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**Book Part**

## Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism – How Globalization Is Reshaping Politics in the Twenty-First Century

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# 1 *Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism – How Globalization Is Reshaping Politics in the Twenty-First Century*

RUUD KOOPMANS AND MICHAEL ZÜRN

## 1.1 Introduction

The twentieth century is considered the century of class cleavage between capital and labour. This class cleavage structured conflicts within the political systems of the developed world, and, in the second half of the century, even in world politics, by setting the East against the West. The concept of cleavage has been especially important in enabling the development of West European political systems to be grasped as a series of formative conflicts. Each of these cleavages was based on structurally differing interests that, along with their corresponding political ideas and organizations, shaped the party systems in most Western European countries (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970; Rokkan et al. 1999). From this point of view, the industrial revolution in the second half of the nineteenth century divided societies into capital owners, with their interest in profitable investments, and the working class, with its interest in humane working conditions, higher wages and social security (Mair 2006; Bartolini 2007). The Right defended free markets and minimal state intervention; the Left stood for a strong state and political regulation.

Politics in the early twenty-first century is undergoing tectonic shifts that question the persistence of class conflict as the decisive political fault line. These changes are occurring at both ends of the political spectrum. Among the Left, a mainstream shaped by the 'Third Way' politics of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and the Clintons is being challenged by a rising new radical Left exemplified by people like Bernie Sanders within the United States (US) Democratic Party and parties such as Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece and Die Linke in Germany. Outside party politics, this new radical Left has been vocal on the transnational level with massive protest mobilization in the field of international trade, which

successfully challenged the planned European Union (EU)–US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the US–Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). This transnational wing of the ‘anti-globalization Left’ goes back at least as far as the Battle in Seattle in 1999. On the other side, the conservative establishment faces increasingly strong challenges by new contenders both from within the ranks of mainstream parties and in the shape of new parties such as the National Front in France, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Geert Wilders’ Freedom Party (PVV) in the Netherlands. Although more strongly focused on party politics than the new radical Left, the ‘New Right’, too, has manifested itself beyond party politics, for instance; in Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA) and the ‘Identitarian Movement’, both of which are active in several European countries.

The year 2016 saw a dramatic acceleration of these shifts. In the United States, Donald Trump’s primary campaign humiliated Republican establishment contenders such as Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio; and Hillary Clinton had to fight a long and hard battle to beat Bernie Sanders. In the United Kingdom, the Brexit referendum surprisingly brought victory to the ‘leave’ camp, and split both the Labour and Conservative parties in two. In the Austrian presidential elections of 2016, for the first time in the country’s history, neither of the two mainstream parties – the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Christian Democrats (ÖVP), who had historically alternated occupancy of the presidency and the chancellorship – managed to get their candidates past the first round. Instead, the run-off second round of voting was contested between candidates of two relatively new parties from the left and right flanks, the Greens and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which together gained almost 60 per cent of the vote in the first round, while the protagonists of the two ‘mainstream’ parties together obtained just over 20 per cent. In September 2017, for the first time in post-war history, a party to the right of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) entered the German parliament: the AfD, previously unrepresented in parliament, became the third-largest party with 13 per cent of the vote. Their votes came primarily from the mainstream right CDU and the mainstream left SPD, who both lost one-fifth of their electorate. Historically, the CDU and SPD had together

captured over three quarters of the vote. In 2017, they were down to 33 and 21 per cent, respectively.

As we will demonstrate in this book, the new fault lines around globalization can no longer be fully captured along the classic redistributional left–right axis. In important respects, they run perpendicular to it. Since the end of the Cold War, parties of the mainstream Left and Right, which had transformed themselves in the decades before from ‘class’ to catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1965), have converged further on pro-globalization positions on a range of issues, such as support for European integration, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and trade agreements such as TTIP. Even on immigration, probably the most divisive of the issues related to globalization, differences between the mainstream Left and Right have become much smaller than they used to be – both because mainstream left parties have distanced themselves from earlier experiments with multicultural policies and because Conservatives have, at least in large parts of Western Europe, embraced pro-immigration views. Germany’s grand coalition of Social Democrats and Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats is perhaps the best example of this new mainstream pro-immigration consensus.

There are good reasons to believe that a new fault line has emerged that pits opponents and proponents of globalization against each other. We therefore ask, in a first set of questions: Has globalization indeed produced new conflict formations that transcend the old binary structure of politics based on capital versus labour? Are we seeing a new conflict line being drawn between globalists and anti-globalists produced by the social revolution of globalization? Is this a new cleavage replacing the old one, or a new conflict line complementing the old divide?

In this book, we label those who advocate open borders, universal norms and supranational authority as ‘cosmopolitans’; and those who defend border closure, cultural particularism and national sovereignty as ‘communitarians’. We are aware that political ideologies are related to normative theories. Political ideologies contain simplifications and normatively indefensible components, and they are selective and much less coherent than political philosophies. We have, nevertheless, chosen these designations, both of which have their roots in recognized and respected political-philosophical traditions, to distance ourselves from the highly moralized terms that dominate and increasingly poison the

political debate. Those on the cosmopolitan side like to depict their opponents not as representatives of a legitimate political alternative, but as 'narrow-minded chauvinists under the spell of populist demagogues'. Conversely, those in the communitarian camp often describe their opponents in at least as derogatory terms as 'crooked, corrupt, and deceitful traitors to the common people'.

We use the terms cosmopolitanism and communitarianism to grasp the core elements of two opposing political ideologies, not least in order to reveal and understand the normativity behind both of these positions and, where possible, to link them back to structurally induced interests on both sides. By using the terms cosmopolitans and communitarians, however, we in no way wish to legitimize or give a seal of moral-philosophical approval to either alternative. Our use of the term cosmopolitan will not prevent us from asking to what extent presumably universalist stances are self-serving and linked to the material benefits and political opportunities that globalization offers to some actors more than others. Neither are we blind to the fact that the label communitarian is sometimes a kind way of describing ugly phenomena such as racism or aggressive chauvinism. Some prominent proponents of globalization are just extreme neo-liberals aiming to identify new business opportunities, while some of the critics of globalization are bigots and demagogues, no matter which moral-philosophical standards one judges them by. However, while there may be a good deal of hypocrisy in the current debates about the pros and cons of globalization, we believe that focusing on them distracts attention from what is at the core of these controversies. One of the central goals of this volume is to get a better understanding of the normative basis and the political ideologies behind this confrontation. We intend, therefore, to move away from the conception that is implicit in many analyses of right-wing populist movements – namely that things like migration, free trade and European integration are historically inevitable, rational and enlightened choices, thus relegating alternatives to the domain of backward irrationalism and seeing them as atavistic in relation to the requirements of modernization (see, e.g., Kitschelt 1988; Betz 1994; Beck 2002).

