and the analysis of switching behavior no longer uses panel data. What we suggest as empirical evidence is based on a cross-sectional estimation using the SNES 2018. Among the individual globalization barrier preference variables, only three of them appear in the SNES 2018, which are $Refugee_i$, $ImmiSupp_i$, and $Multicul_i$. Therefore, we cannot control for trade barrier preferences in analyzing switching behavior towards Swedish Democrats. However, all other demographic and local information still exist in the SNES 2018, so those can be included as covariates. In addition, since the variable $Switcher_i$ has a difference interpretation, we include right-hand side variables in first-differences whenever we can. In particular, since the 2018 SNES respondents are newly-hired, only county level variables such as import and immigrant penetration can be first-differenced.

5.3 County-level Analysis

While the individual-level analysis described in the previous section can inform us on the role globalization barrier preferences play on voting behavior, a deeper understanding alas requires county-level analyses. Using the vote share of a specific party or an electoral coalition as the left-hand-side variable, we investigate whether the variation in barrier preferences at the county level brings about change in vote shares. In particular, we consider the county-

level vote shares of Swedish Democrats to study the rise of Sweden’s right-wing populist party.

We indicate the vote share of Swedish Democrats for each county b in year t as $ShareSD_{bt}$.¹⁷ For county-level globalization barrier preferences, we use the within sample mean for each county denoted by $TradeBar_{bt}$ and $ImmiBar_{bt}$. Accordingly, the county-level estimation equation can be presented as follows:

$$ShareSD_{bt} = \beta_{o1}TradeBar_{bt} + \beta_{o2}ImmiBar_{bt} + \beta_o X_{bt} + \mu_b + \lambda_t + \nu_{bt} \quad (9)$$

In equation 9, all subscripts i have been replaced by b for Swedish counties. X_{bt} includes $Education_{bt}$, $MedInc_{bt}$, Age_{bt} , $Female_{bt}$, $Ideology_{bt}$, $Inequality_{bt}$, $BusinessOwn_{bt}$, $Urban_{bt}$, $HomeOwn_{bt}$, IP_{bt}^{cs} and $ImmiShare_{bt}$. To minimize possible measurement errors, we use official administrative figures instead of within sample mean for some of these variables. Specifically, $Education_{bt}$ is now the share of those with tertiary education in the population in the 25-64 years old category. The median income of each county, $MedInc_{bt}$, from administrative sources is used instead of the within sample mean of $Income_{it}$. $Female_{bt}$ is the actual female share of each county for each year. For consistency, all share variables are in percentage points.

Since $TradeBar_{it}$ is missing from the 1998 and 2018 SNES, the resulting $TradeBar_{bt}$ will be also missing for those waves. Likewise, $ImmiSupp_{bt}$ cannot be calculated for 2014. This implies that, for the estimation with $ImmiSupp_{bt}$, we only have 63 observations at the country-level (21 counties and 3 years). For estimations that do not include $ImmiSupp_{bt}$, we have 84 observations. Given the overall sample size, we maximize the degrees of freedom by estimating a random effect specification.

6 Estimation Results

In this section, we present our main empirical findings. The first three tables for this section (Tables 3-5) display our results on the determinants of individual-level globalization (trade and immigration) barrier preferences based on equations (5) and (6). After identifying the determinants of globalization barrier preferences, we next focus on how they matter for voting behavior. We first estimate equation (8) by dropping individual characteristics (economic and demographic determinants of globalization barrier preferences) as controls, after which we include them. As we explained earlier, this helps us identify the possible role of identity politics, if any, in an individual’s decision on whom to vote for. Tables 5-10

¹⁷Consequently, $0 < ShareSD_{bt} < 100$.

present these results. Tables 11 and 12 present county-level analysis characterizing the vote share of Swedish Democrats and the switching behavior of voters, respectively. For each table in this section, we maximize the degrees of freedom by using all possible waves of the SNES. The variables $TradeBar_{it}$ and $ImmiBar_{it}$ are the only sources of differences in the number of waves used, as clarified in Table A.1. Note that the switching behavior analysis uses only the 2018 wave as explained in the previous sections.

6.1 Individual Characteristics and Globalization Barrier Preferences: The Role of Factor Endowments, Demographics and Ideology

Table 3 presents results from the estimation of equation (5) and equation (6) as least-squares linear regressions with random effects. Table 4 also presents results from the estimation of the same equations but as an ordered logistic model with random effects. The results presented in Table 4 are marginal effects. The dependent variables in both tables are measures of the strength of individual-level preferences for globalization barriers.

Human capital as measured by $Education_{it}$ has a statistically significant negative effect in both Tables 3 and 4: A more educated Swedish voter is less likely to prefer trade and immigration barriers. The result on trade barriers is consistent with Sweden being abundant in high skilled labor, while the immigration result is indicative of immigration flows being, on average, inflows of low-skilled labor into Sweden. $Income_{it}$ is also negatively correlated with the dependent variable in a statistically significant manner throughout Tables 3 and 4, except in the case of $ImmiSupp_{it}$ (column (4) in each of the two tables). Higher income individuals, thus, tend to have a lower preference for trade and immigration barriers.

It is important to note at this point that evidence for the labor market theory, that low-skilled immigration hurts the native low-skilled population while benefiting the native high-skilled workers, is not conclusive. It is therefore highly plausible that an individual's human capital endowment determines his/her attitudes on immigration through perceived, rather than actual, channels. In other words, low-skilled respondents might *perceive* low-skilled immigrants to hurt their economic prospects, whether this effect exists in reality or not. Our findings here are consistent with the results of Mayda (2006), that an individual's factor endowments affect his/her preferences on immigration barriers, despite the lack of evidence for the labor market theory as documented by Peri (2016).¹⁸

¹⁸Ruist (2015) finds no employment effects of refugees in Sweden on the native population, but instead shows that such effects exist for existing low-skilled immigrants. There is also evidence presented by Hansen and Lofstrom (2009) that refugees in Sweden are more dependent on welfare assistance than the natives, which might be contributing to our finding of support for factor endowments affecting an individual's immigration

It is highly plausible that an immigrant’s attitudes towards trade and immigration barriers are different from those of a non-immigrant (native). As shown by the statistically significant and negative coefficients of this variable in column (1) of Tables 3 and 4, immigrants are more supportive of freer trade than non-immigrants. Interestingly, immigrant status does not have a statistically significant effect on a voter’s attitude towards accepting immigrants (column (2) and column (3)). However, as seen in columns (4)-(6), immigrants are more likely to prefer active government support for existing immigrants and a more multicultural and international society. The different labor market outcomes of the immigrants vis-a-vis the natives may help explain some of these results. For instance, that immigrants have higher unemployment rates compared to the natives and that they are more likely to be in poverty are facts consistent with their greater preference for support to immigrants. Their greater preference for multiculturalism and internationalism might also reflect the cultural hardships they might have experienced in their adopted countries.

The coefficients for $Inequality_{it}$ are consistently negative across all specifications in Tables 3 and 4, except in column (2) of both tables where $LaborIm_{it}$ is the dependent variable. Note that $Inequality_{it}$ is a measure of individual-level inequality aversion. Based on these results, we can infer that more inequality-averse individuals have a lower preference for trade and immigration barriers. Including $Inequality_{it}$ as a right-hand side variable in our regressions is motivated by Grossman and Helpman (2020), where the psychological component of the utility function captures inequality aversion. The negative coefficient sign we find for inequality aversion might indicate a concern for inequality at a more global level. It might also reflect a concern for persecuted people in poor countries with nondemocratic governments. As a result, such people might be more open to immigration, especially inflows of refugees. In addition, treating immigrants well and providing them with different kinds of support (including making their society more multicultural and international) might be consistent with inequality aversion. Similarly, openness to trade in Sweden might provide markets for the products of poor countries, consequently creating higher incomes and jobs there. The general concern among voters about inequality may also be a reflection of the fact that Sweden is a relatively equal society with rising levels of inequality.

The signs of the coefficients of the other control variables in Tables 3 and 4 are reasonably consistent with our intuition and/or existing results in the literature. $Urban_{it}$ has negative and statistically significant coefficients across all columns in Tables 3 and 4, except in column (1) of Table 4. Urban citizens prefer freer trade and lower immigration barriers relative to rural residents. This might be the consequence of living in the more cosmopolitan environment of urban areas relative to rural areas. The coefficients of age indicate that older

barrier preferences.

individuals have a lower preference for trade barriers while they want greater immigration barriers for both labor immigrants and refugees coming into Sweden (columns (2) and (3)). In addition, they are opposed to supporting immigrants and pursuing multiculturalism. All of this is not surprising as they are more likely to have grown up in a more homogeneous society. Older individuals who are retired (mainly living on pensions), however, do not see their incomes affected by trade. But, free trade keeps their cost of consumption low.

As the variable $Ideology_{it}$ is higher in value for a more conservative individual, we can infer from its coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 that the relatively conservative voters in Sweden are more likely to prefer freer trade. However, they prefer higher immigration barriers. The effect of $Ideology_{it}$ is positive and significant for all the immigration-related dependent variables.

Turning to gender effects, female voters in Sweden have a stronger preference for trade barriers than male voters. Since we already control for education and income (and also because we see that there is no statistically significant gender gap in education), this significant gender difference in attitudes to trade is not driven by human capital or ownership of other assets. However, it might be due to their greater concern for wage inequality not captured by the inequality aversion variable. Turning to gender effects on barriers to labor immigration and refugee inflows, only in column (3) of Tables 3 and 4 is the coefficient estimate of $Female_i$ statistically significant, in which case it is negative in sign. This means that Swedish female voters are relatively against barriers to refugee inflows. Female voters also are relatively against barriers to multiculturalism, but the result is the opposite for internationalism.

Home ownership and business ownership do not have any meaningful relationship with trade barrier preferences. However, business owners in our sample are less likely to prefer a multicultural society. We also infer from the regression results that home owners are more liberal in accepting labor immigrants while they are not in favor of providing economic support for immigrants living in Sweden.

Table 5 is an extended version of Table 3 in the sense that the human capital endowment variable, $Education_{it}$, is interacted with local information. Mayda (2006) uses GDP per capita to capture the skill composition of the natives relative to that of immigrants in her cross-country analysis. As we were not able to find the official representative mean income of each county, we use the median income of each county $MedInc_{bt}$. Chinese import penetration and immigrant penetration are also separately interacted with $Education_{it}$. The overall marginal effect of $Education_{it}$ is presented in the last row of Table 5, arrived at using the delta method evaluated at the mean of all observations. For all columns, the marginal effects of educational attainment are negative and significant. This result is consistent with

our results in Tables 3 and 4.

When individual human capital endowment is interacted with the median income of their county (5th row of Table 5), we reject the null hypothesis of zero coefficient size when the dependent variables are $TradeBar_{it}$ and $LaborIm_{it}$. In particular, for trade barrier (labor immigration barrier) preference, respondents from counties with a higher median income can have weaker (stronger) negative marginal effects of $Education_{it}$. When educational attainment is interacted with import penetration, only column (2) has a statistically significant coefficient for this interaction term. As it is positive, we can say that voters in counties with higher import penetration have weaker negative marginal effects of $Education_{it}$. Even though more educated people dislike immigration barriers, their dislike is weakened by their county's exposure to Chinese imports. More educated Swedish voters in counties with higher immigrant penetration are likely to have their dislike for barriers to refugee and pursuing multiculturalism strengthened. (Column (3) and (5) of row 7). Other demographic variables and $Ideology_{it}$ contain similar implications in Table 5 as in Tables 3 and 4.

