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Effect of Aid for Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows on the Utilization of Unilateral Trade Preferences offered by the QUAD countries

Sèna Kimm GNANGNON¹ and Harish Iyer²

Abstract

Development aid and non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs) are two major tools available to wealthier nations to assist developing countries in their development efforts. The present paper investigates the effect of Aid for Trade (AfT) flows (that are key for the integration of developing countries into the global trading system) and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, as well as their interplay on the utilization of NRTPs offered by the Quadrilaterals (i.e., QUAD countries). Two major blocks of NRTPs provided by the QUAD countries have been considered, namely the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs and other NRTPs. The analysis has covered 114 beneficiary countries of these NRTPs (of which 38 Least developed countries - LDCs) and the period 2002-2018. Several findings have emerged from the analysis. Over the full sample, total AfT flows contribute to enhancing the utilization rate of both GSP programs and other NRTPs. FDI inflows influence positively the utilization rate of both GSP programs and other NRTPs, with the effect on the former being higher than the effect on the latter. For LDCs, total AfT flows are associated with a better utilization of GSP programs at the expense of other NRTPs, while for NonLDCs, total AfT flows generate a better utilization of GSP programs compared to other NRTPs. In the meantime, higher FDI inflows improve the utilization of the two types of NRTPs, although they exert a higher positive effect on the utilization of GSP programs than on that of other NRTPs. In NonLDCs, higher FDI inflows contribute to improving the utilization of GSP programs, but lead to a lower degree of usage of other NRTPs. Total AfT flows and FDI inflows are strongly complementary in affecting positively the utilization of both types of NRTPs, and the degree of this complementarity is higher on the utilization of other NRTPs than on the utilization of GSP programs. Finally, beneficiary countries' level of export product diversification matters for the effect of both AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization of NRTPs. The conclusion section discusses the implications of these findings.

Keywords: Aid for Trade; Foreign Direct Investment Inflows; Non-reciprocal trade preferences utilization; QUAD countries; Developing Countries.

Jel Classification: F13; F14; O19.

DISCLAIMER

This is a working paper, which represents the personal opinions of individual staff members and is not meant to represent the position or opinions of the WTO or its Members, nor the official position of any staff members.

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1. Introduction

Wealthier nations use two major instruments to assist developing countries in their development efforts. These are the foreign aid, i.e., development aid, also referred to as official development assistance (ODA) and the non-reciprocal (or unilateral) trade preferences³ (henceforth, NRTPs).

ODA is "the government aid⁴ that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries" (OECD⁵, 2021). An important part of ODA is devoted to the trade sector of developing countries, and is referred to as "Aid for Trade (AfT)" in the jargon of the international trade community. The desire to secure a fair and growing share of ODA allocated to the promotion of international trade dates back to the middle of 2000s, where WTO Members realized that developing countries, including the Least developed countries⁶ (LDCs) among them, were marginally integrated into the multilateral trading system. In line with Paragraph 2 of the Preamble⁷ to the Marrakesh Agreement (that is, the Agreement establishing the WTO), WTO Members launched the AfT Initiative at the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005. Paragraph 57 of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (see WTO, 2005) states that AfT Initiative aims to "help developing countries, particularly LDCs build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade". According to our own computation based on the OECD statistics⁸, the average share of gross disbursements of total AfT in the gross disbursements of total ODA (both expressed in million US\$, constant 2018 prices) over all AfT recipient countries increased steadily from 12.3% in 2002 to 28% in 2018.

On the other hand, the international community has explored an additional tool - that is, the offer by developed countries⁹ of non-reciprocal trade concessions (i.e., discriminatory trading arrangements) to developing countries, with a view to providing them opportunities to increase their exports, and ultimately assisting them in their development efforts.

The present paper examines whether AfT flows have helped developing countries better utilize the NRTPs offered by developed countries, and particularly here the so-called "Quadrilaterals" (i.e., QUAD countries), namely Canada, European Union (EU), Japan and the United States of America (USA). The analysis additionally investigates the effect of foreign direct

³ The World Trade Organization (WTO) uses the terminology "preferential trade arrangements" to qualify NRTPs.

⁴ ODA was adopted by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), as the "gold standard" of foreign aid in 1969, and since then it has remained the main source of financing for development aid (e.g., OECD, 2021).

⁵ OECD refers to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

⁶ The group of LDCs has been designated as such by the United Nations as comprising the poorest and most vulnerable countries (to external and environmental shocks) in the world. Further information on this category of countries could be obtained online at: <http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/criteria-for-ldcs/>

⁷ Paragraph 2 of the Preamble of the Marrakech Agreement reads as follows: "Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development". The Agreement could be viewed online at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm

⁸ Statistics on AfT flows as well as ODA flows were collected from the OECD database that provides statistics related to development matters. This database can be accessed online at: <https://stats.oecd.org/>

⁹ The term "developed countries" is used here to mean "industrialized countries".

investment (FDI) inflows on the utilization of these NRTPs, as well as the joint effect of both AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization of these NRTPs.

The focus of the analysis on the NRTPs provided by the QUAD countries is dictated by the fact that the most comprehensive dataset on the utilization rate of NRTPs covers only the QUAD countries, and the period 2002-2020. This dataset¹⁰ has been developed and made publicly available recently by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

The analysis contributes to the literature on several fronts.

First, even though there is a growing number of studies on the determinants of the utilization of NRTPs (e.g., Hakobyan, 2015; Keck and Lendle, 2012; Manchin, 2006; Nilsson, 2016; Sytsma, 2021), to the best of our knowledge, no work has investigated the effect of AfT flows (i.e., AfT interventions) on the degree of utilization of NRTPs. Addressing this topic is all the more relevant that AfT interventions aim to address the supply-side constraints that limit developing countries' capacity to improve their export performance and better integrate into the multilateral trading system.

Second, previous studies on the determinants of the utilization of trade preferences have been performed using a country-product/year¹¹ framework. In addition, they have not controlled for many factors that could affect the supply of exportable goods (e.g., the level of financial development, which captures access of trading firms to credit; the level of real exchange rate, which is key for export competitiveness; the human capital level..... etc). The current paper does not use the country-product/year framework, but instead relies on a country-year framework¹² for the empirical analysis. This framework is better suited for the analysis compared to a country-product/year framework because in principle, AfT interventions do not aim to promote the export of specific products (or services) by recipient countries, but rather to enhance the overall trade (including export) capacity of the recipient countries.

Third, as pointed out by Keck and Lendle¹³ (2012), non-reciprocal preferential regimes overlap, because some countries that benefit from several non-reciprocal preferential regimes could make use of all of them, or for some reasons, prioritize the utilization of one or few of them at the detriment of others. For this reason, when assessing the determinants of the utilization rate of the set of NRTPs enjoyed by a country, it is essential to appropriately take account of the interaction between the utilization rates (by a given beneficiary country) of the variety of NRTPs that it enjoys. Among previous studies that have endeavoured to address this issue were for

¹⁰ The dataset could be accessed online at: <https://gsp.unctad.org/home> The WTO database on preferential trade arrangements provides yet an extensive information on these arrangements, but it has a lower time coverage than the dataset developed by the UNCTAD concerning the beneficiary countries' utilization rates of NRTPs.

¹¹ The country-product/year framework involves a dataset that includes for a given non-reciprocal trade preferential regime, the utilization rate of this preference by a beneficiary country (i.e., the exporting country) in a given year.

¹² This involves considering a dataset that contains the utilization rate of non-reciprocal trade preference (e.g., GSP programs) for a given beneficiary country and for a given year.

¹³ Keck and Lendle (2012) have not considered the utilization rate per beneficiary country (i.e., exporting country), but they have instead examined the overall utilization rate for four major importing countries (i.e., preference-granting countries) (Australia, Canada, the EU and the US). They have noted that calculating the utilization rate for specific regimes in isolation without accounting for the potential overlap between beneficiary countries' non-reciprocal preferential schemes can give the wrong impression that the overall utilization rate (of an importing country) is low, even though one preferential scheme (e.g., the GSP) might be used a lot more if another preferential regime did not exist.

example, Keck and Lendle (2012) and Hakobyan (2015). Keck and Lendle (2012) have defined the utilization rate for each of the four importing countries (Australia, Canada, the EU and the US) by identifying one regime as the most beneficial regime. In analysing factors underpinning the degree of utilization of the US GSP, Hakobyan (2015) have taken into account in his analysis the potential effect of other preferences by incorporating a dummy variable that captures the eligibility of a product (already covered by the US GSP) for an alternative preference program. The dataset and the framework of analysis used in the current paper allow for taking into account easily the interplay between the utilization by a beneficiary country of various non-reciprocal preferential regimes that it benefits.

Fourth and lastly, we are not aware of a study that has explored how both AfT flows and FDI inflows interact in influencing the degree of usage of NRTPs by beneficiary countries. This issue is worth investigating because on the one hand, AfT interventions could contribute to attracting FDI flows to the recipient-countries (e.g., Donaubaer et al. 2016; Lee and Ries 2016; Ly-My and Lee 2019). On the other hand, multinational enterprises may set up a plant in a developing country that enjoys non-reciprocal trade preferential concessions, with a view to harnessing these concessions and expanding its exports (e.g., Yannopoulos¹⁴, 1987).

The empirical analysis relies upon the aforementioned UNCTAD database on the utilization rates of NRTPs to address the questions raised on the paper. It has been carried out using a dataset of 114 beneficiary countries of NRTPs over the period 2002-2018. The empirical outcomes, which are essentially based on the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) approach have revealed interesting findings. Over the full sample, total AfT flows contribute to enhancing the utilization rate of GSP programs and other NRTPs alike, and FDI inflows exert a higher positive effect on the utilization rate of GSP programs than on other NRTPs. While the effect of these capital inflows on the utilization of the two types of NRTPs may vary in LDCs and NonLDCs, it appears that total AfT flows and FDI inflows are strongly complementary in affecting positively the utilization of both types of NRTPs. This complementarity is stronger on the utilization of other NRTPs than on the utilization of GSP programs. Finally, beneficiary countries' level of export product diversification influences the effect of both AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization of NRTPs.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a background on NRTPs and a brief literature review on the factors underpinning the utilization of these preferences. Section 3 discusses how AfT flows and FDI inflows could affect the utilization rate of NRTPs. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, and Section 5 provides some data analysis on key variables of interest in the analysis. Section 6 pins down the econometric approach for conducting the empirical exercise. Section 7 interprets the empirical outcomes. Section 8 deepens the analysis, and Section 9 concludes.

¹⁴ As we will see later, Yannopoulos (1987) is one the rare studies that discuss how FDI inflows could affect the utilization of NRTPs, even though many studies have looked at the effect of trade preferences (notably reciprocal trade preferences) on FDI inflows.

2. Background on non-reciprocal trade preferences and their export effects

Before laying down the discussion on the theoretical effect of AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization of NRTPs, we find useful to provide a brief background on NRTPs (**sub-section 2.1**) and a short literature review on the factors underpinning their utilization (**sub-section 2.2**).

2.1. Background on non-reciprocal trade preferences

The final act of the first UNCTAD conference held in 1964 contains an explicit recommendation on the need for developed countries to supply unilateral trade preferences to developing countries. The recommendation provides that developed nations should grant trade concessions to developing countries, and should not require concessions in return (see for example Bartels, 2003; Persson, 2015a,b). At the second UNCTAD conference held in 1968, members adopted a resolution (i.e., Resolution 21 (II)) that called for the establishment of a “generalized, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory system of preferences¹⁵ (referred to as GSP) in favour of the developing countries, including special measures in favour of the least advanced among the developing countries” (see Grossman and Sykes 2005). According to this Resolution, trade preferences should aim to increase export earnings for developing countries, promote industrialization and accelerate developing countries’ rates of economic growth (e.g., Bartels, 2003, Grossman and Sykes, 2005; Persson¹⁶, 2015a). In 1979, the permanent legal basis for granting trade preferences to developing countries was established through the so-called Enabling Clause, also referred to as “Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries”. While most developing countries can benefit from the GSP programs, preference granting countries also offer more generous schemes only to LDCs.

While the Enabling Clause provides the legal basis for GSP schemes, WTO Members adopted another legal instrument concerning the granting of NRTPs¹⁷ that allows for the granting of any other NRTPs authorised through a Waiver under the WTO Agreement (see WTO, 2010). This is the case for a number of preferential trade arrangements schemes¹⁸ provided under special WTO Waivers by Canada, the European Union, and the United States to some selected developing countries. Canada has currently been providing a tariff treatment to products from Commonwealth Caribbean countries. The EU had provided a non-reciprocal preferential treatment to products originating from Pakistan (from 15 November 2012 to 31 December 2013) and for products originating from Moldova (from 21 January 2008 to 31 December 2015). It is currently offering a non-reciprocal preferential treatment to products originating from the Western Balkans. The USA has been implementing several special preferential trade arrangements. These include for example, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) for eligible countries in Sub-Saharan African (SSA); the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act for Caribbean countries, and particularly the Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement initiative for Haiti; the trade preferences for Nepal; and the "Former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands" in

¹⁵ These types of preferences are also referred to as "Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)".

¹⁶ Cunha et al. (2005) have provided the history of GSPs, and Persson (2015a) has provided an overview on the legal and historical background of trade preferences.

¹⁷ NRTPs are also referred to as "preferential trade arrangements" in the jargon of the WTO.

¹⁸ For further information on these preferential trade arrangements, see the WTO PTA database online at: <http://ptadb.wto.org/default.aspx>

favour of four countries, including Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Palau.

There is no consensus in the literature¹⁹ on whether NRTPs have been effective in promoting beneficiaries' exports. Earlier studies (e.g., Brown, 1989; Sapir and Lundberg, 1984; Whalley, 1990) have considered GSP programs, and observed a modest positive exports effect of these programs, which they have attributed to the trade diversion effect of these programs. Recent studies have considered GSP programs and other NRTP schemes, and also obtained mixed outcomes. Some studies²⁰ have reported that NRTPs have been effective in promoting beneficiary countries' exports to the preference providers' markets; other works²¹ have uncovered that these preferences tend to hamper developing countries' exports. Others²² have also found heterogeneous results across beneficiary countries, sectors and products. For example, among studies that have not observed positive outcomes, Herz and Wagner (2011) have obtained that while the GSP schemes have been associated, on average, with a 4% lower exports by developing countries, the impact of these schemes on developing countries' exports appeared nonetheless to be positive if the scheme existed for less than 10 years, and negative if the scheme existed for a long period (i.e., one or two decades). The negative effect could be attributed to the strict or complicated rules of origin, which in the long term, exert distortive effects on developing countries' exports. These distortions ultimately lead these countries to export under most favoured nations tariffs rather than under the non-reciprocal GSP programs. The findings by Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) tend to confirm the outcomes obtained by Herz and Wagner (2011) concerning the impact of GSP schemes over a decade. In fact, Gil-Pareja et al. (2014) have obtained that NRTPs have led to an expansion of beneficiaries' exports to preference-granting countries, with the cumulative impact ranging from 26% after 4 years to 88% after 8 years. Tobin (2019) has observed that while GSP programs have increased developing countries' trade, they tend to trade (including to import) less under the GSP schemes (compared to GSP recipients that do not join the multilateral trading system) when they become GATT or WTO Members. The author has explained this outcome by the fact that by joining the GATT/WTO, countries enjoy non-discriminatory and hence more predictable (i.e., less subject to ad hoc conditionality) GSP programs. This makes exporters less inclined to lobby against domestic protectionism, and results in lower imports for GSP recipients that join the GATT/WTO compared to those that are outside the multilateral trading system. Ornelas and Ritel (2020) have demonstrated empirically that the impact of NRTPs (mainly GSP schemes) is strong and positive on the exports of beneficiary-countries that are simultaneously poor and WTO Members. Klasen et al. (2021) have reported, *inter alia*, that the individual trade preference regimes - offered to LDCs by the EU, USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,

¹⁹ See for example, Hoekman and Özden (2005) and Cardamone (2007) for a discussion on the effects of trade preferences. More recently, Ornelas (2016) has provided an extensive literature review on the economic effects of S&D, notably the nonreciprocal system of preferences (here the GSP) provided by developed countries.

²⁰ These works include for example, Aiello et al. (2010); Anson et al. (2009); Cuyvers and Soeng (2013); Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010); Gil-Pareja et al. (2014); Hakobyan (2020); Ito and Aoyagi, 2019; Ornelas and Ritel (2020); Thelle et al. (2015).

