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# **"Indenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test"**

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# Indenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test<sup>\*</sup>

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## Abstract

How can a principal (an agent) ensure that an agent (a principal) will work (pay up), if payment (work) precedes work (payment)? When a banknote is torn in two, each part is *by itself* worthless. A principal can *pre-commit* to payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent the first half as “prepayment”; the agent receives the completing half upon delivery of the service. This contract design is known as “indenture”. It is self-enforcing and incentive-compatible. This paper experimentally tests the efficacy of the “indenture game” and its implications for cooperation in one-shot environments. We find that cooperation rates are high and stable over time. Its efficacy is moderated by expected losses due to the existence of uncooperative types.

*JEL Classification:* C91, D64, J41.

*Keywords:* Cooperation, Experiment, Contracts, Indenture, Reciprocity

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## 1. Introduction

When a principal (an agent) incurs cost (effort) in exchange for an agent's (a principal's) work (payment), there is a conflict of interests, and potentially leads to moral hazard (shirking). An effective contract must serve both principal and agent (and better, society). It binds the contracted parties to honor the agreed terms-of-trade. Besides preventing moral hazard, its administration cost should ideally be as low as possible. This paper presents an experimental test of a candidate contract, and explores its efficacy and limitations. The following background motivates its design.

The diversity of contracts can be classified under: i) contracts enforced by third parties, and ii) contracts that are self-enforced by the contracting parties. Third-party enforcement is typically costly, such as when legal costs are involved. The third-party may be an individual, group (e.g. legal administrators), or the effect of manipulated market conditions. For instance, in Shapiro and Stiglitz's (1986) macroeconomic model, employers pay "efficiency wages" above the equilibrium wage. This creates costly unemployment – a threat forcing employees to "not shirk" (i.e., the non-shirking constraint). A large literature on mechanism design shows us how incentive contracts can govern self-interested individuals, with conflicting interests, to complete successful economic transactions. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) provide a wonderful survey.<sup>1</sup>

The efficacy of a contract can be limited by several factors; we mention a few. First, a successful contract requires contracting parties to mutually agree on the contract's objectives and rewards, while providing for all possible contingencies. While in practice no contract can cover all contingencies (Williamson, 1985), the dangerous cocktail of boundedly rational individuals (with imperfect foresight) with conflicting interests can result in delays to agreement, impasses, or worse still disagreement. Next, self-enforced contracts that rely on extrinsic incentives (i.e. monetary payoffs) to induce "cooperation" may potentially diminish the intrinsic incentives (e.g. trust and reciprocity) to voluntarily cooperate (Frey, 1997; Bénabou and Tirole, 1999).<sup>2</sup>

Alternatively, one could consider using contracts of a polar opposite nature of complete contracts: explicit contracts based purely on trust and reciprocity (e.g., Fehr et al., 1997; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2004; for formal models of reciprocity, see Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998; Falk and Fischbacher, 1999).<sup>3</sup> While explicit contracts have proven to be reliable in certain contexts, such as the one investigated by Fehr et al. (1997), the same result might not always hold. Consider the investment game by Berg et al. (1995), where the truster can invest trust in the trustee by sending money – which triples in value – to the trustee, and the trustee can reciprocate by sending money back to the truster. This game is a two-stage version of the Rosenthal's (1982) famous centipede game.<sup>4</sup> While Berg et al. show us that trust and reciprocity can induce considerable levels of cooperation even when the predicted subgame-perfect

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<sup>1</sup> For seminal papers see, e.g. Holmström (1979) Grossman and Hart (1983) and Laffont and Tirole (1988).

<sup>2</sup> Experimental evidence indicates that extrinsic incentives may substitute rather than complement intrinsic motivation (Falk, et al., 1999), or may even lead to a crowding out of voluntary cooperation (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2000).

<sup>3</sup> For a first model based on voluntary cooperation instead of incentives, cf. Holmström and Milgrom (1991).

<sup>4</sup> See Fehr et al. (1993, 1997), Güth et al. (1998), and Fehr and Falk (1999). This approach underlies the concept of relational contracts, where the principal-agent relationship is characterized by adapting tasks and rewards to each given scenario that arises during the trade. See Levin (2003) for restrictions of relational contracts.

equilibrium is to defect, the stability of contracts based on such relations is suspect over time: convergence to non-cooperation is expected if such games are played repeatedly (Zauner, 1999).<sup>5</sup>

The *Indenture Game (IG)* proposed by Kritikos and Bolle (1998) is an example of a self-enforced contract, incentive-compatible in a one-shot environment (where reputation does not count). The IG attempts to combine the low costs of self-enforcement, reliability of incentive-compatibility, and intrinsic motivations of trust and reciprocity. In the IG, the principal transfers the first half (of an indentured, i.e. torn, banknote) to the agent. The agent then decides whether to exert effort. The principal can then complete the transaction by sending the completing half (the other half of the indentured banknote). Kritikos and Bolle theoretically show that amongst the multiple equilibria, cooperation is a mutual best reply for principal and agent and that ‘Forward induction’ (as defined by van Damme, 1989) selects it as the unique *stable* equilibrium.

