

Basic, Zvonimir et al.

**Working Paper**

## The Roots of Cooperation

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 14467

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

*Suggested Citation:* Basic, Zvonimir et al. (2021) : The Roots of Cooperation, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 14467, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/236498>

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ISSN: 2365-9793

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## ABSTRACT

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### The Roots of Cooperation\*

Understanding the roots of human cooperation among strangers is of great importance for solving pressing social dilemmas and maintaining public goods in human societies. We study the development of cooperation in 929 young children, aged 3 to 6. In a unified experimental framework, we examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity as well as third-party punishment – emerges earliest as an effective means to increase cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We find that third-party punishment exhibits a strikingly positive effect on cooperation rates by doubling them in comparison to a control condition. It promotes cooperative behavior even before punishment of defectors is applied. Children also engage in reciprocating others, showing that reciprocity strategies are already prevalent at a very young age. However, direct and indirect reciprocity treatments do not increase overall cooperation rates, as young children fail to anticipate the benefits of reputation building. We also show that the cognitive skills of children and the socioeconomic background of parents play a vital role in the early development of human cooperation.

**JEL Classification:** C91, C93, D01, D91, H41

**Keywords:** cooperation, reciprocity, third-party punishment, reputation, children, parents, cognitive abilities, socioeconomic status, prisoner’s dilemma game, experiment

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\* We would like to thank Ingvild Almås, Silvia Angerer, Michal Bauer, Isabelle Brocas, Alexander Cappelen, Juan Carillo, Gary Charness, Julie Chytilova, Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, Henning Hermes, Felix Kölle, Fabian Kosse, Philipp Lergetporer, Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch, Daniel Schunk, Bertil Tungodden, and seminar participants at UC Santa Barbara, NHH Bergen, University of Mainz, University of Innsbruck, and University of Queensland for helpful comments. We are grateful to all parents of the participating children, the preschool teachers, and kindergartens involved for making this study possible. We thank also Brian Cooper for language editing and numerous research assistants, especially Alexandra Zwankhuizen, Anna-Elena Pinggera, and Jessica Loevenich. Funding from the University of Cologne (through the Hans Kelsen Prize) and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy – EXC 2126/1– 390838866 is gratefully acknowledged. This study was approved by the IRB at the University of Innsbruck (application number 09/19) and pre-registered in the Open Science Framework under [https://osf.io/th25y/?view\\_only=6ff7e93a9b4c481d963dae17cec3e9d9](https://osf.io/th25y/?view_only=6ff7e93a9b4c481d963dae17cec3e9d9).

# 1. Introduction

Humans possess a remarkable ability to cooperate in situations of conflict between selfish and collective interests. Cooperation in these situations, commonly known as social dilemmas, is key to the success of many crucial human challenges, such as climate-change negotiations, containment of pandemics, or provision and maintenance of various public goods that range from teamwork within households and companies to international cooperation across many nations.

In this paper, we study the roots of human cooperation by presenting an experiment with 929 children, aged 3 to 6 years. We designed a unified framework to compare the effects of three fundamental mechanisms that have been identified to support human cooperation: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment (see, e.g., Trivers, 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998, 2005; Fehr and Gächter, 2002). These three mechanisms have never been compared to each other in their potential to increase cooperation in comparison to a baseline condition. While each of them has been shown separately to affect cooperation, the lack of a unified setting has made it impossible to compare the relative effects of these mechanisms against each other. Even more importantly, our paper studies whether and which of these mechanisms develops its potential in young children, at which age this development occurs, and whether and how cognitive and non-cognitive skills, as well as socioeconomic determinants and parenting style, moderate the effects of these different mechanisms. Investigating these issues can help us understand how and under which conditions one can improve cooperation in young children. Since early childhood is formative for children's skills and behavior and their lifetime outcomes (Heckman, 2006; Fehr et al., 2008; Almås et al., 2010; Berger et al., 2020; Cappelen et al., 2020; García et al., 2020; Kosse et al., 2020), promoting cooperation in young children may have long-term beneficial consequences for economic efficiency in groups or society more generally.

Previous studies with adults (see below for the scarce evidence for work with children) have studied single mechanisms and their influence on cooperation. Direct reciprocity refers to the ability to engage in mutually beneficial interactions with the same partner by reacting cooperatively to a partner's previous cooperation and less cooperatively to a partner's past defection (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). Direct reciprocity has been shown to yield higher cooperation rates than in one-shot situations or repeated interactions where subjects never meet anybody twice (e.g., Keser and van Winden, 2000; Clark and Sefton, 2001; Croson, 2007; Brandts and Rivas, 2009; Duffy and Ochs, 2009).

Indirect reciprocity promotes cooperation through the spread of reputational information, even if someone has not interacted with a particular partner in the past. By being cooperative towards others, one gains a positive reputation (or image score; Milinski et al., 2001; Mengel, 2018) that is observable by future interaction partners. Compared to situations without any information about a subject's past behavior, and thus no reputational information, indirect reciprocity can increase cooperation, albeit typically a bit less than direct reciprocity (e.g., Bolton et al., 2005; Seinen and Schram, 2006).

Previous research has claimed that direct and indirect reciprocity are particularly effective in small groups (Boyd et al., 2003; Boyd and Richerson, 2009). This is because direct and indirect reciprocity require one either to experience repeated interactions with the same partner or to know an interaction partner's past behavior, which may be challenging in larger groups of strangers. Therefore, the gene-culture coevolution approach (Boyd et al., 2003; Boyd and Richerson, 2009) has proposed that the two reciprocity mechanisms do not suffice to sustain cooperation in humans, but that a third mechanism, altruistic third-party punishment, is needed to enhance cooperation by enforcing cooperative norms.<sup>1</sup> In the case of third-party punishment, an unaffected bystander may punish subjects who defect in the cooperation game, while the bystander is not directly affected by the level of cooperation. Third-party punishment has indeed typically been found to raise cooperation (see, e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Kurzban and Houser, 2005; Carpenter and Matthews, 2012; Leibbrandt and Lopez-Perez, 2012).

In this study, we compare the three mechanisms to each other and focus particularly on young children, aged 3 to 6. There has been little research on children's willingness to cooperate in strategic games in general. More specifically, no study has systematically investigated at which age direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, and third-party punishment start improving cooperation in social dilemmas, and how such a development interacts with children's skills and their family background. This dearth of evidence is slightly surprising, since research on the formation of economic behavior at an early age has gained strong momentum and lots of attention in recent years (see Sutter et al., 2019, for a survey). For instance, Cappelen et al. (2020) and Kosse et al. (2020) have reported how educational interventions and mentoring programs, respectively, can promote prosociality in disadvantaged children (in simple sharing tasks). Almås et al. (2010) have studied the development of meritocratic principles in allocation tasks performed by adolescents. Fehr et al. (2008) and Bauer et al. (2014) have examined

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<sup>1</sup> The gene-culture coevolution approach does not focus on second-party punishment (where partners in an interaction can punish each other), because the effects of second-party punishment may easily be confounded with direct reciprocity (through reactions to a partner's past behavior). For evidence on second-party punishment, see, e.g., Fehr and Gächter (2000), Masclet et al. (2003), Nikiforakis and Normann (2008), Nikiforakis (2008, 2010), and Molleman et al. (2019).

fairness concerns and the importance of egalitarian allocations for children. Contrary to this evidence on non-strategic sharing and allocation tasks, strategic interaction games like the prisoner's dilemma have rarely been studied with young children. To date, studies investigating social dilemmas primarily involve older children, i.e., school-age children above the age of 6 (e.g., Harbaugh et al., 2000; Peters et al., 2004; Hermes et al., 2020), and are often focused on one-shot (i.e., non-repeated) interactions (e.g., Angerer et al., 2016; Sutter and Untertrifaller, 2020), which makes it impossible to study whether (direct or indirect) reciprocity can improve cooperation.<sup>2</sup>

Lergetporer et al. (2014) have studied the effects of third-party punishment in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with 6- to 11-year-old children. They find that third-party punishment improves cooperation in comparison to a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game without any punishment opportunity. Their one-shot setting is not suitable to determine whether third-party punishment can turn free-riders into cooperators in the future or whether it can stabilize cooperation across repeated interactions. Direct reciprocity has been studied by Vogelsang et al. (2014), with 48 children aged 5 and 6, and by Blake et al. (2015), with 64 children aged 9 to 13. Both studies suggest that children of these ages are capable of reacting to a partner's previous actions, which is a precondition for direct reciprocity to enhance cooperation. Yet, Vogelsang et al. (2014) have no control condition to determine whether direct reciprocity increases cooperation. Moreover, none of these studies included children as young as 3, which leaves open the question whether some mechanisms already become effective at that early age. More importantly, none of these studies were designed to investigate the comparative effects of direct and indirect reciprocity, as well as third-party punishment, and to reveal potential moderating effects of age, the child's cognitive and non-cognitive development, the socioeconomic background of parents, and their parental warmth.

We can do so with our experimental design and the data we gathered from over 900 children and their parents. While the socioeconomic status (SES) of parents is strongly related to children's risk and time preferences and prosociality in non-interactive tasks (Dohmen et al., 2012; Bauer et al., 2014; Alan et al., 2017; Falk et al., 2021), we can examine its relation to behavior in a strategic game, and investigate how it interacts with the institutional

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<sup>2</sup> Brocas et al. (2017) study an alternating dictator game where children from age 5 to 17 can choose an equal or a selfish split of a pie. They find that reciprocity develops with age, and that choosing the fair split in an alternating way can only be sustained at about 11 to 12 years of age. Our experiment not only studies younger children, but it also implements strategic interaction (in a simultaneous move game) and considers a much broader spectrum of three different mechanisms that can sustain cooperation.

environment.<sup>3</sup> We can similarly test the relevance of parental warmth – a key component of the parenting style – which was also shown to be related to non-strategic prosociality (Falk et al., 2021). Finally, we can investigate the importance of several traits which might be decisive for the development of cooperative behavior: children’s cognitive abilities (which may help to navigate strategic interactions; Proto et al., 2019), theory of mind (which may aid us in understanding partner’s or a third party’s intentions; Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs, 2006), and the ability to delay gratification (which may help us to resist the temptation of defection in a cooperation game; Kölle and Wenner, 2021).

In our experiment, we find a striking and very strong effect of third-party punishment on cooperation rates of children aged between 3 and 6. On average, and across all rounds, 68% of children cooperate when third-party punishment is possible. This is more than double the rate in all other conditions, where cooperation rates are in the range from 24% to 29%. The presence of third parties already increases children’s cooperation rates in the first round, i.e., before any punishment could have taken place. This suggests that 3- to 6-year-olds anticipate correctly that defection is likely to be punished, as it is in the majority of cases. Actual punishment has a further effect by turning past defectors into future cooperators with a high probability.

In comparison to a control condition (with perfect stranger matching and without any information on a partner’s previous behavior), the treatments that allow for direct and indirect reciprocity do not improve cooperation rates. This is not to say, however, that children do not reciprocate what others do in these treatment conditions. In fact, they do engage in reciprocating the past behavior of others, showing that reciprocity already prevails in very young children. Yet, given a low base rate of cooperation in the first round, reciprocity keeps the cooperation rates at a low level, since children typically respond to a partner’s past defection with defection of their own. The low first-round cooperation suggests that, contrary to third-party punishment, children do not anticipate, on average, the potential benefits of engaging in reciprocal relations with other children. Yet, those pairs of children who start with mutual cooperation are significantly more likely to cooperate later on also, in comparison to pairs who start with defection.

The age of children has a moderate relation to cooperation; yet, it interacts with the treatments. Older children increase their cooperation in the third-party punishment treatment,

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<sup>3</sup> Sutter and Untertrifaller (2020) show, for simple one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games, that children of parents with higher education are more likely to choose the cooperative strategy. Yet, they do not have any treatments to study how the institutional environment (direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, third-party punishment) matter for cooperation. Moreover, their one-shot game makes it impossible to study reputation formation or dynamics of cooperation.



but they tend to decrease it slightly in the other treatments. We see a similar relationship to children's cognitive abilities. Smarter children (who might be better able to anticipate the consequences of third-party punishment) increase their cooperation in the third-party punishment treatment (even beyond the much higher levels that prevail in general in this treatment), whereas in the control condition (where neither reputational concerns nor potential third-party punishment matter) smarter children have a tendency to decrease their cooperation. Children's theory of mind and patience are largely unrelated to cooperation rates. The same holds true for parental warmth. Yet, the socioeconomic status of parents (proxied here by the highest educational attainment of parents) matters, again in interaction with the experimental treatments. Children of better-educated parents cooperate significantly more often in the third-party punishment treatment in comparison to the control treatment.

In the following, we will present our experimental design and procedure in Section 2. The experimental results are shown in Section 3, and Section 4 discusses and concludes the paper. An online Appendix contains additional material, including further regressions, the experimental instructions, and the parental questionnaire.

## **2. Experimental design and procedures**

### **2.1 Subject pool and procedures**

We recruited 19 public kindergartens in Tyrol, Austria, and ran our study in spring 2019. We informed the children's parents about running a research project for two consecutive days. A total of 1,231 parents gave their written consent, representing 88% of all children in these kindergartens. Participation of children was voluntary. Since the project ran for two days, not all children could participate on both days, mainly due to illnesses or families taking a day off from kindergarten and going on vacation. For these reasons, 168 children were absent on the second day (when the cooperation game was played). We also had 86 children with very poor language skills (mostly due to German being their second language), which led to insurmountable comprehension difficulties.<sup>4</sup> The cooperation game was computerized and run on tablets (see below for details). We had a technical error that made the data of 29 children unusable. 19 children dropped out during the study. In total, this leaves us with 929 children who played and finished the cooperation game. Among them, we had an equal distribution of

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<sup>4</sup> We identified the children who had insurmountable language difficulties on day one (with the assistance of kindergarten teachers and while playing with them the tasks on day one), and on day two these children only played non-interactive trial rounds and hence were not paired with other children who had understood the game.

gender (50% female). Austrian kindergartens have three age cohorts (3/4-year-olds, 4/5-year-olds, and 5/6-year-olds).<sup>5</sup> Table 1 presents the number of children in each age cohort, overall and separately for each treatment introduced below. Kindergartens in Tyrol are typically divided into several classes with one teacher and one assistant each. A class usually comprises children of all age cohorts. Children are randomly assigned to classes when they enter kindergarten and generally remain in this class for the full three years. While children often know others from other classes, the majority of interactions usually take place between children within their own class.

*Table 1 about here*

The experiment took place in separate rooms of each kindergarten, keeping children in a familiar environment where they regularly spend their weekdays. To ensure the anonymity of decisions and to adhere to data-protection regulations, children were assigned a unique code, which was printed on a sticker and stuck onto the child's shirt by the kindergarten teachers. Research assistants (RAs) were only familiar with the first name of a child and removed the sticker after completion of the experiment.

The experimental instructions used only vocabulary that was familiar to children. We presented the cooperation game in a game-like, animated manner on tablets with touchscreens. The graphic design and animations were developed in cooperation with a professional company (see <https://uxkids.com>), which specializes in digital products for young children and their user experience. In addition to the animated, child-oriented interface, we used headphones with prerecorded texts to support comprehension. In addition to these technical tools, the experiment was explained in a one-to-one setting of one RA and one child, in order to adjust to each child's comprehension speed. When going through the instructions, children had to answer questions to make sure they paid attention and could follow the instructions (i.e., repeat parts of the instructions in their own words back to the RA, or answer questions for certain scenarios). If children were unable to answer a question correctly, the RA explained the corresponding paragraph of the instructions again before moving on. As incentives, children could earn tokens that could be exchanged for small presents (e.g., balloons, key chains, toys, candy). Each token was worth one present. We used a large variety of presents that also differed between day 1 and day 2 in order to avoid satiation.

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<sup>5</sup> The age cohort a child belongs to is determined by his or her birthday, with the cutoff on 31 August. Therefore, our youngest cohort included children who turned 4 sometime between 1 September 2018 and 31 August 2019.

## 2.2 Measuring cognitive abilities, theory of mind, and patience as potential prerequisites for cooperation (Day 1)

On day 1, we measured cognitive abilities, theory of mind, and patience (see the instructions in the Appendix).<sup>6</sup> To measure cognitive abilities, we used 12 puzzles, of increasing difficulty, of Raven's Progressive Matrices. The puzzles were printed and presented as a booklet, so that children could progress at their own speed. Children were instructed to find the missing puzzle piece from a set of 6 multiple-choice answers by marking the correct picture. The RA and child solved the first puzzle together to make sure the child had understood the task. The remaining 11 puzzles were solved by the child independently without receiving any feedback on performance. On average, children gave correct answers in 6.96 out of 11 cases (1.48 standard deviation; see Table A1 in the Appendix). Each child received 1 token for this task, irrespectively of performance.