²¹ See for example, Admassu (2020); Gil-Pareja et al. (2019); Gradeva and Martínez-Zarzoso (2016); Seyoum (2006); and Zappile (2011).

²² Borchert (2009); Cipollina and Demaria (2017, 2020); Fernandes et al. (2019); Herz and Wagner (2011); Klasen et al. (2021); Low et al. (2009); and Tobin (2019).

Norway, and Turkey - have not been always effective in raising LDCs' export values. Rather, the export expansion effects have been obtained for individual schemes of some developed countries and some sectors, in particular for LDCs that export agricultural goods and light manufacturing products, including textiles and leather after 1990.

2.2. Literature review on the determinants of the utilization of non-reciprocal trade preferences

The utilization rate of a NRTP reflects the degree of usage of this preference, and provides an indication of the economic value of the preference for the beneficiary country. It is measured by the ratio of imports under the preferential regime to eligible imports (e.g., Cirera et al., 2016; Hakobyan, 2015; Keck and Lendle, 2012; WTO, 2016). According to Hakobyan (2015), low utilization rates of trade preferences likely indicate the absence of economic value of these trade preferences, or at best, that these preferences are providing little value to beneficiary countries. However, the utilization rate of a trade preference might not necessarily provide the best perspective of the value of a preferential regime (e.g., Akinmade et al., 2020): even though low utilization rates of a given trade preference may, to some extent, be informative (e.g., Persson and Wilhelmsson, 2016), it could still hide the existence of some (non-tariff) barriers to the utilization of this preference by the beneficiary country. These non-tariff barriers could be related to rules of origin requirements, as well as administrative and other compliance costs²³ that are to be met by the beneficiary country so as to benefit from the trade preference (e.g., Gitli, 1995; Gradeva and Martínez-Zarzoso 2016; Persson, 2015b, WTO, 2019). Such non-tariff barriers would reduce the beneficiary country's export volumes to the preference granting country, and undermine the value of trade preferences. Low utilization rates of trade preferences could also arise from the erosion of the preference margin, i.e., low preferential tariff margin (a small difference between the preferential tariff and non-preferential tariff rates) (e.g., Inama, 2003; Nilsson, 2016; Reynolds, 2009; WTO, 2019) or reflect inadequate product coverage (Cirera and Cooke, 2015). They could also be attributed to the availability of other trade preferences, the insufficient knowledge or lack of knowledge about the existence of trade preferences (e.g., WTO, 2019). Manchin (2006) has established that the decision to request for preferences is positively associated with the value of the preferences offered. Moreover, the author have found that countries' specificities significantly influence the decision to request or not preferences, as well as how much to import.

While there are many studies on the effect of trade preferences on beneficiaries' trade performance, relatively few studies have investigated the determinants of the utilization of trade preferences. Some studies have reported a high degree of trade preferences utilization (e.g., Bureau et al., 2007; Candau and Jean, 2009; Keck and Lendle, 2012; Nilsson, 2016) while others have, in contrast, found a low utilization rate of trade preferences (e.g., DeMaria et al. 2008; Francois et al., 2006; Hakobyan, 2015; Inama, 2003; Nilsson, 2011; WTO²⁴, 2019).

Manchin (2006) has obtained that the utilization rate of EU's preferences by African, Caribbean and Pacific countries tends to be driven positively, *inter alia*, by a rise in the income

²³ For example, beneficiary countries must incur the administrative burden of filling out forms when claiming trade preferences (e.g., Gitli, 1995; Gradeva and Martínez-Zarzoso 2016).

²⁴ A note by the WTO Secretariat (WTO, 2019) has documented the utilization of trade preferences by LDCs for agricultural exports, and shown the existence of a low utilization of preferences for several agricultural export products and by several LDCs under the preferential regimes reviewed.

(GDP), a decline in the population size, greater economic freedom, and the potential of the preferential scheme, that is, the difference between the third-country duty and the preferential duty multiplied by eligible imports. One major conclusion of this study is that there are no incentives for traders to request for preferences if the difference between preferential and third-country tariff rates are lower than 4 per cent, as otherwise, the costs of obtaining the preferences would outweigh the potential benefits of the trade preferences. On another note, the decision to request preferences and the volume of export under the preference regime depends on a set of other factors, of which production costs, products quality, competitiveness, infrastructure quality, and institutional qualities of countries.

Keck and Lendle (2012) have considered the determinants of the utilization rates of NRTPs offered by Australia, Canada, the European Union and the United States. Their findings suggest that the overall preference utilization rates are often very high, reaching around 90% of preference-eligible imports in Canada, the EU, and the US, while for Australia, the rate is established at 61%. Their analysis also reveals that the size of preferential margin and the export value are key factors that influence positively the usage of NRTPs provided by these four countries. Especially, the utilization rates tend to be higher for agricultural products, and to be negatively associated with exporting primary products.

Nilsson (2016) has observed a high overall utilization rate of EU's trade preferences in 2013, although there are significant variations across partner countries and sectors. Interestingly, and in contrast with the literature (whereby small trade flows from developing countries to developed countries make no or little use of preferences), it appears that low values of export flows to the EU make relatively good use of these preferences. In addition, products that are subject to a low preferential margin shows high utilization rate of preferences. Finally, the author has reported empirical evidence that both the values of export flows and preferential margins, as well as their combination (which reflects the potential value of preferences or potential duty savings) matter positively and significantly for the utilization of trade preferences.

Hakobyan (2015) has documented the underutilization of the GSP offered by the USA, and demonstrated empirically that differences in the utilization rates of the USA GSP across developing countries and sectors are partly attributed to the differences in these countries' production structure, which acts as a proxy for the local content. In particular, the utilization rate of the USA GSP scheme rises with the local content share and falls with the availability of other trade preference programs. He has also shown the existence of a strong heterogeneity in the utilization rates of the GSP by beneficiary countries, as approximately 20% of observations do not claim GSP benefits; among the remainder of observations, some enjoy a full 100% of benefits of the preferential scheme, while others have claimed partial benefits of the scheme.

Sytsma (2021) has explored the extent to which the revision of the rules of origin for apparel products under the EU's GSP scheme has influenced the utilization of this trade preference. He has found evidence that rules of origin act as important deterrent of the utilization of NRTPs by LDCs. Also, the existence of a heterogeneity in the response of utilization rates (to this revision of the rules of origin for apparel products) across products and LDCs shows that revisions of rules of origin might not be a panacea for making the trade preferences fully effective for LDCs.

3. Discussion on the effect of AfT and FDI on the utilization of non-reciprocal trade preferences

This section discusses from a theoretical standpoint the effect of both AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization of trade preferences, as well as how both types of capital flows interact in influencing the usage of trade preferences. But before moving to this discussion, a number of points are worth highlighting.

First, beneficiary countries that are offered several types of NRTPs (let us say for example, GSP programs and other NRTPs) may either use all available preferences or for some reasons, opt for utilizing some trade preferences at the expense of others. These reasons could include the inability of the beneficiary country to meet the requirements (for example, in terms of quality) associated with the export of the eligible products to the preference-granting country; the existence of stringent rules of origin (origin requirements to use the preferences) as well as other administrative barriers, which act as strong bottlenecks to the exports of the beneficiary country under the preferential regime (e.g., Anson et al., 2019; Sytsma, 2021; WTO, 2019). Beneficiary countries may also under-utilize (or even not utilize at all) the NRTPs that they enjoy if they have not implemented the requisite policies to incentivize their domestic firms (either foreign firms or local firms) to harness the opportunities arising from the trade preference schemes.

Second, as the study focuses on the utilization of NRTPs provided by the QUAD countries, it henceforth uses, for the sake of simplicity, the expressions "GSP programs" and "other trade preferences" to mean respectively the "GSP programs offered by the QUAD countries to developing countries" and the "other NRTPs offered by the same countries to developing countries".

3.1. Effect of AfT flows on the utilization of trade preferences

We argue that the effect of total AfT flows that accrue to a country on its utilization of NRTPs would depend on how each of the major categories of total AfT flows (as defined by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development - OECD) affects the usage of trade preferences. The OECD has defined three main categories of AfT flows that are often used in the empirical literature. These categories are AfT for economic infrastructure, AfT related to the build-up of productive capacities, and AfT for trade policy and regulation. AfT for economic infrastructure covers three main sectors, which are transport and storage, communications, and energy generation and supply. AfT related to productive capacities covers sectors such as banking and financial services, business and other services, agriculture, fishing, industry, mineral resources and mining, and tourism. Finally, AfT for trade policy and regulation covers trade policy and regulation as well as trade-related adjustment interventions. AfT interventions concerning trade policy and regulation aim to help build the capacity of developing countries' policymakers to formulate trade policy, participate in trade negotiations, implement WTO Agreements, develop the requisite institutions, and the regulatory framework to that would help facilitate trade.

The theoretical export effect of total AfT flows, including through each of its three components, has been largely discussed in the literature (e.g., Bearce et al. 2013; Busse et al. 2012; Cali and te Velde, 2011; Cirera and Winters, 2015; Vijil and Wagner, 2012). We do not intend to rehearse here this theoretical literature. Rather, we briefly recall some main insights of this literature.

The theoretical effect of AfT for productive capacities on export performance can be straightforward. In fact, firms could not engage in exporting activities if they were not able to produce exportable goods (and services) that would meet the demand in the international trade markets, including here in the markets of preference-granting countries. Thus, AfT flows for enhancing productive capacities are expected to promote export performance in the recipient-countries if they help to foster the capacity of domestic firms (be they local or foreign firms) to supply goods (and services) demanded in the international trade market. AfT flows for productive capacities could then foster the usage of trade preferences (for goods) if they enhanced the capability of firms to supply goods that meet the requirements (e.g., in terms of product quality) of the preference-granting markets.

AfT related to economic infrastructure is a large component of the AfT portfolio (e.g., OECD-WTO, 2017). While this type of AfT is not provided to a specific sector, and may therefore be sector-neutral (e.g., Cirera and Winters 2015), it can contribute significantly to fostering export expansion by reducing trade costs. Likewise, trade facilitation measures that help to limit the time, cost, and number of documents required for export and import procedures, could be sector-neutral, while also facilitating the cross-border movement of trade flows, and hence exports. As a matter of fact, the development of infrastructure²⁵ (soft and hard infrastructure) plays a key role in enhancing countries' competitiveness, and hence promoting export performance (e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller 2002; Cali and TeVelde 2011; Limao and Venables 2001; Portugal-Perez and Wilson 2012; Shepherd and Wilson, 2007; Vijil and Wagner, 2012; Wilson et al. 2003, 2005). For example, Cali and te Velde (2011), Busse et al. (2012), Helble et al. (2012) and Vijil and Wagner (2012) have reported that AfT for economic infrastructure and AfT dedicated to facilitating trade (which is part of AfT for trade policy and regulation) help to reduce trade costs, and facilitate the export of goods. After reviewing the literature on the export effect of AfT flows, Cadot and Melo (2014) have concluded that while there is a support for the argument that investments in hard and soft infrastructure contribute to trade costs reduction, the benefits of these investments might be eroded if complementary reform (especially the introduction of competition in transport services) were not implemented. Against this backdrop, we can expect that greater AfT flows for economic infrastructure would reduce trade costs, strengthen trading firms' capacity to take advantage of preferential trade regimes, and hence increase their exports under these preferential schemes.

Similarly, through its trade costs reduction effect, AfT for trade facilitation could encourage firms (both domestic and foreign firms) to make a better use of the available NRTPs, including by enhancing their exports under these preference schemes. By strengthening the trade policy design and implementation capacity of policymakers (in recipient-countries), AfT related to trade policy regulation can help them to develop sound trade policies that align with their commitments at the WTO, and their export development strategies (e.g., Adhikari, 2019; Stiglitz and Charlton, 2006). Incidentally, AfT interventions for trade policy and regulation are conducive to greater trade policy liberalization in recipient countries (Gnangnon, 2018a). The same effect has been obtained by the author for the other two categories of AfT flows. As trade policy liberalization is potentially associated with export expansion (see discussion in section 4), we could also expect that AfT interventions would lead to a better utilization of trade preferences.

²⁵ Infrastructure is considered here in a broader sense, encompassing physical infrastructure as well as trade facilitation measures. According to Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2012: p 1296), hard infrastructure refers to highways, railroads, ports, etc., while soft infrastructure covers transparency, customs efficiency, institutional reforms.

There is now a wealth of empirical studies on the recipient-countries' trade performance effect of AfT flows. In general, this empirical literature²⁶ tends to confirm the effectiveness of AfT interventions at both the micro and macro level, although their impact may vary considerably depending on a number of factors, including the type of AfT intervention, the income level, the sector that benefits from the support, and the geographical region of the recipient country (e.g., Cadot et al. 2014; OECD-WTO, 2017; Lammersen and Roberts, 2015; Velde te et al. 2013).

Building on these theoretical and empirical works related to the export performance effect of AfT flows, we postulate **hypothesis 1** as follows: AfT interventions would lead to a higher utilization of NRTPs. However, as beneficiaries of preferential concessions might make use of some preferences at the expense of others, including when they enjoy higher AfT flows, we might not expect a uniform effect of AfT interventions on different types of preference regimes. In the present analysis, we can expect that higher AfT flows (including total AfT flows and its three major components) might not necessarily yield a higher utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preference programs together. For example, AfT interventions could positively affect the utilization rate of GSP programs, but negatively influence the utilization rate of other trade preference programs.

3.2. Effect of FDI inflows on the utilization of non-reciprocal trade preferences

Discussing the effect of FDI flows to beneficiary countries on their utilization of NRTPs involves merely elaborating on how FDI inflows affect host-countries' (i.e., beneficiary-countries) exports, including under these trade preference regimes. In the literature, less attention has been paid to the effect of FDI inflows on the utilization of trade preferences (e.g., Yannopoulos, 1987), while some studies have looked the effect of trade preferences (e.g., regional trade agreements) on FDI inflows (e.g., Baccini et al., 2017; Baltagi et al., 2008; Cardamone and Scoppola, 2016; Medvedev, 2012; Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch, 2010; Zahid, 2020).

We first present a brief literature on the effect of FDI inflows on exports, and then discuss specifically how FDI can affect exports authorized under preferential trade regimes. In general, the literature distinguishes two major types of FDI: horizontal²⁷ FDI (e.g., Markusen, 1984) and vertical²⁸ FDI (e.g., Helpman, 1984; Slaughter, 2003), although in practice, multinational enterprises often undertake both types of FDIs. Horizontal FDIs are motivated by the avoidance of transportation and trade costs, and tariff jumping motives, and are, therefore, undertaken with a view to substituting to export activities from the home country. Here, the firm has to make a trade-off between export and FDI strategies by comparing the costs of serving the market of the

²⁶ Studies on the export performance effect of AfT flows include, for example, Bearce et al. (2013); Brazys (2010, 2013); Busse et al. (2012); Cadot et al. (2014); Cali and te Velde (2011); Gnanon (2019a,b,c, 2021a,b,c,d); Gnanon and Roberts (2017); Ferro et al. (2014); Ghimire et al. (2013; 2016); Helble et al. (2012); Hoekman and Shingal (2020); Hühne et al. (2014a; 2014b); Hynes and Holden (2016); Lammersen and Roberts (2015); Ly-My et al., 2021; Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2017); Naito, 2016; Vijil (2014); and Vijil and Wagner (2012).

²⁷ Horizontal FDIs are motivated by the avoidance of transportation and trade costs (and therefore undertaken with a view to substitute to export) and tariff jumping motives. Here, the firm has to make a trade-off between the export and FDI strategies by comparing the costs of serving the market of host country through exporting from its home country to that market, or by engaging in FDI in the host country.

²⁸ Multinational firms engage in vertical FDIs with a view to taking advantage of the lower cost of production factors available in the host country, by relocating part of the production chain in that country.

host country through exporting from its home country to that market, to that of engaging in FDI in the host country. As a result, preferential trade regimes that involve in particular tariff treatment (i.e., reduction or removal of tariffs) might lead to lower economic incentives for horizontal FDI (e.g., Büthe and Milner 2008). On the other hand, multinational firms undertake vertical (or export oriented) FDIs by relocating part of the production chain in the host country with a view to taking advantage of the lower cost of production factors available in that country. Vertical FDIs are typically resource-seeking, as the parent company exploits its foreign affiliates to add value to goods or services that are generally exported (e.g., Baccini et al., 2017).