6.2 Voters' Choices, Globalization Barrier Preferences and Individual Characteristics

We next study voters' choices in the Swedish parliamentary elections by focusing on equation (8). In Tables 6 and 7, we look at how attitudes towards trade and immigration barriers translate into an individual's vote for a conservative or a liberal party. Our dependent variable here is $VoteCons_{it}$, a binary variable explained earlier in the data section.¹⁹

While the trade barrier preference variable is on the right-hand side of every regression presented in Tables 6 and 7, each of these regressions also has a variant of the immigration barrier preference variable one at a time. The econometric model is a logistic model with random effects capturing respondent heterogeneity. Year and county effects are also included, but individual economic and demographic characteristics and ideology are not. We present in Table 6 the estimated marginal effects based on our random-effects specification of the logistic model. In Table 7, another variable capturing preference for tax hikes (or against tax cuts) is included, while this variable is excluded in Table 6.

We see in Table 6 that the more a voter is against trade barriers, the more likely s/he is to vote conservative. At the same time, the greater is a voter's preference for barriers to inflows of refugees, for restrictions on support to immigrants, for limits to multiculturalism, and for restrictions on internationalism, the greater is his/her propensity to vote conservative.

¹⁹With several political parties operating in Sweden, a multinomial setting with many survey waves can be confusing and difficult to make sense of. As we have individual evaluation scores on the ideologies of political parties, we use their mean score to construct our binary choice variable, $VoteCons_{it}$.

Adding the variable capturing the preference for tax hikes on the right-hand side of the regressions in Table 7 does not qualitatively change these results. We also find that those who like tax hikes are more likely to vote liberal, while those who like tax cuts are more likely to vote conservative.

In addition to the variables already present in Table 7, the regressions presented in Tables 8 and 9 include variables representing all the individual characteristics that were shown to be determinants of globalization barrier preferences in Tables 3 and 4. Table 8 does not include individual ideology as an explanatory variable while Table 9 does. The dependent variable is the same in Tables 8 and 9 as in Tables 6 and 7 ($VoteCons_{it}$).

We observe that $Education_{it}$ has a positive marginal effect across all specifications in Tables 8 and 9. This result makes economic sense as the free-trade ideology and the low tax rate platform of conservative parties are in the economic interest of the well-educated or high-skilled individuals with higher incomes.

The income level of a Swedish voter is statistically insignificant in all columns of Table 9 while it is weakly significant in Table 8. The consistently negative and significant coefficient of the tax preference variable clearly indicates that Swedish voters with a stronger preference for higher taxes are likely to prefer progressive political parties. Those preferring tax cuts are likely to vote conservative. We also see that immigrants are less likely to vote conservative. Older people, business owners and home owners are more likely to vote for conservative parties, as seen from each and every specification in Table 8. In Table 9, marginal effects of Age_{it} retain their statistical significance while the p-value is greater than 0.05. Home and business ownership lose their statistical significance in Table 9. Being an urban citizen has a statistically significant negative effect in each and every specification in Table 8 while in Table 9 its overall significance is weakened.

Based on the very high significance level of $Ideology_{it}$ in Table 9, we can view $Ideology_{it}$ as one of the key factors explaining the voting behavior of Swedish voters. More specifically, the marginal effects of $BusinessOwn_{it}$, $HomeOwn_{it}$ and $Urban_{it}$ lose significance after we control for individual ideology in Table 9. This means that these variables were significant in Table 8 due to their associations with differences in political ideology and their effect on voting choice mainly worked through ideology.

The weak explanatory power (based on statistical insignificance) of $Income_{it}$ in Tables 8 and 9 is consistent with other studies of Swedish voting behavior (Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Nieuwbeerta and Ultee, 1999; Oskarson, 2016). We dropped $Education_{it}$ to check whether $Education_{it}$ absorbed variation in income level and/or the effect of the income level on voting choice. Keeping $Income_{it}$ while excluding $Education_{it}$ did not make any difference in our main empirical results. And $Income_{it}$ still remained insignificant.

Our main question about the relationship between globalization barrier preferences and voting choice is once again clearly answered in Tables 8 and 9. In Table 8, as we saw in Tables 6 and 7, we can again observe that $TradeBar_{it}$ has statistically significant negative marginal effects in all of columns (1) through (5). For the $ImmiBar_{it}$ variables in Table 8, columns (2), (3), (4) and (5) show statistically significant positive marginal effects. Thus, those who are against immigration in various forms vote conservative. The fact that these globalization barrier preference variables are significant even in the presence, on the right-hand side, of individual characteristics that were important determinants of globalization preferences in the first place indicates that the effects of globalization barrier preferences on voting behavior work not only through purely economic interests and demographic characteristics but also ideological views on the overall effects (costs and benefits) of globalization. In addition, social and cultural factors such as identity politics could also possibly matter.

Table 9 illustrates some important changes when we include $Ideology_{it}$ as an explanatory variable in equation (8). The $TradeBar_{it}$ is no longer statistically significant in Table 9. However, $ImmiBar_{it}$ variables except $LaborIm_{it}$ maintain their statistical significance. This means that any two voters sharing the same ideological position as well as the same economic and demographic characteristics can vote for parties with different ideologies if their attitudes towards immigration are different. Individual ideological positions and individual economic and demographic characteristics are not enough to explain their voting choices in parliamentary elections. The additional explanatory power of attitudes towards immigration (over and above ideology and individual characteristics) indicate a possible role for social and cultural factors such as identity politics in determining voting choice.

Note here that ideology itself is positive and highly significant statistically in all columns of Table 9, indicating that everything else remaining equal, a person with a conservative ideology is more likely to vote conservative. Table 10 ensures that our main findings can still be identified even after we include the local import penetration and immigrant penetration as covariates.

We present some results on voter turnout in our Appendix Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3, which follow the format of the last three tables on voter choice. As $VoteOrNot_{it}$ is a binary choice variable, the marginal effects from the logistic model with random effects are presented in these Appendix tables. In Appendix Table B.1 where ideology is not controlled for, we observe that more educated people are more likely to vote in the Swedish national parliamentary elections. Older people, home owners and females have a greater turnout rate, while immigrants have a relatively lower turnout. Individuals who support higher tax rates are also more likely to appear at the voting booth. While support for labor immigration does not explain voter turnout, the other immigration barrier preference variables have

negatively significant marginal effects. Thus, Swedish voters that support high barriers to inflows of refugees, oppose the provision of support for existing immigrants and are against multiculturalism and internationalism are less likely to show up to vote at the parliamentary elections.

Including $Ideology_{it}$ as an explanatory variable in Appendix Table B.2 renders all trade and immigration barrier preference variables insignificant, except for $Refugee_{it}$, in the voter turnout regressions. The marginal effects of the other control variables related to individual characteristics maintain their signs and significance except Tax_{it} . We also see that $Ideology_{it}$ is consistently negative (except in column (1)) but never significant. Almost identical patterns are observed after we include the local import penetration and immigrant penetration variables (Appendix Table B.3).

6.3 County-level Analysis and Switchers

Table 11 presents the estimation results based on our county-level analysis described in Section 5.3. These results indicate that all immigration barrier variables except for support for immigrants and internationalism are significant determinants of Swedish Democrats' vote share: A Swedish county with higher average labor immigration barrier preference or refugee barrier preference, or one that is more against multiculturalism is likely to yield a higher vote share for Swedish Democrats. These findings are consistent with Swedish Democrats' anti-globalization agenda. We can also observe that Swedish Democrats win lower vote shares in richer counties and those with older residents. A point that is noteworthy in Table 11 is that counties with higher import and immigrant penetration have higher vote shares for Swedish Democrats (see coefficient estimates of IP_{bt}^{cs} and $ImmiShare_{bt}$).

As discussed in Section 2, Autor et al. (2020) and Mayda et al. (forthcoming) find that import penetration from China and immigrant penetration can together explain the Republican vote shares in the US. Our findings in Table 11 are consistent with their results. In Appendix C, we present results in Tables C.1 and C.2 based on our analysis of the aggregate vote share of the right-wing coalition only and the right-wing coalition together with Swedish Democrats, respectively, as the dependent variables. We can observe from these tables that the immigrant penetration variable is still very significant and positive. Higher import penetration from China is also linked with higher vote share for the right-wing coalition and Swedish Democrats as observed in Table C.2. The estimation results that do not include average globalization barrier preferences on the right-hand side are presented in Table C.3, where the finding that Swedish counties with higher immigrant penetration have higher vote shares for Swedish Democrats is still obtained.

At the same time, we find some important differences between how globalization barrier preferences drive the vote shares of Swedish Democrats and the right-wing coalition (which includes People’s Party Liberals, Moderate Party, Centre Party and Christian Democrats but excludes Swedish Democrats). Compared to Swedish Democrats, the parties in the right-wing coalition are relatively pro-immigration, although in recent years there has been a noticeable anti-globalization shift in these parties’ immigration stands as well. As mentioned in the above paragraph, Table 11 includes our results for the determinants of voting for Swedish Democrats. In Appendix C, Tables C.1 and C.2 respectively present our results on the determinants of the vote share of the right-wing coalition and the total vote share of the right-wing coalition plus Swedish Democrats. Table C.3 runs the same regressions without including globalization barrier preference variables. Comparing Tables 11 and C.1, we can observe that $Refugee_{bt}$ and $Multicul_{bt}$, which are statistically significant in Table 11, lose their statistical significance in Table C.1. We believe this is an important difference that we were not able to capture when investigating only whether a voter voted for a conservative party.

The specification in Table 11 can also be implemented in first-differenced form (as is also possible in the case of our other county-level regressions). We find that this yields similar signs and magnitudes for the estimated coefficients. However, the statistical significance is considerably lower with the first-difference transformation. This is not surprising, given that the first-difference coefficient estimates are known to be systematically less efficient than random effect estimates. Also, the utility of the first-difference transformation (over our level random-effects regressions) is limited in our case, as there are no dynamics to capture given the small time dimension of our dataset. In addition, first difference regressions do not utilize all the information we use in our level regressions.

Table 12 presents our results on the characteristics of those voters that switched to Swedish Democrats between 2014 and 2018. As clarified earlier, the variable $TradeBar_{it}$ as well as two other immigration barrier variables are missing from the 2018 wave of the SNES. Therefore, the analysis in Table 12 uses only the remaining three globalization barrier preference variables ($Refugee_i$, $ImmiSupp_i$ and $Multicul_i$), but are identical to our earlier analysis otherwise. The first column in Table 12 has only two right-hand side variables: the change in IP_{bt}^{cs} and change in $ImmiShare_{bt}$ between 2014 and 2018. As mentioned in the Econometric Specification section, $Switcher_i$ is a binary variable whose value equals 1 when a voter switches to voting for Swedish Democrats in 2018 from a different party in 2014. Thus, the variable $Switcher_i$ has a first-difference interpretation. In the 2018 wave, while each voter reveals whom s/he voted for in 2018 and 2014, we know his/her individual characteristics only in 2018. Assuming there was no change in individual characteristics, first-differencing would

eliminate them from the regression. Note here that the respondents of the SNES 2018 are newly recruited. Therefore, only county-level information such as IP_{bt}^{cs} and $ImmiShare_{bt}$ can go through the first-difference transformation without their elimination. Column (1) indicates that the change in IP_{bt}^{cs} and $ImmiShare_{bt}$ are not significant determinants of switching to Swedish Democrats.

In the next four columns, we incorporate individual-level variables to see whether they affect switching behavior. Columns (2), (3) and (4) incorporate only one immigration barrier preference variable at a time, and indicate that voters with greater refugee barrier preference and that are more against supporting immigrants and multiculturalism are more likely to switch towards Swedish Democrats. The last column of Table 12 has all three immigration barrier preference variables together as explanatory variables. Two of them, $Refugee_i$ and $Multicul_i$, maintain both the signs of their marginal effects and statistical significance. The strength of this finding is noteworthy, given that no other variable has significance comparable to these immigration barrier preference variables. In addition, it suggests that the Syrian refugee crisis during the period of our analysis may have played a role in shifting voters' support to Swedish Democrats, possibly through hardening their nativistic attitudes manifested in their preference for barriers to inflows of refugees and to the diversity of cultures they bring with them. Our findings in Tables 11 and 12 are closely linked as attitudes towards immigration and presumably the refugee crisis contributed to switching towards Swedish Democrats (Table 12) while at the same time providing Swedish Democrats with higher vote shares during our period of analysis (Table 11).