Communitarians and cosmopolitans can be found on both sides of the traditional left–right cleavage. Right-wing cosmopolitans emphasize open economic borders, whereas other cosmopolitans advocate political re-regulation at a level beyond the nation state. Left-wing

communitarians usually emphasize the dangers of globalization for equality and solidarity within states. Right-wing communitarians, by contrast, highlight the dangers of globalization for national cultural cohesion. With respect to some issues, left- and right-wing communitarians take different positions. This is particularly true for their stances on immigration. However, on other globalization-related issues, left and right communitarians often have more in common with each other than with the cosmopolitan camp. Euroscepticism, for instance, has the shape of a U-curve with peaks on the two ends of the traditional one-dimensional political spectrum (Hooghe et al. 2002). It is this implicit alliance of left and right Eurosceptics that has made the Brexit campaign a success. Similarly, campaigns against international free trade agreements such as CETA and TTIP have increasingly drawn support from both sides of the communitarian camp. Their combined strength brought the TTIP negotiations to a complete standstill and forced Hillary Clinton to revise her pro-trade stance and move into the direction of the more protectionist positions of her rivals Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. These developments reflect an important shift on the part of right-wing communitarians. Early radical right-wing parties in Europe, such as the National Front under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 1980s and 1990s or the FPÖ under Jörg Haider, as well as most of the Scandinavian right-wing populist parties, took neo-liberal positions on economic issues. According to political scientist Herbert Kitschelt (1995), the combination of economic neo-liberalism and cultural nationalism was the winning formula for right-wing populism. This seems to be less and less true. The new leaders of these parties, including Jean-Marie Le Pen's daughter Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, and, of course, Donald Trump, are now exploring whether in fact economic protectionism plus cultural nationalism – that is, a coherent communitarian position – is the new winning formula (see also De Lange 2007). Against this backdrop, we ask a second set of questions: Do the labels cosmopolitanism and communitarianism grasp the contentious issues between the two camps? In which regards do the new actors deviate from ideal-typical cosmopolitanism and communitarianism? What does this mean for the left–right continuum in politics?

A third set of questions induced by the developments described refers to the social bases of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism.

Do political parties still represent the people sufficiently or do we observe a growing gap between elites and mass publics? Which economic, social and political actors are found on which side of these conflicts? What is the social basis of the new conflict line? In this respect, we roughly distinguish three explanations.

An *economic explanation* points to deep-seated structural conflicts rooted in the way in which globalization reshapes our societies by affecting the material interests of distinct groups differently: capital ownership versus labour-based income, large and small businesses, export-oriented and domestically oriented economic sectors, high-skilled and low-skilled labour. A *cultural explanation* points to different lifeworlds and the role of the transnational and the international within them. In this view, the conflict is about how to combine universal humanitarian norms and particularistic cultural attachments and solidarities. Most people feel deeply about and cherish both, but they are not easy to reconcile in practice. The *political explanation* points to the tension between the need to address social and environmental problems that are increasingly global in scope and cannot be solved within the context of single nation states, on the one hand, and upholding standards of accountability, participation and representativeness that have historically been tied to the nation state, on the other.

In the remainder of this introduction, we first discuss debates about globalization as the driver of a potential new cleavage, which have occurred in different subfields of social science. Second, we develop our understanding of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism as political ideologies. Third, we address questions regarding the determinants of where actors position themselves on the new fault line and what might explain the differences in the way the fault line manifests itself in different settings. Finally, we present our research design and summarize the most important findings.

## 1.2 Globalization and Cleavage Theory

To make sense of the new conflict formations, we draw on the conceptual framework of cleavage theory. The core of the notion of cleavages is compelling and elegant. In line with liberal conflict theory (Coser 1957; Dahrendorf 1959), conflicts are seen as providing the structure of modern societies. Cleavage theory, however, shifts the focus from specific conflicts (differences in positions between social

actors) to conflict lines (a set of conflicts with at least some actors taking the same sides across a number of issues). The interaction of different conflict lines then produces conflict formations. Cleavages refer to the dominant conflict lines. The cleavage theory of Stein Rokkan (see Rokkan et al. 1999) and Seymour Martin Lipset (1960; see also Lipset and Rokkan 1967) apprehends the history of modern Europe as a partially sequential and partially parallel set of four social cleavages: a core–periphery cleavage, a rural–urban cleavage, a religious cleavage and a class cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 47). Each of the cleavages was accompanied by substantial societal transformations creating structural divisions. Moreover, each cleavage required a social revolution that created a critical juncture that allowed the polarization of new groups of actors in relation to the pre-existing structural divisions. For the class cleavage, for instance, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) point to the rise of industrial capitalism as the structural background condition and the Russian Revolution as the critical event that finally polarized the existing classes (workers and capitalists) and set them against one another. The new social structuration caused by the industrial revolution was made manifest by the critical juncture. These background conditions identified by cleavage theory clearly reach beyond national borders, which is why social cleavages structure different national political systems and different political arenas in similar ways.

For descriptive purposes, the concept of political cleavage has three key components. A full, ideal-typical cleavage involves (a) structural interests, political ideologies and political organizations that converge along a set of contentious issues – as Peter Mair (2006: 373) put it, ‘[t]he shift from society to politics occurs when a particular social divide [structural component] becomes associated with a particular set of values or identities [normative component], and when this is then brought into the political world, and made politically relevant by means of an organized party or group [organizational component]’; (b) two camps that stand against each other across a large set of different issue areas; while it may be theoretically possible to think of a ‘cleavage in one country’, all historical cleavages prove to have played out in (c) different political arenas or political systems at the same time.

Globalization clearly has the potential to be a formative structural development of the kind that may give rise to fundamental changes in



societal conflict lines and political alignments. If globalization or societal denationalization is understood as the relative increase of cross-border flows in goods, pollutants, people, capital, cultural symbols and moral judgements, then it can be stated that globalization affects individuals and societal groups in a fundamental but distinct way. Ronald Rogowski's (1989) seminal *Commerce and Coalitions* is paradigmatic for this line of thinking. He used the Stolper-Samuelson theorem – free trade benefits those factors of production that are abundant in a given country – in order to theorize the political effects of globalization. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, open borders privilege abundant resources, that is, in the Western world capital and in the poorer countries of the world land and labour. On this basis, Rogowski was able to make predictions about the development of political conflicts within domestic political systems, mainly the revival of class conflicts and conflicts between rural areas and cities. According to this argument, the old cleavage between capital and labour would be transformed by putting new issues at the centre of the struggle – above all the economic openness of national societies – but the opposing parties would remain the same.

The subsequent debate in political economy pointed to sectoral conflicts that might also arise as a consequence of economic globalization. Jeffrey A. Frieden (1991) argued that international financial integration does indeed favour capital over labour, particularly in developed countries, in the long run. But in the short run, the effects of integration turn on asset specificity with respect to both use and location. Accordingly, increasing capital mobility impacts producers of tradable goods and services differently from producers of non-tradables (see also Becker and Schwartz 2005). In this perspective, sectoral conflicts based on the transferability of goods and skills may, at least occasionally, cross-cut the conflict between capital and labour.

The question of new conflict formations has been studied in other academic disciplines as well. In International Relations and European Studies, it has been suggested that the politicization of international institutions like the EU, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN) Security Council has been due to an underlying conflict about the recognition of international authority (De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Zürn et al. 2012). A comparative analysis has identified two different types of politicization process – the politicization of problems associated with open but unregulated borders and the

politicization of the international institutions that have been established in response to these problems (Zürn and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2013). From this perspective, conflicts over the degree of globalization and conflicts over global regulations gain prominence. Therefore, the political conflicts around which societal mobilization evolves no longer take place within the container of the nation state, but are precisely about the boundaries of both the nation and the territorial state.

In political sociology, finally, the rise of new party landscapes in European democracies has been debated under the label of new political cleavages pointing to right-wing populism as one pole of a new conflict visible in many of the European party systems (Kitschelt 1995; Steenbergen and Marks 2004). In this view, a new dimension of politics ranging from green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) has been added to the old left–right dimension. Party positions on the issue of European integration have been found to be more strongly determined by the new dimension than the old (Hooghe et al. 2002). More recently, the seminal work of Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande and colleagues has taken up this line of thinking and identified a new cleavage in Western European party systems orthogonal to the one between capital and labour. By analysing the positions of numerous societal actors regarding three themes (economic liberalization, migration and regional integration), they point to a cleavage between demarcationists – those who want to strengthen national borders and stand against European integration – and integrationists – those who are in favour of open borders and more European integration (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012).

