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# Mapping a Sector's Scope Transformation and the Value of Following the Evolving Core

Nicola Cetorelli | Michael G. Jacobides | Sam Stern

## **Mapping a Sector's Scope Transformation and the Value of Following the Evolving Core**

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*Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports*, no. 963

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### **Abstract**

A surprisingly neglected facet of sector evolution is the evolutionary analysis of firms', and thus a sector's, scope. Defining a sector as a group of firms that can change their scope over time, we study the transformation of U.S. banking firms. We undertake a sectoral, population-wide study of business-scope transformation, with particular focus on which segments banks expand into. As financial intermediation evolved, a continuously shifting set of activities became associated with "core banking," with scope changing and relatedness itself (measured through coincidence) evolving over the banking sector's history. Banks that expand scope while staying close to this evolving core attain net performance benefits. Identification tests show that the benefits of following the evolving core are robust to endogeneity.

Key words: scope, relatedness, diversification, industry evolution, expansion

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## INTRODUCTION

What is an “industry”? The question is deceptively simple to ask, yet considerably more difficult to answer (Nightingale, 1978). Economic historians, industry studies, and most strategy researchers align with Marshall (see Andrews, 1949) in defining industries on the basis of “similar establishments.” The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS, 2017: 3) accordingly defines industry segments following “a single principle of aggregation... units that use similar production processes should be grouped together.” NAICS, being a classification device, decomposes these units to the finest degree possible. Yet, while most scholars consider industries as populations of similar firms, they still allow for those firms’ scope to *evolve* over time (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Baum & Singh, 1994).

This brings us to a second, related question: How does an industry change? As Chandler’s pioneering work (1962, 1977) has shown, the evolution of industries is intricately connected to the changing scope of firms within them. For instance, it is hard to understand the evolution of the chemicals industry without looking at the changes in firms such as Dupont; and it is hard to understand Dupont itself without looking at how it broadened its scope. Likewise, it is hard to understand the evolution of automobile manufacturing without looking at General Motors or Ford, or to understand General Motors or Ford themselves without looking at the significant changes in their scope. Chandler shows us that it is important to understand how firms respond to technological, regulatory, and economic opportunities, changing the segments in which they operate. What a “chemicals firm” or an “automobile manufacturer” is, and what segments it covers, changes over time. Accordingly, the definition and scope of the industry itself evolve as its member firms enter new segments and leave old ones.

Given the importance that Chandler placed on how firms change their scope over time, one might expect that scholars of industries (or “sectors”) would have paid careful attention

to it in their studies. Yet for all its emphasis on scale, research into sector evolution has, on the whole, steered clear of questions of scope, as Jacobides and Winter (2005, 2012) point out. Where such research exists, it is selective (Silver, 1984; Langlois & Robertson, 1995), and often narrowly focused on the role of transaction costs (Williamson, 1985; Argyres & Zenger, 2012), leaving us with fragmentary evidence on how a sector’s participants transform their boundaries over time. Separately, research on the benefits and shortcomings of broad scope (Palich *et al.*, 2000; Villalonga, 2004a, b; Kuppaswamy & Villalonga, 2015; Folta *et al.*, 2016) has stayed at the level of the firm and its evolving portfolio of activities, in isolation from the sectors in which these changes occur.<sup>1</sup>

Questions of scope in the context of sectors have figured most prominently in *relatedness* research, which considers the sector-based similarity of firms on the basis of the portfolio of activities in which they engage. Gort (1962), Wrigley (1970), and Rumelt (1974) originally argued that processes, knowledge bases, or human capital shared across multiple businesses can lead to greater efficiency gains. This was later broadened to encompass the realization of return synergies from joint operations (e.g., Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991; Zhou, 2011; Capron & Mitchell, 2013), or from intertemporal efficiencies (Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004). Drawing on the analysis of Teece *et al.* (1994), Bryce and Winter (2009) and Lien and Klein (2009) have argued that we can infer the synergies between two segments by observing how many firms have subsidiaries in both, leading to a “bottom-up” indicator, empirically considering a cross-section of firms, aggregating them over multiple years.<sup>2</sup> Yet

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<sup>1</sup> Population studies that explore aggregate, economy-wide patterns in the prevalence of broad or narrow firms (e.g. Basu, 2010), or consider the effectiveness of different approaches to managing boundaries (Robins & Wiersema, 1995), or explore patterns of entry and exit into more or less related industries (Chang, 1996; Feldman, 2019) have, by and large, ignored industry in their analysis. Empirical research on the merits of becoming broad vs. narrow is occasionally carried out in the context of a particular sector, yet the focus there has been on ensuring comparability (such as Palepu’s 1985 investigation of the entropy measure, applied to a sample of 30 food products firms). By and large, the sectoral context and its evolutionary dynamics are not directly considered.

<sup>2</sup> This was in contrast to previous approaches, which had inferred synergies by the distance of a firms’ activities in terms of the SIC or NAICS code “tree”—looking, e.g., at how many digits they shared. See Caves *et al.*

while this approach takes a sector-level focus, it does not consider sectoral *dynamics*, thus disregarding the fact that relatedness itself may change over time.

What would be the benefits of conducting a sector-level analysis of scope that explicitly focused on a sector's evolutionary dynamics? Narrowing the analysis to all the firms in a single sector would provide a large-scale, quantitative analysis of how sector participants change their scope, while at the same time keeping track of the activities that constitute the sector's "core." We define the core of a sector as that activity, or set of activities, that are most commonly engaged in by firms in that sector.<sup>3</sup> A sector's core is not fixed, and may evolve in response to business opportunities, technological options, and regulatory conditions. By tracking such changes, we could see whether or not firms that, in changing their scope, approach or depart from this evolving core are rewarded in terms of performance. In all, taking such an approach would allow us to see whether the Chandlerian thesis applies to large samples, and whether "moving with the times" confers a performance benefit.

To undertake such an analysis, we need a sector-level database that includes *all* the firms in the sector. Then, by observing the cross-sectional variety of activities that firms engage in, we can reliably establish what is the sector core, and by observing changes in firms' activity portfolios, track the evolution of the core itself. Such comprehensive samples are few and far between, but we are fortunate to have such a setting for the U.S. banking sector.

In U.S. banking, the technology of financial intermediation changed dramatically during the 1990s and 2000s. At the outset, banking firms operated with a very narrow scope, with deposit-taking and loan-making representing the core of the sector. Twenty years later, the sector had fragmented into a decentralized system in which matching deposit supply and loan demand increasingly took place through much longer credit intermediation chains, with a

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(1980), Jacquemin and Berry (1997), or Palepu (1985) for examples; Rumelt (1974) for a critique and alternative; and Weiss (2016) for a review of non-NAICS approaches.

<sup>3</sup> Activity is defined following the NAICS, representing the five-digit (i.e., detailed) description of the main business activity undertaken by each subsidiary.

wide and varying set of other activities emerging as part of core banking (Cetorelli, Mandel, & Mollineaux, 2012). To give a sense of this sector transformation, between 1990 and 2006—the year before the onset of the financial crisis—more than 230 distinct U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), the main legal vehicle defining the boundaries of a banking firm, incorporated securities-dealer or broker subsidiaries; about 500 took control of insurance agencies; and over 1,000 added special purpose vehicle legal entities to their organizations. While these instances of change in banks' scope are certainly significant, they actually represent just the tip of the iceberg in what has been the largest and deepest process of scope transformation in the history of U.S. banking. Indeed, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, more than half of the population of BHCs (accounting for about 97 percent of total sector assets) either created or took control of tens of thousands of subsidiaries, spanning virtually every business segment within the financial services sector and beyond. This created new opportunities for potential synergies across a variety of businesses, and the value of those synergies changed in response to regulatory, technological, and market conditions that evolved over time, *across all firms*.<sup>4</sup>

Rather than focusing, like Chandler, on firms that shaped particular sectors over time, we look at the universe of banking firms in the U.S. Our sample illustrates how all such firms changed their scope, combining their deposit and lending activity—the original core of the sector—with others activities within the financial services sector, and even beyond it. Our sample is comprehensive because banking is a regulated segment, so no entity can engage in the activities that it covers without being included in our database. This provides us with information on the entire population of firms in the sector, and their ever-evolving scope.

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<sup>4</sup> For example, the benefits from combining commercial banking with securities dealing and underwriting, following regulatory changes in the late 1980s/early 1990s, appear to have increased firm-level value-add—especially in the run-up to the 90s technology boom. Likewise, the surge in asset securitization throughout the 1990s likely created the conditions for banking institutions to add specialty lenders, special purpose vehicles, and servicers, among others.

Our comprehensive data clearly shows how the core of this shifting field of financial intermediation evolved. It also shows how banks that followed this evolving core performed, compared with those that didn't expand, or to those that expanded to segments that were more related based on traditional, non-sector-specific, or non-dynamic measures (such as entropy, or NAICS coherence). We provide a thorough empirical investigation of the *marginal impact* of expanding, finding that, while expansion overall is detrimental to performance, expansion into the evolving core is, as Chandler would predict, beneficial.

We find this result to be robust to potential endogenous selection, and to alternative competing explanations. Specifically, we show that moving into vertically integrated segments does not yield any benefit (cf. Williamson, 1975); that the inclusion of (sector-agnostic) entropy measures (Palepu, 1985), constructed as well as our dataset allows, does not affect the results, and we also show that our results are robust to the use of measures of capital-market turbulence, which has recently attracted attention (e.g., Kuppuswamy & Vilallonga, 2015; Matvos, Seru, & Silva, 2018). Finally, our results are maintained when we consider BHC performance during and after the 2007–2009 financial crisis.

In sum, we confirm the Chandlerian thesis that sectors change through the way firms change their boundaries. We do so by providing comprehensive and systematic data on an important sector. Our paper draws on Teece *et al.* (1994), who, drawing on the *survivor principle* originally proposed by Alchian (1950) and reiterated by Stigler (1968), note that the frequent co-occurrence of activities must imply existing synergies among them. This powerful idea, more fully developed by Bryce and Winter (2009), has been used to measure relatedness on the basis of a sample of firms and their NAICS (or SIC) activities. We, too, draw on the survivor principle; however, following Chandler, our focus is on how sectors (and the relatedness of the firms within them) evolve. Unlike Bryce and Winter (2009), we do not focus on the inferences that we can draw from what is *stable* over time, aggregating



across time and across sectors. Rather, we focus on the dynamic story of relatedness that emerges bottom-up from our sample, as it *changes* over time, and track the competitive implications of following this evolving core. In a world of rapidly evolving sectors, from pharmaceuticals and healthcare to media and telecommunications, where businesses' scope is changing constantly over time, such a sector- and time-specific analysis can shed light on what drives sectoral and corporate change, and how such change impacts performance.

### **THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: RELATEDNESS AND ITS DYNAMICS**

Alfred Chandler's (1962) groundbreaking analysis of how major firms, from the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, transformed both themselves and their sectors by growing through scale, scope, and managerial innovation, has had a profound influence on our understanding of scope expansions. However, there has been little systematic follow-through on his key insights. While literature on scope and firm relatedness has proliferated, the focus tends to be on contemporaneous relationships. Change over time has been relatively neglected, and the interplay between sectoral- and firm-level scope dynamics has received even less attention. This leaves a surprising gap in the literature, emphasized in Chandler's last two books, on the evolution of electronics (2001) and chemicals companies and pharmaceuticals (2005). The introduction of his last book sums up this neglected issue:

The continuing evolution of the enterprises and the industries in which they operate focus on three basic themes: creating barriers to entry, defining the strategic boundaries of the enterprise, and evaluating the limits to growth of an industry and the enterprises within it.... [Firms] define their strategic boundaries through competition with one another. These boundaries reflect the competitive success and failure of the individual enterprises in terms of technical achievements and financial returns. I use the term boundaries because these enterprises are nearly always diversified multi-product producers. (Chandler, 2005: 9–10)

Chandler's research aims to shed light on this interplay between firm-level scope change and sector evolution, focusing on evolving patterns at the level of the sector. Using historical methods, he brings considerable subtlety to his analysis, weaving in organizational,

institutional, and competitive factors. This inescapably limits breadth (as he unapologetically focuses on the largest firms) and the ability to generalize.

While some authors have followed Chandler (such as Silver, 1984, or Langlois & Robertson, 1995), there has been little systematic work on this topic. Much of it has focused more narrowly on the question of vertical integration, motivated by the debates in Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1990), sometimes seen in the context of a deep sectoral study (Stuckey, 1989) but mostly focusing on the analysis of firms and their boundaries (Agarwal & Helfat, 2009).<sup>5</sup> Evolutionary approaches have also centered on the question of vertical scope (Langlois, 2004; Jacobides & Winter, 2005, 2012). Analyses of sector evolution proper have broadly taken scope and boundaries for granted, or treated them in a limited, coincidental manner (see Malerba *et al.*, 2016). This focus has provided considerable advances in our understanding of capabilities, technology, institutions, and profitability, but left scope expansion relatively understudied. Yet, when we consider the transformations under way in sectors from financial services and telecommunications to automobile manufacturing (which is mutating into mobility services), it is clear that we have much to learn from a systematic focus on how firms within sectors change their boundaries.

In a distinct literature stream spanning strategy, finance, and economics, the question of relatedness and its impacts has received much attention (Palich *et al.*, 2000). As a result, a more nuanced understanding of the benefits and shortcomings of diversification has emerged—albeit without an explicit consideration of either the role of scope *change* or of sector dynamics.<sup>6</sup> In particular, following Gort (1962) and Berry (1971), Rumelt observed

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<sup>5</sup> Chandler (1962) viewed the focus on vertical scope, and TCE in particular, as an aside that was a distraction. Tellingly, Williamson (unlike others) is not even cited in Chandler's final books on scope (2001, 2005).

<sup>6</sup> In finance, the expectation is that, as a result of the costs associated with agency frictions within the organizational hierarchy (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989), absent capital market imperfections, diversified firms suffer when compared to their narrower peers—as confirmed by findings that diversification dents banks' performance (see e.g., Stiroh, 2015, for a review). At the same time, questions have been raised in terms of the reasons behind the broadly negative associations between scope and performance. First, research

that *related* scope change could yield benefits (1974: 29). Research on this topic advanced considerably in the 1980s and 1990s with the growth of the Resource-Based View (Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988; Markides & Williamson, 1994), which has made significant strides.<sup>7</sup> To assess firm-level scope change, in terms of relatedness, following Jacquemin and Berry (1979) there has been sustained interest in entropy measures (see Palepu, 1985) to assess a firm's portfolio breadth and depth. Robins and Wiersema (1995) provide evidence on the performance impact of scope change and relatedness.