The central feature of this scheme is as such. Offering the first half of an indenture allows a principal to strategically pre-commit to payment-upon-delivery. A principal who sends a hostage to an agent, in effect, sends a signal of his intention to cooperate (honor his debt). A principal can also perceive his indenture as an investment of trust, following the reasoning of Berg et al.’s (1995) trust game.<sup>6</sup> Agents know this and accept contracts; in effect they naturally self-select themselves into performing the task. As with the trust game, an agent may perceive the fulfillment of tasks as reciprocity to the principal for the trust invested in him. At the final stage of the game, the principal is indifferent between transferring and retaining the second half of the indentured banknote, thus able to reward the agent’s trustworthiness without having to sacrifice any additional material payoff. In other words, “cooperative” principals are naturally self-selected into eventual compliance with the contract. In this sense it aligns the pecuniary interests of players; how these interests are aligned conforms to a game structure that can also induce behavior motivated by concerns for trust and reciprocity. As a consequence, the willingness for voluntary cooperation of reciprocal types is not destroyed while, at the same time, selfish players have sufficient incentives to cooperate.

The method of indenture can potentially be applied to real-world situations. For example, Kritikos and Bolle (1998) offer the example of investing in a trainee manager with training (i.e., the first half of indentured banknote) and a positive reference letter (the completing half of indentured banknote) in exchange for a minimum term of work (effort). It is important to test its efficacy, and to further understand the method and its limitations – if theory and empirical evidence is at variance. Laboratory experimentation allows us to test policy recommendations *ex ante* at low costs, relative to the *ex post* costs involved in natural experiments. Our paper does so.

Our results show that, overall, indenture is effective. Its efficacy is moderated by the willingness of principals and agents to enter into contracts. This willingness depends on the

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<sup>5</sup> See e.g. Bolle and Ockenfels (1990) and Güth et al. (1997) for two-stage dilemmas. There is recent research on the centipede game with more than three stages (e.g. Fey et al., 1996; McCabe et al., 1998, or; Zauner, 1999).

<sup>6</sup> For similar interpretations of other similar games, see also Jacobsen and Sadrieh (1996), Bolle (1998), Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000), e.g. Charness (2002) Fehr et al. (1997) (“gift exchange game”), Abbink et al. (2000), for the “moonlight game” and for other specifically designed extensive form games with similar observations of reciprocally behaving subjects, see e.g. Offerman (1998) and Charness and Rabin (2000).

expected gains from cooperation, and the degree of a/symmetry in the respective profit margins for principal and agent (elaborated below). Mean cooperation rates are stable across time. Principals' actions are sensitive to the experiences of previous outcomes from indenture. Agents are sensitive to their beliefs of the "type" of principal they are playing with. The IG performs significantly better over time, relative to the "natural cooperation" benchmark in a simple (three-stage) control game with the option of partial prepayment (half) without indenture. Here, we define the "natural rate of cooperation" as the rate of cooperation observed in a game where trust and reciprocity can give rise to cooperative behavior, but individuals can do better by unilaterally deviating.

Section 2 presents the game and lays out the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the experiment. Section 4 reports the analysis. Section 5 discusses our results and concludes.

## 2. Theoretical Background

The IG is a three-stage game, following Kritikos and Bolle (1998). Here, two parties can potentially enter into trade, exchanging a service (by the agent) for a payment (by the principal). Principals and agents make non-binding agreements. Players cannot be forced to comply with the "agreement" (of course, the word "agreement" is a misnomer if only one party wishes to engage in trade). In stage 1, a principal can *initiate* a contract by indenturing a banknote of value  $e$  by tearing it in two. One part of the indentured banknote (the first half) is sent to the agent. Tearing the banknote into two renders both pieces worthless, when separated. The banknote regains its value only when the principal sends the agent the matching and second half (the completing half).<sup>7</sup> In stage 2, the agent may provide or refuse to provide the service. Upon refusal, there is no "contract", and the agent keeps  $b$ , the cost he incurs in providing the service, where  $b < e$ . In stage 3, if the service is provided, the principal receives  $a$ , the value of the service to him, where  $a > e$ , and then decides whether to transfer or withhold the second part of the indentured banknote.<sup>8</sup> Figure 1a describes the IG (figure 1b will be described in section 3). Node (\*) can be replaced by  $(0, a)$  if one assumes that a principal does not play the altruistic strategy of offering the second half even without receiving the service. This assumption is also tested with our experimental design.