All these analyses point to the importance of conflict constellations that structure political systems. They argue that such constellations may change fundamentally in the age of globalization. Taken together, one can see these academic debates from the 1970s onwards as a reaction to, and part of a politicization of, globalization. The goal of this book is to integrate these different strands of research in order to give a more encompassing account of cleavages, conflict lines and conflict formations in a globalized world. We start with a first set of questions regarding the effects of globalization on political conflicts: Is this politicization of globalization a pluralist one in the sense that conflict constellations differ from issue to issue and from country to country? Or do we observe a more general pattern that cuts across issues, countries and political or polity levels?

In response to these questions, we do not necessarily expect to find one single fully developed global cleavage between cosmopolitans and communitarians that is similarly structured across all countries, polity levels and issues and that dominates all other conflict lines. Yet by using the concept of cleavage based on structurally differing interests, corresponding political ideologies and political organizations, a set of analytical tools is applied that helps to make sense of such new conflict formations to the extent that they arise.

### **1.3 Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism as Political Ideologies**

Peter Mair (2006) has correctly pointed out that structural divisions do not suffice for the emergence of a cleavage; political organizations that bundle issues and groups on the two sides of the cleavage are also required (see also Bartolini 2005). The tying together of issues by political parties and associations also presupposes an ideational background that gives meaning to the bundling and coherence to the different positions taken with respect to these issues. In the case of the class cleavage, for instance, this was provided by liberalism and socialism as political theories, which were translated into political ideologies and party programmes. Moreover, it is only these ideational backgrounds that give political meaning to the structural differences. Without Marxist and – more broadly – socialist theory, the positional difference between employers and employees would not have become one between capitalists and workers, and their differences would not have amounted to a class conflict.<sup>1</sup> In this sense, the ideas of Marx have become historically much more relevant than historical materialism itself suggested they would be.

Moreover, it is only this ideational background that makes positions taken in different issue areas comparable and thus possibly similar. For instance, a position supporting a progressive tax system and one in favour of a universal health insurance system would seem to be quite independent of one another if there were not a political world view that calls for significant corrections to the distributive outcomes produced

<sup>1</sup> In addition to the counterfactual, the US example provides support for this. Where Marxism never took root, the class cleavage was weak (see Sombart 1906).

by markets and thus opposes the world view according to which market interventions and corrections should be kept as limited as possible. Without political ideologies, single issues would be just that: single issues.

It is, therefore, necessary to provide a meaningful space for political positions in order to assess the degree of coherence across a set of issue-specific political conflicts. In order to provide such a space, we take debates in political philosophy as a starting point. This reflects our belief that sustainable political ideologies need to have some minimal coherence and intellectual quality before they can give meaning to political conflicts. Whereas political ideologies never achieve the coherence of normative theories, they implicitly or explicitly use and abuse normative arguments for underpinnings. A long-standing key debate in political philosophy is whether or not it is possible to give good reasons for universally valid norms without privileging certain (local) ethical ideas and marginalizing others.<sup>2</sup> The debate on the relevance and realization of global justice has for a long time pitted those emphasizing humanity's universal responsibility (Pogge 1992; Singer 2002; Caney 2005) against those who insist that there are 'limits to justice' (Sandel 1998) in geographical, institutional or cultural terms (see also Walzer 1994; Nagel 2005).

In political philosophy, cosmopolitanism as a normative theory has been revived as a necessary implication of liberal and universal thinking in a globalized world (Beitz 1979; Goodin 1985; Pogge 1989). In this view, the growing density of transactions across borders leads to externalities, common problems and a global community of fate (Held 1995), suggesting that we have moral obligations to all people independent of national borders. Cosmopolitan theories vary in many respects, one of them being the extent to which they assign tasks to global agencies. They reach from emphasizing the need to overcoming global collective actions problems to models about a world state. In response, others have pointed to the normative dignity of smaller human communities (Miller 1995) or the decisive institutional context of the state (Nagel 2005), positions that can be subsumed under the notion of communitarianism, although this nevertheless conceals a bundle of quite heterogeneous positions from the left to the right

<sup>2</sup> See also Zürn and De Wilde (2016) for a more complex framework along the same lines.

and from statism to communitarianism in the more narrow sense of the term. This debate runs parallel to the one about the just distribution of goods in a society.<sup>3</sup>

The philosophical debate, at its core, is about the status of communities and their relationship to individuals. On the one hand, cosmopolitans emphasizing universalism attribute moral value exclusively to all human beings. It follows that the only community with intrinsic moral value that unites individuals is humanity as a whole (Nussbaum 2007). The freedom of the individual and the principles of individuality and generality are, therefore, what is above all at stake. Likewise, those cosmopolitans, who emphasize the global character of contemporary society, like Charles Beitz (1994) and David Held (1995), argue that, with the advent of world society, justice needs to be thought of in global terms. Here the starting point is not a universalist deontology, but the empirical observation that contexts of justice and injustice, as well as relationships of unjustified domination, cross territorial borders in the age of globalization. Contemporary cosmopolitan theories, therefore, blend arguments from traditional universalism and more recent globalist thinking.

On the other hand, statisticians like John Rawls (1999) and Thomas Nagel (2005) argue that the issue of justice and legitimacy essentially remains within states.<sup>4</sup> The state provides an institutional context in which community members get in such a close relationship of rights and duties that the state is the decisive context for justice. They do not deny the need to manage global issues, but stick to the national communities created and perpetuated by state institutions as the most relevant normative context. In their view, human beings cannot be separated from the constitutive communities they are born into

<sup>3</sup> The debate between liberals and communitarians about the just distribution of goods in a society with a communitarian emphasis on the primacy of the constitutive community for people's identity and perception of justice resonates with a recognition of the state as a meaningful container of societal justice.

<sup>4</sup> As to the question of how to realize a just society within the confines of the nation state, there has been a long-standing debate between different versions of liberalism emphasizing the individual as the ultimate basis of normative concern as opposed to various collectivism – e.g., socialism, conservatism, confessionalism, nationalism – which some consider united in their common objections to liberalism under the banner of communitarianism (Mulhall and Swift 1992; Bell 1993). Communitarianism as a philosophical critique became especially important at the beginning of the 1980s (e.g., Sandel 1982), as a response to the work of John Rawls (1971).

(Bell 1993; Sandel 1998). Some protagonists of communitarianism, such as Michael Sandel (1998), Charles Taylor (1992) and Michael Walzer (1983), take issue with John Rawls' argument (1971) that justice is only thinkable when we imagine a 'veil of ignorance' blocking out our social standing and background. They argue that the original position is an illusion or an empty construction. The constitutive communities we are born into are a core part of our identity. These communities give us the moral guidelines to establish what is just and what is not. In other words, statist and most communitarian political philosophers argue that it is meaningless to isolate individuals – including their moral and ethical obligations – from their surroundings. Our use of the term 'communitarianism' is thus informed both by statist and by communitarians in the narrower meaning of the term.

Political philosophers enjoy ample space and time to develop complex arguments in academic contexts. Indeed, much of the philosophical debate centres on the question of how to achieve, safeguard or reinstate justice in a globalizing world. Political entrepreneurs aiming to support a set of preferences with ideological underpinning in the wider public sphere cannot afford these luxuries. Their debate unfolds in speeches, newspapers, television programmes, blogs and parliament rather than in academic books or articles. The process of turning philosophical arguments into public claims and preferences that will form the building blocks of ideologies is one in which shortcuts and simplifications are only to be expected.

When we move from political philosophies to political ideologies, we identify two axes of contention that are connected with general beliefs about right and wrong. We look, on the one hand, at the question of border permeability and, on the other, at the appropriate site of political authority. These contentious issues are openly debated, and it is empirically possible to code concrete claims and responses by real-world actors with respect to both (see the section on research design).