The literature that focuses on change explicitly is much more limited, and has only recently started garnering serious focus. Chang (1996) provides an early dynamic approach, mapping the sectors that firms enter into and exit from. The Special Issue in *SMJ* on the evolution of firm capabilities (Helfat, 2000) considers firm-level scope evolution (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Holbrook *et al.*, 2000), and Lieberman *et al.* (2017) show the connection between relatedness, exit dynamics, and performance. Feldman (see 2019 for a review) focuses on divestitures and the timing of entries and exits as they shape performance, also without a sector focus, whereas in finance there are economy-wide surveys of the evolution of corporate scope (Basu, 2010). This research has been reinvigorated by burgeoning work on resource reconfiguration (see Folta *et al.*, 2016). Research has focused not only on evidence supporting the value of relatedness, but also the underlying mechanisms that make it attractive, beyond resource sharing, and the role of turnover (e.g. Miller & Yang, 2016).<sup>8</sup>

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has shown that adverse selection could be the culprit—so that performance declines force diversification, and not the other way around (Chevalier, 2000; Campa & Kedia, 2002; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2002). Second, methodological limitations or measurement error (Villalonga, 2004a, b) have been identified. Numerous contributions have expanded this research, pointing out, among others, the connection between diversification and productivity (Schoar, 2002) and capital market conditions (Almeida, Kim, & Kim, 2015; Matvos, Seru, & Silva, 2018) that may make diversification more beneficial.

<sup>7</sup> Helfat and Eisenhardt (2004) argue that resource complementarity may not just be intra-temporal (i.e., the contemporaneous use of some common key resources) but may also be inter-temporal (i.e., the ability of firms to shift resources from one market to another over time). Research on resource redeployment (Folta *et al.*, 2016) has provided additional nuance and evidence of the potential benefits of redeploying resources across segments.

<sup>8</sup> Lieberman *et al.* (2017), for instance, argue that related diversification allows firms to reconfigure resources internally. This makes it easier to redeploy resources (and exit a segment) if a particular expansion doesn't pan out, making expansion *ex ante* safer and more attractive.

The measurement of relatedness has been a perennial bone of contention in scope-expansion research (Weiss, 2016). Early measures developed by Wrigley (1970) and Rumelt (1974), which highlighted the benefit of relatedness, were based on researcher discretion; they considered different categorical “types” of relatedness, which are still used. The desire to use consistent measurements and the availability of data encouraged the use of the SIC and later NAICS classification schemes, and the distance between sectors in terms of their hierarchical trees, in both strategy (see Chang, 1996; Weiss, 2016; Feldman, 2019) and finance (e.g., Rajan, Servaes, & Zingales, 2000). Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and Caves *et al.* (1980) proposed the most frequently used measures,<sup>9</sup> which were also relied upon to assess a particular firm’s overall portfolio entropy (Palepu, 1985).

NAICS hierarchies, though, do not offer a good assessment of how close segments truly are, as industry classifications are focused on outputs, whereas relatedness often relates to the input side—or to sharing common customers and distribution channels. A number of papers have tried to remedy that. Robins and Wiersema (1995) propose an alternative measure that draws on the technology and product flows between the segments. Silverman (1999) and Breschi, Lissoni, and Malerba (2003) propose a patent-based measure. Neffke and Henning (2013) make a convincing case for using labor-market similarity to assess individual business relatedness. However, as Pehrsson (2006) and Weiss (2016) mention in their reviews, most studies of relatedness that eschew SIC/NAICS classifications seem to diverge, and have failed to establish a single alternative basis for assessing relatedness (see Pil, 2009, for a summary and meta-analysis).

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<sup>9</sup> The widely used Jacquemin and Berry (1979) entropy measure draws on the number of a firms’ two-digit SIC sectors (measuring unrelated diversification), and the number of four-digit SIC segments within each two-digit group (measuring related diversification), using a Herfindahl-style concentration measure. The concentric index (e.g., Caves *et al.* 1980; Montgomery & Hariharan, 1991) also draws on the SIC system hierarchy. It first takes the product of shares of sales for each pair of businesses at the bottom level of the hierarchy and then multiplies that result by a digit representing the relationship between the two businesses in the SIC system. It takes the value 0 when all four-level SIC businesses belong to the same three-digit SIC band, 1 when they belong to the same two-digit group but different three-digit groups, and 2 when they are in different two-digit categories.

A different analytical strand connects relatedness with an evolutionary analysis of sectors, drawing on the “survivor principle” (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1968). This approach illuminates how some combinations of business activities will be more frequent than others, and that these combinations (e.g., in terms of particular NAICS or SIC pairs) imply the existence of relatedness-based synergies (Bryce & Winter, 2009).<sup>10</sup> These views are consistent with the explicitly evolutionary approach taken by Teece *et al.* (1994) that the scope of a firm at any given time is the result of its past history (and selection environment) and of the current pressures to adjust. Thus, the extent to which certain activities can be more or less related is also a reflection of sector-wide technological factors that should be common to all firms in operation at a given point in time, as well as the intensity of the selection environment. The most thorough empirical investigation of “bottom-up” relatedness is Bryce and Winter (2009), who draw on predominantly manufacturing data to derive their economy-wide relatedness measures between four-digit SIC codes.<sup>11</sup> However, although Bryce and Winter draw on a panel database, they *average out* the coincidences they observe in the data—and, as they concede, “the predictive value of our index rests on the premise that the methodology captures fundamental aspects of relatedness among industries... accounted for by relatively durable considerations” (2009).

The issue here is that *sectors themselves* evolve. New types of relatedness and synergies may emerge, just as old ones wither away, so that focusing on “average” relatedness over time will necessarily exclude an important part of the picture—especially in the context of a sector’s unfolding history. Changing technologies of production and organization, as well as

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<sup>10</sup> As Teece (1980) and Bryce and Winter (2009) note, the fact that two segments are not found combined in a single firm at a particular time does not imply that there are no synergies or that they are not related, as it may just be the case that the market provides a relatively effective means of combining them instead. They also draw on Richardson (1972) and others, who suggest that combinations within a firm’s boundary can also reflect experimentation, or the luxury of not needing to be too discriminating when selection pressures are weak.

<sup>11</sup> In particular, they draw on the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) at the Center for Economic Studies (CES) at the U.S. Census Bureau, and consider four-digit SIC codes, so as to create a map of the actual co-occurrence of potential SICs, judged against the potential null of any combination. This operationalizes the ideas in Teece *et al.* (1994), albeit focusing on manufacturing establishments and creating an economy-wide measure.

regulatory evolution, can shift the comparative advantage, e.g., from narrower to broader firms—along the lines of Chandler’s (1962, 1977, 2001, 2005) analysis. This is precisely where we see an opportunity for a contribution to theory, and to empirical understanding. Thus, our twofold contribution is to provide a sector-based measure of relatedness that evolves over time, reflecting sector-wide trends, and to use it to assess the *value* of combinations—as opposed to merely registering their occurrence.<sup>12</sup>

Fundamentally, though, our contribution lies in offering a new empirical design that looks at the sector level of analysis *as the sector evolves*. Our expectation is that the value of particular sector-segment combinations will change over time, as the landscape of opportunities and enabling regulations and technologies evolves. We also expect that firms that move closer to the evolving core of the sector will benefit more from their expansion. Our concern is not to compare the benefits of growth from scale vs. scope (Chandler, 1962, 1977, 1990), or of entry and exit over time (Chang, 1996); rather, it is to determine whether, as a sector’s core evolves, moving closer to it yields advantage. We find that it does.

## **DATA DESCRIPTION**

This study considers how Bank Holding Companies (BHCs), the predominant corporate structures in U.S. banking, changed their scope over time. As regulated entities, all BHCs are required to report any change to their structure, including subsidiaries entering or exiting the organization due to acquisitions of going concerns, de novo formations, sales, changes in ownership status, liquidation, or becoming inactive. For the first time, all this information has been assembled in a consistent panel covering the entire population (Cetorelli & Stern, 2015). Online Appendix A1 contains relevant summary statistics of the database.

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<sup>12</sup> We feel that our approach delivers on the concluding exhortation of Bryce and Winter (2009), who note that “[strategies] in a diversified firm, require longitudinal assessments of market entry choices. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, there are a limited number of empirical studies in the literature that take this perspective.”

By definition, all BHCs control one or more commercial bank subsidiaries—i.e. depository institutions that extend credit to households and corporations. Until the late 1980s, the U.S. banking sector had remained highly homogeneous, with such commercial bank subsidiaries being the dominant components of each banking firm, and the related deposit and loan activity representing the core of the sector. This is not surprising, given that U.S. banks had been effectively constrained for decades by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, with bank regulators maintaining a very narrow concept of the so-called “business of banking” (Omarova, 2009). This view progressively broadened, however, and by the end of the 1980s an influential Interpretive Letter of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency set forth a very broad interpretation of activities related to banking, and that were therefore permissible under the laws and regulations of the time (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1989). From that point onwards, BHCs could operate in an unrestricted environment for the first time, all subject to the same regulation, launching the significant transformation of scope that characterized the sector for the following two decades.

This change also coincided with the end of a severe, decade-long banking crisis “...of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression...” (FDIC, 1997). The crisis culminated with the passage of the FDICIA Act in 1991, marking the dawn of modern banking regulation (Spong, 1994). Hence, for the purposes of our study, 1992 marks the start of our panel. When the financial crisis of 2007–09 struck, the process of scope transformation came to a sudden halt, as the result of changing economic incentives as well as significant regulatory reform introducing new constraints on BHCs’ business scope. We therefore use the period between 1992 and 2006 as a laboratory to analyze the process of scope transformation in the sector.<sup>13</sup> Because we focus on firms’ performance, we have merged the database with information on

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<sup>13</sup> In Online Appendix A7 we have run tests to consider whether expansion into related segments, while beneficial during the growth era of the 1992–2006 expansion, might cause the demise of banks during or after the financial crisis. Our analysis confirms that this is not the case: our findings hold even during one of the sector’s most tumultuous periods.

BHCs' own consolidated financials (both balance sheet and income statement items). The matched sample consists of a panel of 3,206 unique BHCs for which we have financial data. This set of firms consistently accounts for the virtual totality of banking assets.

### **Defining business scope, expansion, and exit**

For each subsidiary of a BHC, the database reports its primary and, where applicable, secondary business activity. Only 3 per cent of all subsidiaries in the database ever report a secondary business activity, suggesting that for the vast majority of cases, the subsidiaries are narrow in scope and the database accurately reflects their activities. Also, less than 2 per cent of the subsidiaries ever change their primary or secondary activities—suggesting that, at least in terms of organizational structure, firms change their scope predominantly by creating new subsidiaries or shedding existing ones. Both primary and secondary activities are classified according to the finest (six-digit) North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. Since full six-digit codes are not available for all segments, we aggregated codes at the five-digit level.

We define *business scope* as the number of different five-digit codes that are under a BHC's organizational umbrella.<sup>14</sup> For example, a BHC that controls (one or more) commercial banks (NAICS 52211), (one or more) securities brokerage firms (NAICS 52312), and (one or more) life insurance carriers (NAICS 52411) would have a scope equal to 3. By extension, we define the *expansion* of scope as the addition of one or more subsidiaries in a five-digit NAICS that had never been part of the organization before. From here on, we refer to such NAICS as “new” segments, indicating that they are new *to the firm* (as opposed to new to the sector). We identify an expansion of scope whether it originates from a

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<sup>14</sup> For robustness, we also ran all our analyses on four-digit NAICS. This analysis (available upon request) produced consistent results.



subsidiary's primary or secondary segment.<sup>15</sup> Conversely, we define *exit* as the complete elimination of a previously held NAICS (whether through a sale of the entity, spin-off, or liquidation).

### **Commercial banking as common core, and evolution of scope**

Table 1 displays the composition of subsidiaries in the population of BHCs for reference years. The first row shows that the entirety of the population has at least one commercial bank subsidiary (NAICS 52211), thus confirming that commercial banking represents the common core of the sector—that is, the single segment that remains as a perennial fixture of the core throughout its evolution during our study period. That commercial banking represents the sector's common core is also indicated by the importance of commercial bank subsidiaries' assets. Table 2 displays the mean and median ratios of commercial banking assets to total BHC assets, for the entire population and for those subgroups of BHCs that expanded their scope at any point. The figures provide further confirmation that commercial banking represents the common core in the sector—even for BHCs that expand scope. The finding is unchanged if we construct equivalent ratios using income data instead of asset data.

Figure 1a also shows that most BHCs are “simple” organizations when they are first observed in the database, with most entities starting as commercial banks (NAICS 52211) or having subsidiaries in just one or two additional segments. This is a compelling feature of the population, since in most cases we see a process of business scope transformation driven by a relatively homogeneous base of similar firms—rather than by “legacy” firms that already had a more complex scope before becoming BHCs.

As noted previously, the process of expansion is broadly diffused—not just the practice

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<sup>15</sup> Restricting the identification to consider only subsidiaries' primary business segment would be a more conservative approach, under the presumption that if a NAICS is observed as a secondary activity, it might not be considered economically important enough to qualify as an expansion of scope. At the same time, including secondary NAICS improves the overall information set on BHCs' activity. We have run the entire analysis excluding secondary NAICS' information, and the results were extremely robust throughout.

of a select few. Figure 1b reports, in its upper part, the number of BHCs that pursued some degree of scope expansion in every year. We see a consistent number—about 200 institutions per year in the early 1990s—adding new segments, and then a ramping-up over time, reaching a peak of over 400 per year in the early 2000s. The trend then reverts—but, remarkably, there is still a relatively consistent cross-section of institutions entering new segments. Overall, more than half of the observed population engages in at least some degree of scope expansion.

One might object that much of what we see as strategic may simply reflect the passive incorporation of businesses resulting from merger and acquisition (M&A) dynamics. But this is not borne out by the data, which reveals that only 10% of scope expansions were ever the result of M&A activity between BHCs. Nevertheless, in the analysis of performance, we explicitly take into account the M&A dynamics within each BHC. Finally, we document that differences in scope are economically meaningful and not a product of regulatory arbitrage by estimating the relationship between scope and revenue components. We find that ownership of an additional unique five-digit NAICS code is associated with an increase in bank interest and non-interest revenues of about 0.74%. These results are discussed fully in the Online Appendix A2.

### **Measuring relatedness, and the evolving core**

Since our central question is the differential impact of *where* firms expand to, we need to address the “relatedness” of segments head-on. To do so, we start with traditional, static measures of both NAICS hierarchical distance and NAICS overall coincidence in the BHC sample, and build up to a new, dynamic measure of inferred relatedness. As stated earlier, all BHCs control at least one commercial bank subsidiary (NAICS 52211). Commercial banking was and remains the common core of the sector, even as many BHCs over time embark in significant scope expansion (see Online Appendix A3 for further details). As such, the

metrics of relatedness we present below can be constructed from this point of origin.

Following Caves *et al.* (1980), our first measure is the “distance relatedness” of a given NAICS code relative to code 52211. NAICS codes that share the same first four digits with 52211 are assigned a distance of 1; those that share only the first three digits are assigned 2, etc. The prediction would be that entering more distant segments should have a relatively worse impact on performance (see a description in, e.g., Markides & Williamson, 1994). A second, albeit simpler metric of relatedness differentiates between scope expansions into financial NAICS (codes beginning with 52) and non-financial NAICS (all other codes). This “NAICS 52 relatedness” is particularly relevant in our context, where narrow banks can be contrasted with broader BHCs.

