

Butler, Dana

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Hochschule für
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Berlin School of Economics and Law

Institute for International Political Economy Berlin

Horizontal inequality and grievances: A lethal combination?

Author: Dana Butler

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Editors:

Sigrid Betzelt, Eckhard Hein (lead editor), Martina Metzger, Martina Sproll, Christina Teipen, Markus Wissen, Jennifer Pédussel Wu, Reingard Zimmer

Horizontal inequality and grievances: A lethal combination?
*A case study analyzing the impact of the Israeli settlement policy on the
level of violence of Palestinian citizens living in Hebron*

Dana Butler, HWR Berlin

Abstract

This study assesses how horizontal inequalities between Israeli settlers and Palestinians living in the West Bank cause grievances among Palestinians transforming to violence towards the Israeli citizens. A scoring model tailored to Hebron's case is introduced to evaluate the line of argumentation by estimating the level of violence in the designated area. This method is based on expert interviews containing pre-surveys and a theoretical review. In a second step, the estimated level of violence is tested through data of Palestinian attacks against Israelis based on the Global Terrorism Database (1976-2018). A historical review of the Israeli settlement policy since 1967 substantiates the research. The results suggest that the applied mechanism of horizontal inequalities increases Palestinian grievances and encourages violence in Hebron. Thus, this work strengthens theoretical research of horizontal inequalities, grievances, and violence and offers a new (bottom-up) direction in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Keywords: *Horizontal Inequality; Grievances; Conflict; Scoring Model; Israeli Settlement Policy; West Bank; Hebron*

JEL code: F5, F51, N45

Contact: dana.butler@freenet.de

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List of Abbreviations

GNI	Gross National Income
GoI	Government of Israel
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Horizontal Inequality
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
ILO	International Labour Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organizations
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner
oPt	Occupied Palestinian territory (In the context of this work, the term refers to the West Bank, excluding the region of Gaza)
PA	Palestinian Authority
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PM	Prime Minister
PPP	Purchasing power parity
R (R1, R2, R3, R4)	Respondent
START	National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSCO	United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
VI	Vertical Inequality
WB	World Bank

1. A step towards peace or the beginning of a new intifada?

The Israel-Palestinian conflict is one of the world's most explosive constellations, with roots stretching back to the end of the 19th century (CRF, 2020). Since then, the ethnoterritorial dispute experienced various violence cycles (Stockmarr, 2012, p.11). The first intifada (1987-1993) involved stone-throwing as a central Palestinian tactic, causing more than 2,000 fatalities on both sides (Pressman, 2017, p.519). Contrariwise, the second intifada (2000-2005), which primarily involved suicide bombings committed by Palestinian groups such as Hamas, killed more than 4,000 Israelis and Palestinians. (B'Tselem, n.d.; Jaeger and Paserman, 2005, p.1; Uppsala Conflict Data Program/UCDP, n.d.) More recently, "*Peace to Prosperity*", Trump's peace plan to resolve the conflict published on January 28th, 2020, gave rise to new tensions (Crowley and Halbfinger, 2020; Whitehouse, 2020). Instead of accomplishing a journey towards peace, this might even provoke a new intifada.

This conflict does not only cause enormous casualty figures and personal tragedies but also demands high economic, humanitarian, political, and social costs from both sides (Anthony et al., 2015, pp.xxii-xxiv; United Nations/UN, 2007). Given the longevity and the various costs of the conflict, the questions arise what is at the root of it and what triggers the relapsing eruptions of violence. One prominent component is the Israeli settlement policy, referring to Israeli citizens settling in the West Bank, inhabited by Palestinians (Stockmarr, 2012, p.12). Therewith, the West Bank represents a particular case where two social groups, the Israeli settlers and the Palestinian residents, experience differing circumstances in the cultural, economic, legal, political, and social terms of their daily lives (see e.g. disparity of water consumption; Amnesty International, 2017). As the past and present settlement policy includes the expansion of Israeli settlements to areas inhabited, utilized, and owned by Palestinians, the question arises as to what extent the presence of Israelis living in the West Bank nourishes the conflict and sparks violent clashes. Furthermore, the impact of unequal living conditions between Israeli settlers and Palestinians, leading to emerging grievances for the latter group, is evaluated.

This work¹ investigates how differences between the two groups ignite violence by utilizing research findings on inequalities and conflict that go beyond mainstream narratives. Following the introduction, the second section presents a theoretical overview on grievances, horizontal inequality (HI), and its evaluated correlation focusing on answering the question "*How do theoretical approaches analyze the correlation between the three factors of HI, grievances, and violence?*" The subsequent section contains a description of the applied methodology. The fourth section briefly outlines the main developments and policy directions of the Israeli settlement policies from 1967 to 2020. Subsequently, based on section two and four, the centerpiece of this work assesses the correlation of HI, grievances, and violence using the case of Hebron to answer the question: "*How does Israel's expansionary settlement policy in the West Bank and the associated aspects of HIs and grievances influence the level of violence executed by the Palestinians towards Israeli citizens?*" The final section provides an assessment of findings and concludes with a future outlook of possible challenges and chances in regard to the Israel-Palestinian peace process.

¹ This work is a shortened and revised version of my master thesis submitted to the Berlin School of Economics and Law in 2020 (Butler, 2020). For a more detailed version, please refer to the original work.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. The theory of grievance

For decades, researchers from different disciplines tried to determine the roots of conflicts. Despite the vast of articles and books, academia failed to agree on specific causes and drivers of civil wars and still endeavors to provide answers to the phenomenon “*why men rebel*” (Gurr, 1970; Hanlon, 2006, p.72). One well-known explanatory approach, which was continuously revived and further developed since the mid20th century, are grievances. To ensure a common understanding of this concept, the core elements of the historical development, types of grievances and influencing factors, critics, and preliminary results are introduced in the following sub-sections.

2.1.1. Historical development of the grievance approach

An evaluation of the theoretical development of the grievances approach yields that the dominant research position of a particular time reflects the “*hegemonic ideas of the era*” (Hanlon, 2006, p.75), clustered into three stages with varying degree of academic utilization.

