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Global norms, regional practices: Taste-based and statistical discrimination in German asylum decision-making

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Global norms, regional practices: Taste-based and statistical discrimination in German asylum decision-making

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Regional differences in decisions, recognitions and protection rates in Germany

Table S1 Decisions, recognitions and protection rates by federal state, protection rates by federal states and selected countries of origin, 2015-2017

Federal states	number of decisions	number of recognitions	recognition rates (in %)					
			all countries	Afghanistan	Eritrea	Syria	West Balkan	Iraq
Brandenburg	49691	22952	46.2	36.7	78.0	95.3	0.0	39.5
Berlin	85074	38218	44.9	48.2	83.0	96.9	0.3	44.8
Baden-Württemberg	179096	88500	49.4	43.6	89.1	97.6	0.5	63.2
Bavaria	210543	102212	48.5	42.1	90.9	96.5	0.2	60.7
Bremen	18438	12904	70.0	69.0	95.4	98.8	2.7	93.5
Hessen	125056	71968	57.5	48.5	90.6	97.1	0.4	63.4
Hamburg	40248	22893	56.9	54.7	88.8	95.0	0.3	66.1
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	33670	21694	64.4	51.5	81.5	97.1	0.2	52.3
Niedersachsen	153173	86569	56.5	50.6	86.8	95.0	0.7	78.0
North Rhine-Westphalia	371288	186902	50.3	50.6	89.7	95.8	0.6	69.4
Rhineland-Pfalz	81209	44999	55.4	54.3	83.4	97.1	0.4	58.2
Schleswig Holstein	58559	36032	61.5	53.2	90.9	95.4	0.2	62.9
Saarland	22294	19521	87.6	61.8	85.6	95.1	1.7	66.3
Sachsen	67371	31381	46.6	45.0	89.2	96.8	0.2	56.6
Sachsen-Anhalt	47371	27563	58.2	52.4	84.6	95.6	0.1	62.8
Thuringia	38654	22168	57.3	55.3	82.7	96.1	0.2	56.7
Total	1581735	836476	57.0	51.1	86.9	96.3	0.5	62.1

Notes: Recognitions include refugee protection, subsidiary protection, and humanitarian protection. Decisions are first-instance decisions including decisions based on the Dublin convention. West Balkan includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

Source: Special provision of the BAMF 2010-2017, own calculations

Analyses of the probability of appeal against the initial asylum outcome

Data and method

For the analyses of the second stage decisions, i.e., appeals against the initial asylum outcome, we restricted the data to individuals who filed an appeal against the initial asylum outcome (21.4 percent of those with asylum decision) and received a corresponding decision. This resulted in a sample of 900 individuals. We applied the same modeling strategy to this reduced dataset as in the main article. Note that we include some other correlates to capture the dynamics of this second decision-making body. In particular, analogous to the workload of BAMF agents, the federal state's *workload of judges* is captured by the yearly ratio of the number of pending appeals at the administrative courts to the number of decided appeals. The number of pending and decided appeals at administrative courts is provided yearly by DESTATIS (DESTATIS, 2019).

Descriptive results

In 2016, 14 percent of the asylum-seekers who challenged their initial asylum decision reported that the asylum court overturned the initial decision by the German Office for Migration and Refugees. Together with growing numbers of rejected applications, we observe an increase in successful appeals in 2017 (see Table S2). The court statistics by the BAMF report an increase in the number of successful appeals from 4.2 (2015) to 22.0 percent (2017) (BAMF, 2020). Feneberg und Pukrop (2020, p. 359) argue that these numbers are very likely deflated as they do not consider others settlements that can make up half of the court decisions.

Table S2 Status of the asylum appeals, by survey year (in percent)

	2016	2017
Results of asylum appeal		
Successful	14.17	15.91
Non-successful	85.83	84.09
Observations	194	803

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany, 2016-2017, own calculations.

Multivariate results

Compared to first-instance decisions, the models on the probabilities of second stage asylum decisions show somewhat different patterns (Table S3). The individual asylum reasons do not significantly affect approval chances at this stage, except for individuals having fled forced recruitment: their chances of a successful appeal drop by six percentage points (significant at $p < 0.10$). Applicants from countries free from political oppression have lower chances of a successful appeal, while a higher number of terror-related fatalities is non-significant (albeit negative). Furthermore, the results do not provide evidence for direct taste-based discrimination against certain groups by appeal judges, while the regional preferences seem to feed into appeal decisions. Successful appeals are more likely in regions with more immigration-averse residents or with a more conservative administration, but less likely in regions with administrations that are particularly restrictive with refugees. Approval chances of applicants in regions applying a residence obligation on refugees are *per se* 6 percentage points lower than in regions without this policy in place, and a 10 percent increase in the share of benefits provided to refugees in kind or vouchers (as opposed to cash) results in a two percentage points lower probability of a successful appeal.