However, as Bryce and Winter (2009), Weiss (2016), and others note, NAICS-distance is a problematic measure of true relatedness, as there may very well be segments that are “further away” from the common core in terms of classification codes, yet close in terms of relatedness. In banking, for example, real estate is a non-NAICS-52 segment that is nevertheless likely to offer direct synergies with commercial banking. Bryce and Winter (2009), following the suggestion of Teece *et al.* (1994), proposed an alternative approach, where the relatedness of two segments is inferred from the data, by the relative frequency with which those two segments are actually observed in the population under study.

The fact that we have direct and complete observations of the segments for all BHCs in the population allows us to improve on existing measurements of such overall coincidence, as we can observe the relative frequency of co-occurrence of each NAICS in relation to the common core (NAICS 52211). So, for example, in 2005, there were 2,215 BHCs in our observed population (Table 1). All, of course, had at least one 52211 subsidiary. Out of these 2,215 BHCs, 1,088 (or 49%) also reported subsidiaries with NAICS 52599, which includes, e.g., mortgage real estate investment trusts, collateralized mortgage obligations, and other

special purpose financial vehicles. Also in 2005, 594 BHCs (about 27%) reported control over insurance agency subsidiaries. In the spirit of Bryce and Winter (2009), these two segments are considered more related to commercial banking than, say, credit card issuing, which in the same year was reported by just 20 distinct BHCs (less than 1%). The expectation here would be that greater coincidence overall would be positively related to the performance impact of expansion into a new area.<sup>16</sup>

Following Bryce and Winter (2009), we therefore start by reporting a time-invariant overall inferred relatedness over the entire sample period. This “overall coincidence” measure of a given five-digit NAICS code is defined as the average percent of BHCs holding that NAICS code over the entire sample period.

However, while we draw on Bryce and Winter (2009) to establish the role of overall coincidence, we depart from their analysis since, unlike them, we are not content to look at the time-invariant aspects of coincidence.<sup>17</sup> For that we consider instead a dynamic measure, which we define as “modal relatedness,” by calculating the share of BHCs that own each particular NAICS code at each point in the sample period. This second approach thus yields a time-varying, cross-sectional ranking of the relative importance of each NAICS segment in the U.S. banking sector, which allows to capture the sector’s evolution and the shifting

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<sup>16</sup> That said, there is a scale-specific consideration that might be in play here. If, for instance, some segments (such as having an in-house executive education subsidiary) are only relevant for *larger* (and, as such, *fewer*) firms, then this segment is less likely to be commonly held across banks. A finer-grained analysis of a segment’s “coincidence conditional on size” might yield a different set of segments, but also a different subsample. We fully acknowledge that, beyond “average popularity,” a more refined picture might be possible, but we want to assess attributes for the sample as a whole, as further analysis would exceed what can be accomplished in a paper.

<sup>17</sup> In addition to focusing on a time-variant measure, we also use a different way to assess relatedness on the basis of observed coincidence. Bryce and Winter (2009) provide an economy-wide measure of coincidence, by looking, within their sample, at all the pair-wise combinations of sectors, and calculating a ratio of actual coincidences divided by theoretically possible coincidences, which yields a score for each pair of sectors. This creates a matrix of links between sectors, and, for the sectors where the coincidences are not observed in the data, they ascribe the shortest path distance between every pair of nodes in the weighted distance matrix. This yields a comprehensive pair-wise measure, which can be used to assess whether an expansion (given the set of sectors of a firm) into a new four-digit SIC is more or less related, drawing on the inferred relatedness the sample has yielded. Our interests are narrower, as we focus on how distant various segments are from the common core (NAICS 55221). This allows us to focus on a more parsimonious, if time-varying measure, explained below.

patterns in BHCs' structure as they change scope.

We further posit that expanding scope to a commonly owned NAICS code should yield a relatively better performance outcome. This allows us to capture the fact that adopting certain NAICS codes may have very different implications at different points in the banking sector's evolution, as Chandler's pioneering contributions showed. Thus, our proposed metric of modal relatedness captures the evolving frequencies of coincidence of each NAICS over time. As Table 1 shows, the relative ranking of segment subsidiaries held by BHCs differs significantly from 1995 and 2000, as technology, competition, and regulation (or perhaps fads) compel banks to change their scope.

Figure 2 offers a stark visualization of the changing degree of modal relatedness over the sample period for a representative subset of NAICS codes. For instance, the above mentioned NAICS 52599 was hardly present within the population in the early 1990s, but became a staple for BHCs in later years. The reason for its growing popularity was the transformation of the technology of financial intermediation caused by the asset securitization boom, which incited banks to move into it, as new synergies emerged as a result. Conversely, NAICS 53111, which includes entities managing residential dwellings, was popular in the early 1990s—presumably a time when balance-sheet assets such as mortgages and their collateral defined the predominant scope of a commercial bank—but later declined into obscurity, probably mirroring the subsequent evolution toward the originate-and-distribute model of intermediation. NAICS 52312, “Securities brokerage,” and 52421, “Insurance agencies and brokerages,” start at similar levels of popularity but diverge later on.

## **ANALYSIS**

### **Measuring the correlation of BHC aggregate performance and scope change**

Our objective is to assess the performance impact of firms' change of scope, on the basis of *where* they expand, as sectoral patterns of relatedness evolve. First, to establish a baseline, we

look at the impact of any instance of scope expansion—that is, the addition of subsidiaries in *new* segments by a BHC at a given point in time. Since we run our empirical analysis at an annual frequency, we use the sum of new NAICS that appeared in a BHC in a year as a measure of scope expansion. As our interest is in assessing the impact of changing a bank’s scope, we also look at exits from NAICS. Our data thus allow us to differentiate the performance impact across banks that build and maintain broader scope, as opposed to those that enter new segments while exiting others at the same time (“turnover”), consistent with the idea of strategic renewal (Capron *et al.*, 2001; Folta *et al.*, 2016). To capture these dynamics, we run the following specification:

$$Performance_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \cdot Cum\ Adoption_{i,t-j} + \gamma \cdot All\ Exit_{i,t-j} + \delta \cdot CumAdoption_{i,t-j} \times Exit_{i,t-j} + \theta \cdot Scope_{i,t-j-1} + \Xi \cdot Other\ Controls_{i,t-j-1} + \Phi_i + \Psi_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

The benchmark metric of performance is the BHC *i* accounting return on equity (ROE) measured in year *t*. The standard objection to using accounting metrics of performance is that they may not properly reflect the overall level of risk-taking. Further, the quality of accounting standards may not be homogeneous in the cross-section of firms under study. However, there are good reasons why concerns over the use of accounting metrics are less acute for this particular study. First, net returns reported in BHCs’ income statements include a component of “provisioning” for expected losses, which will be naturally correlated with the level of risk each firm is taking.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, in a sector subject to centralized, supervisory monitoring, accounting standards are bound to be more homogeneous and comparable across reporting BHCs than they would be for cross-sections of corporations not subject to supervisory authority. Also, the data strongly indicates that scope transformation occurs broadly across the entire population of BHCs, and not just among listed companies. For this

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<sup>18</sup> In fact, one could argue that, for this particular sector, there may be a possible upward bias in the use of market-based metrics: If scope expansion leads to circumstances where a BHC is “too complex to let fail,” markets may incorporate a valuation premium associated with this potential regulatory subsidy.

reason, we run our benchmark analysis on the entire population of BHCs, thus privileging the use of *ROE* as the default metric of performance.<sup>19</sup> The main regressor of interest is *Cum* (*Cumulative*) *Adoption*, defined as the total number of new NAICS that a BHC has added in the recent past. As we consider potential effects, it is plausible that expanding into a new segment may require a period of adjustment before any beneficial effect pans out. For example, one might expect that a commercial bank expanding into, say, investment banking needs to build a track record before it can generate returns from its new unit. Thus, value-enhancing scope expansions might initially reduce *ROE*, and only gradually lead to increasing *ROEs*.<sup>20</sup> To allow for this, we look at scope expansion activity over the previous  $n$  years, and measure the impact on performance at time  $t$ . In our baseline specification, we set  $j=3$ , so that the variables with a  $t-j$  subscript are meant to capture a sum over the previous three years.<sup>21</sup>

Financial data for individual subsidiaries is not available, so we cannot measure the intensity of engagement by a BHC in a new segment.<sup>22</sup> However, our focus is on banks that add segments that are new to the banks themselves (i.e. an extensive margin of business scope expansion), and our data are uniquely positioned to inform us about this.

The variable *All Exit*, meanwhile, measures the total number of NAICS that the BHC

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<sup>19</sup> We have nevertheless also performed the analysis using a market-based measure of performance, Tobin's Q, as well as metrics of leverage (which also helps assess ROA impact, as  $ROE = ROA \times \text{leverage}$ ) and risk, measured by the banks' Z-score. See Online Appendix A8.

<sup>20</sup> A similar story can be told for M&A, given the well-known concerns that mergers are costly in the short term because they require firms to integrate their corporate cultures, staff, systems, etc.

<sup>21</sup> We ran alternate specifications from one to five years, and the effects were most visible with the three-year lag—which is also, managerially speaking, a sensible period for the fruits of expansion to affect *ROE*. Tobin's Q impact was, unsurprisingly, over the same period, as the capital markets incorporated these inter-temporal tradeoffs. The consistency between our *ROE*, cumulative lag results, and the Tobin's Q impact, discussed below, increases our confidence in this specification. Finally, we used different weights, and concluded that under-weighting recent expansions and over-weighting previous ones (i.e., ones three years out) helped improve the fit, suggesting that full impact of expansion into new areas does take time, and that three years appears to be the most effective predictor.

<sup>22</sup> For many activities it is also not obvious that total asset size, or total income, would reflect the impact of the new segment. Some have a small organizational footprint but a significant impact (e.g. asset management services, data management, financial technology). Be that as it may, we fully acknowledge that the impact of entry may depend on entry size, and we do not have this information at hand.

completely dropped over the same three-year period, while the interaction between these first two variables captures the phenomenon of “turnover” as defined above. Controls include the level of *scope*, i.e. the count of unique five-digit NAICS within the BHC, before the three years of expansions captured by *Cum Adoption*. We also include basic firm-specific controls that should have a direct and independent impact on the performance of a bank—and for which, at the same time, one could argue that the metric of scope could serve as a proxy. For example, scope *per se* may not have any particular impact on performance, but could simply be a reflection of the size of the bank, with larger banks exhibiting higher returns on average, possibly indicating market power, or easier access to cheaper funding (e.g., Lang & Stulz, 1994). We therefore include the BHC’s log assets in all regressions. Likewise, as noted earlier, regulation constrains scope expansion for banking firms with declining performance. Capital adequacy is one of the main factors capturing a bank’s quality standing. Hence, we include the BHC’s capital-to-asset ratio as a basic control of overall firm quality. Moreover, we control for any M&A activity over the previous three years, as a way to condition on possible scope expansions that might be just the indirect consequence of such activity. In addition, we include the interaction of *Cum Adoption* with *Scope*, to allow for non-linear effects of expanding scope depending on the extent to which scope is broad to begin with. Finally, in order to account for latent heterogeneity in the population, we include BHC fixed effects,  $\Phi_i$ , so our analysis informs us on how dynamics of scope *transformation* affect firms, accounting for their heterogeneity. Also, both expansion decisions and performance could be driven by common unobservable factors changing over time. For example, banks may consider expanding during the upswings of macroeconomic cycles, when their performance may also improve. We address this issue by adding time fixed effects  $\Psi_t$  to the specification.

### **Relatedness and performance**



Our goal is to capture the impact of relatedness of different NAICS (which may change as the financial sector evolves), and use this information to assess the performance impact of banks' entry into more or less related new segments. To estimate the possible differential effect on performance of expansions with differing degrees of relatedness, we augment the previous model specification as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Performance_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot Cum\ Adoption_{i,t-j} + \beta_2 \cdot Cum\ Related\ Adoption_{i,t-j} + \gamma \cdot \\
 All\ Exit_{i,t-j} & + \delta \cdot Cum\ Adoption_{i,t-j} \times Exit_{i,t-j} + \theta \cdot Scope_{i,t-j-1} + \Xi \cdot Other\ Controls_{i,t-j-1} + \\
 \Phi_i + \Psi_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} & \qquad (2)
 \end{aligned}$$

Where, as before, *Cum Adoption* measures the total number of new NAICS a BHC added over the previous three years, and where *Cum Related Adoption* measures the degree of relatedness to core banking of the new NAICS included in *Cum Adoption*. We capture *Cum Related Adoption* using the four alternative relatedness metrics described above: distance, NAICS 52, overall coincidence, and modal relatedness. This specification allows us to compare the impact of moving into NAICS that are (a) close in terms of their hierarchical tree; (b) financial or non-financial by nature; (c) frequently found in BHC portfolios on average; or (d) in NAICS that are popular *at a specific time in the sector's evolution*, respectively.

## RESULTS

Table 3, column 1 reports the results based on specification (1). This is a benchmark specification where we look for the impact on performance of unconditional scope expansion, as captured by *Cum Adoption*. As the results in column 1 indicate, the act of expanding into new NAICS is unconditionally associated with a lower return on equity.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> While expansion might reduce ROE, it might still be beneficial from the vantage point of total value creation, provided that the additional returns produced (ROE-dilutive as they may be) are higher than the cost of capital, leading to a positive NPV. See Jacobides, Winter, and Kassberger (2012) for a broader discussion of total profits vs profitability, and Levinthal and Wu (2010) for a specific illustration of how the pursuit of scale-free resource advantages can reduce profitability and increase profits in diversification. That said, our measure looks at the *relative* benefits of different types of expansion, so focusing on ROE provides a clean measure.

Accounting for exiting strategies is also important, suggesting that firms that engage more broadly in scope expansion but also retrench when (presumably) their results are poor, on net display higher ROE. At the same time, the results in column 1 indicate that overall turnover of segments (as captured by the *Cum adoption x exit* interaction term) does not improve ROE—if anything, lowers it slightly.

The regression results also indicate that the impact of unconditionally expanding scope seems to have a non-linear component, with expansion among institutions with large initial scope gradually becoming associated with a positive impact.<sup>24</sup> The importance of unconditional scope expansion is shown even after controlling for BHCs' M&A activity, which we estimate to be associated with lower ROE as well.<sup>25</sup>

We continue with the presentation of our main results, where we establish empirical evidence of the differential impact on performance of scope expansion based on the relatedness of the new segments at the time of expansion. Table 3, column 2 shows the results of a regression based on specification (2), where *Cum Related Adoption* measures the average distance (measured from NAICS 52211) of NAICS codes adopted over the previous three years. The estimated coefficient for *Cum Adoption* remains similar to estimates in column 1, and the coefficient for *Cum Related Adoption* implies that expansion into NAICS that, on average, share one fewer digit with code 52211 is associated with only slightly lower ROE.