The first stage (1960s/1970s) is associated with the prevailing belief that the “*rich Global North*” was responsible for the general underdevelopment of the “*poor Global South*” and the occurring wars, suiting the idea that civil wars result from deprivation (Hanlon, 2006, p.75). One of the most well-known advocates of this approach is Ted Robert Gurr, who introduced the relative deprivation theory, stating that violence results from a comparison between groups where the juxtaposition yields a deviation between expectations and reality (Basedau et al., 2017, pp.218-219; Porto, 2002, p.13). This disenchantment of aspirations leads to frustration and grievances, which can result in violence (Murshed and Tadjoeeddin, 2009, p.97).²

A paradigm shift characterizes the second stage (1980s/1990s) where the aspect of grievance becomes less important. Instead of blaming the “*rich Global North*,” the “*poor Global South*” was held responsible, with their “*evil*” and corrupt warlords, politicians, and leaders (Hanlon, 2006, pp.75). Complementary to this was the justification that economic motives triggered civil wars such as the individual's opportunity to fulfill personal greed, which in turn fuels conflicts (Allen, 2005, p.56). The new direction can be connected to the socialist bloc's collapse, since the Cold War worry regarding a socialist regime change was downsized. The liberalization of markets, structural adjustments to secure governmental power, and the increasing involvement of (orthodox) economists³ who entered the research field of conflicts accompanied this alteration (Hanlon, 2006, pp.75,91). The reasoning is premised on two neoclassical assumptions, individual rationality and personal utility maximization, which support the idea that “*rebels can do well out of war*” (Cramer, 2006, pp.164,168; Malone and Nitzschke, 2005, p.4).

Due to the lack of consideration of psychological aspects, ethnic, social, and religious components, a dichotomy within research occurred, and the debate “*greed vs. grievance*” emerged, leading to a division of analytical approaches (Adhikari and Samford, 2012, p.459; Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2006, p.2; Collier, 1999, p.1). The debate and the resulting flourishing research landscape inaugurated the third stage (21st century), characterized by the

² This period witnessed the first major grievance controversy including researchers such as Tilly (1978) who doubted the approach's veracity due to lacking quantitative evidence (Basedau et al., 2017, pp.218-220; Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch, 2014, p.419). Instead, he proposed that individuals base their decisions on improving their absolute position (Rustad, 2016, p.110).

³ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler were considered pioneers in this emerging field (see e.g. Allen, 2005, p. 58).

application of interdisciplinary approaches and heterodox economics to conflict research. This development simultaneously reflected the spirit of “*post-modernity*”. In contrast to previous results, economic motivation and opportunity were not determined as fundamental causes of conflict. Instead, heterodox economists and political scientists elucidated that the reasons for conflicts were not limited to the economic aspect, and grievance-triggering factors such as HI should also be considered (Korf, 2005, p.202; Malone and Nitzschke, 2005, p.5)

2.1.2. Types of grievances and influencing factors

Considering the diversified research portfolio outlined above, researchers determined a multitude of grievance types and influencing factors from the economic, political, social, and cultural fields. Examples of types include among others, resources-related, anti-state-related, and bottom-up grievances (see e.g. Hartard and Liebert, 2015; Langer, 2004; Regan and Norton, 2005). Upon close examination of the question on how grievances evolve, researchers offer many explanations, such as Humphreys (2005), stating that natural resources, weak state structures, and agricultural dependence increase the risk of conflict via the grievance mechanism. For both aspects⁴, the typology and influencing factors, it is striking that the majority of types and influencing factors can be directly or indirectly related to the concept of inequality. For instance, resource-related grievances refer to grievances caused by an unequal distribution of resources (see e.g. Malone and Nitzschke, 2005, p.5).

In addition, studies such as Murshed and Tadjoeeddin (2009, pp.1-2,11) refer to prerequisites that must be complied with to enable a transformation from grievances to violence. An example is the group identity formation to overcome the collective action problem described by Mancur Olson⁵ as the shared identity decreases lack of confidence within the group itself and thus is a powerful mobilizing agent for violence (Addison and Murshed, 2006, p. 153; Langer, 2004, p.5). Further aspects being considered are the state’s failure to redress grievances that are revealed through, for instance, protests, the lack of a social contract, and wealth distribution (Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006, p.14; Murshed and Tadjoeeddin, 2009, pp.17-18).

2.1.3. Critics and preliminary result

Lastly, throughout the literature review, four main points of critique related to the grievance approach can be extracted and need to be considered for further investigations: causation (see e.g. Cederman and Girdan, 2005), data collection in conflict zones (see e.g. Basedau et al., 2017), measurement and empirical display of grievance (see e.g. Querido, 2009), and application of proxies (see e.g. Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, 2009).

In summation, grievance theory is based on a feeling of injustice, which can lead to violence (Murshed and Gates, 2005, p.122). The theory evolves from the theoretical argument of relative deprivation to the application of extensive economic analysis and the distinct usage of factors such as HI, explained in the following section. Consequently, different interdependent causes with varying proportions engender civil wars, and thus, “*every war is different*” (Berdal, 2005, pp.689-590; Hanlon and Yanacopulos, 2006, p.9).

2.2. The concept of horizontal inequality

HI is not a new appearance, with theories such as Gurr (1970), Davies (1962), and Marx (1848) including similar approaches (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, p. 94; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011, p. 479). Even though the concept was mentioned beforehand,

⁴ For a detailed listing of grievance types and influencing factors, please refer to Butler (2020, pp. 6-8).

⁵ For relevant studies, please refer to Olson (2009).

the actual term was invented by Frances Stewart (2010, p.6), who defined it as “*inequalities among groups of people who share a common identity. Such inequalities have economic, social, political and cultural status dimensions.*” (Murshed and Tadjoeeddin, 2009, p.98). In contrast to vertical inequalities (VI), which are between individuals or households, HIs are inequalities between groups sharing the same identity (Fukuda-Parr, Langer, and Mine, 2013, p.3). Group identification, which is essential to overcome the collective action problem, often results from self-identification based on factors such as gender or ethnicity (Addison and Murshed, 2006, pp.153, 160).

Stewart states that HI causes grievances, which leads to mobilization and violence (Brown and Langer, 2010, p.28-29). Based on this approach, civil wars are conflicts between groups and “*not a matter of individuals randomly committing violence against each other*” (Østby, 2007, p.2). In addition to Stewart’s theory, various studies apply the concept of HI as a proxy for grievances such as Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011, pp.478, 492). They claim that the probability of the onset of conflict is higher within highly unequal societies than group dynamics whose average level of wealth is closer to the national average. A substantiating line of argumentation is the observation that not all low-income countries suffer conflict, but also middle-income countries such as Syria (Newman, 2014, pp.29- 30).

Consequently, unequal treatment of groups⁶, which can either be preferential or discriminatory, may result in grievances and tension (Fukuda-Parr, Langer and Mine, 2013, pp.3-5). One precondition for this is the group's need to identify its deprived position (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch, 2014, p.422). Thus, the higher the HI’s visibility, the more likely the willingness to participate in violence (Rustad, 2016, p.107).

2.2.1. Categories of horizontal inequality and measurability

HIs can be classified into four categories, namely cultural (e.g. asymmetric acknowledgment of religion; Stewart, 2010, p.2), economic (e.g. unequal distribution of wealth; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011, p.480), political (e.g. active political exclusion of a particular social group; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, p. 32), and social (e.g. varying level of access possibilities such as education; Langer and Stewart, 2014, p.105)⁷.