To measure theory of mind, we used the standard change-of-location or so-called Sally-Anne task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). The RA reenacted a story of two dolls (matched to the gender of the child – called either “Sarah and Anna” or “Stefan and Adam”, reflecting common Austrian names). Together, the two dolls hide a ball in location 1. Then Anna (Adam) leaves and Sarah (Stefan) takes the ball and hides it in location 2. Anna (Adam) returns and the child is asked where Anna (Adam) will look for the ball. A child is classified as possessing theory of mind if he/she is able to answer this question correctly.<sup>7</sup> This was the case for 72.8% of children (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Each child received 1 token for participation in this task, irrespectively of performance.

To measure patience, we gave children 2 tokens. They could exchange them for presents on the same day or could save one or two tokens. Saving meant that a token was doubled for the next day (Angerer et al., 2015). In other words, children could practically choose between (i) 2 tokens today and 0 tokens tomorrow, (ii) 1 token today and 2 tokens tomorrow, or (iii) 0 tokens today and 4 tokens tomorrow. The number of tokens saved for the next day serves as our measure of patience. The average across all children was 0.92 tokens (out of 2 tokens) saved for the next day (standard deviation 0.85; see Table A1 in the Appendix).

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<sup>6</sup> We deliberately began with non-interactive tasks on day 1 (rather than with the more complicated cooperation game), because they are simpler to understand for children of this age, which helped them to get engaged in our project. Moreover, day 1 was intended to build up trust in children when working with us, in particular so that they could exchange the earned tokens into presents.

<sup>7</sup> After this question, we also asked where the toy really was and where the dolls had hidden the toy in the beginning. 94.4% of children could answer these two questions correctly.

### 2.3 The cooperation game (Day 2)

On day 2, children played a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game for 5 rounds. In each round, children had to make a single choice – either keep one token for themselves (defect) or give two tokens to their partner (cooperate). Keeping the one token maximizes a child's earning in a given round, which makes this the dominant strategy under standard assumptions, and by backward induction this holds for all five rounds. Of course, mutual cooperation would lead to a Pareto improvement, yielding 10 tokens over all five rounds instead of only 5 tokens in case of permanent mutual defection.

The options – of cooperation or defection – were indicated on the tablet screen as a closed hand (keeping the one token) or an open hand (handing over the two tokens to the partner), as can be seen in Panel A of Figure 1. Players were always illustrated by an avatar, with each avatar having a different color and representing one child in the room.

*Figure 1 about here*

In each session, we randomly matched children into groups of 6, and (except for a few cases where it was logistically not feasible) all children within a group were: (i) within the same age cohort (young, middle, or old), (ii) from at least two different classes, (iii) of different gender, and (iv) had no siblings within the groups. An experimental session was randomly assigned to one of the following treatments, ensuring balanced age across treatments (see Table 1 for the distribution of subjects across age cohorts and treatments).

1. *Control (CTR)*: Each child was matched with a different child in each round by implementing a perfect stranger matching, so that none of the six children per session interacted with any other child more than once. The partner's avatar at the top of the screen changed in each round to highlight the change of the partner. A child received no information on the current partner's behavior in the past rounds.
2. *Indirect Reciprocity (IR)*: Each child was matched with a different child in each round as in CTR. Yet, before the round started, a child learned the previous behavior of the current partner (from the second round onwards). This was illustrated like in area A1 of Figure 1, and the current partner's previous behavior was also communicated via headphones. The child was also aware that the current partner was informed of the child's own behavior in each of the previous rounds in the same way.
3. *Direct Reciprocity (DR)*: Here, a child was matched with the same partner for all five rounds. Consistent with IR, the child was reminded of the partner's behavior in each of

the previous rounds through visual representation (area A1 in Figure 1) and an audio message. Moreover, a child was informed that the partner was reminded of the child's own behavior in each of the previous rounds in the same way.

4. *Third-Party Punishment (TPP)*: As in CTR, children were matched with a different child in each round by implementing a perfect stranger matching. Children received no information about their current partner's past actions. Here, a third, anonymous, character was introduced, as illustrated in area A2 of Figure 1. This character had one token available to either keep or throw into a box. In the latter case – which represents third-party punishment – defection of a child resulted in the loss of all tokens earned in that round (this rule applied both when a single child defected, but also when both children defected). In that case, the tokens of a defecting child visually broke in half and vanished without entering the child's wallet where all earned tokens were stored. We only allowed for punishing defection, because the IRB and kindergarten teachers did not allow for an opportunity where the third party could punish cooperation. If both children cooperated, the third party kept the initial token.

The decisions of third parties were collected at the end of previously run sessions of the other treatments. A subset of children who had finished playing in the CTR, DR, or IR treatment were asked to make one final decision. This was a surprise, meaning that these children did not know about this final decision when they played the prisoner's dilemma game themselves. The RA explained that the child would receive one additional token which he/she could either keep or insert into a box. The screen then showed two new avatars playing the PD as previously experienced by the child (so the child knew exactly the rules of the game). He/she was made aware that these were two children playing the same game he/she had just played, and that they were from a different kindergarten. Then, the RA explained that inserting the token into the box meant that defecting players in the PD lost their tokens from the respective round. After two trials, the child was asked to make the actual decision. These decisions were collected, and we randomly assigned them to pairs of children playing in the TPP game, where one decision was matched to one round (see Appendix A.1.3. for more details).

The cooperation game was run as follows: Six children were accompanied by six RAs to a separate room where one of the RAs in the room asked the children to form a circle. Children were then shown the first screen of the program installed on the tablet. It showed six different avatars, and the RA explained that each child in the room would be represented by an

avatar in the game. Moreover, the children were aware that they would play with all the other children (or one other child in treatment DR) from the circle, but that the true identity would remain disguised as an avatar.

Explaining this while being in a circle provided a natural learning experience with which all children were familiar. The explanation (see the Appendix for the experimental instructions) stressed *(i)* the matching mechanism, *(ii)* the fact that children would play with other children in the game, and *(iii)* that all children were participating in the same game. After this part, each of the six RAs introduced him- or herself to one child, and each pair sat down at a certain spot within the room (illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1). The spots were sufficiently distanced between the pairs and were additionally separated by partitions to minimize distractions. Each RA continued with the instructions of the game by explaining each screen and action. Children navigated the buttons throughout the instructions to familiarize themselves with the tablet. The positioning (left or right) of the two main decision buttons – cooperate and defect – was randomized across subjects.

Before starting the game, children played four pre-specified trial rounds with four different animal avatars (or one animal avatar in treatment DR) as practice partner(s). During these trial rounds, children received audio messages through headphones, which instructed them on the action they should take (either keep one token or give two tokens to their partner). After each round, the program stopped and children physically had to allocate the tokens earned in that round to their own wallet and the wallet of a fictitious partner. The payoff scenarios consisted of *(i)* defect-defect in trial round 1, *(ii)* cooperate-defect in trial round 2, *(iii)* defect-cooperate in trial round 3, and *(iv)* cooperate-cooperate in trial round 4. In treatment TPP, four different monkey avatars served as third parties across the four trial rounds. They punished defection in 2 out of 4 rounds. Trial rounds had multiple purposes. First, they served as a key element in learning the game. Second, children experienced all scenarios and tried out all buttons of the game, deterring them from taking an action out of sheer curiosity for the ensuing animation in the actual game. Third, and most importantly, the trial rounds served as a final check for comprehension of the game. If the children allocated all tokens in trial rounds 3 and 4 correctly, we classified this as a successful comprehension check, i.e., as successfully passing the control questions. Note that if children did not correctly distribute tokens in the first two trial rounds, the RA corrected them and explained why their allocation was not correct. If children failed to distribute tokens correctly in trial rounds 3 or 4, they were asked to repeat the token allocations to their own and their fictitious partner's wallet once more, and to explain their reasoning. Incorrect allocations were then classified as failing the comprehension check.

In that case, they continued with the game, but were excluded from the main analyses. Subjects who passed the control questions form our main sample for the analyses. The tokens earned in the trial rounds were exchanged for small stickers to mimic the exchange of tokens into (more valuable) presents after the real game.

A video sequence of the animated implementation of the game for all treatments and a translated transcription of the (German) audio instructions is available on [https://osf.io/y7h4v/?view\\_only=f4627bf3ffe347e085f48144b19451e5](https://osf.io/y7h4v/?view_only=f4627bf3ffe347e085f48144b19451e5).

## **2.4 Parental questionnaire**

We complement our experimental data of children with a survey among their parents. At the end of day 1, each child received a printed questionnaire to take home to his/her parents. The questionnaire (reprinted in the Appendix) already contained a child's anonymous code, so that the parents' answers could be matched to the child's decision, while all answers remained anonymous. Parents were asked to return the questionnaire within two weeks by putting it into a mailbox at the kindergarten. The questionnaire included items on sociodemographics, most importantly the highest parental educational level for each parent, and a question on parenting style by asking about parental warmth (degree of agreement on a scale from 1 to 5 with the statements "I show my child with words and gestures that I like him/her" and "I praise my child."; see Falk et al., 2021). Out of our main sample, 80% of parents returned the questionnaire with completed information on educational attainment and parental warmth. We construct the socioeconomic status variable as the highest educational attainment between the two parents. Here, we follow the European Qualifications Framework and assign values from 1 to 8, with 1 being the lowest educational level (compulsory schooling) and 8 the highest (PhD). The average highest parental education across our main sample is 5.66 (standard deviation 1.54; see Table A1 in the Appendix). To calculate the variable of parental warmth, we sum up the two answers on the parenting style questions, yielding an average of 9.64 (standard deviation 0.74). Note that this variable predominantly captures the mother's parental warmth, as mothers answered the questionnaire in 93% of cases.

## **3. Results**

In this section, we first analyze in subsections 3.1 to 3.4 the effects of our treatment variations on cooperation. Then, in subsections 3.5 to 3.7, we examine the influence of the children's characteristics and the parents' background on the children's cooperation. For the

main analysis, we proceed with 814 children who passed all comprehension checks successfully. In subsection 3.8, we round up the results section with a series of robustness checks where we address potential concerns regarding children’s comprehension as well as selection due to control questions or questionnaire response rates, showing that our results are robust.

### 3.1 Cooperation across treatments

Figure 2 presents the average cooperation rates across all five rounds. For CTR, IR, and DR, we note very similar rates, ranging from 24% in IR to 29% in CTR, suggesting that the possibility of reputation formation in IR and DR is not sufficient to increase cooperation rates in the aggregate. This is in stark contrast to the effects of third-party punishment. In TPP, the overall average cooperation rate of 68% is more than double the rate of any other treatment. We compare the cooperation rates across treatments in the regressions shown in Table 2. Column 1 is the most basic regression where we regress a subject’s cooperation decision on three treatment dummies, taking CTR as the omitted category. Column 2 applies kindergarten fixed effects, and columns 3 and 4 add additional control variables. Across all columns, it stands out that cooperation rates in TPP are estimated to be about 40 percentage points higher than in CTR. For IR and DR, we mainly see insignificant coefficients in comparison to CTR, and the coefficients are significantly smaller than in TPP.

*Figure 2 about here*

**Result 1:** *In comparison to CTR, only third-party punishment (TPP) increases cooperation rates significantly by more than doubling them. The two treatments with an opportunity for reputation building (DR and IR) fail to yield cooperation rates above the level in CTR.*

### 3.2 Cooperation across rounds

Figure 3 breaks down cooperation rates by round and treatment. Again, we see that CTR, IR, and DR lie in a narrow range, while cooperation rates in TPP are very much higher in every single round. It is interesting to have a separate look at the very first round, since it is stripped from any experience from previous rounds. For TPP, round 1 cooperation rates indicate whether the mere existence of the punishment threat – *before* ever experiencing actual punishment – is sufficient to increase cooperation. This is obviously the case, given a cooperation rate of 64% in the first round in TPP. Similarly, for IR and DR, round 1 data tell us whether the introduction



of the reputation-building mechanism – without yet observing any signal about a partner’s reputation – is sufficient to affect children’s behavior. This is not the case, as Figure 3 shows, since cooperation rates in the first round are practically identical in CTR, IR, and DR (ranging from 21% to 23%). In Table A2 in the Appendix, we show a regression that uses only first-round data, confirming that TPP, but not DR or IR, increases cooperation rates significantly.

*Figure 3 about here*

**Result 2:** *Looking at behavior in the first round, we observe that the mere existence of potential punishment increases cooperation rates strongly, while the provision of a reputation-building mechanism – both in DR and IR – has no significant effect in comparison to CTR.*

Next, we look more closely at the dynamics of cooperation across rounds. Figure 3 reveals a slightly decreasing trend for CTR, IR, and DR, and a modest upward trend for TPP. Table 3 shows that these trends are significantly negative for CTR and IR (see columns 1-4) and positive for TPP (columns 7-8). In columns 9 and 10 of Table 3, we can examine how the development of cooperation across rounds (which is generally negative, see the main effect of the variable Round) interacts with the three treatment conditions. To calculate the interaction effects in non-linear models, however, one needs to be careful, as calculating only the marginal effect of the interaction term can yield the wrong magnitude, sign, and significance level (see Ai & Norton, 2003; Karaca-Mandic et al., 2012). Moreover, the interaction effect and the significance level can change depending on the observation. Hence, to calculate the interaction effects in our non-linear models, we apply the methodology of Norton et al. (2004), which corrects for the issue using cross-partial derivatives and calculating the interaction effect and the significance level at each observation. Following this approach, when analyzing an interaction term, we inspect the interaction effect and the significance level across all observations, and we summarize the findings in the notes to the tables.<sup>8</sup>

*Table 3 about here*

The results in columns 9 and 10 of Table 3 reveal that the difference in cooperation rates between IR and CTR does not change across rounds. The DR treatment effect reveals a small

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<sup>8</sup> Note that, for purposes of robustness, we also repeat all regressions reported in the paper that have an interaction term by using a linear probability model. Our reported findings stay robust when using this approach.

and significant increase across rounds (at the 10% level in column 9); however, this is not robust to including control variables (in column 10). Turning to TPP, we observe that, with each increasing round, the treatment effect of TPP is significantly increasing by 3.3% (or 3.5%, with controls), on average. Taken together, this means that TPP is successful in reversing the decreasing pattern of cooperation in CTR.

***Result 3:** Cooperation rates are generally slightly downward-trending across rounds. Yet, this decline is reversed successfully in TPP, where cooperation rates increase in the course of repetition.*

### **3.3 Sources for the dynamics of cooperation: reaction to punishment and a partner's reputation**

The development of cooperation across rounds differs between DR and IR, on the one hand, and TPP, on the other. In order to understand these differences in dynamics better, we continue by examining how children react to third-party punishment or a partner's reputation.

From the observation that cooperation rates are not higher in DR and IR than in CTR, one could conclude that the possibility of reputation building and the information about a partner's past behavior in DR and IR do not have any effect on children's behavior. However, such a conclusion would be wrong, as we can show here. To do so, we first calculate the image score of a child (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998), also known as "experience score" in the context of direct reciprocity (Roberts, 2008). This score sums up the actions of all previous rounds in the following way: cooperation increases the score by 1 point, whereas defection reduces it by 1 point. Thus, the image score represents a measure of one's reputation as being more or less cooperative.

*Figure 4 about here*

*Table 4 about here*

In Figure 4, we show the predictions of a regression model where we regress a child's likelihood to cooperate on the current partner's image score, separately for IR (left panel) and DR (right panel). The regression estimates are presented in Table 4. We observe a very clear pattern, both in IR and DR. A child's likelihood to cooperate is significantly positively related to the current partner's image score. This holds true for all specifications in DR, and in 3 out of

4 specifications in IR. The loss of significance in one specification seems to be driven by the reduced sample when including SES and parental warmth as control variables (column 4), and accounting for this issue leaves the significantly positive effect of a partner's image score intact.<sup>9</sup> Comparing the coefficients across the two treatments, we observe that the slope of the relation is slightly steeper in DR (with estimated coefficients around 5% in Table 4) than in IR (with estimated coefficients between 1.7% and 3.8%), but this difference is not significant most of the time.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, the slightly larger coefficient in DR is consistent with the argument that children might respond more strongly in reaction to how their current partner acted in previous rounds towards themselves than a partner might have behaved towards a random stranger.<sup>11</sup>

Interestingly, controlling for a partner's behavior from the previous round is not significant in DR (columns 7 and 8 of Table 4), nor does adding it affect the size of the partner's image score coefficient. This finding suggests that children do indeed care about the entire history of their partner, and not just about how a partner acted in the round before.<sup>12</sup>

Taken together, these results show that – even though DR and IR do not cause a significant difference in the average cooperation rates in comparison to CTR – the reputation mechanism still affects even the behavior of 3- to 6-year-olds in a systematic way. The finding suggests that, already in the age bracket from 3 to 6, children act, on average, as conditional cooperators, a result which has not been established for that age group yet, but which is common among adults (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Kocher et al., 2008). Table A3 in the Appendix provides additional support for this suggestion. It shows that pairs of children who cooperate in round 1 have significantly higher cooperation rates in subsequent rounds than pairs of children who start with defection.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> When imputing missing SES and parental warmth from age, gender, standardized cognitive abilities, theory of mind, number of siblings, and patience, and when repeating the regression in column 4 of Table 4, we find a significantly positive effect of the partner's image score ( $p=0.021$ ,  $AME = 0.021$ ).