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<sup>24</sup> The robustness of this result, however, is challenged in robustness tests (presented in the Online Appendix), which suggest that the non-linearity is driven by a subset of BHCs that enter the database while already relatively broad in scope to start with (so that we cannot follow their entire evolution). What matters for us, though, is that the main result on unconditional scope expansion remains unchanged, even after the robustness tests.

<sup>25</sup> While the baseline control for M&A activity is represented by the cumulative number of subsidiaries acquired through M&A over the previous three years, we tried three alternative specifications, for which we ran the full set of analyses reported in the paper (results available upon request). First, we used an indicator variable that was activated if M&A activity occurred; second, we considered all adoptions that were the result of M&A separately; and third, we excluded from the computation of the cumulative adoptions those that were the result of an M&A event at the top-holder level. None of these affected our results. The robustness is also due to the fact that—as remarked earlier—only a small fraction of all scope adoption events come from M&A activity.

Together, the stable effect from overall adoption and the small coefficient for related adoption may result from the fact that code distance is a poor measure of relatedness.

Next, we try the alternative distance-based metric that separates expansion in NAICS 52 segments from any other. In this alternative specification, *Cum Related Adoption* is the sum of newly adopted segments that are within the 52 range. Column 2 reports that *Cum Adoption* is associated with lower ROE, and *Cum Related Adoption* is associated with higher ROE of a similar magnitude. This implies that expansion into non-financial (i.e., non-52) NAICS codes is associated with a fall in ROE of about 0.32%, while expansion into financial (i.e., 52) NAICS is associated with a negligible difference in ROE. If we assume that this relatedness measure has less measurement error than the distance-based measure in column 1, then these results imply that expansion into banking-related NAICS codes has less of an effect on overall ROE than expansion into non-financial NAICS codes.

We next turn to the overall coincidence measure of relatedness, computing it, following the implementation of Bryce and Winter (2009), as a time-invariant average for each NAICS over the *entire* sample. *Cum Related Adoption* is measured as the sum of overall coincidence relatedness for all of the NAICS that the BHC has adopted over the past three years. Is there a significant differential impact on performance associated with scope expansion in NAICS that, on average over the sample period, are more commonly held by BHCs? The estimated coefficient on *Cum Related Adoption* in Column 3 implies that adopting NAICS codes that are, on average, owned by one percentage point more BHCs over the sample period is associated with 2.13 basis points higher ROE. This estimate is not very precise, which we believe to be understandable given that the banking sector has undergone significant change over the sample period. Indeed, this was the reason we focused on this sector.

Finally, we focus our attention on the *evolving* metric of modal relatedness, shown in Column 4, which captures the dynamic nature of relatedness. As depicted in Table 1 for three

representative years, and in Figure 2 for selected NAICS over time, modal relatedness is the time-varying percentage of BHCs in the entire population that hold a given NAICS as part of their portfolio of subsidiaries.<sup>26</sup> *Cum Related Adoption* is measured as the sum of modal relatedness for all of the NAICS that the BHC has adopted over the past three years. Thus, column 4 reports that adopting NAICS codes that are owned by one percentage point more BHCs in that sample period is associated with 2.15 basis points higher ROE.

Column 4 strongly indicates that expanding into segments that are more popular among BHCs at the time of expansion is associated with higher ROE. Using the estimates in column 4, we can compare the effects of expanding into a given NAICS code when it is popular or unpopular. We run this exercise focusing on a single NAICS code, reporting the hypothetical impact of its addition to the organizational structure of a BHC for different degrees of prevalence among BHCs at the time of adoption. Take, for instance, NAICS 52421, “Insurance agencies and brokerage.” Over the sample period, it had a minimum modal relatedness of 12.2%, and a maximum of 37.5%, with fluctuations over time. A BHC that adopted this NAICS at its nadir of modal relatedness is expected to exhibit a lower ROE of approximately 0.15 percentage points ( $-0.39 + 0.0215 \times 12.2$ ). Adopting this NAICS at its maximum modal relatedness would be associated with a higher net ROE of 0.36 percentage points. Hence, adopting the same NAICS at different points in time can have very different implications for ROE.

The findings, then, suggest that dynamic measures of relatedness are not only theoretically appealing, but also have (in the context of a shifting sector) the ability to explain more variance, more consistently than other measures that rely upon NAICS distance or

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<sup>26</sup> If modal relatedness is a stock variable, which corresponds to existing research on relatedness inferred by coincidence, we also consider its “flow” counterpart as an additional measure of relatedness. As such, we classify individual NAICS on the basis of how many BHCs expanded in them over the previous year. This yielded a natural ranking, with “hot” NAICS at the top, with the understanding that the fact that many BHCs choose to enter the same segments at the same time may indicate bigger rewards at that time. Using such a flow metric yielded consistent results (available on request).

overall coincidence across time (à la Bryce & Winter, 2009). We concur with Weiss (2016) that measures of overall coincidence are superior to those obtained by looking at the NAICS tree, and find that looking at the *shifting* coincidence patterns (i.e., the evolving core of modal NAICS) provides even stronger results, reflecting the changing dynamics of the sector. We find that the *average* coincidence of NAICS is not strongly correlated with success, whereas the *evolving* coincidence, in the spirit of Chandler (1977, 2001, 2005), appears to be strongly correlated with success.

### **Disentangling treatment and selection effects for BHC expansion**

Scope transformation is obviously a choice and not a random occurrence, which raises a question over the interpretation of our results. Specifically, banking firms that are improving in terms of ROE may expand in particular ways, or firms with certain characteristics may systematically choose to make strategic scope expansion choices that suit them, so that our main results that rely on modal relatedness could be the result of selection rather than treatment. Our analytical strategy should help to address the impact of selection. First, we draw our inference from model specifications with BHC-level fixed effects, so that any time-invariant, BHC-specific trait that drives expansion dynamics is fully absorbed. Second, our panel regressions include important covariates, such as asset size, level of capitalization, scope before expansion takes place, alternative exiting strategies, and M&A occurrences, which should account for selection through effective use of observables. However, there may still be interpretation challenges. For example, it may still be the case that banks who have been on a better performance path in the past might tend to choose more conservative scope expansion strategies, thus adopting NAICS that are already comparatively popular among BHCs. Such hypothetical systematic difference in expansion choices, solely based on past performance, would represent a violation of the parallel trend assumption: the future ROE of BHCs that adopt NAICS with high modal relatedness is higher not because these NAICS

contribute more to overall performance, but simply because their ROE was already on a steeper uptrend than that of BHCs expanding in NAICS with lower modal relatedness. Conditioning on observable covariates and fixed effects may not be sufficient to assuage this concern.

We test the parallel trend assumption using a standard procedure: We identified all BHCs that expanded their scope in a given year and separated them into two groups based on whether they expanded into a NAICS segment with one of the 10 highest modal relatedness scores that year.<sup>27</sup> We then ran regressions of ROE on up to five years of lags of this modal relatedness dummy variable. If the ROEs of these two groups of BHCs follow a roughly parallel trend, the point estimates on the lags of the modal dummy should be close to zero. Figure 3 confirms this. On average BHCs that expanded into high modal relatedness NAICS exhibit roughly the same performance in the proximity of the expansion decision as BHCs that did not.

Confirming a non-violation of the parallel trend assumption provides comfort to a causal interpretation of our results. Yet, the parametric assumptions implicit in our model specification (the vector of observables have a linear impact on the outcome variable) may still generate selection biases. In particular, it is still possible that the outcome variable follows a different dynamic process for treated and untreated units, so that extrapolating the counterfactuals from the simple average treatment effect estimated in the benchmark regressions may still embed some biases. To address this issue, we complement the parametric approach used in our main analysis with three semiparametric treatment effects strategies developed in the field of program evaluation. With the first approach, a regression adjustment method, we allow for the dynamic process for the outcome variable (BHCs'

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<sup>27</sup> Sensitivity tests setting the modal relatedness “cutoff” as top 5 and top 15 of the rank ordering of segment popularity yielded qualitatively similar results.

performance) to be different for BHCs that expanded into NAICS segments with high modal relatedness (treated) from those that did not (untreated), and the estimations of the effect of the treatment are adjusted accordingly. The second approach, an inverse-probability weights method, is based on the estimation of the likelihood to be treated, so that in garnering the effect of the treatment, individual observations are weighted differently on the basis of such estimated likelihoods. The third is a combination of the two: a double-robust estimator method, considered to be the preferred approach in the literature (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). More details on the implementation of these alternative methods, and the corresponding results are presented in Online Appendix A5. The results, in Table A5, corroborate our main findings, offering strengthened support to the conjecture that expansions in segments with high modal relatedness yield relatively beneficial effects on future BHC performance.

## **REFINEMENTS AND ROBUSTNESS**

### **Vertical integration and changes in scope; change in entropy measures**

We ran a battery of tests to confirm the robustness of our choice of relatedness metric. First, we wanted to run a horse race between cumulative related adoption based on modal relatedness and NAICS 52 relatedness, which was also positive in the results reported in Table 3. Column 1 of Table 4 shows that when including both NAICS 52 and modal relatedness, the latter is more important: The static NAICS 52 coefficient is reduced by 30% when compared to its standalone regression, while the coefficient on modal relatedness decreases by only 13%.

We also want to ensure that our results are not the spurious outcome of some other potential confounding variables. As such, we consider two motivations for changing a firm's scope: a potential desire to bolster vertical integration (VI) given the presence of Williamsonian transaction costs, and the potential desire to overcome external financing

frictions during periods of adverse capital market conditions. We construct a metric of how vertically related a BHC's scope expansions are by drawing on Input-Output Accounts Data (IO table) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).<sup>28</sup> This is done as follows. Let  $n$  be the five-digit NAICS adopted by the BHC at time  $t$ . From the input table at time  $t-1$  we sum across the inputs that  $n$  gives to each of the NAICS the BHC already holds. A high value of the sum indicates that the addition of  $n$  significantly increases the upstream vertical integration of segments in which the BHC is active. The sum is dynamic in that as a BHC expands its scope, its opportunities for vertical integration also increase: In a BHC with a large scope, there are more NAICS with which the new NAICS  $n$  can be vertically related. We then normalize the inputs sum by dividing from it the total amount of inputs (across all segments, regardless of whether they are held by the BHC) used by the NAICS that the BHC already held prior to its expansion. The resulting metric, which we call *Added VI*, thus captures the extent to which a given scope expansion increases the proportion of upstream production that is housed within the BHC.

Column 2 of Table 4 includes *Added VI* (summed over all NAICS adopted over the past three years) and its interaction with modal relatedness, allowing us to assess the extent to which a firm enters into a commonly held VI sector in our BHC population.<sup>29</sup> We find, first, that *VI* is negative, and second, that the interaction between *Cum Modal Adoption* and *VI* is positive: The value of *VI* increases with a segment's relatedness, positively affecting ROE. More important, adding the variable picking up the relative contribution to *VI* of the adopted

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<sup>28</sup> These tables provide information on how industries in the U.S. economy interact. For a given three-digit NAICS industry  $i$ , the BEA constructs the input component of the IO table by calculating the annual U.S. economy-wide dollar value of inputs provided by each three-digit NAICS industry (including industry  $i$  itself) for the production of output by industry  $i$ . If industry  $i$  takes a large proportion of its inputs from industry  $j$ , then we can reason that industry  $j$  is upstream in the production chain of industry  $i$ , and that the two industries are vertically related.

<sup>29</sup> Modal relatedness of some vertically related segments increases over time, and others less so. This reflects BHCs choosing which of their related segments to hold. NAICS 541 ("Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services"), which includes NAICS 54199 (mostly, specialized B2B service providers) and NAICS 54119 ("Legal Services") gains popularity, while NAICS 561 ("Administrative and Support Services") loses popularity over our sample period, even though both maintain similar vertical linkages.



segment in our analysis does not detract from (evolving) relatedness, and thus our key variable of interest, *Cum Modal Adoption*, remains robust.

Another potential explanatory feature, explored in the diversification literature, is the “entropy measure,” introduced by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and developed further by Palepu (1985). This static measure, used in general population (as opposed to sector study) settings, can be duly modified, to help us see whether the variance in ROE is not caused by firms following the evolving core of the sector, but rather because of the way their diversification pattern (in terms of the evolution of their Palepu score) evolves. Our objective is to see whether the benefits of moving closer to the shifting core of the sector would be robust to a firm-level variable that would consider the BHC’s changing entropy profile. So, replicating our model specification, we ran a regression where we included *total diversification* (in the Palepu sense) at time t-4 and then the change in both *total* and *related diversification* (again, following the Palepu-style formulation above) over the following three years, as we have to provide a dynamic equivalent of a static measure. Column 3 of Table 4 shows that the new variables do not explain variance in our setting. In Column 4 we included such variables in a horse race with our metrics of scope adoptions. Both *Cum Adoption* and *Cum Modal Adoption* preserve their sign and magnitude. Online Appendix 3A contains details about the construction of such measures.

Finally, our results are also robust to the possible confounding factor of coinsurance from diversification (Online Appendix A3), and likewise to running the analysis using market-based metrics of performance (Tobin’s Q), and alternative metrics of risk, such as leverage and the BHC’s Z-score (see Online Appendix A8).

## **CONCLUSION**

This paper has shed light on the dynamics of sector transformation through the expansion of firms into new segments, focusing on U.S. banking, through the BHC population from 1992

to 2006. As Chandler (1962, 1977) noted, the transformation of corporations is part and parcel of the process of sector evolution. Chandler's last two books, on the evolution of electronics (2001) and pharmaceuticals and chemicals (2005), showed how the biggest firms in these two sectors transformed both themselves and the sector as a whole, by broadening their boundaries. However, the richness and detail of Chandler—like that of other business historians who described such evolution, such as Silver (1984) and Langlois and Robertson (1995)—comes at the cost of an inability to capture the entire sector, or to provide precise estimates of the impact (or indeed appropriateness) of changes in scope. Drawing on a data set of unprecedented depth and detail, we conduct a large-scale study of a significant sector in a time of flux, examining firms' changes in scope and experimentation with new activities as they try to take advantage of their regulatory and institutional environment. Since the rules are identical for all participants, and BHCs all start out as narrow, we can see how such expansion played out. We find that the sector has a clearly defined core that evolves over time, and that following this core pays off.

Our paper complements research in sector evolution with a comprehensive, large-scale sector study of scope transformation, focusing on its drivers and consequences. Within this, the established wisdom is partly confirmed. Expanding into new business segments is found not to be beneficial, and has a performance impact that is an order of magnitude greater than creating a new subsidiary in an existing segment.<sup>30</sup>

We also consider relatedness. First, we consider its impact as measured by hierarchical NAICS distance and estimate a small and imprecise effect on ROE. We then consider a coarser distinction between financial and non-financial expansion and find that non-financial expansion is associated with lower ROE than financial expansion. Drawing on Bryce and Winter (2009), we construct a time-invariant measure of relatedness based on the prevalence

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<sup>30</sup> We corroborate this point in the extension analysis reported in Online Appendix A6.

of certain NAICS codes but estimate imprecise results, which may be caused by the static nature of this measure. Lastly, we consider a dynamic measure of relatedness based on how many BHCs currently hold a given NAICS. We estimate that expansion into popular NAICS is associated with higher overall ROE. This result withstands a battery of endogeneity tests, suggesting that there is a persistent treatment effect of adopting NAICS that are currently popular among other BHCs—“following the times,” as it were. This result is robust to the inclusion of measures of vertical integration, changes in the entropy of expanding BHCs, and measures of market risk, and still holds if we exclude BHCs with a minority of assets in commercial banking. Finally, we also show that M&A at BHC level does not drive our results, suggesting that this expansion is the result of a desire to broaden the scope of the banking firm.

