FROM THE GEOGRAPHY OF POLITICS TO THE POLITICS OF GEOGRAPHY

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(Preface to the Brazilian edition of *The return of geopolitics in Europe? Social mechanisms and foreign policy identity crises,* **in:** *O retorno da geopolítica na Europa? Mecanismos sociais e as crises de identidade na política externa.* **São Paulo: Editora UNESP, 2020)**[1]

Which geopolitics? This book is about a theory, but there is also this word. In most Romance languages, for instance, it means simply something which has to do with international politics. Rather than using such long and clumsy phrases, a single word suffices. The term appears frequently in journalistic reports on world politics, as well as in the self-descriptions and analyses of practitioners, diplomats and the military alike.

But even in these generic usages, it is not just any 'international politics' that the word connotes. In fact, in most cases, 'geopolitics' refers to the geographical component of politics, which provides its source or aim. Geography comes in as a source of politics when geographical location, territory and resources, including 'human resources', feed into the assessment of actors' power (resources), which in turn defines their intentions and 'national interest' and thus their behaviour, as the *realpolitik* reading has it. Geography also comes in as the aim of such policies, when an actor eyes up and competes for territory and resources. Hence, geopolitics focuses our view on territorial or demographic politics, and more generally on the competition of 'power politics'. When we say that something is geopolitical, we mean that it touches how the world's main actors engage with each other in the ruling of the global order, or the main regional actors in the ruling of the regional order, or finally, the state in the establishment of its own order and boundaries, while having the idea of a potential conflict, often territorial, at the back of our mind. These conflicts may not turn out to be military, but they are seen as ultimately unavoidable in a world of competition over state power.

Hence, when talking geopolitics, we usually do not refer to the last environmental treaty, cooperation in developing a vaccine or setting up a common system of free residence, where citizens of different countries can move and settle without the need for any residence, work or other permit (as between the countries of the Nordic Council in Europe). And should 'geopolitics' ever be used when analysing such issues, it will impose a reading that reduces all of this to the relationship between

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geography and the struggle for power. Consequently, while it seems to refer to international politics at large, in fact it touches only a certain element with a specific set of assumptions about the role of material (including human) power in world politics. It thereby repeats the classical realist fallacy of reversing the relation between power and politics: while it is arguably correct to see power as an aspect of all politics, not all politics is about power (see e.g. Hannah Arendt's work in this regard).

The fact that 'geopolitics' has acquired this set of connotations is an effect of its past. Any major concept has a history made out of its usages, a history that also informs its present meanings. Moreover, important concepts have no single history since they are embedded in the political and cultural contexts of different environments. The terms of our political discourses do not necessarily develop in the same way across political cultures: the same terms are used differently, and sometimes completely different terms come into play. The English term 'power' often refers to two terms in the Romance languages (if not more, since, e.g., *forza*, *fuerza* and *força* also capture aspects of power), derived respectively from *potentia* and *potestas* in Latin. Conversely, neither the English 'authority' nor 'domination' entirely capture the German *Herrschaft*, which was Max Weber's preferred term for the analysis of power, since *Macht* (usually translated as 'power') was analytically amorphous, and hence useless (Weber 1980 [1921-22]: 28-29). It is not just a matter of finding direct equivalents. Languages carry different ontological contexts. In English, the term 'power' in its two more common versions of 'power-to' and 'power-over', invokes a relatively agent-centred vision, often close to 'influence'. whereas in other languages it more easily relates to the structural aspects of power or impersonal 'rule'.

Yet, as these examples also show, there are family resemblances. Such resemblances are greater when the term has been consciously translated across political cultures. It is fair to argue that this applies to a considerable extent to 'geopolitics', a word shared and exchanged by academic and political elites across many states, being part of the 'common sense' vocabulary of the international practitioner. It is this past which, in the contexts relevant to this book and this translation, led to its present semantic field, where it refers to the relations between physical and human geography, state power, and conflict.