<sup>10</sup> In fact, regressing cooperation on image score, IR treatment dummy variable (with DR as the omitted category), and their interaction term yields a negative interaction effect at each observation (calculated using the methodology of Norton et al., 2004). For almost all observations, the interaction effect is not significant at any conventional level.

<sup>11</sup> Such a pattern – that humans react more strongly to the behavior of others when they were affected personally than when the behavior of others was directed at someone else – is consistent with evidence for adults (see, e.g., Bolton et al., 2004).

<sup>12</sup> As a kind of placebo test, we can show that the partner's image score does not have any significant effect on cooperation rates in the control treatment (CTR), where subjects are not informed about their partner's previous behavior ( $p > 0.2$  in all regressions).

<sup>13</sup> This holds at the 5% level in DR and at the 10% level in IR. Not surprisingly, it does not apply to CTR, where information about a partner's past behavior is missing.

**Result 4:** *Although DR and IR do not increase average cooperation rates, 3- to 6-year-old children do already condition their behavior systematically on the reputation of their partners. The more cooperative a child's partner has been in previous rounds, the higher the probability is that a child will cooperate, suggesting traits of conditional cooperation already at this young age.*

Next, we investigate the dynamic pattern caused by the punishment tool in TPP. In Figure 5, we show the average cooperation rate in round  $t$  for subjects who defected in round  $t - 1$ , where  $t \in \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$ . The left bar represents those defectors who did not get punished by the third party in round  $t - 1$ , while the right bar represents those who experienced punishment. We see a clear and marked difference between the two groups. While only 34.9% of unpunished defectors switch to cooperation in the next round, 60.7% of them do so if they got punished. The observed difference is statistically significant and it is robust to controls (see Table A4 in the Appendix). Moreover, this finding indeed stems from experiencing punishment and not just observing punishment, as we can show that children who cooperated in round  $t - 1$  do not condition their behavior in round  $t$  on whether a defecting partner (in round  $t - 1$ ) was punished or not.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the overall evidence indicates that the punishment mechanism not only functions through the simple existence of the punishment mechanism (see *Result 2*), but also through the execution of punishment itself. It also contributes to a better understanding of the increasing cooperation rates in TPP over rounds (see *Result 3*). There is a relatively high rate of punishment of defection, since 55% of children in the punisher's role decided to punish defectors.<sup>15</sup> If getting punished increases the likelihood of cooperation, then a relatively high punishment rate can become a motor for improving cooperation over time.

**Result 5:** *Experiencing punishment increases the probability of cooperation in the next round, thus improving the chances that defectors turn into cooperators.*

*Figure 5 about here*

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<sup>14</sup> Regressing a cooperation dummy variable (= 1) in round  $t$  on a dummy variable indicating whether a subject observed a partner getting punished (= 1) in round  $t - 1$  yields an insignificant coefficient for the observation dummy variable ( $p = 0.36$ ). The regression includes pairs where the subject cooperated, but the partner defected in round  $t - 1$ .

<sup>15</sup> Recall that the role of the third party was played by children who had played the prisoner's dilemma game themselves before in any of the treatments CTR, DR, and IR. We can show that there is a significantly positive raw correlation between the likelihood to punish defection as a third party and the number of times a child cooperated in the PD game (Pearson's  $r = 0.12$ ;  $p < 0.05$ ). This suggests that more cooperative children are also the ones who are willing to bear the costs for altruistic punishment to enforce cooperation norms when others are playing a prisoner's dilemma game.

### 3.4 Payoffs across treatments

After having examined how our treatments affect cooperation rates, we ask the question here whether cooperation is profitable on an individual basis. To this end, we first regress a child's round payoff on cooperation, as done in Table 5.<sup>16</sup> For CTR, IR, and DR, we see that defection predicts higher profits. This is not very surprising, since defection strictly dominates cooperation in terms of payoffs. Yet, in TPP, the relation changes. There we observe that cooperation is significantly more profitable than defection, and given these relations, children clearly earn much more when switching from defection to cooperation in TPP than in CTR (see column 5 in Table 5). While purely money-maximizing third parties would not want to spend their token on punishing defectors, the relatively high frequency of punishment (of 55%) makes defection unattractive and unprofitable in TPP.

*Table 5 about here*

We can also look at how cooperation rates across the whole five rounds relate to profits (thus widening the perspective beyond a single round). Given that the benefit of cooperation can be transferred from one round to the other in DR and IR, this might make cooperation profitable when considering all rounds together. In Table A5 in the Appendix, we regress a subject's total payoff in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game on the subject's frequency of cooperation across the five rounds. The relation between the frequency of cooperation and total profits remains significantly negative for CTR and IR; yet, for DR, it becomes insignificant. The latter finding goes hand in hand with our *Result 4* – subjects strongly and positively react to the cooperation of others in DR – which can illuminate why, in the long run, those who cooperate do not fare significantly worse than those who defect.

***Result 6:*** *With the exception of TPP, children who are more cooperative earn fewer tokens than children who are not as cooperative. In TPP, this relationship is reversed, because the relatively high likelihood of punishment makes defection less profitable.*

### 3.5 Determinants of cooperation – The role of age

After analyzing cooperation rates across treatments, we now investigate how children's characteristics relate to cooperation. We start by analyzing the role of age in the regressions in

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<sup>16</sup> Note that the round payoff is *fully* determined by a subject's action, the partner's action, and, in TPP, the punisher's behavior.

Table 6. In columns 1 to 8, we look at the four different treatments. In CTR, IR, and DR, age (in months) is negatively related to the likelihood of cooperation, although the coefficients are not always significant.<sup>17</sup> In TPP, age is positively and significantly related to cooperation, showing that older children cooperate more than younger children.

*Table 6 about here*

In columns 9 and 10 of Table 6, we look at the interaction effects of age with our treatments. For DR, we note a significantly positive interaction in column 9, which suggests that older children have an easier time realizing that cooperation can pay off when direct reciprocity is possible; however, this finding is not robust to adding control variables (in column 10). In TPP, this interaction is much more pronounced and statistically robust, indicating that as children get older they are more likely to cooperate in TPP than in CTR. Specifically, one month's age difference is estimated to increase the difference in cooperation rates between TPP and CTR by 1% on average (column 10). This implies that an age difference of 1 year increases our TPP treatment effect by 12%.

**Result 7:** *Age plays an important role for cooperation rates of young children. Cooperation decreases with age in IR, while it increases with age in TPP. Moreover, the TPP treatment effect is increasing with age.*

### **3.6 Determinants of cooperation – The role of cognitive abilities, time preferences, and theory of mind**

Next, we examine the relation between children's traits elicited on day 1 – cognitive abilities, theory of mind, and patience – and cooperation on day 2. In Table 7, we regress cooperation on standardized cognitive abilities, patience (where higher numbers indicate more patience), and a dummy variable indicating whether a child possesses theory of mind or not. Across columns 1 to 8, in Table 7 we note that higher cognitive abilities let children cooperate less in our control condition CTR, and more in the TPP treatment, although none of these effects are robust to controls. For theory of mind, we find a weakly significant positive effect on cooperation in TPP; yet, this effect also vanishes with the addition of further controls. Finally, we observe that patience is positively related to cooperation in TPP. One way to explain this

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<sup>17</sup> In the legend to Table 2, we report that the relation between age and cooperation stays robust if we use age cohort dummies (taking the youngest cohort as the omitted category) instead of the exact age (in months).

would be that higher self-control (for which our patience measure might be a proxy) could prevent children from giving in to the temptation of keeping the one token for themselves when a third party has the option to punish defectors.

*Table 7 about here*

When we look at interaction effects of cognitive abilities, theory of mind, and patience with our treatment conditions (in columns 9 and 10), we observe that for all three of our treatments – IR, DR, and TPP – higher cognitive abilities imply a significantly higher difference in cooperation between the respective treatments and CTR (in column 9). The interaction effects remain significant when adding further controls in DR and TPP (in column 10). A one-standard-deviation increase in cognitive abilities is estimated to increase the difference in cooperation rates between DR and CTR by 5.3%, and between CTR and TPP by even 8.8% (column 10). Turning to patience, we observe no significant interaction effects between patience and any of our treatments. Concerning theory of mind, only TPP shows indications of positively interacting with theory of mind, although the interaction effect lacks robustness.

***Result 8:*** *Cognitive abilities play an important role for the cooperative behavior of young children. Smarter children have significantly higher cooperation rates when exposed to DR and TPP (in comparison to CTR). Patience goes hand in hand with higher cooperation rates in TPP only, while theory of mind hardly ever matters.*

### **3.7 Determinants of cooperation and the role of children’s environment: Socioeconomic status of parents and parental warmth**

Finally, we look at how the family environment of a child is related to cooperative behavior. Table 8 presents regression results for how a child’s cooperation relates to parental warmth and parents’ socioeconomic status (SES; as measured by their highest level of education). From columns 1 to 8, which consider each treatment separately, we note that parental warmth is hardly ever significantly related to cooperation rates. Only for DR do we find a significantly negative effect in column 6.<sup>18</sup> For SES, we see a clearly positive effect on the cooperation rates in TPP, but a negative one in the other treatments, although this is typically not significant.

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<sup>18</sup> While column 6 shows a significant relation, this finding lacks robustness. In addition to the fact that it is not significant without controls (in column 5), it also loses significance at any conventional level when applying stricter comprehension criteria in our robustness checks (see Section 3.8).

*Table 8 about here*

In columns 9 and 10, we look again at the interaction of our treatments with the variables on which we focus here. We observe that parental warmth does not interact with any of the treatments. In contrast, we find evidence that SES interacts with TPP. In particular, increasing the highest education level of parents by one level (e.g., from high-school certificate to a Bachelor's degree) increases our TPP treatment effect by 6.8% on average (column 10).

***Result 9:*** *The socioeconomic status of parents plays an important role for cooperative behavior of young children. Those from families with higher socioeconomic status (i.e., higher education) are more likely to cooperate in TPP, and react on average with higher cooperation rates when exposed to TPP in comparison to CTR. In the absence of potential third-party punishment, the socioeconomic status of parents is (mostly insignificantly) negatively related to cooperation. Parental warmth does not play any role.*

### **3.8 Robustness checks**

We conclude the results section with a series of robustness checks that show that our results remain stable under alternative specifications and inclusion criteria.

*Selection and comprehension checks.* All of our subjects had to pass the comprehension checks successfully in order to be included in the analysis. Through our age-adjusted experimental instructions and carefully designed and implemented task, a very high percentage of subjects successfully passed these checks (88%). However, one might still be concerned regarding the potential selection induced by excluding those who failed. Intuitively, one could expect those who are smarter, and potentially those who are older, to be more likely to understand the game. To address this potential issue and ensure that this does not drive any of our findings, we first test which observable variables predict a successful passing of the comprehension checks. Apart from standardized cognitive abilities and age, we also include gender, number of siblings, and a proxy for a general willingness to cooperate captured by the total frequency of cooperation across the 5 rounds. We find that age and cognitive abilities are significant predictors of passing the comprehension checks (see Table A6 in the Appendix). To correct for these imbalances, we rerun our entire analysis by reweighting the observed data using inverse probabilities of passing the comprehension checks. The probabilities result from a probit model of a binary indicator (indicating whether a child passed the comprehension checks successfully) as a function of standardized cognitive abilities and age (see Appendix



A.1.1 for more details; see Kosse et al., 2020, Bašić et al., 2020, and Falk et al, 2021, for a similar approach). Our results stay robust to reweighting of the dataset (see Tables A7 to A16 in the Appendix). Moreover, we also take an additional step and rerun our entire analysis by using *both* subjects who passed *and* subjects who failed the comprehension checks, i.e., we do not make any exclusions based on the comprehension checks (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details). While this approach induces some noise in our data, our results again stay highly robust. Taken together, the two robustness checks provide strong evidence that our findings are not affected by selection due to passing the comprehension checks.

*Comprehension of the game.* A key aspect of studies with very young children is ensuring that subjects understand the game. Our comprehension checks were designed to identify those who had understood the rules and possible actions in the game, as well as the payoff consequences of these actions. However, we also administered open-ended questions which assessed whether children were able to verbalize and explain specific aspects of the game. In particular, the children had to verbalize with whom they were playing, and explain the introduced mechanisms in the particular treatments: the meaning of icons on the tablet screen representing the current partner's previous round behavior in IR and DR, or the punisher's role and options in TPP. To provide an additional robustness check and ensure that our results are not affected by comprehension issues, we have checked what would happen to our results if we took a more conservative approach by additionally excluding subjects who exhibited any type of difficulty in verbalizing the answers to these open-ended questions; hence, we apply an even stricter comprehension benchmark as in the main analysis. We find that with this approach we would exclude another 134 subjects from our main sample, leaving us with 680 subjects altogether.<sup>19</sup> We rerun our entire analysis with this restricted sample (see Tables A17 to A26 in the Appendix). Overall, our results stay highly robust and consistent with our main analysis.

*Selection, SES, and parental warmth.* We collected the highest education level of parents – as our measure for socioeconomic status (SES) – and the parental warmth variable through a take-home survey. For our main sample, we successfully obtained the two variables for 80% of our subjects. As this sample is not randomly determined, the conclusions regarding the relation between SES, parental warmth, and children's behavior might be exposed to potential selection issues. To address this potential concern, we first test which variables predict obtaining the SES and parental warmth variables from the parents (see Table A27 in the Appendix). Here, we use the same variables as we did when testing who passed the comprehension checks, but

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<sup>19</sup> The reduction is primarily driven by the explanation of the game mechanisms, as only 14 subjects failed to understand with whom they were playing.

additionally we add kindergarten fixed effects to capture differences across kindergartens. This could reflect, for example, the differences in the extent of parental involvement across kindergartens, or the differences in SES of the area where the kindergarten is located. We find that parents of younger children, as well as parents of girls are significantly more likely (at the 10% level) to provide us with SES and parental warmth information. Moreover, we find that kindergarten fixed effects are also a significant predictor. To correct for these imbalances, we rerun the analyses of SES and parental warmth by reweighting the observed data. So, we use inverse probabilities of providing information about SES and parental warmth, where we account for observed imbalances in gender, age, and kindergarten fixed effects (see Appendix A.1.2 for more details; see Kosse et al., 2020, Bašić et al., 2020, and Falk et al., 2021, for a similar approach). Our results stay highly robust (see Table A28 in the Appendix), suggesting that our conclusions regarding the relation between SES, parental warmth, and children's cooperation are not affected by the possible selection concerning survey responses.

***Result 10:*** *Our results are robust to more stringent and less stringent inclusion criteria and to potential selection effects concerning passing the comprehension checks and the survey response among parents.*

## 4. Conclusion

The ability of humans to cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers is remarkable. From an economic perspective, it allows for increasing the efficiency, and thus the welfare, created in human interactions in both small and large groups. While it is obvious that cooperation is necessary to meet crucial human challenges, they will be met more easily the better we understand the roots of human cooperation, i.e., when cooperation emerges and under which conditions it can be expected to flourish. For these reasons, we studied cooperation of more than 900 children, aged 3 to 6 years. Based on earlier insights that childhood is the most formative period for a human being's skills and behavior (Heckman, 2006; Fehr et al., 2008; Almås et al., 2010; Bauer et al., 2014; Alan et al., 2017; Alan and Ertac, 2018; Berger et al., 2020; Brocas and Carillo, 2020, 2021; Cappelen et al., 2020; Hermes et al., 2020; Kosse et al., 2020; Alan et al., 2021), we aimed to illuminate our understanding of when cooperation evolves in young children and what the institutional as well as personal prerequisites are for this.

