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Mass Opinions: Globalization and Issues as Axes of Contention

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Mass Opinions: Globalization and Issues as Axes of Contention

BERNHARD WESSELS AND OLIVER STRIJBIS

3.1 Introduction

We argue in this book that the arena of political conflict has been widened and that political space has lost its unidimensional character – if that ever existed. This chapter aims at a broad comparison of mass publics. Making use of the theoretical considerations set out in the introductory chapter, it will investigate the political space of mass publics, starting from core issues which could be the foundations of new conflict lines and possibly a differentiated cleavage structure.

What was correct in the times of frozen party systems still holds today. In politics and voting, it is rarely the case that single issues determine discussion, conflict and behaviour; instead, we must look to issue packages, ‘commitments, outlooks, and, sometimes, *Weltanschauungen* ...’. Lipset and Rokkan defined their task in the introduction to *Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments* as to identify and develop ‘realistic models to explain the formation of different systems of such “packages”’ (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 2 ff.). The first task of this chapter is to check empirically whether the theoretical claims of the introduction hold true for citizens of the five countries under investigation and beyond. This is the descriptive part of the contribution. Second, the question is whether it is really the globalization context that contributes to the differentiation of issue orientations and conflict lines across mass publics.

To this end, issues have to be identified and we need to check whether they form bundles or packages in the minds of the public thus creating a political space of more than one dimension. The expectation is that, in addition to the traditional dimensions of political conflict, border permeability and the appropriate site of political authority are areas creating new axes of contention as a result of economic, political and cultural globalization. Furthermore, micro and macro explanations

have to be tested. The expectation is that individuals who are negatively or positively affected by the changes brought about by denationalization will contribute to the differentiation of spheres of interest that affect issue orientations and thus contribute to the differentiation of the axes of contention.

In the next section, countries, issues and data are discussed and presented. Section 3.3 then presents some descriptive analyses of contextual differences across countries and the distribution of orientations towards migration, transborder authority, and global warming. Section 3.4 uses multilevel analysis in order to evaluate the impact of individual-level characteristics on the issue orientations while controlling for context. This section also tries to determine to what degree context influences the impact of individual-level factors on issue-orientations. Section 3.5, finally, summarizes the results and discusses the significance of the findings for an understanding of the genesis of a new conflict formation.

3.2 Countries, Issues and Data

A basic assumption of this book is that the national context matters and impacts and frames the attitudes of citizens towards these issues. The selection of countries follows the logic of a most different system design and assumes that it will find ‘concomitant variation’, as John Stuart Mill put it: ‘Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation’ (Mill 1882: 287). Thus, the selection of countries should present some variation in relevant macro contexts. As we have argued, there are three relevant aspects of globalization: the economic, cultural and political. The KOF indices of the Economic Institute of the ETH Zurich cover all three aspects. Their measure of economic globalization considers two dimensions: flows and restrictions. Here we use the flow measure of goods and money across the borders of a country. Cultural globalization is a subdimension of what KOF calls social globalization, and is measured by the spread of Ikea, McDonalds, and foreign books in a country. Third, political globalization is a measure composed of the number of embassies in a country, its membership of international organizations, its participation in UN Security Council missions and the number of international treaties it has signed.

Table 3.1 *Macro-context characteristics: OECD means compared to selected countries*

	KOF Globalization Measures			Change in net migration flow	Greenhouse gas/capita
	Economic	Cultural	Political		
Mean OECD Countries in World Values Survey 5					
Min	47.8	40.0	57.4	−2.3	5.1
Max	94.1	94.8	98.2	13.7	27.1
Mean	72.5	79.0	90.9	4.2	11.4
Median	76.1	88.6	92.1	3.1	9.4
Case countries					
GER	65.1	89.4	92.1	0.8	10.6
MEX	58.9	40.7	72.0	6.1	5.9
POL	73.6	84.7	94.2	−1.8	9.4
TUR	58.9	75.8	92.7	3.0	5.1
USA	58.7	87.9	91.9	2.4	21.3
Mean case countries					
Min	58.7	40.7	72.0	−1.8	5.1
Max	73.6	89.4	94.2	6.1	21.3
Mean	62.7	75.4	88.1	2.3	10.2
Median	58.9	84.7	92.1	2.4	9.4

Sources: KOF globalization measures <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch> (KOF Swiss Economic Institute 2015); Migration: www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimatestotal.shtml (UN: Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 revision – Migrants by Age and Sex); Greenhouse gas: <http://cait.wri.org/historical/> (World Resource Institute).