*<Insert Figure 1 about here.>*

In the IG, in stage 1, the principal virtually "transfers his entire stake" (although only the first half is transferred, it no longer holds pecuniary value for him) to the agent (albeit the intermediate payment in hand holds no pecuniary value to the agent). In the final stage, the principal is indifferent between transferring and withholding the completing half. Next, we lay out our experimental hypotheses, considering both game theoretic and behavioral predictions.

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<sup>7</sup> Kritikos and Bolle (1998) and Kritikos (2000) also discuss conditions under which agents expect to receive the second indenture from principal.

<sup>8</sup> For simplicity, variables such as investment, wage, effort or quality levels are not considered here. The service is an indivisible good, with a fixed quality known to both parties.

The Nash-equilibria are clearly identified by describing the strategies for both players. The principal can choose either to initiate a contract or not initiate it. If the principal initiates the contract, the agent then has the choice between providing and or refusing to provide the service. In the final stage, a principal who has initiated a contract has the choice between the following four strategies: (1) always transfer the second half regardless of the agent's choice; (2) never transfer the second half regardless of the agent's choice; (3) transfer the second half only if the agent had not provided the service, or; (4) transfer the second half only if the agent had provided the service.

There is no unique equilibrium in the IG. *Backward induction* identifies four subgame-perfect equilibria. If the principal chooses strategy (4) it is a mutual best reply for both to take cooperative actions throughout the game. If the principal chooses any of the other three strategies, the best reply of the agent is to defect, and the principal is better off not initiating the contract (i.e. to choose the outside option). Now, allow us to consider an equilibrium refinement.

Using *forward induction* as an equilibrium selection criterion (van Damme, 1989), the *unique stable equilibrium* of the game is one where both principal and agent cooperate. This follows because mutual cooperation leads to the only equilibrium in the IG that yields a strictly higher payoff to both players than the outside option.<sup>9</sup> Still, the outcome predicted by forward induction, notably, coincides with the outcome predicted by the interaction of reciprocal players – if and only if intrinsic incentives are not crowded out. Of course, we do not disregard the possibility that not only perfectly rational and selfish reasoning leads to full cooperation, if observed, but that it also can involve a mixture of motives driven by reciprocity, for example, in addition.

**HI:** By forward induction and/or reciprocity (without any crowding out effect), *all* principals and agents will cooperate, i.e. all transactions will be completed.

As spelt out above, the previous moves of players in stages prior to the final node can be interpreted differently, in terms of types and intentions. For example, a principal who sends a first indenture may later (in stage 3) send the second half if he is of the cooperative type, or withhold the second half if he is of the malicious type. Even though the game is one of complete information on payoffs, in terms of player types it is in the present experiment a game of incomplete information.

In this stride, let us alternatively consider the behavioral argument that a player can behave based on the prior that some but not all co-players will cooperate (for a similar approach in the centipede game, see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992). Consider the cost-benefit ratios for each player. A risk neutral principal makes no offer at the first stage, if he expects a contract to be insufficiently profitable, i.e. if the *perceived* probability of meeting a cooperative agent is  $< e/a$  (with  $a$  being the principal's valuation of the service), i.e., the probability of meeting an uncooperative agent is  $> e/a$ . Likewise, a risk neutral agent will not cooperate, if the perceived probability of the risk neutral agent in meeting a cooperative (non-malicious) principal (who transfers the second half after receiving the service) is  $< b/e$  (with  $b$  being the agent's valuation of

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<sup>9</sup> In games with incomplete information about the "type" of the other player, it is an equilibrium move to cooperate if the expected profit of the cooperative action is higher than the outside option (cf. Kritikos and Bolle, 1998).

the service) i.e., the probability of meeting an malicious principal is  $> b/e$ .<sup>10</sup> Such priors are supported by the existence of a population distribution with players who do not apply forward induction reasoning. For this we may, instead of H1, opt for a weaker hypothesis.

**H2:** The sufficiently high prior of a population distribution with uncooperative co-players result in defection (at stages 1 or 2). Cooperation increases with expected profits.