7 Econometric Concerns and Robustness Checks

In this section, we provide robustness checks and address possible econometric concerns, including the potential endogeneity in our model of the determinants of globalization barrier preferences (Tables 3, 4 and 5). We also address several types of sample selection issues. We have also run alternative specifications to the logistic distribution such as the probit and linear probability models (LPM). All of our robustness checks support the empirical results from our main econometric specifications.

7.1 Endogeneity

In equations (5) and (6), whose estimation results were presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5, the dependent variables (an individual's globalization barrier preferences) can themselves be viewed as making up an individual's ideology. In other words, while an individual's ideology

can determine his/her attitudes towards trade and immigration barriers, the latter could also determine the former to a certain extent. Therefore, there is a simultaneity concern in our models such that the variable $Ideology_{it}$ might be correlated with the error term.²⁰

To address endogeneity, we adopt an instrumental variable strategy. The SNES provides a number of variables that are highly correlated with $Ideology_{it}$ but not with $TradeBar_{it}$ and $ImmiBar_{it}$ separately (over and above their impact through the effects on $Ideology_{it}$). These candidates for instruments are the following variables: $Christian_{it}$ (Should we work towards a society where Christian values are more important?), Law_{it} (Should we work towards a society with more law and order?), $Defense_{it}$ (Should we reduce defence expenditure?), $Tradition_{it}$ (Should we work towards a society that protects traditional Swedish values?), $Environ_{it}$ (Should we work towards an environmentally friendly society even if it means little or no economic growth?).

Table 13 presents our estimates from the random effect 2SLS (G2SLS) regressions that address endogeneity in our models.²¹ These results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. In running these regressions, we work with different sets of instrumental variables for $TradeBar_{it}$ and $ImmiBar_{it}$: For trade barrier preferences, we use the variables $Christian_{it}$, Law_{it} and $Environ_{it}$ simultaneously as our instruments. For the other columns in Table 13 on the determinants of immigration barrier preferences, we use the variables $Environ_{it}$ and $Defense_{it}$ as our instruments. While these variables related to religion, preference for strict law and order, preference for defense spending and environmentalism are integral components of an individual's ideology, they are unlikely to affect attitudes on globalization other than through one's ideological leanings as a conservative or liberal (as explained in the next paragraph). Thus, we expect these variables to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Note that we use at least two instrumental variables for each estimation so that we can test the validity of our instruments through an over-identification test. The last row of Table 13 presents p-values for the Sargan-Hansen over-identification tests. For all columns of Table 13, we can observe that the null hypothesis of the over-identification test (that these are

²⁰We do not believe this is a concern in our county-level regressions, as it is unlikely that the vote shares of conservative parties or in particular Swedish Democrats affect the share of those with a conservative ideology in the electorate.

²¹Since we work with random effects in equations (5) and (6), the random-effects 2-stage least squares (2SLS) method is our preferred method. Baltagi and Li (1992) showed that the error component 2SLS (EC2SLS) and generalized 2SLS (G2SLS) have the same extent of asymptotic efficiency. Baltagi and Chang (1994, 2000) provide us with ways to implement EC2SLS and G2SLS for an unbalanced panel with heterogeneous appearance length T_i , which is one of the characteristics of the SNES data. As we clarified in Sections 4 and 5, the rotating nature of the SNES results in a considerable share of respondents appearing only once in our sample. This means that, for individual-level analysis, EC2SLS's additional instrumental variable of individual mean does not make any differences for respondents for whom $T_i = 1$. Therefore, the G2SLS is our preferred model for Table 13.

valid instruments) cannot be rejected at the 95-percent significance level.

We use an individual’s concern for the environment, as captured by the $Environ_{it}$ variable, as an instrument in all our regressions on the determinants of globalization barrier preferences. While one can theoretically think of channels through which trade affects the environment, they are such that they exert forces in opposite directions. With stricter environmental standards in a developed country such as Sweden than in the rest of the world taken as a whole, opening to trade will make Sweden specialize in goods that use cleaner methods of production (based on the comparative advantage created by their environmental standards). But the higher output level due to more open trade will create more environmental damage at the same time. Also, higher income levels due to trade will lead to adopting cleaner methods of production, through affordability and demand.²² Beliefs of a person about which of these channels dominate(s) can be random or could simply reflect that person’s ideology as conservative or liberal. In addition, beliefs in human-caused climate change (or its denial) or the weight a person puts on the environment relative to income or output are to a great extent reflective of that person’s ideology.²³ Based on these reasons, we strongly believe that environmentalism affects attitudes to trade barriers only through one’s ideology. This is clearly also the case for attitudes towards immigration barriers. It is, therefore, not surprising that our econometric tests support our instruments.²⁴

Note that while environmentalism turns out to be a good instrument, supported both by our econometric tests and economic intuition, for analyzing the determinants of both trade and immigration barrier preferences, we use the variables for religiosity and preference for law and order as instruments only for the model on trade barrier preferences and preference for defense spending as an instrument only for the model on immigration barrier preferences. We believe that this difference makes sense, because while trade and immigration are both issues related to globalization and are therefore connected in that regard, individuals’ preferences on these two issues are also likely to be driven by different motivations due to a fundamental difference between them: Trade concerns goods and services while immigration is about people and the composition of the society one lives in. It is therefore reasonable that people might form attitudes towards these issues in different ways. While one’s preferences for a society organized around greater religious and law and order principles are likely

²²See Antweiler et. al. (2001).

²³See Karakas and Mitra (2020) for a theoretical framework of how voters’ preferences on environmental policy, their beliefs on climate change and their ideologies together affect voting behavior.

²⁴As explained in detail in Appendix D and shown in Table D.1, the instrumental variables we use can explain the endogenous ideology variable ($Ideology_{it}$) in an intuitive way and with statistical significance: those who are more religious, who prefer higher defense spending, who support stricter implementation of the law and who care less about environmental issues are more likely to be politically conservative (right-wing) citizens.

to affect his/her attitudes on immigration through channels separate from her ideology, we believe that this would not necessarily be the case for attitudes on trade. For instance, it is reasonable that a respondent’s religiosity ($Christian_{it}$) and preference for law and order (Law_{it}) impacts his/her attitudes towards immigration barriers through channels that are different from his/her ideology if many immigrants are coming from non-Christian countries with a different set of formal laws and informal norms. Thus, these variables do not work as instruments for explaining attitudes towards immigration barriers.

As we mentioned above, the results in Table 13 are qualitatively fairly unchanged from those in Table 3, with the exception that the ideology variable in column (1) of Table 13 is no longer statistically significant. The signs and the significance levels of the other variables remain more or less unchanged.²⁵ One variable of particular interest here is human capital endowment, i.e. $Education_{it}$. The fact that the significant negative signs of its coefficients are maintained across all columns in Tables 3 and 13 indicates that the predictions from the factor endowments framework continue to hold even after we address the endogeneity of ideology.

The other potentially endogenous variable is IP_{bt}^{cs} in our main county-level regression on the determinants of Swedish Democrats’ vote share, as presented in Table 11. Autor et al. (2020) argue that a positive product demand shock in the home country (US in their case and Sweden in this paper) increases import demand and domestic employment at the same time. They want to focus on shocks that are originating from China and are increasing in China’s competitiveness. By using IP_{bt}^{co} as an instrumental variable for IP_{bt}^{cs} , where the subscript co refers to imports from China in a subset of other developed economies, they are able to eliminate domestic product demand shocks (that increase employment) and focus totally on import competition coming from China (that are expected to reduce employment).²⁶ The former, through people’s satisfaction in current employment outcomes, is expected to reduce (or offset) the movement of vote share towards anti-globalization parties. Thus, OLS will be downward or negatively biased. The positive and significant random effects OLS coefficient of import penetration we find in Table 11, if there exists endogeneity as described above, will, therefore, be underestimated. The true effect then should be larger and more positive. Hence, qualitatively our positive coefficient result then should be correct. When we use IP_{bt}^{co} (and try different possible subsets of other “o” countries) as an instrumental variable, the first stage F statistic is much lower than the threshold of 10, indicating a weak instrument problem. The Hausman test for endogeneity clearly indicates that our random effects OLS

²⁵This is also true when we run EC2SLS, where the estimated coefficients are qualitatively similar.

²⁶Using our definition of the variable IP_{bt}^{cs} and appropriate time lags, the instrument can be defined as $IP_{bt}^{co} = \sum_k \frac{L_{bk,1986}}{L_{b,1986}} IP_{kt}^{co}$, where $IP_{kt}^{co} = M_{kt}^{co} / (Y_{k0-3} + M_{k0-3} - X_{k0-3})$ and M_{kt}^{co} is the magnitude of other developed economies’ imports from China in the election year t .

estimates presented in this table are superior compared to the IV estimates with IP_{bt}^{co} as the IV.

One can also argue that there are reasons why IP_{bt}^{cs} in our case is not endogenous. We do not think that for Swedish Democrats the vote share works through negative employment outcomes, as there are other conservative parties that are much bigger players in the political and policy arenas. We expect the effect on the vote share of Swedish Democrats to be more direct through economic nationalism and nativism channels, which will not distinguish between reasons that caused the increase in imports (those reasons are irrelevant). Any increase in imports will trigger some people’s nativism and nationalism related emotions. This is probably what distinguishes Swedish Democrats from other conservative parties.

7.2 Sample Selection

One potential source of a sample selection problem in our models is the voters’ ability to abstain. If respondents who have abstained are more likely to be affiliated with a particular party, our estimates of the voting choice models might be considered biased. This is because our dependent variable in these models is whether a voter voted conservative, which of course is based only on those respondents who have voted. However, in our sample, more than 90% of the people surveyed did vote, which leads us to conclude that abstention is not a major concern for the validity of our results. Moreover, to eliminate any possibility of biased results due to abstentions, we take advantage of a question in the SNES that asks those who opted not to vote which party they would have voted for if they had not abstained. When we include this information in our voting choice data and re-run the regressions in Tables 8 and 9, we observe no qualitative changes in our results.

A systematic pattern of missing observations and attrition can also cause sample selection problems. When we include ideology as an additional right-hand side variable in our regressions, some missing observations are generated, as can be seen by comparing the number of observations in Tables 8 and 9. This loss of observations can be traced directly to those respondents that chose not to answer the ideology question on the SNES survey. To address potential selection bias issues missing observations might lead to, we re-run the regressions without the ideology control but with the same sample that is generated when the ideology variable is used as a control. We find that the results are not qualitatively different.

Finally, recall that our sample is an unbalanced panel, where the variation in appearance frequency of the respondents might affect estimation results. We address this issue by including a dummy for whether a person appears once or twice in the sample (Verbeek and Nijman, 1992). The dummy variable turns out to be statistically insignificant and our

results remain qualitatively unchanged.

8 Discussion and Conclusions

Our results clearly indicate that Swedish voters make voting decisions both on the basis of their economic interests and their ideologies. Identity politics may also be playing a role in these decisions.

Using six waves of the Swedish National Election Studies (SNES) survey data, we investigate the determinants of attitudes towards barriers to globalization (trade and immigration), and how important these preferences are in determining whom people vote for. First, we find that the more educated as well as the rich support freer trade and more immigration. A female voter, although relatively anti-trade, supports refugee inflows. Older voters support freer trade but oppose refugee inflows. The relatively conservative voters in Sweden are more likely to prefer freer trade but higher immigration barriers.

Second, we find that the more a voter is against trade barriers but the more s/he likes immigration restrictions, the more likely s/he is to vote for conservative parties. We also find that more educated voters are also more likely to vote conservative. Controlling for the various determinants of globalization barriers along with ideology in investigating how people vote leaves the trade barrier preference variable itself statistically insignificant, but attitudes towards accepting refugees, support for immigrants, multiculturalism and internationalism remain significant, thereby indicating to us the importance of identity-driven factors in determining how people vote. Our results in this paper are robust to addressing all possible econometric concerns, such as the endogeneity of ideology in globalization preference regressions and a few different kinds of selection problems. Focusing on Swedish Democrats, we find that greater immigration barrier preferences drive voters towards this party. We also conduct county-level vote share analyses and confirm our findings at this level.