The first contentious issue is policy preference regarding the opening or closure of borders. Cosmopolitan arguments are reflected in claims for opening up borders to allow free transnational exchange. They are normatively derived from the right to free movement and instrumentally backed up by the belief that, overall, open borders increase global efficiency and justice. Those who are inspired by cosmopolitan arguments emphasize that – as a function of technology – this global context has become irreversible and, therefore, advocate open policies. Those

who draw on communitarian arguments portray state borders as necessary to delimit a sphere of justice: they therefore emphasize the normative integrity of borders. To the extent that borders allow communities to achieve collective goals, they defend them and see dense cross-border interdependencies as means of undermining collective regulations – especially since they see no realistic way of reaching global solutions.

The second axis of contention is about the appropriate site of political authority. While this is a theoretically much more versatile issue, the ideological shortcut to it often boils down to criticism of, or support for, the primacy of the nation state as the most powerful form of institutionalized political order in human history. Communitarians advocate upholding sovereignty. For them, the nation state is the place of democratic representation, participation and accountability, as well as the institution that has the capacity for redistributive solidarity within national communities. By contrast, cosmopolitans challenge the ultimate authority of the state. They argue that, in an anarchic world order made up of sovereign nation states, justice cannot be realized. First, global institutions bring in the voice of those who are affected by the negative externalities of national decisions, for example, in environmental policy. Second, a situation of world anarchy generates and sustains inequalities between states as shown by huge differences in income and life chances across the globe (Pogge 2002). Third, the principle of sovereignty does not allow for interference within states that do not uphold principles of justice within their realm. Cosmopolitans argue that the principle of sovereignty is undemocratic, makes indefensible differences between communities possible, and at the same time does not allow humanitarian intervention in the case of human rights violations – including genocide. Sovereignty, they argue, thus stands in the way of realizing justice (see Beitz 2004).<sup>5</sup>

If we assume a simple binary choice with respect to both axes of contention and combine them, we obtain a simple 2 x 2 matrix that

<sup>5</sup> In the communitarian understanding, the question of justice arises from an institutional or community context. Also, the proponents of the practice-dependence thesis argue that the principles of justice vary with the given institutional structure in which individuals relate to one another (Meckled-Garcia 2008; Sangiovanni 2008). Similarly, Dahl sees the state as the biggest unit in which decisions can be made democratically. In a global polity, opportunities for participation would ‘diminish to a vanishing point’ (Dahl 1999: 22).

Table 1.1 *Political ideologies in the age of globalization*

Level of authority	Position regarding borders	
	Openness	Closure
Supranational level	<i>Cosmopolitanism</i>	<i>Regionalism</i>
State level	<i>Liberal nationalism</i>	<i>Communitarianism</i>

delineates four ideal-typical political ideologies in the age of globalization (see Table 1.1).

We label the two ideal-typical political ideologies that bind the two axes coherently together ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘communitarianism’. We thus define the political ideology of cosmopolitanism as the combination of a position that asks for open borders and a supranational level of regulation for transactions across borders. The political ideology of communitarianism, by contrast, is defined by the combination of a position that views justice as tied to specific communities and a belief in the nation state as the primary unit in which such circumscribed justice can be realized.

As political ideologies, cosmopolitanism and communitarianism are tools in an ongoing political struggle. They can be used to rally a group around a common cause and to provide a movement with the means to present a coherent agenda on a range of issues, thus, for example, transforming a short-lived single-issue movement into a stable and multifaceted force in politics (Hamilton 1987). We expect cosmopolitanism and communitarianism as political ideologies to rise in the age of globalization, because citizens develop initially unstructured preferences in the face of new opportunities and threats that provide a potential for political entrepreneurs to capitalize on if they can articulate a political ideology and provide political programmes that harness such preferences.

However, our conceptualization also allows for two mixed positions. As we have seen, those defending open borders may see serious limitations to just and efficient supranational governance and may find that the implementation of universal justice requires the institutional strength, social cohesion and opportunities for democratic participation that, they argue, only the nation state can offer. At best, some intergovernmental institutions may be used to embed national policies. This position we label as ‘liberal nationalism’.



At the same time, not all who emphasize the importance of closure focus necessarily on national borders. Many communitarian philosophers put forward their arguments in favour of ethnic minorities within nation states. Most prominently, Charles Taylor defended the autonomy of Quebec within Canada (Taylor 1994). Because they are morally committed to circumscribed communities, they may also be prepared to engage in regional integration efforts as long as they believe in the possibility of meaningful spaces of solidarity with strong institutions. In some cases, regional integration is thus considered as the only way to maintain distinct institutional and cultural values given the amount and size of external challenges. Those who defend a strong Europe along these lines see it as the only possible way to stay on a par with the United States and China. In this case, the integration project does not serve as a stepping stone for cosmopolitanism, but as a cooperative project of nation states to protect particular shared values and institutions. We label this position 'regionalism'.

Ideologies are of course difficult to measure empirically. They structure people's attitudes and collective actors' stances in public debates, but they rarely become fully manifest. In addition, to the extent that ideological arguments are explicitly used, it is usually impossible to determine to what extent they represent actors' true beliefs or whether they are being articulated for strategic reasons. For instance, labour unions opposing free trade and employers advocating immigration may be presenting these positions on the basis of universalist moral standards, but, of course, they may also be furthering their own particular agendas by advocating such policies – a fact that they may prefer to de-emphasize. For these reasons, we will have to infer ideological positions mostly indirectly and imperfectly from individuals' and collective actors' positions on issues. There are some clear links between positions on issues and positions in the ideological space that we have delineated, but they do not always allow us to tie them into one ideological dimension. Cosmopolitan positions on our issues imply recognition of the problem of climate change, advocacy of human rights in general and of immigrant rights in particular, support for regional and other forms of supranational integration, and opposition to national economic protectionism. But the two mixed positions may also advocate some of these policies. Support for regional integration and advocacy of free trade within a regional project can also be argued from

a regionalist position. Likewise, advocacy of human and immigrant rights also fits a liberal nationalist stance. Communitarians are likely to oppose all of these things. This makes our empirical task more complicated but it is, at the same time, an adequate reflection of the fact that in societal and political reality, the boundaries between ideologies do not exist in the sharp and schematized ways in which we may describe them on the basis of abstract political philosophy.

In addition to questions about the emergence of a new cleavage, we therefore ask more specifically: Can we really see signs of a new pattern of conflict emerging between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, in which the dignity of the borders themselves and the level on which political authority is exercised become the key issues? Can a bundling of different conflicts in issue areas such as migration, trade, human rights and climate change into one more or less coherent ideological field with corresponding political organizations be observed – that is to say, is a new political cleavage taking shape? Does this bundling of issues follow a cosmopolitan or a communitarian logic?

#### **1.4 Social Structuration in the Age of Globalization: Explaining Conflict Formations**

In addition, we wish to achieve a better understanding of what explains the composition of the contending sides in new conflict formations. We distinguish between explanations based on economic interest, cultural capital and political accountability respectively. In terms of social structuration, probably the most systematic consequence of globalization is that its balance of economic, cultural and political costs and benefits tends to be highly positive for some and negative – or, at least in comparative terms, a lot less positive – for others. In view of the complex nature of globalization and its intertwinement with other processes of social change, it is difficult to make out exactly to what extent these costs and benefits are real or perceived. But, politically speaking, the exact mixture of facts and perceptions behind the globalization divide is not decisive because perceptions are real in their consequences. On the morning after the Brexit referendum, the lead editorial in the British newspaper *The Sun* summed it up as follows, under the title ‘Rage of the working class’:

Prosperous middle class home owners in London love all the Polish plumbers and cleaners. For working people the influx has meant low pay, stagnant for

a decade as housing costs have soared. It means schools and surgeries are full up. It means being branded ‘thick’ by supposedly educated Remain supporters [...]. Liberals champion all disadvantaged people EXCEPT poor Brits. (*The Sun*, 24 June 2016)

Whether the Brexit that *The Sun* ardently advocated will actually improve the situation of ‘the working class’ and ‘poor Brits’ may be questionable; just as it remains to be seen whether Donald Trump’s presidency will improve the lot of the working-class voters who brought him victory. It is also not uncontested that the Polish plumbers have really taken away something from those who see themselves as losers of globalization. But *The Sun*’s editorial does seem to reflect the mixture of grievances that is behind the communitarian challenge to cosmopolitan policies. Against this backdrop, we distinguish three explanations.