Since we are concerned with the efficacy of indenture as a candidate contract design, we should test the potential variance of its *efficiency* under different parameter values, in direct relations to its overall performance *given* a distribution of types. Considering the possibility that reciprocal types exist (as is shown in the literature, as cited above), one should consider the possibility of a crowding out of intrinsic incentives to voluntary cooperation. The method of indenture attempts to circumvent this by endogenizing intrinsic incentives in the game structure. Is it effective in this respect? If we should indeed find a dominant proportion of reciprocal players *with* crowded out incentives, we should observe the following. Like in H2, the crowding out of intrinsic incentives results in less than full cooperation. However, unlike H2, the relationship between expected profits from cooperation and the rate of cooperation should be negative (instead of positive). Whether indenture results in a positive or negative net effect depends on whether the effect of crowding out dominates. In this sense, we will observe what the dominant effect of indenture is for a given distribution of (selfish and reciprocal) types. This determines its efficacy and so its appropriateness under different conditions. Such understanding can be useful, for example, when the policymaker knows the distribution of player types.

Related to this, we might expect agents to refuse contracts simply on the basis that principals are getting more out of a completed contract. Envy, in connection to inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), predicts such a result. Our experiment attempts to disentangle such confounds, using an appropriate set of parameterizations, as elaborated below. Kritikos and Bolle (2001) investigate this issue of efficiency and equity concerns in greater detail.

We may formulate the following alternative hypothesis.

**H2':** The crowding out of intrinsically motivated reciprocal players due to extrinsic incentives results in defection (at stages 1 or 2). Cooperation decreases with expected profits if this effect dominates, i.e., if the proportion of “crowded out” reciprocal types is sufficiently large.

Next, we turn to consider the effect and performance of indenture over time. If one assumes that subjects do not play by the concept of forward induction, perhaps because of bounded rationality, such effects can disappear with time. By repeating a game (even with different co-players), one may learn the equilibrium play, as well as update their priors of the distribution of player types. Learning the equilibrium strategy leads to the eventual attainment of H1. Related to this is the concept of strategy adaptation based on previous experiences. The likelihood of playing a strategy is strengthened by past experiences where it paid off (Roth and Erev, 1995). Overall

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<sup>10</sup> The limit  $a/e$  holds for the case that the principal does not choose the so-called “perverse strategy”, i.e. that he offers the second indenture only if the agent does not transfer the service. To exclude such strategies seems to be plausible. Otherwise, the probability of meeting a “perverse” principal needs to be added to  $a/e$ . See Kritikos and Bolle (1998).



cooperation rates can increase (decrease) if players have past experiences of cooperative actions resulting in positive (negative) outcomes, i.e., when co-players cooperated (defected).

**H3:** Given time, cooperation increases (decreases) if past cooperative actions resulted in positive (negative) outcomes (or they learn to play the forward induction equilibrium).

As a working hypothesis, to test if indenture works well, we should ideally have support for

**H4:** The rate of completed contracts in the IG should be higher than the natural cooperation rate.

### 3. Experimental Procedure

The experimental game closely follows that described above. It is therefore a direct test of H1. In the experiment, the principals received specimen banknotes, and agents received vouchers indicating the value of their service. These were all placed, collected and redistributed (to the relevant subject) in envelopes, thus maintaining privacy and anonymity. We fixed  $e = 20$ ; each principal was provided with a “DM 20 banknote”. Principals and agents played IG’s varying in values for the service. The treatments differed according to the following parameters for  $IG(a,b)$ :  $IG(30,10)$ ,  $IG(25,5)$ ,  $IG(25,15)$ , and  $IG(40,15)$ . These variations allow us to test the behavioral considerations underlying H2 and H2’, and also the inequity aversion hypothesis, if behavior deviates from H1, i.e. full cooperation.

Parameters differed across sessions, and kept constant within sessions (between-subject design). Principals received no refunds for indentures made to agents refusing service: doing otherwise would likely result in a deluge of “risk-free” cooperative actions by principals. The game had complete information on payoffs. The same game was repeated seven times, with random and anonymous pair wise re-matching in each round.<sup>11</sup> The number of periods was announced at the beginning of each session. Subjects received feedback on the actions and outcomes relevant to their pair wise match. This procedure preserves independence across rounds and the one-shot nature of tasks. It allows us to test H3, without unnecessary confounds from reputation and supergame effects.