Related to this typification, researchers mostly focus on the effects of political and economic HIs due to their high impact and the possibility to measure it quantitatively (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013, pp.32-33,117). The four categories are interdependent, as for example political power can secure economic power and wealth by implementing relevant rules and regulations, and economic HI can influence social HI (see e.g. access to education; Brown and Langer, 2010, p.30; Stewart, Brown, and Langer, 2008, p.409; Stewart, 2000, p.248).

While discussing HI's multidimensionality, the corresponding measurability is essential. There is no consensus concerning clearly defined methods. Yet, one vital aspect is the definition of each group, according to i.e. linguistic, tribal, or religious characteristics. Here, the overlapping of group memberships can be based on the selected group definition. (Murshed and Tadjoeeddin, 2009, p. 100) Therefore, it is essential to be aware of defined group boundaries and possible changes (Stewart, Brown and Mancini, 2005, pp.21-22).

⁶ Various influencing factors exist which can either mitigate or encourage conflicts. Those factors can be clustered into actors (society, “rebel” leader, state, external stakeholders) and circumstances (historical development, affected country/territory). For a detailed analysis, please refer to Butler (2020, pp. 12-14).

⁷ For relevant studies please refer to Fukuda-Parr, Langer, and Mine (2013, pp.3-5) and Østby (2008, p.145).

2.2.2. Critiques and preliminary result


Similar to the notion of grievance, several critical aspects have to be considered when utilizing the theory of HI. The following five main aspects can be extracted: data availability/collection in conflict regions and measurement (see e.g. Cramer, 2003, p.400), application of proxies (see e.g. Langer and Stewart, 2014, pp.106-112), utilization of VI (see e.g. Østby, 2008, p.144), the difficulty of identifying defined groups (see e.g. Stewart, Brown, and Mancini, 2005, pp.8-9, 21-22), and objective vs. perceived phenomenon (see e.g. Holquist cited in Rustad, 2016, p.112).

To summarize the findings, recent studies that integrated new proxies for HI within their approach detected the notion to be a strong predictor for conflicts (see e.g. Cramer, 2003, p.399). Instead of “*push square pegs through rounds holes*,” as Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2014, p.418) referred to former researchers using unsuitable measures to analyze the correlation of grievances and conflict, the multidimensionality of the topic should be acknowledged and incorporated within conducted research.

2.3. The present state of research

The evolution and multidimensionality of the theory of grievance and HI evaluated in the previous section is likewise presented in various publications and research approaches. Even though the line of argumentation is not incorporated into the mainstream approach of the field of peace and conflict and only very limited on domestic and international policy initiatives, various studies detect a positive correlation between HI, grievances, and mobilization/violence (Stewart, 2010, pp. 4-5). Examples include research such as Cederman, Weidman, and Gelditsch (2011), Hillesund (2015), Koubi and Böhmelt (2014), Langer (2004), Murshed and Gates (2005), Østby (2008), Østby, Nordås and Rød (2009), Pressman (2018), and Stewart, Brown, and Mancini (2005). In this regard, studies such as the one by Cederman, Weidman, and Gelditsch (2011), apply a line of argumentation where the grievance component is explained theoretically, and the link between HI and mobilization/violence examined empirically. A two-stage approach is applied due to the difficulty of empirically compute grievances (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: The two-stage approach of HI, grievances, and violence



Source: Own figure based on Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug (2013, p.44).

To conclude, this work aims at the advancement of the research field of grievance, HI, and conflicts to support its utilization as a conflict predictor and enabler of conflict prevention (Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch, 2014, p.429). However, as the exact level of impact of this theoretical approach is not fully transparent yet, there is a need to further investigate the topic. The theory has been tested on several case studies, however the settlement policy in the West Bank was not amongst them, underlining the relevancy of this work.

3. Methodology

3.1. Research design

A deductive two-stages approach is utilized to test the theoretical correlation of HI, grievances, and violence connected to the West Bank's settlement policy. Due to this topic's complexity and to allow for a comprehensive assessment, qualitative research is used and substantiated by a quantitative method. Based on the two-stage line of argumentation previously established, the selected research design consists of three phases: preparatory work, modeling, and model testing.

The first phase serves as a preparatory base to present the theoretical findings and the settlement policy results in the West Bank. The objective of the second phase is to establish a scoring model that allows for a projection of the correlation between HI, grievances, and violence for Hebron's example. In this context, four guided expert interviews were conducted in June and July 2020 with representatives from Israel and Palestine, all having differing professional backgrounds ranging from academia, non-governmental organizations (NGO), think tanks, and journalism. A pre-survey provides a base for the interview questions. In addition to the survey and the interviews, information for Hebron is compiled. As a final step of this phase, the results from the three interims steps (pre-survey, expert interviews, case study Hebron) are combined with the first phase's findings to develop a scoring model.

The third phase includes testing of the computed score to Hebron's level of violence derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This database is used as it provides a very detailed and comprehensive set of data. To sum up, the application of the different methods allows recommending whether the settlements in a certain region in the West Bank cause HIs resulting in grievances and violence.

3.2. Limitations

Outlining the complexity of the theoretical base in section two and the multidimensionality of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, it cannot be ruled out that essential components affecting the dispute are neglected. This work's limitations are primarily due to space constraints, leading to the disregard of several content-related aspects such as the settlements' international legality status, a detailed description of the historic Israeli-Palestine conflict, the refugee problem, the Gaza strip, the Netanyahu-Gantz and the Bennett government. The area of East Jerusalem is only considered to enhance relevant understanding and when available data does not permit a separation. Otherwise, the area is excluded from further analysis or interpretation. Closely connected to this is the utilization of the GTD database. As the sourcing is based on unclassified media articles, it cannot be ruled out that especially minor acts of violence such as stone-throwing are not considered in the data collection. Lastly, due to the subject's sensitivity, it has to be highlighted that the works limitations only allow for a limited consideration of the topic. Thus, not all influencing factors of the conflict can be considered and listed.

4. An analysis of the Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank

Since 1967⁸, ten different prime ministers (PMs) were in the office, whose political orientation is split into two main blocs. The center-left oriented parties⁹ have primarily been in power since

⁸ The Six-Day war was selected as a starting point, as the preliminary analysis indicated this year as the main point of origin of the Israeli settlement policy.