*Economically*, globalization does indeed offer a world of opportunities for those with mobile economic and human capital. The benefits of a borderless world to multinational firms and investors are obvious, but, below the level of corporations and the super-rich, even those with more modest mobile economic assets may profit from globalization, for instance, by buying comparatively cheap real estate in foreign cities or renting out property in their home towns to tourists and expats. Those with mobile qualifications, and particularly the younger cohorts among them, are in a position to profit from the opportunity to study and work abroad. Their proficiency in English and other foreign languages allows them to participate in global professional networks. This is not limited to those with exorbitantly high incomes. For students, there are numerous scholarships that allow them to spend part of their studies abroad, and academics jet around the globe enjoying the benefits of visiting fellowships, sabbaticals abroad and international conferences in fancy hotels.

Major winners of globalization are also the working and middle classes in rising economies. Within world society as a whole, the middle-income class has gained most in terms of income over recent decades (Milanović 2016). More than 300 million people were lifted out of poverty, especially in some Asian countries. Immigrants, too, are potential economic winners thanks to globalization. They are in a position to profit from the economic opportunities provided by their linkages to two (or more) countries, especially in the form of the high buying power in their poorer

countries of origin of hard currency earned in their high-income countries of immigration. As a result, immigrants who find themselves at the lower end of the socio-economic ladder in countries of immigration may at the same time become middle-class property owners in their countries of origin.

The economic risks of globalization, by contrast, tend to be carried by all those who live in the developed world and lack the appropriate transnational economic, educational and cultural resources. For low-skilled people in the richest countries of the world, globalization means actual or threatened job loss, pressure on wages and social security benefits due to foreign competition, and rising rents. To the extent that these distributional effects in income and life opportunities drive the formation of new conflicts across issue areas, we expect the coalition of winners under globalization to support cosmopolitan positions and the losers to join the communitarian club.

*Culturally*, globalization is an unequal process, as well. It favours those who can and want to participate in an emerging 'world culture' (see, e.g., Lechner and Boli 2005). In some of its aspects, such as 'fusion cuisine' and 'world music', this culture draws on a wide global array of cultural sources. Access to them, however, is not always equal in practice, as theories of cultural capital – which we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 2 – argue. Preferences for exotic food and music, and for diversity in general, are acquired tastes that can function as boundary markers of class distinctions and are apt to transform, to put it in Karl Marx's terminology, a straightforwardly social-structural class '*an sich*' into a self-consciously cosmopolitan class '*für sich*'. When a taste for the exotic and the diverse comes to be defined as the refined and enlightened choice, and a taste for the local and traditional as the parochial and backward-looking one, cultural preferences become an instrument of power.

In the global age, the distinctions between 'high' and 'low' culture as markers of class boundaries have been partly replaced and partly overlaid by the distinction between cosmopolitan and local or 'provincial' culture. Mastering the intricacies of the latest requirements of appropriate gender and race relations discourse and behaviour has become a marker for belonging to the cosmopolitan class, in a similar way that tastes for classical music and art were markers of bourgeois culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The cosmopolitan cultural taste has a paradoxical relationship to local cultural traditions. On the one hand, it cherishes and celebrates them as long as they originate in faraway exotic localities, but it tends to disdain them when they come from the cosmopolitan's own cultural background: the only local music that does not please the cosmopolitan's taste for 'world music' is often the 'country music' from their own cultural backyard. More politically salient and controversial than musical tastes, the cosmopolitan versus local culture divide is marked by attitudes towards immigration and immigrant cultures. To be a member of the global cultural class is to be 'tolerant' and 'respectful' of expressions of immigrant cultures and religions, while often being less enthusiastic about the local majority culture. The more exotic and at odds with local cultural traditions and tastes an immigrant practice is, the better suited it is to cultural boundary drawing for both the cosmopolitan and communitarian sides.

The emerging cosmopolitan world culture not only has a liberal upper- and middle-class bias; it is also decidedly Western. Moreover, it is 'Western' especially in the more limited sense of being Anglo-Saxon or, even more narrowly, US American. Cosmopolitan ideology claims that the norms and values it propagates are 'universal' but in practical terms, large parts of the world live by, and many would like to continue to live by, very different norms and values. Around the globe, religious fundamentalist movements of Christian, Jewish, Hindu and Islamic provenance, as well as nationalist movements, have risen up against the encroachment of universalism, which they perceive as 'Westernization' or 'Americanization', and as incompatible with local traditions. The West itself is far from immune from Christian and nationalist fundamentalisms, though for these fundamentalists the threat is, of course, not defined in terms of the 'West', but in terms of 'liberalism', 'cosmopolitanism' or 'Islam'.

At the same time, communitarian cultural taste has a paradoxical relationship to global culture. While the foreign is often portrayed as a danger to national cohesion, there is a continuing tendency to consume mass products and mass culture that are of foreign origin. For instance, nationally produced movies are certainly not the favourites of most right-wing communitarians in Europe, who prefer Hollywood products instead. In general, new nationalist arguments within the West present a majority culture that is under siege from 'waves' of immigrants and the aloof culture of decadent people living in the cities

who betray tradition and are involved in strange practices of all sorts. This revival of the majority culture and the collective will comes in two versions: either immigrants are considered to be dangers to local values, including tolerance and emancipation, or there is a normative augmentation of the national culture and ethnicity. Outside the West, many communitarian intellectuals see 'Westernization' or 'Americanization' as incompatible with local traditions and as a perpetuation of post-colonial relationships, even though the masses are often greatly attracted by the consumption-oriented version of Westernization – thus to some extent reversing the mass–elite divide in the West.

In sum, we expect that people who possess the educational and linguistic capital that provides them with access to global networks and experiences abroad – those labelled by David Goodhart (2017) as the 'anywheres' – will incline towards cosmopolitanism. Those, by contrast, who do not command such cultural capital and lack transnational experiences – Goodhart's 'somewheres' – are expected to be inclined towards communitarian positions. This cultural explanation thus follows Craig Calhoun's (2003) provocative description of cosmopolitanism as the class conscience of frequent travellers. Conversely, one might propose communitarianism as the class conscience of those who are stuck in their homeland.