In our experiment, we designed a unified framework to examine which of three fundamental pillars of human cooperation – direct and indirect reciprocity, as well as third-

party punishment – emerges earliest and is most effective in increasing cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. These three pillars have never been compared to each other in their potential to increase cooperation in comparison to a baseline condition, neither with adults nor with children. While each of them has been shown separately to affect cooperation (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Bolton et al., 2005), the lack of a unified setting has made it impossible to compare the relative effects of these three mechanisms and their potential in young children. The relative comparison of these mechanisms is particularly relevant in early developmental phases, as it can inform researchers about the developmental trajectory of each mechanism, and practitioners interested in shaping cooperative tendencies in young children.

We found that cooperation rates are modest (around one quarter) in a control condition and in the two treatments that allow for reputation building by informing children about their partner’s past behavior, which makes indirect and direct reciprocity possible. Compared to the control condition, reciprocity does not increase cooperation rates. Yet, this by no means implies that children as young as the age of 3 would not be able to apply reciprocal strategies. On the contrary, we provide clear evidence that children react systematically, and positively, to a partner’s past history of cooperative behavior (summarized in the partner’s image score). The likelihood of children to cooperate increases when they meet a partner who has been more cooperative in the past, either with themselves or to other (and anonymous) children. Given the modest level of cooperation at the beginning of the repeated interaction, such reciprocal strategies are not capable of lifting cooperation rates beyond what we observe in the control condition. Moreover, the modest initial cooperation suggests that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the anticipation of future benefits in strategic interactions are still not in place at that young age. Cooperation levels are only increasing in this young age group when a third party that is unaffected by the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game enters the stage and has the opportunity to punish defectors (at own costs). With potential third-party punishment, cooperation rates skyrocket, one could say, by almost tripling in comparison to the other conditions. Importantly, this effect prevails from the very first round onward, even before any punishment could have been applied. This means that children are able to anticipate that in the presence of a third party it is advisable to cooperate rather than to defect; and in fact cooperation pays off monetarily in the third-party punishment condition. Yet, executing punishment also serves a purpose by making it more likely for former defectors to turn into cooperators. Thus, both the third party’s existence as well as its actions matter for the higher cooperation rates in this condition.

In addition to studying the effects of direct and indirect reciprocity and of third-party punishment, we were also interested in the roots of human cooperation as far as they concern children's individual characteristics and their parents' background. We found that the positive effects of third-party punishment on cooperation becomes even stronger with increasing age and also with increasing cognitive abilities, suggesting that third-party punishment becomes more efficient when children are smarter and have some more years of life experience. Likewise, patience, and partly theory of mind, are positively related to cooperation rates when third-party punishment is possible. In the absence of any external third party that can enforce cooperation, however, children with greater cognitive abilities generally tend to exploit the opportunities of free-riding on others more often than children with lower cognitive abilities. We find a similar relation of cooperation rates to parents' socioeconomic status. Children of better-educated parents are more likely to cooperate in the third-party punishment condition, but seem, on average, to be less likely to cooperate in the absence of a third party. In fact, this finding from a strategic (PD) game reveals an interesting twist in comparison to earlier literature. Cappelen et al. (2020) and Kosse et al. (2020), for instance, have found that children with higher socioeconomic status of parents are *more* prosocial in non-interactive sharing tasks. Our results suggest that their findings might not be directly extendable to strategic games. Children whose parents have higher SES, if anything, tend to cooperate less in our prisoner's dilemma game, as long as no third party may punish defection. This may suggest that higher SES of parents is related to higher strategic sophistication of children, which supports defection in a prisoner's dilemma game and is not supportive of higher levels of cooperation *per se*. Only when third-party punishment is possible do we see unambiguously that children whose parents have higher SES are also significantly more likely to cooperate. In total, we consider it worthwhile for future research to study how SES might be related to behavior in larger sets of non-strategic tasks and strategic games, in order to identify an even more general pattern of the relation of SES to economic behavior, and to examine how this relationship interacts with the institutional settings in such decision situations.

To conclude, our results offer several key findings that inform our understanding of the roots of cooperation in humans. These findings not only inform theory, but provide valuable insights for practitioners and policy-makers aiming to promote cooperation among future generations. In particular, to increase cooperation, a potentially very effective intervention is the possibility for a third-party institution to object to selfish behavior, because children as early as the ages between 3 and 6 react in systematic ways to such incentives by increasing cooperation. That said, it remains an open question for future research to understand when and

how direct and indirect reciprocity will start promoting higher levels of cooperation during human development, and which prerequisites will actually shape their emergence later in life in situations of strategic interaction.

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
## Figures and tables

**Figure 1. Interface of the game and the experimental setting**




*Notes.* Panel A shows the interface used to make decisions in the prisoner's dilemma game. Decision-makers were represented by the lower avatar and could either give 2 tokens to their partner (represented by the upper avatar) by pressing the button with the open hand, or keep 1 token for themselves by pressing the button with the closed hand. Panel A1 was only shown in the direct (DR) and indirect reciprocity (IR) treatments and represents all of the actions the partner chose in the previous round(s). Panel A2 was only shown in the third-party punishment (TPP) treatment and shows the third-party punisher who could use one token to punish if at least one of the two players defected. Panel B shows a graphic representation of our experimental setting in kindergartens. One session consisted of six children making simultaneous decisions. Decisions were made on tablet computers, and children listened to audio instructions during the trial rounds and all rounds of the actual game. Each child was accompanied by one helper.

**Figure 2. Average cooperation rate across treatments**




Treatment abbreviations: CTR (Control), IR (Indirect reciprocity), DR (Direct reciprocity), TPP (Third-party punishment)

**Figure 3. Average cooperation rate across rounds and treatments**




**Figure 4. Predicted cooperation rate conditional on the partner's image score**



The figure shows the predicted probability of cooperation in IR and DR, conditional on the current partner's image score. The image score is calculated as the sum of a subject's actions in previous rounds, where cooperation increases the score by one, and defection decreases it by one. Shaded areas represent 95% CI.

**Figure 5. Average cooperation rate in round  $t$  of subjects who defected in round  $t - 1$ , conditional on punishment in round  $t - 1$**



The figure shows the average cooperation rate in round  $t$  for subjects who defected in round  $t - 1$ , conditional on punishment in round  $t - 1$  (left bar: no punishment; right bar: punishment), where  $t \in \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$ . Error bars show 95% CI.

**Table 1. Distribution of subjects per age cohort and treatment**

	All	3/4 years old	4/5 years old	5/6 years old
Overall	929 (814)	224 (171)	323 (282)	382 (361)
CTR	241 (202)	54 (36)	87 (74)	100 (92)
IR	236 (216)	58 (51)	81 (73)	97 (92)
DR	249 (222)	55 (41)	92 (82)	102 (99)
TPP	203 (174)	57 (43)	63 (53)	83 (78)

Notes: The table shows the number of children participating in the study across treatments (CTR, IR, DR, TPP; see below) and age cohorts. In brackets we show the number of children who passed the control questions. The latter set constitutes the basis for our analysis.



**Table 2. Probit regression estimates of main treatment effects**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IR	-0.046*	-0.041	-0.047*	-0.046
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.030)
DR	-0.006	-0.002	-0.006	-0.024
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
TPP	0.393***	0.405***	0.410***	0.421***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Round			-0.009**	-0.008*
			(0.004)	(0.005)
Age <sup>§</sup>			-0.001	-0.000
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Girl (= 1)			0.011	0.001
			(0.018)	(0.020)
Number of siblings			0.004	-0.004
			(0.011)	(0.012)
Cognitive abilities (standardized)			-0.001	0.002
			(0.011)	(0.011)
Patience			0.016	0.022**
			(0.010)	(0.011)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.026	0.034
			(0.022)	(0.024)
SES of parents				0.001
				(0.007)
Parental warmth				0.008
				(0.016)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-value: IR = DR	0.124	0.172	0.146	0.459
p-value: IR = TPP	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
p-value: DR = TPP	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Observations	4,062	4,062	4,007	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable and treatment dummy variables as the main independent variables. The reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The omitted treatment category is the CTR treatment. Additional variables include the round, age (i.e., number of months), gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; numbers represent the number of tokens saved for the next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; a higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . \*\*  $p < 0.05$ . \*  $p < 0.1$ .

<sup>§</sup> The observed age patterns stay the same when looking at the effect of age cohorts. In particular, we regress age cohort dummy variables with the youngest age cohort (3-4 year-olds) as the omitted category, on cooperation. The positive effect on cooperation in the TPP treatment becomes progressively larger with increasing age cohort, while for the IR treatment, the negative age effect seems to be mostly driven by a pronounced decrease of cooperation of the oldest age cohort (5-6 year-olds) in comparison to the middle and the youngest age cohort.

**Table 3. Probit regression estimates of the effects of repeated play on cooperation**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Round	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.029*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.009)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.015* (0.008)	0.018* (0.010)	-0.018** (0.008)	-0.018* (0.009)
Control variables <sup>#</sup>	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.011 (0.041)	-0.011 (0.047)
DR									-0.066* (0.036)	-0.072** (0.037)
TPP									0.284*** (0.049)	0.307*** (0.053)
IR × round									-0.013 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.013)
DR × round									0.020 <sup>§</sup> (0.011)	0.017 (0.012)
TPP × round									0.033 <sup>°</sup> (0.011)	0.035 <sup>°</sup> (0.014)
Observations	1,002	787	1,080	850	1,110	840	870	740	4,062	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use round as the main independent variable, while columns 9 and 10 use round, treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

<sup>#</sup> Control variables include age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents, parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects.

<sup>§</sup> DR × round interaction effect is positive and significant at the 10% level for all observations in column 9, while it is not significant for any observation in column 10.

<sup>°</sup> TPP × round interaction effect is positive and significant at the 5% level for all observations, both in columns 9 and 10.

**Table 4: Probit regression estimates of the effects of the current partner's image score on a child's cooperation**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)								
	IR				DR			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Partner's image score	0.038*** (0.009)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)	0.017 (0.011)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.053*** (0.013)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.049*** (0.018)
Round			-0.037*** (0.012)	-0.048*** (0.014)			0.026 (0.016)	0.022 (0.020)
Cooperation of partner in previous round (= 1)			-0.009 (0.029)	-0.012 (0.038)			-0.014 (0.047)	-0.025 (0.055)
Subject's image score			0.077*** (0.011)	0.065*** (0.012)			0.091*** (0.016)	0.098*** (0.018)
Subject's cooperation in previous round (=1)			-0.189*** (0.036)	-0.184*** (0.041)			-0.280*** (0.042)	-0.311*** (0.053)
Age			-0.003* (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)			0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Girl (= 1)			0.048* (0.029)	0.003 (0.034)			0.014 (0.030)	0.019 (0.034)
Siblings			0.015 (0.015)	0.020 (0.021)			0.013 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.021)
Std. cognitive abilities			-0.021 (0.015)	0.002 (0.020)			0.007 (0.018)	0.015 (0.019)
Patience			0.001 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.024)			-0.013 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.016)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.042 (0.031)	0.060 (0.040)			0.032 (0.041)	0.047 (0.040)
SES				-0.007 (0.013)				-0.005 (0.011)
Parental warmth				0.019 (0.031)				-0.021 (0.019)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	864	864	860	680	888	888	876	672

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable and the partner's image score as the main independent variable. The sample consists of subjects in IR (columns 1-4) and DR (columns 5-8). The coefficients represent average marginal effects. Additional variables include the round, a dummy variable indicating whether a partner from the previous round cooperated (= 1), a subject's image score, a dummy variable indicating whether a subject cooperated in the previous round (= 1), age as the number of months, a gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; numbers represent the number of tokens saved for next day), a theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher numbers indicate higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

**Table 5: OLS regression estimates of the effects of cooperation on a subject's payoffs**

Dependent variable: subject's round payoff					
	CTR	IR	DR	TPP	All treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Cooperation (= 1)	-0.882*** (0.068)	-0.824*** (0.065)	-0.944*** (0.108)	0.462*** (0.102)	-0.882*** (0.067)
IR					-0.094* (0.049)
DR					-0.012 (0.058)
TPP					-0.617*** (0.088)
IR × cooperation					0.059 (0.093)
DR × cooperation					-0.061 (0.126)
TPP × cooperation					1.344*** (0.121)
Constant	1.577*** (0.040)	1.483*** (0.029)	1.564*** (0.043)	0.960*** (0.079)	1.577*** (0.040)
Observations	1,002	1,080	1,110	870	4,062
R-squared	0.160	0.140	0.181	0.043	0.134

The table reports regression results from OLS models using a subject's round payoff as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 4 use a dummy variable indicating whether the subject cooperated (= 1) as the main independent variable, while column 5 uses the dummy variable indicating whether the subject cooperated, the treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. The omitted treatment category in column 5 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1

**Table 6. Probit regression estimates of the effects of age on cooperation**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age (in months)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.005* (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
Control variables#	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.241 (0.167)	-0.132 (0.193)
DR									-0.342** (0.165)	-0.284 (0.187)
TPP									-0.387* (0.217)	-0.284 (0.210)
Age × IR									0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
Age × DR									0.005§ (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Age × TPP									0.011° (0.003)	0.010° (0.003)
Observations	997	787	1,080	850	1,110	840	870	740	4,057	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use age (in months) as the main independent variable, while columns 9 and 10 use age (in months), treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . \*\*  $p < 0.05$ . \*  $p < 0.1$ .

# Control variables include the round, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents, parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects.

§ In column 9, the Age × DR interaction effect is positive and significant for all observations (predominantly at the 5% level). In column 10, it is positive, but insignificant, for all observations.

° The Age × TPP interaction effect is positive and significant at the 1% level across all observations, both in columns 9 and 10.

**Table 7. Probit regression estimates of the effects of cognitive abilities, patience, and theory of mind (TOM) on cooperation**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Std. cognitive abilities	-0.061*** (0.020)	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.014)	0.019 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.017)	0.018 (0.018)	0.047** (0.023)	-0.005 (0.029)	-0.060*** (0.020)	-0.044** (0.021)
Patience	0.020 (0.017)	0.011 (0.021)	0.002 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)	0.049* (0.029)	0.069*** (0.023)	0.020 (0.017)	0.020 (0.021)
Theory of mind (= 1)	-0.033 (0.040)	-0.020 (0.047)	0.003 (0.037)	0.012 (0.044)	0.025 (0.039)	0.007 (0.045)	0.100* (0.058)	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.032 (0.039)	-0.008 (0.046)
Control variables <sup>#</sup>	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.045 (0.068)	-0.045 (0.084)
DR									-0.006 (0.070)	-0.020 (0.081)
TPP									0.232** (0.099)	0.252** (0.109)
Std. cognitive abilities × IR									0.043 <sup>§</sup> (0.025)	0.042 (0.028)
Std. cognitive abilities × DR									0.056 <sup>°</sup> (0.026)	0.053 <sup>°</sup> (0.027)
Std. cognitive abilities × TPP									0.113 <sup>~</sup> (0.032)	0.088 <sup>~</sup> (0.035)
Patience × IR									-0.019 (0.024)	-0.009 (0.030)
Patience × DR									-0.025 (0.022)	-0.022 (0.026)
Patience × TPP									0.034 (0.036)	0.044 (0.038)
TOM × IR									0.036 (0.055)	0.011 (0.066)
TOM × DR									0.057 (0.055)	0.037 (0.063)
TOM × TPP									0.142 <sup>*</sup> (0.075)	0.114 (0.075)
Observations	982	787	1,075	850	1,100	840	860	740	4,017	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), and a theory of mind dummy variable (= 1) as the main independent variables, while columns 9 and 10 use the same three variables, but also treatment dummy variables and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their reported error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

<sup>#</sup> Control variables include age as the number of months, round, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, SES as the highest education level of parents, parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects.

<sup>§</sup> Std. cognitive abilities × IR is positive for all observations, both in columns 9 and 10. For the majority of observations, the interaction effect is significant at the 10% level in column 9 and insignificant (at any conventional level) in column 10.

<sup>°</sup> Std. cognitive abilities × DR is positive and significant for all observations, predominantly at the 5% level in column 9, and at the 5% and the 10% level in column 10.

<sup>~</sup> Std. cognitive abilities × TPP is positive and significant at the 5% level for all observations, both in columns 9 and 10.

<sup>\*</sup> TOM × TPP is positive for all observations, both in columns 9 and 10. It is significant for the majority of observations (predominantly at the 10% level) in column 9, and for the minority of observations (at the 10% level) in column 10.

