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Non-competing Data Intermediaries

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Abstract

I study a model of competing data intermediaries (e.g., online platforms and data brokers) that collect personal data from consumers and sell it to downstream firms. Competition in this market has a limited impact in terms of benefits to consumers: If intermediaries offer high compensation for their data, then consumers may share this data with multiple intermediaries, and this lowers its downstream price and hurts intermediaries. As intermediaries anticipate this problem, they offer low compensation for this data. Competing intermediaries can earn a monopoly profit if and only if firms' data acquisition unambiguously hurts consumers. I generalize the results to include arbitrary consumer preferences and study the information design of data intermediaries. The results provide new insights into when competition among data intermediaries benefits consumers. It also highlights the limits of competition in terms of improving efficiency in the market for data.

Bank topic: Economic models

JEL codes: D42, D43, L12, D80

Résumé

J'examine un modèle de la concurrence entre les intermédiaires de données, comme les plateformes en ligne et les courtiers en données, qui recueillent les données personnelles des consommateurs et les vendent à des entreprises en aval. La concurrence sur ce marché a une incidence limitée sur les consommateurs du point de vue des avantages : si les intermédiaires offraient une compensation généreuse en échange des données des consommateurs, ces derniers pourraient être tentés de transmettre leurs données à de multiples intermédiaires, ce qui diminuerait le prix des données en aval et nuirait aux intermédiaires. Comme les intermédiaires anticipent ce problème, ils offrent une faible compensation pour les données. Les intermédiaires concurrents peuvent réaliser un profit monopolistique, mais seulement si l'acquisition des données par les entreprises est indéniablement désavantageuse pour les consommateurs. Je généralise les résultats pour tenir compte des préférences arbitraires des consommateurs et j'analyse la conception de l'information des intermédiaires de données. Les résultats permettent de mieux comprendre dans quel contexte la concurrence entre les intermédiaires de données profite aux consommateurs. Ils révèlent aussi les limites du rôle que joue la concurrence dans l'amélioration de l'efficacité du marché des données.

Sujet : Modèles économiques

Codes JEL : D42, D43, L12, D80

Non-technical summary

Online platforms such as Google and Facebook collect user data (e.g., location and individual characteristics) and use them to target advertising. Data brokers, such as Acxiom and Nielsen, also collect consumer data and sell them to retailers and advertisers. This paper studies whether competition among these intermediaries benefits consumers. For example, does this competition incentivize online services to provide better offers in monetary rewards or enhanced privacy protection in exchange for data?

To answer these questions, I study a simple game-theoretic model in which data intermediaries collect data from consumers and sell it to downstream firms. Third-party use of these data may encourage price discrimination and intrusive advertising or, alternatively, incentivize improved products and personalized offerings. Depending on the overall impact of these effects on consumers' welfare, platforms may offer compensation or charge fees for collecting data. Consumers then decide what data to share, balancing the compensation and fees with the benefits or losses owing to the downstream firms' use of their data.

The main finding is that consumers benefit less from competition in digital markets than in traditional ones. Unlike physical goods, consumer data are non-rivalrous: its acquisition by one intermediary does not prevent simultaneous acquisition by others. Thus, if multiple platforms offer valuable services or monetary rewards for these data, consumers can accept all of these services and rewards for the same data. As a result, even if an intermediary offers high compensation for these data, this does not guarantee that the intermediary will become a monopoly provider in the downstream market. This weakens the incentives of data intermediaries to increase compensation to consumers. As a result, consumer welfare tends to be lower in markets for data.

The results have several implications. First, they provide a simple economic reason why consumers do not seem to be compensated properly for their data provision. Indeed, consumers are usually not paid by online platforms for their data. One explanation is that the non-rivalrous nature of consumer data prevents the competition from increasing the compensation for these data. Second, the results point to difficulties an entrant might face in the data economy. Even if an entrant could offer a better service than dominant incumbents, it may fail to be a successful data intermediary because whatever data the entrant tries to collect from consumers are likely to be already held by incumbents. This also suggests that a regulation such as data portability could be effective in promoting competition among platforms.

1 Introduction

Online platforms, such as Google and Facebook, collect user data and share them indirectly through targeted advertising. Data brokers, such as Acxiom and Nielsen, collect consumer data and sell them to retailers and advertisers ([Federal Trade Commission, 2014](#)).¹ I study competition among “data intermediaries” that collect and distribute personal data between consumers and downstream firms.

Concretely, consider online platforms that collect consumer data and share them with third parties. The use of data by third parties may hurt consumers through price discrimination and intrusive advertising. Alternatively, data sharing may benefit consumers through improved products and personalized offerings. Depending on the sign of this effect, platforms may offer compensation or charge fees for collecting data from consumers. This compensation might be in monetary transfers or it might be in non-monetary benefits, such as online services (e.g. web-mapping services).

There are two main questions. The first is whether competition among data intermediaries improves consumer and total surplus; the second is whether competition drives cost-inefficient intermediaries out of the market. These are important questions in recent policy debates on competition in digital markets ([Cr mer et al., 2019](#); [Furman et al., 2019](#); [Morton et al., 2019](#)).

This study’s baseline model consists of a consumer, several data intermediaries, and a downstream firm. The consumer has a finite set of data (or data labels), say, their email address, their physical address, and their purchase history. First, each intermediary chooses the set of data to collect and how much compensation to offer. Second, the consumer decides whether to accept each offer. Then, each intermediary observes what data the other intermediaries have collected.² Finally, the intermediaries post their respective prices and sell the collected data to the firm.

The model captures two features of personal data. First, these data are non-rivalrous, that is, a consumer can provide the same data to multiple intermediaries. Second, the consumer’s payoff can depend non-monotonically on what data the downstream firm obtains. For example, the consumer may be comfortable with sharing either their place of birth or their date of birth. However, they may require compensation to share both, with which companies may be able to infer their social

¹Section 3 discusses these applications in detail.

²Subsection 3.1 motivates this assumption.

security number (Acquisti and Gross, 2009). The model is rich enough to capture such a situation.

The model considers a consumer with one unit of data. Competing intermediaries sustain a monopoly outcome if and only if the downstream firm's data acquisition lowers consumer welfare. Moreover, even if competition benefits the consumer relative to the monopoly, the magnitude of the benefit is smaller than in markets for rivalrous goods. This is because competition does not incentivize intermediaries to increase the compensation they offer: If multiple intermediaries offer high compensation, then the consumer shares their data with all of the intermediaries, and this lowers the downstream price of these data. Also, the non-rivalrous nature of data can create inefficiency in which a cost-inefficient intermediary excludes a more efficient intermediary from the market.

The model also considers the consumer with any finite set of data. The consumer may benefit or lose, depending on the dataset the downstream firm acquires. For the general preferences, I characterize an equilibrium that maximizes intermediary surplus and minimizes consumer surplus among all equilibria under a weak-market condition. The analysis shows that competition occurs only for a dataset the firm uses to benefit the consumer. As a result, in this equilibrium, consumer surplus and the intermediaries profits fall between those in both the monopoly market and markets for rivalrous goods.

With an additional assumption that the consumer incurs an increasing marginal cost of sharing their data, I characterize a class of equilibria with the following two properties. First, the intermediaries collect mutually exclusive sets of data. Second, each intermediary, as a local monopsony, pays the consumer just enough compensation to cover losses they incur from sharing their data. I compare these equilibria in terms of the degrees of *data concentration*, and show that the intermediaries are better off and the consumer is worse off in a more-concentrated equilibrium. I connect this result with the welfare impact of “breaking up platforms.”³

Finally, I use the results to study the information design of data intermediaries. A downstream firm uses data for price discrimination and product recommendation. The intermediaries can potentially obtain any Blackwell experiments about the consumer's willingness to pay. In the intermediary-optimal but consumer-worst equilibrium described above, the resulting consumer

³See, e.g., *Elizabeth Warren on Breaking Up Big Tech*, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2019), www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-break-up-amazon-facebook.html

surplus is equal to the surplus under a hypothetical Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) in which the consumer directly discloses information to the firm.

This paper’s contribution is to clarify when competition among data intermediaries benefits consumers. I show that (i) competition does not work when consumers require positive compensation for sharing their data, but that (ii) it partially works when consumers benefit from having their data collected, in which case a monopoly intermediary would charge a fee. Items (i) and (ii) lead to the main insight that competition for data benefits consumers but not as much as it does in traditional markets. The results help us understand why consumers do not seem to be properly compensated for their data provision (Arrieta-Ibarra et al., 2018). This paper also highlights the limits of competition in terms of improving efficiency: Proposition 2 potentially explains why incumbent data brokers may not be replaced by emerging “data marketplaces,” even if the latter can collect data more efficiently.⁴

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related works and Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 considers two benchmarks: a model of a monopoly intermediary, and a model of multiple intermediaries with rivalrous goods. Section 5 assumes that the consumer has one unit of data. I characterize the equilibrium here and also show that a cost-inefficient intermediary may earn a monopoly profit even if there is a more efficient competitor. Section 6 presents a discussion on the general consumer preferences. Here, I present the intermediary-best and consumer-worst equilibrium, which generalizes the case of a single unit of data. With an additional assumption, I characterize a class of equilibria that tells us the impact of data concentration. Section 7 considers the data intermediaries’ information design. Section 8 provides some extensions, and Section 9 concludes.

2 Literature Review

This paper relates to three strands of literature: markets for data, two-sided markets, and vertical contracting and contracting with externalities.

Markets for Data: Recent works such as Acemoglu et al. (2019) and Bergemann, Bonatti, and Gan

⁴See, for example, <https://www.wired.com/story/i-sold-my-data-for-crypto/> (accessed on March 10, 2020).

(2019) consider models of data collection by platforms. In particular, [Bergemann, Bonatti, and Gan \(2019\)](#) study models of data intermediaries, including the one with competing intermediaries. Their baseline model assumes that (i) data collection by intermediaries unambiguously hurts consumers, and (ii) under competition, different intermediaries exclusively access different pieces of data. Relative to (i), the consumer in my model may benefit or lose depending on what data are collected. Relative to (ii), I consider intermediaries that can collect the same set of data. These two points lead to the following new insights: The magnitude to which consumers can benefit from competition depends on how downstream firms use their data, and competition may not occur even if homogeneous intermediaries compete for the same data. The economic mechanism of my paper is amenable to but independent of data externality, which is the key idea of [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Bergemann, Bonatti, and Gan \(2019\)](#).

The downstream market of my model relates to [Gu, Madio, and Reggiani \(2018\)](#). They study how data brokers' incentives to merge data depend on the downstream firm's revenue function. I abstract from contracting among intermediaries, but consider endogenous data collection in the upstream market. By modeling the upstream market, we can conduct a consumer welfare analysis. [Jones and Tonetti \(2018\)](#) consider a semi-endogenous growth model that incorporates data intermediaries.

My paper considers pure data intermediaries that only buy and sell data. Several works consider richer formulations of how online platforms monetize data. [De Corniere and De Nijs \(2016\)](#) study the design of an online advertising auction where a platform can use consumer data to improve the quality of the matches between consumers and advertisers. [Fainmesser, Galeotti, and Momot \(2019\)](#) study the optimal design of the data storage and the data-protection policies of a monopoly platform. [Choi, Jeon, and Kim \(2019\)](#) consider consumers' privacy choices in the presence of an information externality. [Kim \(2018\)](#) considers a model of a monopoly advertising platform and studies the consumers' privacy concerns, the market competition, and the vertical integration that takes place between the platform and sellers. [Bonatti and Cisternas \(2020\)](#) study the aggregation of consumers' purchasing histories and how data aggregation and transparency affect a strategic consumer's incentives. [De Cornière and Taylor \(2020\)](#) employ the competition-in-utilities approach to study the issue of data and competition.