Exit polls conducted by one of Sweden's national public TV channels, Sveriges Television, during all six parliamentary elections in our sample period clearly indicate that the two key issues for voters were education and immigration/refugees. The proportions of poll respondents who said that employment was a key factor were 58%, 51%, 56%, 53%, 51% and 37% in the parliamentary elections of the years 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018 respectively, while according to 19%, 32%, 25%, 26%, 35%, and 41% of poll respondents respectively, immigration/refugees was a key factor. The findings from these exit polls are consistent with our results: The importance of education implies that voters vote according to their economic interests. However, it needs to be mentioned that both education and attitudes to immigration are related in another way in that both depend on the labor-market

tightness of the national economy. When there is an abundance of low-skilled workers or when there aren't enough opportunities for low-skilled workers, more natives are pushed to go in for higher education. At the same time, the greater competition for the limited number of low-skilled jobs through immigration could lead to people supporting high immigration barriers.

While some political scientists have talked about "issue voting" and "class voting," and the decline in the importance of the latter, our work here shows that both are still important forces. We find that a voter's choice is determined by her trade and immigration policy preferences. Also, whether one is a high-skilled or low-skilled worker will determine one's attitudes towards globalization as well as how one votes. We observe that issue voting and class voting in the context of our questions are not separable. There is considerable simultaneity and interaction between the two.

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Tables

Table 1: Rotating panel structure

2014 : 3,971 observations	
Panel 2010-2014	1,775
Additional Selection in 2014	2,196
2010 : 3,963 observations	
Panel 2006-2010	1,771
Panel 2010-2014	2,008
Additional Selection in 2010	184
2006 : 3,999 observations	
Panel 2002-2006	1,815
Panel 2006-2010	1,975
Additional Selection in 2006	209
2002 : 3,788 observations	
Panel 1998-2002	1,241
Panel 2002-2006	2,436
Additional Selection in 2002	111
1998 : 2,901 observations	
Panel 1994-1998	1,380
Panel 1998-2002	1,433
Additional Selection in 1998	88

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	0.501	0.5	0	1	12238
<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>	0.932	0.251	0	1	12810
<i>Ideology_{it}</i>	5.158	2.44	0	10	10363
<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	2.23	0.975	1	5	5666
<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	3.207	1.137	1	5	6037
<i>Refugee_{it}</i>	3.145	1.262	1	5	12266
<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>	3.802	1.051	1	5	10580
<i>Multicul_{it}</i>	4.216	2.844	0	10	11636
<i>Interna_{it}</i>	3.762	2.316	0	10	7848
<i>Education_{it}</i>	5.277	2.464	0	8	13456
<i>Income_{it}</i>	3.024	1.267	1	5	25728
<i>Age_{it}</i>	4.13	1.773	1	7	26621
<i>Immigrant_i</i>	0.129	0.335	0	1	13358
<i>Female_i</i>	0.495	0.5	0	1	26622
<i>BusinessOwn_{it}</i>	0.046	0.21	0	1	12762
<i>Urban_{it}</i>	0.662	0.473	0	1	16043
<i>HomeOwn_{it}</i>	0.714	0.452	0	1	13343
<i>Inequality_{it}</i>	3.84	1.074	1	5	11679
<i>Tax_{it}</i>	2.785	1.263	1	5	12344
<i>ImmiShare_{bt}</i>	7.085	3.516	1.186	14.758	26565
<i>IP_{bt}^{cs}</i>	87.87	58.208	1.523	225.285	26565
<i>Law_{it}</i>	6.978	2.283	0	10	8014
<i>Environ_{it}</i>	5.55	2.576	0	10	11600
<i>Christian_{it}</i>	3.787	2.841	0	10	7895
<i>Defense_{it}</i>	3.009	1.181	1	5	11241

Table 3: Determinants of globalization barrier preferences.
 OLS with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	<i>Refugee_{it}</i>	<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>	<i>Multicul_{it}</i>	<i>Interna_{it}</i>
<i>Education_{it}</i>	-0.0203*** (0.00730)	-0.0893*** (0.00813)	-0.114*** (0.00647)	-0.0553*** (0.00574)	-0.239*** (0.0146)	-0.182*** (0.0155)
<i>Income_{it}</i>	-0.0415*** (0.0146)	-0.0814*** (0.0164)	-0.0820*** (0.0124)	-0.0104 (0.0110)	-0.150*** (0.0282)	-0.103*** (0.0315)
<i>Age_{it}</i>	-0.0550*** (0.0108)	0.0409*** (0.0122)	0.0443*** (0.00920)	0.0338*** (0.00806)	0.156*** (0.0209)	0.0111 (0.0234)
<i>Immigrant_i</i>	-0.163*** (0.0517)	0.0248 (0.0590)	0.0629 (0.0444)	-0.105*** (0.0384)	-0.225** (0.100)	-0.480*** (0.114)
<i>Female_i</i>	0.332*** (0.0343)	0.0462 (0.0390)	-0.135*** (0.0294)	-0.0374 (0.0253)	-0.389*** (0.0667)	0.243*** (0.0745)
<i>Ideology_{it}</i>	-0.0375*** (0.00789)	0.0274*** (0.00887)	0.151*** (0.00646)	0.101*** (0.00567)	0.269*** (0.0146)	0.0602*** (0.0166)
<i>Inequality_{it}</i>	-0.0366** (0.0160)	0.0166 (0.0178)	-0.0750*** (0.0140)	-0.0907*** (0.0126)	-0.219*** (0.0317)	-0.0854** (0.0339)
<i>BusinessOwn_{it}</i>	-0.0495 (0.0764)	-0.0556 (0.0867)	0.000627 (0.0655)	0.0617 (0.0574)	0.403*** (0.149)	0.0807 (0.165)
<i>Urban_{it}</i>	-0.0634* (0.0354)	-0.107*** (0.0398)	-0.0726** (0.0330)	-0.0887*** (0.0297)	-0.235*** (0.0748)	-0.402*** (0.0759)
<i>HomeOwn_{it}</i>	-0.0144 (0.0387)	-0.0943** (0.0433)	-0.0249 (0.0342)	0.0885*** (0.0306)	0.0624 (0.0772)	-0.0376 (0.0832)
<i>IP_{bt}^{cs}</i>	-0.000775 (0.00107)	-0.000368 (0.00120)	-0.000836 (0.00100)	-0.000550 (0.000840)	0.000170 (0.00226)	-0.000705 (0.00259)
<i>ImmiShare_{bt}</i>	0.0601 (0.0491)	-0.0239 (0.0546)	0.0438 (0.0299)	0.0105 (0.0257)	0.0858 (0.0676)	-0.0792 (0.0974)
Constant	2.292*** (0.431)	3.700*** (0.479)	2.948*** (0.265)	3.332*** (0.228)	3.137*** (0.600)	5.243*** (0.808)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3507	3699	6688	5745	6699	4315

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Determinants of globalization barrier preferences.
 Marginal effects at the highest level of dependent variable from ordered logistic model with
 random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	<i>Refugee_{it}</i>	<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>	<i>Multicul_{it}</i>	<i>Interna_{it}</i>
<i>Education_{it}</i>	-0.00108*** (0.000379)	-0.0177*** (0.00169)	-0.0228*** (0.00132)	-0.0217*** (0.00216)	-0.00954*** (0.000690)	-0.00352*** (0.000462)
<i>Income_{it}</i>	-0.00190** (0.000748)	-0.0161*** (0.00325)	-0.0164*** (0.00243)	-0.00588 (0.00412)	-0.00575*** (0.00112)	-0.00190*** (0.000626)
<i>Age_{it}</i>	-0.00292*** (0.000623)	0.00805*** (0.00241)	0.00839*** (0.00179)	0.0126*** (0.00301)	0.00612*** (0.000850)	0.000133 (0.000443)
<i>Immigrant_i</i>	-0.00839*** (0.00273)	0.00253 (0.0116)	0.0136 (0.00860)	-0.0356** (0.0143)	-0.00984** (0.00393)	-0.00973*** (0.00239)
<i>Female_i</i>	0.0171*** (0.00258)	0.00824 (0.00767)	-0.0269*** (0.00572)	-0.0149 (0.00944)	-0.0146*** (0.00264)	0.00497*** (0.00150)
<i>Ideology_{it}</i>	-0.00177*** (0.000438)	0.00546*** (0.00177)	0.0300*** (0.00135)	0.0392*** (0.00208)	0.0107*** (0.000719)	0.00120*** (0.000338)
<i>Inequality_{it}</i>	-0.00197** (0.000823)	0.00386 (0.00355)	-0.0147*** (0.00277)	-0.0338*** (0.00477)	-0.00913*** (0.00130)	-0.00186*** (0.000671)
<i>BusinessOwn_{it}</i>	-0.00241 (0.00380)	-0.00969 (0.0172)	-0.000367 (0.0129)	0.0315 (0.0222)	0.0155*** (0.00584)	0.00185 (0.00311)
<i>Urban_{it}</i>	-0.00269 (0.00176)	-0.0200** (0.00784)	-0.0147** (0.00641)	-0.0300*** (0.0110)	-0.00907*** (0.00292)	-0.00741*** (0.00161)
<i>HomeOwn_{it}</i>	-0.000624 (0.00190)	-0.0178** (0.00859)	-0.00451 (0.00667)	0.0316*** (0.0113)	0.00332 (0.00302)	-0.000243 (0.00157)
<i>IP_{bt}^{cs}</i>	-0.0000474 (0.0000528)	-0.000110 (0.000237)	-0.000153 (0.000195)	-0.000149 (0.000312)	-0.0000181 (0.0000876)	-0.0000290 (0.0000490)
<i>ImmiShare_{bt}</i>	0.00214 (0.00244)	-0.00752 (0.0108)	0.00897 (0.00583)	0.00304 (0.00965)	0.00421 (0.00263)	-0.00137 (0.00185)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3507	3699	6688	5745	6699	4315