**Table 8. Probit regression estimates of the effects of socioeconomic status (SES) and parental warmth on cooperation**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
SES	-0.025**	-0.018	-0.011	-0.014	-0.004	-0.010	0.053***	0.046***	-0.024**	-0.019
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Parental warmth	0.010	-0.003	0.031	0.025	-0.016	-0.042**	0.053	0.045	0.010	0.016
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Control variables <sup>#</sup>	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.233	-0.171
									(0.257)	(0.277)
DR									0.089	0.284
									(0.245)	(0.232)
TPP									-0.308	-0.202
									(0.193)	(0.242)
IR × SES									0.017	0.010
									(0.017)	(0.019)
DR × SES									0.017	0.009
									(0.016)	(0.014)
TPP × SES									0.070 <sup>§</sup>	0.068 <sup>§</sup>
									(0.042)	(0.031)
IR × parental warmth									0.019	0.014
									(0.038)	(0.040)
DR × parental warmth									-0.025	-0.049
									(0.029)	(0.035)
TPP × parental warmth									0.035	0.030
									(0.045)	(0.050)
Observations	807	787	850	850	850	840	745	740	3,252	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education) and parents' self-reported parental warmth as the main independent variables, while columns 9 and 10 use SES, parental warmth, treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their reported error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

<sup>#</sup> Control variables include age as the number of months, round, a gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), and kindergarten fixed effects.

<sup>§</sup> Both in columns 9 and 10, the TPP × round interaction effect is positive for all observations, and it is significant at the 5% level for all observations whose predicted probability of cooperation is more than 0.5. For observations whose predicted probability of cooperation is less than 0.5, the interaction effect is not significant for the majority of observations in column 9, and significant (predominantly at the 1% or the 5% level) for the majority in column 10.

## **Online Appendix**

### **The roots of cooperation**

#### A.1. Supporting information on robustness checks (see Section 3.8) and additional information on TPP procedures

##### A.1.1. Selection and control questions

**Inverse probability weighting.** A small fraction of children failed to pass the control questions (12%). This opens a door to potential selection issues, as passing the control questions can depend on certain characteristics of the child. To account for this, we first test which observable characteristics are predictive of passing the control questions (see Table A6). We look at the effect of standardized cognitive abilities, age, gender, the number of siblings, and also a proxy for a general willingness to cooperate, captured by the total amount of cooperation across the 5 rounds. We find that older children and those with higher cognitive abilities are more likely to succeed in correctly answering the questions. We then construct individual weights as the inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, where the probabilities result from a probit model of a binary indicator (showing whether the subject has passed the control questions) as a function of standardized cognitive abilities and age. After obtaining the weights, we then reweight our dataset with the constructed weights and repeat the entire analysis (see Tables A7 to A16; see Kosse et al., 2020, Bašić et al., 2020, and Falk et al, 2021, for a similar approach). Our results stay robust to reweighting of the dataset.

**Including children who failed the control questions.** As an alternative approach to accounting for potential selection due to passing control questions, we also rerun our entire analysis by also adding to the sample those who failed the control questions. Thus, we repeat all regressions from Tables 2 to 8, and A2 to A5, with 934 subjects altogether. Due to space considerations, we merely summarize here the findings from this robustness check (the complete results are available on request). The robustness check induces a certain level of noise in the data by design; hence, one might expect subtle changes in the results. However, again we observe that our results remain highly robust overall. We notice a marginal change when looking at the treatment effects. In the robustness check, the negative effect of the IR treatment also remains significant when including controls. Also, when looking at the effect of age or the



effect of cognitive abilities on cooperation in CTR, both variables also remain a significant negative predictor (at the 10% level) when we include control variables.

Together, the inverse probability weighting robustness check and the robustness check with subjects who failed the control questions provide strong evidence that our findings do not suffer from selection issues due to passing the control questions.

### A.1.2. Selection, parents' SES, and parental warmth

**Inverse probability weighting.** We elicited the education of parents and information on parental warmth through a take-home survey. With this approach, we obtained information for SES (highest educational level of parents) and parental warmth for 80% of our main sample.<sup>20</sup> As this sample is not randomly determined, there is a possibility that selection might affect our findings concerning SES and parental warmth, in particular their relation to cooperation (see Table 8). To account for this concern, we first test which observable characteristics are predictive of passing the control questions (see Table A27). Here, we look at standardized cognitive abilities of the child, gender, age, number of siblings, a proxy variable for general cooperativeness captured by the total amount of cooperation across the 5 rounds, and kindergarten fixed effects. We find that age and gender (at the 10% level), as well as kindergarten fixed effects are significantly predictive of obtaining information on SES and parental warmth. To account for these imbalances, we construct individual weights as the inverse probabilities of obtaining information on both SES and parental warmth, where the probabilities result from a probit model of a binary indicator (indicating whether both SES and parental warmth were obtained for a child) as a function of gender, age, and kindergarten fixed effects. After constructing the weights, we reweight our dataset and repeat the analysis for SES and parental warmth (see Table A28; see Kosse et al., 2020, Bašić et al., 2020, and Falk et al., 2021, for a similar approach). We find that our results concerning the relation between SES, parental warmth, and cooperative behavior of children stay robust, suggesting that selection concerning survey responses does not affect our findings.

### A.1.3. TPP procedures

To collect punishment decision for the TPP treatment, at the end of sessions in the other treatments CTR, IR, and DR, children were invited (as a surprise) to play a final task on an

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<sup>20</sup> Not obtaining information for the remaining 20% of parents is almost exclusively due to parents not completing the survey at all. For those who did return a completed survey, only 2% did not provide an answer on questions regarding education or parental warmth.

additional screen where they acted as the observers of how two other children played the prisoner's dilemma game (see Section 2.3). All children accepted the invitation and were then confronted with one of the two punishment decision scenarios: they were either asked to make a decision on whether to punish defection (scenario 1) or were shown a setting of mutual cooperation where no punishment was possible (scenario 2; see Section A.3 for instructions). Thus, the punisher always got to keep the token in scenario 2. The collected punishment decisions were always matched to one of the five rounds of children playing the PD game in a TPP session in a different kindergarten, where scenario 1 decision was used when at least 1 child within the pair defected, and scenario 2 when both children cooperated. Punishment decisions for the initial TPP sessions were collected ex ante (in previous sessions of CTR, IR, and DR). We then recorded (and followed) the actual defection rate in TPP during the experiment to estimate the number of punishment decisions (both scenario 1 and scenario 2) required for the remaining sessions, and collected them accordingly. The punishment decisions were applied by a random draw in the TPP treatment.

## A.2. Supporting tables

**Table A1. Descriptive statistics across treatments**

	CTR	IR	DR	TPP	All subjects
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Girl (= 1)	0.490 (0.501)	0.486 (0.501)	0.455 (0.499)	0.523 (0.501)	0.486 (0.500)
Siblings	1.129 (0.775)	1.162 (0.811)	1.104 (0.770)	1.006 (0.701)	1.105 (0.769)
Age (in months)	65.95 (9.827)	65.46 (9.892)	65.65 (9.300)	64.87 (10.31)	65.51 (9.799)
Cognitive abilities	7.010 (1.476)	6.851 (1.701)	7.045 (1.755)	6.920 (1.708)	6.958 (1.664)
Theory of mind (= 1)	0.715 (0.453)	0.749 (0.435)	0.741 (0.439)	0.701 (0.459)	0.728 (0.445)
Patience	0.965 (0.873)	0.916 (0.827)	0.914 (0.856)	0.866 (0.844)	0.917 (0.849)
SES	5.745 (1.505)	5.399 (1.531)	5.669 (1.541)	5.853 (1.539)	5.657 (1.535)
Parental Warmth	9.639 (0.671)	9.735 (0.591)	9.550 (0.994)	9.640 (0.627)	9.641 (0.743)
Observations	202	216	222	174	814

The table reports means and standard deviations (in brackets) of variables across the four treatments (columns 1 to 4) and for the entire sample (column 5). Variables include a gender dummy variable (girl = 1), the number of siblings, age in months, cognitive abilities (as the number of correctly solved Raven matrices), a dummy variable indicating whether a subject possesses theory of mind (= 1), patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), and self-reported parental warmth. We conduct an  $F$ -test for non-binary variables ( $\chi^2$  for binary variables) to jointly test whether the averages (proportions) across the 4 treatments differ. Out of 8 variables, only SES shows a significant difference at any conventional significance level ( $p = 0.045$ ), which seems to be driven by the lower average in the IR treatment (removing the IR treatment from the joint test yields a  $p$ -value of 0.556, while removing any of the other three treatments always yields a significant result (at least at the 10%):  $p < 0.087$  for each of the three comparisons).

**Table A2. Probit regression estimates of main treatment effects in the first round**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IR	-0.020 (0.042)	-0.029 (0.044)	-0.035 (0.043)	-0.062 (0.049)
DR	-0.012 (0.046)	-0.020 (0.043)	-0.024 (0.043)	-0.057 (0.046)
TPP	0.405*** (0.056)	0.391*** (0.056)	0.396*** (0.056)	0.378*** (0.056)
Age			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Girl (= 1)			-0.033 (0.033)	-0.041 (0.035)
Siblings			-0.002 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.021)
Std. cognitive abilities			0.016 (0.017)	0.015 (0.020)
Patience			0.035** (0.017)	0.039** (0.019)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.003 (0.039)	-0.009 (0.043)
SES				-0.009 (0.013)
Parental warmth				-0.027 (0.023)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	814	814	803	645

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable and treatment dummy variables as the main independent variables. The sample includes only behavior from the first round. The reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The omitted treatment category is the CTR treatment. Additional variables include age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

**Table A3. Probit regression estimates of the effect of being in a cooperative pair in round 1**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)					
	CTR		IR		DR	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Both players cooperated in round 1 (= 1)	0.104 (0.069)	0.128 (0.097)	0.153* (0.082)	0.129* (0.075)	0.215** (0.087)	0.273*** (0.056)
Round		-0.096*** (0.019)		-0.089*** (0.014)		-0.054*** (0.014)
Age		-0.004 (0.005)		-0.003* (0.002)		0.008*** (0.003)
Girl (= 1)		0.028 (0.056)		-0.035 (0.046)		0.075* (0.044)
Siblings		-0.003 (0.035)		0.016 (0.029)		-0.064* (0.033)
Std. cognitive abilities		-0.021 (0.035)		-0.037 (0.035)		0.016 (0.022)
Patience		0.025 (0.034)		-0.006 (0.032)		0.001 (0.021)
Theory of mind (= 1)		-0.024 (0.076)		0.085* (0.050)		0.113** (0.054)
SES		-0.037** (0.015)		-0.003 (0.019)		0.004 (0.013)
Parental warmth		0.001 (0.045)		0.009 (0.042)		-0.012 (0.037)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	492	360	572	472	580	444

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable and dummy variable indicating the pair's cooperative behavior in round one (1 if both the subject and the partner in the first round cooperated in the first round, or 0 if both the subject and the partner in the first round did not cooperate in the first round) as the main independent variable. The sample includes only observations from the second to the fifth round from subjects where they, and their first-round partners, either both cooperated in the first round or both defected in the first round. The reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. Additional variables include the round, age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

**Table A4. Probit regression estimates of the effect of experiencing punishment on cooperation**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Experienced punishment in previous round (= 1)	0.249*** (0.060)	0.289*** (0.063)	0.310*** (0.067)	0.333*** (0.069)
Round			-0.005 (0.022)	0.009 (0.023)
Age			0.005 (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)
Girl (= 1)			-0.052 (0.084)	-0.035 (0.086)
Siblings			-0.070 (0.071)	-0.060 (0.078)
Cooperation of partner in previous round (= 1)			-0.152** (0.063)	-0.139* (0.078)
Std. cognitive abilities			0.064 (0.039)	0.051 (0.041)
Patience			-0.042 (0.052)	-0.008 (0.049)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.042 (0.112)	-0.068 (0.125)
SES				0.027 (0.033)
Parental warmth				0.000 (0.072)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	221	214	206	177

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable and a dummy variable indicating whether a subject was punished in the round before (= 1) as the main independent variable. The sample consists only of subjects from TPP who kept their token (were selfish) in the previous round. The reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. Additional variables include the round, age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, dummy variable indicating whether partner from the previous round cooperated, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01. \*\* p<0.05. \* p<0.1.

**Table A5. OLS regression estimates of the effect of cooperation on a subject's total payoff**

	Dependent variable: total payoff				
	CTR	IR	DR	TPP	All treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Total amount of cooperation	-0.794*** (0.112)	-0.659*** (0.101)	-0.258 (0.202)	0.574*** (0.163)	-0.794*** (0.112)
IR					-0.549* (0.295)
DR					-0.917** (0.359)
TPP					-3.345*** (0.672)
IR × total amount of cooperation					0.136 (0.150)
DR × total amount of cooperation					0.537** (0.230)
TPP × total amount of cooperation					1.368*** (0.197)
Constant	7.762*** (0.242)	7.213*** (0.171)	6.844*** (0.268)	4.416*** (0.633)	7.762*** (0.240)
Observations	198	216	222	174	810
R-squared	0.186	0.122	0.017	0.110	0.105

The table reports regression results from OLS models using a subject's total payoff over the five rounds as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 4 use the subject's total amount of cooperative behavior in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game as the main independent variable, while column 5 uses the total amount of cooperative behavior, the treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

**Table A6. Probit regression estimates of selection on observables concerning passing the control questions**

	Dependent variable: Control questions passed (= 1)
	(1)
Total amount of cooperation	-0.002 (0.007)
Siblings	0.003 (0.013)
Girl (= 1)	-0.024 (0.021)
Age	0.006*** (0.001)
Std. cognitive abilities	0.027** (0.011)
Observations	917

The table reports regression results from a probit model using a dummy variable indicating whether the SES variable (highest educational level of the parents) and the parental warmth variable were obtained for the subject. Independent variables include the subject's total amount of cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game, number of siblings, gender dummy variable (girl= 1), age as the number of months, and standardized cognitive abilities. The reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01. \*\* p<0.05. \* p<0.1.



**Table A7. Probit regression estimates of main treatment effects using inverse probability weighting**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IR	-0.050*	-0.045	-0.051*	-0.050*
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.030)
DR	-0.012	-0.007	-0.011	-0.031
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
TPP	0.381***	0.394***	0.399***	0.410***
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Round			-0.009**	-0.008*
			(0.004)	(0.005)
Age			-0.001	-0.000
			(0.001)	(0.001)
Girl (= 1)			0.013	0.004
			(0.018)	(0.021)
Siblings			0.004	-0.003
			(0.012)	(0.013)
Std. cognitive abilities			0.000	0.005
			(0.011)	(0.012)
Patience			0.018*	0.025**
			(0.010)	(0.011)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.025	0.033
			(0.022)	(0.025)
SES				-0.001
				(0.008)
Parental warmth				0.008
				(0.016)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,062	4,062	4,007	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using inverse probability weighting. A dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) is used as the dependent variable and treatment dummy variables are used as the main independent variables. The reported coefficients represent (weighted) average marginal effects. Weights are predicted as inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). The omitted treatment category is the CTR treatment. Additional variables include the round, age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

**Table A8. Probit regression estimates of main treatment effects in the first round using inverse probability weighting**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IR	-0.031 (0.043)	-0.041 (0.044)	-0.047 (0.043)	-0.074 (0.049)
DR	-0.015 (0.047)	-0.023 (0.044)	-0.027 (0.044)	-0.060 (0.047)
TPP	0.392*** (0.056)	0.381*** (0.056)	0.385*** (0.055)	0.366*** (0.057)
Age			-0.003 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Girl (= 1)			-0.031 (0.033)	-0.038 (0.035)
Siblings			-0.003 (0.019)	-0.025 (0.021)
Std. cognitive abilities			0.017 (0.017)	0.016 (0.020)
Patience			0.037** (0.017)	0.042** (0.019)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.002 (0.039)	-0.012 (0.043)
SES				-0.010 (0.013)
Parental warmth				-0.029 (0.023)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	814	814	803	645

The table reports regression results from probit models using inverse probability weighting. A dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) is used as the dependent variable and treatment dummy variables are used as the main independent variables. The sample includes only behavior from the first round. The reported coefficients represent (weighted) average marginal effects. Weights are predicted as inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). The omitted treatment category is the CTR treatment. Additional variables include age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . \*\*  $p < 0.05$ . \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A9. Probit regression estimates of the effect of round on cooperation using inverse probability weighting**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Round	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.027*** (0.009)	-0.027*** (0.009)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.015* (0.008)	0.018* (0.011)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018* (0.009)
Control variables#	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.022 (0.041)	-0.020 (0.047)
DR									-0.072* (0.037)	-0.076** (0.038)
TPP									0.272*** (0.050)	0.299*** (0.054)
IR × round									-0.009 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)
DR × round									0.020§ (0.011)	0.015 (0.013)
TPP × round									0.033° (0.012)	0.035° (0.014)
Observations	1,002	787	1,080	850	1,110	840	870	740	4,062	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using inverse probability weighting. A dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) is used as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use the round as the main independent variable, while columns 9 and 10 use the round, treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent (weighted) average marginal effects. Weights are predicted inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

# Control variables include age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents, parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects.