At the same time, not all firms could take advantage of the preferential trade regime, given that, by definition all firms do not export, some aiming to serve only the domestic market of the host country beneficiary of trade preferences. This suggests that some firms' characteristics, notably their differences in terms of size and productivity, matter for their engagement in international trade activities, including export activities (e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1999; Bernard et al. 2006; Melitz 2003). Productivity differences among firms reflect their capacity to afford additional trade costs, including the fixed costs of distribution and servicing, and variable costs (e.g., transport, insurance, fees, and tariffs) (e.g., Helpman 2006). Brainard (1997) has shown that the share of exports by multinational firms rises in scale economies (i.e., when there are cost advantages to concentration) and decreases in trade costs and foreign market size (firms establish foreign production facilities when there is proximity to customers, i.e., local markets). The recent literature has emphasized that for a given firm, engaging in FDI involves higher fixed costs (including fixed costs associated with plant setup abroad), and lower variable costs (e.g., transportation costs, input costs, tariffs and trade costs costs), while opting for exports entails lower fixed costs but higher variable costs. Only the largest and most productive multinational corporations can afford the fixed costs and the variable costs (e.g., tariffs and inputs) of producing and sourcing abroad (e.g., Baldwin, 2005; Bernard et al., 2003; Helpman et al., 2004; Melitz, 2003; Yeaple 2005). Studies such as Delgado et al. (2002), Head and Ries (2003) and Girma et al. (2005) have provided empirical support for this theory. Oberhofer and Pfaffermayr (2012) have shown theoretically that in a multi-country setting, the optimal mode, for a given firm, of serving foreign markets can vary across host countries, as some firms can both export and invest abroad. For example, when facing high transportation costs and fixed plant setup costs that have nothing to do with geographical distance, multinational firms tend to serve large and distant markets by engaging in FDI, and serve small and nearby markets via exporting activities. The authors have reported empirical evidence that while the majority of firms tend to utilize both exporting and FDI strategies in a complementarity way, productivity differences across them induce a substitutional relationship between exports and FDI. Building on this literature, we argue that productive multinational firms that engage in FDI in beneficiary countries of NRTPs would likely make use of these preferences so as to enhance their exports to preference-granting countries (that could also be their home countries).

In general, the empirical work on the host country's export effect of FDI inflows has shown that this effect works through a variety of channels, including for example, by raising the domestic capital needed to expand exports; facilitating access to new and large foreign markets; upgrading technical and management skills; training local workforce; and ultimately enhancing productivity (e.g., Aizenman and Noy, 2006; Athukorala and Menon 1995; Banga, 2006; Elkomy et al., 2019; Newman et al., 2015; Saggi, 2002; Ye et al., 2021). The effectiveness of these channels in promoting

multinational firms' exports from their host countries depends on whether conditions²⁹ for the absorption of advanced technologies exist in the host country (e.g., Koo and Perkins 2016; Lall and Pietrobelli, 2002).

Despite the voluminous literature on the export effects of FDI inflows, scarce studies have focused on the effect of FDI inflows on the utilization of NRTPs. Yannopoulos (1987) has pointed out that the contribution of foreign firms to the expansion of exports under preferential tariff treatment would be higher if the new export production requires the utilization of specialized informational assets that are transferable through intra-firm mechanisms. Especially, FDI inflows could enhance exports of the beneficiary of trade preferences if the provisions of the NRTP covered sectors where marketing, management or technological intensity of production is high. Furthermore, when NRTPs entail across the board tariff cuts (or removals), beneficiary countries that have comparative advantages in producing and exporting low value-added products will likely export low-skill and technology-intensive products. In such beneficiary countries, FDIs might not contribute significantly to export expansion under the preferential regimes, in particular if they were resource-seeking³⁰ multinational enterprises. In contrast, beneficiary countries that endeavour to diversify their export product mix could attract foreign firms (including those from both the preference granting country or other countries) aiming at engaging in the exportation of a diversity of products (under the preferential regime). This would particularly be the case if the marketing skills and knowledge required to overcome the marketing entry barriers in the preference-granting country were high. In the absence of other barriers such as legal barriers, such firms could easily compete with local firms (in the beneficiary countries) in the exporting activities stimulated by the tariff preferences (see Yannopoulos (1987).

More importantly, the contribution of foreign firms (in the form of FDI) to export expansion in beneficiary countries of NRTPs (under the preferential regime) could also depend on the share of intermediary inputs that must be supplied from outside the beneficiary countries (Yannopoulos, 1987). Even in the context of less stringent rules of origin governing the preferential scheme, multinational enterprises (notably if they are larger) can, more than local firms, afford the costs of scanning international markets for inputs. This is particularly the case if the inputs is sourced from the host country of the foreign firm that can eventually be the preference granting country³¹ (e.g., Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2012).

In light the foregoing, we postulate **hypothesis 2** as follows: we expect that the effect of FDI inflows on the utilization of trade preferences might not be straightforward, as it could depend on many factors. One of these factors is the comparative advantage of the beneficiary country, and whether the latter implements measures to diversify its export baskets even if it is dependent on the exports of low value-added products). Other factors are the share of intermediary inputs

²⁹ Such conditions could include liberalised trade regime, human capital development, policies in favour of export oriented FDI, and macroeconomic stability (e.g., Zhang, 2001).

³⁰ Multinational enterprises engaged in this type of FDI aim at acquiring some specific types of resources (e.g., national resources or raw materials) that are not available in their home country or that are available in the host country at a lower cost (e.g., unskilled labour whose price is lower than at the home country) (e.g., Dunning, 1993; 1998).

³¹ According to the theoretical models of vertical linkages, the higher distance between the headquarters and the production facilities in the host country, the greater is the share of intermediate inputs sourced by multinationals in a host country (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996 and Markusen and Venables, 1999). Likewise, Hanson et al. (2005) have shown that US multinationals tend to increase their sales of intermediate inputs to their overseas affiliates as trade costs fall.

that would be sourced overseas and firms' characteristics (e.g., their productivity). As noted above, the beneficiary country's domestic policies and institutions (that matter for attracting FDI inflows, including for harnessing the opportunities offered by the NRTPs regime) are also important for the impact that FDI inflows could have on exports under the preferential regime. Nonetheless, as noted above, if multinational firms in the host countries (i.e., beneficiaries of trade preferences) might opt for improving the utilization of some NRTPs at the expense of others, in particular if those preferences provide significant benefits to them. In such a case, higher FDI inflows would lead to a higher utilization rates for some NRTPs programs (let us, for example GSP programs) at the detriment of other NRTP programs - or vice-versa.

3.3. Interaction effect of AfT and FDI on the utilization of trade preferences

The theoretical discussion provided thus far, does not allow to predict specific direction(s) concerning the effects of AfT interventions and FDI inflows on the utilization rate of a given NRTP (i.e., here GSP programs or other trade preferences). Therefore, it would be difficult to anticipate the precise direction in which AfT flows and FDI inflows would jointly affect the utilization of trade preferences, that is, whether AfT interventions would be complementary or substitutable with FDI inflows in enhancing the utilization rate of trade preferences.

On the one hand, few empirical studies have provided guidance on the relationship between AfT interventions and FDI inflows (e.g., Donaubaauer et al. 2016; Lee and Ries 2016; Ly-My and Lee 2019; Selaya and Sunesen, 2012). The findings by Selaya and Sunesen (2012) have revealed that aid flows that take the form of physical capital transfers (e.g., aid allocated to productive sectors) crowd out productive private investment, while aid flows that support complementary inputs such as public infrastructure development exert a positive effect on FDI inflows. A direct and strong positive effect of AfT flows - notably AfT for economic infrastructure - on FDI inflows has been reported by Donaubaauer et al. (2016). Similarly, Lee and Ries (2016) have obtained that total AfT flows have played a strong role in attracting greenfield investment flows to aid recipient countries, and that this positive effect is essentially driven by AfT interventions for economic infrastructure and for building productive capacities. Similar findings have been obtained by Ly-My and Lee (2019). In light of the foregoing, and given the discussion in the previous two subsections, we could be tempted to postulate (**hypothesis 3**) that if both total AfT flows and FDI inflows induced a higher utilization of trade preferences, then both types of capital inflows would act in a complementary way in positively influencing the utilization rate of trade preferences. That is, the magnitude of the positive effect of AfT flows on the usage of trade preferences would become higher as countries enjoy higher FDI inflows (thanks *inter alia*, to AfT interventions). However, the direction of the effect of a type of AfT intervention on the utilization of a given NRTP is still unknown theoretically. Furthermore, not all types of AfT interventions might lead to higher FDI inflows, and once again, some AfT interventions may favour the utilization of some preferences at the detriment of others. As a consequence, FDI inflows might not affect in the same way the utilization of GSP programs and other preference programs offered by the QUAD countries. Hence, the direction of the interaction effect of a particular AfT category (i.e., AfT for economic infrastructure, AfT for productive capacities, and AfT for trade policy and regulation) and FDI inflows on the utilization rate of NRTPs (GSP or other trade preferences) is ultimately

an empirical issue. This signifies that AfT interventions may interact with FDI inflows in a complementary or substitutable way when affecting positively the utilization rate of trade preference schemes.

4. Empirical strategy

This section presents the model specification that helps investigate the effect of AfT flows and FDI flows on the utilization of NRTPs, as well as how these two types of capital inflows interact in influencing the usage of NRTPs (**sub-section 4.1**). It, then, discusses the expected effects of variables included in the model specification (**sub-section 4.2**). Finally, it considers the econometric approach that will help perform the empirical analysis (**sub-section 4.3**).

4.1. Model specification

It is worth recalling that the present paper emphasizes the importance of supply-side³² factors in the exporting (beneficiary country) to explain the differences in the degree of the utilization of trade preferences across beneficiary countries. In contrast with previous studies that have used a country-product/year framework analysis to explore the determinants of the utilization rates of preferences (e.g., Keck and Lendle, 2012; Manchin, 2006; Nilsson, 2016; Sytsma, 2021), the present study uses a country-year framework to investigate the effect of AfT flows and FDI flows on the utilization rate of NRTPs.

The discussion in section 3 has shown that on the one hand, AfT flows help beneficiary countries to improve their competitiveness through trade costs reduction, the development of productive capacities and the implementation of sound trade policies in coherence with WTO rules. On the other hand, FDI inflows could help enhance the utilization of these preferences. In addition to these capital flows, a number of other supply-side factors could potentially influence the utilization rate of preferences, and particularly the effect of AfT flows and FDI flows on the utilization rate of preferences. For example, Manchin (2006) has noted that the decision to request preferences and the volume of exports under the preference regimes depends on a set of other factors, of which production costs, products quality, competitiveness, infrastructure quality, and institutional qualities of countries. We draw these supply-side factors from the literature³³ on the macroeconomic determinants of export performance in developing countries simply because utilizing trade preferences ultimately involves exporting to granting-preference countries, although within the limits (if any at all) of import volumes allowed by the preference-granting country. These factors (features of the beneficiary countries) are the real income, trade policies, the human capital level, the real exchange rate, the level of financial development, the institutional and governance quality, the population size, and the level of terms of trade. In general, each of these factors may

³² For example, Funke and Holly (1992) have shown that supply-side factors have a far higher explanatory power in explaining West German manufacturing sector than demand side factors. According to Fugazza (2004), for a given level of market access, supply-side conditions play a major role in determining the export volume of a country.

³³ See for example, Bearce et al. (2013); Cali and te Velde (2011); Edwards and Alves (2006); Gnanagnon (2018); Helble et al. (2012); Jongwanich (2010); Ju et al. (2010); Santos-Paulino (2002, 2007); Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2004); Vijil and Wagner (2012).

affect in opposite directions the utilization of the two blocs of NRTPs considered here, namely GSP programs, and 'other trade preferences'.

Overall, to lay out the model specifications on the effect of AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization rate of trade preferences, we take cue from previous papers that have investigated the determinants of the utilization of trade preferences using a country-product/year framework (e.g., Keck and Lendle, 2012; Manchin, 2006; Nilsson, 2016; Sytsma, 2021), and build on the insights from the literature on the macroeconomic determinants of export performance in developing countries. As the present analysis examines the effect of two blocks of trade preferences, namely GSP programs and other trade preferences, and given the possible substitutable relationship between these two types of trade preferences (i.e., one trade preference program can be used at the expense of the other group of trade preferences) (e.g., Hakobyan, 2015; Keck and Lendle, 2012), we consider a baseline model specification that captures the interplay among the two blocks of NRTPs as well as a set of control variables derived from the relevant literature (see above).

The two baseline model specifications (1) and (2), i.e., corresponding to the utilization rate for each major NRTP, are as follows:

$$URGSP_{it} = \alpha_1 URGSP_{it-1} + \alpha_2 \text{Log}(AfT)_{it} + \alpha_3 FDICST_{it} + \alpha_4 UROTP_{it} + \alpha_5 \text{Log}(GDP)_{it} + \alpha_6 EDU_{it} + \alpha_7 TP_{it} + \alpha_8 \text{Log}(REER)_{it} + \alpha_9 FINDEV_{it} + \alpha_{10} INST_{it} + \alpha_{11} \text{Log}(POP)_{it} + \alpha_{12} TERMS_{it} + \mu_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

$$UROTP_{it} = \beta_1 UROTP_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{Log}(AfT)_{it} + \beta_3 FDICST_{it} + \beta_4 URGSP_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Log}(GDP)_{it} + \beta_6 EDU_{it} + \beta_7 TP_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Log}(REER)_{it} + \beta_9 FINDEV_{it} + \beta_{10} INST_{it} + \beta_{11} \text{Log}(POP)_{it} + \beta_{12} TERMS_{it} + \rho_i + \theta_t + \omega_{it} \quad (2)$$

In these two equations, *i* and *t* indicate respectively a country and time-period. The coefficients α_1 to α_{12} , as well as β_1 to β_{12} will be estimated. μ_i and ρ_i are time invariant specific feature of each country in the panel dataset. δ_t and θ_t are time dummies that represent the effect of global shocks on the utilization rates of trade preferences by all beneficiaries. ϵ_{it} and ω_{it} are well-behaving error-terms.

An unbalanced panel dataset containing 114 countries over the period 2002-2018 has been built based on data availability. We mitigate the influence of business cycles on variables at hand by averaging data on variables over non-overlapping sub-periods of 3-year that are 2000-2002; 2003-2005; 2006-2008; 2009-2011; 2012-2014 and 2015-2018. Appendix 1 provides the description of all variables contained in equations (1) and (2) as well as their sources.

The variable "URGSP" represents the utilization rate (in percentage) of GSP programs provided by the QUAD countries to developing countries, including LDCs among the latter. It measures the extent to which imports that are eligible for GSP programs are actually imported under these preferences. It has been computed using a formula adopted by both the WTO and the UNCTAD (see WTO, 2016). The formula goes as follows: $URGSP = 100 * (\text{GSP received imports}) / (\text{GSP covered imports})$, where "GSP received imports" refers to the value of imports that received GSP treatment, and "GSP covered imports" indicates the value of imports that are classified in tariff lines that are dutiable and covered by the GSP scheme of the preference-granting country.

The indicator "UROTP" is the utilization rate (in percentage) of the other NRTPs offered by the QUAD countries to developing countries, including LDCs among the latter. In particular, this covers for the USA the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative. In the case of the EU, it includes preferences under the Economic Partnership Agreements entered with selected Africa Sub-Saharan countries. It has been computed as follows: $UROTP = 100 * (\text{Other-Preferential Imports}) / (\text{Other Preferential Covered Imports})$. "Other-preferential imports" refers to the value of imports that benefitted from NRTPs other than GSP programs. "Other-preferential covered imports" refers to the value of imports that are classified in tariff lines that are dutiable and covered by the other-preferential schemes.

The one-period lag of the dependent variable has been introduced in models (1) and (2) not only to capture a potential state dependence path (that is, persistence over time) in the utilization of NRTPs offered by the QUAD countries, but also to account *inter alia*, for omitted variables problems. For example, the lagged dependent variable helps address the omission of the utilization rate of NRTPs provided by non-QUAD countries³⁴. In fact, AfT interventions can affect the utilization rate of NRTPs provided by non-QUAD countries, and hence ultimately the utilization rate the NRTPs offered by the QUAD countries. The one-period lag of the dependent variable as a right-hand side regressor helps account for such an effect, in the absence of an indicator of the utilization of NRTPs provided by non-QUAD countries.