Finally, the paper relates to a broader literature on information goods other than personal data,

such as patents and digital goods (e.g., [Shapiro and Varian 1998](#); [Lerner and Tirole 2004](#); [Sartori 2018](#)). Relative to this literature, the main novelty is to consider the upstream market in which consumers provide data to intermediaries. To keep the model simple, I abstract from many important issues relevant to information goods, such as versioning and network effects.

Two-sided Markets: This paper relates to the literature on two-sided markets (see, e.g., [Caillaud and Jullien 2003](#); [Rochet and Tirole 2003](#); [Armstrong 2006](#); [Galeotti and Moraga-González 2009](#); [Hagiu and Wright 2014](#); [Carrillo and Tan 2015](#); [Rhodes, Watanabe, and Zhou 2018](#)). That the nonrivalrous nature of data relaxes the competition among the intermediaries echoes the finding of the literature that multi-homing by one side relaxes the platform competition for that side (e.g., [Caillaud and Jullien 2003](#) and [Tan and Zhou 2019](#)). Nonetheless, there are three differences between the literature and this study. First, in my model, depending on how downstream firms use data, intermediaries may earn a monopoly profit, or the consumer may extract the full surplus (see, e.g. [Proposition 7](#)). This is more nuanced than the non-rivalry of data relaxing the competition. Second, in terms of the modeling, the consumer may have multiple pieces of data and they may benefit or be harmed, depending on what dataset they share. Such a situation is important for data markets but has no counterpart in the literature where consumers typically choose whether to join a platform to earn some benefit.⁵ Moreover, many of my results—such as the analyses of the data concentration and information design—have no counterpart in the literature. Third, in my model, the consumer shares the same data with multiple intermediaries only *off* the equilibrium path. This is in contrast to the literature where consumers multi-home on the equilibrium path. The difference arises partly because compensation is endogenous.

Vertical Contracting and Contracting with Externalities: We can interpret the model as contracting with externalities ([McAfee and Schwartz, 1994](#); [Segal, 1999](#); [Rey and Tirole, 2007](#)). Namely, a supplier (consumer) provides goods to retailers (intermediaries) who later compete in the downstream market. The model departs from a typical model of vertical contracting in terms of the supplier’s “cost” of producing goods: The cost can be positive or negative and depend non-monotonically on what combination of goods to produce. Also, the marginal cost of producing the second unit of the same good is zero because the consumer’s payoff does not depend on how

⁵[Anderson and Coate \(2005\)](#) and [Reisinger \(2012\)](#) consider platform competition with single-homing such that the presence of advertisers imposes negative externalities on viewers.




Figure 1: Timing of Moves

many intermediaries resell their data.

3 Model

The model includes a consumer, $K \in \mathbb{N}$ data intermediaries, and a single downstream firm (Section 8 considers multiple consumers and firms). Abusing notation, I use K for both the number and the set of intermediaries. Figure 1 depicts the game: The intermediaries obtain data in the upstream market and sell them in the downstream market. The details are as follows.

Upstream Market

The consumer has a finite set \mathcal{D} of data. Elements of \mathcal{D} represent the consumer’s data labels such as their email address, location, and browsing history. These elements may also be different versions of the same data (e.g., browsing histories of different lengths). Each element of \mathcal{D} is an indivisible and non-rivalrous good. See the next subsection for a discussion of this modeling approach.

At the beginning of the game, each intermediary $k \in K$ simultaneously makes an *offer* (D_k, τ_k) . $\tau_k \in \mathbb{R}$ is the amount of compensation that intermediary k is willing to pay for $D_k \subset \mathcal{D}$. The compensation represents the quality of online services or the monetary reward a consumer can enjoy by sharing their data. $\tau_k < 0$ represents a fee. If $D_k \neq \emptyset$, I call (D_k, τ_k) a *non-empty offer*.

The consumer then chooses a set of offers $K_C \subset K$ to accept. $k \in K_C$ means that the consumer provides the requested data D_k to intermediary k and receives compensation τ_k . The consumer can

accept any set of offers, which reflects the non-rivalrous nature of the data.

The firm and all intermediaries observe the dataset $\hat{D}_k \in \{D_k, \emptyset\}$ that each intermediary k has collected. I call $(\hat{D}_k)_{k \in K}$ the *allocation of data*.

Downstream Market

Each intermediary k simultaneously posts a price $p_k \in \mathbb{R}$ for \hat{D}_k . The firm then chooses a set of intermediaries, $K_F \subset K$, from which it buys data $\cup_{k \in K_F} \hat{D}_k$ at total price $\sum_{k \in K_F} p_k$.

Preferences

All players maximize their expected payoffs, and their ex-post payoffs are as follows. The payoff of each intermediary is the revenue it receives from the firm minus the compensation to the consumer.

Suppose that the consumer earns a compensation of τ_k from each intermediary in K_C and the firm obtains data $D \subset \mathcal{D}$. Then, the consumer obtains a payoff of $U(D) + \sum_{k \in K_C} \tau_k$. $U(D)$ is their gross payoff when the firm acquires D from intermediaries. I normalize $U(\emptyset) = 0$. $U(D) > 0$ ($U(D) < 0$) means that the firm's acquisition of D benefits (hurts) the consumer.

Suppose that the firm obtains data $D \subset \mathcal{D}$ and pays a total price of p to the intermediaries. Then, the firm obtains a payoff of $\Pi(D) - p$. $\Pi(D)$ is the firm's *revenue* from data D . $\Pi(\cdot)$ is any increasing set function such that $\Pi(\emptyset) = 0$.⁶

Timing

The timing of the game, depicted in [Figure 1](#), is as follows. First, the intermediaries simultaneously make offers to the consumer. The consumer then chooses the set of offers to accept. After observing the allocation of data, the intermediaries simultaneously post prices to the firm. The firm then chooses the set of intermediaries from which to buy these data.

Solution

The solution concept is a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) that is Pareto-undominated from the perspective of the intermediaries. Unless otherwise noted, "equilibrium" refers to the SPE that satisfies this restriction.

⁶ $\Pi(\cdot)$ is increasing if and only if for any $X, Y \subset \mathcal{D}$ such that $X \subset Y$, $\Pi(X) \leq \Pi(Y)$.

3.1 Discussion of the Assumptions

In this section, I comment on several important modeling assumptions.

Data as an indivisible and non-rivalrous good

In this paper, I do not model the “realization” of data. For example, before sharing their location data, the consumer’s exact location (i.e., “realization”) is their private information. Moreover, depending on the consumer’s location, they may have different preferences over whether to share their data. This may lead to a situation in which the consumer is privately informed of $U(\cdot)$. However, I assume that the contracting takes place ex-ante and I do not model the uncertainty regarding the realization of data. As a result, the consumer has personal data but no private information. This is in line with recent work on data markets, such as [Acemoglu et al. \(2019\)](#), [Bergemann et al. \(2019\)](#), and [Choi et al. \(2019\)](#).

Observable allocation of data

Before the intermediaries set their downstream prices, it is crucial that the intermediaries observe what data other intermediaries collect. There are several motivations for this assumption. First, in practice, some data intermediaries disclose what kind of data they collect. For example, a data broker CoreLogic states that it holds property data that covers more than 99.9% of U.S. property records.⁷ Also, if an intermediary collects data directly from consumers, then it needs to communicate what data it collects (see, e.g., Nielsen Homescan). Moreover, in order for downstream firms to make their purchase decisions, it is particularly necessary for them to know what data the intermediaries hold.

Second, the intermediaries have an incentive to make the allocation of data observable because this often makes them better off in the Pareto sense. To see this, suppose that each intermediary privately observes what data it collects. Consider an equilibrium where intermediary k pays a positive compensation to the consumer and then sells the consumer’s data at a positive price. Then, intermediary k can profitably deviate by collecting no data and charging the same price to the downstream firm. In particular, the firm cannot detect this deviation because it does not observe

⁷<https://www.corelogic.com/about-us/our-company.aspx> (accessed July 11, 2019)

what data intermediary k has collected. This argument implies that there is no equilibrium in which the intermediaries pay positive compensation. If $U(\cdot)$ only takes negative values, then only equilibrium involves no data sharing. Relative to such a situation, the intermediaries are better off when the allocation of data is publicly observable.

Timing

I assume that the intermediaries set their prices after observing the allocation of data. This idea is similar to those expressed in models of endogenous product differentiation, such as [D'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse \(1979\)](#), where sellers set prices after observing their choices of product design. What data an intermediary collects (i.e., the choice of an offer) is often part of a platform design or company policy. For example, a web-mapping service, such as Google Maps, could correspond to an offer (D_k, τ_k) such that D_k consists of location data and τ_k reflects the value of the service, which can depend on costly investment. In contrast, after collecting data, online platforms and data brokers typically share these data in exchange for money. Then, it is reasonable to assume that the intermediaries can adjust the downstream prices of these data more quickly than they can adjust what data they collect.

3.2 Applications

I present several interpretations of the data intermediaries in the model and motivate other assumptions that are not discussed in the previous subsection.

Online platforms

The model can capture competition for data among online platforms such as Google and Facebook. Take any offer (D_k, τ_k) . Then, D_k represents the set of data that a consumer needs to provide in order to use platform k , and τ_k represents the quality of k 's service. Platforms may share these data with advertisers, retailers, and political consulting firms, which could benefit or hurt the data subjects (e.g., through beneficial targeting or harmful price discrimination). The net effect is summarized by $U(D)$.

Several remarks are in order. First, $U(\cdot)$ is exogenous; that is, the intermediaries cannot influence how the firm's use of the data affects the consumer. This reflects the difficulty of writing a fully contingent contract over which third parties can use personal information and how. The lack of commitment over the sharing and use of data plays an important role in other models of markets for data, such as in the work of [Huck and Weizsacker \(2016\)](#) and [Jones and Tonetti \(2018\)](#).

Second, if we interpret the compensation here as the value of a service, then modeling it as a one-to-one transfer means that a consumer's gross benefit from one service does not depend on what other services they use. This requires that the consumer does not perceive that the services offered by different platforms are substitutes. Thus, the model is not appropriate, for example, if two platforms offer search engines. The assumption of costly compensation is natural if an intermediary needs to invest to improve the quality of its service.

Finally, this paper abstracts from the competition for consumer attention, which is relevant to advertising platforms. Competition for attention is different from that for data because attention is a scarce resource. If consumers need to visit platforms to generate data but multi-homing is prohibitively costly due to scarce attention, then the non-rivalry assumption may not hold.

Data brokers

Intermediaries can be interpreted as data brokers, such as LiveRamp, Nielsen, and Oracle. Data brokers collect personal data from online and offline sources and then resell or share those data with others, such as retailers and advertisers ([Federal Trade Commission, 2014](#)).

Some data brokers obtain data from consumers in exchange for monetary compensation (e.g., Nielsen Home Scan). However, it is common for data brokers to obtain personal data without interacting with consumers. The model could also fit such a situation. For example, suppose that data brokers obtain individuals' purchase records from retailers. Consider the following chain of transactions: Retailers compensate customers and record their purchases, say, by offering discounts to customers who sign up for loyalty cards. Retailers then sell these records to data brokers, which resell the data to third parties. We can regard the retailers in this example as consumers in the model.