§ DR × round interaction effect is positive and significant at the 10% level for all observations in column 9, while it is not significant for any observation in column 10.

° TPP × round interaction effect is positive and significant (at least) at the 5% level for all observations, both in columns 9 and 10.

**Table A10. Probit regression estimates of the effect of the partner's image score on cooperation using inverse probability weighting**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)								
	IR				DR			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Partner's image score	0.038*** (0.009)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)	0.016 <sup>§</sup> (0.011)	0.059*** (0.013)	0.053*** (0.013)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.050*** (0.017)
Round			-0.037*** (0.012)	-0.049*** (0.014)			0.027* (0.016)	0.022 (0.020)
Cooperation of partner in previous round (= 1)			-0.012 (0.028)	-0.016 (0.038)			-0.012 (0.048)	-0.022 (0.056)
Player's image score			0.077*** (0.011)	0.063*** (0.012)			0.092*** (0.015)	0.098*** (0.018)
Subject's cooperation in previous round (= 1)			-0.182*** (0.036)	-0.177*** (0.041)			-0.284*** (0.042)	-0.314*** (0.053)
Age			-0.003* (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)			0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Girl (= 1)			0.048 (0.030)	0.002 (0.035)			0.013 (0.030)	0.019 (0.033)
Siblings			0.015 (0.015)	0.022 (0.021)			0.017 (0.023)	-0.016 (0.020)
Std. cognitive abilities			-0.020 (0.014)	0.003 (0.019)			0.009 (0.018)	0.018 (0.018)
Patience			0.005 (0.019)	0.006 (0.025)			-0.016 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.016)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.042 (0.031)	0.056 (0.040)			0.029 (0.041)	0.046 (0.039)
SES				-0.009 (0.013)				-0.006 (0.011)
Parental warmth				0.020 (0.031)				-0.020 (0.019)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	864	864	860	680	888	888	876	672

The table reports regression results from probit models using inverse probability weighting. A dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) is used as the dependent variable, and the partner's image score is used as the main independent variable. The sample consists of subjects in IR (columns 1 to 4) and DR (columns 5 to 8). Reported coefficients represent (weighted) average marginal effects. Weights are predicted as inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). Additional variables include the round, a dummy variable indicating whether a partner from the previous round cooperated (= 1), a subject's image score, a dummy variable indicating whether a subject cooperated in the previous round (= 1), age as the number of months, a gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), a theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . \*\*  $p < 0.05$ . \*  $p < 0.1$ .

<sup>§</sup> The effect of the partner's image score in column 4 is not significant ( $p = 0.135$ ), but it becomes significant when imputing missing SES and parental warmth values from age, gender, standardized cognitive abilities, theory of mind, number of siblings and patience, and repeating the regression ( $p = 0.025$ , AME = 0.021).

**Table A11. Probit regression estimates of the effect of experiencing punishment on cooperation using inverse probability weighting**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Experienced punishment in previous round (= 1)	0.252*** (0.059)	0.292*** (0.062)	0.322*** (0.065)	0.346*** (0.068)
Round			-0.004 (0.021)	0.010 (0.023)
Age			0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)
Girl (= 1)			-0.042 (0.086)	-0.025 (0.088)
Siblings			-0.075 (0.072)	-0.064 (0.079)
Cooperation of partner in previous round (= 1)			-0.158** (0.061)	-0.150** (0.075)
Std. cognitive abilities			0.063 (0.039)	0.052 (0.042)
Patience			-0.035 (0.052)	0.001 (0.050)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.055 (0.110)	-0.053 (0.123)
SES				0.021 (0.033)
Parental warmth				0.002 (0.072)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	221	214	206	177

The table reports regression results from probit models using inverse probability weighting. A dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) is used as the dependent variable, and a dummy variable indicating whether a subject was punished in the round before (= 1) as the main independent variable. The sample consists only of subjects from TPP who kept their token (were selfish) in the previous round. The reported coefficients represent (weighted) average marginal effects. Weights are predicted as inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). Additional variables include the round, age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, dummy variable indicating whether partner from previous round cooperated, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01. \*\* p<0.05. \* p<0.1.

**Table A12. OLS regression estimates of the effect of cooperation on the subject's round payoff using inverse probability weighting**

	Dependent variable: subject's round payoff				
	CTR	IR	DR	TPP	All treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Cooperation (= 1)	-0.882*** (0.068)	-0.819*** (0.064)	-0.938*** (0.109)	0.452*** (0.098)	-0.882*** (0.068)
IR					-0.096* (0.050)
DR					-0.019 (0.060)
TPP					-0.623*** (0.087)
IR × cooperation					0.063 (0.093)
DR × cooperation					-0.056 (0.128)
TPP × cooperation					1.334*** (0.118)
Constant	1.582*** (0.041)	1.486*** (0.029)	1.563*** (0.044)	0.960*** (0.078)	1.582*** (0.041)
Observations	1,002	1,080	1,110	870	4,062
R-squared	0.160	0.139	0.179	0.041	0.132

The table reports regression results from OLS models using inverse probability weighting. A subject's round payoff is used as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 4 use a dummy variable indicating whether the subject cooperated (= 1) as the main independent variable, while column 5 uses the dummy variable indicating whether the subject cooperated, the treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. The reported coefficients represent weighted least squares estimates. Weights are predicted inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . \*\*  $p < 0.05$ . \*  $p < 0.1$

**Table A13. OLS regression estimates of the effect of cooperative behavior on the subject's total payoff using inverse probability weighting**

	Dependent variable: total payoff				
	CTR	IR	DR	TPP	All treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Total amount of cooperation	-0.784*** (0.111)	-0.653*** (0.100)	-0.248 (0.198)	0.568*** (0.163)	-0.784*** (0.110)
IR					-0.548* (0.296)
DR					-0.944*** (0.361)
TPP					-3.369*** (0.674)
IR × Total amount of cooperation					0.131 (0.148)
DR × Total amount of cooperation					0.536** (0.226)
TPP × Total amount of cooperation					1.352*** (0.195)
Constant	7.776*** (0.245)	7.227*** (0.171)	6.832*** (0.269)	4.407*** (0.634)	7.776*** (0.243)
Observations	198	216	222	174	810
R-squared	0.185	0.121	0.016	0.108	0.104

The table reports regression results from OLS models using inverse probability weighting. A subject's total payoff over five rounds is used as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 4 use the subject's total amount of cooperative behavior in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game as the main independent variable, while column 5 uses the total amount of cooperative behavior, the treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. The reported coefficients represent weighted least squares estimates. Weights are predicted inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . \*\*  $p < 0.05$ . \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A14. Probit regression estimates of the effect of age on cooperation using inverse probability weighting**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age (in months)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.006* (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Control variables <sup>#</sup>	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.277 (0.171)	-0.174 (0.196)
DR									-0.383** (0.167)	-0.342* (0.189)
TPP									-0.428** (0.218)	-0.323 (0.212)
Age × IR									0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Age × DR									0.006 <sup>§</sup> (0.002)	0.005 <sup>§</sup> (0.003)
Age × TPP									0.012 <sup>°</sup> (0.003)	0.011 <sup>°</sup> (0.003)
Observations	997	787	1,080	850	1,110	840	870	740	4,057	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using inverse probability weighting. A dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) is used as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use age (in months) as the main independent variable, while columns 9 and 10 use age (in months), treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. The reported coefficients represent (weighted) average marginal effects. Weights are predicted as inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

<sup>#</sup> Control variables include the round, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents, parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects.

<sup>§</sup> In column 9, Age × DR interaction effect is positive and significant for all observations at the 5% level. In column 10, it is positive for all and significant at the 10% level for the majority of observations.

<sup>°</sup> Age × TPP interaction effect is positive and significant at the 1% level across all observations, both in columns 9 and 10.



**Table A15. Probit regression estimates of the effect of cognitive abilities, patience, and theory of mind (TOM) on cooperation using inverse probability weighting**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)									
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Std. cognitive abilities	-0.061*** (0.020)	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.019 (0.014)	0.019 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.017)	0.018 (0.018)	0.047** (0.023)	-0.005 (0.029)	-0.060*** (0.020)	-0.044** (0.021)
Patience	0.020 (0.017)	0.011 (0.021)	0.002 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.015)	0.049* (0.029)	0.069*** (0.023)	0.020 (0.017)	0.020 (0.021)
Theory of mind (= 1)	-0.033 (0.040)	-0.020 (0.047)	0.003 (0.037)	0.012 (0.044)	0.025 (0.039)	0.007 (0.045)	0.100* (0.058)	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.032 (0.039)	-0.008 (0.046)
Control variables#	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.064 (0.054)	-0.053 (0.066)
DR									-0.032 (0.055)	-0.043 (0.064)
TPP									0.266*** (0.079)	0.297*** (0.084)
Std. cog. abilities × IR									0.047 <sup>§</sup> (0.025)	0.047 <sup>§</sup> (0.028)
Std. cog. abilities × DR									0.061 <sup>°</sup> (0.027)	0.058 <sup>°</sup> (0.027)
Std. cog. abilities × TPP									0.122 <sup>~</sup> (0.034)	0.092 <sup>~</sup> (0.035)
Patience × IR									-0.018 (0.024)	-0.006 (0.030)
Patience × DR									-0.029 (0.023)	-0.027 (0.026)
Patience × TPP									0.033 (0.036)	0.043 (0.038)
TOM × IR									0.048 (0.056)	0.022 (0.067)
TOM × DR									0.063 (0.056)	0.048 (0.065)
TOM × TPP									0.157 <sup>*</sup> (0.077)	0.129 <sup>*</sup> (0.077)
Observations	982	787	1,075	850	1,100	840	860	740	4,017	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using inverse probability weighting. A dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) is used as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), and theory of mind dummy variable (= 1) as the main independent variables, while columns 9 and 10 use the same three variables, but also treatment dummy variables and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent (weighted) average marginal effects. Weights are predicted inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their reported error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

# Control variables include age as the number of months, round, gender dummy variable (girls = 1), number of siblings, SES as the highest education level of parents, parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects.

§ Std. cog. abilities × IR is positive for all observations and significant at the 10% level for the majority of observations, in both columns 9 and 10.

° Std. cog. abilities × DR is positive and significant for all observations (mostly at the 5% level), both in columns 9 and 10.

~Std. cog. abilities × TPP is positive and significant (at least) at the 5% level for all observations, both in columns 9 and 10.

\*TOM × TPP is positive for all and significant for most observations, predominantly at the 5% level in column 9, and at the 10% level in column 10.

**Table A16. Probit regression estimates of the effect of SES and parental warmth on cooperation using inverse probability weighting (correcting for selection in passing control questions)**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
SES	-0.025**	-0.019	-0.012	-0.015	-0.005	-0.012	0.052***	0.044**	-0.024**	-0.020*
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Parental warmth	0.011	-0.002	0.033	0.026	-0.018	-0.043**	0.061	0.047	0.011	0.019
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Control variables#	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.229	-0.156
									(0.244)	(0.277)
DR									0.106	0.297
									(0.244)	(0.225)
TPP									-0.323*	-0.213
									(0.177)	(0.229)
IR × SES									0.017	0.010
									(0.017)	(0.020)
DR × SES									0.016	0.009
									(0.016)	(0.015)
TPP × SES									0.062 <sup>§</sup>	0.067 <sup>§</sup>
									(0.047)	(0.037)
IR × parental warmth									0.020	0.012
									(0.038)	(0.041)
DR × parental warmth									-0.028	-0.052
									(0.031)	(0.036)
TPP × parental warmth									0.041	0.032
									(0.047)	(0.050)
Observations	807	787	850	850	850	840	745	740	3,252	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using inverse probability weighting. A dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) is used as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education) and parents' self-reported parental warmth as the main independent variables, while columns 9 and 10 use SES, parental warmth, treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent (weighted) average marginal effects. Weights are predicted as inverse probabilities of passing the control questions, taking into account age and standardized cognitive abilities of the subject (see Appendix A.1.1 for more details on the construction of weights). The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their reported error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

# Control variables include age as the number of months, round, a gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), and kindergarten fixed effects.

§ Both in columns 9 and 10, TPP × round interaction effect is positive for all observations, and it is significant (at least) at the 5% level for all observations whose predicted probability of cooperating is more than 0.5. For observations whose predicted probability of cooperating is less than 0.5, the interaction effect is not significant for the large majority of observations in column 9, and significant for approximately half of observations (with a significance level ranging from 1% to 10%) in column 10.

**Table A17. Probit regression estimates of main treatment effects using stricter comprehension criteria**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IR	-0.064** (0.026)	-0.047 (0.029)	-0.053* (0.028)	-0.040 (0.032)
DR	-0.020 (0.028)	-0.016 (0.027)	-0.021 (0.027)	-0.034 (0.029)
TPP	0.416*** (0.040)	0.433*** (0.039)	0.437*** (0.038)	0.440*** (0.037)
Round			-0.008* (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
Age			-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Girl (= 1)			0.009 (0.018)	-0.005 (0.021)
Siblings			0.001 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.014)
Std. cognitive abilities			0.005 (0.011)	0.003 (0.012)
Patience			0.022** (0.010)	0.029** (0.012)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.027 (0.025)	0.019 (0.028)
SES				0.007 (0.008)
Parental warmth				0.015 (0.018)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,392	3,392	3,352	2,712

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable and treatment dummy variables as the main independent variables. The reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The sample excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. The omitted treatment category is the CTR treatment. Additional variables include the round, age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

**Table A18. Probit regression estimates of main treatment effects in the first round using stricter comprehension criteria**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
IR	-0.027 (0.046)	-0.032 (0.048)	-0.036 (0.048)	-0.033 (0.052)
DR	-0.025 (0.046)	-0.036 (0.044)	-0.041 (0.044)	-0.052 (0.047)
TPP	0.419*** (0.056)	0.390*** (0.056)	0.389*** (0.055)	0.382*** (0.055)
Age			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Girl (= 1)			-0.035 (0.035)	-0.037 (0.037)
Siblings			-0.009 (0.021)	-0.041* (0.024)
Std. cognitive abilities			0.011 (0.019)	0.010 (0.022)
Patience			0.027 (0.018)	0.032 (0.021)
Theory of mind (= 1)			-0.005 (0.044)	-0.031 (0.048)
SES				0.003 (0.013)
Parental warmth				-0.018 (0.028)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	680	680	672	544

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable and treatment dummy variables are used as the main independent variables. The sample includes only behavior from the first round. The reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The sample excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. The omitted treatment category is the CTR treatment. Additional variables include age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

**Table A19. Probit regression estimates of the effect of round on cooperation using stricter comprehension criteria**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Round	-0.020** (0.008)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.027*** (0.009)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.019** (0.008)	0.021* (0.011)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.018* (0.009)
Control variables <sup>#</sup>	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.024 (0.046)	-0.011 (0.052)
DR									-0.085** (0.037)	-0.087** (0.036)
TPP									0.290*** (0.052)	0.317*** (0.054)
IR × round									-0.013 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.014)
DR × round									0.022 <sup>§</sup> (0.012)	0.018 (0.012)
TPP × round									0.039 <sup>°</sup> (0.012)	0.038 <sup>°</sup> (0.014)
Observations	972	767	765	600	830	635	825	710	3,392	2,712

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use the round as the main independent variable, while columns 9 and 10 use the round, treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The sample excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects, and their error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004) \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

<sup>#</sup> Control variables include age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents, parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects.

<sup>§</sup> DR × round interaction effect is positive and significant (at least) at the 10% level for all observations in column 9, while it is not significant for any observation in column 10.

<sup>°</sup> TPP × round interaction effect is positive and significant (at least) at the 5% level for all observations in columns 9 and 10.

