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# Consumption and Hours between the United States and France 

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#### Abstract

We document large differences between the United States and France in allocations of consumption expenditures and time by age. Using a life-cycle model, we quantify to what extent tax and transfer programs and market and home productivity can account for the differences. We find that while labor efficiency by age and home-production productivity are crucial in accounting for the differences in the allocation of time, the consumption tax and social security are more important regarding allocation of expenditures. Adopting the U.S. consumption tax decreases welfare in France, and adopting the U.S. social security system increases welfare in France.


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[^1]
## 1 Introduction

While there is a large literature on the differences in labor supply across countries, ${ }^{1}$ work on cross-country differences in consumption expenditures is limited. To evaluate the effect of variations in policies on allocation and welfare, it is important to study consumption and labor-supply decisions together in a model that is consistent with data on both types of decision.

In this paper, we study cross-country differences in the life-cycle profiles of both labor supply and consumption expenditures. We examine the allocations of consumption expenditures and time by age across countries not only for market activities but also for home activities. Home production is a critical factor in propagating the effect of policies on labor supply and is also an important component in welfare calculation. ${ }^{2}$ We focus on understanding the discrepancy in the life-cycle profiles between the United States and France because the two countries, while at a similar stage of economic development, differ dramatically in their tax and social-benefit systems.

Different tax and transfer programs could create different incentives for households when they allocate their time and expenditures between market and home activities over their life cycle. We observe large differences in such programs between the United States and France. First, the consumption tax rate is 24 percent in France but only 7.5 percent in the United States. Second, the French social security system features a substantially higher tax rate accompanied by a more generous benefit scheme. Lastly, the French income tax is more progressive than that of the United States.

The age profiles of time use and expenditure in the United States and France also differ greatly. Using time-use and consumer-expenditure surveys, we document three important differences. First, the French, at every age, work less in the market but spend more time in home production than Americans. Second, the French have lower expenditure-to-income ratios for spending on both market goods and home inputs (goods used in producing for home consumption), but the difference is larger for market goods than for home inputs. Third, over the life cycle, both Americans and the French shift their allocations of time and expenditures from market to home, but the shift is much faster and stronger in France.

[^2]Higher taxes and a larger social security system in France favor home production over market production and may account for the differences in allocations of expenditure and time observed in the data. We develop a model to formally evaluate the quantitative effects of these policies on allocations. Our model is a life-cycle model with home production, endogenous retirement decisions, and uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In the model, households derive utility from leisure and a consumption good composited from a market good and a home good. The home good is produced using households' time and home inputs. The model incorporates key realistic features of the tax and transfer programs, including the consumption tax, the income tax, and the social security system.

We calibrate the model to the United States and show that it matches well the data on US expenditure and time allocations by age. In our model, besides the differences in tax and transfer programs, France differs from the United States in households' age-efficiency profile for market production and in their productivity in producing home goods. In particular, France has a lower age-efficiency profile, higher home-production total factor productivity (TFP), and lower home laboraugmenting productivity. With these differences in government programs and productivity, the model matches well the data on French allocations of expenditure and hours by age.

The simulated French economy can generate the three documented differences in allocations from the United States. First, lower efficiency units and higher homeproduction TFP in France raise the productivity of home goods relative to market goods and thus increase home hours and reduce market hours. Lower French labor-augmenting technology at home also increases home hours and reduces market hours since more hours are needed to produce the same amount of goods at home. Both of these mechanisms generate the pattern that the French work less in the market but more at home than Americans. Second, higher taxes, a lower ageefficiency profile, and higher home-production TFP all favor home consumption over market consumption and shift expenditures from market to home. Third, the age-efficiency profile is much lower in old age in France, which leads to a stronger shift of hours and expenditures from market to home over the life cycle.

To decompose the effects of policy and productivity, we replace French policies and productivity with US values in the simulated French economy. Our first finding is that all the examined policies combined are more important than all productivity variables combined in accounting for the cross-country difference in expenditure on market goods and are equally important in accounting for the cross-country difference in expenditure on home inputs. Among the policies considered, the consumption tax and social security system are quantitatively more important than the income tax for determining allocation of expenditures. Home
labor-augmenting technology is quantitatively more important than other productivity variables in accounting for the cross-country differences in expenditures on home inputs. Second, we find that productivity differences are quantitatively more important than policy differences in accounting for the differences in the allocation of time by age. In particular, the age-efficiency profile and home-production TFP are more important in accounting for the life-cycle differences in market hours, while home labor-augmenting technology is more important in accounting for the life-cycle differences in home-production hours.

To evaluate the welfare implications of each policy, we change each policy in France while holding government spending constant, which we achieve by imposing an additional proportional income tax. We find that adopting the US consumption tax leads to a decline in welfare, with a larger decline for households with higher initial productivity draws. Adopting the US social security system benefits all French households. The welfare gain is especially large for households with higher productivity because they dislike a larger social security system. The average welfare change from adopting the US income tax, compared to the other policy changes, is small. The welfare gain from adopting the US social security system outweighs the welfare cost from adopting the US consumption tax; thus, adopting all three US policies increases welfare for French households.

This paper is related to the literature studying life-cycle consumption profiles in the United States. Carroll (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) show that precautionary savings, generated by borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic income shocks, can explain the hump-shaped life-cycle consumption profile. Bullard and Feigenbaum (2007) find that including leisure in the utility function helps explain the decline in consumption late in life. A more recent literature studies the subcomponents of consumption over the life cycle. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007) document hump-shaped profiles for both durable and nondurable consumption and propose to explain the hump with a model in which durables serve as collateral. Yang (2009) develops a model with illiquid housing and with collateral constraints to study the life-cycle patterns of housing and nonhousing consumption. Aguiar and Hurst (2013) show that the hump shape in market consumption is related to the substitutability of market and home-produced goods. Dotsey et al. (2014) show that a life-cycle model with home production explains well the life-cycle patterns of market and home consumption and time allocation. Our contribution to this literature is to compare consumption-expenditure profiles across countries and study policy impacts on the profiles of expenditure on both market goods and home inputs to account for cross-country differences.

This paper is also related to the literature that quantifies the effects of government policies on labor supply across countries. Prescott (2004) and Ohanian et al.
(2008) use a one-sector model to study the roles of taxes in accounting for crosscountry differences in labor supply. Rogerson (2008), Olovsson (2009), McDaniel (2011a), and Duernecker and Herrendorf (2018) highlight the importance of home production in propagating the effect of taxes on labor supply. Ngai and Pissarides (2011) and Ragan (2013) find that subsidies for family care are important in accounting for the differences in market hours between the United States and the Nordic countries. Chakraborty et al. (2015) and Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln (2018) study the role of progressive and nonlinear labor income taxes in accounting for cross-country differences in market hours by gender. None of these papers analyze labor supply by age. Two recent papers, Erosa et al. (2012) and Laun and Wallenius (2016), study cross-country differences in market hours late in life and find that social insurance programs are important drivers of the low labor supply of old households in European countries relative to the United States. In contrast to these two papers, we study cross-country differences in not only the allocation of time but more importantly the allocation of expenditures. Our study also distinguishes home consumption from market consumption and covers the whole adult life cycle. The rich structure of the model enables us to study the welfare implications of tax and transfer programs.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the expenditure and time allocations by age. Section 3 first presents a static model to demonstrate the importance of the elasticity of substitutions and then presents the fullblown life-cycle model. Section 4 calibrates the model to the US economy. Section 5 applies the model to the French economy and decomposes the total differences in the expenditure and time allocations between the United States and France into contributions from policies and productivity. Section 6 studies the welfare implications of each policy. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Expenditure and Time Allocations by Age

### 2.1 Data Construction

We use the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS) to construct data for time allocations in the United States and France, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to construct data for expenditures in the United States, and the French Household Budget Survey (HBS) to construct data for expenditures in France. We restrict the samples to reference persons of at least twenty-four years of age, as most individuals complete their education by then. The data throughout this paper are averages from 2010 to 2012 whenever possible. ${ }^{3}$ The rest of this section summarizes the

[^3]data-construction process, and Appendix A provides more details.
We follow Aguiar and Hurst (2007) in classifying the time-use categories as market hours, home hours, and leisure. Market hours comprise time spent working, job searching, and commuting; home hours comprise time spent cooking, cleaning, and household maintenance; the remainder of the time is classified as leisure. Hours for each age are constructed as average weekly hours per adult for that age group. ${ }^{4}$ Accordingly, the constructed hours takes into account the labor force participation at that age.

Following Dotsey et al. (2014), we classify consumption expenditures related to home production as home inputs and the rest as market goods. Home inputs include food at home, household operations, household furnishings and equipment, utilities, housing maintenance, and housing expenditures (which consists of actual rents for renters and equivalent rents for homeowners). The CEX and HBS group all transportation expenditures together, and it is not feasible to separate the portion of expenditures for use in home production from the portion for other purposes. Following Dotsey et al. (2014), we prorate transportation expenses by travel time for market and home activities that we obtained from the MTUS. ${ }^{5}$

The CEX and HBS are designed to collect expenditures by households on goods and services and thus do not include spending by government and nonprofit organizations on behalf of households. Because of the importance of the latter expenditures in household consumption and the difference in their size between France and the United States, it is important to take them into account when performing welfare analysis. Although these expenditures are not included in households' expenditures, they are included in Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) of the National Accounts. Hence, we proportionally change the expenditure for each age group in the expenditure surveys for both the United States and France so that the ratio of average expenditure (market plus home, averaged for all age groups) to average income is equal to the PCE-to-GDP ratio. This adjustment shifts the age profiles of expenditure up and down but keeps the relative expenditures constant across age groups and between market and home expenses. See Appendix A for the detailed adjustment procedures.

### 2.2 Data Facts

In this subsection, we document the similarity and differences in the age profiles of expenditure and time allocations between the United States and France. These

[^4]are the facts we aim to account for with our quantitative model. Figure 1 displays the profiles for expenditure and hours by age in two-year segments. Hours are reported as a fraction of the total available time-one hundred hours per week. Expenditure shares are the ratios of the adjusted expenditures to the average economy-wide income.

Figure 1: Age Profiles of Expenditure and Hours


Notes: Hours are reported as a fraction of the total available time-one hundred hours per week. Expenditure shares are the ratios of the adjusted expenditures to the average income. Expenditures are constructed from the Consumer Expenditure Survey for the United States and from the Household Budget Survey for France. Hours are constructed from the Multinational Time Use Study.

The profiles in both countries exhibit similar life-cycle patterns. The profile of expenditures on market goods and home inputs exhibits a typical life-cycle hump shape. In both countries, expenditures on home inputs exceed expenditures on market goods at every age. Market hours, in both countries, increase slightly for people in their thirties relative to those in their twenties and are flat for most of people's working lives before sharply decreasing in the fifties. Home hours, on the other hand, increase with age.

Despite the similarities, the age profiles differ in three important dimensions between the two countries. First of all, market hours are lower and home hours are higher in France than in the United States at every age. Second, although Americans spend a larger share of their income on both market goods and home inputs than French, the difference in the share of expenditure is smaller for home inputs than for market inputs. To highlight those two facts, we report, in Table 1, aggregate shares of hours and expenditures across all ages. For an average adult, the share of market hours is lower in France by 4 percentage points (four hours per week) and the share of home hours is higher by 3 percentage points (three hours per week). As a result, market hours per adult are 14 percent (0.04/0.28) lower and home hours per adult are 19 percent $(0.03 / 0.16)$ higher in France than in the United States. In contrast, the expenditure share in France is 7 percentage points
lower for market goods and only 5 percentage points lower for home inputs. ${ }^{6}$
Table 1: Data: Aggregate Hours and Expenditure Shares

|  | $N_{m}$ | $N_{h}$ | $\frac{C_{m}}{Y}$ | $\frac{D}{Y}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| US | 0.28 | 0.16 | 0.29 | 0.38 |
| FR | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.33 |
| FR - US | -0.04 | 0.03 | -0.07 | -0.05 |

Notes: The reported values are aggregate hours and expenditure shares across all ages. $N_{m}$ denotes market hours share, $N_{h}$ denotes home hours share, $\frac{C_{m}}{Y}$ denotes market-goods expenditure share, and $\frac{D}{Y}$ denotes home-inputs expenditure share.