Table S3 Multivariate results for the probability of successful appeal (linear probability models, average marginal effects)

Variables	Successful appeal	
	p.p.	(t)
Subjective asylum reasons (H1a)		
Fled because of violent conflict or war	2.67	(0.82)
Fled because of forced recruitment	-5.56+	(-1.91)
Fled because of persecution	1.21	(0.45)
Fled because of discrimination	-4.09	(-1.53)
Objective asylum reasons (H1b)		
FIW score	-0.33**	(-3.24)
Log of conflict-related deaths	-0.42	(-1.49)
Individual characteristics		
Male (H2a)	1.21	(0.47)
Muslim (H2b)	-4.16	(-1.26)
Years of education (H2c)	0.00	(0.01)
Regional characteristics		
Share of residents very concerned about immigration to Germany (H3a)	0.19*	(2.16)
Center-right minister (H3b)	1.69	(0.52)
Years of center-right dominance (H3b)	0.13	(0.54)
Application of the restrictive residence obligation (H3c)	-6.20*	(-2.31)
Share of non-monetary benefits to asylum-seekers (H3c)	-0.22**	(-2.91)
Workload		
Workload of judges	-4.13	(-0.77)
Controls		
BAMF: safe country of origin	5.14	(0.60)
BAMF: Good perspective to stay	-9.24**	(-2.86)
Arrived via safe third country	-6.68+	(-1.78)
Age when filing asylum application	-0.16	(-1.34)
Traumatic experiences on route	1.26	(0.40)
Protection granted	24.32**	(7.67)
Population density	-2.81**	(-3.64)
Share of foreign population	-0.79**	(-2.81)
Unemployment rate	0.49	(0.66)
Information on application/decision dates was replaced	8.04	(1.38)
Sample (Ref. M3)		
Sample: M4	-7.93*	(-2.32)
Sample: M5	-12.38**	(-3.76)
_cons	59.47**	(4.35)
Observations	900	

Notes: Significance level ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test). t = t statistics; p.p. = percentage points. Models further control for missing values.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany, 2016-2017, own calculations.

Interaction effects

For statistical discrimination, the evidence is mixed. Overall, we find only few statistically significant interaction effects of interest, which might be due to the lower sample size for the second stage analyses. The analysis nevertheless yields some evidence that positive appeal decisions are less likely in regions with more immigration-averse residents if evidence is scarce

(Table S4). This result is sensitive to the objective indicator, however. Furthermore, in regions with a more conservative administration appeals are less likely to be successful if the judges' workload is high (interactions are significant at $p < 0.10$, Table S5).

The analyses of this limited appeal sample show that appeal decision making follows other patterns than the administrative decisions preceding them. Particularly, the two models of discrimination that we distinguish in the main body of the text can only marginally explain the decisions made by the administrative courts. We partially relate this to the composition of the appeal sample: whether a rejected asylum seeker challenges the asylum decision by the BAMF is determined by a number of factors, such as the prospects of an appeal, an individual's social, human and economic capital to go to court, and the speed with which an administration targets the deportation of unsuccessful asylum applicants. The sample composition might thus be biased in terms of individual characteristics as well as case characteristics. Secondly, judges have a tenure that surpasses the election cycle and are less exposed to political pressure than the BAMF collaborators. In addition, media attention regarding the duration of decisions is less pronounced. This likely decreases the effect of regional political biases in court decisions. We conclude that our results on asylum appeals in Germany confirm some extra-legal reasoning also for second-stage asylum decisions that deserve a closer investigative look. Yet, the patterns are much less clear as compared to first-stage decisions and can only marginally be explained by the theoretical framework of taste-based and statistical discrimination.

