

Ductor, Lorenzo; Visser, Bauke

Working Paper

Concentration of power at the editorial boards of economics journals

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, No. TI 2021-044/VII

Provided in Cooperation with:

Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam

Suggested Citation: Ductor, Lorenzo; Visser, Bauke (2021) : Concentration of power at the editorial boards of economics journals, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, No. TI 2021-044/VII, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237777>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

TI 2021-044/VII
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper

Concentration of power at the editorial boards of economics journals

Lorenzo Ductor¹
Bauke Visser²

¹ University of Granada

² Erasmus University Rotterdam

Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

Contact: discussionpapers@tinbergen.nl

More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at <https://www.tinbergen.nl>

Tinbergen Institute has two locations:

Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam
Gustav Mahlerplein 117
1082 MS Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31(0)20 598 4580

Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam
Burg. Oudlaan 50
3062 PA Rotterdam
The Netherlands
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900

CONCENTRATION OF POWER AT THE EDITORIAL BOARDS OF ECONOMICS JOURNALS

LORENZO DUCTOR AND BAUKE VISSER

ABSTRACT. Evolutionary arguments and incentive theory point to the importance of variety and rotation of editorial board members to stimulate innovative research. Using a unique dataset covering more than 100 economics journals over the period 1990-2011, we document trends in the incidence of multiple positions, editorial duration and institutional background for more than 6,100 board members. We put these figures into perspective using the literature on boards of directors and measures of market concentration. The picture that emerges is of a discipline with a high concentration of institutional and individual power, especially at the more prestigious journals. Evidence suggests this indeed matters: there is a strong negative association between editorial duration and journal impact.

JEL codes: A11, A14, O31

Key words: editorial boards, journals, concentration, power, busyness, impact

1. INTRODUCTION

Some twenty years ago, [Hodgson and Rothman \(1999\)](#) asked a fundamental question about the organization of the economics discipline: are the editorial boards of economics journals dominated by scholars from a small set of departments? They argued that their question was particularly pressing as the explosion of journals had led to an increase in the relative prestige of publishing in the core. Their data, based on 30 core journals in 1995, showed that editorial board members overwhelmingly came from US-based universities: nine of these institutions accounted for almost 60% of all board members' PhDs worldwide, while 12 such institutions together employed nearly 40% of all board members. Their main concern with such a high concentration of institutional power is the threat it poses to "the potential for innovation and change" (p. F166). It is formulated in evolutionary terms: with a small set of institutions dominating the profession, variety of ideas and approaches—needed for innovation and change—would be at risk.

Over time, the issue of dominance that they raised has only gained in relevance. The growth in the number of journals has continued unabatedly. At the same time, the emphasis put on publishing in the core—or especially in an inner-core known as the Top 5¹—for tenure, promotion and salary

Ductor: University of Granada, lductor@ugr.es. Visser: Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute, bvisser@ese.eur.nl. We would like to thank the many editors, co-editors and editorial assistants who provided us with information on the operation of the editorial board of their journals. We also thank the many research assistants who over the past years helped us in the construction of the database. We are also grateful to Sacha Kapoor and participants of the Spanish Economic Association Meeting 2016 and at an EIPE seminar. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support of the Erasmus School of Economics, Massey University and the State Research Agency (Spain): PID2019-111708GA-I00/SRA (State Research Agency /10.13039/501100011033. We have no conflicts of interests to declare.

¹The Top 5 consists of the *American Economic Review*, *Econometrica*, the *Journal of Political Economy*, the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* and the *Review of Economic Studies*.

decisions has further increased (Heckman and Moktan, 2020). The issue has also gained in prominence, to the extent that ‘The Curse of the Top Five’ was the topic of a round table at the meetings of the American Economic Association (AEA) in January 2017.² Angus Deaton, who participated in the round table, argues that journals should have term limits to withstand the temptation to keep a good editor and to avoid that “one particular point of view dominates and has a huge impact on the profession.” Heckman and Moktan (2020, p. 48), who also contributed to the round table, mince no words: concentration of power lead to “clientele effects,” “incest” and “inbreeding.”³ As Hodgson and Rothman (1999), they see concentration as a threat to innovative research and the production and dissemination of new ideas. Instead of invoking evolutionary arguments, they stress individual researchers’ privately rational incentives to “cultivate (...) editors and cater to their whims.” As a result, they do follow-up research rather than innovative research as the former “is easy to judge, is more likely to result in clean publishable results, and hence is more likely to be published” (p. 53).⁴ Another difference with Hodgson and Rothman (1999) is that Heckman and Moktan (2020) focus on power and dominance at the individual rather than the institutional level.⁵

The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a systematic account of various dimensions of concentration of editorial power and dominance in economics in sections 3-5. It is based on a dataset that we compiled, with information on the editorial board members of more than 100 economics journals over the period 1990-2011. Over this period, more than 6,100 unique persons served on the editorial boards of these journals. Thanks to the information we obtained from editorial reports and many editors, coeditors and editorial assistants, we can map the editorial title as stated on the journal’s front matter in a given year to one of four standardized titles that capture the role and power that somebody with that title when evaluating a submission. We also categorize journals in terms of their impact and readership (general interest, field) and distinguish journals that belong to associations or societies from those that are published by a department (with “publisher’s journals” our name for journals that belong neither to an association nor to a department). As part of this account, we discuss the incidence of scholars who hold multiple editorial positions at the same time and use networks to show which roles are typically combined. Thanks to the length of the sample period we can give a detailed account of the number of years that scholars hold an editorial position at a journal, or successive positions at the same journal or at different ones. We also study the evolution of institutional concentration over time, considering both the universities where editorial board

²Serrano (2018) also criticizes this emphasis on the Top 5.

³As a possible example of clientele effects, Laband and Piette (1994), Brogaard, Engelberg and Parsons (2014), Colussi (2018) and Ductor and Visser (2020) find that network effects are strong. Authors publish many more papers in a journal in years in which they know some of its editors, as past co-author or colleague, than in years without such contacts on the editorial board.

⁴Kim and Koh (2014) find that editors receive many citations from articles published in their journals.

⁵The concerns of Hodgson and Rothman (1999) and Heckman and Moktan (2020) echo similar concerns of others with other forms of research evaluation, see Lee, Pham and Gu (2013) on the British Research Assessment Exercise and Corsi, D’Ippoliti and Zaccchia (2019) on public competitions for academic positions in economics in Italy.

members obtained their highest degree and where they currently work. As the composition of an editorial board changes in a staggered way, one needs a good sample length to be able to discern any changes.

The second purpose of the paper is to put these figures into perspective. One perspective comes from the literature on the relationship between corporate boards of directors and firm performance. We argue in section 6 that the worlds of journal editing and corporate stewardship share at least two concerns, the risk of a particular point of view becoming dominant and board members being too busy to perform their tasks well, and a number of other characteristics that make taking such a perspective informative. We discuss data, empirical analysis and theoretical arguments about the relationship between, on the one hand, multiple positions, busy directors and term limits and, on the other, measures of organizational performance from that literature. Another perspective is offered by the application of a common measure of concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, and an accepted threshold value to distinguish high concentration levels from the not so high. The picture that emerges is one of a discipline with a high degree of concentration, busyness and dominance.

Is the observed degree of concentration and dominance consequential? The last purpose is to begin to answer this question. We analyse the consequences for two citation-based measures of journal impact. A journal's impact attracts considerable attention in the academic world. It is important for researchers, since they are often recruited, promoted, tenured and recognized according to the quality of the journals they have been published in (Laband, 2013). A journal's owner and editor feel pressure to raise the impact of a journal. Some ways are considered acceptable, others not (Martin, 2016; Wilhite, Fong and Wilhite, 2019). If certain board characteristics are correlated with a journal's impact, one may begin to consider to influence those characteristics. Citation-based impact measures are also of interest because citation count and novelty are correlated (Bramoullé and Ductor, 2018). Articles that are considered seminal and innovative, like Akerlof's "The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism" and Tversky and Kahnemann's "Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference-dependent model" have high citation scores; the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (QJE), the journal that published these articles, is a journal with a high impact factor.

We investigate the relationship between journal impact and individual and institutional concentration of power in the short and long-run in section 6.3. We find that, in the long run, average duration is negatively associated with the time-invariant impact factor of the journal developed by Kodrzycki and Yu (2006). Journals that have an average duration of one more year have an impact factor that is 17.3% lower. Moreover, the more concentrated the editorial board is in terms of its members' departmental affiliation, the smaller is the journal's impact factor. In the short-run, average duration and journal impact, as measured by a time-varying Article Influence Score, are negatively associated; an extra year of duration is associated with a decline of 1.4% of this Score. Concentration indices are not significantly related to this Score.

2. DATA

Editorial board members For 106 economics and finance journals and for each year in the period 1990–2011, we collected the names of the editorial board members and their roles (editor, associate editor, etc.) as stated on the masthead of the first issue of the journal published in that year. These journals, listed in Appendix A, are the economics and finance journals that the Dutch Tinbergen Institute (TI) used to evaluate research output by its fellows at three universities, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam until mid 2007.⁶ Goyal, Van Der Leij and Moraga-González (2006) and Fafchamps, Van der Leij and Goyal (2010) also use this list to measure research output. When unable to find a journal’s front matter of a specific year either online or in print in one of the libraries that we consulted, we contacted past (co-)editors and editorial assistants. Alternatively, we compared the journal’s front matter for the years immediately before and after the missing year. Those persons that appeared in the same role in both years were assumed to be in that role in the missing year; for the remaining persons, we consulted their CVs for information on the start or end date of their role in the journal’s editorial board. We distinguish different persons by their first and last name and the initials of any middle name.⁷ After cleaning the names using information from CVs, we obtained 6,192 unique board members.

Journals The 106 journals in our sample can be classified in various ways. We tabulate all information in Appendix A. We follow TI, Goyal et al. (2006) and Fafchamps et al. (2010) and distinguish three impact-based categories, $c \in C = \{\text{Top 5, A-ranked, B-ranked}\}$: the Top 5, consisting of the *American Economic Review*, *Econometrica*, the *Journal of Political Economy*, the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* and the *Review of Economic Studies*; 23 A-ranked journals, consisting of second tier generalist journals like the *Economic Journal* and top field journals like the *Journal of Labor Economics*; and 78 B-ranked journals, like *Theory and Decision* and the *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*.

We distinguish society journals, house journals and publisher’s journals. There are 35 society journals in our sample, *i.e.*, journals of societies and associations, like the *Economic History Review*, the *Journal of Economic Issues*, the *American Economic Review* (AER) and the *Canadian Journal of Economics*. House journals are associated with a university or an organization. Typically, the journal has been founded at that university, its editorial office is located there and key editorial board members are faculty at that university. The *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, the *International Economic Review* and the *QJE* are examples of house journals. There are 24 house journals in the sample. We call a journal that belongs neither to a society nor to a university a publisher’s journal. Examples include the *Journal of Economic Theory*, the *Journal of Financial Economics* and the *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*. There are 47 publisher journals in our sample.

⁶The TI list also included marketing, accounting and operations research journals. We excluded them for this study.

⁷In the relatively infrequent case where first names are unavailable, we apply the name disambiguation algorithm designed by Van der Leij (2006).

We distinguish general interest and field journals using the *JEL* codes that are part of the bibliographic record of an article in *EconLit*. Of an article's *JEL* codes, we keep the field letters. Next, for each journal, we determine the share of articles in each field using all articles published in the journal over the period 1970-2011. Articles with more than one distinct field letter count towards the corresponding fields proportionally. If the share of each field is less than 0.25, we classify the journal as a general interest journal. If instead a share is larger than 0.25, the journal is classified as belonging to that field.