In the case of geopolitics, that past is closely related to two contexts, often combined. The first is its development in US and European political geography in the late nineteenth century, where it often justified, if not encouraged, imperialism and colonialism on civilizational and ultimately often racist grounds (see also the discussion of 'racist realist imperialism' in Hobson 2012: 150ff). This also happened in the smaller empires, as the Italian case in this book illustrates. The main thinkers who are considered pioneers of the geopolitical tradition were geographers who took it upon themselves to think of the world in its totality. Yet they were watching that world through a gaze from the metropoles that were being 'called upon' to rule this world, as exemplified by Sir Halford Mackinder (1904). Some of these thinkers, prominently Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890), a US naval officer turned historian, were military men, the second significant context in which the term 'geopolitics'

developed. This meeting of the military and imperialist gaze on politics is no coincidence. Indeed, as the French political geographer Yves Lacoste put it pithily for the origins of geography, 'geography primarily serves to make war' (Lacoste 1978).

However, this combination of a military view of politics and the strengthening of state power was played out differently in different countries. There is, for example, a 'geopolitics of the weak', as exemplified by some Nordic countries in Europe (Tunander 2008). Geopolitics has also been mobilised by military actors in their version of state-building, including both domestic modernisation (sometimes with internal colonisation) and external border security (for a related analysis as applied to Brazil, see Hage 2015).

This dual lineage also leads to a use of 'geopolitics' that is crucial for the following book: geopolitics not only refers to a certain way of describing the world, it also wants to explain it. Indeed, supposedly the *term* 'geopolitics' can allegedly simply describe the world only because it involves certain tacit assumptions of a *theory* of geopolitics. Any term directs our attention to certain issues at the expense of others: that is normal and unavoidable. As already mentioned, geopolitics makes us look at politics that is conflictual, often territorial, and concerned with power competition, which in the last resort can be military. This stems from a theory of geopolitics that systematically establishes ways of reading politics 'off the map', or as Colin Gray put it, it analyses the 'political meaning of geography' (Gray 2012). As the *Cambridge English Dictionary* defines it, geopolitics is 'the *study* of the way a country's size, position, etc. influence its power and its relationships with other countries' (emphasis added). It is a theory, an analytical apparatus, not just a term.

In my reading, geopolitical theory is characterised by four basic assumptions (see Chapter 2 in this book). First, geopolitics stresses the *interconnectedness* of the world that produces a 'totality' which, for one present-day geopolitical writer, presents 'the ultimate object and justification' of geopolitical theory today (Parker 1985: 2). Here, early thinkers have often resorted to the metaphor of an 'organism' that functions as a proxy for the holism of classical geopolitics, where all in the world is connected with its parts playing different roles and its life-cycle of expansion and decline. But totality and interconnectedness can also be approached otherwise, as in system theory (besides Parker, see e.g. Cohen 1991, 2003). Second, it insists on the *finiteness* of the world in which no conflict can be exported, no easy compensations achieved. This entered into the imperial conscience with the Fashoda incident in 1898, when British and French troops, competing over Africa, confronted one another directly in the Sudan. Thirdly, geopolitics relies on a form of *neo-Malthusianism* that provides the pessimistic determinacy and often demographic imprint of the theory. Thomas Robert Malthus, an English cleric and political economist, had been concerned with the relationship between demography and food production. Geopolitical thinkers deduced from this that, in a finite world where demographic growth could outpace the growth of resources, seeking expansion is the default position of any state, its realization being necessary whenever an opportunity arises. Concepts like 'demographic pressure' or 'vital space' are inspired by this. This vision is, finally, connected to the most contentious

component of the geopolitical tradition, namely the *social Darwinism* that posits an existential struggle for national/cultural or racial primacy.