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Determinants of globalization barrier preferences with interaction terms.
 OLS with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	<i>Refugee_{it}</i>	<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>	<i>Multicul_{it}</i>	<i>Interna_{it}</i>
<i>Education_{it}</i>	-2.246** (1.097)	2.304* (1.214)	-1.192* (0.709)	-0.855 (0.630)	-0.846 (1.610)	-1.761 (1.880)
<i>logMedInc_{bt}</i>	3.088 (2.396)	4.603* (2.648)	2.075 (2.096)	1.699 (1.899)	7.314 (4.712)	5.897 (5.214)
<i>IP_{bt}^{cs}</i>	0.000384 (0.00144)	-0.00246 (0.00161)	-0.000563 (0.00150)	0.00129 (0.00130)	0.00440 (0.00340)	0.00430 (0.00378)
<i>ImmiShare_{bt}</i>	0.104* (0.0561)	-0.0432 (0.0624)	0.0931** (0.0383)	0.0322 (0.0340)	0.253*** (0.0866)	-0.0542 (0.114)
<i>Education_{it} × logMedInc_{bt}</i>	0.183** (0.0901)	-0.198** (0.0997)	0.0890 (0.0586)	0.0663 (0.0521)	0.0592 (0.133)	0.131 (0.155)
<i>Education_{it} × IP_{bt}^{cs}</i>	-0.000157 (0.000169)	0.000393** (0.000187)	0.0000273 (0.000164)	-0.000230 (0.000146)	-0.000503 (0.000373)	-0.000589 (0.000440)
<i>Education_{it} × ImmiShare_{bt}</i>	-0.00488 (0.00350)	0.00518 (0.00389)	-0.00492* (0.00287)	-0.00130 (0.00253)	-0.0149** (0.00650)	-0.0000549 (0.00757)
<i>Income_{it}</i>	-0.0426*** (0.0146)	-0.0812*** (0.0164)	-0.0826*** (0.0124)	-0.0108 (0.0111)	-0.142*** (0.0282)	-0.103*** (0.0316)
<i>Age_{it}</i>	-0.0542*** (0.0108)	0.0413*** (0.0122)	0.0446*** (0.00920)	0.0339*** (0.00806)	0.155*** (0.0208)	0.0105 (0.0234)
<i>Immigrant_i</i>	-0.164*** (0.0518)	0.0264 (0.0590)	0.0617 (0.0444)	-0.104*** (0.0384)	-0.225** (0.100)	-0.475*** (0.114)
<i>Female_i</i>	0.330*** (0.0343)	0.0492 (0.0390)	-0.137*** (0.0295)	-0.0381 (0.0254)	-0.380*** (0.0667)	0.243*** (0.0745)
<i>Ideology_{it}</i>	-0.0366*** (0.00791)	0.0270*** (0.00889)	0.151*** (0.00647)	0.102*** (0.00569)	0.266*** (0.0146)	0.0611*** (0.0166)
<i>Inequality_{it}</i>	-0.0375** (0.0160)	0.0169 (0.0178)	-0.0747*** (0.0140)	-0.0906*** (0.0126)	-0.218*** (0.0317)	-0.0854** (0.0339)
<i>BusinessOwn_{it}</i>	-0.0507 (0.0764)	-0.0562 (0.0867)	0.00336 (0.0656)	0.0610 (0.0574)	0.399*** (0.149)	0.0756 (0.165)
<i>Urban_{it}</i>	-0.0639* (0.0354)	-0.105*** (0.0398)	-0.0713** (0.0330)	-0.0861*** (0.0297)	-0.235*** (0.0748)	-0.399*** (0.0760)
<i>HomeOwn_{it}</i>	-0.0133 (0.0388)	-0.0935** (0.0433)	-0.0242 (0.0342)	0.0897*** (0.0306)	0.0709 (0.0772)	-0.0359 (0.0833)
Constant	-35.99 (29.55)	-52.79 (32.66)	-22.55 (25.62)	-17.53 (23.22)	-87.16 (57.59)	-66.86 (63.68)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3507	3699	6688	5745	6699	4315
M.E. of <i>Education_{it}</i> (Delta Method)	-0.0197*** (0.0074)	-0.0896*** (0.0082)	-0.1146*** (0.0067)	-0.0546*** (0.0059)	-0.2527*** (0.0151)	-0.1806*** (0.0157)

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Determinants of voting choice. Simplest model.
Marginal effects from logistic model with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>
<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	-0.0426*** (0.00809)	-0.0491*** (0.00809)	-0.0599*** (0.00906)	-0.0529*** (0.00790)	-0.0483*** (0.00834)
<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	0.0000232 (0.00644)				
<i>Refugee_{it}</i>		0.0594*** (0.00715)			
<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>			0.0843*** (0.00900)		
<i>Multicul_{it}</i>				0.0285*** (0.00329)	
<i>Interna_{it}</i>					0.00933*** (0.00336)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3674	3738	2834	3738	3720

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Determinants of voting choice. Tax_{it} is included.
 Marginal effects from logistic model with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$VoteCons_{it}$	$VoteCons_{it}$	$VoteCons_{it}$	$VoteCons_{it}$	$VoteCons_{it}$
$TradeBar_{it}$	-0.0280*** (0.00755)	-0.0328*** (0.00745)	-0.0438*** (0.00844)	-0.0360*** (0.00754)	-0.0335*** (0.00777)
$LaborIm_{it}$	-0.00537 (0.00652)				
$Refugee_{it}$		0.0277*** (0.00616)			
$ImmiSupp_{it}$			0.0603*** (0.00800)		
$Multicul_{it}$				0.0188*** (0.00300)	
$Interna_{it}$					0.00690** (0.00337)
Tax_{it}	-0.156*** (0.00470)	-0.150*** (0.00501)	-0.148*** (0.00570)	-0.151*** (0.00495)	-0.157*** (0.00474)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3656	3718	2817	3719	3702

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Determinants of voting choice not including *Ideology_{it}*.
 Marginal effects from logistic model with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>
<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	-0.0153* (0.00809)	-0.0205** (0.00801)	-0.0257*** (0.00891)	-0.0248*** (0.00803)	-0.0225*** (0.00825)
<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	0.00856 (0.00698)				
<i>Refugee_{it}</i>		0.0464*** (0.00647)			
<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>			0.0622*** (0.00828)		
<i>Multicul_{it}</i>				0.0246*** (0.00314)	
<i>Interna_{it}</i>					0.0126*** (0.00358)
<i>Education_{it}</i>	0.0408*** (0.00329)	0.0454*** (0.00326)	0.0464*** (0.00344)	0.0451*** (0.00323)	0.0424*** (0.00327)
<i>Income_{it}</i>	0.0118* (0.00681)	0.0138** (0.00671)	0.000419 (0.00752)	0.0130* (0.00668)	0.0122* (0.00675)
<i>Age_{it}</i>	0.0237*** (0.00512)	0.0223*** (0.00506)	0.0241*** (0.00570)	0.0210*** (0.00504)	0.0237*** (0.00508)
<i>Immigrant_i</i>	-0.113*** (0.0250)	-0.108*** (0.0247)	-0.0880*** (0.0281)	-0.100*** (0.0245)	-0.102*** (0.0248)
<i>Female_i</i>	-0.00485 (0.0163)	0.00160 (0.0160)	0.00883 (0.0179)	0.00794 (0.0160)	-0.00601 (0.0161)
<i>BusinessOwn_{it}</i>	0.174*** (0.0389)	0.178*** (0.0394)	0.208*** (0.0434)	0.182*** (0.0385)	0.175*** (0.0392)
<i>Urban_{it}</i>	-0.0460*** (0.0165)	-0.0441*** (0.0163)	-0.0357* (0.0183)	-0.0451*** (0.0163)	-0.0482*** (0.0165)
<i>HomeOwn_{it}</i>	0.0591*** (0.0180)	0.0583*** (0.0179)	0.0638*** (0.0200)	0.0547*** (0.0178)	0.0614*** (0.0180)
<i>Tax_{it}</i>	-0.156*** (0.00499)	-0.147*** (0.00512)	-0.145*** (0.00548)	-0.150*** (0.00502)	-0.156*** (0.00490)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3424	3475	2629	3477	3461

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Determinants of voting choice including *Ideology_{it}*.
Marginal effects from logistic model with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>	<i>VoteCons_{it}</i>
<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	0.00692 (0.00809)	0.00400 (0.00798)	0.00940 (0.00967)	0.000987 (0.00802)	0.00309 (0.00802)
<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	0.00648 (0.00720)				
<i>Refugee_{it}</i>		0.0255*** (0.00644)			
<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>			0.0396*** (0.0101)		
<i>Multicul_{it}</i>				0.0165** (0.00674)	
<i>Interna_{it}</i>					0.00962*** (0.00370)
<i>Education_{it}</i>	0.0165*** (0.00351)	0.0191*** (0.00346)	0.0223*** (0.00392)	0.0198** (0.00796)	0.0178*** (0.00347)
<i>Income_{it}</i>	0.00809 (0.00670)	0.00884 (0.00658)	0.00113 (0.00829)	0.00857 (0.00718)	0.00560 (0.00657)
<i>Age_{it}</i>	0.00955* (0.00499)	0.00986** (0.00493)	0.0112* (0.00658)	0.00934 (0.00586)	0.0114** (0.00493)
<i>Immigrant_i</i>	-0.0785*** (0.0237)	-0.0781*** (0.0236)	-0.0556* (0.0294)	-0.0695** (0.0349)	-0.0688*** (0.0234)
<i>Female_i</i>	0.0141 (0.0154)	0.0180 (0.0152)	0.0217 (0.0190)	0.0208 (0.0169)	0.0121 (0.0151)
<i>Ideology_{it}</i>	0.111*** (0.00285)	0.108*** (0.00296)	0.101*** (0.00355)	0.107*** (0.0405)	0.110*** (0.00288)
<i>BusinessOwn_{it}</i>	0.0563 (0.0410)	0.0542 (0.0399)	0.0510 (0.0480)	0.0509 (0.0433)	0.0529 (0.0395)
<i>Urban_{it}</i>	-0.0280* (0.0164)	-0.0299* (0.0162)	-0.0248 (0.0205)	-0.0275 (0.0190)	-0.0325** (0.0163)
<i>HomeOwn_{it}</i>	-0.0143 (0.0177)	-0.0163 (0.0175)	0.00116 (0.0223)	-0.0182 (0.0185)	-0.0192 (0.0176)
<i>Tax_{it}</i>	-0.0467*** (0.00685)	-0.0449*** (0.00678)	-0.0453*** (0.00816)	-0.0450** (0.0181)	-0.0485*** (0.00672)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2016	2043	1225	2042	2036

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Determinants of voting choice including $Ideology_{it}$ and local globalization penetration. Marginal effects from logistic model with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$VoteCons_{it}$	$VoteCons_{it}$	$VoteCons_{it}$	$VoteCons_{it}$	$VoteCons_{it}$
$TradeBar_{it}$	0.00706 (0.00808)	0.00411 (0.00798)	0.00961 (0.00966)	0.00131 (0.00801)	0.00312 (0.00801)
$LaborIm_{it}$	0.00634 (0.00720)				
$Refugee_{it}$		0.0255*** (0.00644)			
$ImmiSupp_{it}$			0.0394*** (0.0101)		
$Multicul_{it}$				0.0164*** (0.00321)	
$Interna_{it}$					0.00960*** (0.00370)
$Education_{it}$	0.0165*** (0.00350)	0.0192*** (0.00345)	0.0224*** (0.00392)	0.0199*** (0.00343)	0.0178*** (0.00346)
$Income_{it}$	0.00817 (0.00671)	0.00899 (0.00658)	0.00139 (0.00830)	0.00863 (0.00657)	0.00575 (0.00658)
Age_{it}	0.00960* (0.00499)	0.00994** (0.00493)	0.0119* (0.00661)	0.00941* (0.00489)	0.0114** (0.00493)
$Immigrant_i$	-0.0790*** (0.0236)	-0.0787*** (0.0235)	-0.0564* (0.0294)	-0.0702*** (0.0231)	-0.0696*** (0.0234)
$Female_i$	0.0130 (0.0154)	0.0168 (0.0152)	0.0208 (0.0190)	0.0197 (0.0152)	0.0109 (0.0151)
$Ideology_{it}$	0.111*** (0.00285)	0.108*** (0.00296)	0.101*** (0.00358)	0.107*** (0.00293)	0.110*** (0.00288)
$BusinessOwn_{it}$	0.0549 (0.0411)	0.0518 (0.0402)	0.0485 (0.0483)	0.0491 (0.0391)	0.0508 (0.0398)
$Urban_{it}$	-0.0285* (0.0164)	-0.0304* (0.0162)	-0.0259 (0.0205)	-0.0280* (0.0161)	-0.0329** (0.0163)
$HomeOwn_{it}$	-0.0141 (0.0177)	-0.0160 (0.0176)	0.000826 (0.0223)	-0.0178 (0.0173)	-0.0190 (0.0176)
Tax_{it}	-0.0474*** (0.00688)	-0.0456*** (0.00681)	-0.0462*** (0.00820)	-0.0456*** (0.00674)	-0.0492*** (0.00675)
IP_{bt}^{CS}	0.000641 (0.000436)	0.000706 (0.000431)	0.000666 (0.000533)	0.000615 (0.000430)	0.000638 (0.000431)
$ImmiShare_{bt}$	-0.00251 (0.0212)	-0.00369 (0.0208)	0.0128 (0.0372)	-0.00444 (0.0208)	0.000384 (0.0209)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2016	2043	1225	2042	2036