Editorial roles For each journal-year pair, we map each stated editorial role to a standardized role. To do so, we established the way a paper submitted for publication in a journal was handled and the involvement in the reviewing process of editorial board members of the various stated roles. Information about this process was sometimes found in annual reports of the editor, but was mostly obtained by contacting past (co-)editors or editorial assistants. In this paper, we distinguish four standardized roles, $r \in R = \{\textit{editor}, \textit{co-editor}, \textit{associate editor}, \textit{advisory editor}\}$. Throughout the paper, we use the roles in italics to refer to our *standardized* roles; roles in normal font refer to the roles as they appear on a journal's front matter. An *editor* is anyone who has final decision rights on submissions. *Editors* receive decision proposals or recommendations from *co-editors* or *associate editors*, choose referees or forward papers to others who then choose referees. The editor and co-editors of *Econometrica* throughout the sample period fit this definition. A *co-editor* is anyone whose role is to choose referees and to prepare decisions for an editor. During our sample period, both a co-editor at the *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* and an associate editor at the *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* had this role. An *associate editor* is anyone who appears on a journal's front matter and whose role is to referee papers. The stated role is often associate editor, e.g. at the *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, or, as in the case of the *AER*, member of the editorial board. Finally, an *advisory editor* is anyone whose main role is to provide advice on policy matters, rather than to review or decide on manuscripts, like the advisory editors of *Social Choice and Welfare* in the period 1997-2011. We include honorary editors in this category. As we collected this information for every journal-year pair, we can account for terminology that varies over time for a given journal and for the possibility that the same stated role refers to different standardized roles, both across journals and within the same journal across different years.⁸

Table 1 shows the percentage share distribution of pairs of journal category and editorial role. Within a column, the first three percentages reflect the hierarchical and pyramidal nature of an editorial board; across the columns, the differences in percentages reflect the differences in journal subsample sizes. In what follows we ignore the role of *advisory editor* at the *Review of Economic Studies* in the Top 5 because of its small size.

⁸We assume that differences in the involvement in the reviewing process between persons with the same stated role in the same journal-year pair are absent.

TABLE 1. Editorial positions: distribution over journal category and editorial role

	Top 5	A-ranked	B-ranked
<i>Editor</i>	0.63%	2.83%	7.82%
<i>Coeditor</i>	-	7.18%	13.14%
<i>Associate editor</i>	4.12%	10.80%	40.48%
<i>Advisory editor</i>	0.03%	2.65%	10.32%

Note: Distribution of editorial positions across the three journal categories and four editorial roles.

Clearly, the ‘real’ authority that a role confers over a submission may differ from its ‘formal’ authority, for example because an *editor* lacks the specialized knowledge or the time to evaluate all submissions. As a result, a *coeditor*’s reading of referee reports often becomes the *editor*’s decision on the submission and most *associate editors*’ recommendations weigh heavily in an *editor*’s decision.⁹ Not all journals have board members of all four standardized types. In fact, many journals only have one or more *editors* and a group of *associate editors*.

Bibliographic information We obtain bibliographic information from two sources. From *EconLit*, we obtain, for all articles published in the period 1970–2011 in any of the 1,619 journals covered in the database, the authors and their affiliations, the journal in which the article is published, the year of publication and *JEL* codes.¹⁰ From the *Web of Science*, we obtain yearly citation data for all articles published in our sample of journals over the period 1990–2011.

Affiliation and PhD school An important feature that we study in this paper is the geographical concentration of editorial board members. We study both their affiliations at the time they are a board member and the institution where they obtained their highest degrees, typically a PhD. For the editorial board members we collect their affiliations and PhD schools from their CVs. We collected the CVs of 4,727 editorial board members (76%). The affiliation of the editorial board members with missing CV or missing affiliation in a given year were inferred from their publications. If the affiliation is missing for an editorial board member in any given year, we compare the affiliation on the last publication by that editorial board member before that year and the first after that year. If the reported affiliations are the same, this affiliation is imputed to the editorial board member for the years in between. As researchers report affiliations in many different ways, we manually disambiguated all the affiliations where any editor had been working from 1990 to 2011. This proved especially important for affiliations in non-English speaking countries. It resulted in 395 unique institutions.

To put some of what follows into perspective, Table 2 reports, at five-year intervals, the number of editorial positions at the 106 journals, the average number of articles published in a journal in our sample, the number of unique authors who have published in our sample of journals and the number of unique authors who have published in the larger sample of journals in *EconLit*.

⁹See Aghion and Tirole (1997) for a theory of formal and real authority.

¹⁰Affiliations are only available from 1990 onward. The reader is referred to the [EconLit website](#) for further information on this database.

TABLE 2. Trends in the number of editorial positions, articles and authors

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	Increase over 1990
Editorial positions	2,449	2,949	3,184	3,494	3,810	+56%
Articles	48.8	48.7	50.2	56.9	71.2	+46%
Authors	4,919	6,006	6,950	8,712	11,864	+141%
Authors <i>EconLit</i>	11,611	17,165	24,692	34,182	50,434	+334%

Note: Editorial positions is the number of editorial positions at the 106 journals in the sample. Articles is the average number of articles published in a journal in our sample. Authors is the number of unique authors publishing in the sample of journals. Authors *EconLit* is the number of unique authors publishing in any journal in *EconLit*.

From 1990 to 2010, the number of editorial positions went up from 2,449 to 3,810, an increase of 56%. Part of the increase over the first five years stems from the inclusion of a few journals that appeared for the first time during that period.¹¹ The number of articles that journals published per year remained quite flat in the first half of the sample period and increased rapidly over the next ten years. The number of unique authors publishing in any of the journals in our sample increased by 141%. Some of this increase reflects the growth in co-authored papers (Ductor, 2015). The number of unique authors publishing in a journal in *EconLit* has grown much faster. Economics as a discipline has grown rapidly, with many more researchers seeking to publish their papers. For example, submissions to the Top 5 nearly doubled in number over the sample period, see Card and DellaVigna (2013). Few journals have a policy of publishing the number of submissions or acceptance rates, but we did find some additional information scattered in editorial reports confirming a clear upward trend.¹²

3. INDIVIDUAL INFLUENCE AND POWER: MULTIPLE POSITIONS

In this section and the next, we focus on the individual editorial board member. As a first approximation, the influence individual editorial board members have is likely to increase in the number of positions they hold at the same time. Clearly, board members in different roles exert influence in different ways over a submission; but all board members appear on the journal's website and front matter, signalling to scholars what research is appreciated and may get published. With that in mind, we start our analysis with a simple, unqualified count.

Table 3 presents two distributions of the number of editorial positions held simultaneously. The first column, labeled Full sample, is based on a count of the number of positions held by the editorial board members of all journals in the sample. The second column, labeled Top 5, is based on a count of the number of positions held by the editorial board members of the Top 5 journals. In either case, we only count the positions they hold at journals in our sample.¹³

¹¹We indicate in Table A.2 in Appendix A which journals published their first volumes after 1990.

¹²The number of submissions to the *Journal of Population Economics* went up from 286 in 2007 to 407 in 2011 (Zimmermann, 2014) and to the *Journal of Economic History* from 120 in 1990 to 153 in 2011 (Journal of Economic History, 1991, 2015). Salles (2014) reports a five-fold increase in submissions to *Social Choice and Welfare* from 1984 to 2014.

¹³These percentages are based on all editorial board member-year combinations. We pool the annual data as there is little variation in these figures from year to year.

TABLE 3. Multiple positions

Positions	Full sample	Top 5
1	77.4	37.2
2	16.3	33.7
3	4.7	19.1
4	1.2	7.0
5	0.3	2.4
6	0.1	0.5
7	0.0	0.1
8+	0.0	0

Note: Percentage distribution of the number of editorial positions held in the same year, by editorial board members of journals in the full sample and by those in the Top 5 subsample. We count editorial positions held at journals in full sample.

For the full sample, one person, one position is the norm. A large majority, 77%, holds a single position at a given point in time. Slightly more than 6% hold at least three positions.¹⁴ The average number of positions is 1.3. The picture is quite different when one turns to editorial board members of Top 5 journals. Some 62% of them hold multiple positions, with 30% holding at least 3 positions. The average number of positions for this restricted set of persons is 2.1. Multiple positions are concentrated at the Top 5.¹⁵

To better understand this unequal concentration, we determine for each pair of journal category c and editorial role r a concentration score, a ratio of two shares. The numerator equals the share of positions in cr that are held by persons with multiple positions; the denominator equals the sample-wide share of such positions. Thus, a concentration score higher than one indicates that the category-role pair has a disproportionately large number of positions filled by scholars with multiple positions, while the opposite holds for pairs with a score lower than one. Table 4 tabulates the scores for each position. Multiple positions tend to be concentrated among *associate editors* of the Top 5 and among *coeditors* and *advisory editors* of A-ranked journals. There are relatively few of them among the large group of *associate editors* of B-ranked journals.

TABLE 4. Multiple positions: concentration scores

	Top 5	A-ranked	B-ranked
<i>Editor</i>	1.16	1.22	0.75
<i>Coeditor</i>	-	1.39	1
<i>Associate editor</i>	1.72	1.22	0.81
<i>Advisory editor</i>	-	1.41	0.95


Note: Concentration scores for each pair of journal category and editorial role. The concentration score is a ratio of two shares. The numerator equals the share of positions in a given category-role pair that is held by persons with multiple positions; the denominator equals the sample-wide share of such positions.

¹⁴The only person to hold 8 positions in the same year is Amartya Sen. He does so for 5 years.

¹⁵Table B.1 in appendix B reports the number of multiple positions held by editorial board members of general interest and field journals.

22.6% of editorial board members in the full sample hold multiple positions in the same year. Figure 1 represents a network of their positions. In this network, a node represents a journal category-editorial role pair cr . Two nodes are connected by an edge if at least one person holds the corresponding positions in the same year. Loops in the network indicate editorial board members who hold the same editorial role at different journals that belong to the same journal category. The size of a node cr is proportional to the share of the cr positions in the total number of positions held simultaneously. The weight of the edge connecting positions cr and $c'r'$ is proportional to the share that this pair of positions is held simultaneously in the overall number of simultaneously held pairs of positions. Positions at Top 5 journals are in yellow, at A-ranked journals in red, and at B-ranked journals in grey.

FIGURE 1. Multiple positions: the network



Note: Network of simultaneously held editorial positions. Nodes represent journal category-editorial role pairs. Node size is proportional to the share of the corresponding positions in the total number of positions held simultaneously. The weight of an edge connecting two nodes is proportional to the share that the two corresponding positions are held simultaneously in the overall number of simultaneously held positions. Loops indicate editorial board members who hold the same editorial role at different journals that belong to the same journal category. Positions at Top 5 journals are in yellow, at A-ranked journals in red, and at B-ranked journals in grey. Network obtained considering all simultaneous positions from 1990 to 2011.

In absolute terms, the position most commonly held by board members with multiple positions is an *associate editorship* at a B-ranked journal. A common combination is with another *associate editorship* at another B-ranked journal, at an A-ranked journal or with a *coeditorship* at another B-ranked journal. Those *associate editors* of Top 5 journals that have more than one position often have one as a *coeditor* or *associate editor* of an A-ranked journal, or as an *associate editor* of a B-ranked journal. Some hold two *associate editorships* in the Top 5. It is rare for a person to be the *editor* of more than one journal

at the same time. This should not be too surprising, given the amount of work that typically comes with such a role. Throughout the entire sample period only one person combined his role as an *editor* of a Top 5 journal with the same role at another journal.¹⁶ 10 persons combined an *editorship* at an A-ranked journal with the same role at another journal in the same category, while 24 persons did so with the same role at a B-ranked journal.

The edge weight is a useful device to show the frequency with which scholars hold two positions in the same year. But it does not take into account how common a position is. As a result, it cannot show how inclined scholars are to combine two or more positions relative to their abundance or scarcity. Consider *associate editors* at a Top 5 journal. The weights of the edges connecting that position with the positions of *A-coeditor*, *A-associate editor* and *B-associate editor* are roughly equal. That means that *conditional* on drawing an *associate editor* of a Top 5 journal who has multiple positions, the scholar would be about equally likely to also hold one of these three positions. In fact, these probabilities are 20.1%, 17.7% and 20.1%, respectively.