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Present geopolitical writers will resist some of these characteristics, since they seem to fault geopolitics through 'guilt by association'. There is no denying that geopolitics has a disreputable past, being closely associated with Fascist and Nazi ideologies in the first half of the twentieth century and later also with authoritarian, usually military dictatorships. The German geopolitical scholar Karl Haushofer may not have been the important inspiration or even figure in the Nazi regime that is often assumed (Wolkersdorfer 1999), and his ideas were not always in sync with Nazi practice (Bassin 1987), but his writings (Haushofer 1924, 1934) were nevertheless meant to establish a 'German science of international politics' (Diner 1999: 163) that demanded German expansionism and came in handy for the Nazi government. In Italy, the first journal of geopolitics, *Geopolitica: rassegna mensile di geografia politica, economica, sociale, coloniale*, was created late in the Fascist period.

Geopolitics was also important in the foreign policy expertise of those countries in which the military play a major political role, whether in a direct military regime or in a political system that reserves particular legitimacy to the military for its historical role in state-building, often accompanied by socio-economic privileges and autonomy from both democratic accountability and legal control. In the book, this is exemplified by Pinar Bilgin's chapter on Turkey. However, it has long been established for the Iberian peninsula (Sidaway 2000) and Latin America (Child 1979; Hepple 1992; Kacowicz 2000), for example, Argentina (Dodds 2000; Reboratti 1983), Brazil (Costa 1991: 183-228; Hepple 1986; Kelly 1984) and Chile (Gangas-Geisse 2001; Santis-Arenas 2001). After all, General Pinochet had already established a certain reputation for publishing (text)books on geopolitics before his coup (Pinochet Uguarte 1967, 1974).

But, so the defence goes, this past is no longer part of geopolitics' present, having been amended in what Bassin (2004: 621) has dubbed 'neoclassical geopolitics'. The reference to classical thinkers is always contextualised and used for a more sober approach to geopolitics. It is therefore understandable that present-day proponents of classical or neo-classical geopolitics may find my definition above misleading, if not unfair. But this defence runs into established dilemmas. I will mention the two most important ones.

First, some geopolitical scholars resist the attempt to see their discipline as a scientific theory in the academic sense; rather, geopolitics is a way to develop a systematic foreign policy strategy. That dual level of analysis – observational theory here, doctrine for action there – is very common in International Relations. There is nothing wrong with it as such, only that the two levels should not be confused (Aron 1964: 27, 45-6). An observational theory cannot be treated the same as a foreign policy strategy, nor vice versa. For instance, in the aftermath of the invasion and annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, some commentators saw geopolitics vindicated (see, e.g., Daniel Deudney in Agnew et al. 2017). But that

confuses description with explanation. It is one thing to describe this as a territorial conflict or a war connected to the size and space of countries, quite another to establish the reasons for a land grab. More generally, it is not that realism as a theory is right when things turn violent, or that liberalism is right when states sign a peace treaty: both theories have explanations for either phenomena. Therefore, it means something different to follow a geopolitical foreign policy strategy and to explain the reasons for a particular country deciding to follow such a strategy. The two can fall together only if one smuggles in a high level of determinacy into the analysis where countries literally end up 'having no choice', which is exactly what geopolitics does. Hence, either geopolitics is defended as a foreign policy strategy that cannot be backed up by an observational theory and is thus blind to the very effects of applying such a strategy, which is hardly convincing. Or it does have a theory that tacitly backs it up, but then needs to be assessed by the criteria applied to all observational theory in the social sciences, be they positivist or post-positivist.