Table S4 Average marginal effects (AME) of individual and regional characteristics on the probability of successful appeal at different levels of FIW score and conflict-related deaths

Interaction	Successful appeal	
	p.p.	t-test
AME of male (H4a)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)	-1.54	-0.22
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)	0.84	0.31
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)	2.22	0.62
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.17	
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile	-4.63	-0.77
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile	2.34	0.84
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile	3.46	1.04
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	1.15	
AME of muslim (H4b)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)	-6.16	-0.81
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)	-4.27	-1.29
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)	-3.17	-0.67
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.09	
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile	-2.49	-0.41
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile	-4.77	-1.26
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile	-5.14	-1.15
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.11	
AME of years of education (H4c)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)	-0.84	-1.15
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)	-0.12	-0.44
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)	0.30	0.86
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	1.5	
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile	-0.71	-1.20
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile	0.10	0.40
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile	0.24	0.77
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	1.77	
AME of fled because of persecution (H4d)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)	0.68	0.24
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)	2.39	0.63
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)	0.68	0.24
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.23	
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile	0.65	0.10
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile	1.14	0.40
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile	1.22	0.36
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.01	
AME of fled because of discrimination (H4d)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)	-9.03	-1.15
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)	-4.84+	-1.71
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)	-2.41	-0.63
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.43	
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile	-9.03+	-1.15
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile	-4.84	-1.71
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile	-2.41	-0.63
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	1.49	
AME of center-right minister (H4e)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)	12.96	1.58
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)	3.40	1.00
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)	-2.15	-0.51
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	2.21	
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile	-0.95	-0.13
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile	1.92	0.58
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile	2.38	0.62
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.15	
AME of years of center-right dominance (H4e)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)	0.08	0.15
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)	0.13	0.50
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)	0.15	0.49
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.01	
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile	-0.01	-0.03
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile	0.16	0.63
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile	0.19	0.66

	<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.12
AME of application of the restrictive residence obligation (H4f)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)		11.51 1.53
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)		-3.64 -1.27
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)		-12.45** -3.40
	<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	6.31*
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile		-1.60 -0.23
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile		-6.81* -2.40
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile		-7.64* -2.26
	<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.52
AME of non-monetary benefits to asylum-seekers (H4f)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)		-0.25 -1.17
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)		-0.23** -2.86
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)		-0.22* -2.07
	<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.01
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile		-0.26 -1.34
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile		-0.22** -2.84
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile		-0.21* -2.43
	<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0.04
AME of residents very concerned about immigration to Germany (H4g)		
at FIW score = 67 (e.g., Albania)		-0.19 -0.94
at FIW score = 24 (e.g., Iraq)		0.14 1.54
at FIW score = -1 (e.g., Syria)		0.33** 3.00
	<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	4.54*
at conflict-related deaths = 10 th percentile		0.20 1.20
at conflict-related deaths = 50 th percentile		0.19* 2.03
at conflict-related deaths = 90 th percentile		0.19+ 1.79
	<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>	0

Notes: Significance level ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test). SE = standard errors. p.p. = percentage points. For full models, refer to Tables S6-S7.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany, 2016-2017, own calculations.

Table S5 Average marginal effects (AME) of individual and regional characteristics on the probability of successful appeal at different levels of workload

Interaction	Successful appeal	
	p.p.	t-test
AME of male (H5a)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	-3.37	-0.87
at workload = 50 th percentile	1.22	0.47
at workload = 90 th percentile	6.37	1.54
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		2.58
AME of muslim (H5b)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	-8.10+	-1.73
at workload = 50 th percentile	-4.17	-1.27
at workload = 90 th percentile	0.25	0.05
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		1.39
AME of years of education (H5c)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	0.35	0.95
at workload = 50 th percentile	0.01	0.04
at workload = 90 th percentile	-0.37	-0.97
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		1.66
73AME of fled because of persecution (H5d)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	-1.77	-0.43
at workload = 50 th percentile	0.93	0.34
at workload = 90 th percentile	3.96	0.95
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		0.83
AME of fled because of discrimination (H5d)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	-1.47	-0.36
at workload = 50 th percentile	-3.85	-1.43
at workload = 90 th percentile	-6.51	-1.55
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		0.64
AME of center-right minister (H5e)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	15.32+	1.91
at workload = 50 th percentile	4.12	1.18
at workload = 90 th percentile	-8.44	-1.33
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		3.42+
AME of years of center-right dominance (H5e)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	-0.46	-1.06
at workload = 50 th percentile	0.02	0.09
at workload = 90 th percentile	0.56	1.27
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		2.11
AME of application of the restrictive residence obligation (H5f)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	-8.52+	-1.87
at workload = 50 th percentile	-6.30*	-2.30
at workload = 90 th percentile	-3.81	-0.84
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		0.42
AME of non-monetary benefits to asylum-seekers (H5f)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	-0.21	-1.56
at workload = 50 th percentile	-0.21*	-2.47
at workload = 90 th percentile	-0.21*	-2.36
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		0
AME of residents very concerned about immigration to Germany (H5g)		
at workload = 10 th percentile	0.29*	2.36
at workload = 50 th percentile	0.19*	2.16
at workload = 90 th percentile	0.08	0.61
<i>Wald Test of the interaction effects</i>		1.35