⁹ For simplification reasons, this work classifies the following PMs as left-center politicians: David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharrett, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak.

the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 until the end of the first decade after the Six-Day-War. The center-right/ right-oriented party¹⁰ under the leadership of the Likud party, has mostly been in power since 1977. One exception is the period between 2005 and 2009 when the center-oriented party Kadima presided the administration. (Gov.il, n.d.; The Israel Democracy Institute, n.d.a, n.d.b, n.d.c, n.d.d, n.d.e)

Continuing with the general development of settlement units, a continuous expansion of settlements and outposts¹¹ has been taking place since 1967 within the West Bank. However, it has to be highlighted that there are differing peak periods of construction of new settlements versus outposts. Firstly, the number of new settlements reached three peaks in 1970, 1976 to 1986, and from 1988 until 1992 during the premierships of Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Shamir. In contrast, the majority of outposts were established in two peaks, from 1996 until 2005 and from 2011 to 2019, during the tenures of Benjamin Netanyahu, Ehud Barak, and Ariel Sharon. Also, a gradual construction shift is notable from the settlements to the outposts as already 76.4% of all settlement units were built until 1986 in contrast to the outpost construction which started mainly in 1996. (Own calculation based on extracted data from B'Tselem, 2019a; OCHA, n.d.; Peace Now, 2020) Based on this development, the question arises: *Are differing political strategies the reason for this irregular evolution?*

Before approaching the above question, it has to be emphasized that the described settlement expansion is accompanied by constant support from the Government of Israel (GoI) irrespective of its political affiliation, including institutional, financial, and legal assistance. However, on closer inspection of the Israeli settlement policies per premiership, four main developments can be observed.

Firstly, the original motive justifying the establishment of settlements was a security aspect to increase Israel's protection by creating a buffer zone between Israel and Jordan (see e.g. Levi Eshkol premiership from 1963-1969; B'Tselem, 2017; Fahoum and Abuelaish, 2019, p.266). However, the change in social and political power distribution mainly starting during Golda Meir's presidency (1969-1974) and highly influenced by the Yom Kippur War (October 1973), led to a power gain of the national-conservative Likud party reaching its peak in 1977 when Menachem Begin became PM (1977-1983). (FAZ, 2018; Gov.il, n.d.a.; Kurtzer, 2010, p.10)

In the same period, the settler movement Gush Emunim¹² (Bloc of the Faithful) gained more political influence encouraging the land availability for settlement constructions and conversely reducing the territory for Palestinian usage. (B'Tselem, 2002, pp.13-14) As a consequence of those developments, the security motive was complemented by an ideological motive and settlements were established on strategic military areas and in the heart of the West Bank instead of avoiding highly populated Palestinian areas and hilly regions as it was conducted in the past. (B'Tselem, 2002, p.12; FAZ, 2018; Kurtzer, 2010, p.10; Shapira, 2008, p.315; Wolffson, 1991, p.33)

Secondly and closely aligned to the first aspect, the settlement policy became more institutionally structured through unofficial settlement concepts (see e.g. *Drobbless Plan*) and

¹⁰ For simplification reasons, this work classifies the following PMs as center-right/right-oriented politicians: Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir, Benjamin Netanyahu. An exception is Ariel Sharon, a member of the Likud (center-right/right-oriented) and the Kadima party (center-oriented party).

¹¹ An outpost is usually smaller than a settlement and established without the permission of the GoI. It is created by the usage of caravans near to an existing settlement. Different handling processes on the part of the GoI exist, such as demolition or legalization. (Stockmarr, 2012, p.30)

¹² Gush Emunim is a lobby group aligning with the interpretation of Eretz Yisrael (FAZ, 2018).

legal adjustments of land acquisition (see e.g. *Ottoman Land Code*¹³) both initiated during Begin's tenure aiming to enhance the land availability for settlement constructions and conversely reducing the territory for Palestinian usage (B'Tselem, 2002, p. 14; US Committee on Foreign Relations, 1983, p.371).

Thirdly, the establishment of outposts mainly started during Netanyahu's first premiership in 1996 and primarily stopped in 2005 until reestablished in 2012 (B'Tselem, 2019a; OCHA, n.d.; Peace Now, 2020d). Limitations of the settlement policy characterize this time frame compared to the 1970s and 1980s (see e.g. *Resolution 360, Oslo II Accords, Mitchell Report*; B'Tselem, 2002, pp.15-16; Kurtzer, 2010, p.3-7,11,13). Thus, it appears that institutional restrictions initiated by GoI and international pressure to limit the settlement policy have an inhibiting effect on new settlements/neighborhoods but an expansionary impact on the construction of illegal outposts.

The fourth aspect complements the third finding by detecting that Netanyahu's time in office is characterized by a political power gain of the right-wing, religious Zionist movement to secure and drive their interests of raising settlements to national policy affairs (Kurtzer, 2010, p.10). This settler-friendly phenomenon became especially visible during his third tenure (2013-2015), when an increasing number of representatives and allies of the settler's movement directly controlled essential ministries. (Del Sarto, 2017, pp.166-167; Perliger and Zaidise, 2015, pp.202-203)

To return to the question of whether political affiliation results in differing settlement policies, a partial affirmation is possible. Despite the continuous, supporting trend of the GoI towards settlement activities, different PMs are characterized for differing levels of support and distinguishing strategies such as Begin's and Netanyahu's aggressive settlement policies including the retroactive legalization of outposts during Netanyahu's term, in contrast to Rabin's second administration representing a more moderate and attenuating settlement approach (Aronson, 1995, p.132; B'Tselem, 2002, pp.15-16; Rudoren and Ashkenas, 2015).

5. A case study of the Hebron settlement

5.1. Data, method, and measurements

This section evaluates whether the HIs between Israeli settlers and Palestinians trigger grievances and lead to violence by the regional example of Hebron. The decision was made as it is the only city in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) where Israeli settlements are located within the center itself (Bärschneider, 2017; Breaking the Silence, n.d.). As the presence of settlements within the center results in geographical proximity between the Israeli settlers and the Palestinians, it is assumed that the correlation of HIs, grievances, and violence is more visible than Israeli settlements located in rural areas of the West Bank. To test the two-stage argumentation referred to in section two, a scoring model is utilized. This model is based on three following pillars: the results of the theoretical review, the expert interviews, including the associated pre-survey, and the case of Hebron.

It is crucial to emphasize the challenge of measuring grievances quantitatively. Therefore, the existence of the grievance component within the two-stage approach is strengthened by the literature review results and the pre-survey¹⁴. The literature review

¹³ The application of the Ottoman land code eases the process of declaration of state land. In case the land is registered as state land, a Palestinian who claims the ownership of the property has to provide respective evidence and meet specific demands such as the obligation to cultivate the farmland regularly. (B'Tselem, 2017)

¹⁴ For the applied method of transcription, the pre-survey, the interview guideline, and the interview content analysis please refer to Butler (2020, pp.75-83).

indicates a correlation between HI, grievances, and violence. The pre-survey reinforces the assumption, as all interviewees “*strongly agree*” with statement 3¹⁵, which states that there is a correlation between HI and grievances. Consequently, the link between HI and grievances is determined as valid and is not further specified.