The first regressor of main interest is "AfT", which stands for the real gross disbursements of AfT flows. It can be either total AfT flows ("AfTTOT"), or one of its three major categories. These categories are AfT flows for economic infrastructure ("AfTINFRA"), AfT flows for building productive capacities ("AfTPROD"), and AfT flows related to trade policy and regulation ("AfTPOL"). All AfT variables are expressed in US Dollar, constant 2018 prices (see Appendix 1 for more details on AfT variables). The natural logarithm has been applied to the variable "AfT" in order to limit the skewness of its distribution.

The second main regressor of interest in the analysis is the 'size' of foreign direct investment inflows, measured here by the real Foreign Direct Investment inflows ("FDICST") (constant US\$ 2010 prices). The variable "FDICST" has been obtained by first multiplying the net inflows of FDI (in percentage of GDP) by the real GDP (constant 2010 US\$) (e.g., Nagel et al. 2015 and Herzer, 2011). The variable obtained, and denoted "FDI" is then transformed so as to obtain the variable "FDICST" using the following formula (see Yeyati et al. 2007): $FDICST = \text{sign}(FDI) * \log(1 + |FDI|)$ (2), where $|FDI|$ refers to the absolute value of the variable "FDI" (see also Appendix 1). Note that the FDI variable has not been expressed in percentage of GDP or in percentage of the population size because both the real GD and the population size variables are included in the model. In addition, for the sake of consistency (as AfT variables are expressed in real terms), it makes better sense to also consider the variable capturing FDI inflows in real terms.

The variables "GDP", "REER", and "POP" represent respectively the real Gross Domestic Product (constant 2010 US\$), the real effective exchange rate (computed based on 66 trading partners) and the size of total population. Higher values of the real effective exchange rate indicate an appreciation of the exchange rate. The natural logarithm has been applied to these three variables in order to limit the skewness of their respective distribution.

³⁴ These countries are contained the preferential trade arrangements database developed by the WTO (<http://ptadb.wto.org/>).

The variables "EDU" and "TP" are respectively the the education level, proxied by the gross secondary school enrollment rate (in percentage), and the level of trade policy liberalization. Higher values of "TP" show greater trade policy liberalization. Similarly, the variables "FINDEV" and "INST" represent respectively the level of financial development and the institutional and governance quality. Appendix 2 reports descriptive statistics on variables in models (1) and (2), as well as other variables used later in the analysis. Appendix 3 shows the list of countries contained in the full sample, as well as the countries in the sub-sample of LDCs.

4.2. Expected effects of variables

This sub-section discusses the theoretical effects of variables included in models (1) and (2) on the utilization of NRTPs.

Relationship between GSP programs and other trade preferences: in light of the overlapping nature of non-reciprocal preferential regimes (Keck and Lendle, 2012), it is important to take into account the interaction between GSP programs and other trade preferences in the present analysis. Hakobyan (2015) has obtained that the utilization rate of a given trade preference decreases with the availability of other trade preference programs. Therefore, we can expect that the utilization rate of GSP programs could be negatively related to the utilization rate of other available NRTPs. At the same time, it could be envisaged that some beneficiary countries would use simultaneously GSP preferences available to them and many of (and if possible, all) other available trade preferences. As a result, the utilization rate of the GSP schemes and that of other trade preference programs would be complementary, i.e., there would be a positive effect of the utilization rate of GSP programs on the utilization rate of other trade preference programs, and vice-versa.

Income and the population size: the literature has well established that the level of income and the population size are important determinants of export supply capacity, and hence of the utilization of NRTPs (e.g., Manchin, 2006). A high level of income could be an indication of great economic sophistication, and hence a greater capacity of the country to supply goods and services, including for the international trade market. We can expect a rise in the real per capita income to be positively associated with the utilization of NRTPs. Nevertheless, as the real income rises, some NRTPs may be used at the expense of others.

As for the effect of the population size on the usage of trade preferences, we hypothesize, on the one hand that, a large internal market size (i.e., a large population) implies the existence of potential consumers in the domestic market, which could affect the country's export supply capacity. Such a country may reduce its export supply in favour of supply for the domestic market (e.g., Easterly and Kraay, 2000). In this context, the rise in the population size would be negatively associated with the utilization rate of NRTPs. On the other hand, larger internal markets could reflect an abundance of labour force, which would be associated with lower production costs, ultimately contribute to enhancing the international trade competitiveness of the country concerned. In this scenario, a large population (in particular featuring abundant labour force) would be positively associated with the utilization rate of NRTPs. The population size could also influence the extent to which rules of origin could affect the capacity of the country to utilize the available trade preferences. For example, large countries could take advantage of their abundant

work force to produce the requisite intermediate goods to produce exportable goods. Such countries would, therefore, rely less on imports of these intermediate goods, while small countries might have no other choice than to import these intermediate goods. In such a situation, small countries would likely be severely affected by stringent rules of origin than large countries. Thus, the population size could capture, to some extent, the effect of rules of origin on the utilization of trade preferences by the beneficiary country. This is important because of the difficulties of controlling for the effect of rules of origin on the utilization of NRTPs in a country-year framework. It is also possible that the size of the population influences positively (or negatively) the utilization rate of one type of NRTP (e.g., GSP programs), while concurrently exerting the reverse effect on the usage of the other NRTPs. This would be particularly the case if for example, a labour abundant country uses its labour force to take advantage of a specific NRTP (for example the GSP) at the expense of other trade preferences.

Human capital: the accumulation of human capital can contribute to improving countries' competitive in the international trade market (e.g., Andersson and Johansson, 2010; Bougheas and Riezman, 2007; Grossman, 2004). For example, Grossman (2004) has established that in a world economy featured by two similar countries that have different distributions of talents, the country that has the more heterogeneous labour force, exports the good produced by the most talented individuals. Andersson and Johansson (2010) have uncovered empirically that the endowment of human capital influences innovation performance, which in turn, affects positively the number of export products. Farok and Susan (2008) have obtained that human capital investment exerts a positive and significant effect on exports of both goods and services. Additionally, in contrast with the expectations of human capital theory, human capital investment has not affected much more services exports than goods exports.

Against this background, we expect an improvement in human capital - proxied here by the level of education in the secondary school - could be associated with a higher degree of the utilization of NRTPs. Nevertheless, the education level may affect differently the utilization of GSP programs and other trade preferences.

Trade policy: Trade policy liberalization entails the reduction of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers that impede the movement of trade flows across borders. According to Tokarick (2007), import tariffs provide a disincentive to export by directly raising the domestic price of imports relative to exports, or equivalently, by reducing the export price relative to import prices. More generally, trade policy liberalization promotes exports by reducing the anti-export bias, i.e., the incentive effect of protection on production for export versus the production for the domestic market (e.g., Jenkins, 1996). Trade policy liberalization is particularly important for enhancing export performance when firms source intermediate inputs abroad. Bas (2012) has provided evidence for Argentina that greater reductions in input tariffs improve significantly the probability of entering the export market is higher for firms producing in industries. Along the same lines, Bas and Berthou (2017) have shown that input tariff reductions influences positively firms' technology choice to source capital goods from abroad. This is essential for export performance, in light of both the positive role of imported inputs, including high-tech goods for technology and knowledge diffusion (e.g., Baldwin et al., 2005), and the positive effect of technology on export performance (e.g., Park et al., 2020). Hayakawa et al. (2020) have highlighted a new mechanism

through which import-tariff reductions lead to export expansions. Their findings indicate that a 1% reduction in an importer's tariffs leads to a rise in the import freight rates by around 0.8%, a fall in the export freight rates by around 1.1%, and an increase in the export quantity by 0.6% to 1%. On another note, Uprasen (2014) have found that non-tariff measures (such as the sanitary and phytosanitary measures) implemented by the EU tend to hamper China's overall exports to the EU, while technical barriers to trade tend to foster China's overall exports. Some studies have obtained a positive effect of trade policy liberalization on export performance in developing countries (e.g., Gnangnon, 2018b; Ju et al., 2010; Pacheco-López, 2005; Santos-Paulino, 2006; Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall, 2004; Zakaria, 2014), whereas others have rather reported a mixed evidence or absence of the effect of trade policy liberalization on export performance (e.g., Greenaway and Sapsford, 1994; Jenkins, 1996; Ratnaik, 2012). Overall, we expect that trade policy liberalization could improve the utilization of trade preferences (i.e., the utilization of both GSP programmes and other trade preferences). Meanwhile, it is possible that trade policy liberalization leads to a higher utilization rate of GSP programs at the expense of other trade preferences, and vice-versa.

The real exchange rate: we postulate that, all things being equal, an appreciation of the real exchange rate would undermine the country's competitiveness in the international trade market, result in lower exports (e.g., Eichengreen and Gupta, 2013; Mayer and Steingress, 2020; Xu et al., 2016), and ultimately reduce the utilization rate of NRTPs.

Financial development: A number of studies³⁵ have demonstrated evidence of a positive effect of financial development on the aggregate exports, in particular manufacturing exports (e.g., Beck, 2003; Hur et al., 2006; Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987). This has been confirmed by studies at the firm-level. These studies have shown that firms' financial health influences their investments (e.g., Aghion et al., 2010; de Guevara et al., 2021). The liquidity constraints they face affect their export decision (e.g., Greenway et al., 2007; Manova, 2013; Nagaraj, 2014) and their export performance (e.g., Manova, 2013; Minetti and Zhu, 2011). In the present analysis, we postulate that higher financial development - proxied by the amount of credit offered by the financial system to the private sector (as percentage of GDP) - would contribute to enhancing the utilization of NRTPs, including both GSP schemes and other trade preference programs. However, it could also be envisaged that higher amounts of credits might be provided to firms that use some trade preference schemes over other preference schemes. In this case, greater financial development would lead to a higher utilization rate of some preference schemes (for example, GSP schemes), while lowering the utilization rates of the other preference schemes.

Institutional and governance quality: Institutional and governance quality can positively affect export performance, including by helping to enforce contracts (e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller, 1999); reducing transaction costs (e.g., Álvarez et al., 2018; Bojnec and Fertő, 2009; de Groot et al. 2004; Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos, 2018; Lin et al., 2020), and promoting access to the international trade market (e.g., Francois and Manchin, 2013). Other

³⁵ A literature review on the relationship between finance and international trade is provided by Vaubourg (2016).

studies have also obtained that institutional quality could reduce trade by increasing the bargaining power of workers (e.g., Berden et al., 2014; Lin et al., 2020). Méon and Sekkat (2008) have observed that the quality of institutions affects positively manufactured exports but not nonmanufactured exports. LiPuma et al. (2013) have demonstrated empirically that good institutional quality plays a more important role for export performance of new and small firms, compared with large established counterparts. Bah et al. (2021) have uncovered empirically for SSA countries that an improvement of governance quality influences positively and strongly total exports and its components, including services exports, merchandises exports, and manufactured goods exports.

We expect that an improved institutional and governance quality may be positively related to the utilization of NRTPs. However, some trade preferences may be better utilized than others, further to the improvement of the institutional and governance quality.

Terms of Trade: It could be straightforward to consider that an improvement in the terms of trade of products exported under some trade preference schemes would lead to a higher degree of utilization of these trade preferences, including possibly at the expense of the usage of other trade preferences.

5. Data analysis

Before moving on to the discussion on the appropriate econometric approach for estimating models (1) and (2), it is useful to presenting some correlation patterns between our key variables of interest in the analysis. The different Figures presented here rely on the panel dataset of 114 AfT recipient countries over the 3-year non-overlapping sub-periods of the full period 2002-2018. Figures 1 to 3 display the evolutionary pattern of total AfT flows, FDI inflows and the utilization rate of NRTPs (GSP programs on the one hand, and other trade preferences on the other hand), respectively over the full sample (average data has been computed), and the sub-samples of LDCs and NonLDCs (average data has been computed over each sub-sample). Figures 4 to 6 display the correlation patterns in the form of cross-plots between the same variables, respectively over the full sample, and the two sub-samples.

The choice to focus on the sub-sample of LDCs versus the sub-sample of NonLDCs is dictated by the fact, pursuant to the Hong Kong Ministerial Decision (WTO, 2005), LDCs³⁶ are beneficiaries of DFQF market access treatment under GSP programs offered by developed countries (including the QUAD countries), and duty-free treatment market access provided by many major developing countries. Some LDCs are also beneficiaries of many other trade preferences such as the AGOA for African LDCs, the Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) for Haiti, and the Trade Preferences for Nepal offered by the United States. It is important to note that in the category of NonLDCs, some countries also enjoy other NRTPs regimes. The latter include the AGOA provided by the United States to African countries that are not LDCs; the Commonwealth Caribbean Countries Tariff scheme provided by Canada to Caribbean countries; the EU's trade preferences for Western Balkans

³⁶ These preferences are granted to LDCs (which are the least integrated countries in the global trading system) because of the realization that their status of poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world to external and environmental shocks has been preventing them from better integrating into the global trading system.

countries; and the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act provided by the United States to Caribbean countries³⁷.

[Insert Figure 1, here]

Figure 1 shows, for the full sample, that in 2002-2004, the utilization rate of the GSP programs (which reached 31.73%) was lower than that of other trade preferences (which amounted to 35.54%). However, from 2005-2007 onwards, countries utilized much more GSP programs than other trade preferences. Especially, the utilization rate of GSP programs increased from 38.3% in 2005-2007 to reach 49.73% in 2008-2010, while at the same time, the utilization rate of other preferences declined from 35.66% in 2005-2007 to 29.34% in 2008-2010. Over the rest of the period, the utilization level of GSP programs remained relatively stable and reached 50.06% in 2017-2018, whereas the utilization rates of other trade preferences increased steadily to reach 33.63% in 2017-2018. With regard to capital flows indicators, we note that total AfT flows exhibited an upward trend over the entire period from US\$ million 94.56 in 2002-2004 to US\$ million 294 in 2017-2018. Values of FDI inflows increased steadily from US\$ million 265.65 in 2002-2004 to US\$ million 535.77 in 2011-2013, and then showed a declining trend to reach US\$ million 481.94 in 2017-2018.

[Insert Figure 2, here]

Figure 2 indicates for LDCs that over the sub-periods 2002-2004 and 2005-2007, the utilization rates of other preferences were far higher than those of the GSP programs, even though over these two sub-periods, the utilization rates increased for GSP programs, and decreased for other trade preferences. In 2002-2004, the rate was 44.47% for other trade preferences and 14.24% for GSP programs, whereas in 2008-2010, it reached 23.75% for GSP programs, and 39.14% for other trade preferences. However, the movement reversed over the rest of the period, as LDCs significantly increased the utilization of GSP programs at the expense of other trade preferences: from 2008-2010 to 2017-2018, the utilization rate of GSP programs showed an upward movement to reach 60.8% in 2017-2018, and the utilization rates of other preferences (steadily and) severely declined to reach 12.34%.

Meanwhile, AfT flows provided to LDCs and FDI flows to LDC economies tended to move in opposite directions over some sub-periods. AfT flows consistently increased over the full period, from US\$ million 104.33 in 2002-2004 to US\$ million 298 in 2017-2018. In contrast, values of FDI inflows first declined from US\$ million 39.23 in 2002-2004 to US\$ million 24.89 in 2005-2007, and then rebounded to reach US\$ million 63.65 in 2014-2016. They subsequently fell to US\$ million 37.84 in 2017-2018.

[Insert Figure 3, here]

Turning to the case of NonLDCs (see Figure 3), we observe that from 2002-2004 to 2011-2013, the utilization rate of GSP programs was consistently higher than that of other trade preferences, although in 2014-2016 and 2017-2018, beneficiary countries tended to utilize equally the two types of trade preference programs. The GSP utilization rate rose from 40.5% in 2002-2004 to 50.25% in 2008-2010, and then steadily declined to 44.62% in 2017-2018. In contrast, the rate of usage of other preferences tended to move steadily upward from 31.07% in 2002-2004 to 44.43% in 2017-2018. We also note that in parallel to these trends of the utilization rates of the

³⁷ For further information on the countries concerned, please see the WTO database online at <http://ptadb.wto.org/default.aspx>

trade preferences, the patterns observed for total AfT flows and FDI inflows are similar to the ones observed in Figure 2, and AfT flows moved upward from US\$ million 89.47 in 2002-2004 to 291.87 in 2017-2018. In the meantime, values of FDI flows were US\$ million 695.1 in 2017-2018 against US\$ million 375.88 in 2002-2004.