In addition, the ‘problem loads’ from migration and pollution may be relevant contexts shaping public opinion. The countries selected represent a considerable variation in these five context characteristics. In comparison to the whole OECD world as represented in World Values Survey 5, the selected countries cover quite a large percentage of the distribution: almost 90 per cent of the range of cultural globalization, three quarters of the range of greenhouse gas pollution, the upper half of the range of political globalization, half of the range of migration flow, and about a third of the range of economic globalization (see Table 3.1).

Of the five issues on which we focus in this book, three can be analysed at the level of mass publics using the World Values Survey 2005. Unfortunately, no questions are available on attitudes towards trade liberalization, foreign trade and the like, or towards human rights. Thus, our analysis in this chapter is limited to the issues of migration, the locus of authority and climate change. In order to obtain reliable and valid measures of the positions of respondents in these three issue areas, we have used several indicators to construct scales for each area.

With respect to migration, we used the following questions:

How about people from other countries coming here to work? Which one of the following do you think the government should do? (Read out and code one answer):

- 1 – Let anyone come who wants to?
- 2 – Let people come as long as there are jobs available?
- 3 – Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here?
- 4 – Prohibit people coming here from other countries?

The values of this variable were subtracted from 5 creating a scale that indicated support for open borders by a value of 4 and a restrictive view by a value of 1.

The second question was:

Do you agree, disagree or neither agree nor disagree with the following statements?

When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [nationality of respondent] people over immigrants.

Agree – Neither – Disagree

The third question was:

On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours?

Immigrants/foreign workers

(Mentioned/Not mentioned)

The tolerant position gets the value 4, the intolerant a value of 1.

The fourth item read:

I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all?

People of another nationality

The most trustful position got a value of 4, a no-trust position a value of 1.

The fifth element was a composite of four items asking:

In your opinion, how important should the following be as requirements for somebody seeking citizenship of your country? Specify for each requirement if you consider it as very important, rather important or not important (read out and code one answer for each requirement): Very important; Rather important; Not important:

- Having ancestors from my country;
- Being born on my country's soil;
- Adopting the customs of my country;
- Abiding by my country's laws.

Very important was coded 1, not important 3; the values attributed to items were totalled, divided by 4 and subtracted from 4. The result was a summary measure ranging from 1 to 3 with 1 indicating the most demanding attitude in regard to citizenship requirements and 3 indicating that these four criteria had no relevance at all.

These recoded questions were subjected to confirmatory analysis with satisfactory results. Standardized factor loadings were on average above 0.4, a value which has been regarded as the cut-off for acceptable solutions (McCoy and Kim 2016). Furthermore, fit statistics supported the model. The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) should be close to 0, scores between 0.05 and 0.08 are acceptable, and the same is true for the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR). Finally, for the comparative fit index (CFI) a value of 0.95 or higher is presently accepted as an indicator of good fit (Hu and Bentler 1999). The model fitted all these criteria. The coefficient of determination, that is, the explained variance of the model was 0.51 for the migration issue (see Table 3.2). Thus, an additive scale of items was constructed as the variable to be used for the subsequent analyses.

Regarding authority allocation, that is, supranational integration, five items of a battery were used, which asked the following question:

Some people believe that certain kinds of problems could be better handled by the United Nations or regional organizations rather than by each national government separately. Others think that these problems should be left entirely to the national governments. I'm going to mention some problems. For each one, would you tell me whether you think that policies in this