However, the difference in node sizes of *A-coeditor*, *A-associate editor* and *B-associate editor* in the network shows that among all positions held simultaneously in the sample as a whole, *B-associate editor* is by far the more frequent one, 33% versus 10% for *A-coeditor* and 13.2% for *A-associate editor*. Thus, compared to the relative abundance of *B-associate editorships*, an *associate editor* of a Top 5 is relatively unlikely to hold such a position, and relatively likely to hold an *A-coeditor* position.

By limiting attention to journals in our sample, we underestimate the true influence their editorial board members have through their editorial activity. To get a sense of this underestimation we draw three random samples of 30 editorial board members of the Top 5 journals, one for each of the years 1990, 2000 and 2010, and collect all their editorial positions as reported in their CVs. Table B.2 in the appendix shows that the percentage of positions in journals outside our sample is 9%, 27% and 30% in 1990, 2000 and 2010, respectively. This suggests that at least in the second half of our sample period, we considerably underestimate the total number of editorial positions that editorial board members hold simultaneously, and thus the influence that they have. Many of the journals outside our sample are founded after 1995, like the *Journal of Economic Growth*, *Experimental Economics* and *Theoretical Economics*.

Overall, the results presented in this section show a relatively high concentration of power among the editorial board members of the Top 5, who, apart from their position on these journals, also tend to hold positions of considerable influence at A-ranked journals.

4. INDIVIDUAL INFLUENCE AND POWER: DURATION AND TURNOVER

As a first approximation, the influence individual editorial board members have is likely to increase in the number of years they hold an editorial position. We start by examining how long

¹⁶Andrew Postlewaite was the editor of *Econometrica* and *International Economic Review* in 1998 and 1999.

editorial board members stay in the same editorial role at the same journal. Next, we analyze where they move once they leave the editorial role. Finally, we examine how long persons have an editorial role in general.

4.1. How long does an editorial board member stay in the same role at the same journal? Table 5 presents a number of statistics on board member duration, defined as the number of years that a person remains in the same editorial role at the same journal. It does so for all journals pooled and for various subsamples of journals and editorial roles.

TABLE 5. Duration in a given journal-role combination: summary statistics


	mean	std.	mode	25th pct.	median	75th pct.
All journals	6.26	5.16	3	3	4	8
<i>Journal type:</i>						
Society journal	5.36	4.41	3	3	4	7
House journal	7.23	5.59	3	3	5	10
Publisher's journal	6.79	5.53	2	3	5	9
<i>Journal category:</i>						
Top 5	4.51	3.04	3	3	4	6
A	5.16	4.05	3	3	4	6
B	6.89	5.61	3	3	5	9
<i>Top 5 in detail:</i>						
American Economic Review	3.83	1.80	3	3	4	5
Econometrica	5.15	3.70	3	3	4	6
Journal of Political Economy	4.8	3.15	2	2	4	6
Quarterly Journal of Economics	6.47	4.64	2;5	3	5	9
Review of Economic Studies	4	2.30	4	2	4	6
<i>General interest or field:</i>						
General interest	5.43	4.31	3	3	4	7
C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods	6.62	5.32	3	3	5	9
D: Microeconomics	6.76	5.49	4	3	5	9
E: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics	7.97	5.71	3	3	6	12
G: Financial Economics	6.51	4.77	3	3	5	9
J: Labor and Demographic Economics	6.14	5.22	1	2	4	8
<i>A-ranked general interest journals:</i>						
Economic Journal	4.20	2.73	4	3	4	4
European Economic Review	4.85	2.57	3	3	5	7
International Economic Review	4.57	3.24	4	2	4	6
Review of Economics and Statistics	5.72	3.30	3	3	5	9
<i>Editorial role:</i>						
Editor	5.42	4.64	4	2	4	6
Co-editor	6.46	4.90	3	3	5	9
Associate editor	6.10	5.10	3	3	4	8

Note: Duration statistics for editorial board members in a given journal-editorial role for 1990-2011, for full journal sample and various subsamples. For type, category, and field of a journal, please refer to Appendix A.

The top line of Table 5 shows that, across all journals, the average duration is 6.26 years. More than 25% stay for at least 8 years in the same role. Figure 2 presents a density plot and the percentages of board members' duration for the full sample. It shows that, although the most common duration

is fairly short, 3 years, it is also quite infrequent, about 17%. We also note that 14% of the board members active in 1990, i.e., 270 persons, stay in the same role at the same journal throughout the entire sample period. This explains the peak at 22 years.

FIGURE 2. Duration in a given journal-role combination




Note: Percentage distribution and kernel density plot of number of years served by editorial board members in a given journal-role combination in full sample.

The second part of the table distinguishes society, house and publisher's journals.¹⁷ The data show that society journals have substantially smaller mean duration than the two other types of journals, especially house journals. The difference between the mean duration of society journals and house journals is almost two full years (statistically significant at the 1% level). At society journals, 25% of editorial board members remain in the same role on the journal's editorial board for at least 7 years. At publisher's journals this percentage remains in the same role for 9 years, while for house journals this percentage continues for 10 years. Although 2-3 years is the modal duration across journal types, the percentage of board members who actually leave their position after that period of time is low, in particular at house and publisher journals. At a society journal the percentage equals 23%; at both house and publisher's journals it equals 12%. The left panel in Figure 3 provides density plots for the three types of journals for all editorial roles combined. The right panel distinguishes editorial roles for house and society journals. It shows that for at these journals *coeditors* and *associate editors* tend to remain in their roles for more years than their *editors*. Some journals use term limits, possibly with renewal, for some or all editorial roles. This results in duration statistics with a comparatively low modal number of years and high densities around that year.

The next part of Table 5 groups journals by rank category. The mean duration is lowest for the Top 5, followed by A-ranked journals and next B-ranked journals. The difference in mean duration

¹⁷See section 2 for definitions and Appendix A for the type of each journal.

FIGURE 3. Duration in a given journal-role combination: journal type




Note: Kernel densities of editorial duration in a given journal-role combination for the three journal types. Left panel pools all editorial roles in a journal type; right panel distinguishes various editorial roles.

between the Top 5 and B-ranked journals is more than two years (statistically significant at the 1% level). The density plot in the left panel of Figure 4 shows that the large majority of those who stay in the same editorial role on the same editorial board for the full sample period is to be found at B-ranked journals.

When we look at the Top 5 in detail, the *QJE* stands out because of its high mean duration and large percentage of board members that stay on for more than 9 years. The other house journal, the *JPE*, has a substantially higher turnover. The right panel in Figure 4 gives a density plot for these journals.¹⁸

FIGURE 4. Duration in a given journal-role combination: journal category and Top 5 in detail




Note: Kernel densities of editorial duration in a given journal-role combination for the three journal categories in the left panel and for each of the Top 5 journals in the right panel.

¹⁸Notice that in the period under study, the *JPE* reported only editors on its frontmatter.

The fifth part of Table 5 considers editorial duration for general interest and field journals.¹⁹ General interest journals have a lower mean duration than field journals. Duration differs markedly across various fields. The difference between especially Labor and Demographic Economics and Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics stand out, the first as a field in which 25% of the editorial board members left their roles within the first two years, the second because after 12 years 25% continue in the same role at the same journal. The left panel in Figure 5 shows the densities of the general interests journals; the right panel shows the densities for selected fields and for the general interest sample of journals.²⁰

FIGURE 5. Duration in a given journal-role combination: general interest and field journals



Note: Kernel densities of editorial duration in a given journal-role combination for A-ranked general interest journals in the left panel and for journals in selected fields in the right panel. EJ stands for *Economic Journal*, Restat for *Review of Economics and Statistics*, EER for *European Economic Review* and IER for *International Economic Review*. Fields are identified by their JEL codes, see Appendix A.

Among the A-ranked general interest journals, the *Economic Journal* stands out because within 4 years, 75% of its board members have left their role. The *Review of Economics and Statistics* has a considerably higher mean duration and a fat tail of board members.

Finally, the bottom part of the table shows how in the sample as a whole the duration of editorial board members depends on the role that they play. *Editors* tend to stay in their role for 5.4 years on average, less than *associate editors* and especially *coeditors*. Of the latter, 25% stay on for more than 9 years.

4.2. How long does an editorial board member stay at the same journal? 32% of the editorial board members in our sample have one role at one journal for a number of years during the 22-year time window that we study. In this section and the next two, we focus on the other 68% who, after their first roles, continue in another role at the same journal or at a different journal. We begin by looking at moves at the same journal.

¹⁹See section 2 for definitions. Appendix A indicates for each journal whether it is a general interest or field journal, and, in case it is a field journal, to which field or fields it belongs.

²⁰Figure B.1 in appendix B shows the density plot for other fields: industrial organization, agricultural economics, international economics and urban economics.

Table 6 shows that including other roles at the same journal leaves the most common duration at a journal unaffected and increases by 50% the median duration from 4 to 6 years.²¹ The tail becomes fatter, with 25% of a journal's board members staying at least 10 years at the same journal, up from at least 8 years.

These statistics reflect the hierarchical nature of an editorial board. For the majority of journals, by far the largest group of board members consists of *associate editors*. As there are few positions in other roles, only few can continue in another role at the same journal. As a result, the inclusion of other roles hardly changes the modal duration, the mean duration can increase to some extent, while the right tail can become considerably fatter.

TABLE 6. Duration at a given journal: summary statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mode	25th pct.	Median	75th pct.
Same journal-editorial role	6.26	5.16	3	3	4	8
Same journal	7.53	5.91	3	3	6	10


Duration statistics for editorial board members, in a given journal-editorial role combination and at a given journal, for 1990-2011, for full journal sample.

Table B.3 in Appendix B reports duration statistics for the same journal subsamples as in Table 5. A comparison of the statistics in these tables shows that the inclusion of successive roles at a given journal increases the 75th percentile by on average a year at Top 5 journals and by 3 years at both A-ranked and B-ranked journals. Apart from this heterogeneity across journal categories, there is also considerable variation within journal categories. For example, among the Top 5, the 75th percentile does not change at the *QJE*, goes up by 1 year at the *AER*, 2 years at the *RES*, and 3 years at *ECTA*. The duration statistics of general interest journals undergo relatively little change, while those of certain fields, especially Microeconomics and Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics reflect that tails are becoming considerably fatter.

4.3. Editorial moves. We now investigate the editorial board members who move from one position to another position, with the move implying a change in editorial role, a change in category to which the journal belongs, or both. We pool the yearly data and rely on network analysis to illustrate the resulting flows. We consider two types of networks, an outflow and inflow network, see Figure 6. As before, a node cr represents an editorial role $r \in R$ at a journal category, $c \in C$. However, now edges between nodes represent flows from one cr -pair to another. As the flow is directed from source to target, edges are depicted by arrows. The interpretation of node size and edge weight depends on the network. In the *outflow* network, the size of node cr equals the number of persons *leaving* that journal category–role pair. The weight of an arrow from node cr to node $c'r'$ indicates the share of those who leave cr that move to node $c'r'$. In the *inflow* network, the size of node $c'r'$ equals the number of persons *joining* that journal category–role pair. The weight of an arrow from node cr to

²¹The statistics for journal-role pairs are the same as those reported in the top part of Table 5.

FIGURE 6. Editorial moves



Note: Networks of editorial moves. Nodes are editorial positions characterised by journal category and editorial role. In outflow network, size of node proportional to number of persons *leaving* the journal category–role pair; weight of arrow proportional to share of leavers going to target node. In *inflow* network, size of node proportional to number of persons *joining* the journal category–role pair; weight of arrow proportional to share of joiners coming from source node. Black arrows end at *editors*; dark grey arrows at *coeditors*.


node $c'r'$ indicates the share of those joining $c'r'$ who are coming from node cr . In case a person holds multiple positions simultaneously, these positions are ordered lexicographically by journal category (Top 5 > A-ranked > B-ranked), then by role (*editor* > *coeditor* > *associate editor* > *advisory editor*) and the person is identified with the higher position. Black arrows end at *editors*; dark grey arrows at *coeditors*. Remaining arrows are in light grey. To keep the graph as clean as possible, arrows that represent less than 10 editorial board members leaving or joining a journal category–role pair are not included. As before, nodes related to Top 5 journals are in yellow, A-ranked journals in red, and B-ranked journals are in grey.