Step 1 contains the development of the scoring model. The first draft of the scorecard is based on an information merge of the literature review, expert interviews, and pre-surveys. Following the logic of section 2.2.1, the categories of cultural, economic, political, and social HIs are utilized. This step aims to evaluate how research findings and experts rate the impact of HI on violence. In Step 2, the scorecard is complemented by the case study results composing a comprehensive scoring model. This enables the estimation of the level of violence for a selected region, namely Hebron. Notably, the results of Step 1 are universally applicable, whereas Step 2 has to be adjusted based on the selected region. In the long-term, this model can estimate the development of violence within the West Bank. Lastly, Step 3 comprises the test of the regional sample of Hebron selected in Step 2. The examination of Step 3 draws data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), including all intentional incidents, which contain an act of violence (e.g. violence against property and people) and are not classified as state terrorism (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism/START, 2019, pp.10-11; 2020).

5.2. Hebron: A descriptive overview

In preparation for Step 2, three main regional aspects are discussed within this section: a historical review of the settlement movement in Hebron, the current status quo, and the present HIs existing in the city.

5.2.1. Hebron: A historical review

The evolution of settlements in Hebron started in 1968 when a group of Israeli citizens traveled to Hebron on the pretext of celebrating Passover; however, after the festivities, the group stayed in the city (Yeshiva Shavel Hebron, 2020). Since then, the settlements' constant expansion can be observed.¹⁶ (B'Tselem, 2019b, p.8; DW, 2019).

An essential aspect concerning Hebron's historical development and its settlement policy is the massacre conducted by Baruch Goldstein. In 1995, the Israeli settler opened fire in the Ibrahimi Mosque, located in the old city of Hebron, killing 29 and injuring 129 Palestinians. (Ben-Naftali, Sfard, and Viterbo, 2018, p.527; B'Tselem, 2019b, p.5) As a consequence, the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) was created, and stricter safety regulations were implemented by the GoI (OCHA, 2019, p.1). For instance, Palestinians were placed under a curfew and Al Shuhada, Hebron's main road and central shopping street, was partially closed for Palestinians, whereas the Israeli settlers and Israeli citizens retained the right to access (Föderl-Schmid, 2017). Resulting from the newly initiated restrictions, Palestinian businesses were closed upon Israeli military order leading to the deterioration of the economic situation, and Palestinian families, whose homes were located in the affected areas, were displaced (Ben-Naftali, Sfard, and Viterbo, 2018, p.527).

A further event relates to the *Hebron protocol* of 1997, leading to Hebron's division into the areas of H1 and H2. The civil and security administration of H1, equating to 80% of the city's area, was transferred to the Palestinian Authority (PA). However, H2, including the

¹⁵The survey is listed in Butler (2020, pp. 81-83). Statement three declares the following assertion: “*The above-mentioned inequalities between Israeli settlers and Palestinians living in the West Bank cause emotional distress to the latter group (for instance grievance).*”

¹⁶ See B'Tselem (2019b, pp.8-12) for examples of official settlement plans and settler's initiatives within the center of Hebron.


old city, remained under Israeli control. (Gunkel, 2019) Due to the presence of settlements in H2 instead of H1, the latter area is excluded from this analysis.

An additional aspect to emphasize is the continuous restrictions placed on the Palestinian residents of Hebron. Similar to increasing security installations connected to Baruch's attack, the installation of permanent as well as portable checkpoints, and the restriction to call for prayer and worship at the Ibrahimi Mosque were implemented. (Ben-Naftali, Sfard, and Viterbo, 2018, pp.527-528; OCHA, 2019) Based on the described developments, the former commercial center of the southern West Bank suffered under the deterioration of living conditions such as the freedom of movement for the Palestinians. (B'Tselem, 2019b, p.8)

5.2.2. Hebron: A status quo

In general, different rules apply to the residents of Hebron and the West Bank. The Israelis are ruled under Israeli civil administration, whereas Palestinians are treated under Israeli military law. (Göbel, 2017)

Figure 2: Geographical map of the city of Hebron



Source: OCHA (2019, p.4).

H2 is the most affected part of Hebron concerning the impact of settlements, which becomes apparent when considering the split of H2 into three main parts (see Figure 2). One subarea, containing four settlement compounds, is defined as the military zone¹⁷ ("closed area"). In 2018, 1,022 Palestinian residents lived there, who can only enter if their residency is registered. (OCHA, 2019, p.4) On Israeli bank holidays, the registered Palestinian residents either have to stay in their homes or are not allowed to enter the military zone (OCHA, 2017a). The second zone entrance, classified as a "restricted area", is limited to pedestrian access where vehicles cannot enter. In 2018, 6,025 Palestinians lived in this area. The third area is defined as the rest of H2 and is home for most of the Palestinians in Hebron, namely 26,702 individuals. (OCHA, 2019, p.4)


¹⁷ The area was defined as a military zone after an increasing wave of violence from the Palestinians towards the Israeli settlers in 2015 (OCHA, 2020)

One central point is the security installations connected to the settlers' presence pictured in Figure 2. According to OCHA (2019), a total of 121 obstacles with 21 permanently staffed checkpoints only traversable via foot are installed within the center of Hebron. Additionally, watchtowers, concrete blockades, walls, and a face recognition system are part of the Israeli security strategy (Göbel, 2017; OCHA, 2019, p.5). Connected to the closed and military zones access restrictions, certain streets, housing areas, and markets are classified with an access restriction leading to the evacuation of hundreds of Palestinian apartments as well as businesses and the closure of Palestinians' streets. According to OCHA (2017a), approximately 1,105 abandoned Palestinian homes are located in the restricted area and 500 commercial buildings were shut down by Israeli military order. (Föderl-Schmid, 2017) Besides, 1,100 businesses had to close due to the restricted access for customers and suppliers (Ben-Naftali, Sfard, and Viterbo, 2018, p. 527).

5.2.3. Horizontal inequalities in Hebron

This section focuses on the major HIs¹⁸ existing in Hebron. This involves HIs applying to the entire West Bank (e.g. access to water) and HIs which are unique to the situation in Hebron. The compiled aspects are visualized in Figure 3, clustered according to the previously established dimensions: economic, political, social, and cultural.

Figure 3: An excerpt from the horizontal inequalities of Hebron¹⁹



Source: Own figure based on Fahoum and Abuelaish (2019, pp.269-271), International Labour Organization/ILO (2017, pp.14-15), Niksic, Eddin, and Cali (2014, p.48), OCHA (2017a) OCHA (2017b), OHCHR (2016, pp.8-9, 11-13), Sela (2017), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees/UNHCR (n.d., Box 6.3., The problem of Palestinian nationality), United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process/UNSCO (2016, pp.12-18).

Additionally, Table 1 presents relevant numbers applied to substantiate the argumentation of inequalities for selected sub-categories. The allocation of each HI was performed according to the best-fit principle. Overlaps and multidimensionality are possible,

¹⁸ Please note, that this work does not present a complete list but rather focuses on the major existing inequalities.