Third, as is shown in Figure 1, although households in both countries shift their allocations of time and expenditures from market to home over the life cycle, the shift is much faster and stronger in France. To highlight this fact, in Table 2 we report the ratio of market to home allocations for expenditure and hours for every ten-year age group. The values decline with age in both countries, indicating a shift of time and expenditures from market to home as households age. However, the declines are larger in France than in the United States. Specifically, the reported ratio of hours declines from 2.23 at age twenty-eight (the average of twenty-four and thirty-three) to 0.08 at age sixty-eight (the average of sixty-four and seventythree) in France, compared with a much smaller decline from 2.57 to 0.54 in the United States. Similarly, the ratio of expenditure in France declines by half (from 0.84 to 0.47 ) between ages twenty-eight and sixty-eight while it barely declines in the United States.

Table 2: Data: Market Allocation Relative to Home Allocation by Age

| Age | Time |  | Expenditure |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | US | FR | US | FR |
| 28 | 2.57 | 2.23 | 0.74 | 0.84 |
| 38 | 2.24 | 1.94 | 0.72 | 0.74 |
| 48 | 2.12 | 1.74 | 0.82 | 0.73 |
| 58 | 1.71 | 0.83 | 0.81 | 0.60 |
| 68 | 0.54 | 0.08 | 0.72 | 0.47 |

Notes: This table reports the ratio of market to home allocation of expenditure and hours for every ten-year age group. For example, age twenty-eight represents the average for ages twenty-four to thirty-three.

In summary, we find three important differences in the allocations of expenditure and hours between the United States and France. First, the French, at every

[^5]age, work less in the market and more at home than Americans. Second, the crosscountry difference in the expenditure share of market goods is larger than that in the expenditure share of home inputs. Third, although both American and French households shift their allocations of time and expenditures from market to home as they age, the shift is much faster and stronger in France.

## 3 The Model Economy

Before presenting a full-blown life-cycle model to quantify the extent to which both the tax and transfer programs and market and home productivity can account for the documented differences in the age profiles between the two countries, we first use a static model to show how taxes, wages, and home productivity affect the allocation of hours and expenditures at home and in the market.

### 3.1 Static Model

In the model, there is one representative household who lives for one period. The representative household is endowed with one unit of time and derives utility from a composite consumption good that consists of a market good and a homeproduced good. She also values leisure and allocates her time endowment to market work, home production, and leisure.

The utility function is as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
U(c, l)=\frac{\left[\omega_{3} c^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{3}}}+\left(1-\omega_{3}\right) l^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{3}}}\right]^{\frac{1-\gamma}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{3}}}}-1}{1-\gamma} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $l$ is leisure, $c$ is the composite consumption good, $\zeta_{3}>0$ is the elasticity of substitution between $l$ and $c$, and $\gamma$ is the relative risk-aversion parameter. The composite consumption good is produced by aggregating the market good $c_{m}$ and home-produced good $c_{h}$ through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator:

$$
\begin{equation*}
c=\left[\omega_{2} c_{m}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}+\left(1-\omega_{2}\right) c_{h}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\zeta_{2}>0$ is the elasticity of substitution between the market good and the home good. The home good is produced according to the following production function:

$$
\begin{equation*}
c_{h}=z_{h}\left[\omega_{1} d^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}+\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)\left(v n_{h}\right)^{\left.1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}},}\right. \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $d$ is the market good used in home production and is called the home input, $n_{h}$ is the labor input, $z_{h}$ is TFP at home, and $v$ is labor-augmenting technology in
home production. ${ }^{7} \zeta_{1}>0$ is the elasticity of substitution between home input $d$ and home time $n_{h}$.

Let $\tau_{c}$ be a proportional consumption tax and $\tau_{i}$ be a proportional income tax. The tax revenues are discarded. Normalizing the price of market goods to one, the household's budget constraint is as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)\left(c_{m}+d\right)=\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w n_{m} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $w$ is the wage rate and $n_{m}=1-l-n_{h}$ is market hours.
The solution to the household's maximization problem yields the following two propositions that characterize the effects of taxes, wages (market productivity), and home productivity on allocations of hours and expenditure. The derivations are provided in Appendix B.

Proposition 1: $\frac{n_{h}}{d}$ is not affected by $z_{h}$, is decreasing in $w$, and is increasing in $\tau_{i}$ and $\tau_{c}$. In addition, it is decreasing in $v$ iff $\zeta_{1}<1$.

The intuition is as follows. The ratio of the two inputs in home production, $\frac{n_{h}}{d}$, is decreasing in the price of home hours relative to home inputs. The price of home hours is the after-tax market wage. An increase in wage rate $w$, or a decrease in income tax rate $\tau_{i}$ or in consumption tax rate $\tau_{c}$, increases the price of home hours relative to home inputs and leads to a lower $\frac{n_{h}}{d}$. While the magnitude of these effects depends on the elasticity of substitution between home inputs and home time $\left(\zeta_{1}\right)$, their signs do not. In contrast, the qualitative effect of the home labor-augmenting technology $(v)$ on the allocation of home hours and home inputs depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution. A rise in $v$ leads to an increase in effective home-production hours $\left(v n_{h}\right)$ but a decline in raw home hours $\left(n_{h}\right)$ since less time is needed to produce the same amount of output. The condition $\zeta_{1}<1$ implies that home inputs and home hours are complements; as a result, the rise in effective home hours leads to an increase in home inputs and thus a decline in $\frac{n_{h}}{d}$.

Proposition 2: $\frac{c_{m}}{d}$ is decreasing in $z_{h}$ iff $\zeta_{2}>1$. In addition, it is decreasing in $\tau_{c}, \tau_{i}$, and $v$ and is increasing in $w$ iff $\zeta_{1}<\zeta_{2}$.

The change in the ratio $\frac{c_{m}}{d}$ depends on the substitution between home goods and market goods and the substitution between home hours and home inputs. The effect of home TFP $\left(z_{h}\right)$ works through the substitution margin between home goods and market goods: when home goods and market goods are substitutes ( $\zeta_{2}>1$ ), an increase in $z_{h}$ induces substitution from market goods to home goods,

[^6]resulting in a decline in the ratio of $c_{m}$ to $d$. The effects of other variables work through both substitution margins. Specifically, a decrease in the consumption tax $\tau_{c}$, the income tax $\tau_{i}$, or labor-augmenting technology $v$ or an increase in wage $w$ favors consumption in the market over consumption at home and leads to substitution from home to market goods. As proven in Proposition 1, these changes in policies and productivity also lead to substitution from home hours (effective home hours $v n_{h}$ for changes in $v$ ) to home inputs. When $\zeta_{1}<\zeta_{2}$, the substitution from home goods to market goods is stronger than that from home hours to home inputs, generating a rise in $\frac{c_{m}}{d}$.

In summary, the static model illustrates the effects of the consumption tax, the income tax, the wage rate, home TFP, and home labor-augmenting technology on the allocations of time and expenditure. It also shows the importance of the elasticity of substitution between market goods and home goods ( $\zeta_{2}$ ) and that between home time and home inputs $\left(\zeta_{1}\right)$ in generating these effects. However, it is silent on how allocations vary over the life cycle and how they are affected by the social security system. Next, we introduce a richer life-cycle model to quantify the effects of policies and productivity on the allocations.

### 3.2 Life-Cycle Model

The model is built on Dotsey et al. (2015). It is an overlapping generations model with an infinitely lived government. The government collects taxes on consumption and labor income to provide social security benefits to retirees and to fund government spending. There is no aggregate risk, and households face death shocks and uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to their market labor productivity.

### 3.2.1 Market Production

A representative firm produces a final good according to the following production function:

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y=F^{m}\left(K, L_{m}\right)=K^{\alpha} L_{m}^{1-\alpha} \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $K$ is the aggregate capital stock and $L_{m}$ is the aggregate labor input measured in efficiency units. The final good can be used in four different ways. It can be consumed directly, used as an input in the production of the home good, invested in capital stock, or purchased by the government. The capital stock depreciates at rate $\delta^{k}$. The representative firm pays a social security tax on its total wage bill at rate $\tau_{f}$. Normalizing the price of the final good to one and denoting the interest rate by $r$ and the wage rate per efficiency unit by $w$, the firm's maximization
problem is as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
r & =F_{1}^{m}\left(K, L_{m}\right)-\delta^{k}, \\
w & =F_{2}^{m}\left(K, L_{m}\right) /\left(1+\tau_{f}\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

where $F_{1}^{m}\left(K, L_{m}\right)$ and $F_{2}^{m}\left(K, L_{m}\right)$ are the marginal product of capital and the marginal product of labor, respectively.

### 3.2.2 Households

Households have the same preferences and home-production function as those given in the static model. We assume that home TFP and home labor-augmenting technology are both constant over the life cycle. ${ }^{8}$

Demographics. There are T overlapping generations of households. Each generation is indexed by their age $t=1,2, \ldots, T$. Hence $T$ denotes the maximum possible age. The life span is uncertain, and the exogenous survival probability is denoted by $\lambda_{t}$ for households of age $t$. We assume a constant population growth rate $g$. Since the evolution of the population is stable, the distribution of households by age is constant at any point.

At birth, a household draws her initial assets from a distribution constant for each generation. The uncertainty of life span may lead to a positive amount of assets at death, which are first used to finance the initial assets of the next generations and then equally distributed to households younger than age fifty as bequest $b_{t}$.

Labor Productivity. A worker's labor productivity in the market comprises a deterministic component and a stochastic component. The deterministic component is age dependent and is denoted by $e_{t}$. The stochastic component, denoted by $\varepsilon_{t}^{i}$ for worker $i$ at age $t$, follows a Markov process:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\ln \varepsilon_{t}^{i}=\rho_{\varepsilon} \ln \varepsilon_{t-1}^{i}+v_{t}^{i}, v_{t}^{i} \sim N\left(0, \sigma_{\varepsilon}^{2}\right) . \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

The total productivity of worker $i$ at age $t$ is $e_{t} \varepsilon_{t}^{i}$, the product of the worker's age$t$ deterministic efficiency unit and age- $t$ productivity shock. This parsimonious productivity process follows the literature and captures well the wage dynamics observed in the data.

[^7]Borrowing Constraints. The household is borrowing constrained with a debt limit equal to twice her lowest possible labor income next period, assuming that she spends half of her time working in the market. That is, at any given time a household's financial wealth next period, denoted by $a^{\prime}$, must satisfy the following condition:

$$
\begin{equation*}
a^{\prime} \geq-e^{\prime} \underline{\varepsilon}^{\prime} w \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $e^{\prime}$ is the next period's age-efficiency unit and $\underline{\varepsilon}^{\prime}$ is the next period's lowest possible labor-efficiency shock.

### 3.2.3 Tax and Social Security System

The government maintains a pay-as-you-go social security program. In addition to taxing firms, the government imposes a social security tax on households' labor earnings to finance social security payments. Households' labor earnings are subject to a constant tax rate of $\tau_{s}$ up to a maximum income of $y_{\max }$. Retirees receive social security benefits each period. The level of the benefits is determined by a household's average social security earnings $y_{s}$ and is also adjusted by the claiming age. The government imposes taxes on consumption and labor earnings. The consumption tax is proportional, with a rate of $\tau_{c}$ levied on both market consumption $c_{m}$ and home input $d$. The income tax is progressive, and the average tax rate on labor income $y$ is $\tau(\cdot)$. We assume that half of the social security payment is subject to the income tax. We further assume that the government uses the total tax revenues from the consumption tax, income tax, and social security tax, net of social security payments, to finance exogenous government spending $G$ and thus balances its budget each period.