The model can also be useful for understanding what the incentives of data brokers would look like if they had to source data directly from consumers. This question is of growing importance as

awareness of data-sharing practices increases and policymakers try to ensure that consumers have control over their data (see, e.g., the EU’s GDPR and the California Consumer Privacy Act).

Mobile application industry

Kummer and Schulte (2019) empirically show that mobile-application developers trade greater access to personal information for lower app prices, and consumers choose between lower prices and greater privacy when they decide which apps to install. Moreover, app developers share collected data with third parties for direct monetary benefit (see Kummer and Schulte 2019 and the references therein). The model captures such economic interactions as a two-sided market for consumer data.

4 Two Benchmarks

I begin with two benchmarks, which I will compare with the main specification.

4.1 Monopoly Intermediary ($K = 1$)

In the upstream market, a monopoly intermediary can collect data D by paying a compensation of $-U(D)$. In the downstream market, it can set a price of $\Pi(D)$ to extract the full surplus from the firm. Thus, I obtain the following claim:

Claim 1. *In any equilibrium, a monopoly intermediary obtains and sells data $D^M \subset \mathcal{D}$ that satisfies $D^M \in \arg \max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}} \Pi(D) + U(D)$. The consumer and the firm obtain zero payoffs.*

4.2 Competition for Rivalrous Goods

Suppose that the data are rivalrous—the consumer can provide each piece of data to *at most one* intermediary.⁸ This model captures the competition for physical goods (cf. Stahl 1988). See Appendix A for the proof of the following result.

⁸Formally, I assume that the consumer can accept a collection of offers $(D_k, \tau_k)_{k \in K_C}$ if and only if $D_k \cap D_j = \emptyset$ for any distinct $j, k \in K_C$.

Claim 2. *Suppose that the data are rivalrous and there are multiple intermediaries. In any equilibrium, the intermediaries and the firm all obtain zero payoffs. There is an equilibrium in which the consumer extracts full surplus $\max_{D \in \mathcal{D}} \Pi(D) + U(D)$.*

The result follows from Bertrand competition in the upstream market: If one intermediary earned a positive profit by obtaining D , then another intermediary could profitably deviate by offering the consumer slightly higher compensation to exclusively obtain D .

5 Single-unit Data

This section considers a consumer with one unit of data. First, I characterize the equilibrium and then point to an inefficiency coming from the non-rivalry of data. Following this, I discuss how to improve both consumer welfare and total welfare.

Formally, assume that there are multiple intermediaries ($K \geq 2$) and $\mathcal{D} = \{d\}$. Define $U := U(\{d\})$ and $\Pi := \Pi(\{d\})$. To obtain non-trivial results, assume $\Pi + U > 0$, which means that data collection is efficient. The following result characterizes the equilibrium (see [Appendix B](#) for the proof).

Proposition 1. *In any equilibrium, one intermediary obtains data at compensation $\max(0, -U)$. The consumer obtains $\max(0, U)$, one intermediary obtains $\Pi - \max(0, -U)$, and other intermediaries and the firm obtain zero payoffs. In particular, one intermediary earns a monopoly profit $\Pi + U$ in any equilibrium if and only if the data collection is harmful; i.e., $U < 0$.*

If (and only if) $U > 0$, then the consumer obtains a positive equilibrium payoff, which is strictly greater than the payoff under the monopoly outcome in [Claim 1](#). If $U < 0$, then the equilibrium coincides with a monopoly. In either case, the consumer surplus is lower than $\Pi + U$, which is their best payoff in the case of rivalrous goods ([Claim 2](#)).

The intuition is that competition forces the intermediaries to reduce their positive fees to zero but does not incentivize them to increase this non-negative compensation beyond a monopoly level. To see this, suppose that intermediary 1 collects data at a positive fee. Then, intermediary 2 can undercut it. Importantly, facing the competing offer from intermediary 2, the consumer shares their data *only* with intermediary 2 because they earn a gross benefit of U as long as the downstream

firm buys data from at least one intermediary. This implies that competing intermediaries must offer non-negative compensation. If the firm’s data usage is beneficial to the consumer ($U > 0$), then this logic implies that the consumer enjoys a payoff of at least U .

In markets for rivalrous goods, this Bertrand competition in the upstream market raises the equilibrium compensation to $\Pi + U > 0$. However, in this market for data, competition through raising compensation does not work. For example, suppose that $U < 0$ and intermediary 1 collects data at monopoly compensation $-U > 0$. If intermediary 2 offers a positive compensation, then the consumer will share their data with *both* intermediaries. This intensifies the price competition in the downstream market and reduces the price of the data to zero. Anticipating this, intermediary 2 makes no competing offer.

Consider how the equilibrium depends on U , given a fixed total surplus $TS = \Pi + U$. First, the intermediaries’ joint profit, $TS - \max(0, U)$, is maximized if $U < 0$. Thus, [Proposition 1](#) suggests that the intermediation of the data is more profitable when the downstream firm uses it to hurt consumers. In the other extreme, if $\Pi = 0$ and $U = TS$, then the consumer will extract the full surplus despite the non-rivalrous nature of data. We may think of this as a knife-edge case; however, [Section 7](#) presents an economic application such that $(\Pi, U) = (0, TS)$ is relevant.

Finally, the result provides a rationale to the frequently used assumption in the literature that the market consists of a monopoly data seller.⁹ We can justify the assumption as a subgame of the extended game in which data sellers acquire information at a cost and then sell the collected data.

5.1 Competition and Inefficiency

Because of the non-rivalrous nature of data, competition may fail to drive a less efficient intermediary out of the market. To see this, consider two intermediaries. Modify the consumer’s payoffs so that if the consumer shares d with intermediary k , then they incur a cost of c_k . Thus, the consumer’s payoff from sharing d with the set K_C of intermediaries equals their original payoff minus $\sum_{k \in K_C} c_k$. Assume $c_1 = 0$ but $0 < c_2 < \Pi + U$. For example, intermediary 2 shares the collected data with malicious third parties and this lowers consumer welfare. The efficient outcome is that

⁹See, for example, [Babaioff et al. \(2012\)](#), [Bergemann, Bonatti, and Smolin \(2018\)](#), [Bergemann and Bonatti \(2019\)](#), [Bimpikis, Crapis, and Tahbaz-Salehi \(2019\)](#), and references therein. [Sarvary and Parker \(1997\)](#) is one of the early works that studied competition between information sellers.

intermediary 1 collects and sells these data. However, the non-rivalrous nature of these data can create an inefficiency in which intermediary 2 acts as a monopolist (see [Appendix C](#) for the proof).

Proposition 2. *The following holds.*

1. *In the case of rivalrous goods, in any equilibrium, intermediary 1 collects data at compensation $\Pi - c_2$.*
2. *In the case of non-rivalrous data, if $U < 0$, then there is an equilibrium in which intermediary 2 earns monopoly profit $\Pi + U - c_2$.*

The intuition is as follows. In the case of rivalrous goods, if intermediary 2 earns a nonnegative profit by collecting data, then intermediary 1 could offer the same compensation, exclusively obtain these data, and earn a positive profit. Thus, the less-inefficient intermediary is never active in equilibrium. In the case of non-rivalrous data, if intermediary 2 collects these data and intermediary 1 makes a competing offer, then the consumer will share these data with both intermediaries. As before, this will reduce the downstream price of these data. Anticipating this, intermediary 1 does not make a competing offer.

For rivalrous goods (Point 1), the presence of an inefficient intermediary will increase the consumer surplus by $\Pi + U - c_2 > 0$ without changing the total surplus. For non-rivalrous data (Point 2), the presence of an inefficient intermediary may lower the total surplus without changing the consumer surplus. In particular, if c_2 is close to $\Pi + U$, then the inefficient intermediary may destroy most of the surplus without benefiting the consumer.

Intuitively, the negative welfare implication is likely to materialize when c_k reflects the quality of privacy-enhancing technology and an entrant has a better technology (a lower c_k) than an incumbent. To see this, consider a variant of the game in which (i) intermediary 2 (the incumbent) makes an offer and (ii) after observing (i), intermediary 1 (the entrant) makes an offer. This game selects the equilibrium in which intermediary 2 earns a monopoly profit.

In practice, the incumbent can be an existing online platform or a data broker, whose data collection may impose on consumers the cost of a data breach or mismanagement (e.g., the Cambridge Analytica scandal). The entrant is an emerging “personal data marketplace,” such as Killi or

Hu-manity.co, which claims to offer greater transparency and enhanced privacy protection.¹⁰ The result suggests that even if these new companies could create a higher total surplus, they might not find it profitable to enter the market. This is because existing players may already hold the same data an entrant can obtain from consumers.

5.2 How to Improve Consumer Surplus and Total Surplus?

This subsection asks how we can change the rules of the game to increase both the consumer surplus and the total surplus. I propose two potential solutions.

Giving Bargaining Power to the Consumer One straightforward solution is to give the consumer bargaining power. Namely, if the consumer can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to any intermediary, then they will offer $(\{d\}, \Pi)$ and extract the full surplus. This modification also eliminates the inefficient equilibrium that was discussed in the previous subsection. This solution relates to the recent idea of a “data labour union” discussed in [Arrieta-Ibarra et al. \(2018\)](#).

Richer Contract Space A more subtle way to improve the consumer and the total surplus is to enable the intermediaries to offer richer contracts. Here, I discuss two possibilities. First, suppose that each intermediary k can offer a “revenue-sharing contract” of the form (D_k, α_k) , where $\alpha_k \in [0, 1]$ is the fraction of k ’s downstream revenue that the consumer earns. In this case, there is an equilibrium in which each intermediary offers $(\{d\}, 1)$, and the consumer shares their data with the most-efficient intermediary and extracts the full surplus. When facing revenue-sharing contracts, the consumer will never provide the same data to multiple intermediaries because this will reduce the downstream price of their data. This will restore competition for these data and incentivize intermediaries to make the most attractive offer $\alpha_k = 1$.

Second, suppose that each intermediary can offer a compensation that depends on the consumer’s data-sharing decision with respect to the other intermediaries. Then, there is an equilibrium with exclusive contracts: Each intermediary k commits to pay Π if and only if the consumer provides their data only to k . In this equilibrium, the consumer shares their data with the most-

¹⁰<https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/18/hu-manity-wants-to-create-a-health-data-marketplace-> (accessed on March 20, 2020).

efficient intermediary and extracts the full surplus. Finally, note that implementing these richer contracts implicitly requires the greater commitment power of the intermediaries and the greater transparency of the market outcomes, such as the downstream transactions.

6 General Preferences

I now consider the consumer with any finite set of data. The purpose, here, is to generalize some of the previous results and also to point out the multiplicity of the equilibria due to the non-rivalrous nature of data. The intermediaries are homogeneous as in the baseline model. I allow any $U(\cdot)$ and any increasing $\Pi(\cdot)$ that satisfies the following:

Assumption 1. $\mathcal{D} \in \arg \max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}} \Pi(D) + U(D)$.

I maintain [Assumption 1](#) throughout this section. This assumption implies that the total surplus is maximized when the firm acquires all of the data. This assumption holds, for example, if the firm is a seller and can use all of data \mathcal{D} to efficiently price discriminate against the consumer. [Section 7](#) microfounds U and Π with this interpretation. In terms of the primitives, the assumption holds if the firm's marginal revenue from these data is high relative to the consumer's marginal loss from sharing these data. In [Section 8](#), where I consider the extension with multiple consumers, I argue that (a version of) [Assumption 1](#) is likely to hold when there is an information externality among many consumers.