Notes: Significance level ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test). SE = standard errors. p.p. = percentage points. For full models, refer to Table S8.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany, 2016-2017, own calculations.

Table S6: Interaction effects between individual and regional characteristics and FIW score on the probability of successful appeal (linear probability models, average marginal effects)

Variables	Model H4a	Model H4b	Model H4c	Model H4d	Model H4e	Model H4f	Model H4g
	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.
Subjective asylum reasons							
Fled because of violent conflict or war	2.72	2.62	2.75	2.89	2.78	2.17	3.05
Fled because of forced recruitment	-5.74+	-5.58+	-5.68+	-5.91*	-5.68+	-5.67+	-6.18*
Fled because of persecution	1.21	1.19	1.41	2.32	1.27	1.29	1.45
Fled because of discrimination	-4.04	-4.02	-4.17	-2.51	-3.87	-3.64	-4.32
Individual characteristics							
Male	2.16	1.24	1.03	1.30	1.38	1.32	1.34
Muslim	-4.11	-3.22	-4.50	-4.16	-4.21	-3.48	-4.33
Years of education	-0.00	-0.00	0.28	0.01	-0.00	-0.02	-0.02
Regional characteristics							
Center-right minister	1.60	1.68	1.53	1.51	-1.93	1.80	1.58
Years of center-right dominance	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.09	0.12
Application of the restrictive residence obligation	-6.21*	-6.24*	-6.27*	-6.37*	-6.37*	-12.10**	-6.28*
Share of the non-monetary benefits to asylum-seekers	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.23**	-0.23**	-0.22*	-0.22**
Share of residents very concerned about immigration to Germany	0.19*	0.19*	0.19*	0.19*	0.20*	0.20*	0.32**
Workload							
Workload of judges	-4.09	-4.00	-3.91	-3.87	-3.83	-4.17	-4.18
Objective asylum reasons							
Log of conflict-related deaths	-0.42	-0.42	-0.41	-0.41	-0.44	-0.45	-0.41
FIW score	-0.30*	-0.30*	-0.17	-0.25+	-0.42**	-0.42+	-0.04
x Male	-0.06						
x Muslim		-0.04					
x Years of education			-0.02				
x Fled because of persecution				-0.07			
x Fled because of discrimination				-0.10			
x Center-right minister					0.22		
x Years of center-right dominance					-0.00		
x Application of the restrictive residence obligation						0.35*	
x Share of the non-monetary benefits to asylum-seekers						-0.00	
x Share of residents very concerned about immigration to Germany							-0.01*
Protection granted	24.30**	24.18**	24.17**	24.41**	24.48**	24.91**	24.49**
_cons	58.76**	58.73**	56.71**	58.25**	61.85**	60.87**	54.15**

Notes: Significance level ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test). p.p. = percentage points.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany, 2016-2017, own calculations.

Table S7: Interaction effects between individual and regional characteristics and conflict-related deaths on the probability of successful appeal (linear probability models, average marginal effects)