Table 3.2 *Construction and reliability of scales for three issue areas*

Immigration	Standardized factor loadings (CFA)	Fit statistics	
Allow people from other countries coming here to work (yes = high value)	0.442	RMSEA	0.041
Employers should give priority to [COUNTRY] people (yes = low value)	0.332	SRMR	0.018
Migrants: not like to have as neighbours (yes = low value)	0.336	CD	0.514
Trust people of another nationality	0.464	CFI	0.965
Number and relevance of criteria for citizenship (high = low value)	0.475		
<i>Mean</i>	<i>0.410</i>		
<i>Authority</i>	<i>Standardized factor loadings (CFA)</i>	<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Peacekeeping	0.490	RMSEA	0.086
Protection of the environment	0.494	SRMR	0.030
Aid to developing countries	0.567	CD	0.670
Refugees	0.553	CFI	0.941
Human rights	0.569		
<i>Mean</i>	<i>0.535</i>		
<i>Global Warming</i>	<i>Standardized factor loadings (CFA)</i>	<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Global warming or the greenhouse effect	0.657	RMSEA	0.075
Loss of plant or animal species or biodiversity	0.855	SRMR	0.016
Pollution of rivers, lakes and oceans	0.757	CD	0.833
Poor air quality serious problem in community	0.375	CFI	0.990
<i>Mean</i>	<i>0.661</i>		

Note: Based on data from five nations (Germany, Mexico, Poland, Turkey, USA), about 7,200 respondents.

area should be decided by the national governments, by regional organizations, or by the United Nations? (Read out and code one answer for each problem):

- Peacekeeping
- Protection of the environment
- Aid to developing countries
- Refugees
- Human Rights

National governments – Regional organizations – United Nations – National governments with UN coordination

‘National governments’ were coded 1, ‘National governments with UN coordination’ 2, ‘Regional organizations’ 3, and ‘United Nations’ 4. This re-rating was tested by principle component analysis and scale tests. Again, results from the confirmatory factor analysis supported the unidimensionality of items. Standardized factor scores and goodness of fit values were acceptable (Table 3.2), and therefore here, too, an additive scale of the authority items could be used for the further analyses.

Third, pollution and global warming as an issue area were represented by three items of a battery asking:

Now let’s consider environmental problems in the world as a whole. Please, tell me how serious you consider each of the following to be for the world as a whole. Is it very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious or not serious at all?

- Global warming or the greenhouse effect
- Loss of plant or animal species or biodiversity
- Pollution of rivers, lakes and oceans

Answers were recoded in the following way, namely so that 4 indicated a perception of pollution as a serious problem, 1 no perception of it as a serious problem.

Additionally, a question was asked concerning the local problem load:

I am going to read out a list of environmental problems facing many communities. Please, tell me how serious you consider each one to be here in your own community. Is it very serious, somewhat serious, not very serious or not serious at all?

Poor air quality

Coding was done as above.

According to our theoretical expectations, these three issues – as well as international trade, for which we have no data – are representations of the axes of conflict. The issues are embedded in national contexts, which differ in their degrees of globalization and respective problem loads.

Thus, the question is to what degree citizens' issue positions on the three issues vary with differences in contexts of globalization.

3.3 Contextual Determinants of Issue Orientations

As far as contexts are concerned, the overarching assumption here is that globalization matters. Globalization has a number of aspects and dimensions, which relate to the issues of migration, authority and global warming. On average, economic and cultural globalization should contribute to positive attitudes towards migration because experience with 'others' normally contributes to mutual understanding. This is, at least, a claim made by transactionalism (Deutsch 1968). It assumes that transactions are indicators of sufficient integration at a social level. Political globalization should be conducive to the acceptance of supranational or border-crossing authority. Regarding global warming, one expectation might be that economic globalization goes together with the conviction that the environment is in danger. However, with regard to migration and global warming, more specific contextual characteristics may matter. Increasing migration rates probably decrease support for open borders, as experience with the so-called refugee crisis in 2016 in Europe suggests. Similarly, at least in the highly industrialized world, a level of high greenhouse gas pollution in a country should increase awareness regarding environmental problems and global warming.

These general expectations regarding the impact of global context are 'on average'. Looking at different groups in society would show a different picture. How contextual factors condition the effects of individual characteristics is the topic of the next section. In order to provide the broader picture in which the five countries under observation can be placed, survey data and macro contexts from all OECD countries represented in the World Values Survey 2005 are considered.