### 3.2.4 Equilibrium

Households' Problem. We focus on a stationary equilibrium with constant interest rate and constant wage rate per efficiency unit of labor. A household's state variables are $x=\left(t, a, \varepsilon, y_{s}, t_{r}\right)$, where $t$ denotes the household's current age, $a$ denotes financial assets carried over from last period, $\varepsilon$ denotes the labor-productivity shock in the current period, $y_{s}$ denotes average social security earnings up until the previous period, and $t_{r}$ denotes retirement age, with $t_{r}=0$ indicating nonretirement. Let $\beta$ be the discount factor and $f^{\prime}$ be the retirement decision for next period with $f^{\prime}=1$ indicating retirement and $f^{\prime}=0$ indicating nonretirement. The
household's problem is given by:

$$
\begin{gather*}
V\left(t, a, \varepsilon, y_{s}, t_{r}\right)=\max _{\left\{c_{m}, d, a^{\prime}, n_{m}, n_{h}, f^{\prime}\right\}}\left\{U\left(c, 1-n_{m}-n_{h}\right)+\right. \\
\left.\beta \lambda_{t} E_{t} V\left(t+1, a^{\prime}, \varepsilon^{\prime}, y_{s}^{\prime}, t_{r}^{\prime}\right)\right\} \tag{8}
\end{gather*}
$$

subject to (2), (3), (7), and

$$
\begin{align*}
y & =e_{t} \varepsilon w n_{m}  \tag{9}\\
a^{\prime} & \leq b_{t}+(1+r) a+y+\operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right)-\tau_{s s} \min \left(y_{\max }, y\right)  \tag{10}\\
& -\tau\left(y+0.5 \operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right)\right)\left(y+0.5 \operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right)\right)-\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)\left(c_{m}+d\right) \\
y_{s}^{\prime} & = \begin{cases}{\left[(t-1) y_{s}+\min \left(y_{\max }, y\right)\right] / t,} & t_{r}=0, t \leq t_{m} \\
{\left[\left(t_{m}-1\right) y_{s}+\min \left(y_{\max }, y\right)\right] / t_{m},} & t_{r}=0, t>t_{m}, y_{s}<\min \left(y_{\max }, y\right) \\
y_{s}, & t_{r}=0, t>t_{m}, y_{s} \geq \min \left(y_{\max }, y\right) \\
y_{s,} & t_{r}>0,\end{cases}  \tag{11}\\
t_{r}^{\prime} & = \begin{cases}0, & f^{\prime}=0, \\
t+1, & f^{\prime}=1,\end{cases}  \tag{12}\\
c_{m} & \geq 0, s \geq 0,0 \leq n_{m}, n_{h} \leq 1, \tag{13}
\end{align*}
$$

where $\operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right)$ is the social security benefit, which is a function of the retirement age and the average social security earnings over the entire working life. In any period, a household's resources consists of her asset holdings $a$, labor earnings $y$, pension $\operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right)$, and received bequests $b_{t}$.

We assume that households receive a pension only after they claim social security benefits $\left(t_{r}>0\right)$, and even after that, they can still work. Following the actual policy, the social security benefits are calculated based on the best $t_{m}$ years of earnings before retirement. The evolution of average social security earnings, described in equation (11), mimics this feature. Specifically, for a household who has not claimed social security benefits, average social security earnings $y_{s}$ accumulate in the first $t_{m}$ years, and from $t_{m}$ years onward, $y_{s}$ only accumulates when the current-period earnings $y$ exceed the average social security earnings $y_{s}$. For a household who has claimed social security benefits, average social security earnings do not update.

Definition of the Stationary Equilibrium. Let $v(x)$ be the invariant distribution of people over the state space, $C_{m}$ the aggregate consumption of the market good, $D$ the aggregate home input, $I$ the aggregate investment on capital, $N_{m}$ the aggregate market hours, $N_{h}$ the aggregate home hours, and $S=\int \operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right) v(d x)$
the total pension payments. The stationary equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A stationary equilibrium is given by value functions $V(x)$; policy functions $c_{m}(x), d(x), a^{\prime}(x), n_{m}(x), n_{h}(x), f^{\prime}(x)$; bequest $b_{t}$; government policies $\tau_{c}, \tau(\cdot), \tau_{f}, \tau_{s}, \operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right)$, and $G$; interest rate $r$ and wage rate $w$; and the invariant distribution $v(x)$, such that the following conditions hold:
(i) Given the interest rate, the wage, the government policies, and the expected bequest, the value functions and policy functions solve the household's maximization problem.
(ii) $v(x)$ is the invariant distribution of households over the state space.
(iii) The expected bequest equals the actual bequest:

$$
\int b_{t} v(d x)+\int_{t=0}[a(1+r)] v(d x)=\int\left(1-\lambda_{t}\right)\left[(1+r) a^{\prime}\right] v(d x)
$$

(iv) The price of each factor is equal to its marginal product.
(v) The government budget is balanced each period:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\int\left[\tau_{c}\left(c_{m}+d\right)+\tau\left(y+0.5 \operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right)\right)\left(y+0.5 \operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right)\right)+\tau_{s} \min \left(y_{\max }, y\right)\right] v(d x) \\
+\tau_{f} w L_{m}=G+S
\end{array}
$$

(vi) All markets clear.

## 4 Calibration to the US Economy

We calibrate the model economy to the salient features of the US economy. ${ }^{9}$ We set the parameters of our model in two steps. In the first step, we choose parameters that can be cleanly identified outside our model. The calibrated parameters in the first step are reported in Table 3. In the second step, we estimate jointly the remaining seven parameters by minimizing the difference between the model and data moments for households' allocations of expenditure and time. The calibrated parameters in the second step are reported in Table 4.

### 4.1 First-Stage Calibration

A period in the model is two years. For the purpose of exposition, the reported parameter values are converted to annual frequency, unless stated otherwise. Each person enters the model at age twenty-four. The maximum age $T$ is set to be ninety-eight. The conditional biannual survival probabilities $\lambda_{t}$, shown in the left

[^8]panel of Figure 2, are taken from the Social Security Administration Life Tables in 2000 with both genders included. We set the risk-aversion parameter $\gamma$ to 1.5, following Gourinchas and Parker (2002).

Table 3: First-Stage Calibrated Model Parameters

| Parameter |  | Value | Source |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Demographics |  |  |  |
|  | maximum life span | 98 |  |
| $\lambda_{t}$ | survival probability | fig. 2 | SSA Life Tables |
| Preference |  |  |  |
| $\gamma$ | risk-aversion coefficient | 1.500 | Gourinchas and Parker (2002) |
| Technology |  |  |  |
| $z_{h}$ | TFP in home production | 1 | normalization |
| $v$ | labor-augmenting tech. in home prod. | 1 | normalization |
|  | capital share in NIPA | 0.3565 | Dotsey et al. (2015) |
| $\delta^{k}$ | annual depreciation rate | 0.045 | authors' calculation |
| Endowment |  |  |  |
| $e_{t}$ | age-efficiency profile | fig. 2 | authors' calculation |
|  | $\mathrm{AR}(1)$ coef. of income process | 0.96 | Huggett (1996) |
| $\sigma_{\varepsilon}^{2}$ | innovation of income process | 0.045 | Huggett (1996) |
| $\sigma_{1}^{2}$ | var. of income process at age 1 | 0.38 | Huggett (1996) |
| Government policy |  |  |  |
| $t_{m}$ | years counted in soc. sec. | 36 | authors' calculation |
| $t_{r}$ | soc. sec. retirement-age range | 62-70 | authors' calculation |
| $y_{\text {max }}$ | soc. sec. tax cap | 2.47 | Huggett and Ventura (2000) |
| $\operatorname{pen}\left(t_{r,} y_{s}\right)$ | soc. sec. benefit | see text | Huggett and Ventura (2000) |
| $\tau_{s}$ | soc. sec. tax rate on employee | 0.052 | authors' calculation |
| $\tau_{f}$ | soc. sec. tax rate on employer | 0.052 | authors' calculation |
| $\tau(\cdot)$ | income tax function | see text | Guvenen et al. (2014) |
| $\tau_{c}$ | consumption tax rate | 0.075 | McDaniel (2011b) |

Without loss of generality, we normalize home $\operatorname{TFP}\left(z_{h}\right)$ and home labor-augmenting technology $(v)$ in the United States to one; therefore, $n_{h}$ is measured in units of raw labor. We set the capital share $\alpha$ to 0.3565 , following Dotsey et al. (2015), who calibrate this parameter using National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and Fixed Assets Tables from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We set the depreciation rate $\delta^{k}$ to 0.045 , a value within the range of those used in the literature, to match the average investment-to-output ratio of 0.17 for the United States in the 2000s. The implied interest rate on capital (net of depreciation), $r$, is 0.07 .

The deterministic life-cycle profile of labor productivity for the United States, $e_{t}$, is shown in the right panel of Figure 2. Appendix A describes how we use the March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to construct the
age-efficiency profile. The profile is hump-shaped with a peak at around age forty. We take the idiosyncratic productivity shock from Huggett (1996). In particular, the variance of the initial productivity shock at age twenty-four is set to 0.38 , the variance of the stochastic productivity process $\sigma_{\varepsilon}^{2}$ is set to 0.045 , and the $\operatorname{AR}(1)$ coefficient $\rho_{\varepsilon}$ is set to 0.96 . The joint distribution of wealth and initial labor productivity of households is taken from Dotsey et al. (2015), who calculate it using heads of household aged twenty-three to twenty-six in the Survey of Consumer Finances (2001, 2004, and 2007).

Figure 2: US Survival Rate and Efficiency Unit


The social security system mimics the Old Age and Survivor Insurance component of Social Security in the United States. The number of highest-earning years used to calculate the social security benefits, $t_{m}$, is thirty-six. The earliest age to claim social security benefit is sixty-two, and the age to receive the full retirement benefit is sixty-six. The retirement benefit at age sixty-six is borrowed from Huggett and Ventura (2000):

$$
\operatorname{pen}\left(t_{\left.r=66, y_{s}\right)}=\left\{\begin{array}{ll}
0.9 y_{s}, & y_{s} \leq 0.2 ; \\
0.18+0.32\left(y_{s}-0.2\right), & 0.2 \leq y_{s}<1.24 ; \\
0.5128+0.15\left(y_{s}-1.24\right), & 1.24 \leq y_{s}<y_{\max } \\
0.6973, & y_{s} \geq y_{\max }
\end{array}\right\}\right.
$$

The bend points and the social security earnings cap $y_{\max }$ are expressed as fractions of average earnings. The retirement benefit is adjusted by the claiming age as follows. A household retiring at age sixty-two receives 75 percent of the full pension. A household retiring at age sixty-four receives 87 percent of the full pension. A household retiring after age sixty-six receives 8 percent more pension benefits per year up to age seventy. The social security tax rates for employee $\tau_{s}$ and employer $\tau_{f}$ are both set to 5.2 percent, which are the average rate since the

1970s.
We borrow the income tax function from Guvenen et al. (2014), who estimate it from the OECD tax-benefit model. ${ }^{10}$ The consumption tax rate is set to 7.5 percent, which comes from McDaniel (2011b).

### 4.2 Second-Stage Calibration

There are seven parameters left for the second-stage calibration: $\beta, \zeta_{1}, \zeta_{2}, \zeta_{3}, \omega_{1}$, $\omega_{2}$, and $\omega_{3}$. We jointly estimate them to match the capital-output ratio, $K / Y$, of 3.1 and the four US age profiles of hours and expenditures at home and in the market as shown in Figure 1. The model is therefore overidentified. The calibrated parameters are reported in Table 4. The estimation implies that home time and home inputs are complements ( $\zeta_{1}<1$ ), home goods and market goods are substitutes ( $\zeta_{2}>1$ ), and consumption and leisure are complements ( $\zeta_{3}<1$ ).

Table 4: Second-Stage Calibrated Model Parameters

| Parameters (7) | Value |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\beta$ | discount factor | 0.9412 |
| $\zeta_{1}$ | sub. betw. home input and $n_{h}$ | 0.6020 |
| $\omega_{1}$ | weight on home input | 0.7597 |
| $\zeta_{2}$ | sub. betw. market and home goods | 1.7412 |
| $\omega_{2}$ | weight on market goods | 0.3146 |
| $\zeta_{3}$ | sub. betw. consumption and leisure | 0.7867 |
| $\omega_{3}$ | weight on consumption | 0.4862 |

Although the model is quite complex and the parameters and moments do not map one to one, some parameters affect certain moments more than others do. For example, $\beta$ is largely determined by $K / Y$. The elasticity and share parameters play crucial roles in determining the changes in the allocations of hours and expenditures over the life cycle. The age variations in home-production time and home-input expenditures help to identify $\zeta_{1}$ and $\omega_{1}$. The age variations in expenditures of the market good and the home input help to pin down $\zeta_{2}$ and $\omega_{2}$. The age variation in the sum of market hours and home hours is useful in identifying $\zeta_{3}$ and $\omega_{3}$ since those two types of hours help determine leisure hours.