Our paper is the first to offer a systematic account of the dynamics of relatedness, based on coincidence and sectoral evolution, and also the first to connect this measure to performance. This extends the thesis of Teece *et al.* (1994) and shows that *there is a net benefit of expanding into the evolving core of a sector*, which is not driven by selection. We thus find support for the Chandlerian thesis, and also establish why sector studies should be used to understand scope changes, and vice versa. Our approach, consistent with historically based work emphasizing the role of shifting business models in financial services (Cetorelli *et al.*, 2012; Jacobides *et al.*, 2014), may thus help us revisit the nature and benefits of relatedness (Rumelt, 1982; Weiss, 2016) and the drivers of resource renewal (Folta *et al.*, 2016).

Our results are robust to using market-based metrics of performance, and are robust to measures relating to vertical integration, capital market volatility, and firm-level entropy changes. As to why BHCs would expand into segments that do not increase ROE, a number

of reasons can be put forth, although our paper does not discern them.<sup>31</sup> Our paper is also limited in terms of its normative implications. We have explicitly focused on a benign period of increasingly permissive policy, regulatory flux, and radical technological change that transformed both the process of financial intermediation and the scope of the majority of firms. While we find that related expansion in banking may have helped BHCs in this favorable period, and has not adversely affected their fate during the financial crisis, we did *not* explore the broader social welfare impact that has resulted from the transformation of BHCs. Benefits for BHCs who transform their scope do not imply concomitant benefits for society as a whole; nor do they rule out the possibility of associated negative systemic externalities (Tett, 2009; Rajan, 2011; Jacobides *et al.*, 2014). This is an important issue, and one that deserves dedicated study.

That said, our paper provides the first systematic, large-scale, longitudinal study of scope changes and their performance implications in a sector, and raises the need to better combine our understanding of scope and sector evolution—a path we hope will be more widely followed.

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<sup>31</sup> There are three categories of reasons that we think can explain this pattern. The first is economically rational: The most straightforward reason is that, whereas these moves reduce ROE, they still increase total profits and have a positive NPV, inasmuch as the returns are higher than the cost of capital. As Levinthal and Wu (2010) have noted, diversification can cause profitability to decline while total profits continue increasing, so that economically rational expansion dilutes the rates of return. Less plausibly, it may be the case that while unrelated expansions may not contribute to performance year in, year out, they can still contribute to the benefits of scope expansion in particularly adverse states of nature. The second set of reasons for this pattern relates to managerial agency: Different managerial teams have different risk appetites and may “gamble” on new directions—an area we will consider in future research. The third set of reasons relates to fundamental uncertainty: New segments entail uncertainty and experimentation, so there may be little *ex ante* understanding of what will add value in the first place. Our paper cannot distinguish between these three sets of explanation. Our aim was to document the pattern and leave the exploration of these competing hypotheses for future research.

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**Table 1: Frequency of NAICS for select years**

NAICS		1995			2000			2005		
		BHC count	BHC share (%)	Sub count	BHC count	BHC share (%)	Sub count	BHC count	BHC share (%)	Sub count
52211	Commercial banking	1272	100.00	3418	1705	100.00	3348	2215	100.00	3428
52599	Other financial vehicles	13	1.02	16	251	14.72	512	1088	49.12	2680
52421	Insurance agencies and brokerages	163	12.81	284	398	23.34	896	594	26.82	1134
55111	Management of companies and enterprises	292	22.96	1420	431	25.28	2111	497	22.44	2158
52229	Other nondepository credit intermediation	219	17.22	602	291	17.07	893	333	15.03	1236
54199	All other professional, scientific, and technical services	118	9.28	309	209	12.26	493	277	12.51	814
53111	Lessors of residential buildings and dwellings	253	19.89	957	276	16.19	1327	229	10.34	1447
52393	Investment advice	105	8.25	312	169	9.91	695	211	9.53	847
52222	Sales financing	169	13.29	797	226	13.26	1193	203	9.16	1315
52312	Securities brokerage	169	13.29	272	186	10.91	321	198	8.94	326
52399	All other financial investment activities	120	9.43	520	148	8.68	685	171	7.72	813
51821	Data processing, hosting, and related services	153	12.03	278	175	10.26	358	146	6.59	299
62422	Community housing services	101	7.94	531	124	7.27	2779	142	6.41	5138
52239	Other activities related to credit intermediation	126	9.91	1358	111	6.51	308	105	4.74	209
53119	Lessors of other real estate property	16	1.26	18	107	6.28	207	101	4.56	176
52411	Direct life, health, and medical insurance carriers	119	9.36	259	115	6.74	347	99	4.47	296
54119	Other legal services	13	1.02	21	57	3.34	82	94	4.24	137
52391	Miscellaneous intermediation	57	4.48	170	71	4.16	434	81	3.66	662
52413	Reinsurance carriers	33	2.59	43	57	3.34	65	64	2.89	87
53139	Other activities related to real estate	8	0.63	8	16	0.94	20	61	2.75	111
54161	Management consulting services	43	3.38	111	53	3.11	134	60	2.71	127
52311	Investment banking and securities dealing	7	0.55	7	51	2.99	169	55	2.48	151
53112	Lessors of nonresidential buildings (except miniwarehouses)	61	4.80	186	44	2.58	113	54	2.44	131
52231	Mortgage and nonmortgage loan brokers	27	2.12	76	29	1.70	39	48	2.17	108
52392	Portfolio management	11	0.86	21	21	1.23	67	48	2.17	180
52412	Direct insurance (except life, health, and medical) carriers	6	0.47	6	12	0.70	14	44	1.99	62
52429	Other insurance related activities	2	0.16	2	11	0.65	13	38	1.72	49
52212	Savings institutions	88	6.92	102	73	4.28	77	34	1.53	40
53132	Offices of real estate appraisers	19	1.49	19	27	1.58	29	32	1.44	37
52313	Commodity contracts dealing	40	3.14	96	33	1.94	362	26	1.17	176
52591	Open-end investment funds	4	0.31	4	15	0.88	30	25	1.13	164
52232	Financial transactions processing, reserve, and clearinghouse activities	38	2.99	202	32	1.88	243	23	1.04	192
53121	Offices of real estate agents and brokers	50	3.93	424	36	2.11	86	22	0.99	44
52590	Other investment pools and funds	14	1.10	65	21	1.23	187	22	0.99	81
53131	Real estate property managers	4	0.31	4	6	0.35	9	22	0.99	38
52221	Credit card issuing	27	2.12	54	37	2.17	78	20	0.90	53
52220	Nondepository credit intermediation	25	1.97	348	28	1.64	342	18	0.81	94
56199	All other support services	38	2.99	73	25	1.47	49	17	0.77	26
23721	Land subdivision	42	3.30	100	28	1.64	152	15	0.68	149
52390	Other financial investment activities	4	0.31	7	7	0.41	18	15	0.68	52
56144	Collection agencies	10	0.79	14	8	0.47	9	14	0.63	16
54121	Accounting, tax preparation, bookkeeping, and payroll services	7	0.55	9	7	0.41	11	13	0.59	18
53242	Office machinery and equipment rental and leasing				3	0.18	4	13	0.59	16
81321	Grantmaking and giving services	8	0.63	8	9	0.53	14	13	0.59	16
52314	Commodity contracts brokerage	16	1.26	24	12	0.70	28	12	0.54	20
48121	Nonscheduled air transportation	3	0.24	3	6	0.35	5	12	0.54	11
53249	Other commercial and industrial machinery and equipment rental and leasing	5	0.39	5	8	0.47	11	11	0.50	14
54151	Computer systems design and related services	10	0.79	27	12	0.70	37	10	0.45	40
53130	Activities related to real estate	13	1.02	61	14	0.82	71	9	0.41	27
53241	Construction, transportation, mining, and forestry machinery and equipment	4	0.31	5	5	0.29	8	9	0.41	14

Table 1 shows the share of BHCs that hold the top 50 most common five-digit NAICS sorted in descending order based on the 2005 count of BHCs that hold each NAICS. A BHC is defined as holding a NAICS if the NAICS is either the primary or secondary business activity reported by at least one of its subsidiaries. *BHC count* is the number of BHCs that exist during the year and *Sub count* is the number of subsidiaries with the NAICS. The underlying source is the database of Cetorelli and Stern (2015).

**Table 2: Evolution of the sector's common banking core**

Year	All BHCs		Scope expanding BHC	
	Mean Bank asset ratio	Median Bank asset ratio	Mean Bank asset ratio	Median Bank asset ratio
1992	0.815	0.979	0.776	0.884
1993	0.819	0.985	0.775	0.894
1994	0.822	0.987	0.772	0.881
1995	0.827	0.989	0.780	0.900
1996	0.839	0.991	0.795	0.942
1997	0.847	0.992	0.811	0.970
1998	0.865	0.993	0.835	0.984
1999	0.871	0.994	0.844	0.987
2000	0.881	0.995	0.859	0.991
2001	0.892	0.996	0.873	0.993
2002	0.903	0.997	0.886	0.995
2003	0.912	0.997	0.900	0.996
2004	0.917	0.997	0.906	0.996
2005	0.921	0.997	0.909	0.997
2006	0.891	0.996	0.886	0.995

Table 2 displays both mean and median bank-to-total-BHC-asset ratios, calculated for the entire population in a year and for the subset of scope expanding BHCs. The numerators are the total assets of the commercial bank subsidiaries (NAICS 52211 entities) of each BHC, while the denominators are the consolidated assets of the BHCs, thus including the contribution of non-52211 subsidiaries.

**Table 3: Impact of scope expansion on performance**

	(1) Unconditional	(2) Distance	(3) NAICS 52	(4) Coincidence	(5) Modal
Cumulative adoption	-0.132 (0.0715)	-0.119 (0.0911)	-0.325 (0.121)	-0.185 (0.108)	-0.386 (0.117)
Cum. related adoption		-0.0152 (0.0576)	0.298 (0.141)	0.0213 (0.0299)	0.0215 (0.00781)
All exit	0.193 (0.104)	0.194 (0.104)	0.183 (0.105)	0.194 (0.104)	0.198 (0.104)
Cum. adoption X exit	-0.0198 (0.00970)	-0.0200 (0.00976)	-0.0187 (0.00906)	-0.0201 (0.00972)	-0.0199 (0.00975)
Cum. adoption X scope	0.00877 (0.00452)	0.00852 (0.00471)	0.0120 (0.00477)	0.0102 (0.00478)	0.0146 (0.00438)
Cumulative M&A	-0.336 (0.101)	-0.337 (0.101)	-0.333 (0.0993)	-0.329 (0.100)	-0.331 (0.0998)
Scope (lagged)	-0.218 (0.0619)	-0.217 (0.0628)	-0.228 (0.0613)	-0.222 (0.0626)	-0.242 (0.0612)
Log assets	-1.205 (0.593)	-1.207 (0.595)	-1.222 (0.590)	-1.175 (0.603)	-1.186 (0.591)
Capital ratio	-0.435 (0.0735)	-0.435 (0.0735)	-0.437 (0.0733)	-0.434 (0.0734)	-0.436 (0.0736)
Constant	34.11 (7.854)	34.15 (7.885)	34.40 (7.822)	33.73 (7.978)	33.94 (7.834)
Bank fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10226	10226	10226	10226	10226
Adjusted $R^2$	0.032	0.032	0.033	0.032	0.034

Table 3 reports regressions of performance on both unconditional and related adoption of new NAICS based on specification (1) and (2). The dependent variable is a BHC's return on equity. An adoption is defined as the appearance of a new five-digit NAICS within a BHC's organizational structure. *Cumulative adoption* is the count of a BHC's adoptions over a consecutive three-year period. *Cum. related adoption* is a sub-specification of *Cumulative adoption* based on the adoption relatedness definition specified in each column header. *Distance* (Column 2) defines related adoption as the average distance (one, two, three or four digits) from NAICS 52211 of the NAICS adopted by the BHC. *NAICS 52* (Column 3) is the subset of the cumulative adoption count of adoptions in NAICS 52. *Coincidence* (Column 4) defines related adoptions by using a Bryce and Winter metric of relatedness as a time-invariant average calculated over the whole time period of analysis. *Modal* (Column 5) defines related adoptions as the sum of the shares of BHCs that hold the NAICS a BHC adopt at the time of adoption. Regressions include both BHC and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the BHC level.

**Table 4. Robustness tests. Financial NAICS, entropy metrics and vertical Integration**


	(1) Modal w/ 52	(2) Modal w/ VI	(3) Entropy	(4) Modal w/ entropy
Cumulative adoption	-0.493 (0.142)	-0.193 (0.165)		-0.385 (0.116)
Cum Modal adoption	0.0187 (0.00794)	0.0162 (0.00812)		0.0220 (0.00784)
NAICS 52 adoptions	0.214 (0.143)			
All exit	0.190 (0.104)	0.216 (0.104)		0.200 (0.106)
Cum. adoption X exit	-0.0191 (0.00927)	-0.0224 (0.0103)		-0.0217 (0.00973)
Cum. adoption X scope	0.0162 (0.00459)	0.0128 (0.00493)		0.0149 (0.00448)
Cumulative M&A	-0.330 (0.0986)	-0.358 (0.100)	-0.304 (0.0986)	-0.298 (0.0994)
Scope (lagged)	-0.246 (0.0608)	-0.228 (0.0620)	-0.150 (0.0542)	-0.259 (0.0624)
Weighted total diversification (lagged)			-0.134 (0.179)	-0.143 (0.170)
Weighted total diversification (change)			-0.201 (0.171)	-0.223 (0.170)
Weighted related diversification (change)			-0.175 (0.440)	-0.137 (0.438)
Log assets	-1.201 (0.590)	-1.173 (0.592)	-1.335 (0.590)	-1.161 (0.590)
Capital ratio	-0.437 (0.0735)	-0.439 (0.0740)	-0.440 (0.0741)	-0.437 (0.0738)
Cum. added VI		-0.0277 (0.0106)		
Modal X VI		0.000240 (0.000143)		
Constant	34.17 (7.810)	33.81 (7.852)	35.74 (7.842)	33.73 (7.823)
Bank fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10226	10226	10225	10225
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.034	0.035	0.032	0.034

Table 4 reports additional regressions of performance on related adoption of new NAICS. Column (1) includes both the modal relatedness and NAICS 52 relatedness versions of Cumulative Related Adoptions. *Cum Modal adoption* corresponds to cumulative related adoption based on modal relatedness and *NAICS 52 adoptions* corresponds to cumulative related adoption based on NAICS 52 relatedness. Column (2) shows the modal relatedness regression augmented with a measure of vertical integration added via adoption, *Cum. added VI*, along with the interaction between this variable and *Cumulative adoption* and *Modal. Cum. added VI* is the sum of the amount of inputs (from the BEA Input/Output table) the adopted NAICS contributes to each of the BHC's NAICS (normalized by the total inputs taken by the BHC's NAICS), summed over each adoption in the past three years. *Weighted total and related diversification* are the entropy measures constructed on the basis of Palepu (1985). Exact derivation of these variables is presented in Online Appendix A3. Column (4) compares the explanatory power of *Modal* and *Entropy* adoption by including both sets of regressors contemporaneously. Regressions include both BHC and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the BHC level.