*Politically*, globalization bolsters the relative importance of non-majoritarian institutions over majoritarian ones. As the centre of gravity of political decision-making moves away from the nation state to supranational organizations, intergovernmental summits and transnational regulatory agencies, the influence of the majoritarian institutions in parliamentary democracies – elected national, regional and local legislatures; parties; and, where they are present, institutions of direct democracy – tends to be undermined. Moreover, within national political systems, executives gain influence compared to parliaments. Non-majoritarian institutions such as central banks and constitutional courts become more influential almost everywhere (Zürn 2011).<sup>6</sup>

As far as extra-parliamentary forms of political participation are concerned, the move of politics beyond the nation state and the fragmented and diffuse nature of authority on the supranational level

<sup>6</sup> Majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions rely on different sources of legitimacy. How these different sources are related to 'democratic' legitimacy will be discussed in the conclusion.

literally take them further away from people, so that the classical repertoire of place-bound protest by way of strikes and demonstrations in concrete locations of authority, so masterfully analysed in the work of Charles Tilly (e.g., 1993), loses relevance. The corporatist channels of national labour relations are also eroded when the economic decisions that matter are increasingly taken in corporate headquarters far away or in diffuse global networks of free-flowing capital. At the same time, the large population of transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the diffuse 'epistemic communities' of experts in various fields, become more influential. These fora of participation are, however, socially much more selective than the eroding national channels of participation and representation. If NGOs have an individual member base at all – which is the case for only a minority of them – it tends to be overwhelmingly highly educated and Western. Epistemic communities, by their very nature, provide channels of participation and influence only to a select group of professional experts with the highest levels of specialized education.

Globalized politics thereby empowers state and supranational executives, non-majoritarian institutions within national political systems, global business leaders, experts and transnational NGO professionals, while nation-bound elected parliaments and nationally organized interest groups and protest politics see their political leverage dwindling. Reclaiming 'sovereignty' has, therefore, become the rallying cry of communitarian opponents of political globalization. Cosmopolitans, by contrast, view national sovereignty as an increasingly dysfunctional answer to global problems that require global solutions. Moreover, they argue, in a world in which decisions taken in one place increasingly affect people in far-away places or the world community at large, the principle of unfettered national sovereignty is not only inefficient but also normatively deficient.

From this perspective, we can expect that the new conflict lines run parallel to a growing divide between elites and masses in all countries affected by globalization. The more a country is politically globalized, the stronger the mass–elite divide can be expected to grow. Moreover, those who take cosmopolitan positions are likely to be those sitting at international negotiation tables, in international institutions and in non-majoritarian institutions within states. Those institutions that are more closely bound to majoritarian politics within nation states, such as parties and members of parliaments, are more likely to take

communitarian positions. Finally, the common feature of non-majoritarian institutions is that technocratic expertise and the power of argument are decisive rather than the power of numbers. Therefore, those with recognized expertise and superior education should be expected to be on the cosmopolitan side, while the less highly educated, who are excluded from technocratic decision-making processes, can be expected to be associated with communitarian positions.

### **1.5 Our Research Design**

We answer our research questions by analysing political conflict formations in five countries – the United States, Germany, Poland, Turkey and Mexico – and two international organizations – the EU and the UN. Previous research on the political impacts of globalization has had a strong focus on Western Europe, with the work of Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande and their colleagues being the most influential example (Kriesi et al. 2008; 2012). Western Europe does seem to be the world region where the political repercussions of globalization first became visible; for instance, in the form of the rise of right-wing populist parties from the 1980s onward, as well as of increased controversies over immigration and European integration. Given that Western European economies are among the most open in the world and that the EU is by far the most developed example of political supranationalization, this is not surprising. As will become clear in the course of the book, our results for the German case confirm many of Kriesi et al.'s (2008; 2012) findings for Western Europe. However, if globalization is really the driving force behind these shifts in the political landscape, we should also be able to observe its transformative effects outside Western Europe, and we should enquire to what extent other regions show similar or different patterns.

Because studying the effects of globalization on political mobilization and public debates is not meaningfully possible in authoritarian contexts where political competition and the media are severely restricted, we limit ourselves to countries that fulfil certain minimum standards of competitive democracy and civil liberties. Concretely, we have only considered countries that were classified in the Polity IV index as 'full democracies' or 'democracies' during the period of our data gathering (2004–2015), and that were considered as at least



‘partly free’ by the Freedom House index.<sup>7</sup> This still leaves, of course, a wide range of choices open. We therefore delimited our choice set further by focusing on two of the most developed projects of regional economic and political integration in the world today: the EU and NAFTA. We chose Germany and Poland for the EU, and the United States and Mexico for NAFTA. In the EU context, we also included Turkey, which is a candidate for EU membership.

This choice of countries offers variation across all three dimensions of globalization. Economically, it includes both rich and medium-income countries. Culturally, it includes two countries of the Western core, as well as countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. Moreover, Germany and the United States are among the most important immigration countries in the world, whereas the other three countries are net emigration countries. Politically, some of our countries have a long history of stable democracy while others are more recently democratized, plagued by coups and ongoing authoritarian tendencies in their political systems. They include parliamentary and presidential democracies, operate under various forms of proportional and majoritarian electoral rules and have two- or multiple-party systems. In addition, in terms of exposure to politics beyond the nation state, we have the variation between the deep form of regional integration of the EU and the much shallower integration of the NAFTA bloc. Within the EU context, we include a founding core member (Germany), a recent accession country (Poland), and a candidate country on the EU’s periphery (Turkey). With so much variation across only five cases, it should be obvious that we cannot – and do not aim to – engage in rigorous testing of cross-country hypotheses. Rather, we follow a so-called ‘most different systems’ design in which we investigate the extent to which similar patterns can be discerned in the ways that globalization impacts politics across countries with varying economies, cultures, political histories and party systems.

<sup>7</sup> Polity IV, ‘Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013’, Principal Investigator: Monty G. Marshall, retrieved from [www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm](http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm) (last updated 6 June 2016, last accessed 16 April 2017). Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2016*, ‘Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom under Pressure’, retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016> (last accessed 16 April 2017).

For each of these countries, we follow a multi-method approach based on three components: mass population surveys, an elite survey and political claims data drawn from print media. For the population surveys, we make use of two existing cross-national sources that cover our countries of study: the World Values Survey (Waves 5 and 6; conducted, depending on the country, between 2005 and 2014) and the Transatlantic Trends Surveys of 2008 and 2009. For the two other components, we have built new datasets. Our WZB International Leaders Survey (see Teney et al. 2018) covers more than 1,600 occupants of leading positions across twelve societal sectors (politics, administration, justice, military and police, labour unions, finance and economy, other lobbyism, research, religion, culture, media and other civil society). This elite survey is unique not only in scope but also regarding the content of the questions we asked. By confronting elites with the same questions on issues related to globalization that have also been asked in population surveys, we are in a position to make direct comparisons between elite and mass attitudes. We can thereby address the key question as to the extent to which a divergence between elites and mass publics is a defining characteristic of the new pattern of political conflict in the age of globalization.

Our new data on political claims are based on an extensive content analysis of almost 12,000 public statements on globalization-related issues made by a variety of social and political actors across sixteen leading newspapers in the five countries. Using the methodology of claims-making analysis, we coded who speaks on which issues, in favour of which positions, addressing which levels of authority, and in the name of which constituencies (cf. Koopmans et al. 2005; De Wilde et al. 2014).

However, in order to adequately capture the political impacts of globalization, we, of course, could not limit ourselves to nationally circumscribed data sources. In addition to our five country cases, therefore, we took a systematic look at the European and global polity levels. On the global level, we conducted the elite survey among the upper echelons of the UN and other supranational organizations, global interest groups and international NGOs covering the same twelve sectors as on the national level. With regard to political claims, we analysed statements made in the UN General Assembly. On the European level, we surveyed elites and analysed political claims made in debates in the European Parliament. On both the global and the

European level, these data involved no restrictions on the national provenance of actors. The elites interviewed at the global and European levels could have come from one of our five chosen countries or have been of any other nationality; likewise our claims data from the UN and EU levels include statements made by actors from, say, Russia, Estonia or Nigeria. We apply a similar approach to our coding of newspapers: the statements we coded were made by actors not only from our five countries and the European and global levels, but from any other country in the world.