¹⁹ Figure 3 visualizes the examined HI and its categorization but neglects interrelations among them.

which are colored as white bubbles. When comparing both groups' overall situation, the inequality between the Israeli settlers²⁰ and the Palestinians living in Hebron becomes apparent when looking at the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI). The Israeli HDI is estimated at 0.919, corresponding to the 19th place in the worldwide ranking, compared to the Palestinian HDI, which is 0.708 and the 115th place. (United Nations Development Programme/UNDP, n.d.) Even though those numbers do not accurately reflect Hebron's situation, they indicate the extent of inequality between both groups.

Table 1: A comparison of selected indicators between Israel and Palestine (2019)

Category	Aspect	Index: Israel	Index: Palestine
Not applicable	HDI	0.919	0.708
Social	Life expectancy at birth (years)	83	74
Economic	Gross national income (GNI) per capita (constant 2017 Purchasing power parity, PPP\$)	40187	6417
Economic	Employment to population ratio (% ages 15 and older)	61.6	32.4
Social	Expected years of schooling (years)	16.2	13.4
Economic	Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI)	0.814	0.613

Sources: Own table based on UNDP (n.d.).

Firstly, political HI consists of three sub-categories or aspects: restriction of movement, legal affiliation and legal framework, as well as liberty and security. The last point is categorized as a hybrid of political and social HI. One aspect is the extent of the restriction of movement. This sub-category either causes or magnifies other HI sub-categories. One exception to this rule is the aspect of legal affiliation and the legal framework, where no direct influence can be detected. The aspect of restriction of movement for Palestinians is caused by security installations distributed across Hebron. These include checkpoints, walls, and access restricted areas that are adjacent to the settlement compounds (OCHA, 2017a; UNSCO, 2016, p. 17). To conclude, Hebron exhibits HIs concerning the freedom of movement. Interestingly, the Israeli settlements within Hebron are the main reason for the enhanced security measures.

Another aspect of political HI is the legal affiliation and legal framework, which refers to two different legal systems' co-existence. The Israeli settlers are treated under the Israeli civil administration, whereas Palestinian residents live under the Israeli military administration and are treated under Israeli military law. (Sela, 2017) The third sub-category is connected to Israeli settlers' violence towards Palestinian residences and the IDF's missing intervention. (OHCHR, 2016, pp.11-12) This contrasts with the intervention and prosecution if a Palestinian resident attacks an Israeli settler (see e.g. Amnesty International, 2020).

Secondly, one example of cultural HI is the restriction of freedom to worship. In contrast to the Israeli settlers, Palestinians are partially restricted by, for instance, limitations on their access to the Ibrahim Mosque during Jewish holidays. In those times, access to the mosque as well as the call for prayer is prohibited. (OHCHR, 2016, p.8)

Thirdly, the economic bubble consists of two aspects: the overall economic situation and access to resources such as water. The latter is defined as a compound of economic and

²⁰ As the Israeli settlers possess Israeli citizenship, it is assumed that data evaluating Israel's situation can be applied as a reference point, even though the numbers between Israelis living in Israel or Israeli settlers might not completely match. However, the Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) of 0.814 indicates that the social, political, economic, and cultural situations are not significantly different regarding the pure numbers (UNDP, n.d.).

social HI. Inequality in terms of the overall economic situation (see Table 1) can be assessed when comparing the 2019 human development index (HDI) indicators of gross national income (GNI) per capita (2017 purchasing power parity (PPP) \$) and the employment to population ratio (% ages 15 and older). The GNI of Israel is more than six times higher than the Palestinian GNI. Further, the Israeli employment rate exceeds the Palestinian rate by 29.2 percentage points. (UNDP, n.d.) Applying this to the case of Hebron, the Palestinian economy is much weaker than the Israeli one. Similar to the restriction of movement, inequality between the groups exists, and it is the Israeli settlements' presence that mainly causes it. Due to the connected restriction of movement, economic growth, employment²¹, utilization of resources, procurement and transportation of goods, and access to agricultural land are highly impacted. Hebron's uncertainty concerning the security strategy keeps investment low and limits economic growth and possible employment options. Also, the closure of businesses based on military orders impacts the regional Palestinian economy. (Fahoum and Abuelaish, 2019, pp.269-270; ILO, 2017, pp.14-15; OCHA, 2017b)

The example of water can explain the socioeconomic HI of access to resources. Due to the limited water network within the West Bank, additional transports have to be secured, which raises the price. This amount is highly influenced by physical barriers such as checkpoints. Regarding average spending on water, Palestinians pay approximately 8% of their monthly expenditure on water, compared to Israeli's living in the settlements paying approximately 0.9%. (Fahoum and Abuelaish, 2019, p. 271; UNSCO, 2016, p.18)

The bubble of social HI consists of six sub-categories, where two of them are presented together with economic/social and political HIs. The remaining four HIs are related to health, an adequate standard of living, education, and children's protection. Health inequality is reflected in the life expectancy of 2019, where Israel's value of 83 years exceeds the Palestinian number by nine years, namely 74 years (UNDP, n.d.). In Hebron's case, the difference can be partially explained by the low availability of health services such as emergency services (e.g. delay of ambulances due to movement restriction) and primary health care (UNSCO, 2016, pp.14-15). An adequate standard of living refers, for instance, to the social exclusion of Palestinian citizens living in the military zone. Due to the connected restrictions in terms of their housing, they are isolated from the rest of society and separated from their families. (OHCHR, 2016, p.9) Since this rule does not apply to the Israeli settlers, it can be defined as inequality between them.

Education HIs can be explained by the impacts on Palestinian children in contrast to Israeli children living in the Hebron settlements. According to UNSCO (2016), 11,329 Palestinian children attended school in H2 in 2014-2015. However, through restriction on the freedom of movement (e.g. checkpoints on students' way to school), settler harassment, or preventive measures of closing the school due to Jewish holidays, the access and quality of education is highly impacted. The lack of a safe learning environment leads to, among others, higher absence rates, a decline in academic grades, and an increase in drop-out rates (OHCHR, 2016, pp.12-13; UNSCO, 2016, pp.12-13). This explanation is partially reflected in the HDI Index of expected years of schooling in 2019, where Israel's index exceeds the Palestinian index by almost 3 years (UNDP, n.d.).

Lastly, children's protection refers to the aspect that children should live in a secure living environment. However, concerning Hebron's case, Palestinian children²² are regularly

²¹ The employment of Palestinians in the settlements should be kept in mind, offering a higher wage than the territories average (see e.g. Sawafta, 2016). However, in the case of Hebron, such an employment opportunity could not be detected.

²² In this regard, it has to be highlighted that Israeli children in the settlement are also constantly exposed to high military presence and the conflict. However, in this regard, the Israeli military's differing role and behavior

exposed to a high military presence with search and arrest operations, settler harassments, and demonstrations' fatal consequences. For instance, in 2015, Palestinians and Israelis clashed, leading to the death of five Palestinian children and injuries among 26 children. (UNSCO, 2016, pp.12-13) Based on the analysis of Hebron, HIs within the city concern all four dimensions of HI.