When comparing Figures 2 and 3, we observe that LDCs tended to rely significantly on GSP programs (at the detriment of other trade preferences) for their exports under NRTPs regimes. While NonLDCs have had the propensity to make much more use of GSP programs than of other trade preferences for many years, they relied almost equally on both types of preferences towards the end of the period. As for AfT flows, LDCs received higher amounts of total AfT flows than NonLDCs, whereas NonLDCs enjoyed far higher amounts of FDI inflows than LDCs.

[Insert Figure 4, here]

Figure 4 shows, for the full sample, strong positive correlation patterns between total AfT flows and the utilization rate of GSP programs on the one hand, and between FDI flows and the utilization rate of GSP programs on the other hand, even though the slope of the correlation is higher for AfT flows than for FDI flows. In contrast, FDI inflows are negatively correlated with the utilization rate of other trade preferences, while total AfT flows are only slightly positively correlated with the utilization rate of other trade preferences. Similar patterns are observed for NonLDCs (see Figure 3). However, for LDCs (see Figure 2), we observe negative correlation patterns between total AfT flows and the utilization rate of other trade preferences on the one hand, and between FDI inflows and the utilization rate of other trade preferences, on the other hand. Meanwhile, total AfT flows are positively correlated with the utilization rate of other trade preferences, and FDI inflows are positively correlated with the utilization rate of other trade preferences. These patterns observed for LDCs are consistent with evolutionary patterns in Figure 2.

6. Econometric approach

To provide a first insight on the relationship between AfT flows, FDI flows and the utilization of NRTPs, we estimate models (1) and (2) without the lagged dependent variable as regressor, by means of the within fixed effects estimator³⁸ (FEDK) and the feasible generalized least squares³⁹ (denoted "FGLS"). In these specifications, the variable "AfT" is measured only by the total AfT flows. The outcomes of these estimations are provided in Table 1 for the sake of comparison with the outcomes arising from using other estimators (later in the analysis). These outcomes could, however, be biased for several reasons. First, the static versions of models (1) and (2) estimated using the FEDK and FGLS estimators may suffer from the omitted variable bias, in particular, the omission of the lagged dependent variable. As noted above, the latter could help address not only the omitted variable problem, but it can also help take into account the state dependent nature of the utilization rate of trade preferences, whereby the degree of trade preference utilization in period t-1 is likely related to the degree of trade preference utilization in period t. At the same time, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in models (1) and (2)

³⁸ Standard errors of estimates obtained from the FEDK-based regressions have been corrected for the heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence in the residuals by means of the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) technique.

³⁹ The FGLS estimator also allows addressing the heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence in the residuals.

and the estimation of the resulting models using the FEDK or FGLS approaches is likely to generate biased estimates because of the potential correlation between the lagged dependent variable and countries' time invariant specific effects (e.g., Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009). This endogeneity bias, also referred to as Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981) becomes small as the time dimension of the panel datasets increases. In the present analysis, this bias is likely to be important given that the time dimension is 6, and the number of countries is equal to 114. Furthermore, the estimates in Table 1 may be biased due to the possible endogeneity of all regressors except the population size and the terms of trade variables. Such an endogeneity can come from the reverse causality from the degree of utilization of trade preference to each of these regressors.

To illustrate this, one can think that while all regressors are expected to influence the utilization rates of trade preferences, a country that wishes to improve its degree of utilization of NRTPs could be incentivized to implement policies to attract multinational firms (i.e., FDI inflows) that would exploit the opportunities provided by the NRTPs and export under these preferences. Such policies would be implemented on the premise that the attraction of these multinational enterprises would, *inter alia*, create jobs, generate public (including tax revenues) and improve the countries' export performance. Likewise, donor-countries may provide higher AfT flows to preference beneficiaries that utilize less their NRTPs, with a view to improving these countries' degree of utilization of the trade preferences. Beneficiary countries that also wish to enhance their NRTPs utilization may promote the development of the domestic financial system so as to facilitate credit supply to firms engaged in trading activities, notably those that wish to harness the opportunities offered by NRTPs. Beneficiary countries could also improve the education level, the institutional and governance quality, and maintain a competitive real exchange rate. Incidentally, beneficiary countries could further liberalize trade policies, for example, by reducing or eliminating tariffs and non-tariffs barriers on intermediate inputs needed in the process of producing goods that are to be exported under NRTPs. Finally, beneficiary countries that enjoy a high level of utilization of NRTPs could experience a higher real income, hence the reverse causality from the utilization rate of NRTPs to the real income variable.

We confront these endogeneity problems by employing the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). This involves estimating (for each model) a system of equations that combines an equation in differences with an equation in levels. Lagged first differences variables are used as instruments for the levels equation, and lagged levels of variables are used as instruments for the first-difference equation. In the presence of highly persistent variables over time, this estimator generates more consistent and efficient estimates than the ones arising from the regression-based on the difference-GMM estimator (proposed by Arellano and Bond, 1991) (e.g., Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell et al., 2001). For example, in the presence of highly persistent variables over time, the difference-GMM estimator suffers from weak-instruments problem, which arises from the weak correlation between lagged variables in level and variables in first difference (e.g., Alonso-Borrego and Arellano, 1999; Roodman, 2009). On another note, the system GMM technique generates estimates with small biases (in terms of size) than the difference-GMM estimator or the fixed effects estimator when the required stationary condition is doubtful (e.g., Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009).

The validity of the two-step system GMM estimator is assessed using several statistical tests. The latter include the Arellano-Bond test of the presence of first-order serial correlation in the

first-differenced error term (denoted AR(1)); the Arellano-Bond test of absence of second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced error term (denoted AR(2)); and the Sargan/Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions (OID). The two-step system GMM estimator is valid if we do not reject the null hypothesis for the AR(1) test, which is that there is no first-order serial correlation in the differenced-error term; and if we do not reject the null hypotheses associated with the AR(2) test, as well as the null hypothesis of the OID test of over-identifying restrictions (the null hypothesis is the validity of overidentifying restrictions). Finally, we make sure that in the regressions based on the two-step system GMM estimator, the rule of thumb whereby the number of instruments should be lower than the number of countries is met; as otherwise the validity of the estimator would be weakened (e.g., Roodman, 2009). To that effect, we employ in the regressions, three lags of the dependent variable as instruments, and two lags of the endogenous variables as instruments.

Regressions based on the two-step system GMM approach are conducted as follows. Table 2 contains the estimates arising from the estimation of the dynamic models (1) and (2) but where the variable "AfT" is measured only by total AfT flows.

Table 3 contains the outcomes of the estimation of the same models where the variable "AfT" is measured by each component of total AfT flows.

Table 4 contains estimates that allow examining the effect of total AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization rate of NRTPs (GSP programs or other trade preferences) in LDCs versus NonLDCs. These outcomes are obtained by estimating several variants of each of models (1) and (2), where a dummy variable "LDC" is included in the models, and interacted respectively with the total AfT flows variable as well as the variable "FDICST". The "LDC" dummy takes the value "1" for LDCs, and "0" otherwise. The sub-sample of LDCs contains 38 countries whose list is provided in Appendix 3.

Table 5 reports outcomes that allow evaluating the interplay between AfT flows and FDI inflows in affecting the utilization rate of NRTPs. These outcomes are obtained by estimating different other specifications of models (1) and (2) where each AfT variable (i.e., total AfT flows and each of its component) is interacted with the variable representing the FDI inflows, i.e., "FDICST".

7. Interpretation of empirical outcomes

Results in all columns of Table 1 (i.e., those based on the FEDK and FGLS estimators) reveal that total AfT flows are positively and significantly (at least at the 5% level) associated with the utilization rate of both GSP and other trade preferences. This suggests, as expected, that AfT interventions (i.e., total AfT flows) promote the utilization of these two types of trade preferences, but the magnitudes of the effects are higher for results based on the FGLS approach than for those based on the FEDK estimator. Outcomes based on the FEDK estimator (see columns [1] and [2]) indicate that a 100 percent increase in total AfT flows is associated with a 3.26-point increase in the utilization rate of GSP, and a 2.6 percentage point increase in the utilization rate of other trade preferences. For FGLS-based outcomes, we obtain that a 100 percent increase in total AfT flows is associated with a 4.74 percentage point increase in the utilization rate of GSP, and a 4.9 percentage point increase in the utilization rate of other trade preferences.

FDI inflows appear to exert a significant effect only on the utilization rate of other trade preferences when using the FGLS estimator (see column [4]). However, in other columns of Table 1, FDI inflows do not significantly affect the utilization rate of preferences at the conventional significance levels. We also obtain from all columns of Table 1 the confirmation of the findings (for example by Hakobyan, 2015) that the usage of GSP programs is made at the expense of other trade preferences. In fact, in columns [1] and [3] of Table 1, the utilization rate of other preferences is negatively and significantly (at the 1% level) associated with the utilization of GSP programs (the coefficients of the variable "USOTP" are quite similar and amount to -0.67 in these two columns of the Table). Likewise, in columns [2] and [4] of the same Table, results indicate that the utilization rate of GSP programs is negatively and significantly (at the 1% level) associated with the utilization rate of other trade preference programs, with the magnitude of the coefficient of the variable "USGSP" being lower (in absolute value) for the result based on the FGLS estimator (the coefficient amounts to -0.62) than for the result based on FEDK estimator (the coefficient amounts to -0.71).

[Insert Table 1, here]

As for other control variables, the real income appears, as expected, to be robustly and positively associated with the utilization rate of GSP programs, as well as other trade preferences programs. As also expected, an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate tends to reduce the utilization of these two NRTPs. Trade policy liberalization tends to promote the utilization of these two blocks of trade preferences. Estimates of the other control variables (including the education level, the institutional and governance quality, the level of financial development, the population size and terms of trade) do not hold the same across all columns of the Table. This situation could be attributed to possible endogeneity problems that could have plagued the static specification of models (1) and (2).

Before turning to the outcomes reported in the other Tables, it is useful to note that the within R-squared statistic suggests that variables included in models (1) and (2) have strong explanatory power in explaining respectively the utilization rate of GSP programs, and that of other NRTPs (the within R^2 is 50.5% for the GSP programs, and 45.44% for other trade preferences).

We now consider the estimates presented in Tables 2 to 5, which are obtained by using the two-step system GMM estimator. We need first to assess the validity of the two-step system GMM estimator used to obtain these results. Across all columns of these Tables, the one period lag of the variables representing the utilization rate of GSP programs, and the other trade preferences have coefficients that are positive and significant at the 1% level. This indicates the persistence over time of the utilization rate of trade preferences, and underlines the relevance of considering specifications of models (1) and (2) in a dynamic form. Also, at the lower-end part of Tables 2 to 5 are reported the results of the three above-mentioned statistical tests, i.e., the AR(1) and AR(2) tests as well as the over-identifying restrictions test. They suggest, as expected, the presence of autocorrelation at the first order in the first-differenced error term (the p-values associated with the AR(1) test are lower than 0.01, i.e., the 1% level of statistical significance), the absence of the second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced error term (the p-values associated with the AR(1) test are higher than 0.1, i.e., the 10% level of statistical significance). Lastly, the OID test reveals p-values higher than 0.10. Taken together, all these outcomes confirm the suitability of the two-step system GMM estimator for conducting the empirical exercise.

[Insert Table 2, here]

The outcomes presented in the two columns of Table 2 indicate positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficients of the variables measuring total AfT flows, and FDI inflows. This suggests that both higher total AfT flows, and FDI inflows promote the utilization of GSP programs and other trade preferences. Interestingly, coefficients are similar across the two columns for total AfT flows (and even similar, to some extent, to those reported in Table 2). In contrast, FDI inflows exert a far higher positive and significant effect on the utilization rate of GSP programs than on the utilization of other trade preferences. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, we note on the one hand that doubling the amount of total AfT flows (i.e., increasing these resource flows by a 100 per cent) leads to a rise in the utilization rate of GSP by a 3.9-points, and a rise in the utilization rate of other trade preferences by 4.08-point. On the other hand, an increase in the real values of FDI inflows by 1 percent is associated with a rise in the utilization rate of GSP programs by 1.1-point, and the utilization rate of other trade preferences by 0.26-point. As in Table 1, there is a negative relationship between the utilization rate of the two preferences: results in column [1] suggest that, at the 1% level, a rise in the utilization rate of other trade preferences by a 1 percentage point induces a fall in the utilization rate of GSP programs by 0.48 percentage point. Likewise, at the 1% level, an increase in the utilization rate of GSP programs by a 1 percentage point induces a fall in the utilization rate of other trade preferences by 0.46 percentage point.

Estimates related to control variables in columns [1] and [2] indicate that as countries enjoy a higher real income, they tend to reduce the utilization of GSP programs (but here, the effect is significant only at the 10% level), while strongly improving the usage of other trade preferences. Countries that improve the level of secondary education of their citizen tend to make less use of other trade preferences at the benefit of GSP programs. Terms of trade improvements exert a positive and significant effect (at the 1% level) on the utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preferences (the magnitude of the impact is almost the same for the two types of NRTPs). The expansion in the domestic financial market in beneficiary countries (proxied by the size of their population) does not affect significantly (at the conventional significance levels) the utilization of GSP programs, but does lead to a lower utilization of other trade preferences. This may signify that as financial development deepens, countries tend to use less other trade preferences provided by QUAD countries at the benefit of NRTPs provided by non-QUAD countries. Improvements in the institutional and governance quality are associated with a lower utilization of GSP programs, but do not influence significantly the utilization of other trade preferences. This outcome may suggest that as they enjoy a better institutional and governance quality, beneficiaries of GSP programs tend not to use these programs, possibly at the benefit of NRTPs provided by non-QUAD countries. Based on these outcomes, one may question whether a deepening of the domestic financial system, and an improvement in the institutional and governance quality lead countries to shift from the usage of GSP programs to other trade preferences, or to export products under reciprocal preferences (in the context of RTAs), or at the most favoured nations tariffs. This issue opens an avenue for future research. On another note, trade policy, the real exchange rate, and the level of financial development do not affect the utilization of GSP programs or of other trade preferences.

[Insert Table 3, here]

Results in columns [1] and [2] of Table 3 suggest that higher AfT flows for economic infrastructure induce a better utilization of GSP programs (the coefficient of the variable is

significant at the 1% level), but do not affect the utilization of other trade preferences at the conventional significance levels. A 100 percent rise in AfT flows for economic infrastructure is associated with an improvement in the utilization rate of GSP programs by 2.8 percentage point. Estimates in columns [3] and [4] show that higher AfT flows for productive capacities affect positively and significant (including at the 1% level) the utilization rate of both GSP programs and other trade preferences, with the magnitude of the positive effect being higher for the other trade preferences than for GSP programs. Especially, doubling the amounts of AfT for productive capacities leads to a 4-percentage point increase in the utilization rate of GSP programs, and a 6.8 percentage point rise in the utilization rate of other trade preferences. Finally, estimates in columns [5] and [6] show that at the conventional levels of significance, AfT interventions related to trade policy and regulation are associated with a better utilization of other trade preferences, but do not influence the usage of GSP programs. In particular, doubling the amounts of AfT for trade policy and regulation results in a rise of the utilization rate of other trade preferences by 0.9 percentage points.

Across all columns of Table 3, the coefficient of "FDICST" is positive and significant at the 1% level, thereby confirming the positive and significant effect of FDI inflows on the utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preferences. Additionally, as in Table 2, FDI inflows appear to exert a far higher positive effect on the usage of GSP programs than on the usage of other trade preferences. The negative and significant effect of the utilization of other trade preferences on the utilization of GSP programs on the one hand (see columns [1], [3] and [5] of Table 3), and the negative and significant effect of the utilization of GSP programs on the usage of other trade preferences (see columns [2], [4] and [6] of Table 3) are confirmed here as well. Similar findings are obtained in Tables 4 and 5. Incidentally, results of other control variables in Table 3 (as well as those in Tables 4 and 5) are, with some exceptions, consistent with the outcomes presented in Table 2.