The graphs suggest a hierarchical structuring of editorial boards across journal categories. Outflows from B-ranked journals are predominantly to other B-ranked journals or to the role of *associate editor* at A-ranked journals; by and large, inflows into the Top 5 come from scholars who hold a position at an A-ranked journal. Outflows from Top 5 mostly go to A-ranked journals, less to B-ranked journals. The graphs show heavy traffic between A- and B-ranked journals, in both directions, especially at the *associate editor* roles. The graphs also show that, more than at other journals, B-ranked

journals exhibit many moves up and down the editorial hierarchy. Finally, those who continue to become an *editor* at a Top 5 journal held at least an *associate editorship* at a Top 5. At A-ranked journals, those who continue to become an *editor* have had another editorial role in the same journal category; only rarely do they join directly from a B-ranked journal. Some were previously *associate editor* at Top 5.

4.4. How long do scholars continue as editorial board members overall? Scholars can join an editorial board in one role, continue on the same board in another or take up an editorial role at another journal. We estimate the overall survival function for board members within the sample of journals using the Kaplan-Meier statistic. We limit attention to those who started an editorial role in 1991 or after. The result is plotted in Figure 8. The lower, dashed line depicts the unconditional survival probability that a person is a member of an editorial board of some journal in our sample t years after starting in their first editorial role, possibly at another journal. The other, drawn line depicts the probability that a person continues as an editorial board member in some role at some journal for another year conditional on having started t years before in their first editorial role.

FIGURE 8. Survival function: fraction of editorial board member editing for a given number of years



Note: Estimated survival functions for editorial board members t years after they started their first editorial role, possibly at another journal, obtained using the Kaplan-Meier statistic. Dashed line is the unconditional survival probability; drawn line is probability of continuing in editorial role conditional on having been in an editorial role for t years.

The figure shows that after ten years, 80% of a cohort of editorial board members continues as members of the editorial board of some journal in our sample. 30% of those who joined an editorial board in 1991 continue in an editorial role at some journal in 2011. Our data also shows that persons whose existing editorial commitments end in a given year and experience a year without any editorial

role are unlikely to join the editorial board of a journal afterwards. In fact, of those who stopped in 1991-2000, only 15% joined an editorial board again before 2011.²²

5. INSTITUTIONAL CONCENTRATION

In this section, we turn to institutional concentration. We follow [Hodgson and Rothman \(1999\)](#) and focus on the institution that awarded the highest degree to an editorial board member and on the institution of employment at the time of board membership.

5.1. Institutions where highest degrees were obtained. Table 7 shows the universities where the editorial board members of 2011 obtained their highest degree. We present the information per journal rank category. We have information on the university that awarded the highest degree for 2,568 of the 3,025 distinct persons that are active in 2011 (85%). For 96% of them, the highest degree is a PhD.²³

Over 50% of the editorial board members of the Top 5 obtained their PhD at one of 6 US universities, Harvard, MIT, Stanford, Princeton, Berkeley and Chicago. Nearly 75% of all board members of the Top 5 obtained their PhD at one of 13 US universities. The LSE is the fifth contributing institution. At the country level the UK is the second largest contributor. The number of editorial board members who were trained at either Harvard, MIT or Stanford is larger than the total number of board members who received their PhDs in any single country outside the US.

The skewedness of the distribution within the US declines somewhat when one considers A-ranked journals; the total share of PhDs obtained in the US remains stable at 80%. Its skewedness declines further for B-ranked journals; in this journal category, 63% of editorial board members received their PhD in the US.

Table B.4 in the Appendix shows that, for the three categories combined, 2 in 3 editorial board members in 2011 hold a PhD from a US university, and nearly 12% from a university in the UK. Germany, Canada, France and the Netherlands are the only countries that contribute more than 2% each.

How does the institutional concentration of 2011 compare to other years? To shed light on this, we begin by defining three regions. We distinguish the US, UK and Europe.²⁴ Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa. Next, we aggregate to the regional level the annual data on the institutions where editorial board members obtained their highest degrees and determine the annual regional shares. Figure 9 presents these regional shares over the sample period. The US share is reported on the left scale in each panel, while the shares of the other regions are on the right scale.

²²Because of this low probability of re-starting as an editorial board member, it is plausible that few of those who started in 1991 held an editorial position before.

²³Notice that we count the number of *unique* persons per journal rank.

²⁴Few editorial board members received their highest degree in institutions in the Americas outside the US or in Asia.

TABLE 7. Institutions where the editorial board members of 2011 obtained their highest degree

Top 5			A-ranked journals			B-ranked journals		
Country/Institution	Freq.	%	Country/Institution	Freq.	%	Country/Institution	Freq.	%
US-Harvard U.	23	14	US-Harvard U.	74	11	US-Harvard U.	110	5
US-MIT	21	12	US-MIT	54	8	US-MIT	107	5
US-Stanford U.	16	9	US-U. Chicago	43	6	US-UC-Berkeley	92	5
US-Princeton U.	12	7	US-Princeton U.	42	6	US-U. Chicago	88	4
US-UC-Berkeley	9	5	US-Stanford U.	38	5	US-Stanford U.	70	3
US-U.Chicago	8	5	US-Yale U.	35	5	US-Princeton U.	69	3
US-Northwestern U.	8	5	US-UC-Berkeley	32	5	US-Yale U.	59	3
US-Yale U.	7	4	US-U. Pennsylvania	24	3	US-U. Pennsylvania	52	3
US-U.Minnesota	7	4	US-Northwestern U.	22	3	US-U. Minnesota	41	2
US-U.Pennsylvania	5	3	US-U. Minnesota	20	3	US-Northwestern U.	39	2
US-U.Michigan	3	2	US-U. Rochester	19	3	US-Cornell U.	33	2
US-Carnegie Mellon U.	3	2	US-Columbia U.	12	2	US-U. Rochester	32	2
US-UC-San Diego	2	1	US-U. Michigan	12	2	US-U. Wisconsin-Madison	32	2
US-Other	9	5	US-Other	129	23	US-Other	471	36
Subtotal US	133	79	Subtotal US	556	80	Subtotal US	1,295	63
UK-LSE	10	6	UK-LSE	14	2	UK-Oxford U.	57	3
UK-Oxford U.	4	2	UK-Oxford U.	11	2	UK-U. Cambridge	52	3
UK-U. Keele	1	1	UK-U. Cambridge	7	1	UK-LSE	43	2
Subtotal UK	15	9	Subtotal UK	48	7	Subtotal UK	259	13
France	8	5	France	14	2	Germany	78	4
Germany	3	2	Canada	14	2	Canada	65	3
Denmark	3	2	Netherlands	12	2	France	59	3
Netherlands	2	1	Germany	10	1	Netherlands	53	3
Other countries	5	3	Other countries	42	6	Other countries	233	11
TOTAL	169	100	TOTAL	696	100	TOTAL	2,042	100

Note: Institutions where the editorial board members of 2011 obtained their highest degree. Based on the 2,568 editorial board members of 2011 with known highest-degree-awarding institution. For 96% of them, the highest degree is a PhD.


The three panels show that the evolution of the share of editorial board members with a PhD from a US-based institution differs qualitatively across journal tiers. At the Top 5, left panel, the share has risen, from 74% in 1990 to 79% in 2011. It has remained stable for A-ranked journals, middle panel, and is slowly trending downward for B-ranked journals, right panel.

The share of editorial board members of the Top 5 journals that has been trained in a British institution has been declining over the sample period. Moreover, whereas in the early 1990s the British share at these journals was larger than the share of Europe-trained editorial board members, this reversed in the early 2000s. The UK share is also declining, and the European share increasing, in the largest journal set, B-ranked.

Figure 10 shows, for each editorial role separately, the evolution of the shares of the regions where editorial board members obtained their highest degrees.²⁵ Clearly, across all editorial roles, US-based institutions have been the dominant factor throughout this period and have more or less maintained their presence relative to institutions from other regions. Although the second largest share of *editors* and *advisory editors* obtained their PhD at a UK-based institutions throughout the sample period, this

²⁵Figures B.2–B.4 in the Appendix show, by journal category-editorial role pair, the shares of the regions where the highest-degree-awarding institutions are located.


FIGURE 9. Highest-degree-awarding institutions: regional shares by journal rank



Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members obtained their highest degrees, by journal category. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.

share has been declining for both editorial roles. A growing share of editorial board members has been trained in Europe. The growth has been especially important for *editors*.

FIGURE 10. Highest-degree-awarding institutions: regional shares by editorial role



Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members obtained their highest degrees, by editorial role. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.

5.2. Institutions that Employ Editorial Board Members. Which institutions employ editorial board members? Table 8 tabulates these institutions for the year 2011, per journal rank. We have information on the institutions that employ of 2,422 of the 3,025 distinct persons that are active as an editorial board member in 2011 (80%). We report the main US and UK affiliations and the countries where the largest numbers of editorial board members are working.

TABLE 8. Institutions that employ the editorial board members of 2011

Top 5			A-ranked journals			B-ranked journals		
Country/Institution	Freq.	%	Country/Institution	Freq.	%	Country/Institution	Freq.	%
US-Yale U.	13	7	US-Harvard U.	28	4	US-Harvard U.	42	2
US-Harvard U.	11	6	US-U. Chicago	23	3	US-Stanford U.	38	2
US-Princeton U.	8	4	US-Yale U.	22	3	US-UC-Berkeley	37	2
US-U. Pennsylvania	8	4	US-Northwestern U.	21	3	US-Columbia U.	33	2
US-Northwestern U.	7	4	US-Stanford U.	18	2	US-U. Chicago	32	2
US-Stanford U.	7	4	US-UC-Berkeley	18	2	US-Yale U.	30	1
US-UCLA	7	4	US-New York U.	17	2	US-Northwestern U.	28	1
US-U. Chicago	6	3	US-Duke U.	15	2	US-UCLA	28	1
US-Columbia U.	6	3	US-U. Pennsylvania	15	2	US-MIT	24	1
US-MIT	6	3	US-World Bank	15	2	US-Duke U.	24	1
US-UC-Berkeley	4	2	US-UCLA	13	2	US-New York U.	23	1
US-Cornell U.	4	2	US-MIT	13	2	US-Cornell U.	20	1
US-Dartmouth College	3	2	US-Columbia U.	13	2	US-U. Pennsylvania	20	1
US-Other	31	17	US-Other	285	39	US-Other	693	34
Subtotal US	121	65	Subtotal US	516	71	Subtotal US	1072	52
UK-LSE	14	8	UK-UCL	12	2	UK-LSE	38	2
UK-UCL	8	4	UK-LSE	11	2	UK-Oxford U.	36	2
			UK-U. York	4	1	UK-U. Cambridge	17	1
UK-Other	4	2	UK-Other	24	3	UK-Other	122	6
Subtotal UK	27	15	Subtotal UK	51	7	Subtotal UK	213	10
France	6	3	Canada	21	3	Germany	104	5
Germany	5	3	France	13	2	Canada	84	4
Netherlands	3	2	China	18	2	Netherlands	60	3
			Germany	15	2	France	59	3
Other countries	24	13	Other countries	96	13	Other countries	452	22
TOTAL	186	100	TOTAL	730	100	TOTAL	2,044	100

Note: Institutions that employ the editorial board members of 2011. Based on the 2,422 editorial board members of 2011 with known institution of employment.

Nearly 30% of all editorial board members of the Top 5 are employed at 6 universities in the US: Yale, Harvard, Princeton, University of Pennsylvania, Northwestern and Stanford. 65% of all editorial board members of the Top 5 are located in the US. The institution that employs the largest percentage of editorial board members of this group of journals, 8%, is *outside* the US, the LSE. Another London-based institution, UCL, ties with Princeton and the University of Pennsylvania for the fourth position.