**Table 5: Description of Key Variables**


<b>Variable</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Unit of observation</b>	<b>Source</b>	
<i>Adoption</i>	Addition of a new five-digit NAICS to a BHC's organizational structure.	NAICS-BHC-year	<i>FR Y-6 Annual Report of Bank Holding Companies; FR Y-10 Report of Changes in Organizational Structure</i>	
<i>Cumulative Adoption</i>	Count of a BHC's Adoptions over the preceding three years.	BHC-year		
<i>Exit</i>	Disappearance of a five-digit NAICS from a BHC's organizational structure.	NAICS-BHC-year		
<i>All Exit</i>	Count of a BHC's Exits over the preceding three years.	BHC-year		
<i>Scope</i>	Count of unique five-digit NAICS within a BHC's organizational structure.	BHC-year		
<i>Cumulative M&amp;A</i>	Number of subsidiaries acquired by a BHC from other BHCs over the preceding three years.	BHC-year		
<i>Return on Equity</i>	Ratio of net income to equity of a consolidated BHC.	BHC-year		<i>FR Y-9C Consolidated Report of Condition and Income</i>
<i>Log assets</i>	Natural log of total assets held by a consolidated BHC.	BHC-year		
<i>Capital ratio</i>	Ratio of regulatory capital to total assets of a consolidated BHC.	BHC-year		
<i>Coincidence Relatedness</i>	Share of BHCs that hold a given NAICS code in a given year, averaged over the entire sample period by NAICS code.	NAICS		
<i>Modal Relatedness</i>	Share of BHCs that hold a given NAICS code in a given year.	NAICS-year	<i>FR Y-6 Annual Report of Bank Holding Companies; FR Y-10 Report of Changes in Organizational Structure</i>	
<i>Cumulative Related Adoption – Distance</i>	Average distance between each unique NAICS codes that a BHC adopted over the preceding three years and the code "52211." Distance between two five-digit codes is defined as the number of digits that do not match between the two codes. All digits that follow the first unmatched digit are considered unmatched. For example, codes "53111" and "52211" have a distance of four because they do not match on the second digit.	BHC-year		
<i>Cumulative related adoption – NAICS 52</i>	A subset of Cumulative Adoption restricted to financial NAICS (first two digits are "52").	BHC-year		
<i>Cumulative Related Adoption – Coincidence</i>	Sum of Coincidence Relatedness for all NAICS adopted by a BHC in the preceding three years.	BHC-year		
<i>Cumulative Related Adoption – Modal</i>	Sum of Modal Relatedness for all NAICS adopted by a BHC in the preceding three years.	BHC-year		

Variable	Description	Unit of observation	Source
<i>Added VI</i>	<p>A measure of potential vertical integration between an adopted five-digit NAICS segment and an existing BHC organizational structure. Consider a BHC that adopts segment <math>p</math> in year <math>t</math> and held a subset, <math>M \in N</math>, of all segments in the previous year, <math>t - 1</math>. Let <math>x_{n,m,t}</math> represent the IO table input of segment <math>n</math> to segment <math>m</math> in year <math>t</math>. <i>Added VI</i> is defined as,</p> $\text{Added VI}_t = \frac{\sum_{m=1}^M x_{p,m,t-1}}{\sum_{m=1}^M \sum_{n=1}^N x_{n,m,t-1}}$	BHC-year	Input-Output Accounts Data (IO table) from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
<i>Cum. Added VI</i>	The sum of Added VI for all NAICS adopted by a BHC in the preceding three years.	BHC-year	
<i>Total Diversification</i>	<p>A measure of BHC diversification analogous to entropy from Palepu (1985). Let <math>P_i</math> be the share of subsidiaries with five-digit NAICS segment <math>i</math> over the total number of subsidiaries held by the BHC. For a BHC holding <math>I</math> unique segments, <i>Total Diversification</i> is defined as,</p> $DT = P_i \sum_{i=1}^I \ln\left(\frac{1}{P_i}\right)$	BHC-year	FR Y-6 <i>Annual Report of Bank Holding Companies</i> ; FR Y-10 <i>Report of Changes in Organizational Structure</i>
<i>Related Diversification</i>	<p>A measure of BHC diversification centered on related NAICS groups following Palepu (1985). Consider a three-digit NAICS group, <math>j</math>, held by a BHC and five-digit NAICS segment, <math>i \in j</math>, within group <math>j</math>. We define related diversification of group <math>j</math> as,</p> $DR_j = \sum_{i \in j} P_i^j \ln\left(\frac{1}{P_i^j}\right),$ <p>where <math>P_i^j</math> is the ratio of subsidiaries in segment <math>i</math> to subsidiaries in group <math>j</math>. For a BHC with <math>J</math> groups, <i>Related Diversification</i> is defined as,</p> $DR = \sum_{j=1}^J DR_j P^j,$ <p>where <math>P^j</math> is the ratio of subsidiaries in group <math>j</math> to total subsidiaries in the BHC.</p>	BHC-year	



**Figure 1a: BHC scope upon entry**


Figure 1a shows a histogram of initial activity scope for all BHCs that file the Y-9C and become BHCs during the sample period (1992–2006). Initial activity scope is the number of unique five-digit NAICS that a BHC holds during its first year as a top-tier BHC, based off the reported primary or secondary NAICS of its controlled subsidiaries. The data underlying the activity scope measure is from the Cetorelli and Stern (2015) database of organizational structure.



**Figure 1b: Annual number of BHCs with adoptions or exits**


Figure 1b shows, among Y-9C-filing BHCs, how many BHCs make at least one adoption and/or at least one exit during each year over the sample period (1992–2006). An adoption occurs for a given year when a BHC controls a subsidiary with a five-digit primary or secondary NAICS code that prior to that year the BHC had never held within its organization. An exit occurs for a given year when it is the final year that a BHC holds a five-digit NAICS that it has held in prior years. The data underlying the adoption and exit statistics is from the Cetorelli and Stern (2015) database of organizational structure.





**Figure 2: Annual prevalence of selected NAICS**

Figure 2 shows the *modal relatedness* of four different five-digit NAICS among Y-9C-filing BHCs for each year over the sample period (1992–2006). The right y-axis corresponds to the modal relatedness of NAICS 52599 (“Other Financial Vehicles”), while the left y-axis corresponds to the other three NAICS. Modal relatedness for a NAICS-year equals the number of BHCs that hold that NAICS during any quarter of the year divided by the total number of BHCs in the population (multiplied by 100). A BHC is considered to hold a NAICS if it controls at least one subsidiary whose reported primary or secondary activity is that NAICS. The underlying data is from the Cetorelli and Stern (2015) database of organizational structure.



**Figure 3. Parallel trends**

Figure 3 reports the estimated coefficients of lags (up to 4 years) of an indicator variable that is equal to one for BHCs engaging in a modal expansion at time  $t=0$ , and it is equal to zero for instances in the same year of non-modal expansions. For each lag the dot depicts the magnitude of the coefficient and the vertical bars its 95% confidence interval.

## **MAPPING A SECTOR'S SCOPE TRANSFORMATION AND THE VALUE OF FOLLOWING THE EVOLVING CORE: ONLINE APPENDIX**

### **A1. Summary statistics**

Table A1 offers a snapshot of key firm-level characteristics for the entire population of BHCs in our sample, for three reference years: 1995, 2000, and 2005. The table illustrates the dynamics in the sector, seen through the change in terms of total asset distribution, number of subsidiaries, and scope of segments (i.e., number of unique NAICS). It also documents the relative munificence and stability of the environment, as evidenced by the stable and healthy performance variable data. Table A2 provides a different aggregation of our panel, which combines all our observation years and groups them on the basis of the intensity of the scope expansion of each BHC. The top panel shows summary statistics for BHCs that never expand scope over the period of analysis (1992–2006); the center panel captures BHCs that expanded scope by adding subsidiaries in up to five unique five-digit NAICS; and the bottom panel summarizes those with the most extensive scope expansion strategies (more than five). Not surprisingly, size correlates with scope expansion. We also see that lower expansion strategies correlate with stronger capital ratios and lower risk, as captured by the Z-score, and relatively lower performance as captured by *ROE*.

### **A2. Properly capturing changes in business scope**

While we believe that our database presents the most detailed and extensive analysis of banking scope (and, arguably, the most detailed database of scope transformation of any major sector), there is a risk of both Type I and Type II errors in our measure of changes in scope. First, there may be subsidiary additions that have little to do with actual economic activity, driven perhaps by tax or regulatory arbitrage (although creating a tax shield or circumventing regulatory restrictions could

still be considered synergistic strategies).<sup>32</sup> Second, one could argue that scope expansion could still take place within the boundaries of a commercial bank entity, even without a subsidiary addition. For instance, a commercial bank could obviously engage in mortgage lending without necessarily adding a specialist mortgage lender to its structure, so that the addition of such a lender may signal the “start” of a new activity that actually began earlier.

To check on the first type of concerns, we run regressions with both interest income ratio (revenues from interest-earning assets over total revenues) and non-interest income ratio (revenues from fee-based activities over total revenues) as dependent variables, and BHC scope as regressor. If a large scope is merely an artifact of the tax and regulatory landscape, or any other arbitrage opportunity, we should not find any systematic association with income. The results, reported in Table A3, show the opposite: high scope is consistently associated with greater income, especially in the non-interest component—as we would predict, since most adopted segments are likely to generate fee-based rather than interest-based revenues.<sup>33</sup>

The second concern is also unlikely to apply in our setting. While certain segments, such as specialty lending, could be pursued by a commercial bank, there were significant legal restrictions. Indeed, the BHC is the vehicle that U.S. law has designed for a bank to pursue broader segments. Having said that, in specific circumstances we could accurately map NAICS types to balance-sheet items. If those segments were already being significantly pursued by an existing subsidiary, the addition of a new one would simply present a new way of organizing these segments. Yet, regression analysis confirms that adding subsidiaries in either credit-card lending or rental and leasing for the first time led to a significant rise in the respective balance-sheet line items (results available upon

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<sup>32</sup> An example of scope expansion driven by regulation may be represented by BHCs adding community housing services subsidiaries (NAICS 62422). The main driver of such decision is U.S. regulation mandating BHCs to meet the credit needs of the communities they operate in (See, e.g., Cetorelli & Wang, 2016). These subsidiaries are therefore contributing to the scope expansion of a BHC, but they are hardly related to its performance. If BHC scope expansion were to be driven predominantly by such regulatory factors, we should not see a systematic relationship between NAICS number (the extensive margin of scope, which we focus on) and income. This is precisely what this section addresses.

<sup>33</sup> A larger BHC footprint is also associated with higher income expenses, suggesting that adding subsidiaries in new activities has direct economic consequences. It also is associated with higher interest income—a first indication that broadening out leads to synergies across activities.

request). Also, even if this were an issue, it would induce a conservative bias in our estimates.<sup>34</sup>

### **A3. Additional robustness tests**

#### **Accounting for BHCs with broad scope at first appearance in the database**

When we first introduce the role of unconditional scope expansion on performance, a possible concern is that there may be BHCs that, when they first appear in the database, may already have a broad scope (e.g. financial conglomerates such as insurance companies that acquire a bank charter at some point, and therefore become BHCs). The issue is that we cannot observe the dynamics that brought them to that point. Our attempted workaround is to run a separate regression excluding BHCs that were already “complex” in scope (i.e. three or more separate NAICS) at the outset. The results of this alternative regression (equivalent to column (1) of Table 3) are in column 1 of Table A4, indicating overall robustness of the negative relationship between unconditional scope expansion and performance.

#### **BHCs departing from the sector’s common core**

A possible concern regarding our main results is that there could be BHCs that radically depart from the common core, so that our definition of modal relatedness would not be appropriate for such firms (for example, there could be firms that turned into BHCs having started out in different sectors, e.g. insurance, and still maintained insurance as their core business even after they became BHCs). We believe this concern is marginal, as the virtual totality of BHCs do start as commercial banks (recall Figure 1). Nevertheless, we ran robustness tests where we excluded from the sample BHCs where commercial banking accounts for a relatively smaller share of total BHC assets (less than 30%, 40%, and even 50% of total assets). The main results were unchanged, confirming that our data is properly

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<sup>34</sup> Further, we consider the fact that NAICS industry classifications are revised over time—a potential challenge in maintaining a consistent panel database. However, this is not an issue in our case, since the industry codes assigned to subsidiaries and reported to the regulatory authorities are either confirmed or updated in the event of changes in the classification system, and then the information is rendered backward-compatible in the database according to the most recent classification.

capturing a sector that has a common core, while still experiencing significant transformation. The results are reported in columns 3–5 of Table A4.

### **Confounding factor of coinsurance from diversification**

The literature on diversification has recently stressed how a significant motivation for scope expansion is related to deteriorating capital market conditions. If firms expect to face external financing constraints during an upcoming period of market stress, then the benefits of expanding scope increase due to the potential coinsurance effects of diversification. One possible explanation for our finding that adoption of popular NAICS is associated with higher ROE could be that what makes segments popular is exactly that they provide BHCs with the greatest ability to smooth cash flows during times of capital market volatility.<sup>35</sup> We can explicitly control for this potential confounding factor by interacting *Cum Adoption* with the *TED spread* at time  $t$ , a measure of market volatility found to be a driver of diversification in recent literature (Kuppaswamy & Villalonga, 2015; Matvos *et al.*, 2018).<sup>36</sup> If the positive relationship between ROE and adopting NAICS with high modal relatedness is solely the result of expansions being more beneficial when they occur in distressed financial conditions, the positive sign on *Cum Related Adoption* should go away with the inclusion of this variable. This does not occur, with the coefficient remaining essentially unchanged (results in column 5 of Table A4). This indicates that the beneficial effects of diversification in times of financial stress found in the extant literature cannot explain the differentially beneficial effects of expansion into popular NAICS.

### **Considering a Palepu-style entropy measure as an alternate driver of our results**

The Palepu (1985) measure compares *unrelated diversification* (i.e. business activities that span

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<sup>35</sup> If, for example, BHCs anticipate an upcoming period of market turmoil, and the set of NAICS that supplies the largest coinsurance benefits is similar across BHCs, then we might expect much of the population to expand into these NAICS and experience better performance during the upheaval, possibly leading to a positive effect of scope expansions into popular NAICS and unrelated to the synergy-dynamics arguments.