[Insert Table 4, here]

We now consider the estimates displayed in Table 4 that allow investigating how total AfT flows and FDI inflows affect the utilization of trade preferences in LDCs and NonLDCs. Results in columns [1] and [2] of this Table show that at the 1% level, total AfT flows influence positively the utilization rate of GSP programs and other trade preferences in LDCs and NonLDCs alike. However, total AfT flows exert a higher positive effect on the usage of other trade preferences in NonLDCs than in LDCs, whereas their effect is of the same magnitude on GSP programs. The net effect of total AfT flows on the utilization rate of GSP programs in LDCs and NonLDCs amount to 5.84. The net effects of total AfT flows on the utilization rate of other trade preferences are respectively $-0.445 (= 4.048 - 4.493)$ for LDCs, and 4.05 for NonLDCs. These signify that doubling the amount of total AfT leads to a rise of the utilization rate of GSP programs by 5.84 percentage point in LDCs and NonLDCs. At the same time, a rise in total AfT flows by 100 percent leads to an increase in the utilization rate of other trade preferences by 4.05 percentage point in NonLDCs, but a decline in the utilization rate of other trade preferences by 0.45 percentage point in LDCs. Thus, we infer that while total AfT flows help LDCs to make a better use of GSP programs at the expense of other trade preferences, a rise in these resource flows leads NonLDCs to use both trade preference programs, although with a higher degree of utilization of GSP programs than for other trade preference programs.

Also, outcomes in columns [1] and [2] of Table 4 suggest that, at the 1% level, FDI inflows exert a higher positive and significant effect on the utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preferences in LDCs than in NonLDCs. The net effects of FDI inflows on the utilization rate of GSP programs in LDCs and NonLDCs are respectively 1.08 ($= 0.745+0.331$) and 0.75. The net effects of FDI inflows on the utilization of other trade preferences amount to 0.19 ($= 0.254 - 0.0661$) for LDCs and - 0.066 for NonLDCs. Overall, these findings show that while FDI flows to LDCs help them to improve the utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preferences (with the impact being far higher for GSP programs than for other trade preferences), these capital inflows enhance the usage of GSP programs in NonLDCs (although to a lesser extent than in LDCs) at the expense of other trade preferences.

[Insert Table 5, here]

Regarding the outcomes presented in Table 5, we are interested in examining how AfT interventions and FDI inflows interact in affecting positively the utilization of NRTPs. Thus, our main coefficient of interest in each of the eight columns of this Table is the interaction term of the variable that captures the interaction between each AfT variable and the FDI variable. Starting with results in the first two columns of Table 5, we observe that this interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level, and it is additionally higher for other trade preferences than for GSP programs. This, therefore, suggests that total AfT flows and FDI inflows are complementary in strengthening the utilization of both GSP programs and other NRTPs offered by the QUAD countries, but the level of this complementarity is stronger for the utilization of other trade preferences than for the usage of GSP programs. Thus, countries that receive higher amounts of both total AfT flows and FDI inflows enjoy a higher degree of utilization of NRTPs (although at a higher level for other preferences than for GSP programs) than countries that receive a higher amount of one type of capital flows (let us say, AfT flows) and lower amounts of the other type of capital flows (for example, FDI inflows). Put it differently, the utilization of NRTPs is stronger when AfT interventions (i.e., total AfT flows) take place in the context of greater FDI inflows, given that such interventions could also contribute to attracting FDI inflows.

Outcomes in column [3] of Table 5 indicate that AfT for economic infrastructure is complementary with FDI inflows in raising the utilization rate of GSP programs only at the 10% level. For example, at the 5% level, such complementary does not exist. This signifies that at the 5% level, there is no significant joint effect of AfT for economic infrastructure and FDI inflows on the utilization of GSP programs. At the same time, at the 1% level, this category of AfT intervention strongly raises the utilization rate of other trade preferences when beneficiary countries concurrently enjoy higher FDI inflows. At the 1% level, AfT for productive capacities appears to be strongly complementary with FDI inflows in enhancing the utilization rates of both GSP programs and other trade preferences, and the degree of this complementarity is higher for GSP programs than for other trade preferences (see results in columns [5] and [6] of Table 5). Finally, there is no significant joint effect of AfT interventions for trade policy and regulation and FDI inflows on the utilization rate of GSP programs. However, this type of AfT interventions are strongly complementary with FDI inflows in raising the utilization rate of other trade preferences.

8. Further analysis

This section deepens the analysis carried out thus far by investigating whether the effect of total AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization of trade preferences depends on the beneficiary countries' capacity of exporting a diversity of products. Theoretically, this would depend first and foremost on the product coverage of the non-reciprocal preferential regimes. If the product coverage includes a set of manufactured products (i.e., ranging from light to sophisticated products) - in line with the original intention of the provision of NRTPs - then exporting firms in the beneficiary countries might be incentivized to supply such goods in the market of the preference-granting countries, provided that governments in beneficiary countries set up suitable conditions for doing so. For example, the LDCs enjoy a duty quota free access to the markets of many developed countries, but often sell in these markets at best, light manufactured products (including for example, textile and leather). LDCs exhibit a high dependence of export product basket on primary products and on one or two 'light' manufactured products (e.g., WTO, 2020). Hakobyan (2015) has observed empirically that the degree of product processing has influenced negatively the utilization rate of the USA GSP, while the availability of regional cumulation within some regional associations influences it positively. He has concluded that less stringent local content requirements would make the US GSP more effective in terms of promoting exports of beneficiary countries. Hence, if trade preferences schemes encourage the diversification of export products in the beneficiary countries (which is, as noted above, the intended purpose of non-reciprocal preferential concessions) and if AfT interventions promote export product diversification (e.g., Gnanon, 2019a,b,c; Hühne et al. 2014b; Kim, 2019), then we could anticipate that total AfT flows would lead to a higher degree of trade preference utilization in countries that diversify their export product mix.

On another note, some studies have looked at the effect of export product diversification (and more generally the effect of the economic complexity⁴⁰) on the FDI inflows. For example, Gnanon (2019d) has provided evidence that countries that diversify their export product baskets are more likely to attract FDI inflows than countries that concentrate their export product mix on few products. Javorcik et al. (2018) have obtained that Turkish firms tend to introduce more complex products in sectors and regions that are likely to supply foreign affiliates. Sadeghi et al. (2020) have shown that the level of economic complexity (including economic sophistication) explains significantly the differences in terms of FDI attraction performance between countries that have similar human capital endowments: the greater the level of economic sophistication, the higher the FDI inflows. However, Antonietti and Franco (2021) have nuanced these findings, as they have obtained that it is the accumulation of FDI that influences economic complexity and not the other way around. Concurrently, foreign firms could exploit (more than local firms) opportunities offered by NRTPs if the non-reciprocal preferential regimes covers sectors where the marketing, management, or technological intensity of production is high (e.g., Yannopoulos, 1987). In this scenario, we could hypothesize that higher FDI inflows would lead to a greater utilization of NRTPs in countries that diversify their export products mix if countries with greater

⁴⁰ According to Hausmann and Hidalgo (2009), Economic complexity indicates the sophistication of a country's productive structure, and hence reflects both the extent of export product diversification of this country along with the ubiquity of its products (the number of countries that also export these products).

export product diversification attract FDI flows, and if the latter are associated with a better utilization of NRTPs. Otherwise, FDI inflows would enhance the utilization of trade preferences in countries with a high degree of export product concentration. Once again, for reasons highlighted above, the effect of AfT flows and FDI flows on the utilization of NRTPs for varying degrees of export product diversification might not be the same for GSP programs and for other preferences programs.

We test empirically whether the effect of total AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization rates of NRTPs depends on the beneficiary countries' levels of export product diversification, by using the index of export product concentration developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This index denoted "ECI" is the Theil index of the overall export product concentration and has been computed by building on the approach adopted by Cadot et al. (2011). It has two components, namely the export product concentration at the intensive margins ("ECIINT") and export product concentration at the extensive margins ("ECIEXT"). Higher values of these indices indicate a rise in the degree of export product concentration, and lower values of the indices show lower levels of export product concentration (i.e., higher levels of export product diversification). Export product diversification at the extensive margins entails the increase in the number of new export products or trading partners, while export product diversification at the intensive margins involves an increase in the shares of export volumes across active products or trading partners. Export product diversification may therefore take place either at the intensive margins and/or at the extensive margins.

Using these indices, we estimate several specifications of models (1) and (2) that include an index of countries' level of export product diversification (either the overall export product diversification or each of its components), as well as the interaction between each of these indices and the variables representing total AfT flows and FDI inflows. These model specifications are estimated using the two-step system GMM approach, and the results obtained are reported in Table 6.

[Insert Table 6, here]

First, the one-period of the dependent variable always exhibits a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% level, which is consistent with the findings in the previous Tables. Second, all the requirements for the consistency of the two-step system GMM estimator are met. Thus, once again, the two-step system GMM estimator is appropriate here as well. The estimates reported in columns [1] and [2] show that (at the 1% level) total AfT flows induce a higher utilization rate of GSP programs in countries that diversify their export products mix. At the same time, these resources flows influence positively and significantly (at the 5% level) the utilization rate of other NRTPs in countries with a high level of export product concentration. These findings indicate that AfT interventions (i.e., total AfT flows) encourage the utilization of GSP programs (at the detriment of other trade preferences) in countries that diversify their export product basket.

Results in columns [3] and [4] show that total AfT flows lead to a higher utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preferences in countries that experience a rise in the export product concentration at the intensive margins, and the magnitude of this effect is slightly higher for other trade preferences usage than for the utilization of GSP programs. For both types of trade preferences, the magnitude of the effect rises as the degree of export product concentration becomes higher. As for results in columns [5] and [6], we note that there is no significant joint effect (at the conventional significance levels) between total AfT flows and export product

concentration at the extensive margins on the utilization rate of other trade preferences. However, total AfT flows generate a higher utilization rate of GSP programs in countries that diversify their export product basket at the extensive margins. Overall, when combining results in columns [1] to [4], we can conclude that the result whereby total AfT flows lead to a higher utilization rate of GSP programs as the level of overall export product diversification increases is essentially driven by a positive joint effect of total AfT flows and export product diversification at the extensive margins, which far outweighs (in terms of magnitude) the positive joint effect of total AfT flows and export product diversification at the intensive margins.

Turning to the effect of FDI inflows on the utilization rate of NRTPs for varying levels of export product diversification, we note from the first two columns of the Table that at the 1% level, FDI inflows lead to a greater utilization of GSP programs and other trade preferences in countries that diversify their export products mix, with the magnitude of this impact being far higher on the utilization of the other trade preferences than on that of GSP programs. Furthermore, the magnitude of this positive impact rises as the level of export product diversification increases. One interpretation of this finding could be that exporting foreign firms in the beneficiary countries tend to export a variety of products under the NRTPs offered by the QUAD countries, or at least that through their positive spillovers to local firms, foreign firms engaged in trade related FDI activities contribute to the diversification of the export product mix of the beneficiary countries under the NRTPs. The same findings (although with some differences) apply to results reported in columns [3] and [4] on the one hand, and in columns [5] and [6] on the other hand. Especially, at the 1% level, greater FDI inflows lead to a higher utilization rate of both GSP programs and other trade preferences in countries that diversify their export product mix at the intensive margins, as well as in countries that diversify their export product mix at the extensive margins (results are significant at the 5% level). Additionally, the magnitude of these positive effects rises as the degree of export product diversification respectively at the intensive and extensive margins improves. However, while higher FDI inflows lead to a better utilization of other trade preferences than GSP programs as countries improve their level of export product diversification at the intensive margins, the reverse outcome is obtained when countries diversify their export product basket at the extensive margins (FDI inflows exert a slightly higher utilization of GSP programs than other trade preferences as countries diversify their export product mix at the extensive margins).

Results related to control variables are, with some few differences, similar to those reported in Table 2.

9. Summary of findings and concluding remarks

The present paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of the utilization of NRTPs (i.e., GSP programs and other trade preferences) offered by the QUAD countries. It investigates, on the one hand, how both AfT flows and FDI inflows influence the utilization rate of these NRTPs, and on the other hand, how these two resource inflows interact in affecting the utilization rates of NRTPs. The analysis has been conducted using a sample of 114 countries (of which 38 LDCs) over the period 2002-2018. The findings are quite interesting, including from a policy perspective.

Over the full sample, total AfT flows exert positive effects (of similar magnitude) on the utilization rate of both GSP programs and other trade preferences. While FDI inflows affect positively the utilization rates of both types of NRTPs, their effects are higher on the utilization rate of GSP programs than on the utilization rate of other trade preferences. Outcomes over the sub-samples have revealed mixed evidence. Total AfT flows help LDCs better utilize GSP programs at the expense of other trade preferences. At the same time, these resource flows contribute to improving the utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preferences in NonLDCs, although with a higher positive effect on the utilization of GSP programs than on the usage of other trade preferences. FDI inflows help LDCs enhance the utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preferences, and the magnitude of this positive impact is far higher for GSP programs than for other trade preferences. For NonLDCs, higher FDI inflows lead to a greater utilization of GSP programs (although to a lesser extent than LDCs) at the expense of the usage of other trade preferences.

The findings concerning the effect of the three major categories of total AfT flows on the utilization of NRTPs over the full sample are also mixed. Higher AfT flows for economic infrastructure enhance only the utilization of GSP programs, while AfT interventions for trade policy and regulation help to improve only the utilization of other trade preferences. However, higher AfT flows for productive capacity are associated with a better utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preferences, with the magnitude of this positive effect being higher for the utilization of other trade preferences than for GSP programs.

The analysis concerning the interplay between AfT flows and FDI inflows in influencing the utilization rate of NRTPs has also revealed interesting outcomes. First, total AfT flows and FDI inflows jointly enhance the utilization rate of both GSP programs and other trade preferences, and the level of this complementarity is higher for other trade preferences than for GSP programs. The interaction effects between each AfT component and FDI inflows on the utilization rates of GSP and other trade preferences have shown mixed evidence. At the 5% level, there is no significant joint effect of AfT flows for economic infrastructure and FDI inflows on the utilization rate of GSP programs, while such joint effect appears to be strongly positive and significant on the utilization rate of other trade preferences (i.e., AfT flows for economic infrastructure and FDI inflows are strongly complementary in promoting the usage of other trade preferences). AfT flows related to trade policy and regulation and FDI inflows are strongly complementary in raising the utilization rate of other trade preferences, while there is no significant joint effect of these two capital flows on the degree of utilization of GSP programs. Finally, AfT for productive capacities and FDI inflows are strongly complementary in promoting the usage of both GSP programs and other trade preferences, although the degree of complementarity is higher for the utilization of GSP programs than for the utilization of other trade preferences.

The study has finally considered whether beneficiary countries' level of export product diversification matters for the degree of the utilization of NRTPs. Results show that total AfT flows induce a higher degree of utilization rate of GSP programs, but a lower degree of utilization of other trade preferences in countries that diversify their export products mix (i.e., the overall export product diversification). These findings reflect, on the one hand, a positive effect of total AfT flows on the utilization rate of GSP programs in countries that diversify their export product basket at the extensive margins, but no significant effect on the utilization rate of other trade preferences in countries that experience a greater level of export product diversification at the

extensive margins. On the other hand, total AfT flows lead to a higher utilization rate of both GSP programs and other trade preferences in countries that experience a rise in the export product concentration at the intensive margins, but the magnitude of this positive effect is slightly higher for the utilization of other trade preferences than for the utilization of GSP programs.

FDI inflows lead to a greater utilization of both GSP programs and other trade preferences in countries with higher levels of the overall export product diversification: the magnitude of this impact is far higher for other trade preferences than for GSP programs. The same findings apply to export product diversification at the intensive margins. However, FDI inflows exert a higher positive effect on the utilization of GSP programs than on that of other trade preferences.

All these outcomes have several policy implications. Higher AfT flows supplied by donor-countries would surely contribute to significantly improving the utilization of NRTPs. Prowse (2010) has pointed out that AfT programs should be used to support the reform NRTPs programs, and emphasized, in this regard, three pillars for doing so: (i) providing support to advise governments, SMEs and business associations on the potential opportunities available under the preferential market access programs; (ii) identify the supply side and policy constraints, and provide support to meet them; and (iii) support to ensure a process of graduation and adjustment to preference erosion. Thus, in the current complex and evolving trading environment, it is more than ever essential to scale up AfT flows and deliver them in a coordinated manner (among donors) to recipient countries so as to promote the integration of developing countries into the global trading system, including through a better utilization of NRTPs. In addition, providers of AfT flows, which are also preference-granting countries could contribute to strengthening the utilization of NRTPs by simplifying the rules of origin attached to these NRTPs, and reducing administrative barriers that limit the usage of trade preferences. At the same time, beneficiary countries of both AfT flows and the NRTPs have also the duty to develop a business-friendly environment that could allow trading firms to make a full use of NRTPs. This can involve maintaining a competitive exchange rate, facilitating trading firms' access to credit in the domestic financial market and possibly in the international financial markets; developing the appropriate domestic institutions that would provide incentives to firms to engage in export activities, including with a view to exploiting the opportunities under the NRTPs.