This confusion between the level of practice and the level of explanation has to do with the specific history of international expertise and its late academic institutionalisation. When the Western social sciences started to develop in the nineteenth century, International Relations followed a different trajectory from political science (or 'the science of the state'), economics or sociology. In the increasing functional differentiation of Western societies, sciences developed to observe the newly autonomous fields that became separate from the state, like the government, the market economy and civil society. International relations did not need to do this, as it was already a separate sphere of knowledge, especially practical knowledge, mainly in strategy and diplomacy. Its difference predates the social differentiation within the state because it is based on differences between states. It already had its specialized experts. Yet, when its practical knowledge came under scrutiny in the early twentieth century, scientific justification was needed in order to maintain its credibility and influence. IR too now needed a discipline. In contrast to the other social sciences, late-coming IR therefore worked the other way around: 'The discipline was not there to produce knowledge; already-existing (practical) knowledge produced its discipline' (Guzzini 2013: 524). Ever since, IR has navigated between the knowledge of actors and of observers, which again prompted some anxiety in terms of its 'lost relevance' when not speaking to practice, or the 'pitfalls of common sense' when practical knowledge does not link up with controlled knowledge.

A second rejoinder from present-day geopolitical scholars agrees with me that the four characteristics are not all defensible and argue especially that the last no longer applies. In general, they agree that politics cannot simply be read off the map. Being an island apparently meant something else in eighteenth-century England and Japan, although it is always possible to find some reasons connected to geography to explain differences. There is no 'environmental determinism', so the argument goes, and geography does not cause politics. But this correct admission produces yet another dilemma. If geopolitical writers wish to make the point that their approach is superior to others, they cannot merely mean that we need to take factors in physical and human geography seriously: all explanations do, depending on the issue at hand. This is neither distinct nor determinate: it cannot show how much

geography matters, let alone how much it matters 'in itself', as classical geopolitical theory has it. If, then, it wishes to justify its distinctiveness and legitimize recourse to its theory rather than a different one, it systematically glides into treating geography as providing explanatory primacy and determinacy while simultaneously not providing a theoretical justification for it, since it rejects the charge of 'environmental determinism'. In other words, geopolitical theory runs into a dilemma: it is either indistinct, indeterminate and correct but trivial, or distinct and determinate but wrong. This irresolvable dilemma explains what General Carlo Jean (1995: 8, 20), a geopolitical thinker himself, calls the unavoidable geopolitical temptation of scientism and determinism (which he indeed does not avoid himself, as I show in the book).

Therefore, I think it is fair to define neoclassical geopolitics in a more demanding manner, as I do in Chapter 2, where I refer to 'a policy-oriented analysis, generally conservative and with nationalist overtones, that gives explanatory primacy, but not exclusivity, to certain factors in physical and human geographic factors (whether the analyst is open about this or not), and gives precedence to a strategic view, realism with a military and nationalist gaze, for analysing the "objective necessities" within which states compete for power and rank'.[2]

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Hence, given its determinist, competitive and militarising character, geopolitical theory would be one we would expect to flourish in societies with a strong military presence in domestic politics, as defined above, and in a context of international affairs that is strongly associated with (great) power competition. This produces the puzzle that informs this book: why would we find a revival of geopolitical thought in Europe at the end of the Cold War, that is, in the 1990s, which had just experienced the end of great-power competition as we knew it and the dismantling of many authoritarian and often very militarised regimes?[3] The book assesses a series of hypotheses to explain that puzzle. In the end, it concentrates on 'foreign policy identity crisis' as the most significant explanation.

According to this view, the ending of the Cold War not only pacified the European security order in the 1990s, it also raised new questions for the very way to understand that new security order and a country's role in it. This was a concern for newly (re-)created countries, such as Estonia in the book, where new elites had to devise a new strategy and foreign policy identity. It also applied to countries that saw their borders shift, such as unified Germany and the smaller Czech Republic and Russia. It also produced problems for the self-understanding and importance of countries whose role was closely tied to Cold War dynamics, such as Italy and Turkey. Giorgy Arbatov, Director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies and advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev, is widely quoted for saying in an interview to a US

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[2] This is inherently connected to the ideology of the state and/or nation, which in many countries links it to the political right, though this is not always the case.

[3] For a Brazilian example of the revival after 1989, see Mello's (1999) attempt to rescue a reading of Mackinder for understanding world politics after the end of the Cold War.

journalist in 1988 that 'We are going to do a terrible thing to you—we are going to deprive you of your enemy'.