[^9]
### 4.3 Model Fit for the US Economy

This subsection compares the results of the calibrated model with the actual US economy. Figure 3 compares the model-implied age profiles of expenditure and hours with the targeted profiles, along with the 95 percent confidence interval of the data. The figure shows that the model generally matches the actual allocations of time and expenditure by age both in the market and at home. The hours profiles are mostly sensitive to the age-efficiency profile, with social security also playing a role in old age. The borrowing constraint and precautionary-saving motive suppress the consumption of young households. As households age, these forces are alleviated and consumption expenditures increase until old age, when the increase of mortality risk leads to a decline in the consumption path.

Figure 3: Age Profiles in the United States - Model versus Data


Notes: The dashed lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals of the data.

The model also matches the aggregated variables in the data. Table 5 reports the model predictions side by side with the data. In the table, the investment-to-GDP ratio is the only targeted moment, and it is matched exactly. Since the model matches well the age profiles, it is not surprising that it also matches closely the aggregate hours and expenditure-to-output ratios for both market and home allocations. Moreover, the model-implied ratio of social security expenditure to GDP of 5.7 percent, an untargeted moment, is close to the data value of 7 percent.

Table 5: Model and Data Comparison in the Aggregate

|  | $N_{m}$ | $N_{h}$ | $\frac{C_{m}}{Y}$ | $\frac{D}{Y}$ | $\frac{I}{Y}$ | $\frac{G}{Y}$ | $\frac{S}{Y}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| US model | 0.2778 | 0.1582 | 0.2837 | 0.3740 | 0.1697 | 0.1868 | 0.0565 |
| US data | 0.2795 | 0.1567 | 0.2817 | 0.3716 | 0.1697 | 0.1920 | 0.0700 |

Notes: The reported values are aggregate shares of expenditures and hours across all ages. $N_{m}$ denotes markethours share, $N_{h}$ denotes home-hours share, $\frac{C_{m}}{Y}$ denotes market-goods expenditure share, and $\frac{D}{Y}$ denotes home-inputs expenditure share.

## 5 Simulation of the French Economy

In this section, we simulate the French economy, allowing France to differ from the United States in age-efficiency profile (market productivity), home productivity, and tax and benefit systems, including consumption tax, income tax, and social security. We first discuss parameters in France that differ from those in the United States. We then simulate the hours profiles and expenditures profiles for France and compare the predicted profiles with those in the data and in the United States. Lastly, we decompose the model-predicted differences between the United States and France into contributions from policies and productivity.

### 5.1 French Policies and Productivity

This subsection describes the parameters that have different values from those in the United States. We assume that France is a small open economy and thus has the same interest rate as the United States. The investment-to-GDP ratio in France is 1.5 percentage points higher. We adjust the depreciation rate to generate that ratio; the resulting depreciation rate is 5.5 percent. ${ }^{11}$

Table 6 compares the parameters that differ between the two countries. The consumption tax and income tax functions come from the same source as those for the United States. The consumption tax rate in France, 24 percent, is much higher than that in the United States, 7.5 percent. The left panel of Figure 4 compares the income tax function in the two countries, where income is normalized by the average household income in a country. ${ }^{12}$ As shown in the figure, the income tax is more progressive in France than in the United States. However, the difference is small except for income above four times the average.

The French social security system differs dramatically from the US system. It consists of a public pension and a mandatory occupational pension, both of

[^10]Table 6: Parameters That Differ by Country

| Government policy | US | FR |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\tau_{c}$ | consumption tax rate | $7.5 \%$ | $24 \%$ |
| $\tau(\cdot)$ | income tax function | see section 4.1 | see text |
| $\tau_{s}$ | soc. sec. tax rate on employee | $5.2 \%$ | $9.45 \%$ |
| $\tau_{f}$ | soc. sec. tax rate on employer | $5.2 \%$ | $14.0 \%$ |
| $t_{m}$ | years counted in soc. sec. | 36 | 32 |
| $t_{r}$ | soc. sec. retirement-age range | $62-70$ | $60-70$ |
| $y_{\max }$ | soc. sec. tax cap | 2.47 | 3 |
| $p e n\left(t_{r}, y_{s}\right)$ | soc. sec. benefit | see section 4.1 | $0.8516 y_{s}$ |
| Productivity | US | FR |  |
| $e_{t}$ | efficiency profile | Figure 4 | Figure 4 |
| $v$ | labor-augmenting tech. in home prod. | 1 | 0.4962 |
| $z_{h}$ | TFP in home production | 1 | 1.3569 |

which we incorporate. We summarize the choice of the policy parameters here and provide more details in Appendix D. The reference earnings to determine the benefit is the best thirty-two years of earnings. The earliest age at which one can claim social security benefits is sixty, and the age at which one can receive the full retirement benefit is sixty-six. If a household retires before age sixty-six, pension benefits are reduced by 5 percent per year; and if a household retires after age sixty-six, pension benefits are increased by 5 percent per year up to age seventy. The social security earnings cap is three times average earnings. The tax rate on employees is 9.45 percent, and the tax rate on employers is 14.0 percent. ${ }^{13}$ The pension benefit is a linear function of the average life-time earnings subject to the social security tax, and we calibrate the benefit-replacement ratio at age sixty-six to match the ratio of aggregate social security spending to GDP of 13 percent. The resulting ratio is 85 percent.

The French age-efficiency profile is constructed from the French Labor Force Survey; the details are described in Appendix A. GDP per capita in France is about 80 percent of that in the United States. We adjust proportionally the level of the French efficiency profile to match the cross-country difference in GDP per capita found in the data. The right panel of Figure 4 compares the deterministic profiles of labor productivity in the two countries. French labor productivity rises slower from young to middle age and decreases faster afterward. As a result, an average worker of age sixty is as productive as a twenty-five-year-old in the United States, whereas she is only half as productive in France.

We allow both TFP in home production, $z_{h}$, and labor-augmenting technology in home production, $v$, to differ from their values in the United States. In particular,

[^11]Figure 4: Efficiency Profile and Income Tax Function

we calibrate those two parameters to match two aggregate moments in French data: home hours per adult (0.19) and the ratio of aggregate home expenditure to GDP (0.33). As is reported in Table 6, the resulting $v$ is lower in France than in the United States. This is driven by the fact that France has a higher ratio of aggregate home hours to home inputs (0.72) than the United States does (0.42). As proven in Proposition 1, a lower $v$ is needed to match a higher ratio of home hours to home inputs when home time and home inputs are complements ( $\zeta_{1}<1$ ). Moreover, as proven in Proposition 2, a higher home-production TFP is needed to match the lower ratio of market-goods to home-inputs expenditure in France (0.68) than in the United States (0.76).

### 5.2 Model Fit for the French Economy

This subsection compares the model's prediction of the allocations of expenditure and hours with the French data.

Hours Profiles and Expenditure Profiles by Age. Figure 5 compares the modelpredicted age profiles of expenditure and hours at home and in the market, which are nontargeted in the simulation, with the data. As the figure shows, the model nearly reproduces the French profiles with the differences from the US in the tax and transfer programs and in productivity at home and in the market. ${ }^{14,15}$

[^12]Figure 5: Age Profiles in France--Model versus Data


Notes: The dashed lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals of the data.

Aggregate Allocations of Hours and Expenditure. Table 7 reports the modelimplied aggregate hours and aggregate expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the two countries together with the data reported in Table 1. The model matches not only the targeted aggregate home-production time and home-inputs expenditure share, but also the untargeted aggregate market hours and market expenditure share. More specifically, the model is able to generate the first two facts documented in section 2.2: France has less market time and more home time than the United States, and the cross-country difference in the expenditure share of market goods is larger than that in the expenditure share of home inputs.

Table 7: Aggregate Hours and Expenditure Shares-Model versus Data

|  | $N_{m}$ | $N_{h}$ | $\frac{C_{m}}{Y}$ | $\frac{D}{Y}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FR model | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.33 |
| FR data | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.33 |
| FR-US model | -0.03 | 0.03 | -0.07 | -0.05 |
| FR-US data | -0.04 | 0.03 | -0.07 | -0.05 |

Notes: The reported values are aggregate shares of expenditures and hours across all ages. $N_{m}$ denotes markethours share, $N_{h}$ denotes home-hours share, $\frac{C_{m}}{Y}$ denotes market-goods expenditure share, and $\frac{D}{Y}$ denotes home-inputs expenditure share.

In the next subsection, we quantify the contribution of each country-specific feature in generating those patterns, while we summarize the key mechanisms here. In the model, both lower efficiency units and higher home TFP in France favor home production over market production and thus increase home hours and

Table 8: Market Allocation Relative to Home Allocation by Age-Model versus Data

| Age | Time |  |  |  | Expenditure |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | Model |  | Data | Model |  |  | Data |  |
|  | US | FR | US | FR | US | FR | US | FR |
|  | 2.48 | 2.44 | 2.57 | 2.23 | 0.72 | 0.69 | 0.74 | 0.84 |
| 38 | 2.80 | 2.27 | 2.24 | 1.94 | 0.81 | 0.75 | 0.72 | 0.74 |
| 48 | 2.10 | 1.64 | 2.12 | 1.74 | 0.81 | 0.74 | 0.82 | 0.73 |
| 58 | 1.25 | 0.68 | 1.71 | 0.83 | 0.77 | 0.67 | 0.81 | 0.60 |
| 68 | 0.50 | 0.10 | 0.54 | 0.08 | 0.70 | 0.61 | 0.72 | 0.47 |

Notes: This table reports the ratio of market to home allocation of expenditure and hours by age group in ten-year segments. For example, age twenty-eight represents the average for ages twenty-four to thirty-three.
reduce market hours. Lower labor-augmenting technology in France also increases home hours and reduces market hours, per the discussion of Proposition 1. As for expenditure, higher taxes reduce the expenditure shares of both market goods and home inputs, as more income is directed to tax payments. The estimation implies that home time and home inputs are complements and home goods and market goods are substitutes ( $\zeta_{1}<1<\zeta_{2}$ ). Thus Proposition 2 implies that higher taxes in France generate a larger decline in expenditures on market goods than on home inputs. These intuitions imply that France's productivity and tax system favor production and consumption at home relative to production and consumption in the market and thus shift hours and expenditures from market to home.

Allocations of Life-Cycle Hours and Expenditure. Table 8 reports the modelimplied ratios of market-to-home allocations for age groups in ten-year segments; the ratios were not targeted in the calibration. As the table shows, the model is consistent with the data in that the expenditures on home inputs exceed the expenditures on market goods at every age and market hours are higher than home hours for prime working ages. More importantly, the model predictions are consistent with the third fact documented in section 2.2-namely, a shift of expenditures and hours from market to home as households age and a larger shift in France than in the United States. In the model, this larger shift is mainly driven by the faster decrease of the French age-efficiency profile at older ages: for one reason, a lower wage gives rise to less market time and more home time; for another reason, Proposition 2 implies that under our parameterizations of elasticities, a faster decline in wages leads to a faster decline in market-goods expenditure relative to home-inputs expenditure.

### 5.3 Decomposition

This subsection evaluates the quantitative effect of each country-specific feature in accounting for the difference in allocations of expenditure and time between the United States and France. We proceed by comparing the changes in the allocations after replacing one of the features in France with that in the United States. Since we assume France is a small open economy, the interest rate and wage rate stay the same. Table 9 reports the percent changes in the allocations of hours and expenditure in the aggregate from the French benchmark economy after changing each factor. As a comparison, the total changes of all factors from the French benchmark economy to the calibrated US economy are reported in the last row. ${ }^{16}$ Figures 6 and 7 plot the level changes in hours and expenditure by age that result from policy and productivity changes, respectively. The corresponding life-cycle profiles are reported in Appendix E. Expenditures in the figures are normalized by GDP in the benchmark French economy.