Table 3.3 *Aggregate correlations of mean issue orientations and globalization contexts, 35 OECD countries*

	KOF globalization measures			Change in net	Greenhouse
	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Cultural</i>	<i>Political</i>	<i>migration flow</i>	<i>gas/capita</i>
Authority	-0.073	0.341	0.482	0.195	-0.307
Immigration	0.544	0.399	0.484	-0.236	0.259
Global warming	-0.082	0.009	-0.195	0.259	-0.156

The highest correlations between mean issue orientation in a country and macro contexts in the 35 OECD countries covered by the survey are those between the migration issue and economic globalization, the same issue and cultural globalization and authority and cultural globalization. More specifically regarding expectations, the idea of a positive relation between economic and cultural globalization also and openness for migration is supported by the data (Table 3.3). Political globalization goes together with a higher support for cross-border authority. However, economic globalization does not contribute to a higher sensitivity to environmental problems, and being a stronger greenhouse gas polluter actually leads to less concern about global warming.

How countries group with respect to their mean issue position and contexts of globalization is shown in Figure 3.1, which gives the theoretically most reasonable aggregate correlations. Results weakly suggest that the higher the impact of globalization, the more positively people, on average, position themselves regarding open borders and supranational authority. However, the more a country is a polluter the less people seem to regard global warming as a problem. The five case countries more or less fit the general pattern. Mexico is somewhat of an outlier regarding its degree of cultural globalization and level of support for supranational authority allocation. The second outlier is the USA regarding greenhouse gas per capita and criticism of global warming.

3.4 Interaction of Individual and Contextual Determinants of Issue Orientations

Patterns of globalization in the aggregate only weakly relate to the particular mean issue orientations of mass publics. However, because




Figure 3.1 Macro contexts of globalization and mean positions on three issues in the OECD

there are systematic differences in the consequences of globalization for different groups in society, effects may be visible only at the individual level. Economic, cultural and political globalization and their global consequences are costly for some and positive for others, creating objective losers and winners of globalization. The question is under which conditions this translates into respective issue orientations regarding openness of borders and supranationalization of authority.

Economic globalization is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, liberalized markets seem to contribute to higher levels of trade between countries, contributing to affluence in general. On the other hand, globalization produces different effects on national labour markets. For those who are well educated and well trained, economic globalization may open up opportunities not otherwise available. For those who

do not enjoy this privilege, globalization may be regarded as a threat to their economic security and employment.

By the same token, cultural globalization may be regarded as a chance or as a threat. Cultural globalization changes the definitions of in-groups and out-groups, thus constituting a threat to those who feel that they are on the losing side of globalization. Like economic globalization, cultural globalization produces inequalities. Participation in a global culture demands mastery of cognitive tools, just as profiting from economic globalization demands high qualifications, skills, language capacities and mobility.

Gabel has shown that support for supranational authority and global markets is higher among professionals, lower among manual workers, and increases with education as well as with income (Gabel 1998b). These findings are very much in line with the general understanding that globalization affects individuals and social groups in very different ways, an expectation raised in the introduction with reference to Rogowski (1989).

Whereas this type of idea with an emphasis on classical social divisions and divisions between social coalitions argues in terms of class theory and thus conventional forms of conflict within the frame of left and right ideologies, the debate on a new conflict line in Western societies (Hildebrandt and Dalton 1978; Alber 1985; Weßels 1991; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2012) has called into question the one-dimensionality of conflict and identified a conflict line orthogonal to the one between left and right, or capital and labour. This new conflict line has been variously labelled as ‘new politics’ or ‘liberal-authoritarian’, but the phenomenon meant seems to be the same.

Regarding possible tensions in the three issue areas, the cumulative distribution shows the following: with regard to migration and authority, polarization is quite strong, dividing respondents so that roughly 40 per cent fall on the left-hand side of the distribution, meaning that they tend to oppose open borders and supranational authority and 60 per cent fall on the other side of the scale. For global warming the distribution is entirely different. Only a small minority of less than 10 per cent regards global warming as not a problem, the other 90 per cent are of the opinion that it is a problem (see Figure 3.2).

The panel below Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of respondents in each of the five countries showing a negative, median or positive orientation towards migration, supranational authority and combating




Figure 3.2 Cumulative distribution of issue positions regarding migration, authority and global warming

global warming. Measures of concentration and polarization show that polarization is not really strong, although there are marked differences between issues and countries. Migration and global warming are hardly polarized. The issue of cross-border authority shows some degree of polarization. With regard to migration, conflicts are strongest in Turkey, with considerable deviation from an equal distribution across categories. Global warming is, if conflictual at all, most polarized in Germany and the United States because the consensus that it is a problem (categories 3–4) is not as high as in the other three countries. The issue of global authority is most polarized in Turkey. This follows from the fact that there is an almost equal distribution across categories, namely, negative, median and positive.