Identities are always relationally constituted. Losing the established cardinal points undermines the identity narratives that states mobilise when reading the political world and locating their own positions and policies. In post-1989 Europe, their self-understandings and sense of their role-recognition had to be redefined. In this context, the apparent simplicity of geopolitics, where one country's place and role can be 'read off the map', was an easy way to address this anxiety quickly while never really fixing it, as several chapters in this book show. As the book also shows, however, this geopolitical revival did not happen everywhere, not even in countries where state borders shifted, like Germany and the Czech Republic, something that needed to be understood in its turn.

Offering an explanation in terms of a foreign policy identity crisis relies heavily on research in critical geopolitics (for early and still remarkable examples, see Agnew 2003; Ó Tuathail 1996; Raffestin et al. 1995), as well as constructivist foreign policy or security analysis.[4] In doing so, it discards another quite prominent thesis of the time, namely that the Yugoslav wars showed how Europe's past was also Europe's future (Mearsheimer 1990). In this reading, there was absolutely nothing puzzling about the return of geopolitical thought. For realists, moments of détente, and even the end of the Cold War, could only be seen as a temporary respite in a continuous state of conflict in world affairs that cannot be overcome. Besides the usual confusion between diplomatic-military behaviour and its explanation (see above), however, extrapolating from the Yugoslav wars to the perennial wisdom of geopolitics is unconvincing for two reasons. For one thing, it adopts a kind of 'freezer theory', an ahistorical understanding where pre-existing conflicts or social structures reappear once some historical epoch disappears, as if country and world-wide dynamics could evolve without affecting one another. It analyses historical outcomes by reading a constant logic backwards into a 'given' history when it is that history that constantly re-constitutes the outcomes. Rather than having perennial ethnic divides explain the conflict, the Yugoslav wars also clearly show how the emerging conflict ended up creating new ethnic divides in the first place (Gagnon jr 2004). Second, it is not persuasive of realists or geopolitical scholars to say that the end of the bipolar competition, the great power politics that defined the entire international order (and many wars of remarkable mortality), is less important for understanding world politics than a war limited to the Balkans. With this argumentative strategy, the problem of realism is not that it goes wrong, but

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[4] Early references on constructivist foreign policy analysis include Ted Hopf (2002) and Jutta Weldes (1999). A prominent Brazilian foreign policy analysis based on identity is that by Celso Lafer (2004). Ontological security appeared in the mid-2000s in the work of Jennifer Mitzen (2006) and Brent Steele (2007). For a recent update of the theory, see 'Symposium: Anxiety, Fear, and Ontological Security in World Politics', edited by Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen in *International Theory*, in particular the contributions by the editors (Kinnvall and Mitzen 2020), Bahar Rumelili (2020), Felix Berenskötter (2020), and Badredine Arfi (2020). For an exchange on the relationship between the approach taken in this book and ontological security, see Jennifer Mitzen's intervention in the symposium on the book (Agnew et al. 2017) and my response (Guzzini 2017).

that there is no way it could ever go wrong, since things can always be found or rearranged to fit the theory (Guzzini 1998, 2004).

Yet, having established its leading hypothesis of a foreign policy identity crisis, the book then moves to a second aim and develops ways to understand better and analyse methodologically such foreign policy identity crises and their effects. In other words, halfway through the book its aim and purpose shift. It is first a book about how a foreign policy identity crisis did or did not give rise to the revival of geopolitical thought in a context where it would be least expected. That part of the book, which focuses empirically on Europe, might become a backdrop for studies of the 'geopolitical imaginary' and potential foreign policy identity crises elsewhere. But then, this is also a book that develops the analysis of the foreign policy identity crisis through the idea of interpretivist process-tracing and social mechanisms (see also Norman 2015; Pouliot 2015) as one way to improve constructivist foreign policy analysis. I believe that it is an important theoretical contribution in that it is the first time an analysis of social mechanisms has been adapted to a constructivist meta-theory in International Relations. I refer to the final chapter for its elaboration. In the remainder of the preface, I will focus on one of its political implications.