Consumption Tax. Row 2 of Table 9 reports the aggregate effect of replacing the French consumption tax with the US consumption tax. Unsurprisingly, when we apply the lower US rate to France, households choose to increase consumption expenditures on both market goods and home inputs. Because consumption and leisure are complements ( $\zeta_{3}<1$ ), the increase in consumption leads to an increase in leisure time. Because home inputs and home time are complements ( $\zeta_{1}<1$ ), the increase in home inputs leads to an increase in home hours. As a result of increases in both home hours and leisure, market hours decline.

More interestingly, the increase in expenditure is larger for market goods than for home inputs. This is because the elasticity of substitution between market goods and home goods is larger than that between home inputs and home time ( $\zeta_{1}<\zeta_{2}$ ) and therefore, as demonstrated in Proposition 2, a lower consumption tax rate induces a stronger substitution from home goods to market goods than from home time to home inputs and thereby generates a larger increase in market goods than in home inputs.

As for the magnitude, the consumption tax alone can account for about 30 percent (17.73/57.43) of the cross-country difference in market-goods expenditure and 23 percent ( $9.99 / 42.81$ ) of the difference in home-inputs expenditure. In this decomposition, the percent change in output is the same as that in total efficiency units, which is mainly determined by the change in aggregate market hours; thus the change in output has a similar magnitude as that for market hours. Adopting

[^13]the substantially lower US consumption tax rate leads to a large drop of 35 percent in total government spending.

Table 9: Decomposition: Percent Change in Aggregate Allocations

| (1) | $N_{m}$ | $N_{h}$ | $C_{m}$ | $D$ | $Y$ | $G$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| (2) Consumption tax | -2.34 | 0.93 | 17.73 | 9.99 | -2.06 | -34.58 |
| (3) Social security | -5.27 | 1.64 | 10.66 | 6.41 | -4.22 | 8.72 |
| (4) Income tax | 0.63 | -0.23 | 0.34 | -0.15 | 0.89 | 3.64 |
| (5) All policies | -6.85 | 2.24 | 30.82 | 16.70 | -5.23 | -25.20 |
| (6) Efficiency profile | 7.49 | -2.09 | 13.25 | 6.38 | 16.83 | 10.76 |
| (7) Home TFP | 5.30 | -3.08 | 19.23 | -4.43 | 5.43 | 5.11 |
| (8) Home labor-augmenting | 3.16 | -13.64 | -15.10 | 14.63 | 2.32 | 2.17 |
| (9) All productivity | 16.64 | -17.49 | 14.63 | 17.47 | 25.96 | 21.08 |
| (10) US benchmark | 9.62 | -15.12 | 57.43 | 42.81 | 25.01 | -6.14 |

Notes: This table shows the percent changes in each aggregate variable from the French benchmark after adopting US values.

Panel (a) of Figure 6 plots the changes in the life-cycle profiles of hours and expenditure shares after applying the US consumption tax to France. Although the consumption tax rate is the same for every age group, the changes in allocations are not uniform and are larger for people of prime working age. To understand this, note that the reduction in the consumption tax leads to a higher total consumption expenditure for every household. The increase in expenditure reduces market hours and increases home hours through income effects. This channel only applies to nonretirees, and thus the changes in allocations in the working age-population are larger.

Social Security System. Panel (b) of Figure 6 plots the changes in the lifecycle profiles when applying the US social security system to France. As the combined social security tax rate for workers and firms falls from 23.45 to 10.4 percent, households have more income to spend. As a result, they increase expenditures on both market goods and home inputs at all ages except at the end of their lives. At the end of life, expenditures on market goods and home inputs both decline significantly because households run out of assets and their consumption drops dramatically with the reduction in social security benefits. As can be seen in row 3 of Table 9, differences in the social security system contribute to 15 percent of the cross-country difference in expenditure on home inputs and 18 percent of the difference in expenditure on market goods. The magnitude of the effect is substantial but smaller than that of the effect of the consumption tax.

Figure 6: Changes in Allocation With US Policies
(a) Consumption Tax

(c) Income Tax


Notes: This figure plots changes from the French benchmark in hours and expenditure by age after adopting US values. Expenditures are normalized by GDP per wroker in the benchmark French economy. Panel (a) shows the changes after applying the US consumption tax to the French economy. Panel (b) shows the changes after applying the US social security system to the French economy. Panel (c) shows the changes after applying the US income tax to the French economy.

Panel (b) of Figure 6 also shows that when social security taxes are reduced and social security benefits become less generous, market hours decrease before the mid-fifties and increase afterward. This is driven by two important changes in the social security system: first, the reduction in the tax rate, which is mostly responsible for the reduction in market hours and the rise in home hours before the mid-fifties; second, the number of years for determining social security benefits, which increases from thirty-two to thirty-six. Hence, to maximize social security
benefits, households choose to retire later and work more years. Correspondingly they increase their market hours and decrease their home hours at older ages. Thus, in our model, the difference in the social security system accounts partially for the lower market time around retirement age in France. ${ }^{17}$ The aggregate effect of the two changes in policy, reported in row 3 of Table 9, is a reduction in market hours and a rise in home hours. The reduction in market hours results in a 4.2 percent reduction in output. ${ }^{18}$ Government spending $G$ goes up by 8.7 percent for two reasons. First, the increase in market goods and home inputs generates more revenues from consumption taxation. Second, social security tax payments by the firm are exempted from the income tax. Hence the reduction in the social security tax rate on the firm leads to higher taxable income and thus higher income tax revenue.

Income Tax. As shown in Figure 4, the US income tax is less progressive than that in France but the two tax functions differ only by a small amount. Hence the quantitative effects of the income tax on allocations are small. After switching to US income taxes, total revenue from the income tax goes up since most households face a higher income tax rate. As a result, total government spending goes up.

Efficiency Profile. Panel (a) of Figure 7 shows the changes in life-cycle profiles when applying the US age-efficiency profile to the French economy. As shown in Figure 4, the US efficiency profile is slightly lower before age thirty and are much higher later in life. This leads to a slight decline in market hours before age thirty and a large increase afterward. Changes in home hours are the reverse of the changes in market hours over the life cycle, but the changes are mitigated because leisure hours change in the same direction as home hours.

Row 6 of Table 9 reports the effects on the aggregate allocations. The higher efficiency level increases output by 17 percent and generates large increases in expenditures on both market goods and home inputs. As proven in Proposition 2 , the ratio of market goods to home inputs is increasing with efficiency units, resulting in a larger percent increase in market goods than in home inputs. The

[^14]difference in the efficiency profile alone can account for 78 percent of the difference in aggregate market hours and 14 percent of the difference in aggregate home hours between France and the United States. The contribution of the efficiency profile to the difference in expenditures is comparable to the contribution of the social security system. The increases in efficiency units lead to more income and higher consumption and thus more tax revenue and higher government spending.

Figure 7: Changes in Allocation with US Productivity

## (a) Efficiency Profile


(c) Home Labor-Augmenting Technology


Notes: This figure plots changes from the French benchmark in hours and expenditure by age after adopting US values. Expenditures are normalized by GDP per worker in the benchmark French economy. Panel (a) shows the changes after applying the US efficiency profile to the French economy. Panel (b) shows the changes after applying US home TFP to the French economy. Panel (c) shows the changes after applying the US home labor-augmenting technology level to the French economy.

Home-Production TFP. As shown in panel (b) of Figure 7, reducing homeproduction TFP to the US level increases expenditures and hours allocated to the market and decreases those allocated to the home. This is intuitive. Because home goods and market goods are substitutes $\left(\zeta_{2}>1\right)$, a reduction in home TFP induces a substitution from home goods to market goods and thus from home hours to market hours and from home inputs to market goods. The latter effect is proven in Proposition 2: $c_{m} / d$ is decreasing in home-production TFP. Because old households work less in the market, the substitution generates smaller changes in their allocations. Row 7 of Table 9 shows that home TFP alone can account for 55 percent of the difference in market hours and 20 percent of the difference in home hours between France and the United States. The increase in market hours generates a similar-size increase in output, and the rise in output leads to more tax revenue and thus more government spending.

Home Labor-Augmenting Technology. Panel (c) of Figure 7 shows that raising labor-augmenting technology at home to the US level increases market hours and home inputs but decreases home hours and market goods. The intuition for these results is as follows. A rise in $v$ leads to an increase in effective homeproduction hours $\left(v n_{h}\right)$ but leads to a decline in raw home hours ( $n_{h}$ ) since less time is needed to produce the same amount of output. As a result, market hours increase. The increase in effective home hours gives rise to an increase in home inputs since home goods and home inputs are complements ( $\zeta_{1}<1$ ). Because home goods and market goods are substitutes ( $\zeta_{2}>1$ ), a rise in home labor-augmenting productivity induces a substitution from market goods to home goods and results in a decline in market-goods expenditure.

As can be seen in Table 9, home labor-augmenting technology alone can account for 33 percent of the difference in market hours and 90 percent of the difference in home hours between the two countries. Thus it is the most important factor explaining the differences in home hours. The increase in market hours generates an increase in output, which in turn leads to more tax revenue and thus more government spending.

Policies versus Productivity. In the decomposition exercises discussed so far, we changed only one specific feature to the US level and left all remaining model features at the French level. To separate the effects of policy differences from the effects of productivity differences, we now conduct decomposition exercises in which we use either all US policies or all US productivity variables. Rows 5 and 9 of Table 9 report the total effects of all policies and all productivity variables, respectively. All policies combined are more important than all productivity
variables combined in accounting for the difference in the expenditure on market goods and are equally important in accounting for the difference in the expenditure on home inputs between the United States and France. The consumption tax and social security system are more important than the income tax for determining expenditure allocations. Productivity is more important in accounting for the differences in the allocation of hours between the United States and France. In particular, the age-efficiency profile and home TFP are more important in accounting for the differences in market hours, and home labor-augmenting technology is more important in accounting for the differences in home hours.

## 6 Policy Experiments for France

While the experiments in section 5.3 are useful for decomposing the effects of different policies on expenditure and time allocations, they are unsuitable for evaluating the effects of policy on welfare because government spending $G$ varies after the changes in policy. To evaluate the welfare implications of the discussed tax and transfer policies, we proceed by replacing each French policy with the corresponding US policy while holding constant the government spending as that in the French benchmark economy. This is achieved by imposing an additional proportional tax or subsidy on all kinds of incomes, including labor earnings and pension benefits, so that the government budget constraint is still balanced. This section reports the results of these policy experiments in terms of the allocations of expenditure and hours and evaluates the welfare implications.

### 6.1 Policies' Implications for Allocations

Table 10 reports for each policy experiment the percent changes to the aggregate allocations and the proportional income tax rate needed to keep government spending constant. The associated life-cycle profiles are provided in Appendix E. The differences in allocations between Tables 10 and 9 reflect the effects of the additional income tax, which has a similar effect to the consumption tax. Thus a negative proportional income tax has a similar effect to the reduction in the consumption tax discussed in section 5.3 and a positive income tax has the opposite effect.

As reported in Table 10, to compensate for the reduction in tax revenue from switching to the US consumption tax, a 14 percent proportional tax on income is needed. The additional income tax leads to a reduction in expenditures on both market goods and home inputs, which overturns the finding of an increase in expenditures in the decomposition experiment on the consumption tax. It also
leads to a rise in market hours and a decline in home hours; thus, the signs of the changes in market hours and home hours are the opposite of those in the decomposition experiment. Applying the US social security system to the French economy requires imposing a negative income tax of 5 percent. The negative income tax generates changes in hours and expenditures in the same direction as the reduction in the social security tax and therefore further increases market-goods expenditures, home-inputs expenditures, and home hours and decreases market hours relative to the decomposition experiment on the social security system. Applying the US income tax to France requires imposing a negative proportional income tax of only 1.6 percent, the quantitative effects of which are negligible, just as they are in the decomposition experiment.

The policy counterfactual of applying all US policies at once requires imposing a proportional income tax of 10 percent. The total effects are a decline in market hours and an increase in market-goods expenditure, home-inputs expenditure, and home hours. For both hours and expenditures, the effects of social security dominate those of the consumption and income taxes. In all experiments, the change in output is again the same as the change in aggregate efficiency units and thus is close to the change in market hours.