Thus, there is enough potential for conflict or at least difference of interest. Theoretical considerations made above with reference to existing findings suggest the following:

- Citizens with higher educational resources and thus probably higher cultural capital do not face strong risks from globalization and will therefore support open borders and supranational authority, and will regard global warming as relevant.

- Because globalization implies that factor prizes equalize across countries, competition on the labour market is no longer competition on the home market but competition on the world market. This benefits those who have the relevant professional training and skills and exposes ordinary workers to strong competition. Thus, we expect workers to have a sceptical orientation towards these issue areas whereas professionals will tend to regard migration and open borders more positively.
- However, these expectations are not unconditional. As the general expectation regarding the effect of globalization suggests and Gabel has noted, ‘the economic benefits of an internal market for an unskilled or a skilled worker depends on how well he/she can compete with workers in his/her occupation throughout the market, not with other factors of production in his/her nation’ (Gabel 1998a: 939). This implies that the effect of a person’s position in the occupational system or regarding cultural capital on his or her issue orientations depends on the degree to which globalization creates a relevant context.

	Germany	Mexico	Poland	Turkey	USA
<i>Immigration</i>					
% negative 1–2	12.6	22.1	13.1	23.7	9.4
% median 2.01–2.99	63.8	70.6	79.2	66.9	71.1
% negative 3–4	23.6	7.3	7.7	9.4	19.5
Diff. from equal distr.	0.46	0.56	0.69	0.50	0.57
Herfindahl std.	0.22	0.33	0.48	0.27	0.33
Polarization index (.1)	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.16	0.14
<i>Authority</i>					
% negative 1–2	12.8	23.9	22.8	32.4	26.0
% median 2.01–2.99	32.6	32.8	42.5	29.6	36.5
% negative 3–4	54.6	43.3	34.7	38.1	37.6
Diff. from equal distr.	0.32	0.15	0.16	0.07	0.11
Herfindahl std.	0.13	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01
Polarization index (.1)	0.25	0.31	0.30	0.38	0.32

(cont.)

	Germany	Mexico	Poland	Turkey	USA
<i>Global warming</i>					
% negative 1–2	7.3	4.1	1.4	4.8	5.7
% median 2.01–2.99	37.3	8.8	11.0	3.2	20.1
% negative 3–4	55.4	87.1	87.6	92.0	74.2
Diff. from equal distr.	0.39	0.81	0.82	0.88	0.61
Herfindahl std.	0.18	0.65	0.67	0.77	0.39
Polarization index (.1)	0.18	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18

Diff. from equal distribution: Index of dissimilarity, standardized to maximum difference; Herfindahl std.: H-index standardized to minimum; Polarization index (Esteban and Ray 1994), alpha set to 0.1.

Our general expectations for the conditional effects of social position on issue orientations are the following. The positive effect of education as an indicator for cultural capital on issue orientations will be stronger the more strongly the respondent's country is affected by globalization. The effect of high cultural capital or being a professional on positive orientations regarding the three issues depends on the degree of globalization of the respondent's country. The more globalized it is, the stronger the positive effect. The negative effect of being a worker on the three issues is stronger the more intensely the respondent's country is affected by globalization. Neither support for supranational authority nor sensitivity towards global warming is expected to be shaped particularly by being a worker or being a professional, because position in the labour market is only indirectly affected by these factors, if at all. Regarding the impact of ideologies like left–right or materialism–post-materialism, the general expectation is that the more strongly a country is affected by globalization, the more strongly ideology will shape attitudes (Esteban and Ray 1999). The salience of distributional consequences increases with the degree of globalization. Moreover, globalization also affects the balance between economic and non-economic interests (Marks 2004). The more salient these types of problems become, the stronger the effect of ideology on the structuring of attitudes, in this case resulting in opposition from the left and from post-materialists. Whereas internationalism and cosmopolitanism shape the attitudes of left and post-materialistically oriented people,

being on the right and aligned to the materialistic pole tends to rather go together with negative orientations towards migration and supranational authority.