5.3. A scoring model for the case of Hebron

As explained in section 5.1, the development of a scoring model aims to evaluate the impact of HIs on the level of violence in Hebron. Before assessing the impact of HIs existing within Hebron, the development of the scoring model (see Figure 4), which consists of two steps, is elaborated.

Figure 4: A conceptual framework of the developed scoring model

Step 1						Step 2		
Step	Method	Criteria	Weighting Score/ Method	Weighting Score (Average of Step 1a/1b)	Final Weighting Score (Step 1)	Method	Criteria	Fullfillment of sub-criteria
Step 1a	Theoretical Review	Cultural	0,1	0,1175	0,12	Case Study Hebron	Cultural	1
Step 1b	Interview 1-4	Cultural	0,1875					
Step 1a	Theoretical Review	Economic	0,3	0,2975	0,30		Economic	1
Step 1b	Interview 1-4	Economic	0,2875					
Step 1a	Theoretical Review	Political	0,4	0,3825	0,38		Political	1
Step 1b	Interview 1-4	Political	0,3125					
Step 1a	Theoretical Review	Social	0,2	0,2025	0,20		Social	1
Step 1b	Interview 1-4	Social	0,2125					

Weighting Score Step 1:	
Theoretical Review	0,8
Interview 1-4	0.2

Source: Own figure.

In the first step, the four criteria (cultural, economic, social, and political HI) are assigned specific weights based on the estimated impact concerning violence. This rate is based on the theoretical review (Step 1a) and the four conducted expert interviews and associated pre-surveys (Step 1b). After reviewing each interview, the average weight per criteria²³ (cultural, economic, political, social) is estimated. As a final procedure of Step 1, the weighted average of both sub-steps is calculated. Here, the value of Step 1a receives a higher weight, namely 0.8, as the estimation of the criteria is based on a comprehensive literature review. In contrast, the expert interviews comprise only four samples and are utilized to substantiate the results obtained through the review. Based on the calculation of the final weighting score, political HI (0.38) has the most significant influence, followed by economic (0.3), social (0.2), and cultural (0.12) HI.

The second step is to customize the scoring model to a specific region. To examine the possible violence caused by HI, it has to be considered which type of HI is present in the region. Step 2 evaluates whether the sub-criteria are fulfilled. In case the type of HI exists in the

towards the group (see liberty and security of person) has to be included. Even though the impact on the Israeli children should not be denied, it differs from the position of the Palestinian group.

²³ Please find the detailed explanation of every dedicated weighting score in Butler (2020, pp. 85-88).

targeted region, a value of 1 is assigned. In case the criteria cannot be supported, a value of 0 is allocated. To complete the second step, the weighted score of the four criteria is calculated, including the results of both steps. The final score ranges between 0 and 1, meaning that the closer the score is to 1, the higher the estimated level of violence.


When applying this scoring model to Hebron's case, the fulfillment of the sub-criteria in the second step can be based on the HIs determined in section 5.2., which yielded that all four HIs are present and a value of 1 is assigned per criteria. Consequently, the final score is equal to 1 (Calculation: $0.12 \times 1 + 0.3 \times 1 + 0.38 \times 1 + 0.2 \times 1 = 1$). This indicates a high level of violence caused by the HIs between settlers and Palestinian residents in Hebron.

5.4. Model testing: The case of Hebron

Based on the scoring model's result, Hebron's estimated level of violence based on HIs attained the highest value of 1. To evaluate its veracity, two steps are performed: a comparison between the average level of violence in the West Bank and Hebron and an analysis of the development of violence in Hebron.

Both steps are based on the following assumptions: in consideration of the high violence score of Hebron and the theoretical deduced correlation between HI, grievances, and violence (see section 5.1), it can be presumed that the level of violence in Hebron attains at least the West Bank's average level of violence. Under the assumption that violence-triggering factors are at least equally distributed across the West Bank, the level of violence caused by Hebron citizens should range at a similar level as the city's proportionate population rate. Consequently, not less than 7.03% of the level of violence in the West Bank should be caused by Hebron's Palestinian citizens (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics/PCBS, 2020a; 2020b).

Figure 5: The development of violence in the West Bank on Israeli citizens conducted by Palestinian residents (1970-2019)




Source: Own figure based on START (2020).

The first part examines the cogency of the model through a comparative test with the West Bank based on START (2020). In this regard, the number of attempts, victims' injuries, and victims' fatalities are compared between Hebron and the West Bank²⁴ over a time frame from 1970 to 2019²⁵. When analyzing the number of attempted attacks in the West Bank and Hebron from 1970 to 2019 (see Figure 5), all six functions follow the same trend with different frequencies (START, 2020). This leads to the question of how much of the total proportion is caused by the violence of Hebron.

The level of violence in Hebron in proportion to the West Bank is determined by three factors: the number of attacks, victims injured, and the fatality rate of the victims. From 1970 until 2019, the average of all three determinants exceeds the minimum limit of 7.03% by at least 6.79 percentage points. On average, 13.79% of the attacks, 14.61% injuries, and 16.70% fatalities occurred in Hebron. The heights were reached in 1997 equating to 60% of the attacks, in 1980 engendering 80% of the fatalities, and in 1998 causing 92.31% of the injuries. Thus, the GTD indicates that the level of violence in Hebron is considerably higher than the average of the West Bank. (PCBS, 2020a.; 2020b.; START, 2020) The data strengthens the estimated level of violence in Hebron determined by the scoring model. This is substantiated by the finding that Hebron is one of the four regions most affected by the settlement policy.

Figure 6: The development of violence in the Hebron on Israeli citizens conducted by Palestinian residents (1970-2019)²⁶



Source: Own figure based on START (2020).

After examining the violence level of Hebron compared to the West Bank, the second step is to connect the aspect of HIs evoked by the settlement strategy and the level of violence in Hebron. To achieve this, the level of violence based on the three selected indicators is

²⁴ According to the GTD, Jerusalem is classified as the West Bank and thus included in the analysis. This decision was made as the analysis of the development of settlements contain the neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. Therefore, a clear structure is followed.

²⁵ The data availability of the GTD limits the considered period. The first attack in the West Bank is noted in 1976 and the last one in 2018.

²⁶ The red frame in Figure 6 visualizes three outbreaks of violence.

analyzed from 1970 to 2019 and tested for abnormalities (see Figure 6). Those are then inspected under consideration of settlement strategies previously discussed. To secure a structure, the West Bank's strategies and individual actions implemented in Hebron are distinguished. On close inspection of the level of violence in Hebron (see Figure 6), three time periods exhibit a more extensive violence level relating to all three factors: 1978-1984; 1990-2006; and 2013-2017 (START, 2020).