6.1 Partially Monopolistic Equilibrium

The following result generalizes [Proposition 1](#) (see [Appendix D](#) for the proof).

Proposition 3 (Partially Monopolistic Equilibrium (PME)). *There is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which one intermediary obtains all of the data at compensation $\max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}} U(D) - U(\mathcal{D})$ and the consumer obtains an equilibrium payoff of $\max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}} U(D)$.*

If the consumer has one piece of data d , then $\max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}} U(D) = \max(0, U(\{d\}))$ and, thus, the PME coincides with the unique equilibrium that is characterized by [Proposition 1](#). [Proposition 3](#)

states that the intuition for [Proposition 1](#) applies to arbitrary preferences. To see the intuition, consider [Figure 2](#), which depicts $U(\cdot)$ and $\Pi(\cdot)$ as functions of the amount of data acquired by the firm. $U(\cdot)$ is non-monotone, and $\Pi(\cdot)$ exhibits increasing returns to scale. First, a monopoly intermediary obtains all of the data at compensation $-U(\mathcal{D})$ (short red-dotted arrow). We can decompose $-U(\mathcal{D})$ into two parts: The monopolist extracts the surplus created by $D^* \in \arg \max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}} U(D)$ from the consumer by charging $U(D^*) > 0$ and it obtains additional data $\mathcal{D} \setminus D^*$ at the minimum compensation $U(D^*) - U(\mathcal{D})$ (long blue-dotted arrow). In contrast, when there are multiple intermediaries, competition prevents these intermediaries from extracting surplus $U(D^*) > 0$. This guarantees that the consumer will obtain a payoff of at least $U(D^*)$. However, this competition does not increase the amount of compensation for data $\mathcal{D} \setminus D^*$, the sharing of which hurts the consumer. Thus, in the PME, a single intermediary acquires all of the data but compensates the consumer according to the loss $U(D^*) - U(\mathcal{D})$ of sharing $\mathcal{D} \setminus D^*$. Finally, the compensation in the PME is still lower than $\Pi(\mathcal{D})$, which is the compensation the consumer would receive in markets for rivalrous goods (black-dashed arrow).




Figure 2: Partially monopolistic equilibrium

The next result shows that if there are many intermediaries, then the PME minimizes the consumer surplus and maximizes the intermediary surplus across all equilibria (see [Appendix E](#) for the proof). In this sense, the PME is a natural extension of the monopoly equilibrium. To state the result, let $CS(K)$ denote the set of all possible (subgame perfect) equilibrium payoffs of the

consumer when there are K intermediaries.

Proposition 4. *As the number K of intermediaries grows large, the lowest consumer surplus converges to the one in the PME:*

1. $\lim_{K \rightarrow \infty} (\inf CS(K)) = \max_{D \in \mathcal{D}} U(D)$. \mathcal{D} can be an infinite set if the right-hand side is well-defined.
2. If \mathcal{D} is finite and $\Pi(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing, then there is $K^* \in \mathbb{N}$ such that, for any $K \geq K^*$, $\min CS(K) = \max_{D \in \mathcal{D}} U(D)$.

Thus, the best intermediary surplus (among all subgame perfect equilibria) also converges to the one in the PME.

The intuition is as follows. Suppose that there are K intermediaries, and in some equilibrium, the consumer obtains a payoff of $U(D^*) - \delta_K$ with $\delta_K > 0$. If an intermediary offers (D^*, ε) with $\varepsilon < \delta_K$, then the consumer will prefer to accept this offer. Because any intermediary can always deviate and offer (D^*, ε) , each intermediary will obtain a payoff of at least δ_K . This implies that each intermediary's payoff is, at least, $K \cdot \delta_K$. However, this surplus is bounded from above by $\Pi(\mathcal{D}) < \infty$. Thus, $\delta_K \rightarrow 0$ as K grows large; i.e., the worst consumer surplus converges to $U(D^*)$ as the number of intermediaries grows large. Point 2 shows that under a stronger assumption, $U(D^*)$ is exactly the lowest equilibrium payoff to the consumer for a sufficiently large but finite K . Finally, in the PME, the total surplus is maximized and the consumer surplus is $U(D^*)$. Thus, the PME is (approximately) an intermediary-optimal outcome for a large K .

The main takeaway from the above propositions is that the impact of the competition for the consumer's data depends on how downstream firms use these data. In a frictionless market for rivalrous goods, for any $U(\cdot)$, competition among intermediaries gives the full surplus to those in the upstream market. In markets for consumer data, the non-rivalrous nature of these data makes $U(\cdot)$ relevant. If the use of these data benefits consumers, then competition will eliminate the fees that consumers would have to pay in a monopoly market. However, if the use of these data hurts consumers, then competition may have no impact on increasing compensation. In a general setting, both effects are relevant. As a result, competition may increase consumer welfare and decrease intermediaries' profits but not as much as in markets for rivalrous goods.

6.2 Partitional Equilibria

It is beyond the scope of this paper to characterize all equilibria for any $(U(\cdot), \Pi(\cdot))$. In this subsection, I assume the increasing and convex cost of sharing data for the consumer and the decreasing marginal revenue for the downstream firm.

Assumption 2. $U(\cdot)$ is decreasing and submodular, and $\Pi(\cdot)$ is increasing and submodular.¹¹

Definition 1. A *partitional equilibrium* is an equilibrium such that the allocation of data $(\hat{D}_k)_{k \in K}$ is a partition of \mathcal{D} . That is, $\hat{D}_k \cap \hat{D}_j = \emptyset$ for any distinct $j, k \in K$, and $\cup_{k \in K} \hat{D}_k = \mathcal{D}$.

In the “rivalrous goods” model (i.e., [Claim 2](#)), any equilibrium has a trivial partition under a mild additional restriction (see [Appendix F](#) for the proof).

Claim 3. *Suppose that the data are rivalrous and $\Pi(\cdot)$ is strictly submodular. Then, in any equilibrium, at most, one intermediary collects a non-empty set the data.*

In contrast, any partition can arise as an equilibrium allocation of data.

Proposition 5. *The allocation of data $(D_k^*)_{k \in K}$, compensation $(\tau_k^*)_{k \in K}$, and prices $(p_k^*)_{k \in K}$ consist of a partitional equilibrium if and only if*

1. $D_j^* \cap D_k^* = \emptyset$ for any distinct $j, k \in K$, and $\cup_{k \in K} D_k^* = \mathcal{D}$;
2. For each $k \in K$, $\tau_k^* = U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - U(\mathcal{D})$ whenever the right-hand side is positive.
3. For each $k \in K$, $p_k^* = \Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*)$ whenever the right-hand side is positive.

Partitional equilibria have three features. First, although data are non-rivalrous, no two intermediaries will obtain the same piece of data because these data will have no value in the downstream market.

Second, any partition of \mathcal{D} can arise in some equilibrium. For example, if the consumer holds data x and y , in one equilibrium, intermediaries 1 and 2 will collect x and y , respectively. In the case of rivalrous goods, intermediary (say) 1 could profitably deviate by offering the consumer to

¹¹ $U(\cdot)$ is submodular if, for any $X, Y \subset \mathcal{D}$ with $X \subsetneq Y$ and $d \in \mathcal{D} \setminus Y$, it holds that $U(Y \cup \{d\}) - U(Y) \leq U(X \cup \{d\}) - U(X)$. If the strict inequalities hold, then $U(\cdot)$ is strictly submodular.

collect $\{x, y\}$ at a higher compensation. In the case of non-rivalrous data, intermediary 1 would not benefit from such a deviation because the consumer would share data y with both intermediaries.

Third, each intermediary compensates the consumer according to the marginal (or precisely, incremental) loss they incur by sharing \hat{D}_k conditional on sharing these data with other intermediaries. This contrasts with the rivalrous-goods case in which the equilibrium compensation depends on the downstream firm's willingness to pay for these data.

6.3 Data Concentration

[Proposition 5](#) implies that any partition of \mathcal{D} can arise as an allocation of the data in some equilibrium. We can interpret an equilibrium that is associated with a coarser partition as an equilibrium where there is a greater concentration of data among the intermediaries:

Definition 2. Take two partitional equilibria, E and E' . Let $(D_k)_{k \in K}$ and $(D'_k)_{k \in K}$ denote the equilibrium allocations of data in E and E' , respectively. We say that E is more concentrated than E' if for each $k \in K$ there is $\ell \in K$ such that $D'_k \subset D_\ell$.

The following result summarizes the welfare implications of data concentration (see [Appendix H](#) for the proof).

Proposition 6. *Take two partitional equilibria such that one is more concentrated than the other. The intermediaries' joint profit is higher and the consumer surplus and the firm's profit are lower in the more-concentrated equilibrium.*

The intuition is as follows. The downstream price of data D_k is the firm's marginal revenue $\Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\cup_{j \in K \setminus \{k\}} D_j)$ from D_k . If there are many intermediaries each of which has a small subset of \mathcal{D} , then the contribution of each piece of data is close to $\Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} \setminus \{d\})$. In contrast, if a few intermediaries jointly hold \mathcal{D} , then each of them could charge a high price to extract the infra-marginal value of its data. Since $\Pi(\cdot)$ is submodular, the latter leads to a greater total revenue for the intermediaries. Symmetrically, if $U(\cdot)$ is submodular, then data concentration hurts consumers. This is because a large intermediary compensates the consumer based on the infra-marginal cost of sharing these data. The following example relates this result to the idea of breaking up big platforms.

Example 1 (Breaking up data intermediaries). Each consumer has their location and financial data. The downstream firm profits from these data but there is a risk of data leakage. Each consumer incurs an expected loss of \$20 from this potential data leakage if only if the firm holds *both* the location and financial data (otherwise, they incur no loss).

If the market consists of a monopoly intermediary, then this intermediary obtains both the location and the financial data and pays \$20 to each consumer. This leads to a consumer surplus of zero. For example, the intermediary may operate an online service that requires consumers to provide these data.

Suppose now that a regulator breaks up the monopolist into two intermediaries, 1 and 2. [Proposition 5](#) implies that in one of the equilibria, intermediaries 1 and 2 collect the location and the financial data, respectively, and each intermediary pays a compensation of \$20. For example, the two intermediaries may operate mobile applications that collect different data, and each application delivers the value of \$20 to consumers. In this equilibrium, each consumer obtains a net surplus of \$20. Thus, breaking up a monopolist may change the equilibrium allocation of data, increase the compensation, and benefit consumers.

7 Application: Information Design by Data Intermediaries

So far, I have treated data as indivisible and non-rivalrous. However, in practice, firms eventually use consumer data to learn about their private information. To illustrate this point, this section applies the model to a setting in which the firm uses data to learn about a consumer's willingness to pay. The firm then tailors its pricing and product recommendations.

The formal description is as follows. The downstream firm is now a seller that provides $M \in \mathbb{N}$ products $1, \dots, M$. The consumer has a unit demand, and their values for products $\mathbf{u} := (u_1, \dots, u_M)$ are independently and identically distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F with a finite support $V \subset (0, +\infty)$.¹²

Each $d \in \mathcal{D}$ is a signal (Blackwell experiment) from which the seller can learn about \mathbf{u} . \mathcal{D} consists of all signals with finite realization spaces. The intermediaries can request any set of

¹²I define F as a left-continuous function. Thus, $1 - F(p)$ is the probability that the consumer's value for any given product is weakly greater than p at the prior.

signals from the consumer.¹³ The consumer decides which offers to accept before observing \mathbf{u} .