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Determinants of vote share for Swedish Democrats including $Ideology_{it}$ and globalization penetration. Random effect estimation under balanced panel.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$ShareSD_{bt}$	$ShareSD_{bt}$	$ShareSD_{bt}$	$ShareSD_{bt}$	$ShareSD_{bt}$
$TradeBar_{bt}$	-0.902 (0.652)	-0.507 (0.645)	-1.655*** (0.631)	-0.720 (0.635)	-1.011 (0.667)
$LaborIm_{bt}$	1.609** (0.786)				
$Refugee_{bt}$		1.804*** (0.597)			
$ImmiSupp_{bt}$			0.493 (0.650)		
$Multicul_{bt}$				0.520* (0.301)	
$Interna_{bt}$					0.394 (0.332)
$Education_{bt}$	-0.104 (0.0899)	-0.115 (0.0851)	-0.0190 (0.0734)	-0.104 (0.0982)	-0.114 (0.0942)
$MedInc_{bt}$	-0.930*** (0.330)	-0.899*** (0.317)	-0.790*** (0.291)	-0.988*** (0.344)	-0.978*** (0.340)
Age_{bt}	-2.698*** (1.025)	-3.121*** (1.005)	-0.586 (0.857)	-2.742*** (0.998)	-2.763*** (1.031)
$Female_{bt}$	-0.506 (0.737)	-0.260 (0.714)	-0.546 (0.555)	-0.358 (0.796)	-0.408 (0.783)
$Ideology_{bt}$	0.344 (0.397)	0.529 (0.381)	0.568* (0.331)	0.406 (0.386)	0.490 (0.396)
$BusinessOwn_{bt}$	2.010 (6.122)	1.425 (5.944)	-1.778 (4.979)	1.633 (6.122)	2.891 (6.186)
$Urban_{bt}$	-3.422 (2.131)	-2.358 (2.103)	-3.028* (1.578)	-2.858 (2.188)	-3.211 (2.199)
$HomeOwn_{bt}$	-1.467 (2.140)	0.102 (2.136)	0.642 (2.121)	-1.137 (2.092)	-0.882 (2.200)
Tax_{bt}	0.205 (0.907)	0.805 (0.855)	0.512 (0.757)	0.439 (0.880)	0.478 (0.907)
IP_{bt}^{cs}	0.0127** (0.00547)	0.0136*** (0.00524)	0.0111*** (0.00425)	0.0128** (0.00565)	0.0143** (0.00559)
$ImmiShare_{bt}$	0.700*** (0.178)	0.607*** (0.175)	0.486*** (0.173)	0.672*** (0.188)	0.674*** (0.187)
Constant	53.80 (38.63)	37.75 (37.84)	44.82 (29.55)	49.31 (41.06)	52.46 (40.76)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	84	84	63	84	84

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 12: Characteristics of switchers:
Switchers towards Swedish Democrats during 2014 - 2018
Marginal effects from logistic model.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>Switcher_i</i>	<i>Switcher_i</i>	<i>Switcher_i</i>	<i>Switcher_i</i>	<i>Switcher_i</i>
<i>Refugee_i</i>		0.0448*** (0.00778)			0.0340*** (0.00798)
<i>ImmiSupp_i</i>			0.0380*** (0.00974)		0.00961 (0.00798)
<i>Multicul_i</i>				0.0116*** (0.00208)	0.00412** (0.00202)
<i>Education_i</i>		-0.000129 (0.00177)	-0.00200 (0.00177)	0.0000639 (0.00181)	0.000495 (0.00178)
<i>Income_i</i>		-0.00629* (0.00338)	-0.00878** (0.00353)	-0.00664** (0.00338)	-0.00693** (0.00337)
<i>Age_i</i>		0.000908 (0.00263)	0.000392 (0.00259)	-0.000296 (0.00259)	0.000899 (0.00263)
<i>Immigrant_i</i>		0.00175 (0.0115)	0.00459 (0.0123)	0.00792 (0.0117)	0.00134 (0.0120)
<i>Female_i</i>		-0.0168** (0.00830)	-0.0204** (0.00862)	-0.0159* (0.00835)	-0.0179** (0.00834)
<i>Ideology_i</i>		0.00273 (0.00209)	0.00486** (0.00218)	0.00380* (0.00211)	0.00168 (0.00206)
<i>BusinessOwn_i</i>		-0.0366* (0.0214)	-0.0384* (0.0219)	-0.0402* (0.0217)	-0.0375* (0.0211)
<i>Urban_i</i>		0.0105 (0.0122)	0.0126 (0.0124)	0.0103 (0.0123)	0.0106 (0.0121)
<i>HomeOwn_i</i>		-0.00358 (0.00944)	-0.00580 (0.00983)	-0.00790 (0.00948)	-0.00348 (0.00952)
<i>Tax_i</i>		-0.00127 (0.00371)	-0.00294 (0.00387)	-0.00197 (0.00380)	-0.00153 (0.00367)
$IP_{b,2018}^{cs} - IP_{b,2014}^{cs}$	0.000552 (0.000612)	-0.000452 (0.000628)	-0.000205 (0.000629)	-0.000343 (0.000626)	-0.000419 (0.000623)
$ImmiShare_{b,2018} - ImmiShare_{b,2014}$	0.00417 (0.00826)	0.00622 (0.00841)	0.00983 (0.00852)	0.00633 (0.00843)	0.00729 (0.00848)
Observations	3060	2028	2012	2014	2002

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13: Determinants of globalization barrier preferences.
G2SLS under unbalanced panel.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$TradeBar_{it}$	$LaborIm_{it}$	$Refugee_{it}$	$ImmiSupp_{it}$	$Multicul_{it}$	$Interna_{it}$
$Education_{it}$	-0.0216*** (0.00831)	-0.137*** (0.0141)	-0.156*** (0.0133)	-0.144*** (0.0143)	-0.347*** (0.0325)	-0.342*** (0.0279)
$Income_{it}$	-0.0452*** (0.0148)	-0.112*** (0.0196)	-0.124*** (0.0212)	-0.00119 (0.0205)	-0.191*** (0.0515)	-0.157*** (0.0410)
Age_{it}	-0.0556*** (0.0111)	0.0201 (0.0155)	0.0278* (0.0169)	-0.0495*** (0.0165)	0.0146 (0.0407)	-0.0861*** (0.0318)
$Immigrant_i$	-0.166*** (0.0529)	0.0535 (0.0717)	0.0996 (0.0797)	-0.0755 (0.0729)	-0.252 (0.191)	-0.412*** (0.145)
$Female_i$	0.329*** (0.0347)	0.0635 (0.0458)	-0.0412 (0.0522)	-0.0162 (0.0464)	-0.225* (0.124)	0.339*** (0.0926)
$Ideology_{it}$	-0.0334 (0.0240)	0.284*** (0.0533)	0.506*** (0.0590)	0.490*** (0.0512)	1.289*** (0.138)	0.828*** (0.0998)
$Inequality_{it}$	-0.0345 (0.0221)	0.183*** (0.0395)	0.154*** (0.0390)	0.188*** (0.0409)	0.521*** (0.0953)	0.387*** (0.0797)
$BusinessOwn_{it}$	-0.0538 (0.0791)	-0.206* (0.108)	-0.239** (0.113)	-0.348*** (0.113)	-0.516* (0.280)	-0.622*** (0.224)
$Urban_{it}$	-0.0630* (0.0358)	-0.0847* (0.0481)	-0.0377 (0.0502)	-0.0537 (0.0493)	-0.288** (0.122)	-0.350*** (0.0992)
$HomeOwn_{it}$	-0.00336 (0.0401)	-0.189*** (0.0553)	-0.141** (0.0587)	-0.0524 (0.0574)	-0.380*** (0.142)	-0.238** (0.113)
IP_{bt}^{cs}	-0.000923 (0.00109)	-0.0000552 (0.00141)	0.00123 (0.00170)	-0.00104 (0.00173)	0.00229 (0.00410)	-0.00154 (0.00334)
$ImmiShare_{bt}$	0.0626 (0.0497)	-0.00654 (0.0728)	0.116* (0.0686)	0.131 (0.0853)	0.170 (0.168)	0.00711 (0.139)
Constant	2.268*** (0.469)	2.061*** (0.729)	-0.0107 (0.694)	0.0352 (0.793)	-4.347*** (1.680)	0.0221 (1.341)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3448	3168	3762	3307	3789	3762
Endogenous Var.	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$
Instruments	$Christian_{it}$ Law_{it} $Environ_{it}$	$Environ_{it}$ $Defense_{it}$	$Environ_{it}$ $Defense_{it}$	$Environ_{it}$ $Defense_{it}$	$Environ_{it}$ $Defense_{it}$	$Environ_{it}$ $Defense_{it}$
Sargan-Hansen's p-values	0.0588	0.4081	0.8877	0.5470	0.2968	0.9677

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix A: Data Appendix

Table A.1: Globalization barrier preference variables.

	<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	<i>Refugee_{it}</i>	<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>	<i>Muticul_{it}</i>	<i>Interna_{it}</i>
1998	x	x	o	o	o	o
2002	o	o	o	o	o	o
2006	o	o	o	o	o	o
2010	o	o	o	o	o	o
2014	o	o	o	x	o	o
2018	x	x	o	o	o	x

Table A.1 summarizes the frequency of individual globalization barrier preference variables. The variables *Refugee_{it}* and *Muticul_{it}* appear in all six SNES waves while other variables appear in only four or five waves.

We clarify below the various social and economic background variables that we use throughout our analysis.

- *Immigrant_i*: *Immigrant_i* is a dummy variable such that *Immigrant_i*=1 means that the respondent *i* is classified as an immigrant. Otherwise, *Immigrant_i*=0. The criteria that we use are based on responses to the following three questions: “Where did you for the most part live as a child?,” “Where did your father for the most part live as a child?,” and “Where did your mother for the most part live as a child?” If the answer to at least one of these questions is a place in a foreign country, we code the person as an immigrant, i.e., *Immigrant_i* = 1. Otherwise, *Immigrant_i* = 0 and is a native (or a nonimmigrant). Nearly 13 percent of individuals (observation units) in our sample are classified as immigrants according to this criteria.

- *Income_{it}*: This variable measures the income level of respondents in our sample. Statistics Sweden used each individual’s actual information on his/her taxed income to create the following categorical variable: ① Very low, ② Pretty low, ③ Neither low nor high, ④ Pretty high, ⑤ Very high. In our pooled sample, the proportions falling in these categories are 15%, 20%, 30%, 20% and 15% respectively.

- *Education_{it}*: This variable measures the education level of each individual in this dataset. We have nine values between zero to eight. ① not completed primary/comprehensive, or equivalent, school, ② primary/comprehensive school or corresponding compulsory school, ③ vocational school, ④ secondary school, ⑤ secondary/high school, ⑥ upper secondary/high school (degree not completed), ⑦ upper secondary/high school (degree completed), ⑧ higher education including university (degree not completed), ⑨ higher education including university (degree completed). People belonging to the category with a higher value of *Education_{it}* are more educated. As each wave has a slightly different list of categories, we

made $Education_{it}$ to concord across waves for consistency.