Naturally, it was neither possible nor desirable to analyse mass or elite opinions, much less political claims, across the full range of political issues. Since we are specifically interested in the impact of economic, cultural and political globalization, it was necessary to focus on issue areas dominated by transborder interactions or societal denationalization in the first place. These issues have to do with the crossing of borders by people (migration), as well as by a variety of commodities and goods (trade), capital (e.g., global finance, foreign direct investment), pollutants (environmental degradation, climate change), violence (e.g., humanitarian intervention), values (e.g., human rights, gender equality), political influence (e.g., UN, EU or multilateral decisions), diseases (global pandemics), communication (e.g., the internet), or security threats (e.g., international terrorism) (cf. Beisheim et al. 1999).

To capture a significant variety of ‘globalized’ issue areas, we chose five that involve the crossing of borders by different commodities. First, the regulation of international trade has long been at the forefront of globalization studies (see, e.g., Rogowski 1989; Frieden 1991). The societal transaction involved concerns border crossing by goods and services. Migration is a second major issue area dominantly understood to be a feature of globalization (e.g., Koopmans et al. 2005; Kymlicka 2010). Its transactional substance is border crossing by people, whether for temporary or permanent resettlement. This issue area includes questions such as rights to employment and residence permits, roads to citizenship and asylum policy, as well as brain drains and the social integration of immigrants and diasporas. The third issue area we have chosen is climate change. In this case, environmental pollutants and their remedies cross borders and thus create issues of governance. Questions dealt with include whether a country should subscribe to obligations as currently laid down in the Paris Convention or earlier in

the Kyoto Protocol to limit its emissions of greenhouse gasses, to what extent combating global climate change should be voluntary, and who should pay for mitigating the effects of climate change (Biermann et al. 2012). Fourth, we address the issue area of human rights. At stake here are the diffusion and global application of norms and values with regard to the relationships among states, other powerful actors and individuals. The build-up of a global human rights regime under the auspices of the UN is one of the cornerstones of arguments in favour of a shared global responsibility among humanity (e.g., Pogge 2002; Risse et al. 2013). This issue area includes the defence of the physical integrity of human beings against violence, non-discrimination, freedom of association and religion, and the right to due process and a fair trial. In political practice, we find arguments in favour of and against international intervention, as well as debates on conflicting human rights, as between non-discrimination with regard to women and the religious freedom to wear a headscarf. Fifth and finally, we look at border crossing by political authority focusing on debates around the EU and NAFTA regional integration projects. This issue area includes questions such as whether countries should be members of a regional organization, how much power regional institutions should have over their member states, which policy issues these institutions should be allowed to pass collectively binding decisions on and how regional decision-making processes should be organized – including such questions as voting weights and unanimity versus majority voting (Börzel 2005; Hooghe et al. 2016). In each of these five issue areas, we look at whether actors take positions for or against open borders and for or against political authority beyond the nation state.

Needless to say, there are many more issues that manifest and contribute to globalization and denationalization. The selection here is merely an attempt to capture a broad variety of issues – representative of border crossing by people, goods, norms, authority and pollutants – that cover aspects of all three dimensions of globalization. We make no *a priori* assumptions as to whether certain issues belong uniquely to one of these dimensions. International trade obviously captures the economic dimension, while regional integration obviously has a political component, but equally clearly has an economic and, in Europe, also a cultural dimension. Similarly, migration may be seen as a cultural but also an economic issue, human rights as political or cultural, and combating climate change might plausibly be seen predominantly

from an economic, a cultural or a political governance angle. Therefore, we leave the question of how these issues relate to the economic, cultural or political dimensions of globalization – or whether they perhaps even converge into a single ‘cosmopolitanism versus communitarianism’ opposition – to be dealt with empirically.

Our approach differs from existing research in a number of respects. First, in our view, it is not only open borders but more generally the governance of open borders that is at stake. We look not only at positions regarding the openness of societies, but also ask about positions regarding the appropriate level of authority. Second, in doing so, we not only look at structurally induced positions or interests of societal actors, but at political ideologies that combine at least two axes of contention. In taking cosmopolitanism and communitarianism as ideal-typical political ideologies, we also take into account the belief systems underlying conflict formations building on debates in political philosophy. In doing so, we want to avoid the integrationist stance taken by most research so far, which tends to define the counterposition to cosmopolitanism as a merely defensive response to globalization and, therefore, sees one side of the new conflict line implicitly as a transitional atavism and a brake to modernization. The laying-out of the ideational elements at an eye level shall avoid this bias. Finally, our analysis moves beyond national political arenas in Western Europe. We overcome this Eurocentrism by taking into account the development of conflict formations in societies such as Mexico and Turkey, as well as those in European and international arenas.

## **1.6 Overview of the Book**

The empirical section of this book consists of two parts. The three chapters in Part I investigate impacts of globalization on the domestic politics of our five countries of study. The three chapters in Part II expand the picture to take in analyses at the supranational level and cross-level analyses including both national and supranational actors.

We start with a comparison of mass and elite opinions in Chapter 2. Earlier studies dealing with specific issues such as European integration, or covering several issues in Germany, pointed to the existence of a substantial attitude gap between economic, cultural and political elites, who tend to adhere to cosmopolitan positions, and mass publics with more communitarian leanings. We investigate whether this

finding can be generalized across the range of issues and countries included in our study. Contrasting mass opinion surveys with results from our own elite survey, we show that the mass–elite divide on globalization issues is indeed pervasive and can be found in all five countries of study. To explain this divide, we consider both economic causes in the shape of diverging material interests and cultural ones, the latter pointing towards the cultural capital and symbolic boundaries that define a transnational cosmopolitan class consciousness. The results align more with the cultural than with the economic explanation. In spite of their different sectoral interests, economic, cultural and political elites in the five countries display remarkably convergent cosmopolitan positions across issues as varied as international trade, climate change, migration and supranational integration. Mass publics are much more divided on these issues. Within mass publics, higher levels of education are associated with more cosmopolitan positions. However, education alone does not explain the mass–elite gap because occupants of elite positions are still significantly more cosmopolitan than highly educated members of mass publics, even within the same country.

In Chapter 3, we further explore mass opinions by investigating theoretically derived hypotheses about the differential effects of education, class location and political values conditional on countries' levels of economic, cultural and political globalization. Using data from the World Values Survey, we demonstrate that the more globalized a country is along these dimensions, the stronger the polarization of attitudes within that country across classes, between the less well and the better educated, between those who identify as left-wing and right-wing, and between adherents of materialist and post-materialist value patterns. The impact of globalization on domestic politics is thus not just a question of new lines of conflict but also one of the reinvigoration and increased polarization of existing lines.

Chapter 4 shifts attention from individual attitudes to issue contestation by collective actors in public debates in our five countries of study. Here, we look at claims-making in print news media by both governmental, legislative and party-political actors, and a range of civil society groups, including employers, labour unions, churches and NGOs. To these data, we apply multidimensional scaling analysis and ask to what extent we find polarization along the five globalization issues and to what extent this polarization allows us to identify coherent 'camps'

that represent consistent combinations of positions on issues. We also ask to what extent these conflict patterns look similar in the five countries. In line with the findings from Chapter 2, we find a powerful mainstream holding cosmopolitan and liberal nationalist positions in all countries. It consists mostly of governmental actors and the judiciary, but also encompasses large parts of the media, civil society organizations and experts. Legislative and party actors, by contrast, tend to cluster in different camps that are defined by anti-immigration positions in right-wing parties and anti-trade positions in parties on the left. In none of the countries do we find a coherent communitarian cluster. In particular, left communitarians tend to be critical of international trade, but neutral or supportive towards migration; right communitarians tend to display the opposite pattern. Regarding cross-national differences, we find migration to be much more polarized in the United States, Germany and Poland than in the emigration countries of Turkey and Mexico. In Mexico, polarization centres around the trade issue, and in Turkey there is not much polarization on any of the globalization issues. For Turkey, globalization seems as yet not to be a major structuring force in the political landscape.