To test H4, we added a control treatment, CG, to benchmark the natural rate of cooperation. This game (Figure 1b) was parameterized so that the gains from cooperation, compared across the initial and terminal nodes, is similar to  $IG(30,10)$ . Here principals have no access to indenture. Instead, the principal can transfer a *prepayment* (of half the pecuniary value of total payment – not half the fiduciary document) to the agent when initializing the contract, and the second half upon delivery of the service. Once again, IG and CG are similar in that no party is forced to honor their dues (i.e., payment upon service, or service upon payment). In the CG, however, the unique equilibrium by backward induction is that the principal chooses not to initiate the contract right from stage 1 (Rosenthal, 1982). The predictions in both games differ: CG therefore serves as a useful control. First, it shows us whether there indeed exists heterogeneity of types (in particular, selfish and reciprocal types). Second, the only thing we vary, moving from CG to IG, is the access

<sup>11</sup> Even with 7 rounds we get very lucid results for behavior over time.

to indenture – this affects payoffs and in turn equilibrium predictions. Given equal values in the goods to be traded, what is the effect of indenture? Related to this, we can disentangle the non-monetary motives of cooperation (trust and reciprocity) in both IG and CG, from the monetary incentives unique to the IG. Payoffs differ in nodes other than the uncooperative strategy in the initial node and the cooperative strategy in the final node. Thus, its primary purpose is for benchmarking performance in terms of natural rate of completed contracts, and on a game-by-game level rather than stage-by-stage behavior. It also allows us to control for “goodwill” effects (a concept underlying relational contracts) from indenture in the IG, as also implemented by the prepayment in the CG.<sup>12</sup>

The experiment was conducted in the European University Viadrina, Germany. A total of 160 undergraduates participated, with 32 subjects in each of the five sessions. Subjects were recruited via verbal and written announcements. Upon arrival, the subjects were randomly assigned roles as principals or agents. Roles remained unchanged throughout the session. There were 16 principals and 16 agents in each session. Subjects were placed in two separate rooms, depending on role. Instructions were read aloud to inform subjects of the uniformity of tasks. They were also provided with these instructions on a printed sheet. The appendix contains, using the case of the IG(30,10) principal as, an example of the decision sheet. Neutral language was used to avoid framing effects. Before making decisions, subjects answered control questions in order to ensure understanding. The session started after all subjects had given correct answers. Two agents and two principals were randomly chosen to receive payments at the end of each period. The average payoff per subject was about 13 Euros; each session lasted 60-90 minutes.

#### 4. Results

**Primary results.** Table 1 provides an overview of the observed behavior. In stage 1, principals decided to offer contracts by sending the first half of the indenture to their potential trading partners in 94% of all cases. For stage 2, agents who were offered a contract accepted it, and delivered the service, in 88% of all cases. A high proportion of principals and agents mutually agree on a contract. In stage 3, principals who had received the service completed the contract by transferring the completing half in 97% of all cases. Completed transactions were observed in 79% of all the games played. H1 receives strong support both on the levels of individual stages and entire games. The behavior observed in stage 3 is in line with theories of other-regarding behavior. Perfectly selfish principals, at this stage, would be indifferent between transferring and withholding the completing half. Nevertheless, almost all principals transfer the completing half, suggesting that social preferences (e.g. reciprocity and efficiency concerns) can serve as good tiebreakers in such cases of indifference, if it was not already pre-meditated at the first stage. Most importantly, the observed behavior supports the forward induction solution, and efficacy of the IG.

*<Insert Table 1 about here.>*

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<sup>12</sup> This control is similar in nature to the games mentioned in note 5, but design of the experiments are different in terms of stages and payoffs and, thus, cannot serve the purpose of a comparable control treatment in this investigation.

We now analyze possible explanations for why full cooperation was not observed.

**Strategic concerns.** Table 2 compares the perceived probability threshold of meeting a non-cooperative co-player required for a cooperative action to be chosen, and the observed cooperation rates, in each role.

As to the agents, the number of contracts accepted by them decreased from 96% in IG(25,5), to 88% in IG(30,10), 85% in IG(40,15), and 81% in IG(25,15). Agents do not accept contracts simply based on the (possible) signal sent by the indenture. Our data also reveals that the profit margin (i.e., the revenue relative to the value of the service) reduces the agent's willingness to transfer the service, even though cooperation is a best-reply (see correlation presented below).