- $Female_i$: $Female_i = 1$ if a respondent is female. $Female_i = 0$ otherwise.
- Age_{it} : Age_{it} has seven options: ① 18-21 years, ② 21-30 years, ③ 31-40 years, ④ 41-50 years, ⑤ 51-60 years, ⑥ 61-70 years, ⑦ 71-80. Thus, the higher the value of Age_i , the older the respondent. For the waves of 2006, 2010, 2014 and 2018, the last category is extended to 71-84 years old.
- $Urban_{it}$: Respondents had to choose one of the four following categories based on their type of residence: ① countryside, ② small town or village, ③ suburb of large town or city, ④ large town or city. If an individual chose ③ or ④, that respondent was classified as a resident of an urban area. $Urban_{it} = 1$ if a respondent is regarded as a resident of an urban area. Otherwise, $Urban_{it} = 0$. In our integrated sample of four waves, 60 percent of total observations take a value of 1 for $Urban_{it}$.
- $BusinessOwn_{it}$: To identify business owners, we make use of the responses to the following question: “Could you tell me which of the following occupational groups you belong/belonged to?” Among multiple choices for this questionnaire, five of them are as follows: ‘Self-employed: no employees’, ‘self-employed: 1-9 employees’, ‘self-employed: 10 or more employees’, ‘farmer: no employees’ and ‘farmer: one or more employees.’ A respondent is classified as a business owner if s/he has at least one employee. As expected, only about 5 percent of the respondents are business owners.
- $HomeOwn_{it}$: Each wave that we use has the following question: “Do you, or someone else in your household, own or rent the property where you currently live?” We code $Homeown_{it} = 1$ if the respondent answered that s/he owns her property. Otherwise, $Homeown_{it} = 0$. There are 8,742 observations for $Homeown_{it}$, out of which $Homeown_{it} = 1$ for 6,067.
- $Inequality_{it}$: In all the four waves we use, the following proposal appears: “Sweden should reduce income differences in society.” On a 1-5 scale, 1 means that the respondent regards the above proposal as very good while a score of 5 is exactly the opposite. To construct $Inequality_{it}$ an increasing measure of inequality aversion, we inversely recoded the responses as 6 minus the number on the response.
- Tax_{it} : Since 1998, the SNES has been making the following proposal about tax cuts in Sweden: “Sweden should cut taxes.” The measure, Tax_{it} , takes values of 1 through 5, where a higher value means a higher preference for taxes (or a lower preference for tax cuts).
- IP_{bt}^{cs} : As noted in the main text, L_{bk}/L_b is the employment share of industry k in Swedish county b . Autor et al. (2020) use the year 2000 for measuring L_{bk}/L_b , which implies that the two-year lagged labor share is used since their outcome variable is the vote share of the Republican Party since the 2002 presidential election. In our analysis, the outcome variables in some estimations start in 2002 while the rest start in 1998. When an outcome

variable starts in 1998, we can construct L_{bk}/L_b using the HUS's 1996 wave. Some estimations for the determinants of globalization barrier preferences start in 1998. On the other hand, the voting choice analysis starts only in 2002, because questions required to construct the variables $TradeBar_{it}$ and $LaborIm_{it}$ do not appear in the SNES in 1998. In that case, we use the 1998 wave of the HUS as the closest year to 2002.²⁷ To summarize, HUS 1996 is used for estimations that start in 1998 while HUS 1998 is used for estimations that do not cover 1998. Using the HUS waves of 1996 and 1998, we obtain L_{bk}/L_b for each Swedish county. Among the 31 industries in the HUS, half are non-tradable service industries. Therefore, we have 15 industries for constructing the IP_{bt}^{cs} variable.²⁸ The industrial output of these 15 Swedish industries (Y_{k0}) are coming from the EU KLEMS. Table 2 includes descriptive statistics for our IP_{bt}^{cs} variable.

The four variables below are instrumental variables used in the estimations in Table 13. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of these instrumental variables.

- $Christian_{it}$: A question in the SNES asks: ‘Should we work towards a society where Christian values are more important?’. Respondents can choose any integer in the interval [0,10]. 0 means ‘very bad proposal’ while 10 means ‘very good proposal’. Consequently, having higher value of $Christian_{it}$ can be interpreted as being a more religious respondent.

- Law_{it} : One of the policy suggestions in the SNES survey asks ‘Should we work towards a society with more law and order?’ Respondents can choose any integer in the interval [0,10]. 0 means ‘very bad proposal’ while 10 means ‘very good proposal’. Therefore, respondents with higher values of Law_{it} support stricter implementation of law.

- $Environ_{it}$: There is a policy suggestion in SNES survey asking ‘Should we work towards an environmentally friendly society even if it means little or no economic growth?’ Respondents can choose any integer in the interval [0,10]. 0 means ‘very bad proposal’ while 10 means ‘very good proposal’. This means that a respondent with higher values of $Environ_{it}$ are likely to care more about environmental issues.

- $Defense_{it}$: One of the policy suggestions in the SNES survey asks ‘Should we reduce defense expenditure?’. Respondents choose an integer from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating the strongest support for the idea and 5 the strongest opposition. Therefore, having higher values of $Defense_{it}$ indicates that this respondent i prefers higher defense expenditure from the Swedish government.

²⁷The last survey of the HUS is conducted in 1998. Consequently, we use the four-year lagged labor share in constructing the local import penetration for the voting choice model.

²⁸Consequent tradable industries that we consider here are “Farming, hoticulture, hunding”; “Forestry”; “Coal mining”; “Mineral materials except metal”; “Ore mining”; “Other mining and extraction”; “Food, beverages and tobacco”; “Textile, clothing, leather manufacturing”; “Pulp, paper, graphic production”; “Chemical products, rubber and plastics”; “Metal production”; “Engineering”; “Fishing”; “Construction”; “Other manufacturing”.

Appendix B. Turnout Analysis

Table B.1: Determinants of turnout not including *Ideology_{it}*.
Marginal effects from logistic model with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>
<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	-0.00130 (0.00403)	0.000590 (0.00400)	-0.00217 (0.00440)	0.0000263 (0.00401)	0.00217 (0.00409)
<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	-0.00422 (0.00342)				
<i>Refugee_{it}</i>		-0.0122*** (0.00345)			
<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>			-0.0125*** (0.00440)		
<i>Multicul_{it}</i>				-0.00526*** (0.00152)	
<i>Interna_{it}</i>					-0.00627*** (0.00171)
<i>Education_{it}</i>	0.00622*** (0.00175)	0.00466*** (0.00172)	0.00637*** (0.00190)	0.00475*** (0.00171)	0.00471*** (0.00173)
<i>Income_{it}</i>	0.000118 (0.00338)	0.00134 (0.00335)	0.00140 (0.00374)	0.000579 (0.00333)	0.00142 (0.00338)
<i>Age_{it}</i>	0.0127*** (0.00279)	0.0118*** (0.00269)	0.0131*** (0.00306)	0.0121*** (0.00272)	0.0111*** (0.00272)
<i>Immigrant_i</i>	-0.0341*** (0.0106)	-0.0353*** (0.0106)	-0.0397*** (0.0120)	-0.0327*** (0.0106)	-0.0328*** (0.0108)
<i>Female_i</i>	0.0283*** (0.00861)	0.0290*** (0.00852)	0.0347*** (0.00962)	0.0271*** (0.00848)	0.0309*** (0.00858)
<i>BusinessOwn_{it}</i>	-0.0120 (0.0169)	-0.0115 (0.0168)	-0.0130 (0.0186)	-0.00678 (0.0172)	-0.00875 (0.0176)
<i>Urban_{it}</i>	0.0119 (0.00841)	0.0125 (0.00827)	0.0137 (0.00932)	0.00853 (0.00827)	0.00948 (0.00838)
<i>HomeOwn_{it}</i>	0.0272*** (0.00861)	0.0281*** (0.00855)	0.0355*** (0.00965)	0.0259*** (0.00850)	0.0279*** (0.00864)
<i>Tax_{it}</i>	0.00788** (0.00311)	0.00518* (0.00313)	0.00885** (0.00349)	0.00646** (0.00307)	0.00786** (0.00309)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3157	3203	2812	3205	3191

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.2: Determinants of turnout including *Ideology_{it}*.
Marginal effects from logistic model with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>	<i>VoteOrNot_{it}</i>
<i>TradeBar_{it}</i>	0.00382 (0.00569)	0.00464 (0.00564)	0.00365 (0.00701)	0.00461 (0.00569)	0.00623 (0.00586)
<i>LaborIm_{it}</i>	0.000777 (0.00464)				
<i>Refugee_{it}</i>		-0.00870* (0.00471)			
<i>ImmiSupp_{it}</i>			-0.0102 (0.00712)		
<i>Multicul_{it}</i>				-0.00311 (0.00211)	
<i>Interna_{it}</i>					-0.00348 (0.00238)
<i>Education_{it}</i>	0.00651*** (0.00236)	0.00449* (0.00235)	0.00606** (0.00286)	0.00486** (0.00232)	0.00513** (0.00234)
<i>Income_{it}</i>	0.00420 (0.00464)	0.00601 (0.00463)	0.00563 (0.00579)	0.00586 (0.00470)	0.00687 (0.00474)
<i>Age_{it}</i>	0.00990*** (0.00370)	0.00834** (0.00361)	0.0104** (0.00458)	0.00861** (0.00365)	0.00786** (0.00365)
<i>Immigrant_i</i>	-0.0365*** (0.0138)	-0.0359** (0.0140)	-0.0439** (0.0178)	-0.0356** (0.0140)	-0.0366*** (0.0142)
<i>Female_i</i>	0.0198* (0.0112)	0.0222** (0.0113)	0.0277** (0.0141)	0.0208* (0.0113)	0.0234** (0.0113)
<i>Ideology_{it}</i>	0.000110 (0.00245)	-0.000123 (0.00246)	-0.000185 (0.00313)	-0.000179 (0.00246)	-0.000704 (0.00249)
<i>BusinessOwn_{it}</i>	-0.0323 (0.0207)	-0.0281 (0.0209)	-0.0402 (0.0253)	-0.0282 (0.0209)	-0.0275 (0.0213)
<i>Urban_{it}</i>	0.00851 (0.0113)	0.00901 (0.0113)	0.0113 (0.0142)	0.00621 (0.0114)	0.00755 (0.0114)
<i>HomeOwn_{it}</i>	0.0219* (0.0119)	0.0232* (0.0119)	0.0360** (0.0151)	0.0224* (0.0119)	0.0250** (0.0121)
<i>Tax_{it}</i>	0.00584 (0.00457)	0.00421 (0.00455)	0.00810 (0.00574)	0.00503 (0.00455)	0.00578 (0.00461)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1540	1558	1216	1560	1556

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.3: Determinants of turnout including $Ideology_{it}$ and local globalization penetration. Marginal effects from logistic model with random effects.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$VoteOrNot_{it}$	$VoteOrNot_{it}$	$VoteOrNot_{it}$	$VoteOrNot_{it}$	$VoteOrNot_{it}$
$TradeBar_{it}$	0.00383 (0.00570)	0.00502 (0.00569)	0.00351 (0.00698)	0.00470 (0.00559)	0.00583 (0.00583)
$LaborIm_{it}$	0.000798 (0.00465)				
$Refugee_{it}$		-0.00879* (0.00473)			
$ImmiSupp_{it}$			-0.0100 (0.00711)		
$Multicul_{it}$				-0.00302 (0.00208)	
$Interna_{it}$					-0.00361 (0.00238)
$Education_{it}$	0.00653*** (0.00237)	0.00443* (0.00238)	0.00606** (0.00286)	0.00477** (0.00230)	0.00521** (0.00234)
$Income_{it}$	0.00425 (0.00466)	0.00609 (0.00469)	0.00553 (0.00576)	0.00581 (0.00462)	0.00686 (0.00473)
Age_{it}	0.00992*** (0.00371)	0.00832** (0.00364)	0.0105** (0.00458)	0.00848** (0.00359)	0.00793** (0.00366)
$Immigrant_i$	-0.0367*** (0.0139)	-0.0356** (0.0142)	-0.0430** (0.0177)	-0.0350** (0.0138)	-0.0373*** (0.0141)
$Female_i$	0.0197* (0.0112)	0.0223* (0.0114)	0.0277** (0.0141)	0.0203* (0.0111)	0.0237** (0.0113)
$Ideology_{it}$	0.000107 (0.00245)	-0.0000999 (0.00250)	-0.000117 (0.00311)	-0.000161 (0.00242)	-0.000736 (0.00246)
$BusinessOwn_{it}$	-0.0320 (0.0208)	-0.0281 (0.0214)	-0.0409 (0.0251)	-0.0278 (0.0207)	-0.0278 (0.0212)
$Urban_{it}$	0.00842 (0.0113)	0.00930 (0.0114)	0.0113 (0.0142)	0.00626 (0.0112)	0.00720 (0.0114)
$HomeOwn_{it}$	0.0218* (0.0119)	0.0237** (0.0121)	0.0359** (0.0150)	0.0221* (0.0117)	0.0247** (0.0120)
Tax_{it}	0.00585 (0.00458)	0.00413 (0.00462)	0.00820 (0.00570)	0.00492 (0.00448)	0.00591 (0.00458)
IP_{bt}^{cs}	-0.0000314 (0.000361)	-0.00000222 (0.000367)	0.000143 (0.000477)	0.0000114 (0.000361)	0.00000892 (0.000369)
$ImmiShare_{bt}$	0.00753 (0.0249)	0.000459 (0.0247)	-0.00939 (0.0340)	0.00296 (0.0246)	-0.00111 (0.0248)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1540	1558	1216	1560	1556