Sensitivity to environmental concerns should also be lower among the right than on the left. Post-materialist orientations produce just the opposite inclinations to those of the political right, that is, favourable attitudes towards migration and supranational authority, and stronger concern about global warming than materialists. However, the impact of ideology on attitudes is conditional on the salience of problems produced by globalization.

There are two different questions to consider. The first is whether individual characteristics have any effect at all; the second is to what degree the impact of an individual-level characteristic differs significantly across contexts. Because the statistical model is a multilevel one with cross-level interactions, interpretation of the effect of coefficients of the constitutive terms is of limited value. Interpretation of the constitutive terms of interactions only makes sense if the interacting variable has a valid score of zero because a coefficient of a constitutive term is the effect of that variable when the interacting variable is zero (Brambor et al. 2006). Thus, we refrain from interpreting the constitutive terms of the interactions, and focus instead on the interaction terms or marginal effects, respectively.

For that reason, we first consider the significant marginal effects of individual-level characteristics without looking at the variation in marginal effects. In a second step, we concentrate on the differences between marginal effects. The latter tell us to what degree context shapes or conditions the impact of characteristics of individual respondents.

Thus, in order to check these expectations empirically and at the same time take context into account, five regression models have been calculated. Three models, one for each issue, include macro-level variables on economic, political and cultural globalization. In addition, at the individual level, the models include education, being a worker, being a professional, left-right self-placement and post-materialism as independent variables.

In addition, two models test the impact of specific problem loads. One model for the issue of migration has been tested including only the two globalization variables that are theoretically reasonable, namely economic and cultural globalization, together with the change in

migration rates. And a model for the issue of global warming has been tested that, besides economic globalization, also includes countries' emission levels of greenhouse gases. Each individual-level independent variable is interacted with the respective macro-level contextual variables. In addition, gender, age, being a migrant and media consumption have been included in the model as control variables.¹

First, however, we omit the question of varying contexts and consider only the question of whether there are any significant marginal effects from individual-level variables. Concentrating on marginal effects rather than regression coefficients is justified by the fact that, in interaction models, the effect of the constituent terms of the interaction variables cannot directly be read from the regression coefficients. Results show some deviations from expectations.

Expectations regarding the effect of education on issue orientations are supported, as are expectations regarding the effect of being a worker. Higher education contributes to stronger support for migration and cross-border authority, as well as a greater sensitivity to environmental concerns. Being a worker, however, produces the opposite effects, although not entirely consistently (see Table 3.4). Being a professional produces hardly any significant marginal effects. Results for left–right position and issue orientations support the expectations. The more an individual is situated to the right of the political spectrum, the less support we find for border crossing by people and authority, and the less concern for the environment. The effects of being a post-materialist support expectations regarding the issues of migration and authority but there is no effect on the orientation towards global warming. Thus, with exception of being a professional, results more or less strongly support the expectations.

Turning to the question of whether globalization and problem context have a conditioning or moderating effect, we turn to the differences between the marginal effects of individual-level variables. Starting with the issue of migration, the impact of cultural capital as measured by education should be most strongly positively affected by cultural globalization and the change in migration rates. The reasoning behind this assumption is that a culturally more heterogeneous context is beneficial for individuals with more cultural capital – intellectually or materially.

¹ Full results are available from the authors on request.