**Table A20. Probit regression estimates of the effect of the partner's image score on cooperation using stricter comprehension criteria**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)							
	IR				DR			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Partner's image score	0.037*** (0.009)	0.035*** (0.009)	0.023** (0.010)	0.024** (0.011)	0.061*** (0.013)	0.053*** (0.013)	0.056*** (0.019)	0.060*** (0.020)
Round			-0.033** (0.016)	-0.033* (0.019)			0.026 (0.019)	0.029 (0.018)
Cooperation of partner in previous round (= 1)			-0.019 (0.037)	-0.010 (0.045)			-0.003 (0.049)	-0.018 (0.058)
Player's image score			0.079*** (0.013)	0.079*** (0.015)			0.087*** (0.019)	0.096*** (0.021)
Cooperation in previous round (= 1)			-0.211*** (0.047)	-0.224*** (0.048)			-0.264*** (0.051)	-0.314*** (0.056)
Age			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)			0.003 (0.002)	0.005* (0.003)
Girl (= 1)			0.023 (0.031)	0.000 (0.036)			0.015 (0.035)	0.006 (0.042)
Siblings			0.028 (0.019)	0.039 (0.025)			0.013 (0.030)	-0.031 (0.030)
Std. cognitive abilities			-0.011 (0.018)	0.007 (0.025)			0.000 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.017)
Patience			-0.004 (0.021)	-0.007 (0.028)			0.005 (0.018)	0.014 (0.022)
Theory of mind (= 1)			0.079* (0.044)	0.068 (0.054)			0.027 (0.051)	0.063 (0.048)
SES				-0.015 (0.015)				0.011 (0.012)
Parental warmth				-0.042 (0.038)				-0.018 (0.032)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	612	612	608	480	664	664	660	508

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable and the partner's image score as the main independent variable. The sample consists of subjects in IR (columns 1 to 4) and DR (columns 5 to 8). The coefficients represent average marginal effects. The sample excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. Additional variables include the round, a dummy variable indicating whether a partner from the previous round cooperated (= 1), a subject's image score, a dummy variable indicating whether a subject cooperated in the previous round (= 1), age as the number of months, a gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), a theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . \*\*  $p < 0.05$ . \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A21. Probit regression estimates of the effect of experiencing punishment on cooperation using stricter comprehension criteria**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Experienced punishment in last round (= 1)	0.258*** (0.058)	0.299*** (0.059)	0.342*** (0.069)	0.340*** (0.067)
Round			-0.002 (0.023)	0.007 (0.023)
Age			0.006 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)
Girl (= 1)			-0.106 (0.083)	-0.065 (0.091)
Siblings			-0.119* (0.062)	-0.115* (0.063)
Cooperation of partner in previous round (= 1)			-0.161*** (0.063)	-0.117 (0.078)
Std. cognitive abilities			0.090** (0.035)	0.091** (0.044)
Patience			-0.031 (0.054)	-0.002 (0.052)
Theory of mind (= 1)			-0.035 (0.098)	-0.161 (0.116)
SES				0.031 (0.031)
Parental warmth				0.000 (0.071)
Kindergarten FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	197	193	189	162

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable and a dummy variable indicating whether a subject was punished in the round before (= 1) as the main independent variable. The sample consists only of subjects from TPP who kept their token (were selfish) in the previous round, and it excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. The reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. Additional variables include the round, age as the number of months, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, dummy variable indicating whether partner from previous round cooperated (= 1), standardized cognitive abilities, patience (from 0 to 2; number represents the number of tokens saved for next day), theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education), parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects. \*\*\* p<0.01. \*\* p<0.05. \* p<0.1.

**Table A22. OLS regression estimates of the effect of cooperation on the subject's round payoff using stricter comprehension criteria**

	Dependent variable: subject's round payoff				
	CTR	IR	DR	TPP	All treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Cooperation (= 1)	-0.883*** (0.067)	-0.830*** (0.092)	-0.993*** (0.113)	0.506*** (0.105)	-0.883*** (0.067)
IR					-0.081 (0.050)
DR					-0.006 (0.056)
TPP					-0.643*** (0.090)
IR × cooperation					0.053 (0.113)
DR × cooperation					-0.110 (0.130)
TPP × cooperation					1.389*** (0.123)
Constant	1.573*** (0.039)	1.492*** (0.031)	1.567*** (0.042)	0.930*** (0.082)	1.573*** (0.039)
Observations	972	765	830	825	3,392
R-squared	0.160	0.134	0.192	0.051	0.135

The table reports regression results from OLS models using a subject's round payoff as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 4 use a dummy variable indicating whether the subject cooperated (= 1) as the main independent variable, while column 5 uses the dummy variable indicating whether the subject cooperated, the treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. The sample excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . \*\*  $p < 0.05$ . \*  $p < 0.1$ .



**Table A23. OLS regression estimates of the effect of cooperative behavior on the subject's total payoff using stricter comprehension criteria**

	Dependent variable: total payoff				
	CTR	IR	DR	TPP	All treatments
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Total amount of cooperation	-0.791*** (0.112)	-0.723*** (0.144)	-0.329 (0.233)	0.613*** (0.160)	-0.791*** (0.111)
IR					-0.396 (0.328)
DR					-0.797** (0.363)
TPP					-3.463*** (0.661)
IR × Total amount of cooperation					0.068 (0.181)
DR × Total amount of cooperation					0.462* (0.257)
TPP × Total amount of cooperation					1.403*** (0.194)
Constant	7.739*** (0.244)	7.342*** (0.222)	6.942*** (0.272)	4.275*** (0.620)	7.739*** (0.242)
Observations	192	153	166	165	676
R-squared	0.187	0.138	0.027	0.121	0.119

The table reports regression results from OLS models using a subject's total payoff over five rounds as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 4 use the subject's total amount of cooperative behavior in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game as the main independent variable, while column 5 uses the total amount of cooperative behavior, the treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. The sample excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . \*\*  $p < 0.05$ . \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A24. Probit regression estimates of the effect of age on cooperation using stricter comprehension criteria**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
Control variables <sup>#</sup>	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.264 (0.173)	-0.148 (0.194)
DR									-0.402** (0.190)	-0.420* (0.219)
TPP									-0.391* (0.230)	-0.364 (0.224)
Age × IR									0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Age × DR									0.006 <sup>§</sup> (0.003)	0.006 <sup>§</sup> (0.003)
Age × TPP									0.012 <sup>°</sup> (0.003)	0.011 <sup>°</sup> (0.003)
Observations	967	767	765	600	830	635	825	710	3,387	2,712

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use age (in months) as the main independent variable, while columns 9 and 10 use age (in months), treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The sample excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

<sup>#</sup> Control variables include the round, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), SES as the highest education level of parents, parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects.

<sup>§</sup> In column 9, Age × DR interaction effect is positive and significant for all observations, predominantly at the 5% level. In column 10, it is positive for all and significant for most observations, predominantly at the 10% level.

<sup>°</sup> Age × TPP interaction effect is positive and significant at the 1% level across all observations, both in columns 9 and 10.

**Table A25. Probit regression estimates of the effect of cognitive abilities, patience, and theory of mind (TOM) on cooperation using stricter comprehension criteria**

	Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)									
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Std. cognitive abilities	-0.062*** (0.021)	-0.033 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.009 (0.024)	0.004 (0.016)	0.007 (0.015)	0.053** (0.023)	0.003 (0.028)	-0.060*** (0.021)	-0.050** (0.022)
Patience	0.024 (0.017)	0.015 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.019)	-0.015 (0.026)	0.009 (0.015)	0.015 (0.022)	0.047* (0.027)	0.070*** (0.024)	0.023 (0.017)	0.024 (0.021)
Theory of mind (= 1)	-0.037 (0.042)	-0.039 (0.048)	0.003 (0.045)	-0.000 (0.061)	0.028 (0.046)	0.006 (0.064)	0.079 (0.057)	-0.029 (0.045)	-0.036 (0.041)	-0.022 (0.047)
Control variables#	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.081 (0.057)	-0.030 (0.073)
DR									-0.067 (0.056)	-0.074 (0.069)
TPP									0.298*** (0.080)	0.329*** (0.085)
Std. cog. abilities × IR									0.055§ (0.028)	0.048 (0.031)
Std. cog. abilities × DR									0.065° (0.026)	0.069° (0.029)
Std. cog. abilities × TPP									0.120~ (0.032)	0.095~ (0.034)
Patience × IR									-0.026 (0.026)	-0.028 (0.033)
Patience × DR									-0.015 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.030)
Patience × TPP									0.030 (0.035)	0.043 (0.037)
TOM × IR									0.040 (0.063)	0.010 (0.078)
TOM × DR									0.064 (0.061)	0.044 (0.075)
TOM × TPP									0.123~ (0.076)	0.089 (0.079)
Observations	952	767	760	600	830	635	820	710	3,362	2,712

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use standardized cognitive abilities, patience, and theory of mind dummy variable (= 1) as the main independent variables, while columns 9 and 10 use the same three variables, but also treatment dummy variables and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The sample excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their reported error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

# Control variables include age as the number of months, round, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, SES as the highest education level of parents, parents' self-reported parental warmth, and kindergarten fixed effects.

§ Std. cog. abilities × IR is positive for all observations, both in columns 9 and 10. The interaction effect is significant for all observations (predominantly at the 5% level) in column 9, and insignificant for the majority of observations in column 10.

° Std. cog. abilities × DR is positive and significant for all observations (predominantly at the 5% level), both in columns 9 and 10.

~Std. cog. abilities × TPP is positive and significant (at least at the 5% level) for all observations, both in columns 9 and 10.

~TOM × TPP is positive for all observations and significant for a minority of them in column 9 (at the 10% level), and insignificant for any observation in column 10.

**Table A26. Probit regression estimates of the effect of SES and parental warmth on cooperation using stricter comprehension criteria**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
SES	-0.027**	-0.019	-0.002	-0.016	0.005	0.009	0.049***	0.044***	-0.026**	-0.020*
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Parental warmth	0.011	-0.001	-0.010	-0.035	0.001	-0.022	0.052	0.041	0.011	0.019
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.015)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Controls <sup>#</sup>	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									0.016	0.173
									(0.368)	(0.344)
DR									-0.089	0.086
									(0.225)	(0.325)
TPP									-0.272	-0.150
									(0.185)	(0.226)
IR × SES									0.021	0.013
									(0.020)	(0.018)
DR × SES									0.030 <sup>§</sup>	0.023
									(0.017)	(0.018)
TPP × SES									0.070 <sup>°</sup>	0.068 <sup>°</sup>
									(0.042)	(0.031)
IR × parental warmth									-0.020	-0.035
									(0.040)	(0.043)
DR × parental warmth									-0.010	-0.030
									(0.028)	(0.040)
TPP × parental warmth									0.036	0.029
									(0.046)	(0.050)
Observations	787	767	600	600	640	635	715	710	2,742	2,712

The table reports regression results from probit models using a dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education) and parents' self-reported parental warmth as the main independent variables, while columns 9 and 10 use SES, parental warmth, treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. The sample excludes subjects who did not pass the additional (stricter) comprehension criteria. The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their reported error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

<sup>#</sup> Control variables include age as the number of months, round, a gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), and kindergarten fixed effects.

<sup>§</sup> DR × SES is positive for all observations. It is significant for the majority of them in column 9 (predominantly at 5%) and insignificant for any observation in column 10.

<sup>°</sup> Both in columns 9 and 10, TPP × round interaction effect is positive for all observations, and it is significant (at least) at the 5% level for all observations whose predicted probability of cooperating is more than 0.5. For observations whose predicted probability of cooperating is less than 0.5, the interaction effect is not significant for the majority of observations in column 9, and significant (predominantly at the 1% or the 5% level) for the majority in column 10.

**Table A27. Probit regression estimates of selection on observables concerning SES and parental warmth**

	Dependent variable: parental SES and parental warmth variables obtained (= 1)
	(1)
Total amount of cooperation	0.009 (0.009)
Siblings	-0.026 (0.017)
Girl (= 1)	0.052* (0.028)
Age	-0.003* (0.002)
Std. cognitive abilities	0.019 (0.016)
Kindergarten FE	Yes
p-value: Kindergarten FE coefficients = 0	0.004
Observations	805

The table reports regression results from a probit model using a dummy variable indicating whether the SES variable (highest educational level of the parents) and the parental warmth variable were obtained for the subject. Independent variables include a subject's total amount of cooperation over five rounds, number of siblings, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), age as the number of months, standardized cognitive abilities, and kindergarten fixed effects. The reported coefficients represent average marginal effects. Standard errors at the session level in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.01. \*\* p<0.05. \* p<0.1.

**Table A28. Probit regression estimates of the effect of SES and parental warmth on cooperation using inverse probability weighting (correcting for selection in obtaining SES and parental warmth variables)**

Dependent variable: Cooperation (= 1)										
	CTR		IR		DR		TPP		All treatments	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
SES	-0.024**	-0.019	-0.012	-0.016	-0.005	-0.011	0.053***	0.048***	-0.023**	-0.019*
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Parental warmth	0.009	-0.003	0.024	0.019	-0.015	-0.042**	0.052	0.046	0.009	0.015
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Controls <sup>#</sup>	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
IR									-0.192	-0.135
									(0.280)	(0.286)
DR									0.084	0.292
									(0.257)	(0.237)
TPP									-0.298	-0.195
									(0.199)	(0.238)
IR × SES									0.015	0.008
									(0.018)	(0.019)
DR × SES									0.016	0.008
									(0.016)	(0.014)
TPP × SES									0.069 <sup>§</sup>	0.069 <sup>§</sup>
									(0.046)	(0.035)
IR × parental warmth									0.014	0.010
									(0.039)	(0.040)
DR × parental warmth									-0.023	-0.047
									(0.030)	(0.036)
TPP × parental warmth									0.036	0.030
									(0.046)	(0.050)
Observations	807	787	850	850	850	840	745	740	3,252	3,217

The table reports regression results from probit models using inverse probability weighting. A dummy variable for cooperation (= 1) is used as the dependent variable. Columns 1 to 8 use SES as the highest education level of parents (from 1 to 8; higher number indicates higher education) and parents' self-reported parental warmth as the main independent variables, while columns 9 and 10 use SES, parental warmth, treatment dummy variables, and their interaction terms. Reported coefficients represent (weighted) average marginal effects. Weights are predicted as inverse probabilities of obtaining the SES and parental warmth variables, taking into account age, gender, and kindergarten fixed effects (see Appendix A.1.2 for more details on the construction of weights). The omitted treatment category in columns 9 and 10 is the CTR treatment. Clustered standard errors at the session level in parentheses. The interaction coefficients in columns 9 and 10 represent average interaction effects and their reported error terms in parentheses represent average standard errors, calculated using the methodology of Norton et al. (2004). \*\*\* p < 0.01. \*\* p < 0.05. \* p < 0.1.

<sup>#</sup> Control variables include age as the number of months, round, gender dummy variable (girl = 1), number of siblings, standardized cognitive abilities, patience, theory of mind dummy variable (= 1), and kindergarten fixed effects.

<sup>§</sup> Both in columns 9 and 10, TPP × round interaction effect is positive for all observations, and it is significant at the 5% level for all observations whose predicted probability of cooperating is more than 0.5. For observations whose predicted probability of cooperating is less than 0.5, the interaction effect is not significant for the majority of observations in column 9, and significant (predominantly at the 1% or the 5% level) for the majority in column 10.

## A.3. Experimental instructions

### A.3.1 The prisoner's dilemma game

#### Legend:

Control (CTR): stranger matching (children play with another child each round and are never paired with another child more than once)

Indirect Reciprocity (IR): stranger matching (children play with another child each round, but are informed about that child's behavior in each previous round)

Direct Reciprocity (DR): partner matching (children play with the same child each round and are informed about that child's behavior in each previous round)

Third-Party Punishment (TPP): stranger matching (children play with another child each round and are never paired with another child more than once; they do not receive information about another child's past behavior either)

Instructions for RA: *italics*

#### [SECTION 0: PICK UP]

Hello, I am \_\_\_\_\_ (*name of research assistant, RA*). For today we have prepared another game for you. Would you like to participate in the game? Great! Just like last time you can get tokens in this game (*show tokens*). Do you remember the tokens? These tokens can be exchanged for presents. Do you see these presents? (*show boxes with presents*) Just like last time you can exchange 1 token for exactly 1 present.

(*All 6 children form a circle holding hands*) The six of you are all of similar age and will be playing the game together on a tablet. Now take a look at each other. On the tablet you will look like one of these figures (*show picture of avatars in a circle*).

[**stranger matching:** You all will play one round with each child. Let's make an example. You (*point at child*) will play one round with him/her, one round with him/her ... one round with him/her.] [**partner matching:** You will be paired with one of the children here for the whole game. For example, you (*point to random child*) could always play with her/him. Or maybe you would always be paired with her/him.] We do not know with whom you will play – that is a secret.

Now you get to sit down with one of our assistants. (*each child assigned to RA*)

#### [SECTION I: INTRO]

Hello, I am \_\_\_\_\_ (*name of RA*). What's your name? Do you want to participate in our game?

I will now explain how the game works. We're going to play the game on a tablet and you get to wear these headphones (*show tablet and headphones*). Have you ever used a phone or tablet before?

#### [SECTION II: PARTNER]

Now look at this figure (see Figure at the end of document). See, this is you (*point to child's avatar*). The children from your circle will also be playing the same game on the tablet. See how the figures on the screen are forming a circle? These are the other children from your circle (*point to other avatars*). Let's spin the wheel and we will see which child will play with you. Here is the other child who will play with you (*point to partner avatar*) (Figure A-2). But you do not know who that is – that is a secret.