In Part II of the book, we expand our focus beyond the domestic politics of the five countries. Chapter 5 returns to our elite survey and compares national, European and global elites. Unlike Chapter 2, where the comparison of elites and mass publics was the focus, we now look at variance within elites. The positions of European-level elites turn out to be even more strongly cosmopolitan than those of national elites, which indicates that a particularly large gap exists between the cosmopolitanism of European elites and the more communitarian orientation of mass publics. We again apply our economic interest, cultural capital and political accountability perspectives to intra-elite variation, and find that economic explanations are mainly relevant for positions on international trade and supranational integration, where business and labour union elites diverge strongly, particularly in Mexico. Cultural explanations – measured by embeddedness in transnational networks – have the greatest explanatory power. Those elites who have more transnational contacts and travel experience are more cosmopolitan with regard to trade, immigration and supranational integration.

In Chapter 6, we investigate claims-making in the two arguably most influential supranational representative arenas, the United Nations

General Assembly and the European Parliament. Using the same method as we did for domestic debates in Chapter 4, we find that debates in these supranational arenas lean even more strongly towards cosmopolitan positions than the domestic debates did. Within the UN General Assembly, there is not much polarization on these issues at all and any differences that do exist relate to the frequency with which actors make claims on globalization issues (i.e., to issue salience), rather than to diverging positions on them. This is, to some extent, different in the European Parliament. Here we find significant polarization on migration due to the presence of right-wing populist parties, polarization on international trade because of the presence of parties of the new radical Left and polarization on regional integration because of the presence of both. We argue that this difference between a cosmopolitan consensus in the UN General Assembly and a more politicized debate in the European Parliament fits the political accountability explanation since the European Parliament is directly elected by mass electorates and is – albeit imperfectly compared to national parliaments – accountable to them. Additional evidence for this reading comes from the fact that claims made by representatives of the executive European Commission who speak before the European Parliament are significantly more cosmopolitan than claims by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This points, we argue, to a dilemma for cosmopolitan democrats: democratizing supranational governance and making it more politically accountable seems to erode support for cosmopolitan policies within supranational bodies.

Our final empirical chapter, Chapter 7, offers a comprehensive analysis of political claims-making that brings together the results from domestic public debates, and the supranational arenas of the UN General Assembly and the European Parliament. We include claims not only made by actors from our five countries of study, but also by actors from other countries around the world. Using factor analysis, we analyse the dimensionality of claims-making and find support for our threefold distinction between the economic, cultural and political dimensions of globalization. The cultural dimension is centred on migration and also includes human rights and climate change, and the economic dimension is centred on international trade. Positions on regional integration – our indicator of political globalization – vary between NAFTA members Mexico and the United States, where it is associated with the trade issue, and EU members Germany and Poland,



where it is part of the cultural dimension. This reflects the different nature of the two arenas of regional integration, almost exclusively economic in the case of NAFTA, but with important cultural and social components in the case of the EU. With respect to actors' positions on globalization issues, we again find strong evidence for our political accountability explanation. Global actors (mostly NGOs and UN organizations) take cosmopolitan positions almost exclusively. They are followed by regional-level and finally domestic actors who show a stronger representation of communitarian positions. Among domestic actors there is a marked differentiation between predominantly cosmopolitan executive and administrative state actors on the one hand, and legislative and civil society actors with more strongly communitarian leanings, on the other. The fact that, in global and regional-level governance, specialized knowledge and technocratic arguments tend to be decisive rather than electoral calculus also explains why expert actors, like political executives, display consistently cosmopolitan positions across all issues. On trade and regional integration issues, we also find evidence for more classic economic-interest explanations. Here, labour unions and farmers, as representatives of a form of immobile capital, are found on the communitarian side, whereas business associations and representatives of large firms strongly favour free international trade and regional integration.

Overall, our analyses in this book reveal a picture of the political repercussions of globalization that is much richer and more complex than that shown in previous analyses that have focused primarily on party-political conflicts within domestic, European polities and on migration and regional integration as the primary issues that ignite conflicts around globalization. Our analyses replicate findings from earlier studies, such as the existence of a sociocultural ('GAL-TAN', 'new politics') conflict line that is perpendicular to traditional class cleavages, or the 'inverted U-curve' of support for political denationalization. However, by extending the range of issues and countries, by looking not only at domestic but also at regional and global political arenas, and by looking beyond political parties alone, we are able to arrive at several new and important findings.

First, we show that processes of globalization and denationalization have restructured the domestic political space not only in Europe, but have operated in very similar ways in non-European countries such as Mexico and the United States. In Turkey, the impact of globalization

on the structure of political conflict is less strong, but still discernible. In all five countries, we find that political space is structured by a sociocultural as well as an economic dimension of globalization.

The second novel finding revealed by our analyses is that, overlying conflicts along sociocultural and economic lines, there is a conflict that revolves around structural issues of democratic accountability, representation and participation. Here we find a strong and very consistent polarization between cosmopolitan governments and experts, on the one hand, and more communitarian legislative members, citizens and civil society groups of various kinds, on the other.

Third, our research design takes into account the obvious but thus far neglected fact that, by their very nature, conflicts around globalization and denationalization cannot and will not play themselves out only within national polities. Our results show that, in addition to the various domestic conflict lines, there is an international dimension to such conflicts, and, in particular, there is consistent and pronounced opposition between polity levels, with cosmopolitan supranational actors squaring off against more communitarian national actors.

Fourth and finally, our comparison of elite and mass surveys reveals a marked attitudinal rift. Economic, cultural and political elites strongly converge on cosmopolitan positions, whereas mass publics are less homogeneous, but lean more strongly towards communitarian positions. As a consequence, elites from different countries and from domestic or supranational polity levels are much more similar to each other than they are to the mass publics of their countries of origin. Among elites, embeddedness in transnational social networks and international travel are the strongest determinants of cosmopolitanism. We thus find strong evidence for the emergence of a cosmopolitan class with dense transnational social network ties, extensive experience of international travel and living abroad, which, by virtue of its elite status, multilingualism and expert knowledge, has privileged access to processes of global governance.

The normative implications of these findings are discussed in the concluding Chapter 8. The core argument here is that both cosmopolitan and communitarian conceptions of democracy have become prominent in the age of globalization, but both display considerable weaknesses. On the one hand, cosmopolitan notions of global democracy are mainly built on the affectedness principle – all those who are affected by a decision should have a say in the decision-making. Yet

most cosmopolitan understandings of democracy fail to develop convincing answers to the threshold question of how much affectedness justifies a voice in the political process. Moreover, the issue of feasibility looms large. Is there any possibility to create the institutions necessary for a global democracy to work? On the other hand, communitarian notions of democracy are built on territorially confined political communities. Yet in the age of globalization, externalities and interdependence undermine the notion of contained communities. Communitarian political ideologies do not have convincing answers for the handling of those externalities and (therefore) often develop notions of community that are exclusionist and arbitrary. Indeed, borders have become the bones of contention. While previous cleavages could be dealt with within nation states, the borders of nation states themselves are now at stake. This makes the current struggle over borders historically unprecedented. Given that the conflict goes so deep, it is no surprise that communitarians and cosmopolitans often take diametrically opposing positions and that both have problems formulating political projects that are fully compatible with democratic principles.

In sum, our study shows that the political repercussions of globalization go far beyond domestic party politics. They also lead to deep tensions between supranational and national polity levels, between countries differentially exposed to globalization, between executive and legislative political elites, as well as between elites and mass publics. Together, they pose fundamental challenges for organizing democratic politics in a global age.

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