<sup>36</sup> This literature finds evidence of performance benefits from scope diversification in times of financial turmoil. We actually confirm this empirical finding, but given our focus on scope expansion strategies, we do not report the related analysis. Our focus is on the robustness of our core results.

different two-digit NAICS/SIC sectors) with *related diversification* (i.e., business activities that span different four-digit segments within the same two-digit sector). The entropy measure computes the composite score, weighing this dispersion with the share of the revenue (or sales) in each category.

Following Palepu (1985), we computed analogous metrics for the banking sector. Data limitations constrain our implementation to the count of subsidiaries in each three- and five-digit NAICS subgroup rather than more standard measures of subgroup activity (e.g. total sales). Let  $P_i$  be the share of subsidiaries in the  $i$ th five-digit NAICS segment over the total number of subsidiaries in the BHC. For a BHC holding  $I$  five-digit segments, *total diversification* is defined as

$$DT = P_i \sum_i^I \ln\left(\frac{1}{P_i}\right).$$

This measure of total diversification is analogous to entropy in Palepu (1985). For each three-digit NAICS group indexed by  $j$ , we define related diversification within a given three-digit group as

$$DR_j = \sum_{i \in j} P_i^j \ln\left(\frac{1}{P_i^j}\right),$$

where  $P_i^j$  is the share of subsidiaries in the  $i$ th five-digit segment over the number of subsidiaries in the three-digit group  $j$ . For a BHC with  $J$  three-digit groups, overall *related diversification* is defined as

$$DR = \sum_j^J DR_j P^j,$$

where  $P^j$  is the share of subsidiaries in the  $j$ th three-digit group over the total number of subsidiaries in the BHC.

Lastly, we define *unrelated diversification* as

$$DU = \sum_j^J P^j \ln\left(\frac{1}{P^j}\right).$$

Note that total diversification equals the sum of related and unrelated diversification:

$$DT = DR + DU.$$

The results of regressions including the entropy metrics are in Table 4.

### **Expanding into new vs. existing segments**

A possible objection to the way we capture scope expansion is that we are ultimately just picking up the addition of subsidiaries to a BHC's structure, and that there may be nothing special about the addition of subsidiaries in a new NAICS. We therefore re-run the regressions to test the robustness of our *Cum expansion* variable by examining the cumulative addition (and removal) of subsidiaries in already-existing NAICS. After all, adding subsidiaries in general could be interpreted as a way to pursue diversification through an “intensive margin”—that is, by changing the relative importance of existing segments. Specifically, we included measures of subsidiary expansion and exit in existing segments, and likewise an explicit control for a change in scope pursued through a change in the scale of operation of existing segments, picked up by the ratio of non-bank to bank assets. The results of this test (not reported but available upon request) confirms that scope expansion as captured by the addition of subsidiaries in new NAICS has a robust association with performance.

### **A4. Selection. Details on the semi-parametric methods**

This appendix offers details on the implementation of the semi-parametric methods used to test the robustness of our main finding: that expansion into NAICS segments with high modal relatedness is associated with higher ROE. Implicit in the benchmark approach presented in the paper is the assumption that in the construction of the theoretical counterfactuals for treated and untreated units (i.e., what the effect on the outcome variable would be for treated units had they not expanded scope in popular segments, and likewise the effect for untreated units had they pursued expansion in more popular segments instead) that the relationship between observables and the outcome variable, or with the likelihood to be treated is linear. With that assumption, the average treatment effect provides a reliable estimate of the impact of the treatment. The methods used to test the robustness of the

benchmark results relax this assumption, by explicitly estimating the dynamic process for either the outcome variable or the likelihood of being treated separately for treated and untreated units (see, e.g., Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009).

The first approach implemented in the robustness tests is based on a *regression adjustment* model. In this approach we allow for the outcome variable, post-expansion ROE, to be modeled separately for the treated and the untreated units. By doing so, we relax the implicit assumption of a constant differential in the average treated effect conditional on other covariates. Hence we implement this specification estimating post-expansion ROE as a function of basic (lagged) BHC covariates: total assets, capital-to-asset ratio, and lagged ROE.

The second approach focuses instead on the scope expansion choice itself, modeling the propensity to engage in scope expansion as a function of lagged covariates. This model then weighs the different observations in the control group on the basis of their individual estimated propensity scores, thus yielding a modified control group—based on their *inverse-probability weights*—that is more comparable to the treatment group represented by expanding BHCs. The basic covariates used in estimating the propensity to engage in scope expansion are: (a) total assets; (b) lagged ROE; (c) whether the BHC had performed expansion in the previous year; and (d) a measure of non-performing loans (which proxies for the relative “success” of the banking firm in core banking segments, and is hence a potential indicator of the incentive to depart from, or stay with, such segments).<sup>37</sup>

The third approach, broadly considered in the literature as a preferred solution, combines the previous two methods. Such *double robust* estimators have the advantage of achieving robustness to potential mis-specifications in the parametric choices in both the regression adjustment and the propensity score models.<sup>38</sup> Of course, the double robust estimator is consistent if either the regression

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<sup>37</sup> Both models are robust to the set of covariates used to perform the estimations.

<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, we have conducted robustness tests of the double robust approach under alternative model specifications to improve our confidence in the quality of the results.



adjustment model or the propensity score models are correctly specified (although the method is still consistent if *one* of the two models is mis-specified; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). However, as the results below indicate, the estimates from these alternative models yield qualitatively very similar results, and results that are likewise consistent with the basic model specification and the various other specifications we have run in robustness tests. In particular, we have run a battery of alternative specifications including a wider array of covariates (year indicators, whether an expanding BHC had exited from other NAICS, the BHC’s overall scope, and whether the BHC had engaged in M&A events) to assuage the potential concerns of mis-specification due to omitted variables, and we have attained very consistent results (not shown but available upon request). Moreover, testing confirms that the overlap assumption, i.e. the assumption that each unit has a positive probability to be treated, holds (results not reported but available upon request). All these should add confidence to the interpretation of the results from the double robust estimator, and that a potential issue of specification in these approaches is unlikely to play an important role in our conclusions (see also, e.g., Acemoglu *et al.*, 2019 for a similar argument).

As noted above, the implementation of these methods requires the comparison of the estimate of the potential outcome for the two groups, treated and untreated. Because we are focusing on strengthening confidence in our results on expansions into modally related segments, we run these robustness analysis on the population of expanders, and define the treatment—as explained earlier—as an expansion into a NAICS that had one of the top 10 highest modal relatedness scores in the year of expansion. In line with the arguments presented in the main paper, we define the outcome variable as the ROE observed three years after the treatment.<sup>39</sup>

We report the results of these estimations in Table A5, Panel A. From the 3,206 unique BHCs over the 1992–2006 period, we have a pooled cross-section of scope expansion events, totaling 1,003

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<sup>39</sup> Choosing ROE at different points in time in the future, or even an average among multiple years post-treatment, does not change the quality of the results. These results are described later and reported in Table A5 Panel B.

observations. Of these, 744 are considered treated as per our definition above, and 259 untreated. We have run the regression adjustment model assuming a linear specification, and the propensity score model adopting a logit specification (however, the results are robust to an alternative probit specification). In all specifications robust standard errors were computed via bootstrapping.

The first column reports the results of a naïve OLS estimator, presented here just as a reference, which shows a positive estimated average treatment effect (ATE), with a coefficient equal to 2.39. Column 2 then reports an estimated ATE of 2.94 from the regression adjustment model. The effect weakens somewhat when we employ the propensity score matching method (column 3). Finally, the double robust estimator yields consistent results, with an estimated ATE of 3.00.

In Panel B we perform a battery of sensitivity tests. For example, while we define the binary modal indicator variable with a top 10 cutoff in the rank ordering of segments' popularity in the BHC population, we re-run the estimations by using two alternative cutoffs that would still be within a reasonable range of what should capture the most popular NAICS segments: top five and top 15. We present the results, for convenience just on the double robust estimator method, in columns 1 and 2 of Figure A6, Panel B. The estimations show that defining the modal indicator variable more conservatively (top five segments) leads to a reduction in the ATE, as we are now more likely to observe higher ROE within the untreated group. When the cutoff is made wider instead (but still relatively close to the benchmark cutoff), the estimates are much closer to those obtained in the benchmark case.

Likewise, we wanted to probe robustness in defining the outcome variable, so instead of looking at ROE three years out, we also used an average of post-treatment ROE over the three years following expansion (so, year  $t+1$ – $t+3$ ), and also an average between  $t+2$  and  $t+4$ . The results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table A5, Panel B—again, based on the double robust estimator method. The estimated ATEs are close to those in column 4 of Panel A.

Overall, the results support the main findings that expansions into NAICS with high modal relatedness have a beneficial impact on future performance, and they assuage legitimate concerns associated with potential selection and endogeneity bias as driving the empirical relationship between scope expansion and performance.

#### **A5. Scope transformation and the 2007–2009 crisis**

One might argue that while strategically expanding scope helped BHCs during the good times, being an expanding BHC (and, in particular, adopting popular NAICS) led the same firms on to the rocks during the storm that followed—a sort of strategic time-bomb. Would our findings hold if we looked at BHC performance during and after the crisis that followed our study period? Is there any evidence that pursuing scope expansions in the years prior to the crisis lead to worse performance during the crisis and produced long-lasting effects throughout the years that followed?

To answer these questions, we consider the impact of scope expansion in the years prior to the crisis on the severity of the drop in performance during or after the crisis.<sup>40</sup> We construct as alternative dependent variables the peak-to-trough ROE and peak-to-trough Tobin’s Q, defined as the difference in the performance measure between the worst-performing year over 2007–2015 (the “trough”) and 2006 (the pre-crisis “peak”). The independent variables are *Cum adoption*, *Cum related adoption* (based on modal relatedness), and exits from NAICS over the five years preceding the crisis—i.e., 2001–2006.<sup>41</sup>

The results of these regressions are presented in Table A8. As we can see, expansions overall do not seem to drive the peak-to-trough fall, and more narrowly, neither is modal relatedness associated

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<sup>40</sup> We are flexible in that we allow for BHC-specific cycles. For example, some BHCs might experience their worst year of performance during the industry-level trough (2009), while others might experience their worst year afterwards (say, 2012) because of idiosyncratic characteristics (say, a BHC heavily exposed to the European sovereign debt crisis). Our measure accommodates both (and any other) possibilities.

<sup>41</sup> Switching to five years in these specifications, we take a more conservative approach, in that we allow for scope expansions occurring further back in time to still be the seeds of bad outcomes during and after the crisis. We also experimented with other windows, from three to seven years, without materially affecting the results; we also shortened the period to 2006–2009 and measured the simple percentage drops from 2006–2009. These results, available upon request, also do not change the thrust of the conclusions.

with the severity of crisis-period problems. The only relationships that we observe are, for Tobin's Q, the capital ratio (which reduces the magnitude of the hit, as one would expect), and for ROE, exits (which seem to reduce the magnitude of the problems) and *Exit x Cum adoption* (which has a negative coefficient). As such, there does not seem to be support for the hypothesis that expansions (into high modal relatedness segments in particular) only had positive influences in the boom period, but that this led to demise during the crisis. Related expansions enhanced performance in relative terms on the way up, without creating significant measures in the tumultuous period of the crisis, and the post-crisis period.

#### **A6. A market measure of performance, and the role of risk**

Earlier, we explained why we strongly prefer the use of an accounting profitability measure. However, we have also performed the basic analysis using Tobin's Q (available for the listed firms). The analysis shows remarkable consistency. Specifically, we observe analogous results when we consider the importance of *Cum Related Adoptions* (Table A7): there is a base negative impact on scope expansion, but the metrics of relatedness are all positive. Other results (lagged scope, controls) are equivalent to those presented in our main results, Table 3. Overall, the Tobin's Q robustness analysis suggests that our results are not picking up a particularity of accounting measures.

In addition to Tobin's Q, we considered other measures of interest, such as leverage, to see whether scope expansion was associated with an increase of the risk that a BHC needed to carry. We found no consistent evidence that expansion into new subsidiaries, and especially in high modal relatedness segments, increases leverage (thus making profits riskier). Unlike ROE or Tobin's Q, leverage's impact is inconsistent and varies between specifications. (Results are available upon request.)

A more direct analysis of risk comes from the analysis of Z-score. This measure is computed routinely in banking as an estimate of the number of standard deviations below the mean that consolidated profits would have to fall to make consolidated equity negative, and as such constitutes

a plausible metric of distance from default (Boyd & Graham, 1986). Our analysis (available upon request) shows that while the average impact of entering new segments is negative (i.e., it increases risks, compared to either not expanding or gaining subsidiaries in existing NAICS), there is no particular increase of risk attributed to adopting popular NAICS (i.e. those with high modal relatedness). Exits increase riskiness (perhaps unsurprisingly, as exits may also be instigated by banks that are failing at their core), but both *Exit x Entry* and *Scope x Entry* are positive, suggesting that both turnover and learning can not only help boost *ROE*, but also potentially reduce risks. Relatedness does not seem to have adverse effects on risk or leverage.

## Appendix References

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**Table A1: Summary statistics. Population snapshots**

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Min	P25	P50	P75	Max
1995								
ROE (%)	1069	13.57	5.42	-29.00	11.09	13.55	16.15	36.09
Assets (\$Mil)	1069	3,351.69	16,899.29	150.19	207.33	309.19	701.72	269,013.00
Capital Ratio (%)	1069	8.84	2.31	2.49	7.35	8.65	9.99	19.35
Z-Score	1069	115.85	186.94	1.69	35.37	64.88	116.64	1,346.66
Subsidiary Count	1069	11.11	48.63	1.00	1.00	3.00	6.00	1,008.00
NAICS Count	1069	3.58	5.95	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	70.00
2000								
ROE	1526	13.19	7.25	-59.96	9.78	12.97	16.59	36.09
Assets (\$Mil)	1526	3,743.13	31,068.94	150.11	206.65	309.01	632.16	738,205.00
Capital Ratio (%)	1526	9.01	2.75	3.18	7.22	8.58	10.19	20.06
Z-Score	1526	138.04	206.31	1.20	37.43	72.15	141.97	1,346.66
Subsidiary Count	1526	10.38	63.97	1.00	1.00	3.00	5.00	1,293.00
NAICS Count	1526	3.43	5.12	1.00	1.00	2.00	4.00	83.00
2005								
ROE	2103	13.67	7.62	-64.37	9.73	12.93	17.15	36.09
Assets (\$Mil)	2103	4,994.18	54,273.57	150.46	224.76	347.56	663.55	1,489,891.00
Capital Ratio (%)	2103	9.38	2.47	3.18	7.88	8.91	10.27	20.06
Z-Score	2103	114.86	181.94	0.19	37.38	66.78	119.05	1,346.66
Subsidiary Count	2103	10.75	89.56	1.00	2.00	3.00	5.00	2,867.00
NAICS Count	2103	3.46	4.24	1.00	2.00	2.00	4.00	65.00

Table A1 reports summary statistics for the entire population of BHCs in operation at three distinct points in time during our sample period, end of year 1995, 2000 and 2005. *ROE* is the return on equity of a BHC, *Assets* is total asset size of the consolidated BHC, *Capital Ratio* is the ratio between regulatory capital and total asset. *Z-score* is calculated as the sum of ROA and the capital ratio (equity over assets) divided by the standard deviation of ROA across the previous four years. Subsidiary Count is the total number of subsidiaries controlled by a BHC. NAICS Count is the total number of unique business activities, based on 5-digit NAICS codes, as reported by a BHC's subsidiaries. The second column reports the total number of BHCs in the sample in the corresponding year. The remaining columns report mean and conventional percentiles of the distribution for each variable.