We test if inequity aversion is able to explain the differing behavior of the agents, or more specifically whether envy for the higher profit of the principal might have induced the agent to be less cooperative in some games than in others. We disentangle the effect of differing profit margins (mentioned above) from effects attributable to envy (if there is any) using the following comparisons. From the agent's point-of-view the principal earns more in the IG(40,15) than in the IG(25,15), while the agent's payoff is kept constant here. If agents should have made their decision also on the basis of envy, they should refuse more often in the former than the latter. We find no significant difference ( $z = -0.59$ , n.s., 2-tailed) between both conditions in terms of the rates of cooperation in stage 2 per subject (average across all rounds per subject as one independent observation). Along the same lines of argument, from the point-of-view that the agent earns more in the IG(25,5) than the IG(25,15), relative to the principal's payoff (kept constant here), an agent should be more envious and therefore refuse less often in the former than the latter. A Mann Whitney U test finds refusals more prevalent in the IG(25,5) than the IG(25,15) ( $z = -2.07$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ), being in counter-support for H2' (i.e. the opposite result to that predicted by envy). This observation implies that the expected profits story is more convincing in our context. The probability of an agent offering the service increases with the (expected) profit margin providing support for H2 with respect to agents.

*<Insert Table 2 about here>*

Similarly, we may expect that, in stage 1, the probability that principals initiate contracts increase with their own profit margin. The rate of contracts offered rose from 88% in IG(25,15), to 89% in IG(30,10), and 99% in IG(40,15). This relationship, however, does not hold for IG(25,5) where we observe 100% of principals offering contracts; it should in this case have a similar cooperation rate as IG(25,15) – but it does not.

A possible explanation is as follows. In the IG(25,5) the perceived probability threshold for agents to not cooperate is low. In turn, the probability of agents unwilling to cooperate is low. The Spearman correlation between  $b/e$  and the (average per subject) cooperation rate for agents across treatments is negative and significant ( $\rho = -0.27$ ,  $p < 0.05$ , 1-tailed). For a sufficiently high perceived probability of meeting a malicious principal, the expected profits from cooperation must also be sufficiently high to encourage cooperation by agents. Cooperation rates are negatively correlated with risks, and conversely speaking, positively correlated with potential profits.

Principals, anticipating this and being the first movers, had good reasons to always offer a contract.<sup>13</sup> The Spearman correlation between  $e/a$  and the (average per subject) cooperation rate for principals across treatments is insignificant ( $\rho = -0.08$ , n.s.). H2, with respect to principals, has to be considered together with their anticipation of how agents will respond to the indenture, given an agent's expectation of meeting a malicious principal and the potential profit from trade. The principal's strategic position allows for such anticipations to be used in the decision-making process. To test this extended hypothesis, we simply restrict the sample by considering all cases except IG(25,5). There is a positive and significant correlation between the  $e/a$  and average principal cooperation rates ( $\rho = -0.25$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ). We find support for this extended hypothesis. In turn, it provides support for anticipation and backward induction reasoning, beyond cases explainable by forward induction.

**Over time.** Adaptive individuals will continue using a strategy if this strategy yielded a positive outcome when used in the past. Strategies may be revised if negative outcomes result. For a principal who initiated a contract, the outcome is determined by whether the agent offered the service. For this, we use a binary logistic regression of the probability of offering a contract in a current round, on whether offering a contract in a previous round led to a service ( $LWork$ ), controlling for round ( $Round$ ). Table 3 shows that for principals,  $Round$  coefficients are insignificant for all treatments. Cooperation rates are stable over time. For principals in IG(30,10) and IG(25,15), there is a positive relationship between a "cooperative" experience (i.e., the contracts they initiated resulted in a service provided by the agent) in the previous round and a cooperative action in the current round. There is no such relationship for IG(40,15) and IG(25,5) since cooperation rates are close to full. Conversely, cooperation in a previous round resulting in a negative experience (the agent shirked) discourages a principal from cooperating in the current round. These results support H3.

*<Insert Table 3 about here.>*

An agent's outcome ( $LPaid$ ) is determined by whether the principal completed the payment, if a service was provided, or if the service was not provided. We use a binary logistic regression of the probability of offering the service in a current round, on whether offering a service or otherwise in a previous round led to full payment, controlling for round. Table 3 shows that for agents, cooperation rates are stable across time, and there is a no relationship between experiences in the previous round and behavior in the current round. The explanation for why our tests detected no experience-based behavior by agents is simple: those who worked almost always received the completing half (97%). In no cases did it pay to shirk after first-indentures had been received – completing halves were never transferred in such cases.<sup>14</sup> See also previous subsection "Strategic concerns": agents base behavior on the scenario at hand, i.e. parameters and principals signals/moves as and when inferable.

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<sup>13</sup> There were only four cases where agents did not cooperate. In their comments, principals criticized this behavior as incomprehensible and thus continued to offer contracts.