The percentage of editorial board members of A-ranked journals that is employed by a US-based institution is higher than for the Top 5 journals. It equals 71 %. The percentage for the UK, 7%, is lower than for the top tier. For B-ranked journals these figures are 52% and 10%, respectively.


Table B.5 in the Appendix shows that, for all journals pooled, 55% of all editorial board members are employed in the US, 11% in the UK and nearly 34% in the rest of the world. In the rest of the world, only Germany, Canada, the Netherlands, France, China, and Italy each house more than 2% of the editorial board members.

A comparison of Tables 7 and 8 shows that the distribution of employment over institutions is less skewed than the distribution of institutional origins of editorial board members. It also shows that

the major institutions that train editorial board members are often also the institutions where editorial board members are employed. Notice though that UCLA appears as one of the top employers of editorial board members in all three journal categories, but is absent from the top of the list of major training institutions. Something similar holds for Duke—absent in the top of training rankings for all journal categories, but present as a top employer of editorial board members of tier-A and tier-B journals. Minnesota, on the other hand, has trained many editorial board members across the three journal categories, but employs too few editorial board members to appear in the top of any journal category by employment. Finally, whereas MIT and Harvard are the top providers of PhD training of editorial board members, scoring almost identical numbers for Top 5 and B-ranked journals, only Harvard is at the top of the editorial employment rankings. Indeed, MIT employs about half the number of editorial board members that Harvard does, irrespective of the journal category.²⁶

Figure 11 sheds light on development of the regional shares of the institutional location of editorial board members over the sample period. Across the three journal ranks, the share of Europe is rising, while the share of the US is declining. This development is particularly prominent for B-ranked journals, as can be seen from the right panel. The share of editorial board members of journals in this category who are employed at a US-based institution declined from 65% in 1990 to 53% in 2011. Over the same period, the European share has steadily risen. As a result, in 2011 Europe accommodates nearly 25% of all editorial board members of B-ranked journals. The relative presence of US-based scholars on the editorial boards of the Top 5 and A-ranked journals has declined less rapidly over the sample period: from 71% to 66% for Top 5 and from 76% to 72% for A-ranked journals.

FIGURE 11. Institutions of employment: regional shares by journal rank




Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members are employed, by journal rank. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.

Figure 12 shows how the regional shares of institutional location have evolved for the four levels of editorial decision power. Across the four editorial roles, and throughout the whole sample period, the majority of editorial board member has been employed by a US institution. The panels also show that the US share has been steadily declining for all editorial roles. For *editors*, it has gone down from 61% to 53%, for *coeditors* from 70% to 55% and for *associate editors* from 65% to 57%. Europe's

²⁶Size matters. *Ceteris paribus*, a large department will count more editorial board members among its faculty. But the size of a department and of its PhD programme will also be correlated.

share is growing across all roles, in particular for the *editors*, where it has grown from 11% to 20%. The evolution of these for UK-based board members depends on the role: its employment share for *editors* is going down, it is flat for *associate editors* and somewhat rising for *coeditors*.²⁷

FIGURE 12. Institutions of employment: regional shares by editorial role



Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members are employed, by editorial role. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.


A growing fraction of editorial board members is working in Europe. Figure 13 shows that a growing percentage of them has a PhD from a US university. The top-left panel shows that this percentage has increased from 29% in 1990 to 37% in 2011 for *editors*, while the top-right panel shows that over the same period this percentage increased from 20% in to 35% for *coeditors*. For *associate editors*, in the bottom panel, the share has been stable over time in Europe, but it has increased substantially in the UK, from 13% in 1990 to 34% in 2011. The shares of *editors* and *coeditors* with a US PhD. working in the UK have also slightly increased during the sample period.

6. DISCUSSION

The aim of this section is to put the figures that we have presented so far into perspective and to inform a discussion about the organisation of editorial boards. We begin with a comparison with data on corporate boards. We explore two areas—multiple positions and duration and their effects

²⁷ Figures B.5-B.7 in the Appendix show, by journal rank-editorial role pair, the shares of the regions where the institutions of employment are located.

FIGURE 13. Editorial board members with highest degree obtained in US: regional shares by editorial role



Note: Shares of editorial board members who work in the indicated region and obtained their highest degree in the US, per editorial role. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.

on firm performance—in which discussions about the organisation of editorial boards could benefit from the literature on corporate governance. The specifics of corporate agency problems are different from the editorial ones. But the corporate and academic worlds share a concern with the risk that one particular point of view becomes dominant at the cost of other ways of thinking. Another concern they share is that board members may be too busy to perform their tasks well. Next, we apply the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure concentration on editorial boards. This Index is widely used to measure market concentration. We borrow from the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission the threshold value that they use to qualify a market as highly concentrated. As these comparisons suggest that concentration of power—individual and institutional—is fairly high, we empirically investigate the relationship between measures of concentration and journal impact in the section 6.3.

6.1. What can we learn from the literature on boards of directors? Apart from shared concerns, editorial and corporate boards share a number of other important characteristics.²⁸ First, as with directors on corporate boards, for the majority of editorial board members their roles on the editorial boards are side jobs as their main occupation is elsewhere. Second, both in the area of journal editing

²⁸See Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) for a survey of the literature on boards of directors.

and in the realm of corporate stewardship, reputation is an important factor determining the mutual attractiveness of board and person. Moreover, the reputations of editorial and corporate board members tend to be built in their main occupations. As discussions about concentration of power and measures of organisational performance - both static and dynamic - appear to be more advanced in the area of corporate governance, we may learn from the arguments and findings in the corporate governance literature.

6.1.1. *Multiple positions.* We begin by comparing data on multiple positions. The left part of Table 9 presents the data from Table 3 on editorial board members. The right part provides data from two studies on corporate boards. Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) study a sample of public US firms that vary considerably in size. They find that 84% of the directors hold 1 position, 10% hold 2 positions, and the remaining 6% hold at least 3 positions. They also report that directors holding multiple positions are concentrated at large firms. In a sample that actually focuses on large public US firms, Stein and Zhao (2019) indeed find that the majority of independent directors at such companies holds multiple positions. 26% of the independent directors hold at least 3 positions, while 35% of independent executive directors do.

TABLE 9. Distribution of number of positions held simultaneously

Positions held	Editorial board members		Directors		
	Full sample	Top 5	Ferris et al.	Stein and Zhao, indep.	Stein and Zhao, indep. exec.
1	77.4	37.2	84.4	47.8	30.8
2	16.3	33.7	10.1	25.6	34.2
3	4.7	19.1	3.2	15.7	22.2
4	1.2	7.0	1.5	6.8	8.2
5	0.3	2.4	0.5	2.7	3.2
6	0.1	0.5	0.2	1.0	1.1
7	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2
8+	0.0	0	0.0	0.2	0.2

Note: The first two columns give the percentage distributions of the number of editorial positions held by editorial board members of journals in the full sample and in the Top 5 subsample, resp. We only include editorial positions held at journals in our sample. The next three columns present distributions of the number of directorships on boards of directors of publicly listed US companies for comparison. Ferris et al. (2003) use a sample of firms with at least \$100 million in total assets at the beginning of 1995. The numbers are for any directorship. Stein and Zhao (2019) use a sample of firms that are on average larger. The numbers are for independent directors and independent executive directors, resp. A director is called independent (vis-à-vis a firm) if he or she is not employed by the firm. An independent executive director is an independent director whose primary job is as an executive of a company. We thank Luke Stein for sharing these statistics with us.

The distributions of editorial board positions and directors' position are similar. The distribution of editorial positions in the sample as a whole is quite comparable with the distribution of directors' positions in the sample of firms that vary considerably in size. In either case, more than 75% of board members hold one position; and the percentage holding more than one position is small. On the other hand, the distribution of editorial positions held by those involved with a Top 5 journal is closely bracketed by the distributions of independent directors and independent executive directors at firms that are on average large.

Such distributions have led to a debate in the corporate governance literature on the benefits and costs for an organization of having board members who hold multiple positions. [Fama and Jensen \(1983\)](#) argue that multiple positions can be a sign of director ability, and directors want to maintain their reputation in the market for directors. Moreover, companies may benefit from the experience and contacts that directors have thanks to their other directorships. Also, having well-connected directors may strengthen a company's legitimacy ([Ferris, Jayaraman and Liao, 2020](#)). On the other hand, due to a time constraint the performance of a company will be hurt if its board consists of directors who hold many positions. A considerable empirical literature studies how the number of positions that board members have affects measures of firm performance. Directors are typically called busy if they hold three or more directorships, see *e.g.*, [Fich and Shivdasani \(2006\)](#); [Stein and Zhao \(2019\)](#). The evidence using this count is mixed. Recently, researchers have started to identify distracted directors—directors whose commitments in one company come under pressure due to important events in their private lives or at other companies. They find that distracted directors cause various measures of firm performance to deteriorate (see *e.g.* [Falato, Kadyrzhanova and Lel, 2014](#); [Hauser, 2018](#); [Masulis and Zhang, 2019](#)). Moreover, [Stein and Zhao \(2019, p. 199\)](#) note that in the corporate world Institutional Shareholder Services, a large shareholder advisory company, recommends “that shareholders vote against CEO directors who sit on more than two outside boards.” [Ferris et al. \(2020, p. 3\)](#) report that in a 2012 survey, 75% of S&P 500 firms restrict the number of multiple positions that its directors can have.

We are not aware of journals that advise or require their editorial board members to have at most n editorial roles. What the right upper bound would be is hard to say; using the definition from the corporate governance literature, some 30% of the editorial board members of Top 5 journals classify as busy, and 6% of the overall journal set. Clearly, persons differ in their ability at juggling various commitments. Note, though, whereas companies may benefit from the experience and contacts that their directors have thanks to their other directorships, one wonders whether journals enjoy similar benefits from editorial board members who hold several positions.²⁹ On the other hand, whereas a university professor who contemplates an *editorship* may successfully ask for a reduced teaching load, executives who have been invited to join a board of directors are unlikely to obtain a reduction in their responsibilities from share holder representatives.

In Table 10, we combine data on the number of editorial positions with data on another time-consuming activity of editorial board members—doing research and publishing articles. The top part of the table reports the median number of all editorial positions held by scholars on the editorial boards of journals in the indicated journal category. It shows that, in each year reported, at least 50% of the editorial board members of the Top 5 journals are on at least one other editorial board of a

²⁹We thank Luke Stein for bringing this argument to our attention.

journal in the full sample, whereas at least 50% of the editorial board members of the A and B-ranked journals are on one editorial board.³⁰

The next four parts present the median number of publications in the full sample of journals and in the indicated subsamples by the editorial board members of the three subsamples of journals. The median number of publications reported for year t is based on the number of publications in the period $[t, t + 2]$, the idea being that editorial board members were busy with those publications in year t .³¹ The table suggests that editorial board members of Top 5 journals work on more papers at the same time, and more of them eventually get published in higher ranked journals than editorial board members that are not on the board of a Top 5 journal.

Based on these measures, editorial board members of Top 5 journals could be called busier than other editorial board members. Whether this really makes that they have less time to perform their editorial tasks is unclear. This will also depend on other factors about which we don't have information, including their other tasks, their effectiveness in their editorial roles, their ability and that of their co-authors, and the support (research assistance, teaching buy-out, administrative assistance) they receive from their departments.

TABLE 10. Busyness of editorial board member per journal category

Category of journal one is editing	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Median number					
Editorial positions held					
Top 5	2	2	2	2	2
A	1	1	2	1	1
B	1	1	1	1	1
Publications in full sample					
Top 5	3	4	3	4	2
A	3	3	3	3	2
B	2	2	2	2	2
Publications in Top 5 journals					
Top 5	1	1	1	1	1
A	0	0	0	0	0
B	0	0	0	0	0
Publications in A-ranked journals					
Top 5	1	2	1	1	1
A	1	1	1	1	1
B	0	0	0	0	0
Publications in B-ranked journals					
Top 5	1	1	0	0	0
A	1	1	1	0	0
B	1	1	1	1	1

Note: The table reports, for the editorial board members of Top 5, A-ranked and B-ranked journals separately and for the indicated years, figures for the median of (i) simultaneously held editorial positions, (ii) total publications and (iii) total publications in the three journal categories. The publication count for year t equals the number of articles published in years $[t, t + 2]$.