Table 10: Policy Experiments: Percent Change in Aggregate Allocation

|  | $\tau_{p}$ | $N_{m}$ | $N_{h}$ | $C_{m}$ | $D$ | $Y$ |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Consumption tax | 13.57 | 0.18 | -0.15 | -9.52 | -5.32 | -0.39 |
| Social security | -4.92 | -6.05 | 1.96 | 19.95 | 11.40 | -4.77 |
| Income tax | -1.64 | 0.28 | -0.09 | 3.06 | 1.40 | 0.61 |
| All policies | 10.48 | -4.82 | 1.45 | 8.20 | 4.84 | -3.88 |

Notes: This table shows the percent changes from the French benchmark economy in each aggregate variable after adopting US values while keeping government spending fixed.

### 6.2 Policies' Welfare Implications

This subsection discusses the welfare implications of the counterfactual policy experiments. Following De Nardi and Yang (2016), we measure the expected lifetime utility of a newborn conditional on her initial draws of labor productivity and asset position. The change in welfare is measured by the amount of assets that need to be given to a French household, as a fraction of average income in the benchmark French economy, so that each household is indifferent between living in the benchmark French economy and moving to the counterfactual economy under the US policy regime. Hence negative asset compensation indicates that households are better off in the new French economy under the US policy regime. When reporting

Table 11: Welfare Implications

|  | All | Initial productivity |  |  |  |  | Frac. gain | Avg. gain/loss |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1st | 2nd | 3rd | 4th | 5th |  | Winner | Loser |
| Consumption tax | -0.516 | -0.247 | -0.326 | -0.488 | -0.691 | -0.932 | 0.009 | 0.434 | 0.524 |
| SS system | 1.765 | 1.113 | 1.302 | 1.648 | 2.184 | 2.985 | 1.000 | 1.765 | 0.000 |
| Income tax | 0.035 | -0.069 | -0.057 | 0.006 | 0.110 | 0.300 | 0.622 | 0.089 | 0.053 |
| All policies | 0.988 | 0.642 | 0.718 | 0.897 | 1.218 | 1.797 | 1.000 | 0.988 | 0.000 |

Notes: This table reports the welfare effects of changing French policy values to the US values. In the first six columns, a positive number indicates a welfare gain from switching from the French benchmark economy to the economy with US policy. Welfare effects are reported by the amount of assets required relative to the average income in the French benchmark economy. The columns " 1 st " - " 5 th" report average welfare change by the quintile of the initial productivity level. The column "Frac. gain" reports the fraction of population who gain from the policy experiment. The last two columns report the average gain or loss for the population who gain or lose, respectively.
the results, however, we reverse the signs for asset compensation so that a positive number indicates a welfare gain from switching from the French policy to the US policy. The welfare measure, derived from the change in a household's utility, reflects not only the changes of market-goods consumption but also the changes in home production and leisure.

Table 11 reports the welfare implications when France adopts the US policies. To better understand the welfare benefits and costs of each policy experiment, we also report the fraction of households that gain and the average gains and losses conditional on a newborn's initial productivity draw. Reducing the consumption tax to the US level while keeping government spending fixed leads to a decline in welfare for almost the entire population. On average, a newborn would need to be compensated with a onetime asset transfer at age twenty-four that is equivalent to 51.6 percent of the average income in the benchmark economy. The welfare loss is driven by the large decreases in expenditure on market goods and home inputs, as reported in Table 10.

Adopting the US social security system benefits all French households. The rise in welfare is driven by the increase in market-goods expenditures, home-inputs expenditures, and leisure time. The welfare gain is especially large for more productive households because they pay more to and benefit less from social security and thus gain more from a less generous system. The result that reducing the size of social security improves welfare is in line with a large literature analyzing the effects of reforming the social security system by using models that include various features, such as liquidity constraints, income and longevity risks, altruism, flexible labor supply, endogenous benefit claims, housing, and home production. ${ }^{19}$ The benefits of social security as insurance against labor-income shocks and as an

[^15]annuity to insure against mortality risk are outweighed by the costs due to a distortional income tax and discouragement of savings. Thus, in our model, as in the literature, reducing the size of the social security system improves welfare.

Although the aggregate effects on hours and expenditures of adopting the US income tax are small, this policy experiment has a large distributional impact on welfare. Two-thirds of the households gain, and the rest of the households lose. This is because the US income tax is less progressive and therefore the policy experiment leads to an increase in the tax rate for the poor and a decrease in the tax rate for the rich. Because of persistence in the wage process, households that have high initial productivity draws are more likely to have high income over the course of their lives; thus they benefit from a less progressive income tax. In contrast, households with low initial productivity draws lose.

Lastly, because the welfare gain from adopting the US social security system is large enough to more than offset the welfare loss from adopting the US consumption tax, when France adopts all the US policies there is a welfare gain for all French households that is equivalent to a onetime asset transfer at age twenty-four in the amount of 98.8 percent of the average income in the benchmark economy.

## 7 Conclusion

Using time-use and consumer-expenditure surveys, we documented large differences between the United States and France in consumption expenditures and time use by age. More specifically, we found that the French, at every age, work less in the market but spend more time on home production than Americans. In contrast, the French spend smaller shares of their income on market goods and home inputs, with a larger difference for market goods. And although both American and French households shift their allocations of time and expenditures from market to home as they age, the shift is much faster and stronger in France.

We used a life-cycle model with home production to account for the crosscountry differences in the age profiles of expenditure and hours. The model features a borrowing constraint, idiosyncratic income shock, endogenous laborleisure decision, and endogenous retirement decision. The two countries differ in their consumption taxes, progressive income taxes, social security systems, ageefficiency profiles, and home-production productivity. The model simulations showed that while the age-efficiency profile and home-production productivity are crucial in accounting for the cross-country differences in allocation of hours, the consumption tax and social security are more important in accounting for the differences in the expenditure profiles. Finally, we studied the welfare implications of the tax and transfer programs. We found that reducing the French consump-
tion tax to the US level decreases welfare, adopting the US social security system increases welfare, and adopting the US income tax has a small but distributional significant effect on welfare in France. The benefit of adopting the US social security system outweighs the cost of adopting the US consumption tax; therefore the net effect of adopting all three US policies is welfare improving.

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## Appendix

## A Data

## A. 1 Time Use

We use the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS) to construct market hours and home hours. ${ }^{20}$ The latest year for which French time-use data are available is 2010. For the United States, the data are available for more years and we use the averages from 2009 to 2011 so that the data cover similar years to those in France. Timeuse data record time diaries from survey respondents. The survey groups time spent on daily activities into twenty-five types of activity, and we further group the twenty-five activities into market hours, home hours, and leisure. The division of the activities follows Aguiar and Hurst (2007). Market and home activities are summarized in Table A.1. The remainder is leisure activities.

Table A.1: MTUS Activities and Categories

| MTUS Variable | Category |
| :--- | :--- |
| Paid work | Market work |
| Commuting to work | Market work |
| Gardening | Nonmarket work |
| Pet care | Nonmarket work |
| Food preparation | Nonmarket work |
| Cleaning | Nonmarket work |
| Maintainance | Nonmarket work |
| Remainder | Leisure |

The MTUS survey records time diaries for different days of the week and shows that weekdays and weekends have very different time allocations. It is therefore important to weight observations by day of the week. The MTUS provides such weights that incorporate the weights for the days of a week ( $5 / 7$ for weekdays and $2 / 7$ for weekends) and the population weights. Hence we weight the observations as suggested by the MTUS. The age profiles of market and home hours are constructed as the average weekly hours per adult by two-year age segments for individuals aged twenty-four or above.

[^16]
## A. 2 Consumption Expenditure

Consumption Expenditure for the United States. We use the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to construct consumption expenditures in the United States. ${ }^{21}$ To be consistent with French data, we construct the average expenditures between 2009 and 2011. We classify the detailed expenditure categories in the CEX into market and home expenditures following Dotsey et al. (2014). Table A. 2 reports the division of expenditures between market goods and home inputs. The CEX groups all transportation expenditures together, and it is not feasible to separate the part dedicated to home production from the other parts, so we prorate transportation expenses by travel time for market and home activities that we obtained from the MTUS.

We use the actual rent for renters and the imputed rent for homeowners for spending on housing. We eliminate the observations for any subsidized or student renters, as their reported expenditures do not reflect the true value of rental costs. The number of observations eliminated is negligible in both countries. To avoid extreme values, we also exclude households with total expenditures belonging to the top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution. We weight the consumption expenditures using the sample-suggested population weights and construct the age profiles of expenditures on market goods and home inputs as the cross-sectional averages for every two-year age group, where the age is that of the head of household.

Consumption Expenditure for France. We use the French Household Budget Survey (HBS) to construct consumption expenditures in France. The data come from the Luxembourg Income Study Database. ${ }^{22}$ Similar to the CEX, the HBS is a cross-sectional household survey that collects information on consumption expenditure by detailed categories. The data are available for 2010, and there are over fifteen thousand observations. The categories in the HBS are slightly different from those in the CEX. We divide these categories into market goods and home inputs so that they are comparable to those in the United States. Table A. 3 reports the French division of expenditures between market goods and home inputs.

NIPA Adjustment. Let $c_{m t}$ and $d_{t}$ be the average expenditure levels for age $t$ in the data, $\bar{c}_{m}$ the average market expenditure, and $\bar{d}$ the average home expenditure. The adjustment procedure is as follows. First, we derive PCE as a share of GDP (from the NIPA) and denote the share by $s$; second, we derive the ratio of

[^17]Table A.2: US Market- and Home-Expenditure Categories

| Market-Expenditure Categories |
| :--- |
| Food away from home |
| Alcoholic beverages |
| Apparel and services |
| Tobacco and smoking supplies |
| Reading |
| Personal care |
| Other lodging |
| Fees and admissions |
| Televisions, radios, and sound equipment |
| Other equipment and services |
| Medical services, prescription drugs, and medical supplies |
| Education |
| Insurance |
| Transport, weighted by market-time share |
| Home-Expenditure Categories |
| Food at home |
| Maintenance, repairs, and other expenses |
| Household operations |
| House furnishings and equipment |
| Utilities, fuels, and public services |
| Housing |
| Transport, weighted by home-time share |

expenditure for each age group to the average expenditure (across all ages) in the data $\left(\frac{c_{m t}+d_{t}}{\bar{c}_{m}+\bar{d}}\right)$; third, the product of $s$ and the expenditure ratio derived in the second step gives the adjusted total expenditure-to-income ratio by age group $\left(\frac{c_{m t}+d_{t}}{\bar{c}_{m}+d}\right)$; fourth, the expenditure shares for market and home are calculated by assigning the total expenditure share from step three according to the ratio between market and home expenditures from the data for each age group $\left(s_{c_{m t}}=s \frac{c_{m t}+d_{t}}{\bar{c}_{m}+\bar{d}} \frac{c_{m t}}{c_{m t}+d_{t}}\right.$ for market and $s_{d_{t}}=s \frac{c}{m t}_{\bar{c}_{m}+d_{t}}^{\bar{d}} \frac{d_{t}}{c_{m t}+d_{t}}$ for home). The adjustment procedure gives an aggregate expenditure share of the same value as the share in the NIPA and keeps the relative expenditures constant across age groups and across market and home expenses. Figure 1 plots $s_{c_{m t}}$ and $s_{d_{t}}$.

Table A.3: French Market- and Home-Expenditure Categories
Market-Expenditure Categories
Alcohol and tobacco
Clothing and footwear
Health consumption
Recreation and culture
Education
Restaurants and hotels
Personal care
Personal goods and services
Insurance
Transport, weighted by market-time share
Home-Expenditure Categories
Consumption of food and nonalcoholic beverages
Consumption of furnishings, equipment, appliances, tools, etc.
Water, electricity, gas, and other fuels
Actual rent for renters and equivalent rent for homeowners
Consumption of communication
Transport, weighted by home-time share
Social protection

## A. 3 Wages in France and the United States

We use the March supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS 2010-18) and the French Labor Force Survey (LFS 2010) to construct the age-efficiency wage profiles. ${ }^{23}$ We compute hourly wages using earnings and usual hours worked at an individual's main job. For the decision about labor-market participation, it is important to know the potential wage offered if nonworking individuals were to choose to work. But these wage offers cannot be observed. Following Neal and Johnson (1996), we use the least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator to impute wages for individuals who are not working. The LAD estimator is the solution to the following optimization problem:

$$
\min _{\beta} \sum\left|y_{i}-x_{i} \beta\right|
$$

[^18]Here $y_{i}$ is wages and $x_{i}$ is a vector that contains observables such as age, education, race, marital status, and gender. In addition to current marital status, we include an indicator variable representing whether an individual was ever married.