Table 3.4 Significant marginal effects and their direction in five countries

Effect variable and effect direction											
Issue	Macro context	Education		Worker		Professional		Left-right		Post-materialism	
		negative	positive	negative	positive	negative	positive	negative	positive	negative	positive
Migration	Econ. Global.	0	GER, MEX, TUR, USA	GER, MEX, POL, TUR	0	0	0	GER, MEX, POL, TUR, USA	0	0	GER, MEX, POL, TUR, USA
	Cult. Global.	0	GER, POL, TUR, USA	GER, POL, TUR, USA	0	0	0	GER, POL, TUR, USA	MEX	0	GER, POL, TUR, USA
	Polit. Global.	0	GER, POL, TUR, USA	MEX	0	0	0	GER, MEX, POL, TUR, USA	0	0	MEX
Authority	Migr-Change	0	MEX, TUR, USA	POL	MEX, TUR, USA	0	0	POL	MEX, TUR, USA	POL	MEX, TUR, USA
	Econ. Global.	0	MEX, TUR, USA	0	0	0	POL	MEX, TUR, USA	POL	0	GER, POL, TUR, USA
	Cult. Global.	0	TUR	0	0	0	0	GER, POL, TUR, USA	MEX	0	MEX, TUR
Global warming	Polit. Global.	0	0	0	0	0	0	MEX	0	0	GER, POL, TUR, USA
	Econ. Global.	0	GER, MEX, TUR, USA	0	0	0	0	GER, MEX, TUR, USA	POL	0	0
	Cult. Global.	MEX, TUR	0	GER, POL, USA	MEX	0	0	GER, POL, TUR, USA	MEX	0	0
Greenh.-Gas	Polit. Global.	0	GER, POL, TUR, USA	MEX	GER, POL, TUR, USA	0	0	MEX	0	0	0
	Greenh.-Gas	USA	GER, MEX, POL, TUR	0	0	0	0	GER, POL, USA	0	0	0

Note: Only significant effects reported. If less than five entries for negative and positive effects, less than five effects are significant. ‘0’ indicates no significant effect. If significant negative and positive marginal effects exist, the respective macro characteristic has a significant moderating effect.




Figure 3.3 Migration issue: Illustration of difference in conditional marginal effects of micro determinants across globalization contexts

However, there is no systematic variation in the effect of education on orientations towards migration although it is clearly the most important individual-level determinant. It seems to be a universal effect not modified by context. Being a worker has a stronger negative effect on orientations towards migration, the higher the degree of cultural globalization happens to be and the higher the rate of change in migration levels (see Figure 3.3, left panel; see also Table 3.5).

This is a direct effect of economic globalization, which puts ordinary workers in a stronger competitive situation. Because economic

Table 3.5 Significant moderating effects of macro context on the impact of micro characteristics

	Economic globalization	Cultural globalization	Political globalization	Migrant change	Greenhouse gas
<i>a) Migration</i>					
– Education	No	No	No	No	
– Worker	No	+1.8 to –1.4	–0.28 to –0.0	+0.4 to –0.4	
– Professional	No	No	No	No	
– Left–right	No	+0.03 to –0.06	No	+0.1 to –0.14	
– Post-material.	No	–0.25 to +0.22	–0.4 to 0.0	–0.6 to +0.7	
<i>b) Authority</i>					
– Education	No	No	No		
– Worker	No	No	No		
– Professional	No	No	No		
– Left–right	–0.03 to +0.02	–1.3 to –0.7	–0.12 to 0.0		
– Post-material.	No	No	–0.22 to +0.30		
<i>c) Global warming</i>					
– Education	No	No	No		+0.07 to –0.05
– Worker	No	+0.4 to –0.17	–0.41 to +0.18		No
– Professional	No	No	No		No
– Left–right	–0.06 to +0.02	+0.10 to –0.09	–0.13 to 0.0		0.0 to –0.09
– Post-material.	No	No	No		No

globalization together with increased migration increases the level of cultural globalization, stronger cultural globalization is more negatively related to orientations towards migration for workers. Interestingly enough, with stronger political globalization the negative effect on migration attitudes vanishes (Table 3.5). Because there are no significant marginal effects of being a professional, there are also no significant variations across contexts.

Regarding ideology, we find support on the issue of migration for the assumption that the more globalized the context, the stronger its impact on issue orientations will be. The effect of post-materialism on positive orientations towards migration is strongest where levels of cultural globalization and change in migration rates are highest (Figure 3.3, right panel; Table 3.5). Left–right position is negatively related to positive views on migration, implying that leftists support migration more than rightists. The effect is stronger where levels of cultural globalization and migration rates are highest (see Table 3.5).

Regarding support for supranational authority, already existing political globalization should contribute to positive effects because experience reduces insecurity and increases understanding of the consequences of internationalized governance. This has been shown again and again by research on support for European integration (Niedermayer and Sinnot 1990). Regarding individual-level variables, only those related to ideology, namely, left–right self-placement and post-materialism, show significant marginal effects. Thus, only these need to be considered regarding context. Results show that political globalization makes the left–right effect vanish. For post-materialism, the positive effect on border-crossing authority increases with political globalization (Figure 3.4; Table 3.5).