After buying a set of data $D \subset \mathcal{D}$ from the intermediaries, the seller learns about \mathbf{u} from the signals in D . Then, the seller sets a price and recommends one of M products to the consumer. Finally, the consumer observes the value and the price of the recommended product and decides whether to buy it.¹⁴ A recommendation could come from an advertiser who sends a targeted advertisement or from an online retailer who sends a personalized recommendation. If the consumer buys product m at price p , then their payoff from this transaction is $u_m - p$. Otherwise, their payoff is zero. The seller's payoff is its revenue. I consider a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that, both on and off the equilibrium paths, all players calculate their posterior beliefs based on the prior F , the signals in D , and Bayes' rule.¹⁵

An important observation is that [Assumption 1](#) holds: If the seller has all of the data, then it can access a fully informative signal and perfectly learn \mathbf{u} . The seller can then recommend the highest-value product and perfectly price discriminate the consumer, which maximizes the total surplus.

The following notations are useful: Given a set D of signals, let $U(D)$ and $\Pi(D)$ denote the expected payoffs of the consumer and the seller, respectively, when the seller that has D optimally sets a price and recommends a product and the consumer makes an optimal purchase decision. $\Pi(D)$ is an increasing set function because a larger D corresponds to a more informative signal. Define $p(F) := \min(\arg \max_{p \in V} p[1 - F(p)])$. $p(F)$ is the lowest monopoly price, given a prior distribution F .

A monopoly intermediary can collect a fully informative signal (or any signal that achieves an efficient outcome) and extract the full surplus from both the consumer and the seller. In equilibrium, the consumer surplus is $U(\emptyset)$, which is the payoff that the consumer would earn if the seller

¹³To close the model, I need to specify how the realizations of the different signals are correlated conditional on \mathbf{u} . One way is to use the formulation of [Gentzkow and Kamenica \(2017\)](#): Let X be a random variable that is independent of \mathbf{u} and uniformly distributed on $[0, 1]$ with typical realization x . A signal d is a finite partition of $V^M \times [0, 1]$, and the seller observes a realization $s \in d$ if and only if $(\mathbf{u}, x) \in s$. However, the result does not rely on this particular formulation.

¹⁴The model assumes that the seller only recommends one product, and thus the consumer cannot buy non-recommended products. This captures the restriction on how many products can be marketed to a given consumer. See [Ichihashi \(2020\)](#) for a detailed discussion of the motivation behind this formulation.

¹⁵Thus, I omit the description of the players' beliefs in the following results. I also assume that the seller breaks ties in favor of the consumer when the seller sets a price and recommends a product. The existence of an equilibrium is shown in [Ichihashi \(2020\)](#).

recommended a product randomly at a price of $p(F)$.

If there are multiple intermediaries, then the consumer surplus in the partially monopolistic equilibrium, $\max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} U(d)$, would be equal to the one in a hypothetical scenario where the consumer directly discloses information to the seller. In other words, the consumer surplus is equal to the one in Bayesian persuasion (see [Appendix I](#) for the proof).

Proposition 7. *Suppose that there are multiple intermediaries. In the partially monopolistic equilibrium, one intermediary (say 1) obtains a fully informative signal and the consumer obtains a payoff of $\max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} U(\{d\})$. Moreover, this equilibrium satisfies the following.*

1. *If the seller provides a single product ($M = 1$), then all intermediaries earn zero payoffs.*
2. *If the seller provides multiple products ($M \geq 2$), then for a generic prior F that satisfies $p(F) > \min V > 0$, intermediary 1 earns a positive payoff that is independent of the number of intermediaries.¹⁶*

The intuition is as follows. First, consider Point 1. [Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris \(2015\)](#) show that there is a signal d^* such that (i) d^* maximizes the consumer's payoff, i.e., $d^* \in \arg \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} U(d)$; (ii) the seller is indifferent between obtaining d^* and nothing, i.e., $\Pi(d^*) = \Pi(\emptyset)$; (iii) d^* maximizes total surplus $U(d) + \Pi(d)$. Item (i) implies that the competing intermediaries cannot charge the consumer a positive fee for d^* . Item (ii) implies that they cannot charge the firm a positive price for d^* . Moreover, (iii) implies that these intermediaries cannot make a profit by obtaining and selling additional information. Thus, in the PME, the consumer obtains a payoff of $U(d^*)$ and no intermediaries can make a positive profit. In this case, competition among the intermediaries yields the consumer all of the welfare gain from their information. [Proposition 4](#) implies that if K is large, then this equilibrium (PME) is the worst for the consumer. This implies that when $M = 1$ and K is large, the equilibrium outcome is (almost) unique.

Second, consider Point 2. [Ichihashi \(2020\)](#) shows that if the prior F satisfies the condition in Point 2, then any consumer-optimal signal $d^* \in \arg \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} U(d)$ leads to inefficiency. Intuitively, d^* conceals some information about which product is most valuable to the consumer. This benefits

¹⁶A generic F means that the statement holds for any probability distribution in $\Delta(V) \subset \Delta(\mathbb{R})$ satisfying $p(F) > \min V$, except for those that belong to some Lebesgue measure-zero subset of $\Delta(V)$.

the consumer by inducing the seller to lower their prices but it also leads to inefficiency due to a product mismatch. This inefficiency (under the hypothetical Bayesian persuasion) creates room for competing intermediaries to earn positive profits: An intermediary can additionally obtain information that enables the seller to perfectly learn the consumer's values. The consumer requires a positive compensation to share such information. This, in turn, implies that a single intermediary can act as a monopoly of that information. Thus, competition benefits the consumer relative to the monopoly but it does not completely dissipate the intermediaries' profits.

8 Extensions

8.1 Other Market Structures

The baseline model assumes that intermediaries move simultaneously when they make offers or set prices. The main insight is robust to other timing assumptions. For example, suppose that each intermediary sequentially makes an offer to the consumer and, after observing all offers, the consumer chooses which ones to accept. For the cases in Propositions 1, 3 (for a large K), and 5, this game selects the equilibrium such that the first mover collects all of the data.

We can also think of various games for the downstream market. For example, we could assume that the downstream firm can buy data from only one intermediary. Alternatively, we could think of a game in which the downstream firm is randomly matched with one intermediary that can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm. In either case, a monopoly equilibrium exists for the case of Propositions 1 (for $U < 0$) and 5.

8.2 Multiple Consumers with Information Externality

The baseline model assumes a single consumer. However, the results extend to multiple consumers (see [Appendix J](#) for a detailed description and the proofs of the following claims). Formally, let $I \in \mathbb{N}$ denote the number and set of consumers. Each consumer $i \in I$ has a set \mathcal{D}_i of data. Define $\mathcal{D} := \cup_{i \in I} \mathcal{D}_i$ and $\mathcal{D}_{-i} := \cup_{j \in I \setminus \{i\}} \mathcal{D}_j$. If the firm acquires data $D \subset \mathcal{D}$, then consumer i obtains a gross payoff of $U_i(D_i, D_{-i})$, where $D_i = D \cap \mathcal{D}_i$ and $D_{-i} = D \cap \mathcal{D}_{-i}$. The intermediaries know $(U_i(\cdot, \cdot))_{i \in I}$ and they can make different offers to different consumers.

To accommodate a general case in which $U_i(D_i, D_{-i})$ depends on D_{-i} (“information externalities”), I need several modifications. First, I assume private offers; that is, each consumer i does not observe the offers made to the other consumers. Second, a solution concept is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that the consumers have passive beliefs. In other words, after consumer i detects deviations among the intermediaries, they do not change their beliefs regarding what offers the other consumers are receiving.

Claim 4 (Extending Proposition 1). *Suppose $\mathcal{D}_i = \{d_i\}$ for each $i \in I$ and $\Pi(\cdot)$ is submodular. Take any set $D^M \subset \{d_1, \dots, d_I\}$ of data that a monopoly intermediary collects in some equilibrium. Then, for any $K \geq 2$ and a partition (D_1^M, \dots, D_K^M) of D^M , there is an equilibrium in which each intermediary k collects data $d_i \in D_k^M$ at compensation $\max(0, -U_i(d_i, D_{-i}^M))$ where $D_{-i}^M = D^M \cap \mathcal{D}_{-i}$.*

To extend the other results, I modify Assumptions 1 and 2. I replace Assumption 1 with the assumption that Π and $(U_i)_{i \in I}$ are such that a monopoly intermediary collects and sells all of the data $\cup_{i \in I} \mathcal{D}_i$ in some equilibrium (in the absence of information externalities, these assumptions are equivalent).

Claim 5 (Extending Proposition 3). *Under the modified Assumption 1, there is an equilibrium such that a single intermediary collects all of the data at a compensation of $\max_{D_i \subset \mathcal{D}_i} U_i(D_i, \mathcal{D}_{-i}) - U_i(\mathcal{D}_i, \mathcal{D}_{-i})$ for each $i \in I$.*

As discussed above, the modified Assumption 1 states that a monopoly intermediary collects all of the data in some equilibrium. This is likely to hold if there are informational externalities among many consumers. As Bergemann, Bonatti, and Gan (2019) show, the externality creates a gap between an intermediary’s revenue from selling the data and the compensation consumers demand for their data. This makes it more likely that a monopoly intermediary will transfer all of the data.

Finally, to extend Proposition 5, I modify Assumption 2 so that for each $i \in I$ and $D_{-i} \subset \mathcal{D}$, $U_i(\cdot, D_{-i})$ is a decreasing submodular set function. Given this modified assumption, the set of the partitional equilibria is characterized by the allocation of data, the compensation, and the prices such that each intermediary compensates consumer i according to their marginal loss from

sharing their data, which is calculated by $U_i(\cdot, \mathcal{D}_{-i})$. The welfare implication of data concentration naturally extends.

8.3 Multiple Downstream Firms

In addition to multiple consumers, the model can take into account multiple downstream firms if they do not interact with each other: Suppose that there are L firms, where firm $\ell \in L$ has revenue function Π^ℓ that depends only on the data being available to ℓ . Each consumer i 's gross payoff from sharing their data is $\sum_{\ell \in L} U_i^\ell$, where each U_i^ℓ depends on the set of i 's data that firm ℓ obtains.

This setting is equivalent to the one with a single firm. For example, suppose that intermediary 1 has all of the data \mathcal{D} and intermediary 2 has some data D . Then, intermediary 1 posts $\Pi_\ell(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi_\ell(D)$ and intermediary 2 posts 0 to each firm ℓ . If each $\Pi_\ell(\cdot)$ is submodular, then [Lemma 1](#) implies that, for any allocation of data, each intermediary k will post a price of $\Pi_\ell(\cup_k D_k) - \Pi_\ell(\cup_{j \neq k} D_j)$ to firm ℓ . In either case, this is as if the downstream market consists of one firm with revenue function $\sum_{\ell \in L} \Pi_\ell$.

Second, the intermediaries cannot commit to not sell the data to downstream firms. Thus, once a consumer shares their data with one intermediary, these data are sold to all firms. This means that in equilibrium, each consumer i decides which offers to accept in order to maximize the sum of the total compensation and $\sum_{\ell \in L} U_i^\ell(D_i)$. Therefore, we can apply the same analysis as before by defining $U_i := \sum_{\ell \in L} U_i^\ell$.

9 Conclusion

This paper studies competition among data intermediaries that obtain data from consumers and then sell these data to downstream firms. The model incorporates two key features of personal data: Data are non-rivalrous, and the use of data by third parties can increase or decrease consumer welfare. I show that non-rivalous data relaxes competition among intermediaries. If a downstream firm's data usage hurts consumers, then the equilibrium may coincide with the monopoly outcome. Unlike markets for rivalrous goods, the entry of a more efficient intermediary may not eliminate a less efficient incumbent. Under certain conditions, an equilibrium with a greater data concentration is associated with higher profits for intermediaries and lower consumer welfare.