<sup>14</sup> Some agents commented that they wanted to test whether they would receive the second part of the indenture without offering the service since half the indenture was useless for the principal. However, all principals refrained from indulging such opportunistic agents. This underlines that the reciprocal/best-reply strategy is used in both ways.

**Performance.** Figure 2 shows that IG(30,10) performs about as well as the CG in the first round, but way better over time and in the final round in terms of completed contracts. The rate of completed contracts increases from 0.69 to 0.88 in IG(30,10) (mean 0.76), while it decreases from 0.63 to 0.06 (mean of 0.36) in the CG. Mann Whitney U tests find the difference in initial round completed contract rates insignificant ( $z = -0.37$ , n.s., 2-tailed), while the differences between conditions in terms of final round cooperation ( $z = -4.53$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ) and overall completed contract rates (where the average of completed contracts per principal is taken as one independent observation) is significant ( $z = -3.86$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). Binary logistic regressions capture the evolution of behavior over time for CG and IG(30,10).<sup>15</sup> Cooperation rates decay in the CG over time ( $-0.24$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) – in stark contrast to the stable rates in the IG over time (0.10, n.s.). We find strong evidence for H4, and further, significantly more stability of cooperation over time in the IG.

*<Insert Figure 2 about here.>*

## 5. Discussion and Conclusion

This paper shows that high cooperation rates can be achieved when a contract is designed as an IG, even in a one-shot environment where reputation does not count. Cooperation rates are significantly higher than natural cooperation rates overall and in the final round – its stability over time further makes it an attractive policy or contract tool. The transfer of an indentured banknote in return for an agent’s service is an incentive-compatible enforcement device. Agents realized that their mutual best reply in this game is to cooperate and thus offered the requested service, while principals anticipating this transferred the first half of the indenture.

The extent to which the IG is effective increases with the potential profits an agent can derive from cooperating. For principals, it is not as straightforward. Their strategic position allows them to play a dictatorial role, albeit “benevolent” as reflected in our data. Knowing that the agent can stand to gain more, principals were convinced that sending the first half is a safe move; their potential profits, although relatively low, will be gained with a high probability. This can be attributed to the high degree of strategic “complementarity”, which cuts both ways. An agent should cooperate as and when a principal offers a contract. Likewise, a principal who considers the agent’s high potential gains from cooperation can expect his offer to be accepted with a high probability. In the other cases, a principal’s readiness to cooperate was observed to increase with potential profit. Considering this point, one should be cautious when applying the IG to cases where the potential gain of an agent might be very low, relative to his cost, as refusals by agents to accept contracts might give rise to losses suffered by principals upon “let-down” (and in turn, efficiency losses result). Another method to circumvent this problem is by providing social history of previous interactions, such as a “track record”, to signal reputation.

“Learning” also played a role in the adaptation of strategies over time, in particular for principals. Cooperation rates for both principals and agents were stable over time. Principals continued cooperating when agents fulfilled their roles in providing the service. Principals became

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<sup>15</sup> We do not analyze stage-by-stage behavior, due to the difference in payoff relations, as explained in section 3.

cautious when agents shirked. Some agents shirked after receiving the first half, perhaps to test principals' unconditional altruism, but such strategies were not rewarded. After learning that there is no positive response to the opportunistic strategy, agents should revise their strategies to that of cooperation thereafter. This self-governing process thus circumvents much moral hazard due to the exploitation of other-regarding types in relational contracts. It performs far better in comparison with the natural rate observed in the control treatment.

On another note, a critic could argue that the observed cooperation is due not only to incentive compatibility, because the forward induction outcome coincides with behavior due to social preferences such as reciprocity.<sup>16</sup> We do not dispute this, and have tested the extent to which introducing extrinsic incentives to a population with reciprocal players might result in possible negative effects (via crowding out), which in turn diminishes the efficacy of indenture. In our case, the IG has proven to be an effective solution for both selfish and reciprocal players. Insofar as there exists reciprocally driven players, we have not observed strong evidence indicating any form of "crowding out" of intrinsic incentives. In contrast, cooperation increased with the amount of extrinsic incentives provided. The IG endogenizes intrinsic motivation in extrinsic incentives, by implementing commitment with the first half as trust, and payment with the completing half as reciprocity. To this effect, some principals and agents cooperate, in words of Frey (1997), "not just for the money". Further, it also works for the others who cooperate just for the money.

To conclude, this experiment provides strong evidence that individuals can be induced to cooperate when indenture can temporally delay incentives, *ex ante* serving as a commitment to follow through with payment-upon-delivery. This suggests further consideration for the potential of using the method of indenture to complement the design of contracts in future work.