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For there are also good reason to be empirically and politically alert to the revival of geopolitical thought. As the last chapter of the book argues, this revival is usually accompanied by two effects. These effects may not be intended, and at times they are even openly opposed. But resorting to neo-classical geopolitical thought and theory will inevitably mobilise them.

The first effect is what I call, following Raymond Aron (1976), the 'reversal of Clausewitz'. Aron castigated US foreign policy during the Cold War for making this reversal. Rather than conceiving of military politics as a mere instrument in a wider foreign policy strategy – that is, using military means only to the extent they would further political goals – US foreign policy put the worst case of war as the default scenario that was to inform all foreign policy elaboration. Such thinking is visible in the pre-Clausewitzian slogan, 'If you want peace, prepare for war', readable on the entrance gate to the Fort in Copacabana, when such preparation for war may only allow the peace of graveyards. It also shows in the sentence, completely meaningless for Aron's take on Clausewitz, that says 'We won the war, but lost the peace'. If you've lost the peace you've also lost the war, since the only valid reason for going to war is to improve the political situation that follows. War is the prolongation of politics by other means, not the other way round. It is a political instrument. That political vision is fundamental. Geopolitics blurs all this by reducing politics to military strength or even primacy. It confuses the interests of the state with the interests of the army, which Clausewitz did not (for this critique, see Aron 1972: 611). Hence, the issue is not that geopolitical claims are only related to the military sector, they can perfectly well be part of wider state policies and diplomacy. But they affect the logic of those policies. They colonise and securitise politics. Neo-classical geopolitics militarises politics.

The second pernicious effect of the revival of geopolitical thinking is what I call the essentialisation of physical and human identities with the accompanying risk of a politics of assimilation and, in its extreme version, ethnic cleansing. This is readily exemplified by a geopolitical thesis, based upon human geography, that was prominent in the early 1990s: the 'Clash of Civilizations'. Huntington's (1993) (in)famous article (and later book) proposed an existing Cold War solution in search of a post-Cold War problem. His thesis was that US primacy would have to be defended no longer at the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, but at civilizational fault lines. In the search of an enemy, 'civilizational' conflict was found to have taken over from the ideological conflicts of the twentieth century. As many immediately feared, this thesis was dangerous not only because it was wrong (there were more clashes within civilisations, whatever that meant; see Senghaas 1998), but because it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy: if we all believe we live in homogeneous civilisations that cannot meet each other peacefully, we will prepare for the next war that will, almost inevitably, be fought in identitarian terms, both inwards and outwards. Pierre Hassner (1996/97: 64) noted Huntington's cultural determinism and wrote that he 'assumes the closed and conflictual character of these entities as he tries to fit every conflict in the world into his scheme. And … he bases his prescriptions for Western policies on what amounts to a global segregationist scheme…' And, as Fouad Ajami eloquently wrote, 'The West itself is unexamined in Huntington's essay. No fissures run through it. No multiculturalists are heard from. It is orderly within its ramparts. What doubts Huntington has about the will within the walls, he has kept within himself. He has assumed that his call to unity will be answered, for outside flutter the banners of the Saracens and the Confucians' (Ajami 1993: 3, fn. 1).

Hence, the self-fulfilling prophecy not only concerns international affairs, it is performative in re-constituting what these civilisations 'should be' in the first place. Huntington's analysis is not an external description of world politics – it is an intervention *in* politics. It wants to homogenise a certain political culture and nation. 'In fact, Huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make "civilizations" and "identities" into what they are not: shut-down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human history…' (Said 2001). As if to confirm this latent concern about cultural or ethnic 'purity', Huntington (2004) later published on the Hispanic threat to US (or what he calls 'American') identity.