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Appendix

A Competition for Rivalrous Goods: Proof of Claim 2

Take any $K \geq 2$. Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium in which intermediary k^* obtains a positive payoff of $\pi^* > 0$. For each intermediary $k \in K$, let (D_k^*, τ_k^*) denote its equilibrium offer. Take any $j \neq k^*$, and suppose that j offers $(\cup_{k \in K} D_k^*, \sum_{k \in K} \tau_k^* + \epsilon)$ with $\epsilon \in (0, \pi^*)$. Then, the consumer accepts this offer and rejects all other offers. The deviation of intermediary j increases the consumer’s payoff by ϵ , reduces the sum of the payoffs of other intermediaries $k \neq j$ by at least π^* , and weakly reduces the firm’s payoff. Because the deviation does not change the total surplus, this means that j ’s payoff increases by at least $\pi^* - \epsilon > 0$. This is a contradiction.

To show the second part, take any $D^* \in \arg \max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}} \Pi(D) + U(D)$. Consider the following strategy profile: All intermediaries offer $(D^*, \Pi(D^*))$, and the consumer accepts one of them. In the downstream market, an intermediary that has D^* sets a price of $\Pi(D^*)$. We assign arbitrary equilibrium strategy in any subgame following deviations. This strategy profile is an equilibrium. Indeed, if an intermediary could deviate and earn a positive payoff, then this weakly increases the consumer’s payoff (as they can at least accept $(D^*, \Pi(D^*))$), it also weakly increases the firm’s

payoff and strictly increases the intermediaries' joint profits. This contradicts D^* maximizing the total surplus.

B Equilibrium for Single-unit Data: Proof of Proposition 1

First, I show that, in any equilibrium such that the consumer sells their data to at least one intermediary, the total compensation τ^* that they earn is weakly greater than $\max(0, -U)$. First, consider $U \geq 0$ and suppose to the contrary that $\tau^* < \max(0, -U) = 0$. This implies that all intermediaries that make non-empty offers charge positive fees (negative compensation), and the consumer provides data only to intermediary (say) k^* , which charges the lowest fee $-\tau^* > 0$. However, intermediary $j \neq k^*$ can offer $(\{d\}, \tau)$ with $\tau \in (\tau^*, 0)$, exclusively obtain d , and earn a positive profit. This is a contradiction. If $U < 0$, then $\tau^* \geq \max(0, -U) = -U$ holds; otherwise, the consumer would not sell their data to any intermediary.

Second, I show that there is an equilibrium in which one intermediary collects data at compensation $\max(0, -U)$ and sets a downstream price of Π . Consider the following strategy profile: Intermediary (say) 1 offers $(\{d\}, \max(0, -U))$, and all other intermediaries offer $(\{d\}, 0)$. On the path of play, the consumer accepts the offer of intermediary 1 and rejects all others. If intermediary k unilaterally deviates to $(\{d\}, \tau)$, then the consumer accepts a set K_C of offers such that (A) K_C maximizes their payoff and (B) if $k \in K_C$, then there is some $j \neq k$ with $j \in K_C$. In the downstream market, an intermediary sets a price of Π if it is the only one holding d . If multiple intermediaries hold d , then they set a price of zero.

The proposed strategy profile is an SPE. First, no intermediary has a profitable deviation: Suppose intermediary k offers $(\{d\}, \tau)$. If $\tau < 0$, then the consumer rejects it because another intermediary offers non-negative compensation. If $\tau \geq 0$, then the consumer may accept it, but they also accept the offer of another intermediary. Then, the downstream price of these data is zero. Thus, the deviation is not profitable. Second, the consumer's strategy is optimal. In particular, suppose that intermediary k deviates to a non-empty offer. Suppose also that K_C satisfying (A) contains k . Then, the consumer can add any $j \neq k$ that offers non-negative compensation to K_C in order to satisfy (B). Adding j to K_C weakly increases the consumer's payoff because it weakly increases their total compensation without affecting their gross payoff.

The above SPE maximizes the joint profit of intermediaries among all SPEs because the consumer receives the minimum possible compensation, the firm obtains zero profit, and the outcome (i.e., the firm acquiring d) maximizes total surplus. Also, one intermediary extracts this maximized joint profit. This implies that if there is another equilibrium that is Pareto-undominated from the perspective of the intermediaries, then in such an equilibrium, multiple intermediaries must be earning positive profits. However, there is no such equilibrium because an intermediary earns positive profits only by selling d to the firm at a positive price, which occurs only if one intermediary collects d .

The above arguments imply that in any equilibrium, one intermediary collects d at compensation $\max(0, -U)$ and sets a price of Π to the firm. As a result, the consumer obtains a payoff of $\max(0, U)$ and the firm obtains a payoff of zero. If $U < 0$, then this is a monopoly outcome in which all but one intermediary receives zero payoffs.

C Inefficiency and Competition: Proof of Proposition 2

First, consider the case of rivalrous goods. Take any SPE. If intermediary 2 collects data, then intermediary 1 can make the same offer and exclusively collects d , which is a contradiction. Thus, intermediary 1 collects d . Let τ^* denote the equilibrium compensation of 1. If $\tau^* > \Pi - c_2$, then intermediary 1 can instead offer $\tau \in (\Pi - c_2, \tau^*)$. The consumer continues to accept this because the maximum payoff that intermediary 2 can give is $U + \Pi - c_2$. This is a contradiction and, thus, $\tau^* \leq \Pi - c_2$. If $\tau^* < \Pi - c_2$, then intermediary 2 can collect data by offering compensation $\tau \in (\tau^*, \Pi - c_2)$, which is a contradiction. Thus, $\tau^* = \Pi - c_2$. Moreover, there exists an equilibrium in which intermediary 1 offers $(\{d\}, \Pi - c_2)$, intermediary 2 offers $(\{d\}, \Pi)$, and the consumer accepts the offer from 1. This completes the proof of Point 1.

Second, consider the case of non-rivalrous data. Consider the following strategy profile: Intermediary 1 offers $(\{d\}, 0)$, intermediary 2 offers $(\{d\}, \max(0, -U) + c_2)$, and the consumer accepts only 2's offer. Assign arbitrary equilibrium strategy after deviations. Intermediary 1 has no profitable deviation: If it increases its compensation, then the consumer shares d with both intermediaries, following which the downstream price of the consumer's data becomes zero. If 1 offers negative compensation, then the consumer continues to reject it. Intermediary 2 has no profitable

deviation: In particular, the consumer's payoff from accepting 2's offer is $\max(0, U)$. Meanwhile, the consumer can secure a payoff of $\max(0, U)$ by either rejecting all offers or accepting the offer of intermediary 1. Thus, if intermediary 2 lowers compensation, then the consumer rejects 2's offer. However, as intermediary 2 obtains a payoff of $\Pi - \max(0, -U) - c_2 \geq \Pi + U - c_2 > 0$ on the path of play, it does not benefit from lowering its compensation. Finally, that this equilibrium is Pareto-undominated follows from the same argument as the proof of [Proposition 1](#).

D Partially Monopolistic Equilibrium: Proof of [Proposition 3](#)

Proof. Take any $D^* \in \arg \max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}} U(D)$. Consider the following strategy profile: In the upstream market, intermediary 1 offers $(\mathcal{D}, U(D^*) - U(\mathcal{D}))$. Other intermediaries offer $(D^*, 0)$. The consumer accepts only the offer of intermediary 1. If an intermediary deviates, then the consumer optimally decides which intermediaries to share data with, breaking ties in favor of sharing data. In the downstream market, if intermediary 1 does not deviate in the upstream market, then any intermediary $j \neq 1$ sets a price of zero, and intermediary 1 sets a price of $\Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(D^{-1})$, where D^{-1} is the set of data that intermediaries other than 1 hold. If intermediary 1 deviates in the upstream market, then assume that players play any equilibrium of the corresponding subgame.

I show that the suggested strategy profile is an equilibrium. First, I show that intermediary 1 has no incentive to deviate. Suppose that intermediary 1 deviates and obtains data D_1 . Let \hat{D} denote the set of all of the data that the consumer shares as a result of intermediary 1's deviation ($D_1 \subsetneq \hat{D}$ if they also share data with some intermediary $j \neq 1$). The revenue of intermediary 1 in the downstream market is, at most, $\Pi(\hat{D})$. The compensation τ to the consumer has to satisfy $\tau \geq U(D^*) - U(\hat{D})$. To see this, suppose $U(D^*) > U(\hat{D}) + \tau$. The left-hand side is the payoff that the consumer can attain by sharing data exclusively with intermediary $k > 1$. The right-hand side is the consumer's maximum payoff conditional on sharing data with intermediary 1. Note that all intermediaries other than 1 offer zero compensation. Then, $U(D^*) > U(\hat{D}) + \tau$ implies that the consumer would strictly prefer to reject the offer from intermediary $k \neq 1$. Now, these bounds on revenue and cost imply that intermediary 1's payoff after the deviation is, at most, $\Pi(\hat{D}) - [U(D^*) - U(\hat{D})] = \Pi(\hat{D}) + U(\hat{D}) - U(D^*)$. Since the efficient outcome involves full data sharing, this is, at most, $\Pi(\mathcal{D}) + U(\mathcal{D}) - U(D^*) = \Pi(\mathcal{D}) - [U(D^*) - U(\mathcal{D})]$, which is

intermediary 1's payoff without deviation. Thus, there is no profitable deviation for intermediary 1.

Second, suppose that intermediary 2 deviates and offers (D_2, τ_2) . Without loss of generality, assume that each consumer accepts the offer. Let D_{-1} denote the set of data that the consumer provides to intermediaries in $K \setminus \{1\}$ after the deviation. If the consumer accepts the offer of intermediary 1 in addition to sharing D_{-1} , their payoff increases by $U(\mathcal{D}) - U(D_{-1}) + U(D^*) - U(\mathcal{D}) \geq U(\mathcal{D}) - U(D^*) + U(D^*) - U(\mathcal{D}) = 0$. The inequality follows from $U(D^*) \geq U(D_{-1})$. Thus, the consumer prefers to accept the offer of intermediary 1. If $\tau_2 \geq 0$, this implies that intermediary 2 could be better off (relative to the deviation) by not collecting D_2 because it could save compensation without losing revenue in the downstream market. Indeed, intermediary 2's revenue in the downstream market is zero for any increasing Π . If $\tau_2 < 0$, then the consumer strictly prefers sharing data with intermediary 1 to sharing data with intermediary 2. Overall, this implies that intermediary 2 does not benefit from the deviation. The optimality of each player's strategy on other nodes holds by construction. \square

E Welfare Properties of a Partially Monopolistic Equilibrium: Proof of Proposition 4

Proof. (Point 1) I prepare several notations. Define $U^* := \max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}} U(D)$, and $TS^* := \Pi(\mathcal{D}) + U(\mathcal{D}) > 0$. Assumption 1 implies that TS^* is the maximum total surplus. As U^* is an equilibrium payoff in the PME, $\inf CS(K) \leq U^*$ holds for all $K \in \mathbb{N}$. Thus, we obtain $\limsup_{K \rightarrow \infty} (\inf CS(K)) \leq U^*$. Thus, it suffices to show that

$$\liminf_{K \rightarrow \infty} (\inf CS(K)) \geq U^*.$$

Suppose to the contrary that $\liminf_{K \rightarrow \infty} (\inf CS_i(K)) < U^* - 3\delta$ for some $\delta > 0$. This implies that there exists a strictly increasing subsequence $\{K_n\} \subset \mathbb{N}$ such that $\inf CS(K_n) < \liminf_{K \rightarrow \infty} (\inf CS(K_n)) + \delta < U^* - 2\delta$. This implies that for each K_n , there exists an equilibrium E_n in which the payoff of the consumer, denoted by CS^n , satisfies $CS^n < U^* - \delta$.