Table 2: An overview of relevant milestones of the settlement policy in the West Bank and Hebron related to the three eruptions of violence²⁷

	Period 1: 1978-1984	Period 2: 1990-2006	Period 3: 2013-2017
West Bank	Menachem Begin (1977-1983): Change of settlement strategy Yitzhak Shamir (1983-1984): 100.000 plan	Yitzhak Shamir (1986-1992): Settlement expansion Yitzhak Rabin (1992-1995): Oslo accords, progression of outpost strategy Benjamin Netanyahu (1996-1999): Aggressive settlement policy Ehud Barak (1999-2001): Al-Aqsa intifada and extensive settlement activities	Benjamin Netanyahu (2013-2015): Strengthening of settler's political position, right-wing shift Benjamin Netanyahu (2015-2020): Settler-friendly government, regularization law
Hebron	Various settlement constructions in Hebron (e.g. Qiryat Arba)	Attack of Baruch Goldstein Hebron protocol Expansion of security installations	Occupation of Rajabi house Establishment of Hebron as an independent community

Source: Own table based on findings of Butler (2020, pp. 28-43).

The next step is to examine whether the three periods can be directly affiliated with specific settlement policies and milestones summarized in Table 2. When combining the three significant violent developments from Figure 6, with the relevant settlement developments in the West Bank and Hebron, it is apparent that all periods contain important settlement events and strategies. For instance, the first period mainly covers Begin's tenure, a significant change in strategy compared to the former ruling left-wing government. Moreover, various settlement constructions were established in Hebron itself. The second period, ranging over 16 years, contained massive adjustments such as the progression of outposts strategies, which mainly occurred in the 1990s during Benjamin Netanyahu's aggressive settlement policy in the same decade. Moreover, Hebron's situation became tenser through the Baruch Goldstein attack, the *Hebron protocol*, and stricter security installations. The third period from 2013 to 2017 covers Netanyahu's third and fourth tenure, which was predominantly characterized by the strengthening of the settler's political situation, a strong right-wing shift, and the resulting development to a settler-friendly government. To conclude, the pattern of violence concurs with major settlement strategies and connected measures. A correlation between HI caused by the settlement strategy, grievances, and violence appears to be comprehensible.

²⁷ The findings of the table are based on an in-depth analysis of the settlement policy milestones per PM in Butler (2020, pp. 28-43). For a detailed elaboration, please refer to the original work.

5.5. Results

Firstly, the descriptive findings of the literature review demonstrate that since the arrival of the first settlers in 1968, the continuous and intensifying impact of the settlements on the Palestinians in Hebron persists. Moreover, the presence of cultural, economic, social, and political HIs can be identified between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. It has to be stressed that the political sub-category of restriction of movement is a major contributing factor triggering a chain reaction towards the formation or intensification of the economic, social, and cultural HIs. Additionally, the presence of settlements in Hebron not only visualizes the existence of disparities between the groups but also evokes inequalities by utilizing the power imbalance between the occupation force and the occupied. For example, Hebron's security installations, which are established as a protection measure for Israeli settlers, restrict the movement of the Palestinians and negatively impact the Palestinian local economy.

Secondly, the value of one in the scoring model is the highest possible level of violence and is assessed for Hebron's case. The results deduced by the pre-survey and expert interviews can be substantiated by a general evaluation of the correlation. In the pre-survey, which is based on the five-point Likert scale, two of the four respondents state that they strongly agree that HIs give rise to grievances and caused violent actions in the past and present conducted by Palestinians towards Israelis. One interviewee agrees with the statement, and the fourth respondent (R4) neither agreed nor disagreed.

Those estimations are supported by the results of the conducted expert interviews. For example, R1 claims a connection between the violent action of the occupation itself, including the settlements' existence, and the variety of Palestinian attacks on settlers, which occurred in a settlement. R1 emphasizes the arbitrariness of violence, which in the respondent's opinion, is mostly conducted by Palestinian teenagers. R2 takes a different explanatory approach and instead outlines that while Palestinians do engage in violent actions, due to the power imbalance between settlers and Palestinians they are hesitant to do so. Here, R2 stresses that violence is primarily used as a method of defense by Palestinians.

A similar result is advocated by R4, stressing that the majority of the Palestinian society is not willing to use force, but "*want to be left alone*". However, and comparable to the statement of R1, R4 notes that if violence is applied, younger generations primarily execute it. R3 agrees with the observation that teenagers conduct various violent actions. Furthermore, R3 adds that various channels for grievances exist, which are classified in legitimate or non-legitimate options. In case a non-legitimate forceful way is chosen, HI is one of the possible explanations.

Thirdly, when considering the period 1970 to 2019 in GTD data, the scoring model's testing indicates that the index of violence in Hebron exceeds the territorial average of 7.03% (PCBS, 2020a.; 2020b.; START, 2020). Due to the extensive data availability of the GTD, the results of this analysis are rated as decisive. To conclude, the comparison between the average level of violence in the West Bank and Hebron determines a high level of violence in Hebron. This result can be applied to reinforce the applicability of the developed scoring model. The second affirmation, connected to the evaluation of the evolution of violence in Hebron, reveals that Hebron is subject to three significant tension periods, including many attacks of Palestinians on Israelis. All three peaks can be affiliated to important settlement events, strategies, and changes conducted for the entire West Bank or Hebron itself. This allocation suggests an indicative positive correlation between HI, grievances, and violence. However, the impact of political events and associated events on society's sentiment beyond the settlement policy cannot be excluded from consideration.

6. Conclusion

To conclude, the literature review revealed a diverse theoretical landscape within which the heterodox research field indicates a significant correlation between HI, grievances and violence. In pursuit of the second research question, a positive correlation between the existence and expansion of settlements, the accruing HIs and grievances, and rising violence is ascertained. Consequently, the work's results align with recent research and emphasize this research field's relevance, the need to further pursue similar approaches, and offers a new path for the Israel-Palestinian peace process. As currently no convergence between the Israeli and Palestinian leadership is likely, a first step would be to execute the HI approach via a bottom-up movement (see e.g., Track 3 diplomacy).

Despite the indications of the above, the findings should be interpreted with caution. Due to the complexity of the conflict itself, it is problematic to reduce the analysis only to the determinants of HIs, grievances, and violence. Thus, interactions with other factors such as the Palestinian refugee problem and domestic challenges (see e.g., corruption, state form), cannot be ruled out, potentially leading to amplification or mitigation of the measured effects.

The closing remarks refer to the introduction: *instead of accomplishing a journey towards peace, the question arises whether this development is a step in the direction of a new intifada?* After evaluating this work's findings, the prospects for solving the tense situation between Israeli settlers and the Palestinian population are challenging and require a substantive rapprochement between both groups. The current situation and possible future steps, such as Trump's peace plan, are not geared to peacebuilding and render a peaceful cohabitation rather unlikely. Furthermore, the conflict potential of HIs resulting from settlements should not be underestimated.

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