³⁰Editorial board members of A-ranked journals in 2000 are an exception.

³¹Other publication lags lead to comparable findings.

6.1.2. *Duration.* According to [Dou, Sahgal and Zhang \(2015, p. 583\)](#), “[s]hareholder advisory firms and regulators increasingly view lengthy experience as a negative attribute for independent directors” as it would make them “entrenched and aligned with managers,” and would hinder the influx of fresh thinking into the boardroom. They refer to a survey showing that in 2007 22% of the largest US firms impose term restrictions on directors and note that an advisory organization promoting best practices in boardrooms “recommends term limits of 10 to 15 years.”

[Dou et al. \(2015\)](#) argue that experience also comes with benefits. Experienced directors may be better at assessing the current executives thanks to the possibility of comparing them with previous executives at the same organisation. They may have a higher stake in the organisation and may have gained a stronger position vis-à-vis the current executives.

Table 11 compares the duration of editorial board members in our overall sample of journals with the duration of corporate board members studied in [Dou et al. \(2015\)](#).³² Compared with the 7.5

TABLE 11. Duration statistics: editorial boards and corporate boards

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mode	25th pct.	Median	75th pct.
Editorial board members: same journal	7.53	5.91	3	3	6	10
Corporate board members (Dou et al.): same company	9.06	7.57	2	3	7	13

Note: Duration statistics for editorial board members (same journal) and for corporate board members (same company) in the [Dou et al. \(2015\)](#) sample. We thank Ying Dou for sharing the corporate board statistics with us.

years that a scholar stays on average on the editorial board of a journal, a corporate director stays on average 1.5 years more on the board of a company. This is due to a fatter right tail; 25% stay on for more than 13 years. The modal director duration at the same company is 2 years, 1 year less than for editorial board members, and the 25th percentiles are the same, while the median is 1 year higher.

Some journals have term limits; they tend to be considerably shorter than the recommended 10 to 15 years mentioned above in the context of corporate boards. Arguably, it takes more time to gain a deep understanding of a large organization than of a journal, making shorter term limits for editorial boards plausible. At the round table at the January 2017 AEA meeting to which we referred in the introduction, James Heckman notices that various society journals that currently don’t have term limits consider their introduction. Overall, our data show that society journals are the ones with the highest turnover. Publisher’s journals and especially house journals tend to be characterised by little turnover.

Interestingly, [Dou et al. \(2015\)](#) find no evidence that experienced directors are less committed to their roles, rather the opposite, but their study cannot completely exclude self-selection issues—both companies and directors may want to continue their relationship only if past performance has been satisfactory. In any event, the corporate governance literature does suggest that term limits may stop commitment to an organisation from building up.

³²Their sample contains companies that are comparable in market value to the ones in the [Stein and Zhao \(2019\)](#) sample.

6.2. Measuring editorial board concentration. We measure concentration on editorial boards using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (*HHI*, hereafter). Consider the index based on affiliations of board members. Let N_{ijt} denote the number of distinct affiliations i of editorial board members of journal j in year t ; let s_{ijt} denote the percentage share of editorial board members of journal j in year t who are affiliated with institution i . The affiliation-based index HHI_{jt}^a of journal j in year t is defined as

$$(1) \quad HHI_{jt}^a = \sum_i^{N_{ijt}} s_{ijt}^2.$$

Similarly, one can define a PhD school-based index HHI_{jt}^{phD} of journal j in year t by properly defining the shares in terms of the universities where editorial board members obtained their highest degrees. We say that concentration is high if the index exceeds 2,500. This is the same threshold that the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission use in their 2010 horizontal merger guidelines, see [U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission \(2010\)](#).

Table 12 lists the 40 journals, out of the 106 in our sample, that have a high concentration, based on affiliation or PhD school in at least one year in our sample period 1990-2011. 19 journals have a high concentration score for at least 15 years in the 22-year sample period we study. 9 journals have editorial boards with high affiliation concentration throughout the entire period, and 11 have editorial boards with high PhD concentration throughout the entire period. 8 have both. In particular, two journals of the AEA, the *JEL* and the *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, score high on either concentration index. The same holds for two Chicago-based journals, the *JPE* and the *Journal of Law and Economics*, and for three Oxford-based journals, the *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, *Oxford Economic Papers* and the *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*. It also holds for society journals like the *Economic History Review* and the *Southern Economic Journal*, and for publisher's journals like *Energy Economics* and *Economic Development and Cultural Change*.

6.3. Concentration of power and journal influence. We close this discussion section with an empirical investigation into the relationship between concentration of power and journal impact. The first measure of journal impact is the time invariant impact factor developed by [Kodrzycki and Yu \(2006\)](#) (KY). It is based on the citations received by all articles published in a journal weighted by the importance of the citing journal. It excludes self-citations. It is available for our sample of 106 journals. The second measure is the time varying Article Influence Score (AIS) developed in [Ductor, Goyal, Van der Leij and Paez \(2020\)](#). It is based on the eigenfactors of the citation matrix of journal j in year t and the number of articles published by journal j . Each cell jk in the year t citation matrix corresponds to the fraction of articles in journal j in year t that refer to articles published in journal k between years $t - 1$ to $t - 6$. The AIS is then defined as,

$$(2) \quad AIS_{jt} = \frac{EF_{jt}}{n_{jt}},$$

TABLE 12. Editorial board concentration: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

(1) Journal name	(2) HHI^a #years > 2,500	(3) HHI^{PhD} #years > 2,500
Applied Economics	14	8
Cambridge Journal of Economics	3	22
Canadian Journal of Economics	4	8
Economic Development and Cultural Change	15	15
Economic Geography	2	2
Economic History Review	22	22
Economic Journal	1	6
Economica	6	0
Energy Economics	22	22
Health Economics	2	0
Environment and Planning A	0	13
Industrial and Labor Relations Review	19	17
IMF staff papers	20	1
Journal of Applied Economics	0	4
Journal of Economic Issues	1	0
Journal of Economic Literature	22	22
Journal of Economic Perspectives	19	22
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics	3	0
Journal of International Money and Finance	0	9
Journal of Labor Economics	3	4
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization	15	10
Journal of Law and Economics	22	22
Journal of Macroeconomics	1	1
Journal of Monetary Economics	4	0
Journal of Political Economy	22	19
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty	2	0
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy	6	6
Kyklos	22	22
Macroeconomic Dynamics	1	1
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics	20	22
Oxford Economic Papers	22	22
Oxford Review of Economic Policy	22	22
Quarterly Journal of Economics	0	10
RAND Journal of Economics	1	0
Review of Economics and Statistics	1	0
Review of Financial Studies	0	1
Scottish Journal of Political Economy	6	0
Southern Economic Journal	19	12
Review of World Economics	22	22
World Economy	18	20

Note: Column 1 lists the journals with an HHI_{jt}^a or HHI_{jt}^{PhD} above 2,500. Column 2 shows the number of years that a journal had an affiliation-based HHI above 2,500 during 1990-2011. Column 3 shows the number of years that a journal had a PhD school-based HHI above 2,500 during 1990-2011.

where EF_{jt} is the eigenfactor of the citation matrix of journal j in year t and n_{jt} is the number of articles published by journal j in t . As the KY impact factor, the AIS excludes self-citations and considers the influence of the citing journal.³³

As a measure of individual power, we use the average number of years that the editorial board members of journal j in year t remain in the same editorial role at the same journal j . We denote this

³³See Bergstrom, West and Wiseman (2008) for further discussion on the advantages of AIS and Ductor et al. (2020) for further details on the computation of the AIS .

average as Dur_{jt} . Higher average number of years in the same role and in the same journal capture a higher degree of individual control.

We run two regressions to explain a journal's impact. Following the empirical growth literature, we consider a cross-section of 106 journals with the data averaged over the period 1990–2011 to characterise the long-run relationship between the variables of interest. In the long-run analysis, we use the time invariant *KY* index as a measure of journal quality. We also consider panel data, journal-year, to characterise the relationship between journal impact and concentration in the short run. In the panel setting, we use the time varying *AIS* as a measure of journal impact.

In either impact model, we include journal characteristics that could be correlated with the journal impact factor: (i) the fields of research of the journal, given by the shares of articles published in each of the 19 *JEL* codes³⁴; (ii) the number N of articles published, which captures the capacity of the journal and could be negative related to journal quality (Ductor et al., 2020); (iii) average article length, *ArtLength*, as it is positively related to citations (Card and DellaVigna, 2013; Bramoullé and Ductor, 2018); (iv) the average number of authors, *Authors*, of an article. In the panel regression, we use yearly values of these variables, marked with a subscript t , while in the cross section, we use the average yearly values, marked with an overline. Thus, the cross-section model is

$$(3) \quad \begin{aligned} \text{Log}(KY_j) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \overline{Dur}_j + \beta_2 \overline{HHI}_j^a + \beta_3 \overline{HHI}_j^{PhD} + \beta_4 \overline{ArtLength}_j + \beta_5 \overline{N}_j \\ & + \beta_6 \overline{Authors}_j + \sum_{l=1}^{19} \gamma_l \overline{JEL}_{jl} + u_j \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Log}(KY_j)$ is the log of the *KY* index of journal j . The main parameters of interest are β_1 , β_2 and β_3 that measure the effect of individual and institutional concentration of control on the journal quality impact factor. The panel-data model becomes

$$(4) \quad \begin{aligned} \text{Log}(AIS_{jt}) = & \delta_0 + \rho \text{Log}(AIS_{jt-1}) + \delta_1 Dur_{jt} + \delta_2 HHI_{jt}^a + \delta_3 HHI_{jt}^{PhD} + \delta_4 ArtLength_{jt} \\ & + \delta_5 N_{jt} + \delta_6 Authors_{jt} + \sum_{l=1}^{19} \theta_l JEL_{l,jt} + \epsilon_{jt} \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Log}(AIS_{jt})$ is the log of the *AIS* index of journal j in year t , $\text{Log}(AIS_{jt-1})$ is the log of the *AIS* index of journal j in year $t - 1$ and captures the dynamic of the *AIS*.³⁵ The main parameters of interest are δ_1 , δ_2 and δ_3 , that measure the effect of individual and institutional concentration of control on the article influence score of the journal.

Column 1 of Table 13 shows the result of estimating model 3 using OLS. The results show a negative long-run association between the average duration of researchers on the editorial board of a journal and the journal's impact factor: an increase in the average duration by 1 year is related with

³⁴We use the letter of the *JEL* code to define field of research. Articles with more than one distinct letter count towards the corresponding fields proportionally.

³⁵We reject the null hypothesis that *AIS* follows an unit root process. However, the lagged of the *AIS* is highly statistically significant.

TABLE 13. Impact factor of a journal and concentration of control

VARIABLES	(1) OLS (cross-section) Log(KY)	(2) POLS (panel data) Log(AIS)
Log(AIS)_{t-1}		0.820*** (0.028)
Average duration	-0.173*** (0.055)	-0.014*** (0.004)
$\text{Log(HHI}^a)$	-0.741*** (0.212)	0.011 (0.033)
$\text{Log(HHI}^{PhD})$	0.882*** (0.300)	0.010 (0.036)
Article length	0.136*** (0.029)	0.008*** (0.003)
# articles	0.005* (0.003)	-0.000 (0.000)
Avg. # authors	1.868* (1.052)	0.103 (0.083)
Observations	106	1,326
R-squared	0.689	0.851
JEL codes shares	✓	✓
Year dummies		✓

Note: *KY* is the impact factor developed by [Kodrzycki and Yu \(2006\)](#), *AIS* is the article influence score computed by Thomson Reuters (JCR index) in 2013. Average duration is the average duration of editors per role in each journal from 1990 to 2011. Both models include shares of articles published per *JEL* codes. Robust standard errors in column 1 and clustered standard errors at the journal level in column 2. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

a decline in the *KY* impact factor of 17.3%. We also find that affiliation concentration of a journal's board and the journal's impact factor are negatively associated: a 1% increase in the HHI based on affiliations, is associated with a 0.74% decrease in the *KY* impact factor.³⁶ We also find a positive long-run association between PhD concentration of a journal's board and journal quality; a 1% increase in HHI^{PhD} is related to a 0.88% increase in the *KY* impact factor.