Therefore, talking geopolitics is not innocent. While silencing other visions of politics, the term itself only captures a certain conflictual vision of international politics through a geographical imagination which becomes both a source and an aim of state policies. As a theory, geopolitics' inherent physical and cultural determinism mobilises a militarisation of politics in reversing Clausewitz's famous dictum and, through its reification of identities, encourages an essentialisation and 'purification' of social groups. Both intervene in world politics in a manner which produces conflict and fault lines where empirically they don't exist – or not yet. For all this happened *before* 9-11: it is not 9-11 that started the re-militarisation of world politics in the Western world. Already in the 1990s in some parts of the world, and certainly in Europe and the US, we experienced a re-militarisation of thinking about

world politics that became an inspiration for the political analysis and militarised answers that were provided after the attacks.

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This book bears witness to this puzzling revival of a militarizing and essentialising theory in post-1989 Europe. At the end of this preface, I wish to thank those who have made the book possible, both the original and its translation. My first expression of gratitude goes to my co-authors in the volume. *The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?* engages with a series of research agendas: the analysis of European security in the 1990s, the content and role of geopolitical theory, the use of social mechanisms and process-tracing in interpretivism, and the theorization of micro-dynamics in constructivist theories of international relations. The original project entitled 'self-fulfilling geopolitics' did not start that way (Guzzini 2003). The more the research advanced, the more these different agendas were connected. To a considerable extent, this is due to the discussion within the research group. Although the six framework and theory chapters were written by myself, they have been informed by an ongoing conversation. Far from simply providing case studies of different countries, the other authors in the book are all theorists in their own right with quite diverse sensitivities. They had already worked on related issues before the research group came together (see e.g. Behnke 1998; Bilgin 2004, 2007; Drulák 2001, 2003; Kuus 2002a, 2002b). Consequently, their empirical analyses were not merely applications of a given framework, but spurred reflections that fed back into the general framework; inversely, the discussion around the framework also affected the different paths of their own research (see e.g. Behnke 2013; Bilgin 2017; Brighi 2013; Kuus 2014; Morozova 2009).

A second vote of thanks goes to those who made this translation possible. The translation was financially supported by a grant from the Borbos Hansson Foundation in Sweden. I owe Bárbara Motta my greatest thanks, since she initiated the whole project of this translation, then did the translation, invited me to present the main theses at a lecture at the Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais San Tiago Dantas, São Paulo, and patiently shepherded the whole project through the rather long process. Without her, this would not have been possible, in more than one way. Thank you. I would also like to thank Aureo Toledo and Lara Selis for the opportunity to present some of the theses of the book in a public lecture at the Universidade Federal de Uberlândia.

After many years of teaching at IRI, PUC-Rio, I am glad to see this book made available in Portuguese (so far, one of my previous articles has been translated, thanks to João Urt; see Guzzini 2014). The book has been inspired by a mainly European puzzle, yet its concern with the militarisation of domestic and international politics and the construction of 'purified' identities have wider resonance. This by no means implies that there are European lessons to be applied. If anything, most of the book is about political developments I would not invite anyone to re-apply. But, most of all, 'apply' is a profoundly mistaken term. Political

developments in some parts of the world, as well as ideal-typical concepts and the contingent and open social mechanisms in our explanations, such as those developed in the last chapter, need to be *translated* into different contexts so as not to fall into the trap of naturalising their own contextual origins (for a correct way of doing this, see, for instance, the attempts to 'think the Copenhagen School in Portuguese' in Barrinha and Freire 2015). These developments also need to be re-thought in this translation, where some things may get lost and others by added, because the logics of practices in the other context work differently (Guzzini 2015). Most importantly, to work well, any such translation is a two-way street in which ontologies meet, generally in a new place, and, if everything works as it should, horizons fuse, as Gadamer put it. I hope the readers of this book will find that its content speaks to them sufficiently, even if negatively, for them to want to influence the two-way translation, that is, to change the book's meaning by translating it back into a place not yet foreseen.

Geneva, July 2020
Stefano Guzzini

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