Using the estimated equations, we impute a wage for individuals who do not have an observed wage because they are either unemployed or are out of the labor force. To compute the age-efficiency profile, we average wages by age, where the wage comes from the data for individuals with a wage observation and is imputed from the regression equation for individuals without a wage observation. The average wage for each two-year age group is then normalized to the average wage of individuals aged twenty-four to twenty-five. The generated average wages for prime-aged individuals are quite similar to the actual average wages in the data because of the high labor force participation rate of prime-aged individuals.

## B Solution to the Static Model

The representative agent solves the following problem:

$$
\max _{c_{m}, d, n_{h}, n_{m}} U(c, l)=\frac{\left[\omega_{3} c^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{3}}}+\left(1-\omega_{3}\right) l^{\left.1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{3}}\right]^{\frac{1-\gamma}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{3}}}}-1}\right.}{1-\gamma}
$$

subject to

$$
\begin{align*}
& c=\left[\omega_{2} c_{m}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}+\left(1-\omega_{2}\right) c_{h}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}}  \tag{14}\\
& c_{h}=z_{h}\left[\omega_{1} d^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}+\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)\left(v n_{h}\right)^{\left.1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}}}\right.  \tag{15}\\
& \left(1+\tau_{c}\right) c_{m}+\left(1+\tau_{c}\right) d=\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w n_{m}  \tag{16}\\
& l=1-\left(n_{h}+n_{m}\right) \tag{17}
\end{align*}
$$

## B. 1 Solution

Let $\mu$ be the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. FOCs are given as follows:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\left(c_{m}\right) & \frac{\partial U}{\partial c} \frac{\partial c}{\partial c_{m}}=\left(1+\tau_{c}\right) \mu, \\
(d) & \frac{\partial U}{\partial c} \frac{\partial c}{\partial c_{h}} \frac{\partial c_{h}}{\partial d}=\left(1+\tau_{c}\right) \mu, \\
\left(n_{h}\right) & \frac{\partial U}{\partial c} \frac{\partial c}{\partial c_{h}} \frac{\partial c_{h}}{\partial n_{h}}=\mu\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w, \\
\left(n_{m}\right) & \frac{\partial U}{\partial l}=\mu\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w \tag{21}
\end{array}
$$

From equations (19) and (20), we have the following:

$$
\frac{\partial c_{h}}{\partial d} \frac{1-\tau_{i}}{1+\tau_{c}} w=\frac{\partial c_{h}}{\partial n_{h}}
$$

Plugging in the derivatives gives us the following:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{1-\tau_{i}}{1+\tau_{c}} w \omega_{1} d^{-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}=\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)(v)^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} n_{h}^{-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} \\
& \left(\frac{\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w \omega_{1}}{\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)(v)^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}}\right)^{-\zeta_{1}} d=n_{h}
\end{aligned}
$$

or

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Delta_{n h} \equiv \frac{n_{h}}{d}=\left(\frac{\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w \omega_{1}}{\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)}\right)^{-\zeta_{1}} v^{\zeta_{1}-1} \tag{22}
\end{equation*}
$$

The ratio $\Delta_{c h} \equiv \frac{c_{h}}{d}$ can be solved from the definition of $c_{h}$ in equation (15) directly:

$$
\begin{align*}
\Delta_{c h} & \equiv \frac{c_{h}}{d}=z_{h}\left(\omega_{1}+\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)(v)^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} \Delta_{n h}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}} \\
& =z_{h}\left(\omega_{1}+\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)\left(\frac{\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w \omega_{1}}{\left(1+\tau_{d}\right)\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)}\right)^{1-\zeta_{1}} v^{\zeta_{1}-1}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}} \tag{23}
\end{align*}
$$

From equations (18) and (19), we get the following:

$$
\frac{\frac{\partial c}{\partial c_{m}}}{\frac{\partial c}{\partial c_{h}}}=\frac{\partial c_{h}}{\partial d}
$$

Plugging in the derivatives, we find the following:

$$
\frac{\omega_{2}}{1-\omega_{2}}\left(\frac{c_{h}}{c_{m}}\right)^{\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}=z_{h}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}\left(\frac{c_{h}}{d}\right)^{\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} \omega_{1}=\omega_{1} z_{h}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} \Delta_{c h}^{\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}
$$

Thus we derive $\Delta_{c m} \equiv \frac{c_{m}}{d}$ as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Delta_{c m} \equiv \frac{c_{m}}{d}=\left(\frac{\omega_{2}}{\left(1-\omega_{2}\right) \omega_{1}}\right)^{\zeta_{2}} \Delta_{c h}^{1-\frac{\zeta_{2}}{\zeta_{1}}} z_{h}^{\frac{\zeta_{2}}{\zeta_{2}}-\zeta_{2}} \tag{24}
\end{equation*}
$$

From the definition of $c$ in equation (14), we get the following:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Delta_{c} \equiv \frac{c}{d}=\left[\omega_{2} \Delta_{c m}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}+\left(1-\omega_{2}\right) \Delta_{c h}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}\right]^{\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}} \tag{25}
\end{equation*}
$$

The ratio of $\Delta_{l} \equiv \frac{l}{d}$ can be solved by first combining equations (18) and (21):

$$
\frac{\frac{\partial U_{t}}{\partial l}}{\frac{\partial U_{t}}{\partial c}}=\frac{\partial c}{\partial c_{m}} \frac{1-\tau_{i}}{1+\tau_{c}} w
$$

Plugging in derivatives, we get the following:

$$
\frac{1-\omega_{3}}{\omega_{3}}\left(\frac{c}{l}\right)^{1 / \zeta_{3}}=\frac{1-\omega_{3}}{\omega_{3}}\left(\frac{\Delta_{c} d}{\Delta_{l} d}\right)^{1 / \zeta_{3}}=\omega_{2} \frac{c_{m}^{-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}}{c^{-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}} \frac{\left(1-\tau_{i}\right)}{\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)} w
$$

Using the definition of $\Delta_{c m}$ and $\Delta_{c}$, we have the following:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Delta_{l} & \equiv \frac{l}{d}=\left(\frac{1-\omega_{3}}{\omega_{3} \omega_{2} w} \frac{1+\tau_{c}}{1-\tau_{i}}\right)^{\zeta_{3}} \Delta_{c}\left(\frac{\Delta_{c}}{\Delta_{c m}}\right)^{\frac{-\zeta_{3}}{\zeta_{2}}} \\
& =\left(\frac{1-\omega_{3}}{\omega_{3} \omega_{2} w} \frac{1+\tau_{c}}{1-\tau_{i}}\right)^{\zeta_{3}}\left(\omega_{2}+\left(1-\omega_{2}\right)\left(\frac{\Delta_{c h}}{\Delta_{c m}}\right)^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{2}}}\right)^{\frac{\zeta_{2}-\zeta_{3}}{\zeta_{2}-1}} \Delta_{c m} \\
& =\left(\frac{1-\omega_{3}}{\omega_{3} \omega_{2} w} \frac{1+\tau_{c}}{1-\tau_{i}}\right)^{\zeta_{3}}\left(\omega_{2}+\left(1-\omega_{2}\right)\left(\frac{\left(1-\omega_{2}\right) \omega_{1}}{\omega_{2}}\right)^{\zeta_{2}-1} \Delta_{c h}^{\frac{\zeta_{2}-1}{\zeta_{1}}} \frac{\frac{\left(\zeta_{2}-1\right)\left(\zeta_{1}-1\right)}{\zeta_{h}}}{\zeta_{1}}\right)^{\frac{\zeta_{2}-\zeta_{3}}{\zeta_{2}-1}} \Delta_{c m}
\end{aligned}
$$

Thus, we have solved the ratios of all other variables relative to $d$. Finally, we solve $d$ from the budget constraint:

$$
\left(1+\tau_{c}\right) \Delta_{c m} d+\left(1+\tau_{c}\right) d=\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w\left(1-\left(\Delta_{n h}+\Delta_{l}\right) d\right)
$$

This gives us the following:

$$
\begin{equation*}
d=\frac{\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w}{\left(1+\tau_{c}\right) \Delta_{c m}+\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)+\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w\left(\Delta_{n h}+\Delta_{l}\right)} \tag{26}
\end{equation*}
$$

We solve the rest of the allocations as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
n_{h} & =\Delta_{n h} d  \tag{27}\\
n_{m} & =1-\left(\Delta_{n h}+\Delta_{l}\right) d  \tag{28}\\
c_{m} & =\Delta_{c m} d \tag{29}
\end{align*}
$$

## B. 2 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2

Proof of Proposition 1. Equation (22) gives us the following

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log \Delta_{n h}=-\zeta_{1} \log \left(\frac{\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w \omega_{1}}{\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)}\right)+\left(\zeta_{1}-1\right) \log v \tag{30}
\end{equation*}
$$

Thus, we can solve and determine the sign of the following partial derivatives:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}}{\partial \log v} & =\zeta_{1}-1 ;  \tag{31}\\
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}}{\partial \log z_{h}} & =0 ;  \tag{32}\\
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}}{\partial \log w} & =-\zeta_{1}<0 ;  \tag{33}\\
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}}{\partial \log \left(1-\tau_{i}\right)} & =-\zeta_{1}<0 ;  \tag{34}\\
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}}{\partial \log \left(1+\tau_{c}\right)} & =\zeta_{1}>0 \tag{35}
\end{align*}
$$

Thus, $\frac{n_{h}}{d}$ (i) is increasing in $\tau_{c}$ and $\tau_{i}$ and is decreasing in $w$; (ii) is not affected by $z_{h}$; (iii) is decreasing in $v$ iff $\zeta_{1}<1$.

Proof of Proposition 2. We first solve and determine the sign of the partial derivatives with respect to $\log \Delta_{c h}$. Equation (23) gives us the following:

$$
\begin{align*}
\log \Delta_{c h} & =\log z_{h}+\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} \log \left(\omega_{1}+\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)(v)^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} \Delta_{n h}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}\right)  \tag{36}\\
& =\log z_{h}+\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} \log \left(\omega_{1}+\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)(v)^{\zeta_{1}-1}\left(\frac{\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w \omega_{1}}{\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)}\right)^{1-\zeta_{1}}\right.
\end{align*}
$$

Thus, we can solve and determine the sign of the following partial derivatives:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log z_{h}}=1>0}{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}} \frac{\partial \log v \Delta_{c h}}{\partial v} v=\frac{\left(1-\omega_{1}\right) \zeta_{1} v^{\zeta_{1}-1}\left(\frac{\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w \omega_{1}}{\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)}\right)^{1-\zeta_{1}}}{\left(\omega_{1}+\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)(v)^{\zeta_{1}-1}\left(\frac{\left(1-\tau_{i}\right) w \omega_{1}}{\left(1+\tau_{c}\right)\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)}\right)^{1-\zeta_{1}}\right)}>0 \tag{38}
\end{equation*}
$$

Note the following:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}}=\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \Delta_{n h}} \Delta_{n h}=\frac{\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)(v)^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} \Delta_{n h}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}}{\left(\omega_{1}+\left(1-\omega_{1}\right)(v)^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}} \Delta_{n h}^{1-\frac{1}{\zeta_{1}}}\right)}>0 \tag{40}
\end{equation*}
$$

Combined with the results in the proof of Proposition 1, we further determine
the sign of the following partial derivatives:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log w} & =\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}} \frac{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}}{\partial \log w}<0 ;  \tag{41}\\
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log \left(1-\tau_{i}\right)} & =\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}} \frac{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}}{\partial \log \left(1-\tau_{i}\right)}<0 ;  \tag{42}\\
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log \left(1+\tau_{c}\right)} & =\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}} \frac{\partial \log \Delta_{n h}}{\partial \log \left(1+\tau_{c}\right)}>0 \tag{43}
\end{align*}
$$