Incidentally, Lammersen and Roberts (2015) have emphasized the high flexibility of the AfT Initiative to adapt to the changing trade and development landscape, and proposed *inter alia*, that development finance from different sources could be instrumental in enhancing the capacity of AfT interventions to tackle trade-related binding constraints faced by recipient countries in their effort to better integrate the global trading system. This suggests that while domestic measures highlighted above are essential to attract FDI inflows, including in the exporting sectors that benefit from preferential access to foreign markets, it could also be useful to leverage on AfT interventions to drive in FDI inflows in those sectors in beneficiary countries of NRTPs. These would help further enhance the utilization of NRTPs. For example, donor-countries, notably those that are providers of both AfT flows and NRTPs could help beneficiary countries better utilize NRTPs by encouraging their domestic firms to engage in FDI activities in beneficiary countries with a view to exploiting the opportunities associated with the NRTPs. As well known, the benefits of FDI flows to beneficiary countries are not limited to the exploitation of opportunities provided by NRTPs, but they could also include jobs creation, positive spillovers to local firms and ultimately positive economic performance at the aggregate level in the beneficiary countries.

Data availability confines the present analysis to QUAD countries. An avenue for future research could be to conduct the same study when data will be available for other providers of NRTPs.

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
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
Figure 1: Total AfT flows, FDI Inflows and the utilization rate of trade preferences_Over the full sample



Source: Author

Note: The variable "AfTTOT" is the gross disbursement of total AfT flows, and expressed in million US\$, Constant 2018 Prices. The variable "FDICST" is the real net FDI inflows, expressed in billion US\$, Constant 2010 Prices.


Figure 2: Total AfT flows, FDI inflows and the utilization rate of trade preferences_Over the sub-sample of LDCs



Source: Author

Note: The variable "AfTTOT" is the gross disbursement of total AfT flows, and expressed in million US\$, Constant 2018 Prices. The variable "FDI" is the real net FDI inflows, expressed in billion US\$, Constant 2010 Prices.


Figure 3: Total AfT flows, FDI inflows and the utilization rate of trade preferences_Over the sub-sample of NonLDCs



Source: Author

Note: The variable "AfTTOT" is the gross disbursement of total AfT flows, and expressed in million US\$, Constant 2018 Prices. The variable "FDI" is the real net FDI inflows, expressed in billion US\$, Constant 2010 Prices.


Figure 4: Scatter plot between Total AfT flows, FDI inflows and the utilization rate of trade preferences_Over the full sample



Source: Author


Note: The variable "AfTTOT" is the gross disbursement of total AfT flows, and expressed in million US\$, Constant 2018 Prices. The variable "FDI" is the real net FDI inflows, expressed in billion US\$, Constant 2010 Prices.

Figure 5: Scatter plot between Total AfT flows, FDI inflows and the utilization rate of trade preferences_Over the sub-sample of LDCs



Note: The variable "AfTTOT" is the gross disbursement of total AfT flows, and expressed in million US\$, Constant 2018 Prices. The variable "FDI" is the real net FDI inflows, expressed in billion US\$, Constant 2010 Prices.

Figure 6: Scatter plot between Total AfT flows, FDI inflows and the utilization rate of trade preferences_Over the sub-sample of NonLDCs



Note: The variable "AfTTOT" is the gross disbursement of total AfT flows, and expressed in million US\$, Constant 2018 Prices. The variable "FDI" is the real net FDI inflows, expressed in billion US\$, Constant 2010 Prices.

TABLES and APPENDICES

Table 1: Effect of total AfT flows and FDI inflows on the Utilization of Trade Preferences
Estimators: FEDK and FGLS

Variables	FEDK		FGLS	
	URGSP	UROTP	URGSP	UROTP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log(AfT/TOT)	3.263***	2.609**	4.740***	4.904***
	(0.910)	(1.259)	(0.500)	(0.656)
FDICST	0.0612	0.0459	0.0548	-0.140**
	(0.0574)	(0.108)	(0.0495)	(0.0606)
UROTP	-0.674***		-0.668***	
	(0.0450)		(0.0176)	
URGSP		-0.623***		-0.709***
		(0.0246)		(0.0164)
Log(GDP)	17.45***	40.21***	8.657***	14.09***
	(3.427)	(3.954)	(0.838)	(1.110)
EDU	-0.0199	-0.170***	0.0833**	-0.298***
	(0.0457)	(0.0447)	(0.0337)	(0.0436)
TP	0.171***	0.0136	0.199***	0.0910*
	(0.0393)	(0.0318)	(0.0480)	(0.0470)
Log(REER)	-9.892***	-3.390***	-4.719*	-1.455
	(1.330)	(0.618)	(2.428)	(3.210)
FINDEV	-0.0391	-0.110***	-0.0375	-0.0869**
	(0.106)	(0.0256)	(0.0453)	(0.0419)
INST	-0.734***	-0.658***	-0.574***	-0.0708
	(0.151)	(0.242)	(0.0697)	(0.0583)
Log(POP)	31.82***	-30.41***	-8.056***	-15.41***
	(7.641)	(9.186)	(0.889)	(1.256)
TERMS	-0.00136	-0.0134	-0.0209*	-0.0401**
	(0.0114)	(0.0257)	(0.0120)	(0.0156)
Constant	-846.5***	-395.0***	-66.44***	-81.68***
	(59.50)	(66.51)	(17.30)	(20.45)
Observations - Countries	492 - 114	492 - 114	484 - 106	484 - 106
Within R-squared	0.5052	0.4544		
Pseudo R-squared			0.7139	0.7182

*Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis. The Pseudo R² has been calculated for FGLS-based regressions, as the correlation coefficient between the dependent variable and its predicted values. Time dummies have been included in the regressions.*

Table 2: Effect of total AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization of trade preferences
Estimator: Two-Step System GMM

Variables	URGSP	UROTP
	(1)	(2)
One-Period Lag of the Dependent Variable	0.167***	0.374***
	(0.0159)	(0.0182)
Log(AfTTOT)	3.907***	4.076***
	(0.880)	(0.641)
FDICST	1.076***	0.259***
	(0.132)	(0.0793)
UROTP	-0.476***	
	(0.0374)	
URGSP		-0.461***
		(0.0192)
Log(GDP)	-6.925*	20.76***
	(3.538)	(1.727)
EDU	0.433***	-0.521***
	(0.118)	(0.0642)
TP	0.0518	0.137
	(0.102)	(0.101)
Log(REER)	5.561	-0.000748
	(4.167)	(2.725)
FINDEV	0.0644	0.0501
	(0.0612)	(0.0480)
INST	-0.936***	-0.00690
	(0.135)	(0.148)
Log(POP)	4.048	-20.13***
	(3.758)	(2.105)
TERMS	0.0888***	0.0825***
	(0.0216)	(0.0113)
Observations - Countries	413 - 114	413 - 114
AR1 (P-Value)	0.0005	0.0001
AR2 (P-Value)	0.3680	0.1549
Sargan (P-Value)	0.4708	0.2682

Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The variables "AfTTOT", "FDICST", "GDP", "EDU", "TP", "REER", "FINDEV", "INST" and the variable capturing the trade preference utilization rate (that has been used as a right-hand side regressor) have been treated as endogenous. The variables "TERMS" and "POP" have been treated as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions. The latter have used a maximum of 3 lags of the dependent variable as instruments, and 2 lags of endogenous variables as instruments.

Table 3: Effect of the components of total AfT flows on the Utilization of Trade Preferences
Estimator: Two-Step System GMM

Variables	URGSP	UROTP	URGSP	UROTP	URGSP	UROTP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
One-Period Lag of the Dependent Variable	0.175***	0.391***	0.142***	0.370***	0.183***	0.381***
	(0.0138)	(0.0203)	(0.0214)	(0.0189)	(0.0149)	(0.0199)
Log(AfTINFRA)	2.788***	-0.490				
	(0.613)	(0.371)				
Log(AfTPROD)			4.003***	6.835***		
			(1.121)	(0.841)		
Log(AfTPOL)					0.113	0.897**
					(0.373)	(0.428)
FDICST	0.977***	0.321***	1.362***	0.222***	0.979***	0.351***
	(0.137)	(0.0745)	(0.158)	(0.0784)	(0.133)	(0.0653)
UROTP	-0.459***		-0.489***		-0.428***	
	(0.0329)		(0.0297)		(0.0301)	
URGSP		-0.443***		-0.498***		-0.427***
		(0.0218)		(0.0202)		(0.0238)
Log(GDP)	-5.478*	19.89***	-8.059***	17.67***	-12.14***	18.45***
	(3.076)	(1.879)	(2.882)	(1.750)	(2.139)	(2.069)
EDU	0.410***	-0.517***	0.467***	-0.373***	0.514***	-0.653***
	(0.104)	(0.0597)	(0.0903)	(0.0539)	(0.0842)	(0.0625)
TP	0.0464	-0.0146	0.0167	0.0272	0.0601	0.241**
	(0.0780)	(0.0703)	(0.0926)	(0.106)	(0.0850)	(0.101)
Log(REER)	4.310	3.339	7.081*	4.972	8.829**	1.846
	(3.621)	(3.275)	(3.999)	(3.231)	(3.700)	(3.170)
FINDEV	0.0443	0.0543	0.0808	0.0904*	-0.0171	0.102*
	(0.0575)	(0.0461)	(0.0530)	(0.0519)	(0.0553)	(0.0536)
INST	-0.863***	0.278*	-0.913***	-0.0513	-0.698***	0.283*
	(0.134)	(0.149)	(0.133)	(0.101)	(0.120)	(0.151)
Log(POP)	2.861	-16.20***	4.546	-18.33***	12.85***	-15.53***
	(3.040)	(2.385)	(3.625)	(2.140)	(2.540)	(2.286)
TERMS	0.0742***	0.0407***	0.110***	0.0851***	0.00845	0.0617***
	(0.0224)	(0.0131)	(0.0197)	(0.0110)	(0.0165)	(0.0141)
Observations - Countries	412 - 114	412 - 114	413 - 114	413 - 114	410 - 114	410 - 114
AR1 (P-Value)	0.0005	0.0001	0.0005	0.0001	0.0001	0.0003
AR2 (P-Value)	0.4541	0.2159	0.3011	0.2157	0.7924	0.2348
Sargan (P-Value)	0.4682	0.2188	0.4816	0.2398	0.4545	0.3385

Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. AfT variables, the variables "FDICST", "GDP", "EDU", "TP", "REER", "FINDEV", "INST" and the variable capturing the trade preference utilization rate (that has been used as a right-hand side regressor) have been treated as endogenous. The variables "TERMS" and "POP" have been treated as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions. The latter have used a maximum of 3 lags of the dependent variable as instruments, and 2 lags of endogenous variables as instruments.

Table 4: Effect of total AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization of trade preferences in LDCs versus NonLDCs

Estimator: Two-Step System GMM

Variables	URGSP	UROTP
	(1)	(2)
One-Period Lag of the Dependent Variable	0.180***	0.370***
	(0.00924)	(0.0111)
Log(AfTTOT)	5.844***	4.048***
	(0.403)	(0.348)
[Log(AfTTOT)]*LDC	2.268	-4.493***
	(1.621)	(0.972)
FDICST	0.745***	-0.0661**
	(0.0219)	(0.0269)
FDICST*LDC	0.331***	0.254***
	(0.0574)	(0.0832)
UROTP	-0.430***	
	(0.0195)	
URGSP		-0.457***
		(0.0136)
LDC	-41.38	67.84***
	(29.17)	(17.12)
Log(GDP)	-1.845	15.89***
	(1.258)	(0.965)
EDU	0.510***	-0.505***
	(0.0579)	(0.0356)
TP	-0.133***	-0.0393
	(0.0483)	(0.0502)
Log(REER)	8.757***	0.368
	(2.389)	(1.645)
FINDEV	0.0946***	0.0317
	(0.0356)	(0.0228)
INST	-0.949***	0.218***
	(0.101)	(0.0818)
Log(POP)	-1.376	-13.71***
	(1.094)	(1.088)
TERMS	0.0972***	0.0539***
	(0.0109)	(0.00871)
Observations - Countries	413 - 114	413 - 114
AR1 (P-Value)	0.0002	0.0002
AR2 (P-Value)	0.4415	0.1477
Sargan (P-Value)	0.4476	0.3435

Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. AfT variables, the variables "FDICST", "GDP", "EDU", "TP", "REER", "FINDEV", "INST", the variable capturing the trade preference utilization rate (that has been used as a right-hand side regressor) and the interaction variables have been treated as endogenous. The variables "TERMS" and "POP" have been treated as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions. The latter have used a maximum of 3 lags of the dependent variable as instruments, and 2 lags of endogenous variables as instruments.

Table 5: Interaction effect between AfT flows and FDI inflows on the Utilization of Trade Preferences
Estimator. Two-Step System GMM

Variables	URGSP	UROTP	URGSP	UROTP	URGSP	UROTP	URGSP	UROTP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
One-Period Lag of the Dependent Variable	0.183***	0.372***	0.193***	0.380***	0.150***	0.375***	0.191***	0.396***
	(0.0159)	(0.0155)	(0.0118)	(0.0172)	(0.0188)	(0.0165)	(0.0121)	(0.0146)
Log(AfTTOT)	1.312	-6.984***						
	(0.928)	(1.340)						
[Log(AfTTOT)]*FDICST	0.153***	0.420***						
	(0.0389)	(0.0487)						
Log(AfTINFRA)			1.397*	-9.114***				
			(0.833)	(1.807)				
[Log(AfTINFRA)]*FDICST			0.0714*	0.335***				
			(0.0391)	(0.0708)				
Log(AfTPROD)					-8.402***	-6.216***		
					(1.783)	(1.952)		
[Log(AfTPROD)]*FDICST					0.508***	0.477***		
					(0.0582)	(0.0735)		
Log(AfTPOL)							-0.210	-2.940***
							(0.410)	(0.583)
[Log(AfTPOL)]*FDICST							0.0130	0.178***
							(0.0151)	(0.0215)
UROTP	-0.475***		-0.462***		-0.521***		-0.443***	
	(0.0298)		(0.0279)		(0.0292)		(0.0306)	
URGSP		-0.457***		-0.459***		-0.494***		-0.432***
		(0.0175)		(0.0197)		(0.0169)		(0.0195)
Log(GDP)	-6.008***	21.51***	-6.517***	19.35***	-7.615***	17.92***	-9.596***	16.72***
	(1.476)	(1.529)	(2.146)	(1.629)	(1.819)	(1.508)	(1.518)	(1.617)
EDU	0.459***	-0.542***	0.377***	-0.510***	0.421***	-0.420***	0.350***	-0.557***
	(0.0690)	(0.0526)	(0.0730)	(0.0539)	(0.0735)	(0.0375)	(0.0542)	(0.0532)

TP	0.0218	0.104	0.130*	-0.0200	-0.0426	0.0273	0.123**	0.173***
	(0.0860)	(0.0899)	(0.0693)	(0.0686)	(0.0816)	(0.101)	(0.0551)	(0.0561)
Log(REER)	7.826**	0.884	2.171	4.698	9.860***	5.710*	6.774**	-0.664
	(3.592)	(2.953)	(3.094)	(3.729)	(3.823)	(3.067)	(3.044)	(2.545)
FDICST	-1.613***	-7.088***	-0.301	-5.391***	-7.514***	-7.791***	0.553***	-2.099***
	(0.624)	(0.835)	(0.588)	(1.154)	(0.942)	(1.200)	(0.180)	(0.256)
FINDEV	0.130***	0.141***	0.115**	0.0636*	0.108**	0.122***	-0.0440	0.0630**
	(0.0416)	(0.0425)	(0.0501)	(0.0368)	(0.0498)	(0.0420)	(0.0492)	(0.0316)
INST	-1.148***	-0.231*	-0.931***	0.160	-0.865***	-0.0537	-0.500***	0.233
	(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.119)	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.0808)	(0.0931)	(0.151)
Log(POP)	1.180	-21.46***	2.843	-15.75***	4.298*	-19.04***	11.65***	-13.27***
	(1.693)	(1.977)	(2.309)	(1.741)	(2.397)	(2.013)	(1.583)	(1.762)
TERMS	0.113***	0.0860***	0.0910***	0.0412***	0.108***	0.0954***	0.0120	0.0469***
	(0.0174)	(0.0120)	(0.0218)	(0.0128)	(0.0165)	(0.0120)	(0.0137)	(0.0126)
Observations - Countries	413 - 114	413 - 114	412 - 114	412 - 114	413 - 114	413 - 114	410 - 114	410 - 114
AR1 (P-Value)	0.0005	0.0001	0.0003	0.0001	0.0004	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002
AR2 (P-Value)	0.3276	0.1838	0.4704	0.2782	0.3429	0.1793	0.9529	0.1848
Sargan (P-Value)	0.3694	0.4657	0.5288	0.2619	0.5604	0.4044	0.4911	0.5524

Note: * p -value <0.1 ; ** p -value <0.05 ; *** p -value <0.01 . Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. AfT variables, the variables "FDICST", "GDP", "EDU", "TP", "REER", "FINDEV", "INST", the variable capturing the trade preference utilization rate (that has been used as a right-hand side regressor) and the interaction variables have been treated as endogenous. The variables "TERMS" and "POP" have been treated as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions. The latter have used a maximum of 3 lags of the dependent variable as instruments, and 2 lags of endogenous variables as instruments.