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<sup>16</sup> Similar results are found even with no such "coincidence", e.g. Brandts and Holt (1992), as corroborated by applications of forward induction to the Battle of the Sexes (e.g. Cooper et al., 1993; Brandts and Holt, 1995). van Huyck et al. (1993) found similar support when the outside option was auctioned; the outcome of the outside option is thus endogenized. For a related discussion of Forward Induction in experimental games, see Ochs (1995).

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Figure 1a The Indenture Game




Figure 1b The Control Game




Figure 2 Evolution of CG and IG(30,10) Over Time




Table 1 Mean Cooperation Rates

| Treatment |      | Stage 1 | Stage 2 | Stage 3 | Completed |
|-----------|------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|
| IG(30,10) | Mean | 0.89    | 0.88    | 0.97    | 0.76      |
|           | N    | 112     | 100     | 88      | 112       |
|           | S.D. | 0.31    | 0.33    | 0.18    | 0.43      |
| IG(40/15) | Mean | 0.99    | 0.85    | 0.97    | 0.81      |
|           | N    | 112     | 111     | 94      | 112       |
|           | S.D. | 0.09    | 0.36    | 0.18    | 0.39      |
| IG(25,15) | Mean | 0.88    | 0.81    | 0.94    | 0.66      |
|           | N    | 112     | 98      | 79      | 112       |
|           | S.D. | 0.33    | 0.40    | 0.25    | 0.48      |
| IG(25,5)  | Mean | 0.99    | 0.96    | 1.00    | 0.95      |
|           | N    | 112     | 111     | 106     | 112       |
|           | S.D. | 0.09    | 0.21    | 0.00    | 0.23      |
| Total     | Mean | 0.94    | 0.87    | 0.97    | 0.79      |
|           | N    | 448     | 420     | 367     | 448       |
|           | S.D. | 0.24    | 0.33    | 0.17    | 0.40      |

Table 2 Perceived Probability Threshold and Mean Cooperation Rates

| Treatment | e/a  | Stage 1 | b/e  | Stage 2 |
|-----------|------|---------|------|---------|
| IG(25,15) | 0.80 | 0.88    | 0.75 | 0.81    |
| IG(40,15) | 0.50 | 0.99    | 0.75 | 0.85    |
| IG(30,10) | 0.67 | 0.89    | 0.50 | 0.88    |
| IG(25,5)  | 0.80 | 1.00    | 0.25 | 0.96    |

Table 3 Binary Logistic Regressions on the Probability of Cooperating\*

| Stage 1         | IG(30,10) | IG(40,15) | IG(25,15) | IG(25,5)   | Total  |     |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|--------|-----|
| Constant        | 1.42      | 25.32     | 0.75      | 128.54     | 1.93   | *   |
| Round           | 0.02      | -0.72     | 0.06      | -15.33     | -0.03  |     |
| LWork           | 1.34      | * -17.13  | 2.13      | *** -18.72 | 1.74   | *** |
| -2LogLikelihood | 41.55     | 9.77      | 42.12     | 7.05       | 116.38 |     |
| Stage 2         | IG(30,10) | IG(40,15) | IG(25,15) | IG(25,5)   | Total  |     |
| Constant        | 20.56     | 1.94      | 21.04     | 9.87       | 2.61   | *** |
| Round           | 0.22      | -0.21     | 0.04      | -1.19      | -0.09  | **  |
| LPaid           | -19.32    | 0.95      | -19.59    | -          | 0.03   |     |
| -2LogLikelihood | 38.43     | 63.03     | 48.63     | 25.71      | 189.15 |     |

\* Significance at the 0.1(0.05)[0.01] level (2-tailed for comparability) is denoted by \*(\*\*)[\*\*\*].

## Appendix

**Instructions for K**

Password:.....

Pseudonym:.....

You take part in an experiment between two parties, named V and K. A person V has a stamp to which he assigns a value of DM 10. A person K assigns a value of DM 30 to the same stamp. Both agree that V will sell the stamp to K at a price of DM 20.

You are **K**!

Your number is .....

## Step 1

You may (but you do not have to) tear the banknote in two parts and transfer half of it to V. If you keep your banknote, the exchange is over. If you tear the banknote and transfer one part of it to V, the exchange goes on:

## Step 2

V may (but does not have to) send you his/her stamp.

## Step 3

You may (but you do not have to) send the second part of the banknote to V.

If you have a complete banknote of DM 20, you are entitled to DM 20. If you have the stamp you are entitled to DM 30. If V has the stamp, he/she is entitled to DM 10.

In each group 2 participants will be randomly chosen to receive the appropriate payment.