Column 2 presents the results for the *AIS* model, using POLS and standard errors clustered at the journal level. The only significant factors of journal impact in the short run are the average duration of researchers on a journal's editorial board and the average article length. Average duration and *AIS* are negatively related: an increase in the average duration by 1 year is related with a decline in the *AIS* score of 1.4% in the short-run. This effect is larger than the positive effect of average article length on *AIS*. We do not find significant short-run effects of either affiliation or PhD concentration on the article influence score, partly because institutional concentration is quite stable over time.

Overall, the findings show that an editorial board characteristic, the average duration of researchers on a journal's editorial board, is among the main variables associated with short-run and long-run journal impact.³⁷

³⁶These results are robust to using the average *AIS* of the journal as a quality measure. Results available upon request. We consider the *KY* index because it is available for our 106 journals, while the *AIS* is only available for 67 journals.

³⁷The results are robust to the exclusion of the Top 5 journals.

7. CONCLUSION

Editorial board members are gate keepers, deciding what research gets published and disseminated. Their decisions shape individual careers. Their names on the front matter of journals signal what type of research journals appreciate. Some board members also take an active role in the development of the content that is submitted for publication, either through their personal editorial style or by design of the journal. As a result, editorial positions come with considerable power over the discipline. We have investigated the concentration of individual and institutional power on the editorial boards of 106 economics and finance journals over the period 1990-2011.

We find that many editorial boards are characterised by high degrees of concentration of power. This manifests itself in various ways. Many scholars continue on editorial boards for many years, either at the same journal in the same role or at other journals. A select group of scholars holds many positions at the same time. A large minority of journals has high concentrations score for many years. A small group of institutions has granted PhDs to many future editorial board members. A small group of institutions employs editorial board members. The dominance of the institutions that employ and train editorial board members has been persistent over the entire period. It is slowly decreasing, in general. There is little variation over time in the distribution of multiple positions or in duration.

Some journals have term limits, and other journals are considering their introduction. Findings in the literature on corporate governance suggests that board performance also depends on how busy and distracted board members are. By a standard borrowed from that literature, some 30% of editorial boards members of the Top 5 classify as busy, and 6% in the overall journal set, as a result of the number of editorial positions that they hold simultaneously. We also show that higher concentration of power by the editorial boards is negatively associated with the impact of the journal.

This suggests to us that the discipline would benefit from further research into the relationship between characteristics of editorial boards and editorial board members on the one hand and measures of impact, quality and innovativeness of a journal on the other.

REFERENCES

- Adams, Renee B., Benjamin E. Hermalin, and Michael S. Weisbach (2010) 'The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey.' *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(1), 58–107
- Aghion, Philippe, and Jean Tirole (1997) 'Formal and real authority in organizations.' *Journal of Political Economy* 105(1), 1–29
- Bergstrom, Carl T, Jevin D West, and Marc A Wiseman (2008) 'The eigenfactor™ metrics.' *Journal of Neuroscience* 28(45), 11433–11434
- Bramoullé, Yann, and Lorenzo Ductor (2018) 'Title length.' *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 150, 311–324
- Brogaard, Jonathan, Joseph Engelberg, and Christopher A Parsons (2014) 'Networks and productivity: Causal evidence from editor rotations.' *Journal of Financial Economics* 111(1), 251–270
- Card, David, and Stefano DellaVigna (2013) 'Nine facts about top journals in economics.' *Journal of Economic Literature* 51(1), 144–161
- Colussi, Tommaso (2018) 'Social ties in academia: A friend is a treasure.' *Review of Economics and Statistics* 100(1), 45–50
- Corsi, Marcella, Carlo D'Ippoliti, and Giulia Zacchia (2019) 'Diversity of backgrounds and ideas: The case of research evaluation in economics.' *Research Policy* 48(9), 103820
- Dou, Ying, Sidharth Sahgal, and Emma Jincheng Zhang (2015) 'Should independent directors have term limits? The role of experience in corporate governance.' *Financial Management* 44(3), 583–621

- Ductor, Lorenzo (2015) 'Does co-authorship lead to higher academic productivity?' *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 77(3), 385–407
- Ductor, Lorenzo, and Bauke Visser (2020) 'Why are connections to editorial board members of economics journals valuable?' Technical Report, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.
- Ductor, Lorenzo, Sanjeev Goyal, Marco J. Van der Leij, and Gustavo Paez (2020) 'On the influence of top journals.' Unpublished
- Fafchamps, Marcel, Marco J Van der Leij, and Sanjeev Goyal (2010) 'Matching and network effects.' *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8(1), 203–231
- Falato, Antonio, Dalida Kadyrzhanova, and Ugur Lel (2014) 'Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?' *Journal of Financial Economics* 113(3), 404–426
- Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen (1983) 'Separation of ownership and control.' *The Journal of Law & Economics* 26(2), 301–325
- Ferris, Stephen P., Murali Jagannathan, and Adam C. Pritchard (2003) 'Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments.' *The Journal of Finance* 58(3), 1087–1111
- Ferris, Stephen P., Narayanan Jayaraman, and Min-Yu (Stella) Liao (2020) 'Better directors or distracted directors? An international analysis of busy boards.' *Global Finance Journal* 44, 100437
- Fich, Eliezer M., and Anil Shivdasani (2006) 'Are busy boards effective monitors?' *The Journal of Finance* 61(2), 689–724
- Goyal, Sanjeev, Marco J Van Der Leij, and José Luis Moraga-González (2006) 'Economics: An emerging small world.' *Journal of Political Economy* 114(2), 403–412
- Hauser, Roie (2018) 'Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from mergers.' *Journal of Financial Economics* 128(1), 16–37
- Heckman, James J., and Sidharth Moktan (2020) 'Publishing and promotion in economics: The tyranny of the Top Five.' *Journal of Economic Literature* 58(2), 419–70
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M., and Harry Rothman (1999) 'The editors and authors of economics journals: A case of institutional oligopoly?' *Economic Journal* 109(453), 165–186
- Journal of Economic History (1991) 'Editors' notes.' *Journal of Economic History* 51(1), 201–206
- (2015) 'Editors' notes.' *The Journal of Economic History* 75(1), 250–258
- Kim, Jinyoung, and Kanghyock Koh (2014) 'Incentives for journal editors.' *Canadian Journal of Economics* 47(1), 348–371
- Kodrzycki, Yolanda K, and Pingkang Yu (2006) 'New approaches to ranking economics journals.' *The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy*
- Laband, David N (2013) 'On the use and abuse of economics journal rankings.' *The Economic Journal* 123(570), F223–F254
- Laband, David N, and Michael J Piette (1994) 'Favoritism versus search for good papers: Empirical evidence regarding the behavior of journal editors.' *Journal of Political Economy* 102(1), 194–203
- Lee, Frederic S., Xuan Pham, and Gyun Gu (2013) 'The UK Research Assessment Exercise and the narrowing of UK economics.' *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 37(4), 693–717
- Martin, Ben R. (2016) 'Editors' JIF-boosting stratagems—Which are appropriate and which not?' *Research Policy* 45(1), 1–7
- Masulis, Ronald W., and Emma Jincheng Zhang (2019) 'How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions.' *Journal of Financial Economics* 132(3), 226–256
- Salles, Maurice (2014) 'Social choice and welfare' at 30: Its role in the development of social choice theory and welfare economics.' *Social Choice and Welfare* 42(1), 1–16
- Serrano, Roberto (2018) 'Top5itis.' *Economics Bulletin* 38(2), A2
- Stein, Luke C.D., and Hong Zhao (2019) 'Independent executive directors: How distraction affects their advisory and monitoring roles.' *Journal of Corporate Finance* 56, 199 – 223
- U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2010) 'Horizontal merger guidelines'
- Van der Leij, Marco (2006) 'The economics of networks: Theory and empirics.' PhD dissertation, Tinbergen Institute
- Wilhite, Allen, Eric A. Fong, and Seth Wilhite (2019) 'The influence of editorial decisions and the academic network on self-citations and Journal Impact Factors.' *Research Policy* 48(6), 1513–1522
- Zimmermann, Klaus F. (2014) 'Journal of Population Economics: Report of the editor-in-chief'

APPENDIX A. JOURNAL LIST

Table A.2 tabulates all journals in our database, their type, *i.e.*, whether they are a society, house or publisher journal, the journal category, *i.e.*, Top 5, A-ranked or B-ranked, and the field or fields, if any, to which the journal belongs. If no field is reported, the journal is defined as a general interest journal. If the journal is classified as belonging to a society or association, the society or association is also listed; if the journal is a house journal, the university or organization to which it belongs is reported. For definitions of journal type, category and field, please see section 2. Unless otherwise stated, all journals are covered over the entire sample period, 1990-2011. Table A.1 lists all JEL codes that we use in the paper and in Table A.2.

TABLE A.1. JEL codes and categories

JEL code	Categories
A	General Economics and Teaching
B	History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
C	Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
D	Microeconomics
E	Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
F	International Economics
G	Financial Economics
H	Public Economics
I	Health, Education, and Welfare
J	Labor and Demographic Economics
K	Law and Economics
L	Industrial Organization
M	Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics
N	Economic History
O	Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth
P	Economic Systems
Q	Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics
R	Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics
Y	Miscellaneous Categories
Z	Other Special Topics

Note: As stated on the website of the AEA: "The JEL classification system was developed for use in the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL), and is a standard method of classifying scholarly literature in the field of economics. The system is used to classify articles, dissertations, books, book reviews, and working papers in EconLit, and in many other applications. For descriptions and examples, see the guide at <https://www.aeaweb.org/jel/guide/jel.php>".

TABLE A.2. Information about the journals in our sample

Journal	Type	Society/Association (Type=S); University (Type=H)	TI-Rank	Field
American Economic Review	S	American Economic Association	Top 5	
American Journal of Agricultural Economics	S	Agricultural & Applied Economics Association	B	Q
Applied Economics	P		B	
Cambridge Journal of Economics	H	University of Cambridge	B	
Canadian Journal of Economics	S	Canadian Economics Association	B	
Contemporary Economic Policy	S	Western Economic Association International	B	
Ecological Economics	S	The International Society for Ecological Economics	B	Q
Econometric Theory	P		A	C
Econometrica	S	Econometric Society	Top 5	CD
Economic Development and Cultural Change	P		B	O
Economic Geography	H	Clark University	B	R
Economic History Review	S	Economic History Society	B	N
Economic Inquiry	S	Western Economic Association International	B	
Economic Journal	S	The Royal Economic Society	A	
Economic Policy: A European Forum	P		B	
Economic Record	S	The Economic Society of Australia	B	
Economic Theory ³⁸	S	Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory	B	D
Economica	H	London School of Economics	B	
Economics Letters	P		B	
Economics and Philosophy	P		B	D
Energy Economics	P		B	LQ
Environment and Planning A	P		B	R
Environmental and Resource Economics ³⁹	S	European Assoc.of Environmental and Resource Econ.	B	Q

³⁸First year of publication is 1991.³⁹First year of publication is 1991.