Moving on to $\Delta_{c m}$, equation 24 gives us the following:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log \left(\Delta_{c m}\right)=\zeta_{2} \log \left(\frac{\omega_{2}}{\left(1-\omega_{2}\right) \omega_{1}}\right)+\left(1-\frac{\zeta_{2}}{\zeta_{1}}\right) \log \Delta_{c h}+\left(\frac{\zeta_{2}}{\zeta_{1}}-\zeta_{2}\right) \log z_{h} \tag{44}
\end{equation*}
$$

We can solve and determine the sign of the partial derivatives with respect to $\log \Delta_{c m}$. The first step is as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log z_{h}}=\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}} \frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log z_{h}}+\frac{\zeta_{2}}{\zeta_{1}}-\zeta_{2}=1-\frac{\zeta_{2}}{\zeta_{1}}+\frac{\zeta_{2}}{\zeta_{1}}-\zeta_{2}=1-\zeta_{2}<0 \tag{45}
\end{equation*}
$$

Secondly, we can see easily that $\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}=1-\frac{\zeta_{2}}{\zeta_{1}}<0$ iff $\zeta_{1}<\zeta_{2}$. Thus, we can see that iff $\zeta_{1}<\zeta_{2}$, the following is true:

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log v} & =\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}} \frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log v}<0 ;  \tag{46}\\
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log w} & =\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}} \frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log w}>0 ;  \tag{47}\\
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log \left(1-\tau_{i}\right)} & =\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}} \frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log \left(1-\tau_{i}\right)}>0 ;  \tag{48}\\
\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log \left(1+\tau_{c}\right)} & =\frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c m}}{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}} \frac{\partial \log \Delta_{c h}}{\partial \log \left(1+\tau_{c}\right)}<0 \tag{49}
\end{align*}
$$

## C The Computation Algorithm

This appendix describes the computation algorithm. To solve the steady-state equilibrium numerically, we discretize the stochastic productivity process into a five-state Markov chain. The state space for average social security earnings is discretized into a grid of fifteen points, and the state space for assets is discretized into an unevenly spaced grid of thirty points. The choice variables are searched over a grid of two hundred points for home inputs and fifty points for market hours; they are continuous for other variables. When computing the expected values next period, we use piecewise linear interpolation to approximate value functions for the points not on the state grids.

We solve for the steady-state equilibrium in the United States as follows:

1. Guess the interest rate $r$ and the wage rate $w$.
2. Guess the amount of accidental bequests.
3. Solve the value function and policy functions for the last period of life. By backward induction, repeat at each age until reaching the first period in life.
4. Starting from the initial distribution at the beginning of the life cycle, compute the stationary distribution of households by forward induction using the policy functions.
5. Check whether the amount of associated accidental bequests equals the initial guess. If not, go back to step 2 and update accidental bequests.
6. Check whether market-clearing conditions hold. If not, go to step 1 and update the initial guesses.

The French economy is solved similarly, except that we do not need to iterate over interest rate and wage rate to check for market-clearing conditions. In the policy experiments in which government spending is fixed to that in the benchmark French economy, we further iterate over the proportional income tax to balance the government budget constraint.

## D French Social Security Tax

The French social security system consists of a public pension and a mandatory occupational pension. The public pension had a flat tax rate of 6.75 percent for employees and 9.9 percent for employers in 2010 and an earnings cap of average earnings. The mandatory occupational pension comprises two schemes. One is for employees (the ARRCO, or Association for Employees' Supplementary Pension Schemes), and the other one is for managerial and executive staff (the AGIRC, or General Association of Retirement Institutions for Executives). We use the first one to calculate the social security tax rate since it covers most workers.

The ARRCO has two income brackets. The tax rate is constant within each bracket and is zero if earnings are higher than the second bracket. The first bracket has an earnings cap equal to average earnings, and the second bracket has an earnings cap ranging between average earnings and three times average earnings. Table D. 4 reports the tax rate for each bracket and the total tax rate for public and occupational pensions for average income and for three times the average income. Because there are earnings caps, the tax rate, including both the public pension and the mandatory occupational pension and taking into account the earnings brackets, is decreasing with income. Hence, for earnings between one and three times average earnings, the tax rate for employees is between 10.55 percent and 9.45 percent, and for earnings greater than three times earnings it is less than 9.45 percent. We use 9.45 percent as the value for $\tau_{s}$ in the simulation. This is a
conservative value since most of the population earns less than three times average earnings. Similarly, we use a conservative value of 14 percent as the employer tax rate $\tau_{f}$.

Table D.4: French Social Security Tax Rate, \%

|  | Employee rate | Employer rate |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Public |  |  |
| $\leq$ avg. earnings | 6.75 | 9.9 |
| ARRCO |  |  |
| $\leq$ avg. earnings | 3.8 | 5.7 |
| $1-3 *$ avg. earnings | 8.9 | 13.3 |
| Total |  |  |
| 1*avg. earnings | $6.75+3.8=10.55$ | $9.9+5.7=15.6$ |
| $3^{*}$ avg. earnings | $[(6.75+3.8) * 1+8.9 * 2)] / 3=9.45$ | $\left.\left[(9.9 \%+5.7 \%)^{*} 1+13.3 * 2\right)\right] / 3=14$ |

While the public-pension benefit is based on the best twenty-five years of earnings, the occupational pension is based on average lifetime earnings. Since the retirement age is 65 , the length of working life is $65-24=41$ in the model. We use the average of 25 and 41 years as the number of best years that the pension income is tied to. ${ }^{24}$

[^19]
## E Additional Results

## E. 1 Life-Cycle Profiles for Decomposition

Figure E.1: Life-Cycle Profiles from Decomposition Using US Policies
(a) Consumption Tax

(b) Social Security

(c) Income Tax


Expenditure


Hours

Notes: This figure compares hours and expenditure by age in the French benchmark economy with those after adopting US values. Expenditures are normalized by GDP per worker in the benchmark French economy. Panel (a) shows the changes after applying the US consumption tax to the French economy. Panel (b) shows the changes after applying the US social security system to the French economy. Panel (c) shows the changes after applying the US income tax to the French economy

Figure E.2: Life-Cycle Profiles from Decomposition Using US Productivity
(a) Efficiency Units

(b) Home TFP

(c) Home Labor-Augmenting Technology


Expenditure


Hours

Notes: This figure compares hours and expenditure by age in the French benchmark economy with those after adopting US values. Expenditures are normalized by GDP per worker in the benchmark French economy. Panel (a) shows the changes after applying the US efficiency profile to the French economy. Panel (b) shows the changes after applying the US home TFP to the French economy. Panel (c) shows the changes after applying the US home labor-augmenting technology level to the French economy.

## E. 2 Life-Cycle Profiles for Policy Experiments

Figure E.3: Life-Cycle Profiles from Policy Experiments Using US Policies
(a) Consumption Tax

(c) Income Tax


Expenditure


Hours

Notes: This figure compares hours and expenditure by age in the French benchmark economy with those after adopting US values, holding constant government spending. Expenditures are normalized by GDP per worker in the benchmark French economy. Panel (a) shows the changes after applying the US consumption tax to the French economy. Panel (b) shows the changes after applying the US social security system to the French economy. Panel (c) shows the changes after applying the US income tax to the French economy.


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[^2]:    ${ }^{1}$ See, for example, Prescott (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008), Rogerson (2008), Olovsson (2009), McDaniel (2011a), Ngai and Pissarides (2011), Erosa et al. (2012), Ragan (2013), Chakraborty et al. (2015), Duernecker and Herrendorf (2018), Laun and Wallenius (2016), Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln (2018).
    ${ }^{2}$ See, for example, Benhabib et al. (1991), Rupert et al. (1995), and Rogerson and Wallenius (2016) for the effects of home production on market hours. See, for example, Dotsey et al. (2015) and Boerma and Karabarbounis (2020) for the importance of home production in assessing the welfare implications of polices.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ We do so because the HBS is available only for 2010.

[^4]:    ${ }^{4}$ Borella et al. (2018) show that to better match the aggregates, it is important to calibrate (or estimate) the model including both men and women in the data.
    ${ }^{5}$ As a robustness check, we use total market hours and total home hours to prorate the transportation expenditure. The data facts are almost the same as what is reported in Figure 1.

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ The expenditure shares are lower in France for both market goods and home inputs because taxes are higher there.

[^6]:    ${ }^{7}$ We follow Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) and McGrattan et al. (1997), among others, and assume that home production takes time and home capital as inputs. In those papers, home capital consists of residential housing and consumer durables. Our definition of home inputs includes residential housing, consumer durables, and some nondurables, such as food at home. See section 2.1 for details.

[^7]:    ${ }^{8}$ Dotsey et al. (2014) show in Figure 5A that estimated home-production productivity across the life cycle is very flat, with a hump at age fifty that is only 7 percent higher than that at age twenty-four.

[^8]:    ${ }^{9}$ See Appendix C for details of the computation algorithm.

[^9]:    ${ }^{10}$ Guvenen et al. (2014) lump income tax and social security tax together. Since social security tax is linear, we subtract it from the estimate of Guvenen et al. (2014) directly to derive the tax rate $\tau(y)$ as a function of income $y: \tau(y)=1.1568-0.009420(y / A W)-0.942610(y / A W)^{-0.102590}$, where $A W$ is the average income.

[^10]:    ${ }^{11}$ The difference in the depreciation rate contributes little to the allocation differences between the United States and France.
    ${ }^{12}$ The French tax rate as a function of before-tax income $y$ is given by $\tau(y)=0.43790+$ $0.00339(y / A W)-0.24249(y / A W)^{-0.41551}$, where $A W$ is average income.

[^11]:    ${ }^{13}$ The rates are conservative compared to the actual rates.

[^12]:    ${ }^{14}$ Compared with two recent papers—Erosa et al. (2012) and Laun and Wallenius (2016)— studying cross-country differences in labor supply late in the life cycle, our model can account for more differences in labor supply between the United States and France because we adopt a rich model with home production and allow for differences in home productivity.
    ${ }^{15}$ Our model overpredicts market hours at younger ages because France's faster decline in the age-efficiency profile and its lower social security claiming age both incentivize French households to shift market hours from older ages to younger ages. This overprediction implies that French market hours at young ages are also affected by factors other than tax and transfer programs and

[^13]:    ${ }^{16}$ Because of the interactions between different factors, the sum of effects from individual factors is not exactly equal to the total effect from all factors combined.

[^14]:    ${ }^{17}$ Erosa et al. (2012) find that adopting the US social security system eliminates all differences in hours worked between US and France after age sixty. In our model, social security plays a smaller role in explaining the lower labor supply after age sixty in France relative to the United States. This is mainly because the age-efficiency profile in France drops much faster after age sixty in our study, which accounts for most of the differences in market hours after that age. We show a faster drop in the age-efficiency profile for France because our wage profiles take into account the potential wages offers to retirees.
    ${ }^{18}$ The French experiment is a partial equilibrium one with the interest rate fixed at the US value. Therefore, output is determined only by the aggregate number of efficiency units. The reduction in output is thus not at odds with the literature that finds that in general equilibrium a less generous social security system leads to higher output because of an increase in the capital stock.

[^15]:    ${ }^{19}$ See, for examples, Nishiyama and Smetters (2007), Fuster et al. (2007), Hurst and Willen (2007), Chen (2010), Imrohoroglu and Kitao (2012), Laitner and Silverman (2012), Yang (2013), and Dotsey et al. (2015).

[^16]:    ${ }^{20}$ The data can be obtained from http://www.timeuse.org/mtus/.

[^17]:    ${ }^{21}$ Data can be obtained from http://www.bls.gov/cex/.
    ${ }^{22}$ Access may be obtained at http://www.lisdatacenter.org/.

[^18]:    ${ }^{23}$ French Labor Force Survey: https://www.insee.fr/en/metadonnees/source/serie/s1223/. CPS microdata sets were obtained from IPUMS: http://cps.ipums.org.

[^19]:    ${ }^{24}$ The average is thirty-three years. The model period is two years. Hence we use thirty-two years.