I show that this leads to a contradiction. Take any K_n . Suppose that intermediary k deviates and offers (D^*, ε) with $\varepsilon \in (0, \delta)$. If the consumer rejects this deviating offer, then their payoff is,

at most, $CS(K_n)$. If they accept the deviating offer and reject all other offers, then their payoff is $U^* - \varepsilon > U^* - \delta$. Thus, the consumer accepts the deviating offer. This implies that for each n , in equilibrium E_n , any intermediary earns a payoff of at least δ , which implies that the sum of payoffs of all intermediaries is at least $K_n\delta$. However, for a large K_n , we obtain $K_n\delta > TS^*$, which is a contradiction. Combining $\liminf_{K \rightarrow \infty}(\inf CS(K)) \geq U^*$ and $\limsup_{K \rightarrow \infty}(\inf CS(K)) \leq U^*$, we obtain $\lim_{K \rightarrow \infty}(\inf CS(K)) = U^*$.

(Point 2) Define $m := \min_{d \in \mathcal{D}, D \subset \mathcal{D}} \Pi(D) - \Pi(D \setminus \{d\}) > 0$. Let K^* satisfy $K^* > TS^*/m$. Suppose that there are $K \geq K^*$ intermediaries, and take any equilibrium. Suppose (to the contrary) that the consumer's payoff is $U(D^*) - \delta$ with $\delta > 0$. I derive a contradiction by assuming that any intermediary obtains a payoff of at least m . Suppose to the contrary that intermediary k earns a strictly lower payoff than m . If intermediary k deviates and offers (D^*, ε) with $\varepsilon \in (0, \delta)$, then they accept this offer. Let D_{-k} denote the data that the consumer shares with the intermediaries in $K \setminus \{k\}$ as a result of k 's deviation. Then, $D^* \setminus D_{-k} \neq \emptyset$ holds. To see this, suppose to the contrary that $D^* \subset D_{-k}$. Then, the consumer could be strictly better off by rejecting intermediary k 's offer (D^*, ε) because $\varepsilon > 0$. However, conditional on rejecting k 's deviating offer, the set of offers that the consumer faces shrinks relative to the original equilibrium. Thus, the maximum payoff the consumer can achieve by rejecting k 's deviating offer is, at most, $U(D^*) - \delta < U(D^*) - \varepsilon$, which is a contradiction. Since the consumer accepts the offer of intermediary k and $D^* \setminus D_{-k} \neq \emptyset$, intermediary k can earn a profit arbitrarily close to m . This implies that, in the equilibrium, any intermediary earns a payoff of at least m . However, if each intermediary earns at least m , then the sum of the payoffs of all the intermediaries is at least $Km > TS^*$. This implies that one of the consumers and the firm obtains a negative payoff, which is a contradiction. Therefore, in any equilibrium, any consumer obtains a payoff of at least $U(D^*)$. Because the PME gives the consumer a payoff of $U(D^*)$, we obtain the result.

□

F Proof of Claim 3

Take any equilibrium, and let $(D_k)_{k \in K}$ denote the allocation of data (i.e., rivalrous goods). Without loss of generality, suppose $D_1 \neq \emptyset$. Suppose to the contrary that $D_k \neq \emptyset$ for some $k \neq 1$. Let

τ_k denote compensation that intermediary k pays to the consumer. Suppose intermediary 1 offers $(\cup_{k \in K} D_k, \sum_{k \in K} \tau_k + \varepsilon)$ with $\varepsilon > 0$. Then, the consumer only accepts this offer. Thus, intermediary 1 earns a downstream revenue of $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K} D_k)$. Without intermediary 1's deviation, the joint downstream revenue is $\sum_{k \in K} [\Pi(\cup_{j \in K} D_j) - \Pi(D_{-k})]$ (this follows from [Lemma 1](#) below). By the same logic as the proof of [Proposition 6](#), below, $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K} D_k) > \sum_{k \in K} [\Pi(\cup_{j \in K} D_j) - \Pi(D_{-k})]$ holds. Thus, intermediary 1 can strictly benefit from the deviation with a sufficiently small $\varepsilon > 0$. This concludes $\cup_{k \in K} D_k = D_1$.

G Partitional Equilibria: Proof of Proposition 5

To characterize partitional equilibria, I first show that the downstream market has a unique equilibrium outcome if the firm's revenue function is submodular.¹⁷

Lemma 1. *Suppose $\Pi(\cdot)$ is submodular. Suppose that each intermediary k has collected data D_k . In any pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the downstream market, intermediary k obtains a revenue of*

$$\Pi_k := \Pi \left(\bigcup_{j \in K} D_j \right) - \Pi \left(\bigcup_{j \in K \setminus \{k\}} D_j \right). \quad (1)$$

If $\Pi_k > 0$, then intermediary k sets a price of Π_k and the firm buys D_k with probability 1. The downstream firm obtains a payoff of $\Pi \left(\bigcup_{j \in K} D_j \right) - \sum_{k \in K} \Pi_k$.

Proof. Take any allocation of data (D_1, \dots, D_K) . I show that there is an equilibrium (of the downstream market) in which each intermediary k posts a price of Π_k and the firm buys all of the data. First, the submodularity of Π implies that $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K' \cup \{j\}} D_j) - \Pi(\cup_{k \in K'} D_j) \geq \Pi_j$ for all $K' \subset K$. Thus, if each intermediary k sets a price of Π_k , then the firm prefers to buy all of the data. Second, if intermediary k increases its price, then the firm strictly prefers buying data from intermediaries in $K \setminus \{k\}$ to buying data from a set of intermediaries containing k . Finally, if an intermediary lowers the price, then it earns a lower revenue. Thus, no intermediary has a profitable deviation.

¹⁷[Lemma 1](#) is more general than Proposition 18 of [Bergemann, Bonatti, and Gan \(2019\)](#) in that the equilibrium payoff profile in the downstream market is shown to be unique even if $D^k \subset D^j$ for some k and $j \neq k$. [Gu, Madio, and Reggiani \(2018\)](#) assume $K = 2$ and consider not only submodularity but also supermodularity. Relative to [Gu, Madio, and Reggiani \(2018\)](#), the uniqueness of the equilibrium revenue for any K is a new result.

To prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs, I first show that the equilibrium revenue of each intermediary k is at most Π_k . Suppose to the contrary that (without loss of generality) intermediary 1 obtains a strictly greater revenue than Π_1 . Let $K' \ni 1$ denote the set of intermediaries from which the firm buys data.

First, in equilibrium, $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K'} D_k) = \Pi(\cup_{k \in K} D_k)$. To see this, note that if $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K'} D_k) < \Pi(\cup_{k \in K} D_k)$, then there is some $\ell \in K$ such that $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K'} D_k) < \Pi(\cup_{k \in K' \cup \{\ell\}} D_k)$. As such, intermediary ℓ can profitably deviate by setting a sufficiently low positive price because the firm then buys data D_ℓ . This is a contradiction.

Second, define $K^* := \{\ell \in K : \ell \notin K', p_\ell = 0\} \cup K'$. Note that K^* satisfies $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K'} D_k) = \Pi(\cup_{k \in K} D_k) = \Pi(\cup_{k \in K^*} D_k)$, $\sum_{k \in K'} p_k = \sum_{k \in K^*} p_k$, and $p_j > 0$ for all $j \notin K^*$. Then, it holds that

$$\Pi(\cup_{k \in K^*} D_k) - \sum_{k \in K^*} p_k = \max_{J \subset K \setminus \{1\}} \left(\Pi(\cup_{k \in J} D_k) - \sum_{k \in J} p_k \right). \quad (2)$$

To see this, suppose that one side of the equation is greater than the other. If the left-hand side is strictly greater, then intermediary 1 can profitably deviate by slightly increasing its price. If the right-hand side is strictly greater, then the firm would not buy D_1 . In either case, we obtain a contradiction.

Let J^* denote a solution for the right-hand side of equation (2). I consider two cases. First, suppose that there exists some $j \in J^* \setminus K^*$. By the construction of K^* , $p_j > 0$. Then, intermediary j can profitably deviate by slightly lowering p_j . To see this, note that

$$\Pi(\cup_{k \in K^*} D_k) - \sum_{k \in K^*} \hat{p}_k < \Pi(\cup_{k \in J^*} D_k) - \sum_{k \in J^*} \hat{p}_k, \quad (3)$$

where $\hat{p}_k = p_k$ for all $k \neq j$ and $\hat{p}_j = p_j - \varepsilon > 0$ for a small $\varepsilon > 0$. This implies that after the deviation by intermediary j , the firm buys data D_j . This is because the left-hand side of equation (3) is the maximum revenue that the firm can obtain if it cannot buy data D_j , and the right-hand side is the lower bound of the revenue the firm can achieve by buying D_j . Thus, the firm always buys data D_j , which is a contradiction.

Second, suppose that $J^* \setminus K^* = \emptyset$, i.e., $J^* \subset K^*$. This implies that the right-hand side of equation (2) can be maximized by $J^* = K^* \setminus \{1\}$ because Π is submodular and $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K^*} D_k) -$

$\Pi(\cup_{k \in K^* \setminus \{\ell\}} D_k) \geq p_\ell$ for all $\ell \in K^*$. Plugging $J^* = K^* \setminus \{1\}$, we obtain

$$\Pi(\cup_{k \in K^*} D^k) - \sum_{k \in K^*} p_k = \Pi(\cup_{k \in K^* \setminus \{1\}} D_k) - \sum_{k \in K^* \setminus \{1\}} p_k. \quad (4)$$

I show that there is $j \notin K^*$ such that

$$\Pi(\cup_{k \in K^* \setminus \{1\}} D_k) < \Pi(\cup_{k \in (K^* \setminus \{1\}) \cup \{j\}} D_k). \quad (5)$$

Suppose to the contrary that for all $j \notin K^*$,

$$\Pi(\cup_{k \in K^* \setminus \{1\}} D_k) = \Pi(\cup_{k \in (K^* \setminus \{1\}) \cup \{j\}} D_k). \quad (6)$$

By submodularity, this implies that

$$\Pi(\cup_{k \in K^* \setminus \{1\}} D_k) = \Pi(\cup_{k \in K \setminus \{1\}} D_k).$$

Then, we can write equation (4) as

$$\Pi(\cup_{k \in K} D_k) - \sum_{k \in K^*} p_k = \Pi(\cup_{k \in K \setminus \{1\}} D_k) - \sum_{k \in K^* \setminus \{1\}} p_k$$

which implies $\Pi_1 = p_1$. This is a contradiction. Thus, there must be $j \notin K^*$ such that equation (5) holds. As such, intermediary j can again profitably deviate by lowering its price, which is a contradiction. Therefore, intermediary k 's revenue is at most Π_k .