Table 6: Effect of AfT flows and FDI inflows on the utilization of trade preferences for varying levels of export product diversification
Estimator: Two-Step System GMM

Variables	URGSP	UROTP	URGSP	UROTP	URGSP	UROTP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
One-Period Lag of the Dependent Variable	0.209***	0.336***	0.190***	0.345***	0.159***	0.305***
	(0.0183)	(0.0278)	(0.0235)	(0.0273)	(0.0183)	(0.0320)
Log(AfTTOT)	9.972***	-1.472	-1.150	-2.377	7.250***	2.825***
	(1.581)	(1.794)	(1.531)	(1.827)	(1.054)	(1.044)
[Log(AfTTOT)]*ECI	-1.841***	1.207**				
	(0.524)	(0.495)				
FDICST*ECI	-0.217***	-0.530***				
	(0.0726)	(0.1000)				
[Log(AfTTOT)]*ECIINT			1.606***	1.757***		
			(0.597)	(0.621)		
FDICST*ECIINT			-0.371***	-0.651***		
			(0.0968)	(0.109)		
[Log(AfTTOT)]*ECIEXT					-5.463***	0.336
					(1.011)	(0.622)
FDICST*ECIEXT					-0.632**	-0.578**
					(0.252)	(0.233)
ECI	37.70***	-7.850				
	(8.928)	(8.580)				
ECIINT			-21.40**	-14.43		
			(9.649)	(10.90)		
ECIEXT					107.9***	2.425
					(20.11)	(12.91)
FDICST	1.968***	2.812***	2.863***	3.174***	0.813***	0.276***
	(0.421)	(0.552)	(0.538)	(0.571)	(0.0753)	(0.0896)
UROTP	-0.544***		-0.489***		-0.565***	
	(0.0299)		(0.0386)		(0.0405)	
URGSP		-0.544***		-0.539***		-0.548***
		(0.0242)		(0.0246)		(0.0225)
Log(GDP)	-2.836*	8.454***	-6.399***	9.568***	-2.849	13.16***
	(1.566)	(1.677)	(1.592)	(1.546)	(2.381)	(1.380)
EDU	0.284***	-0.0427	0.325***	-0.168***	0.251***	-0.310***
	(0.0647)	(0.0466)	(0.0610)	(0.0399)	(0.0772)	(0.0428)
TP	-0.0325	0.168	0.0784	0.169	0.269**	0.150*
	(0.116)	(0.113)	(0.0999)	(0.103)	(0.110)	(0.0832)
Log(REER)	11.60**	0.772	7.171*	0.285	2.342	4.579
	(4.977)	(4.488)	(3.873)	(3.839)	(4.421)	(3.301)
FINDEV	-0.108	0.0814*	0.0752	0.124**	-0.0558	-0.103
	(0.0679)	(0.0469)	(0.0730)	(0.0541)	(0.0786)	(0.0687)
INST	-0.716***	-0.429***	-0.800***	-0.421***	-0.647***	0.0974
	(0.148)	(0.129)	(0.165)	(0.136)	(0.159)	(0.157)
Log(POP)	-0.356	-7.818***	1.923	-8.789***	-1.406	-11.93***
	(1.922)	(1.883)	(2.085)	(1.824)	(2.697)	(1.730)

TERMS	0.0434**	0.000498	0.0879***	-0.00844	0.0706***	0.0427***
	(0.0191)	(0.0203)	(0.0166)	(0.0157)	(0.0198)	(0.0151)
Observations - Countries	346 - 111	346 - 111	346 - 111	346 - 111	346 - 111	346 - 111
AR1 (P-Value)	0.0075	0.0052	0.0042	0.0042	0.0124	0.0054
AR2 (P-Value)	0.9045	0.5433	0.9264	0.4743	0.8115	0.4256
Sargan (P-Value)	0.2520	0.2418	0.2013	0.3273	0.2397	0.1733

*Note: *p-value<0.1; **p-value<0.05; ***p-value<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The variables "AFTOT", "ECI", "ECIINT", "ECIEXT", "FDICST", "GDP", "EDU", "TP", "REER", "FINDEV", "INST", the variable capturing the trade preference utilization rate (that has been used as a right-hand side regressor) and the interaction variables have been treated as endogenous. The variables "TERMS" and "POP" have been treated as exogenous. Time dummies have been included in the regressions. The latter have used a maximum of 3 lags of the dependent variable as instruments, and 2 lags of endogenous variables as instruments.*

Appendix 1: Definition and Source of variables

Variables	Definition	Source
URGSP	<p>This is the indicator of the utilization rate of unilateral trade preferences under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) schemes provided by the so-called “Quadrilaterals” (i.e., QUAD countries), namely Canada, European Union (EU), Japan and the United States of America (USA). It captures the extent to which imports that are eligible for trade preferences are actually imported under these preferences (e.g., WTO, 2016).</p> <p>This indicator has been computed using a formula adopted both by the WTO (see WTO, 2016) and the UNCTAD and which goes as follows:</p> $\text{URGSP} = 100 * (\text{GSP Received Imports}) / (\text{GSP Covered Imports}),$ <p>where "GSP received imports" refers to the value of imports that received GSP treatment, and "GSP covered imports" indicates the value of imports that are classified in tariff lines that are dutiable and covered by the GSP scheme of the preference-granting country. Detailed information on the dataset is available over the Internet at: https://gsp.unctad.org/about</p> <p>Values of the indicator "URGSP" range between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating a greater utilization rate of GSP programs.</p>	<p>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Dataset: https://gsp.unctad.org/utilization</p>
UROTP	<p>This is the indicator of the utilization rate of the other trade preferences than the GSP programs provided by the QUAD countries to developing countries, including least-developed countries among them. In particular, this covers preferences granted by USA under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative; in the case of the European Union, it includes preferences under the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) entered with selected Africa Sub-Saharan countries.</p> <p>This indicator has been calculated using a formula similar to the one used to compute the indicator "USGSP". The formula goes as follows:</p> $\text{UROTP} = 100 * (\text{Other-Preferential Imports}) / (\text{Other Preferential Covered Imports}),$ <p>where "Other-Preferential Imports" refers to the value of imports that benefitted from NRTPs other than GSP and under selected Economic Partnership Agreements that the EU has entered with some African countries.</p> <p>"Other-Preferential Covered Imports" refers to the value of imports that are classified in tariff lines that are dutiable and covered by the other-preferential schemes.</p>	<p>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Dataset: https://gsp.unctad.org/utilization</p>

	<p>Detailed information on the dataset is available over the Internet at: https://gsp.unctad.org/about</p> <p>Values of the indicator "UROTP" range between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating a greater utilization rate of other trade preferences programs.</p>	
<p>AfTTOT, AfTINFRA, AfTPROD, AfTPOL</p>	<p>"AfTTOT" is the total real gross disbursements of Aid for Trade. "AfTINFRA" is the real gross disbursements of Aid for Trade allocated to the buildup of economic infrastructure.</p> <p>"AfTPROD" is the real gross disbursements of Aid for Trade for building productive capacities.</p> <p>"AfTPOL" is the real gross disbursements of Aid allocated for trade policies and regulation. All four AfT variables are expressed in constant prices 2018, US Dollar.</p>	<p>Author's calculation based on data extracted from the database OECD statistical database on development, in particular the OECD/DAC-CRS (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/Donor Assistance Committee)-Credit Reporting System (CRS). Aid for Trade data cover the following three main categories (the CRS Codes are in brackets):</p> <p><u>Aid for Trade for Economic Infrastructure ("AfTINFRA")</u>, which includes transport and storage (210), communications (220), and energy generation and supply (230);</p> <p><u>Aid for Trade for Building Productive capacities ("AfTPROD")</u>, which includes banking and financial services (240), business and other services (250), agriculture (311), forestry (312), fishing (313), industry (321), mineral resources and mining (322), and tourism (332); and</p> <p><u>Aid for Trade policy and regulations ("AfTPOL")</u>, which includes trade policy</p>

		and regulations and trade-related adjustment (331).
FDICST	The variable represents the 'transformed' real Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows (constant US\$ 2010 prices). We first compute the real Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows (constant US\$ 2010 prices) (denoted "FDI") by multiplying the net inflows of Foreign direct investment (in percentage of GDP) by the real GDP (constant 2010 US\$) (e.g., Nagel et al. 2015 and Herzer, 2011). Then, we compute the 'transformed' real Foreign Direct Investment inflows ("FDICST") (constant US\$ 2010 prices) by using the following transformation technique (see Yeyati et al. 2007): $FDICST = sign(FDI) * \log(1 + FDI)$ (2), where $ FDI $ refers to the absolute value of the variable "FDI".	Author's calculation based on data on net inflows of Foreign direct investment (in percentage of GDP) extracted from the World Development Indicator (WDI) database of the World Bank, and data on GDP extracted also from the WDI.
ECI, ECIINT, ECIEXT	The variable "ECI" represents the index of overall export product concentration. It is calculated using the Theil Index and following the definitions and methods used in Cadot et al. (2011). The index of overall export product concentration is the sum of two components, namely the export product concentration at the intensive margins ("ECIINT") and export product concentration at the extensive margins ("ECIEXT"). Indeed, export product diversification can occur over either product narrowly defined or trading partners. It can, therefore, be broken down into the extensive and intensive margins of diversification. Export diversification at the extensive margins reflects an increase in the number of new export products or trading partners, while export diversification at the intensive margins considers the shares of export volumes across active products or trading partners. The index has been computed using a classification of products into "Traditional", "New", or "Non-Traded" products categories. A rise in the values of "ECI" index signifies an increase in the degree of overall export product concentration, while a decrease in the values of the index indicates a rise in the degree of overall export product concentration (that is, greater export product diversification).	Details on the calculation of this Index could be found online: International Monetary Fund's Diversification Toolkit – See data online at: https://data.imf.org/?sk=3567E911-4282-4427-98F9-2B8A6F83C3B6
GDP	Gross Domestic Product (constant 2010 US\$).	World Development Indicators (WDI)
TERMS	This is the indicator of the terms of trade, measured by the net barter terms of trade index (2000 = 100).	WDI

FINDEV	This is the depth of financial development, measured by the domestic credit to private sector by banks, as a percentage of GDP.	WDI
EDU	This is the indicator of the education level, proxied by the gross secondary school enrollment rate (%).	WDI
REER	This is the measure of the real effective exchange rate (REER). It is computed using a nominal effective exchange rate based on 66 trading partners. An increase in the values of this index indicates an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate, i.e., an appreciation of the home currency against the basket of currencies of trading partners.	Bruegel Datasets (see Darvas (2012a, 2012b)). The dataset could be found online at: http://bruegel.org/publications/datasets/real-effective-exchange-rates-for-178-countries-a-new-database/
TP	This is the indicator of trade policy, measured by the trade freedom score. The latter is a component of the Economic Freedom Index. It is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services. The trade freedom score is graded on a scale of 0 to 100, with a rise in its value indicating lower trade barriers, i.e., higher trade liberalization, while a decrease in its value reflects rising trade protectionism.	Heritage Foundation (see Miller et al., 2021)
POP	This is the measure of the total Population	WDI
INST	This is the variable representing the institutional and governance quality in a given country. It has been computed by extracting the first principal component (based on factor analysis) of the following six indicators of institutional quality and governance. These indicators include an index of: political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; regulatory quality; rule of law index; government effectiveness index; Voice and Accountability; and corruption. Higher values of this index are associated with better governance and institutional quality, while lower values reflect worse governance and institutional quality. The institutional and governance quality indicator is one of the components of the overall index of productive capacities computed by the UNCTAD.	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Statistics portal: https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx Note that data on the six indicators components of institutional quality and governance has been collected from World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI) developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) and recently updated.

Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics on variables used in the analysis

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
URGSP	492	46.762	33.691	0.000	97.620
UROTP	492	34.401	36.417	0.000	97.130
AfTTOT	492	203	371	0.300679	3650
AfTINFRA	491	119	245	0.024612	3110
AfTPROD	492	80.4	150	0.288584	1890
AfTPOL	484	4.065	17.5	0.00018	275
FDI	492	430000	1,480,000	-281000	19,000,000
ECI	425	3.628	1.087	0.000	6.283
ECINT	425	3.269	1.025	0.000	5.939
ECIEXT	425	0.360	0.481	-0.041	2.612
EDU	492	68.648	26.969	7.472	130.873
TP	492	69.061	11.327	22.800	89.200
TERMS	492	120.934	42.023	28.100	453.720
REER	492	107.375	30.321	59.176	645.307
FINDEV	492	33.353	24.074	2.210	121.843
INST	492	46.748	12.762	18.155	84.290
GDP	492	162000	462000	187	5540000
POP	492	50.1	172	0.070852	1350

Note: Statistics on the variables "AfTTOT, AfTINFRA, AfTPROD, AfTPOL, FDI, and GDP" have been reported here in terms of US\$ million. However, they have not been used in terms of US\$ million when performing regressions. The variable "POP" is also expressed in millions.

Appendix 3: List of countries contained in the full sample and the sub-sample of LDCs

Full sample			LDCs
Afghanistan	Eritrea	Nicaragua	Afghanistan
Albania	Eswatini	Niger	Angola
Algeria	Ethiopia	Nigeria	Bangladesh
Angola	Fiji	North Macedonia	Benin
Argentina	Gambia, The	Oman	Bhutan
Armenia	Georgia	Pakistan	Burkina Faso
Azerbaijan	Ghana	Panama	Burundi
Bangladesh	Guatemala	Papua New Guinea	Cambodia
Barbados	Guinea	Paraguay	Central African Republic
Belarus	Guinea-Bissau	Peru	Chad
Belize	Guyana	Philippines	Comoros
Benin	Honduras	Rwanda	Djibouti
Bhutan	India	Samoa	Eritrea
Bolivia	Indonesia	Sao Tome and Principe	Ethiopia
Botswana	Iran, Islamic Rep.	Saudi Arabia	Gambia, The
Brazil	Jamaica	Senegal	Guinea
Burkina Faso	Jordan	Seychelles	Guinea-Bissau
Burundi	Kazakhstan	Sierra Leone	Lao PDR
Cabo Verde	Kenya	Solomon Islands	Lesotho
Cambodia	Kyrgyz Republic	South Africa	Liberia
Cameroon	Lao PDR	Sri Lanka	Madagascar
Central African Republic	Lesotho	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Malawi

Chad	Liberia	Sudan	Mali
Chile	Libya	Suriname	Mauritania
China	Madagascar	Tajikistan	Mozambique
Colombia	Malawi	Tanzania	Nepal
Comoros	Malaysia	Thailand	Niger
Congo, Rep.	Maldives	Togo	Rwanda
Costa Rica	Mali	Tonga	Sao Tome and Principe
Cote d'Ivoire	Mauritania	Tunisia	Senegal
Croatia	Mauritius	Turkey	Sierra Leone
Djibouti	Mexico	Uganda	Solomon Islands
Dominica	Moldova	Ukraine	Sudan
Dominican Republic	Mongolia	Uruguay	Tanzania
Ecuador	Morocco	Uzbekistan	Togo
Egypt, Arab Rep.	Mozambique	Vanuatu	Uganda
El Salvador	Namibia	Venezuela, RB	Vanuatu
Equatorial Guinea	Nepal	Yemen, Rep.	Yemen, Rep.