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix C. Additional County-level Analysis

Table C.1: Determinants of vote share of the right-wing coalition including $Ideology_{it}$ and globalization penetration. Random effect estimation under balanced panel.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$ShareR_{bt}$	$ShareR_{bt}$	$ShareR_{bt}$	$ShareR_{bt}$	$ShareR_{bt}$
$TradeBar_{bt}$	-0.495 (0.693)	-0.614 (0.765)	-0.997 (1.006)	-0.601 (0.717)	-0.515 (0.757)
$LaborIm_{bt}$	-1.899** (0.886)				
$Refugee_{bt}$		-0.537 (0.722)			
$ImmiSupp_{bt}$			-1.039 (1.065)		
$Multicul_{bt}$				-0.295 (0.346)	
$Interna_{bt}$					0.0600 (0.376)
$Education_{bt}$	0.232 (0.227)	0.244 (0.219)	0.483* (0.284)	0.176 (0.234)	0.241 (0.221)
$MedInc_{bt}$	0.286 (0.515)	0.303 (0.539)	-1.395** (0.703)	0.470 (0.541)	0.286 (0.541)
Age_{bt}	1.213 (1.108)	1.424 (1.198)	0.627 (1.318)	1.248 (1.137)	1.341 (1.190)
$Female_{bt}$	3.466** (1.443)	3.923*** (1.490)	3.713** (1.487)	3.280** (1.497)	4.031*** (1.507)
$Ideology_{bt}$	1.289*** (0.453)	1.211** (0.486)	1.590*** (0.578)	1.196*** (0.462)	1.248** (0.486)
$BusinessOwn_{bt}$	8.048 (7.089)	8.924 (7.617)	10.44 (8.506)	9.282 (7.316)	8.531 (7.587)
$Urban_{bt}$	-0.519 (2.802)	-0.944 (3.005)	0.737 (2.847)	-0.514 (2.875)	-0.605 (2.989)
$HomeOwn_{bt}$	3.859 (2.353)	3.610 (2.603)	5.757 (3.612)	3.880 (2.420)	4.184 (2.580)
Tax_{bt}	-0.648 (1.027)	-1.410 (1.048)	0.336 (1.222)	-1.095 (1.033)	-1.428 (1.075)
IP_{bt}^{cs}	0.00728 (0.00741)	0.00656 (0.00789)	0.00687 (0.00766)	0.00756 (0.00766)	0.00679 (0.00790)
$ImmiShare_{bt}$	1.008*** (0.311)	1.175*** (0.319)	1.565*** (0.501)	1.092*** (0.317)	1.148*** (0.320)
Constant	-152.4** (71.70)	-178.9** (74.24)	-143.6** (72.46)	-149.2** (74.24)	-186.3** (74.83)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	84	84	63	84	84

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.2: Determinants of vote share of the right-wing coalition and Swedish Democrats including $Ideology_{it}$ and globalization penetration. Random effect estimation under balanced panel.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	$ShareRSD_{bt}$	$ShareRSD_{bt}$	$ShareRSD_{bt}$	$ShareRSD_{bt}$	$ShareRSD_{bt}$
<i>TradeBar_{bt}</i>	-1.363 (0.903)	-1.170 (0.945)	-1.963* (1.038)	-1.323 (0.913)	-1.485 (0.941)
<i>LaborIm_{bt}</i>	-0.838 (1.142)				
<i>Refugee_{bt}</i>		0.788 (0.890)			
<i>ImmiSupp_{bt}</i>			-1.436 (1.097)		
<i>Multicul_{bt}</i>				0.173 (0.438)	
<i>Interna_{bt}</i>					0.380 (0.468)
<i>Education_{bt}</i>	0.216 (0.234)	0.214 (0.224)	0.565** (0.276)	0.214 (0.236)	0.217 (0.224)
<i>MedInc_{bt}</i>	-0.745 (0.625)	-0.810 (0.624)	-1.942*** (0.711)	-0.758 (0.637)	-0.833 (0.626)
<i>Age_{bt}</i>	-1.855 (1.441)	-1.905 (1.480)	-0.584 (1.359)	-1.771 (1.445)	-1.727 (1.475)
<i>Female_{bt}</i>	4.857*** (1.667)	5.313*** (1.650)	3.358** (1.491)	4.956*** (1.686)	5.365*** (1.664)
<i>Ideology_{bt}</i>	1.683*** (0.584)	1.749*** (0.593)	1.982*** (0.592)	1.624*** (0.581)	1.748*** (0.594)
<i>BusinessOwn_{bt}</i>	12.52 (9.127)	12.39 (9.320)	8.249 (8.746)	12.05 (9.217)	12.96 (9.309)
<i>Urban_{bt}</i>	-3.689 (3.545)	-3.552 (3.618)	-2.624 (2.926)	-3.484 (3.563)	-3.737 (3.602)
<i>HomeOwn_{bt}</i>	1.815 (3.034)	2.634 (3.192)	4.690 (3.703)	2.010 (3.055)	2.505 (3.175)
<i>Tax_{bt}</i>	-0.164 (1.321)	-0.466 (1.286)	1.064 (1.256)	-0.576 (1.300)	-0.739 (1.323)
<i>IP_{bt}^{cs}</i>	0.0214** (0.00937)	0.0215** (0.00945)	0.0170** (0.00788)	0.0205** (0.00946)	0.0218** (0.00948)
<i>ImmiShare_{bt}</i>	1.779*** (0.365)	1.818*** (0.362)	1.928*** (0.499)	1.803*** (0.365)	1.818*** (0.362)
Constant	-191.8** (83.05)	-219.1*** (82.70)	-109.4 (72.77)	-199.2** (83.75)	-219.4*** (83.04)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	84	84	63	84	84

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C.3: Determinants of election outcome
without considering globalization barrier preference.
Random effect estimation under balanced panel.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>ShareSD_{bt}</i>	<i>ShareR_{bt}</i>	<i>ShareRSD_{bt}</i>
<i>Education_{bt}</i>	-0.119 (0.105)	-0.00143 (0.00220)	0.000545 (0.00208)
<i>MedInc_{bt}</i>	-0.862*** (0.325)	0.00523 (0.00540)	-0.00335 (0.00594)
<i>Age_{bt}</i>	-1.547* (0.928)	0.00916 (0.0122)	-0.00669 (0.0153)
<i>Female_{bt}</i>	-0.665 (0.886)	0.0383** (0.0166)	0.0535*** (0.0170)
<i>Ideology_{bt}</i>	0.0310 (0.388)	0.0115** (0.00529)	0.0139** (0.00651)
<i>BusinessOwn_{bt}</i>	6.027 (5.912)	0.00587 (0.0799)	0.0809 (0.0989)
<i>Urban_{bt}</i>	0.100 (1.973)	0.0368 (0.0283)	0.0356 (0.0339)
<i>HomeOwn_{bt}</i>	-1.297 (2.115)	0.0409 (0.0279)	0.0326 (0.0349)
<i>Tax_{bt}</i>	0.111 (0.844)	0.00515 (0.0112)	0.00607 (0.0140)
<i>IP_{bt}^{cs}</i>	0.0109* (0.00566)	0.0000511 (0.0000863)	0.000153 (0.000100)
<i>ImmiShare_{bt}</i>	0.703*** (0.165)	0.00184 (0.00262)	0.0115*** (0.00296)
Constant	58.92 (45.00)	-1.748** (0.829)	-2.351*** (0.858)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	105	105	105

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix D. First Stage Estimation Results of the 2SLS Specifications in Table 13

The table in this appendix presents the first stage estimation results corresponding to the second stage results presented in Table 13. As previously explained, Table 13 uses G2SLS.

We can also observe in Table D.1 (corresponding to the second-stage regression results presented in Table 13) that the instrumental variables we use can explain the endogenous ideology variable ($Ideology_{it}$) with robust statistical significance. The signs of the coefficients are also consistent through all six columns. For instance, we can confirm that SNES respondents who are more religious, who prefer higher defense spending, and who support stricter implementation of the law are more likely to be politically conservative (right-wing) citizens. On the other hand, respondents who care more about environmental issues are likely to be more politically progressive (left-wing) citizens. All of these first stage results are quite intuitive. The results in Table D.1 with respect to other variables are consistent with their signs in regressions that look at the likelihood of voting conservative.

Table D.1: 1st stage estimation of $Ideology_{it}$ in Table 13.
 Random effect estimation with unbalanced panel.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$	$Ideology_{it}$
Law_{it}	0.180*** (0.0153)					
$Christian_{it}$	0.124*** (0.0129)					
$Environ_{it}$	-0.148*** (0.0135)	-0.112*** (0.0146)	-0.103*** (0.0134)	-0.120*** (0.0147)	-0.108*** (0.0134)	-0.116*** (0.0138)
$Defense_{it}$		0.233*** (0.0317)	0.229*** (0.0291)	0.255*** (0.0320)	0.237*** (0.0293)	0.275*** (0.0300)
$Education_{it}$	0.177*** (0.0148)	0.196*** (0.0159)	0.156*** (0.0140)	0.210*** (0.0158)	0.164*** (0.0141)	0.201*** (0.0151)
$Income_{it}$	0.083*** (0.0299)	0.040 (0.0323)	0.063** (0.0304)	0.017 (0.0329)	0.059* (0.0305)	0.037 (0.0308)
Age_{it}	0.007 (0.0227)	0.091*** (0.0240)	0.072*** (0.0236)	0.127*** (0.0240)	0.079*** (0.0233)	0.101*** (0.0224)
$Immigrant_i$	-0.309*** (0.1066)	-0.196* (0.1162)	-0.109 (0.1153)	-0.143 (0.1155)	-0.117 (0.1135)	-0.085 (0.1083)
$Female_i$	-0.071 (0.0707)	-0.099 (0.0752)	-0.124* (0.0753)	-0.070 (0.0745)	-0.104 (0.0739)	-0.092 (0.0694)
$Inequality_{it}$	-0.547*** (0.0317)	-0.560*** (0.0346)	-0.499*** (0.0311)	-0.596*** (0.0347)	-0.517*** (0.0314)	-0.586*** (0.0328)
$BusinessOwn_{it}$	0.679*** (0.1562)	0.753*** (0.1654)	0.760*** (0.1514)	0.906*** (0.1638)	0.825*** (0.1528)	0.838*** (0.1557)
$Urban_{it}$	-0.062 (0.0725)	-0.132* (0.0785)	-0.055 (0.0729)	-0.093 (0.0784)	-0.041 (0.0731)	-0.144** (0.0735)
$HomeOwn_{it}$	0.377*** (0.0791)	0.344*** (0.0861)	0.344*** (0.0803)	0.370*** (0.0865)	0.330*** (0.0803)	0.313*** (0.0814)
$ImmiShare_{bt}$	-0.117 (0.1006)	-0.135 (0.1198)	-0.109 (0.0995)	-0.266** (0.1347)	-0.117 (0.1000)	-0.093 (0.1043)
IP_{bt}^{cs}	-0.001 (0.0022)	0.000 (0.0023)	0.001 (0.0025)	0.002 (0.0028)	0.001 (0.0025)	0.003 (0.0025)
Constant	5.877*** (0.8882)	6.724*** (1.0380)	6.708*** (0.8108)	7.941*** (1.0742)	6.807*** (0.8166)	6.678*** (0.8542)
Year Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1st-stage F stat.	139.99	64.50	67.63	74.44	72.92	88.80
Observations	3,448	3,168	3,762	3,307	3,789	3,762

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$