**Table A2: Summary Statistics. Cross sections by intensity of scope expansion**

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Min	P25	P50	P75	Max
Never Adopted								
ROE (%)	6160	12.15	8.84	-64.37	9.14	12.38	15.69	36.09
Assets (\$Mil)	6160	404.49	1,843.70	150.02	181.90	228.60	332.36	99,679.70
Capital Ratio (%)	6160	9.92	2.89	3.18	8.00	9.41	11.29	20.06
Z-Score	6160	134.01	217.49	0.19	36.55	71.04	136.79	1,346.66
Subsidiary Count	6160	2.36	4.67	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	152.00
NAICS Count	6160	1.72	1.23	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	28.00
1-5 Adoptions								
ROE (%)	9063	13.45	7.11	-64.37	10.10	13.25	16.62	36.09
Assets (\$Mil)	9063	1,818.00	9,567.12	150.03	287.77	471.41	942.51	441,957.34
Capital Ratio (%)	9063	8.87	2.29	3.18	7.43	8.56	9.83	20.06
Z-Score	9063	97.99	137.30	0.19	33.89	60.81	110.05	1,346.66
Subsidiary Count	9063	7.00	17.45	1.00	2.00	4.00	6.00	673.00
NAICS Count	9063	3.80	3.11	1.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	61.00
> 5 Adoptions								
ROE (%)	1424	14.12	7.15	-56.10	11.13	14.36	17.40	36.09
Assets (\$Mil)	1424	45,715.68	136,804.97	275.22	1,877.94	6,233.20	31,729.77	1,586,201.00
Capital Ratio (%)	1424	8.21	2.18	3.18	6.96	7.95	8.99	20.06
Z-Score	1424	80.80	94.27	0.72	27.29	54.84	96.16	1,346.66
Subsidiary Count	1424	97.34	244.75	1.00	11.00	20.00	52.50	2,932.00
NAICS Count	1424	14.88	12.29	1.00	7.00	10.00	17.00	83.00

Table A2 reports summary statistics for the population of BHCs conditional on the intensity of scope expansion during our sample period. *Never Adopters* are BHCs that throughout their existence in the population between 1992 and 2006 never add subsidiaries with a business activity in a 5-digit NAICS the BHC did not already have. *1<sup>st</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> Adoptions* identifies BHCs that add up to five new 5-digit NAICS to their organization over the period of analysis. *>5<sup>th</sup> Adoptions* identifies BHCs that add more than five new 5-digit NAICS to their organization over the period of analysis. *ROE* is the return on equity of a BHC, *Assets* is total asset size of the consolidated BHC, *Capital Ratio* is the ratio between regulatory capital and total asset. *Z-score* is calculated as the sum of ROA and the capital ratio (equity over assets) divided by the standard deviation of ROA across the previous four years. *Subsidiary Count* is the total number of subsidiaries controlled by a BHC. *NAICS Count* is the total number of unique business activities, based on 5-digit NAICS codes, as reported by a BHC's subsidiaries. The second column reports the total number of BHC-year observations for each sub group. The remaining columns report mean and conventional percentiles of the distribution for each variable.

**Table A3: Components of ROE and activity scope**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Int. inc.	Nonint. rev.	Nonint. exp.	Int. inc.	Nonint. rev.	Nonint. exp.
Unique 5-digit NAICS	-0.0205 (0.0778)	0.784 (0.126)	0.890 (0.159)	0.160 (0.0964)	0.584 (0.118)	0.883 (0.174)
Log assets	-2.159 (0.292)	0.792 (0.420)	-2.683 (0.566)	-5.155 (0.693)	-4.387 (0.695)	-11.91 (0.977)
Capital ratio	-3.750 (0.103)	-0.799 (0.154)	-3.569 (0.186)	-2.538 (0.104)	-0.897 (0.0975)	-2.732 (0.148)
Constant	109.9 (3.881)	8.063 (5.642)	104.7 (7.454)	139.0 (9.135)	74.33 (9.098)	213.7 (12.84)
Bank fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742	16742
Adjusted $R^2$	0.355	0.154	0.230	0.290	0.071	0.190

Table A3 reports regression results from a regression of different components of ROE on BHC activity scope. The sample consists of all FR Y-9C-filing BHCs, both listed and non-listed ones, between 1992 and 2006. The dependent variable is some component of net income, indicated by the column title, divided by equity. *Int. inc.* (Columns 1 and 3) is net interest income over equity, *Nonint. rev.* (Columns 2 and 5) is noninterest revenue over equity, and *Nonint. exp.* (Columns 3 and 6) is total noninterest expenses over equity. *Scope* is defined as the count of unique five-digit NAICS reported by a BHC's subsidiaries. *Log assets* is the natural log of the total asset size of the consolidated BHC, while *Capital ratio* is the ratio between regulatory capital and total asset. The regression frequency is annual, with all variables taken from year  $t$ . Columns 4 through 6 include both BHC and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the BHC level.



**Table A4. Robustness tests**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Cumulative adoption	-0.209 (0.126)	-0.386 (0.117)	-0.399 (0.121)	-0.387 (0.126)	-0.372 (0.134)	-0.371 (0.116)
Cum. related adoption		0.0215 (0.00781)	0.0226 (0.00804)	0.0230 (0.00827)	0.0206 (0.00868)	0.0382 (0.0113)
All exit	0.0793 (0.162)	0.198 (0.104)	0.217 (0.103)	0.236 (0.102)	0.203 (0.107)	0.196 (0.103)
Cum. adoption X exit	0.113 (0.0509)	-0.0199 (0.00975)	-0.0224 (0.0101)	-0.0241 (0.00985)	-0.0232 (0.0112)	-0.0205 (0.00986)
Scope (lagged)	-0.151 (0.114)	-0.242 (0.0612)	-0.249 (0.0653)	-0.255 (0.0650)	-0.225 (0.0663)	-0.258 (0.0618)
Cum. adoption X scope	0.00158 (0.0320)	0.0146 (0.00438)	0.0162 (0.00428)	0.0158 (0.00453)	0.0154 (0.00489)	0.0145 (0.00436)
Cumulative M&A	-0.644 (0.226)	-0.331 (0.0998)	-0.377 (0.109)	-0.356 (0.107)	-0.327 (0.126)	-0.332 (0.0984)
Log assets	-0.730 (0.738)	-1.186 (0.591)	-1.008 (0.618)	-0.883 (0.641)	-0.863 (0.684)	-1.224 (0.595)
Capital ratio	-0.458 (0.0774)	-0.436 (0.0736)	-0.451 (0.0752)	-0.454 (0.0776)	-0.475 (0.0793)	-0.440 (0.0737)
Cum. related adoption X TED spread						-0.0428  (0.0206)
Constant	27.64 (9.534)	33.94 (7.834)	31.68 (8.180)	30.10 (8.470)	29.98 (9.003)	34.52 (7.892)
Bank fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8005	10226	9927	9598	9200	10226
Adjusted $R^2$	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.033	0.033	0.035

Table A4 displays results of three separate batteries of robustness tests: Column 1 reports the results of a regression that excludes BHCs with a scope at entry in the database equal to or greater than 3. Column 2 repeats, for convenience, the results of the benchmark regression from Table 3, column 5, showing the relatively positive effects of engaging in more related (modal) adoptions. In columns 3-5 we excluded from the sample BHC observations where commercial banking accounts for a relatively smaller share of total BHC assets (less than 30%, 40%, and 50% of total assets, respectively). Column 6 shows the benchmark regression of column 1, augmented with an interaction between a measure of capital market distress, *TED Spread* (the spread between the rates on three-month Treasury bills and LIBOR), and *Cum. related adoption*. Regressions include both BHC and year fixed effects. Note that as the TED spread only has time (year) variation and as the regression has year dummies, TED alone can't be identified, which is why we focus on the interaction term. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the BHC level.

**Table A5. Panel A Semiparametric estimates of the effect of modal expansion on ROE**

	OLS	RA	IPW	IPWRA
Treatment effect	2.388	2.943	1.560	2.998
	(1.025)	(0.916)	(0.681)	(1.150)

Table A5, Panel A presents semiparametric estimates of the effect of modal expansion on future ROE. Column 1 reports the results of a *naïve* OLS regression, where we report the estimated coefficients of the indicator variable for the treated units. Column 2 report the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated using a regression adjustment model. Column 3 report the estimates of the average treatment effects on the treated using an inverse propensity score reweighting, and column 4 report the estimates obtained with a doubly robust estimator, combining the regression adjustment and the inverse propensity score reweighting. In all estimates, the outcome variable is defined as the ROE observed three years after the scope expansion event, and the treatment indicator (modal expansion) is defined as a NAICS segment that was a top 10 most held in the BHC population in the year the expansion occurred. Below each estimate, we report robust standard errors obtained via bootstrapping.

**Table A5. Panel B Semiparametric estimates. Sensitivity tests**

	Top 5 Modal Indicator	Top 15 Modal Indicator	ROE avg (t+1-t+3)	ROE avg (t+2-t+4)
Treatment effect	0.775	1.956	2.035	2.320
	(0.512)	(1.111)	(0.727)	(0.770)

Table A5, Panel B presents sensitivity tests on the semiparametric estimates of the effect of modal expansion on future ROE. In all columns, the methods used is the double robust estimator. Column 1 reports the estimate of the average treatment effects on the treated where the treatment indicator was defined as a NAICS segment that was a top 5 most held in the BHC population in the year the expansion occurred. Column 2 report the estimate of the average treatment effects on the treated where the treatment indicator was defined instead as a NAICS segment that was a top 15 most held in the BHC population in the year the expansion occurred. In Column 3 the outcome variable is defined as the average ROE observed between years t+1 and t+3 after the scope expansion event. In Column 4 the outcome variable is defined as the average ROE observed between years t+2 and t+4 after the scope expansion event. Below each estimate, we report robust standard errors obtained via bootstrapping.

**Table A6: Post-2006 peak-to-trough change in ROE/Tobin's Q (2007-2015) and related 2001-2006 adoption activity**

	(1)	(2)
	ROE	Tobin's Q
Cumulative adoption	-0.0529 (0.119)	0.00382 (0.00271)
Cum. related adoption	-0.00948 (0.00707)	-0.000230 (0.000174)
All exit	-0.349 (0.211)	-0.00101 (0.00292)
Cum. adoption X exit	0.0410 (0.0245)	0.0000559 (0.000348)
Cum. adoption X scope	-0.0103 (0.00791)	-0.000147 (0.000119)
Cumulative M&A	0.204 (0.129)	-0.00503 (0.00258)
Scope (lagged)	0.104 (0.0854)	0.00148 (0.00121)
Log assets	-0.196 (0.262)	-0.00571 (0.00426)
Capital ratio	-0.103 (0.134)	-0.00712 (0.00208)
Constant	1.732 (4.196)	0.0261 (0.0635)
Observations	616	247
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.039

Table A6 presents regressions of the change in BHC performance over the crisis on pre-crisis adoption activity. The dependent variable is based on a BHC's return on equity in Column 1 and a BHC's Tobin's Q (calculated as the BHC's market value (approximated by the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt) over the BHC's book value (total assets), multiplied by 100) in Column 2. The dependent variable equals the minimum value of a BHC's ROE/Tobin's Q over 2007-2015 (the "crisis" period) minus ROE/Tobin's Q in 2006 (the pre-crisis "base" year). *Cumulative adoption* is the count of a BHC's adoptions over the five-year pre-crisis period (2001-2006). *Cum. related adoption* is a sub-specification of the cumulative adoptions count over the same period (2001-2006) defined as the sum of shares of BHCs that hold the NAICS a BHC adopt (*Modal* from Tables 3 and 8). The regression frequency is annual. *Cumulative adoption*, *All exit*, *Cum. related adp*, and *Cumulative M&A* are calculated over the pre-crisis 2001-2006 period, and *Scope* at 2000. The sample for Column 1 consists of all BHCs that file the FR Y-9C for each year between 2000-2009; the sample for Column 2 is further restricted to publically-listed BHCs. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the BHC level.

**Table A7: Tobin's Q and related adoptions**

	(1) Distance	(2) NAICS 52	(3) Coincidence	(4) Modal
Cumulative adoption	-0.272 (0.120)	-0.529 (0.161)	-0.375 (0.140)	-0.566 (0.150)
Cum. related adoption	0.0350 (0.0972)	0.438 (0.192)	0.0647 (0.0396)	0.0288 (0.0100)
All exit	0.107 (0.131)	0.0936 (0.133)	0.112 (0.131)	0.108 (0.129)
Cum. adoption X exit	-0.0107 (0.0121)	-0.00947 (0.0116)	-0.0115 (0.0125)	-0.0106 (0.0125)
Cum. adoption X scope	0.0100 (0.00645)	0.0144 (0.00661)	0.0128 (0.00710)	0.0166 (0.00754)
Cumulative M&A	0.283 (0.134)	0.286 (0.136)	0.297 (0.132)	0.282 (0.132)
Scope (lagged)	-0.467 (0.0916)	-0.482 (0.0906)	-0.477 (0.0918)	-0.496 (0.0922)
Log assets	-4.860 (0.785)	-4.925 (0.788)	-4.763 (0.772)	-4.794 (0.778)
Capital ratio	0.296 (0.133)	0.295 (0.133)	0.300 (0.133)	0.296 (0.133)
Constant	174.9 (11.17)	175.9 (11.20)	173.6 (10.96)	174.1 (11.07)
Bank fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3542	3542	3542	3542
Adjusted $R^2$	0.356	0.358	0.357	0.358

Table A7 reports regressions of performance on related adoption of new NAICS based on specification (2). The dependent variable is Tobin's Q, calculated as the BHC's market value (approximated by the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt) over the BHC's book value (total assets), multiplied by 100. *Cum. related adoption* is a sub-specification of *Cumulative adoption* (see Table 1) based on the adoption relatedness definition specified in each column header. *Distance* (Column 1) defines related adoption as the average distance (one, two, three or four digits) from NAICS 52211 of the NAICS adopted by the BHC. *NAICS 52* (Column 2) is the subset of the cumulative adoption count of adoptions in NAICS 52. *Coincidence* (Column 3) defines related adoptions by using a Bryce and Winter metric of relatedness as a time-invariant average calculated over the whole time period of analysis. *Modal* (Column 4) defines related adoptions as the sum of the shares of BHCs that hold the NAICS a BHC adopt at the time of adoption. Regressions include both BHC and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the BHC level.