Table A.2: continued from previous page

Journal	Type	Society/Association (Type=S); University (Type=H)	Category	Field
European Economic Review	S ⁴⁰	European Economic Association	A	
Explorations in Economic History	P		B	N
Financial Management	S	Financial Management Association International	B	G
Games and Economic Behavior	S	Game Theory Society	A	CD
Health Economics ⁴¹	P		B	I
IMF Staff Papers	H	International Monetary Fund	B	F
Industrial and Labor Relations Review	H	Cornell University	B	J
Insurance: Mathematics and Economics	P		B	G
International Economic Review	H	University of Pennsylvania	A	
International Journal of Forecasting	P		B	C
International Journal of Game Theory	S	Game Theory Society	B	C
International Journal of Industrial Organization	S	European Association for Research in Industrial Economics	B	L
International Review of Law and Economics	P		B	K
International Tax and Public Finance	P		B	H
Journal of Applied Econometrics	P		B	C
Journal of Banking and Finance	P		B	G
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics	S	American Statistical Association	A	C
Journal of Comparative Economics	S	Association for Comparative Economic Studies	B	
Journal of Development Economics	P		B	O
Journal of Econometrics	P		A	C
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization	P		B	D
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control	P		B	
Journal of Economic History	S	The Economic History Association	B	N
Journal of Economic Issues	S	The Association for Evolutionary Economics	B	B

⁴⁰The European Economic Review was a Society Journal from 1985 to 2002.⁴¹First year of publication is 1992.

Table A.2: continued from previous page

Journal	Type	Society/Association (Type=S); University (Type=H)	Category	Field
Journal of Economic Literature	S	American Economic Association	A	
Journal of Economic Perspectives	S	American Economic Association	A	
Journal of Economic Psychology	S	IntAssocfor Research in Economic Psychology	B	D
Journal of Economic Theory	P		A	D
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy ⁴²	H	Northwestern University	B	L
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management	S	Association of Environmental and Resource Econ.	A	Q
Journal of Evolutionary Economics ⁴³	S ⁴⁴	The International Joseph Alois Schumpeter Society	B	O
Journal of Finance	S	American Finance Association	A	G
Journal of Financial Economics	H	University of Rochester	A	G
Journal of Financial Intermediation	P		B	G
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis	H	University of Washington	B	G
Journal of Forecasting	P		B	C
Journal of Health Economics	P		A	I
Journal of Human Resources	P		A	IJ
Journal of Industrial Economics	P		B	L
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics	P		B	
Journal of International Economics	P		A	F
Journal of International Money and Finance	P		B	F
Journal of Labor Economics	S	Society of Labor Economists	A	J
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization	H	Yale University	B	L
Journal of Law and Economics	H	University of Chicago	B	L
Journal of Macroeconomics	H	Louisiana State University	B	E
Journal of Mathematical Economics	P		B	D

⁴²First year of publication is 1992.⁴³First year of publication is 1991.⁴⁴It is a Society journal since 1993.

Table A.2: continued from previous page

Journal	Type	Society/Association (Type=S); University (Type=H)	Category	Field
Journal of Monetary Economics	H	University of Rochester	A	E
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking	H	Ohio State University	B	EGF
Journal of Political Economy	H	University of Chicago	Top 5	
Journal of Population Economics	S	European Society for Population Economics	B	J
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics	P		B	E
Journal of Public Economics	P		A	H
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty	P		B	D
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy	H	University of Bath	B	RL
Journal of Urban Economics	P		B	R
Kyklos	H	University of Basel	B	
Land Economics	P		B	Q
Macroeconomic Dynamics ⁴⁵	P		B	E
Mathematical Finance ⁴⁶	P		B	G
National Tax Journal	S	National Tax Association	B	H
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics	H	Oxford University	B	
Oxford Economic Papers	H	Oxford University	B	
Oxford Review of Economic Policy	H	Oxford University	B	
Public Choice	S	Public Choice Society	B	D
Quarterly Journal of Economics	H	Harvard University	Top 5	
RAND Journal of Economics	H	Rand Corporation	A	LD
Regional Science and Urban Economics	P		B	R
Resource and Energy Economics	P		B	Q
Review of Economic Studies	P		Top 5	D
Review of Economics and Statistics	H	Harvard University	A	

⁴⁵First year of publication is 1996.⁴⁶First year of publication is 1991.

Table A.2: continued from previous page

Journal	Type	Society/Association (Type=S); University (Type=H)	Category	Field
Review of Financial Studies	S	The Society for Financial Studies	A	G
Review of Income and Wealth	S	IntAssocfor Research in Income and Wealth	B	C
Scandinavian Journal of Economics	P		B	
Scottish Journal of Political Economy	S	Scottish Economic Society	B	
Small Business Economics	P		B	L
Social Choice and Welfare	S	The Society for Social Choice and Welfare	B	D
Southern Economic Journal	S	Southern Economic Association	B	
Theory and Decision	P		B	D
Transportation Research: Part B: Methodological	P		B	R
Review of World Economics ⁴⁷	H	Kiel Institute for the World Economy	B	F
World Bank Economic Review	H	World Bank	A	
World Development	P		B	O
World Economy	P		B	F

⁴⁷Until 2002, this journal was called the Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv.

APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE B.1. Multiple positions: general interest and field journals

Positions	General	C	D	E	G	J
1	89.6	83.9	84.7	92.8	82.0	93.7
2	9.2	14.6	11.8	6.9	13.7	6.3
3	1.2	1.4	2.1	0.3	3.4	0
4	0.1	0.12	1.2	0	0.8	0
5+	0	0	0.1	0	0.1	0


Note: Percentage distribution of the number of editorial positions held in the same year, by editorial board members of journals in the indicated journal subsample (general interest or field). Fields are denoted by their JEL code. We count editorial positions held at journals in full sample. See appendix A for the list of journals and JEL codes.

TABLE B.2. Multiple positions: all positions sample editorial board members Top 5

	All journals reported in CVs			Journals outside sample	
	Positions	Journals	Avg no. positions	Positions (%)	Journals
1990	69	31	2.3	6 (9%)	6
2000	101	57	3.4	27 (27%)	24
2010	92	50	3.1	28 (30%)	24

Note: The table reports information for three random samples of 30 editorial board members of Top 5 journals about all their editorial positions as reported in their CVs. The left part reports information about their editorial positions in all journals; the right part reports information about editorial positions in journals outside the sample of 106 journals in our study.

FIGURE B.1. Duration in a given journal-role combination: other field journals



Note: Kernel densities of editorial duration in a given journal-role combination for selected fields. Fields are identified by their JEL codes, see Appendix A.

TABLE B.3. Duration in a given journal: summary statistics

	mean	std.	mode	25th pct.	median	75th pct.
All journals	7.53	5.91	3	3	6	10
<i>Journal type:</i>						
Society journal	6.58	5.31	3	3	5	9
House journal	8.34	6.27	3	3	7	12
Publisher's journal	8.13	6.23	3	3	6	11
<i>Journal rank:</i>						
Top 5	5.44	3.69	3	3	5	7
A	6.55	5.12	3	3	5	9
B	8.14	6.28	3	3	6	12
<i>Top 5 in detail:</i>						
American Economic Review	4.41	2.25	3	3	4	6
Econometrica	6.04	4.37	3	3	5	9
Journal of Political Economy	4.80	3.15	2	2.5	4	6
Quarterly Journal of Economics	6.90	5.10	2;5	3	5.5	9
Review of Economic Studies	5.54	3.38	3;6	3	5	8
<i>General interest or field:</i>						
General interest	6.38	4.95	3	3	5	8
C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods	8.04	6.19	3	3	6	11
D: Microeconomics	8.53	6.40	3	3	6	12
E: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics	9.44	6.21	3	4	8	15
G: Financial Economics	7.80	5.67	3	3	6	11
J: Labor and Demographic Economics	7.58	6.17	1	3	5	11
<i>A-ranked general interest journals:</i>						
Economic Journal	4.64	3.17	4	3	4	4.5
European Economic Review	5.30	3.10	3	3	5	7
International Economic Review	5.82	3.81	4	3	5	7
Review of Economics and Statistics	6.14	3.47	3	3	5	9


Note: The table reports duration statistics for editorial board members in a given journal for the period 1990-2011, for the whole sample of journals and for various subsamples. For type, rank, and field of a journal, please refer to Appendix A. The *QJE* and the *RES* have a bimodal distribution of duration.

TABLE B.4. Institutions where the editorial board members of 2011 obtained their highest degree. All journals.

Country/Institution	Frequency	%	Country/Institution	Frequency	%
US-Harvard University	164	6.39	UK-Oxford U.	64	2.49
US-MIT	155	6.04	UK-LSE	58	2.26
US-University of Chicago	121	4.71	UK-U. of Cambridge	55	2.14
US-UCBerkeley	121	4.71	UK-U.of York	13	0.51
US-Stanford U.	104	4.050	UK-UCL	11	0.43
US-Princeton U.	100	3.89	UK-other	98	32.78
US-Yale U.	88	3.43	Whole UK	299	11.64
US-U. of Pennsylvania	69	2.69			
US-Northwestern U.	57	2.22	Germany	81	3.15
US-U. of Minnesota	53	2.06	Canada	74	2.88
US-Cornell U.	39	1.52	France	73	2.84
US-Columbia U.	38	1.48	Netherlands	59	2.30
US-U. of Michigan	38	1.48	Sweden	30	1.17
US-U. of Wisconsin-Madison	37	1.44	Australia	25	0.97
US-UCLA	32	1.25	Italy	23	0.90
US-other	499	19.43	Other countries	189	7.36
Whole US	1715	66.78	Sub-total non US, non UK	554	21.57
Total	2568	100			


Note: Institutions where the editorial board members of 2011 obtained their highest degree. Based on the 2,568 editorial board members of 2011 with known highest-degree-awarding institution. For 96% of them, the highest degree is a PhD.

FIGURE B.2. Highest-degree-awarding institutions: regional shares by editorial role. Top 5 journals.




Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members obtained their highest degrees, by editorial role. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.

FIGURE B.3. Highest-degree-awarding institutions: regional shares by editorial role. A-ranked journals.



Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members obtained their highest degrees, by editorial role. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.

FIGURE B.4. Highest-degree-awarding institutions: regional shares by editorial role. B-ranked journals.




Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members obtained their highest degrees, by editorial role. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.

TABLE B.5. Institutions that employ the editorial board members of 2011. All journals.

Country/Institution	Frequency	%	Country/Institution	Frequency	%
US-Harvard U.	79	2.6	UK-Oxford U.	56	1.9
US-Stanford U.	66	2.2	UK-LSE	28	1.7
US-Yale U.	62	2	UK-U. Cambridge	26	0.9
US-UCBerkeley	61	2	UK-UCL	25	0.8
US-U. Chicago	59	1.9	UK-U. Warwick	21	0.7
US-Northwestern U.	54	1.8	UK-Other	104	3.4
US-Columbia U.	51	1.7	Whole UK	342	11.2
US-New York U.	47	1.5	Germany	118	3.9
US-MIT	45	1.5	Canada	113	3.7
US-UCLA	41	1.3	Netherlands	85	2.8
US-U. Pennsylvania	37	1.2	France	76	2.5
US-Duke U.	37	1.2	China	63	2
US-U. Michigan	35	1.1	Italy	62	2
US-Cornell U.	34	1.1	Other countries	506	16.6
US-Princeton U.	28	0.94	Subtotal nonUS, nonUK	1023	33.5
US-Other	949	31.1	TOTAL	3050	
US-Total	1685	55.2			


Note: Institutions that employ the editorial board members of 2011. Based on the 2,422 editorial board members of 2011 with known institution of employment.

FIGURE B.5. Institutions of employment: regional shares by editorial role. Top 5 journals




Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members are employed, by editorial role. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.

FIGURE B.6. Institutions of employment: regional shares by editorial role. A-ranked journals



Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members are employed, by editorial role. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.

FIGURE B.7. Institutions of employment: regional shares by editorial role. B-ranked journals



Note: Shares of the regions where editorial board members are employed, by editorial role. Europe stands for any European country, excluding the UK, and including Israel and South Africa.