Next, I show that in equilibrium, each intermediary k receives a revenue of at least Π_k . This follows from the submodularity of Π : If intermediary k sets a price of $\Pi_k - \varepsilon$, then the firm buys D_k no matter what prices the other intermediaries set. Thus, intermediary k must obtain a payoff of at least Π_k in equilibrium. Combining this with the previous part, we can conclude that, in any equilibrium, each intermediary k obtains a revenue of Π_k .

Finally, the payoff of the downstream firm is $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K} D_k) - \sum_{k \in K} \Pi_k$ because the firms' gross revenue from these data is $\Pi(\cup_{k \in K} D_k)$, whereas it pays Π_k to each intermediary k . \square

A direct corollary of this lemma is that an intermediary's revenue is determined by the part of

its data that other intermediaries do not hold.

Corollary 1. *Suppose that each intermediary $j \neq k$ holds data D_j . The equilibrium revenue of intermediary k in the downstream market is identical between when it holds D_k and $D_k \cup D'$ for any $D' \subset \cup_{j \neq k} D_j$.*

I now prove [Proposition 5](#).

Proof of Proposition 5. First, I prove the “if” part. Take any $(D_k^*)_{k \in K}$, $(\tau_k^*)_{k \in K}$, and $(p_k^*)_{k \in K}$ that satisfy Points 1 - 3 of [Proposition 5](#). Suppose that each intermediary k offers (D_k^*, τ_k^*) and sets a price of data that follows [Lemma 1](#) (if $\Pi_k = 0$, then k sets a price of zero). On the equilibrium path, the consumer accepts all offers. After an intermediary’s unilateral deviation, the consumer accepts all offers from the non-deviating intermediaries and decides whether to accept the deviating offer, breaking a tie in favor of acceptance. I show that this strategy profile is an equilibrium. First, the consumer’s strategy is optimal because $U(\cdot)$ is decreasing and submodular. Second, [Lemma 1](#) implies that there is no profitable deviation in the downstream market. Third, suppose that intermediary k deviates and offers $(\tilde{D}_k, \tilde{\tau}_k)$. Without loss of generality, we can assume that $\tilde{D}_k \subset D_k^*$ for the following reason. If the consumer rejects $(\tilde{D}_k, \tilde{\tau}_k)$, then k can replace such an offer with $(\emptyset, 0)$. If the consumer accepts $(\tilde{D}_k, \tilde{\tau}_k)$ but $\tilde{D}_k \subsetneq D_k^*$, it means that k obtains some data $d \in \tilde{D}_k \setminus D_k^*$. Because $\cup_k D_k^* = \mathcal{D}$, another intermediary obtains data d . By [Corollary 1](#), k is indifferent between offering $(\tilde{D}_k \setminus \{d\}, \tilde{\tau}_k)$ and offering $(\tilde{D}_k, \tilde{\tau}_k)$. Now, let $D^- := D_k^* \setminus \tilde{D}_k$ denote the set of data that are not acquired by the firm as a result of k ’s deviation. If k deviates in this way, then its revenue in the downstream market decreases by $\Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - [\Pi(\mathcal{D} \setminus D^-) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*)] = \Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} \setminus D^-)$. In the upstream market, if the consumer provides data \tilde{D}_k to k , then it is optimal for the consumer to accept other offers from non-deviating intermediaries, because $U(\cdot)$ is submodular. This implies that the minimum compensation that k has to pay is $U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D^-)$. Thus, k ’s compensation in the upstream market decreases by $U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - U(\mathcal{D}) - [U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D^-)] = U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D^-) - U(\mathcal{D})$. Because collecting \mathcal{D} is an optimal choice for the monopolist, it holds that $\Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} \setminus D^-) - [U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D^-) - U(\mathcal{D})] \geq 0$. Therefore, the deviation does not strictly increase intermediary k ’s payoff.

Second, I prove the “only if” part. Points 1 and 3 follow from the definition of partitioned equilibrium and [Lemma 1](#), respectively. Let τ_k^* denote the compensation k pays for collecting

D_k^* . To show Point 2, suppose to the contrary that $\tau_k^* \neq U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - U(\mathcal{D})$. Suppose that $\tau_k^* < U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - U(\mathcal{D})$ even though the right-hand side is positive. Then, the consumer rejects at least one non-empty offer on the equilibrium path. This contradicts a condition for partitional equilibrium where the intermediaries jointly collect \mathcal{D} . Next, suppose $\tau_k^* > U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - U(\mathcal{D})$. Then, by the “if” part, we can find an equilibrium that has the same outcome except intermediary k offers $\tau'_k \in (\tau_k^*, U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - U(\mathcal{D}))$ for collecting D_k^* . This equilibrium Pareto dominates the original equilibrium, which is a contradiction. Thus, we obtain $\tau_k^* \leq U(\mathcal{D} \setminus D_k^*) - U(\mathcal{D})$. \square

H Data Concentration: Proof of Proposition 6

Proof. Let $(\hat{D}_k)_{k \in K}$ and $(D_k)_{k \in K}$ denote two partitions of \mathcal{D} such that the former is more concentrated than the latter. In general, for any set $S_0 \subset S$ and a partition (S_1, \dots, S_K) of S_0 , we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pi(S) - \Pi(S - S_0) \\ &= \Pi(S) - \Pi(S - S_1) + \Pi(S - S_1) - \Pi(S - S_1 - S_2) + \dots \\ & \quad + \Pi(S - S_1 - S_2 - \dots - S_{K-1}) - \Pi(S - S_1 - S_2 - \dots - S_K) \\ & \geq \sum_{k \in K} [\Pi(S) - \Pi(S - S_k)], \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality follows from the submodularity of $\Pi(\cdot)$. For any $\ell \in K$, let $K(\ell) \subset K$ satisfy $\hat{D}_\ell = \sum_{k \in K(\ell)} D_k$. The above inequality implies

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} - \hat{D}_\ell) & \geq \sum_{k \in K(\ell)} [\Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} - D_k)], \forall \ell \in K \\ \Rightarrow \sum_{\ell \in K} [\Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} - \hat{D}_\ell)] & \geq \sum_{\ell \in K} \sum_{k \in K(\ell)} [\Pi(\mathcal{D}) - \Pi(\mathcal{D} - D_k)]. \end{aligned}$$

In the last inequality, the left- and the right-hand sides are the total revenue for intermediaries in the downstream market under (\hat{D}_k) and (D_k) , respectively. By replacing Π with $-U$, we can show that the consumer receives a lower total compensation in a more-concentrated equilibrium. This completes the proof. \square

I Proof of Proposition 7

Proof. Note that [Theorem 3](#) holds even when \mathcal{D} is not finite. Let d_{FULL} denote a fully informative signal. I show Point 1. Assuming that there is a single product ($M = 1$), [Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris \(2015\)](#) show that there is a signal d^* that satisfies the following conditions: $d^* \in \arg \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} U(d)$; $\Pi(d^*) = \Pi(\emptyset)$; d^* maximizes total surplus, i.e., $U(d^*) + \Pi(d^*) = U(d_{FULL}) + \Pi(d_{FULL})$. Namely, d^* simultaneously maximizes the consumer surplus and the total surplus without increasing the seller's revenue. These properties imply that intermediary 1's revenue in the downstream market is equal to the compensation it pays in the upstream market: $\Pi(d_{FULL}) - \Pi(\emptyset) = \Pi(d_{FULL}) - \Pi(d^*) = U(d^*) - U(d_{FULL})$. Thus, all intermediaries earn zero payoffs.

I show Point 2. [Ichihashi \(2020\)](#) shows that if $M = 2$, then for a generic F satisfying $p(F) > \min V$, any signal $d^{**} \in \arg \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} U(d)$ leads to an inefficient outcome. This implies $\Pi(d_{FULL}) + U(d_{FULL}) > \Pi(d^{**}) + U(d^{**}) \geq \Pi(\emptyset) + U(d^{**})$. Then, $\Pi(d_{FULL}) - \Pi(\emptyset) - [U(d^{**}) - U(d_{FULL})] > 0$. Thus, intermediary 1 earns a positive profit. \square

J Multiple Consumers with Information Externalities: Appendix for Subsection 8.2

First, I describe the timing of the game when there are multiple consumers. First, each intermediary $k \in K$ makes an offer (D_i^k, τ_i^k) to each consumer $i \in I$, where $D_i^k \subset \mathcal{D}_i$. Then, each consumer i privately observes $\{(D_i^k, \tau_i^k)\}_{k \in K}$, and chooses a set K_i of offers to accept. This leads to the allocation of data such that intermediary k holds $D^k = \cup_{i: k \in K_i} D_i^k$. After observing the allocation of data, each intermediary simultaneously posts a price for D^k . Finally, the firm decides from which intermediaries to buy data. As discussed in the main text, the gross payoff of consumer i is given by $U_i(D_i, D_{-i})$. The solution concept is a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium with passive beliefs.

Proof of Claim 4. Take any set $D^M \subset \{d_1, \dots, d_I\}$ of data that a monopoly intermediary collects in some equilibrium. Take any partition (D_1^M, \dots, D_K^M) of D^M . Consider the following strategy profile. Take any $i \in I$. If $d_i \in D_k^M$, then intermediary k offers $(\{d_i\}, \max(0, -U_i(d_i, D_{-i}^M)))$ to consumer i . If $d_i \notin D_k^M$, then intermediary k offers $(\{d_i\}, 0)$ to consumer i . On the path of play,

each consumer i accepts the offer of k if and only if $d_i \in D_k^M$. After an intermediary deviation, a consumer chooses the set of offers to accept, breaking ties in favor of acceptance. The equilibrium in the downstream market follows [Lemma 1](#).

The optimality of each consumer's strategy follows the proof of [Proposition 1](#) with $U_i(\cdot)$ replaced by $U_i(\cdot, D_{-i}^M)$. The passive belief implies that after any deviation, consumer i 's (perceived) gross payoff is given by $U_i(\cdot, D_{-i}^M)$.

Next, I show the optimality of each intermediary's strategy. First, it is not optimal for intermediary k to collect data d_i such that $d_i \notin D_k^M$, because consumer i will then share the same data with other intermediaries. Second, suppose that intermediary k chooses to not collect d_i such that $d_i \in D_k^M$. This weakly decreases k 's payoff if $U_i(d_i, D_{-i}^M) \geq 0$, because k collects d_i for free. Suppose $U_i(d_i, D_{-i}^M) < 0$. Not collecting d_i will reduce k 's downstream revenue by at least $\Pi(D^M) - \Pi(D^M \setminus \{d_i\})$ and will decrease compensation by $-U_i(d_i, D_{-i}^M) > 0$. Since a monopoly intermediary finds it optimal to collect d_i , $\Pi(D^M) - \Pi(D^M \setminus \{d_i\}) \geq -U_i(d_i, D_{-i}^M)$. This completes the proof. \square

Proof of Claim 5. Take any $D_i^* \in \arg \max_{D \subset \mathcal{D}_i} U_i(D, \mathcal{D}_{-i})$. Consider the following strategy profile. Intermediary 1 offers $(\mathcal{D}_i, U_i(\mathcal{D}_i, \mathcal{D}_{-i}) - U_i(D_i^*, \mathcal{D}_{-i}))$, and intermediary $k \neq 1$ offers $(D_i^*, 0)$ to each consumer $i \in I$. On the path of play, each consumer i accepts the offer of intermediary 1. After an intermediary's deviation, a consumer chooses the set of offers to accept, breaking ties in favor of acceptance. Assign any equilibrium to each subgame of the downstream market. We can apply the proof of [Proposition 3](#) by replacing $U_i(\cdot)$ with $U_i(\cdot, \mathcal{D}_{-i})$. \square