Variables	Model H4a	Model H4b	Model H4c	Model H4d	Model H4e	Model H4f	Model H4g
	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.
Subjective asylum reasons							
Fled because of violent conflict or war	2.83	2.73	2.54	2.84	2.78	2.79	2.66
Fled because of forced recruitment	-5.78*	-5.55+	-5.61+	-6.25*	-5.58+	-5.57+	-5.55+
Fled because of persecution	1.06	1.25	1.39	0.98	1.27	1.27	1.21
Fled because of discrimination	-4.07	-4.15	-4.41+	-5.61+	-4.15	-4.09	-4.09
Individual characteristics							
Male	0.02	1.16	1.03	1.34	1.23	1.18	1.21
Muslim	-3.92	-4.01	-4.66	-4.23	-4.18	-4.17	-4.16
Years of education	-0.01	0.01	-0.17	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00
Regional characteristics							
Center-right minister	1.43	1.73	1.45	1.52	0.96	1.61	1.69
Years of center-right dominance	0.16	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.10	0.12	0.13
Application of the restrictive residence obligation	-6.14*	-6.20*	-6.33*	-6.22*	-5.95*	-5.08	-6.20*
Share of the non-monetary benefits to asylum-seekers	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.21**	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.23**	-0.22**
Share of residents very concerned about immigration to Germany	0.19*	0.19*	0.19*	0.20*	0.19*	0.19*	0.19*
Workload							
Workload of judges	-3.89	-4.17	-4.22	-4.10	-4.06	-3.91	-4.14
Objective asylum reasons							
FIW score	-0.33**	-0.33**	-0.33**	-0.35**	-0.33**	-0.33**	-0.33**
Log of conflict-related deaths	-0.73+	-0.33	-0.93+	-0.71+	-0.64	-0.45	-0.40
x Male	0.51						
x Muslim		-0.17					
x Years of education			0.06				
x Fled because of persecution				0.04			
x Fled because of discrimination				0.60			
x Center-right minister					0.21		
x Years of center-right dominance					0.01		
x Application of the restrictive residence obligation						-0.38	
x Share of the non-monetary benefits to asylum-seekers						0.00	
x Share of residents very concerned about immigration to Germany							-0.00
Protection granted	24.29**	24.33**	24.20**	24.32**	24.15**	24.52**	24.32**
_cons	59.58**	59.70**	61.76**	60.77**	59.88**	59.34**	59.42**

Notes: Significance level ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test). p.p. = percentage points.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany, 2016-2017, own calculations.

Table S8: Interaction effects between individual and regional characteristics and workload of judges on the probability of successful appeal (linear probability models, average marginal effects)

Variables	Model H5a	Model H5b	Model H5c	Model H5d	Model H5e	Model H5f	Model H5g
	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.	p.p.
Subjective asylum reasons							
Fled because of violent conflict or war	2.56	2.40	2.42	2.91	2.75	2.66	2.79
Fled because of forced recruitment	-5.34+	-5.50+	-5.42+	-5.48+	-5.34+	-5.49+	-5.69+
Fled because of persecution	1.36	1.12	1.21	-4.73	1.14	1.22	1.21
Fled because of discrimination	-3.95	-3.99	-4.01	1.13	-3.98	-4.02	-3.99
Individual characteristics							
Male	-8.39	1.24	1.13	1.23	1.16	1.10	1.18
Muslim	-4.29	-12.41	-4.29	-4.25	-4.71	-4.10	-4.06
Years of education	0.01	0.02	0.72	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Regional characteristics							
Center-right minister	1.81	1.71	1.49	1.67	27.59+	1.45	1.38
Years of center-right dominance	0.13	0.11	0.14	0.13	-0.99	0.15	0.12
Application of the restrictive residence obligation	-6.53*	-6.22*	-5.99*	-6.23*	-6.36*	-10.95	-6.53*
Share of the non-monetary benefits to asylum-seekers	-0.23**	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.20**	-0.21	-0.21**
Share of residents very concerned about immigration to Germany	0.19*	0.19*	0.20*	0.19*	0.20*	0.20*	0.40*
Objective asylum reasons							
Log of conflict-related deaths	-0.41	-0.43	-0.41	-0.43	-0.41	-0.43	-0.44
FIW score	-0.33**	-0.34**	-0.32**	-0.33**	-0.33**	-0.33**	-0.33**
Workload							
Workload of judges	-13.31+	-13.81	6.25	-5.67	-7.59	-5.85	9.07
x Male	14.58						
x Muslim		12.51					
x Years of education			-1.08				
x Fled because of persecution				8.58			
x Fled because of discrimination				-7.54			
x Center-right minister					-35.58+		
x Years of center-right dominance					1.53		
x Application of the restrictive residence obligation						7.04	
x Share of the non-monetary benefits to asylum-seekers						-0.00	
x Share of residents very concerned about immigration to Germany							-0.32
Protection granted	24.43**	24.17**	24.33**	24.21**	23.89**	24.27**	24.39**
_cons	65.23**	66.04**	51.13**	59.91**	60.48**	59.59**	50.41**

Notes: Significance level ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$ (two-tailed test). p.p. = percentage points.

Source: IAB-BAMF-SOEP Survey of Refugees in Germany, 2016-2017, own calculations.

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