Global warming, finally, is an issue which should be strongly influenced by environmental problem load, measured here as emission of greenhouse gases per capita. As environmental protection is an issue not directly related to social position, being a worker or being a professional is not expected to change people's orientation towards global warming if the level of greenhouse gas pollution is higher or lower. Education and ideology, however, as cognitive tools for viewing the world ought to show different impacts in settings with different degrees of pollution. The positive effects of education and post-materialism on concerns about global warming should become stronger the more greenhouse gas pollution there is in a country. The effect of left–right ideology




Figure 3.4 Authority issue: Illustration of difference in conditional marginal effects of micro determinants across globalization contexts

should also become more pronounced, implying that a leftist ideological position (i.e., a low value on the left–right variable) increases sensitivity to environmental problems more strongly when levels of pollution are high.

However, these expectations do not hold. The effect of education on sensitivity to global warming becomes more negative, the more a country pollutes. The effect of post-materialism does not vary across contexts at all because there are no significant marginal effects. The effect of left–right orientation varies across context as expected: a right orientation reduces sensitivity to environmental concerns, the more of a polluter a country is (see Figure 3.5; Table 3.5).

It seems, however, that these two quite strong context effects of greenhouse gas pollution are very strongly driven by the mass-publics in the United States. It is by far the biggest greenhouse gas polluter per capita among our five countries, and shows, together with Germany, the lowest sensitivity to global warming (Figure 3.2), although Germany produces half the amount of greenhouse gas per capita (see Table 3.1).

3.5 Summary of Results and Tentative Conclusions

In this chapter, we have attempted to answer two general questions: Is there conflict on certain core issues relating to globalization within societies, and does the context of globalization matter for the strength of this conflict? Our empirical investigation proceeded in three steps. One step related to macro-level questions, a second to micro-level analysis of individuals, and a third investigated the impact of context on micro-level relationships. We showed that our five countries of study cover considerable variation regarding characteristics of globalization and problem loads when compared to the rest of the OECD. Our countries cover between one third and three quarters of the range of variation in the OECD. Furthermore, with one exception, they are not outliers with respect to the relationship between economic, cultural, political globalization and the problem loads of migration and pollution. The one exception is Mexico, which is an outlier where the relationship between political globalization and support for border-crossing authority is concerned. In general, degrees of contextual globalization and support for the issues seem to be related on the aggregate level. We find quite strong aggregate correlations between economic and cultural




Figure 3.5 Global warming issue: Illustration of difference in conditional marginal effects of micro determinants across globalization contexts

globalization and support for migration, between political and cultural globalization and support for internationalized governance, and some support for a relationship between problem loads and issue orientations.

At the individual level, our results show that educational differences produce strong differences in issue orientations in particular regarding migration and global warming. We find that the higher the level of education, the stronger the support for migration and, to some extent, for border-crossing authority as well, and the higher the sensitivity to environmental problems. Being a worker produces almost the opposite results regarding issue orientations. Social stratification, therefore, produces differences in orientation between social groups and, if politicized, brings political conflict. Consequently, ideology matters too. Being more to the right of the political spectrum increases the likelihood of being against migration and transborder authority, and goes along with a low sensitivity to environmental concerns. Exactly the opposite is true for individuals with post-materialist orientations. Thus, there is potential for conflict produced by social stratification and political polarization within societies.

The third question we set out to answer was to what extent the contexts of globalization shape the degree to which differences between social and ideological groups have an impact on issue orientations. The reasonable assumption is that the more strongly individual-level characteristics contribute to differences in political orientations, the more politicized the issue, and the more politicized the social and ideological structure of a society. This assumption is very much in line with classical cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) and studies of voting and cleavages (Pappi 1973).

Results clearly show that globalization matters, albeit different forms of globalization to different degrees for each of the issues under investigation. However, the general message is that the impact of social and political differentiation on issue orientations is stronger where globalization is more advanced. The more globalized a country is, the more polarized opinions are between social and political groups in society. With globalization, polarization of attitudes within a country between social classes, between the better and the less well educated, as well as between ideological camps, becomes more intense. The significance and meaning of this finding is obvious: the more pronounced the interest differentiation on the issues in question, the more a society is affected by globalization.

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