You will play this game for five rounds. [**stranger matching:** You will play with a different child in each round (*point to partner avatar*). You can see that it's a different child because this figure here will change.] [**partner matching:** You will play with the same child for the whole game.]

**Follow-up questions:**

Please show me on the screen who you are and tell me which color you have.

Now please point to the other child and tell me his/her color.

You will play this game for five rounds. With whom will you play this game?

[SECTION III: ACTIONS]

Well done! I will now tell you how you can earn tokens, which you can exchange for presents at the end of the game. In this game, you can choose either to keep 1 token for yourself or to give 2 tokens to the other child.

If you want to keep 1 token, you can push this button (*demonstrate on tablet*). See, the token is now yours because it goes into your pocket and you can exchange it for a present later (*point to token*). The other child does not receive any tokens and cannot choose a present.

If you want to give 2 tokens to the other child, you can push this button (*demonstrate on tablet*). See, the 2 tokens are now going into the other child's pocket and he/she will be able to choose 2 presents afterwards. If you give 2 tokens to the other child, you do not keep any token for yourself and cannot choose a present for this round (Figure A-3).

For practice, I will play this blue child now (*point to avatar*). I can also decide either to keep 1 token for myself, if I push this button (*point to blue avatar's keep-button*), or I can give 2 tokens to you, if I push this button (*point to blue avatar's give-button*).

Before we practice this game, can you please answer some questions for me?

**Follow-up questions:**

Can you tell me what happens if you push this button? (*point to keep-button*) – How many tokens will you get and how many tokens will you give to the other child?

Can you tell me what happens if you push this button? (*point to give-button*) – How many tokens will you get and how many tokens will you give to the other child?

Can you tell me what happens when the other child pushes this button? (*point to keep-button of other child*)

Can you tell me what happens if the other child pushes this button? (*point to give-button of other child*)



Let's try it together:

- Please push the button that will let you keep 1 token for yourself and I will push my button that will let me keep 1 token for myself. (*push respective keep-button simultaneously*)
- Well done! How many tokens do you get now? Please take your 1 token and put it in your wallet. (*Wait for child to physically take 1 token from pile and put it in his/her wallet next to tablet*) I have also kept 1 token for myself, that's why I also get 1 token (*take 1 token and put on own wallet*).
- Now let's try the other button. Please push the button that will let you give 2 tokens to me and I will press my button that will let me give 2 tokens to you (*push respective give-button simultaneously*)
- Well done! Can you tell me what happened? Please take 2 tokens and put them in my wallet (*Wait for child to take 2 tokens and put them in your wallet*). I also gave you 2 tokens, so I will place them in your wallet (*put 2 tokens in the wallet of the child*).

[**TPP**: Now I will tell you who this child here is (*point to observer*) (*Figure A-4*). This figure is another child from a different kindergarten. We will call him/her the observer. The observer has one token that he/she can use to make a decision. If YOU keep the token for yourself, the observer can break all of your tokens in this round. That means you cannot exchange them for presents! This can only happen if you keep the token for yourself. If you give 2 tokens to the other child, the observer cannot break your tokens in this round. The same happens to the other child. To break the tokens, the observer has to throw his/her token into the red box. If the observer decides to keep his/her token, none of the tokens will break.

The observer will be somebody else in each round. This means you will see a new observer right here in each round (*point to observer*).

Now please answer this question for me:

**Follow-up question:**

If you keep the token for yourself, and the observer throws his/her token into the red box, what happens to the tokens you got that round?]

[TRIAL ROUNDS]

Great! Now let's try this together before the actual game begins! This is just for practice right now and you will play with Mr. Bear [**stranger matching**: Mr. Dog, Ms. Cat, and Ms. Giraffe]. Because this is just for practice, you will get these smaller tokens that can only be exchanged for these stickers. [**TPP**: Because you have done a great job at paying attention so far, I will give you four tokens in advance (*place tokens in wallet*).] Here you can see Mr. Bear and his wallet [**stranger matching**: Mr. Dog, Ms. Cat, and Ms. Giraffe and their wallets] (*first show pictures of all animals, then place laminated picture of bear and his wallet on the other side of the tablet*). After each round, you can put your tokens into your wallet or into the wallet of Mr. Bear [**stranger matching**: then Mr. Dog, then Ms. Cat, and finally Ms. Giraffe]. I will put Mr. Bear's [**stranger matching**: Mr. Dog's, Ms. Cat's, and Ms. Giraffe's] tokens into his wallet (*Figure A-5 and Figure A-6*).

For the game you will get to wear these headphones. The headphones will help explain what's happening, so pay close attention to what they are saying. (*Familiarize child with headphones; if child distributes tokens incorrectly, explain why it is wrong and show correct distribution after each round. **Comprehension check:** write down whether token allocation was correct for rounds 3 & 4.*)

- *Round 1: Child keeps 1 token and puts 1 token into his/her wallet. The bear keeps 1 token – RA puts 1 token in the bear's wallet. [TPP: Punisher uses 1 token for punishment, hence 0 tokens child, 0 tokens bear]*
- *Round 2: Child gives 2 tokens to the bear [**stranger matching:** dog]. The bear (dog) keeps 1 token. Child puts 2 tokens in the bear's (dog's) wallet. RA puts 1 token on the bear's (dog's) wallet. [TPP: Punisher does not punish, hence 0 tokens child, 3 tokens dog]*
- *Round 3: Child keeps 1 token and puts 1 token on his/her wallet. The bear [**stranger matching:** cat] gives 2 tokens. RA puts 2 additional tokens on child's wallet. [TPP: Punisher uses 1 token for punishment, 0 tokens child, 0 tokens bear]*
- *Round 4: Child gives 2 tokens to the bear [**stranger matching:** giraffe] and the bear (giraffe) gives 2 tokens back. Child puts 2 tokens on the wallet of the bear (giraffe) and RA puts 2 tokens on the wallet of the child. [TPP: 2 tokens child, 2 tokens bear]*

Great job! Let's count all the tokens in your wallet right now. Six tokens! Now you get to exchange these tokens for stickers (*wait for child to choose 6 stickers*).

[GAME SCREEN AS IN INTRODUCTION]

Now please answer some final questions for me:

**Repetition of comprehension check and additional questions:**

*(Only ask this question if child fails to distribute tokens correctly in trial rounds 3 or 4; Repeat incorrect scenarios from the trial rounds 3 and 4.*

What happens if you push this button? How many tokens will you get? And the other child?

What happens if the other child pushes this button? How many tokens will the other child get? How many tokens do you get?)

In the trial rounds you played with animals. With whom will you play the real game, where you can earn the large yellow tokens? (*if child does not answer correctly: "Turn around. Can you see the children here, the ones from your circle? [**partner matching:** One of them] [**stranger matching:** Each one of them] will play the game with you. Could you please now tell me with whom you will play the real game?"*)

What do these pictures mean? (*point to icons in upper left corner representing previous actions of the child's partner*) (Figure A-7).

Remember, the other child also sees which button you pushed in the rounds you already played!

[TPP: **Follow-up question:** Can you please explain what the observer does? When you keep one token for yourself, and the observer puts his token in the red box, what happens to the tokens you got in this round?]

Now we're ready to play the game! This time you will get these big tokens that you can exchange for the presents you have seen. Have another look at the children from your circle with whom you will play now. They will play the other figures. I will put all tokens into your wallet. Remember you will be playing with [**stranger matching**: a different child in each of the 5 rounds] [**partner matching**: the same child in all 5 rounds], but you don't know with whom. That is a secret!

I will be right here and will wait for you to finish the game. You may now put your headphones back on and wait for the game to start. The game will start once all children are ready.

*(signal to coordinator that your child is ready to start)*

[ADDITIONAL ONE-SHOT THIRD-PARTY PUNISHMENT GAME (played with a subset of subjects)]

VERSION 1 (at least one child defected):

I have only one more task for you. Do you see these two figures here? *(point to two characters in upper half of screen)* These are children who are playing a similar game as you just played. They could either keep 1 token for themselves or give 2 tokens to the other child. This here is you *(point to orange avatar)* and you are watching them play the game.

Look, this child *(point to turquoise child)* decided to keep 1 token for himself/herself *(start animation)*. Now you can make one decision: You can either keep one token by pushing this button. See, the token goes into your pocket and nothing happens to the other child *(animation starts again)*. Or you can drop the token into this box by pushing this button *(point to throw-into-box-button)*. Then the child who kept 1 token to him-/herself will lose all of his/her tokens from this round *(start animation)*. See, when you put the token into the box, all the tokens of the child break. The same thing will happen to the other child if he/she kept the token for him-/herself and you put the token into the box.

**Follow-up questions:**

What happens if you push this button? *(point to keep-button)*

What happens if you push this button? *(point to box-button)*

Now please decide which button you want to push: Push this button to keep the token for yourself, or push this button and the token will go into the box.

VERSION 2 (both children cooperated):

I have only one more task for you. Do you see these two figures here? *(point to top screen)* These are children who are playing a similar game to the one you have just played. They could either give 2 tokens to the other child or keep 1 token to themselves. This here is you *(point to orange avatar)* and you are watching them play the game.

Now you can make one decision: You can either keep one token by pushing this button. Or you can drop the token into this box by pushing this button (*point to second button*). Dropping it into the box will break all the tokens of the children, but only if they decided to keep the token for themselves.

Let's see what the children have done. Both children have given 2 tokens to each other. That means you cannot put the token into the box. You get to keep the token for yourself.

[END]

Let's count the tokens in your wallet (*count tokens with child*). Here are the tokens you got in the game. Now we can exchange them for presents. But before, please answer one short question: Who are your two best friends from the kindergarten? Have they been in the circle?

FIGURES: Examples of screens




Figure A-1. Screen with avatars. Child plays as orange avatar.




Figure A-2. CTR - screen with orange avatar (child) and blue avatar (partner).




Figure A-3. CTR – example for cooperate-cooperate. Tokens fly into pocket.




Figure A-4. TPP treatment with observer (gray avatar).




Figure A-5. Trial round 1 with Mr. Bear as practice partner.



Figure A-6. TPP trial round 1 with Mr. Bear as practice partner and monkey as observer.




Figure A-7. DR & IR - Screen with actions of partner in previous rounds (images top left; turquoise child defected in round 1 and cooperated in round 2).




Figure A-8. Observer view: animation of punishment

### A.3.2 Instructions on Day 1 (measuring theory of mind, cognitive abilities, and patience)

#### [SECTION 0: PICK UP, OUTSIDE OF EXPERIMENT ROOM]

Hello, I am \_\_\_\_\_ (name of research assistant, RA). Today we have brought some games for you to play. Would you like to join us? Great! In these games, you can get tokens (*show tokens*). You can collect them in your wallet (*show wallet*). These tokens can be exchanged for presents. Do you see the presents over here (*show boxes with presents*)? For each token you can pick one present.

How many presents would you get for 3 tokens? (*make several examples*)

Each RA introduces themselves to a child and is assigned a seat:

Hello, my name is \_\_\_\_\_ (name of RA). What's your name? Would like to play these games with me?

#### [SECTION 1: THEORY OF MIND (note: gender of dolls matched to child's gender)]

For this task you will receive 1 token. Here, I'll put it into your wallet.

CQ1: What can you do with the token afterwards?

Now we are going to play a game with Sarah and Anne. This (*referring to the first doll*) is Sarah (Stefan), and this (*referring to the second doll*) is Anna (Adam). Anna has a ball (*show ball*). She and Sarah are going to hide it here (*show Sarah and Anna hide the ball in treasure box*).

Anna has to leave now. Goodbye Anna! (*hide Anna behind back*).

Now that Anna is gone, Sarah has decided that she is going to move Anna's ball to the other hiding spot (*Sarah moves ball to star-shaped box*).

Ok, now I have some questions for you:

- 1) Where will Anna (Adam) look for her toy when she comes back?
- 2) Where is the toy really?
- 3) Where was the toy in the beginning?

#### [SECTION 2: COGNITIVE ABILITIES]

Now I have a new task for you. You'll get another token for this task (*put 1 token into child's wallet*). Here are some pictures with missing puzzle pieces. Can you find the piece that fits the picture? Only one piece will fit. You can circle the right one with this pen.

Let's try the first picture together. Which piece do you think will fit this picture? (*child circles piece; if wrong – show correct answer and explain*)

CQ2: Can you tell me again what you'll have to do?

[*child receives booklet; RA turns page after child circles a piece and says:*] Good job! Here's another one.

#### [SECTION 3: PATIENCE]

In this game, you can collect tokens for today and for tomorrow, which you can exchange for presents either today or tomorrow. Look, here I have white and blue bowls. The tokens in the white bowl can be exchanged into presents TODAY, the tokens in the blue bowl can be exchanged into presents TOMORROW.

Do you know what tomorrow means? (*if child confirms wait for explanation*) Tomorrow means that you will sleep for one night to receive the tokens from the blue bowl and then you can exchange them into presents. As you know we will be back tomorrow morning.

So the tokens from the white bowl can be exchanged for presents today and the tokens from the blue bowl can be exchanged for presents tomorrow. Got it?

Here we have three possibilities and you can pick one: [*show three sets of cardboards with bowls*]

- Option 1: If you choose option 1, there are 2 tokens in the white bowl (*count with child*) and none in the blue bowl. That means you will receive 2 presents today (*point to white bowl*) and no presents tomorrow (*point to blue bowl*).
- Option 2: If you choose option 2, there is 1 token in the white bowl (*count with child*) and 2 tokens in the blue bowl (*count with child*). That means you will receive 1 present today and 2 presents tomorrow.

- Option 3: If you choose option 3, there are no tokens in the white bowl and 4 tokens in the blue bowl (*count with child*). That means you will receive no presents today and 4 presents tomorrow.

You may now choose one of these three options. But first please answer some questions:

- CQ3: How many options can you choose?
- CQ4: What happens if you choose option 1? How many tokens will you receive today and how many tokens will you receive tomorrow? [*let child count tokens in each bowl*]
- CQ5: What happens if you choose option 2? How many tokens will you receive today and how many tokens will you receive tomorrow? [*let child count tokens in each bowl*]
- CQ6: What happens if you choose option 3? How many tokens will you receive today and how many tokens will you receive tomorrow? [*let child count tokens in each bowl*]

Well done! Now please choose one option.

Great, you have chosen option \_\_\_\_\_. That means you will receive  $X$  presents today and  $X$  presents tomorrow.

You may now exchange your tokens for presents. (Remember, you saved these tokens for tomorrow. So I will put these presents into a separate bag which you'll get to take home tomorrow.) (*let child choose presents*)



## A.4. Parental Questionnaire

Dear parents and legal guardians,

Thank you for allowing your child to participate in our study. We were able to gain valuable insights into the decision-making process of young children. As a final step, we would like to ask you to answer the following questionnaire. Please return the completed questionnaire within the next two weeks by putting it into one of the available boxes. You will make an important contribution to research. Thank you for your assistance!

The questionnaire is fully anonymous and all answers are voluntary! In the left upper box, you will find the anonymous ID your child received for the participation in the study. We will be able to connect your answers to your child's decisions. We only require one questionnaire even if you have more than one child who participated in the study. In the latter case, please add the ID of your second (third, ...) child to the ID box.

All of the following questions refer to **your oldest child, who participated in the study in kindergarten.**

Who is answering this questionnaire?

mother     father     other legal guardian: \_\_\_\_\_

- How well do the following statements describe you as a person? Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10. A 0 means "does not describe me at all" and a 10 means "describes me perfectly". (Please circle the corresponding number.)

*"When someone does me a favor I am willing to return it."*

Does not describe  
me at all

Describes me  
perfectly

00    01    02    03    04    05    06    07    08    09    10

To what extent do the following statements describe you as a person?

	Not at all applicable	Rarely applicable	Neither	Somewhat applicable	Fully applicable
<i>"I show my child with words and gestures that I like him/her."</i>					
<i>"I praise my child."</i>					

How often do you read books/stories to your child?

approx. \_\_\_\_\_ times per \_\_\_\_\_ (day, week, month)

What is the name of your child's favorite book/story: \_\_\_\_\_

How often does your child consume one of the following food items?

	Never or rarely	Approx. 1-2 times per month	Approx. 1-2 times per week	approx. 3-4 times per week	Once daily	Several times per day
Vegetables (e.g., as snack or side dish)						
Fruit (e.g., as snack or side dish)						
Candy (e.g., chocolate, ice cream)						
Lemonades/soda (e.g., coke, fanta)						
Syrups (diluted with water)						
Fast food (e.g., McDonald's)						

Do mother and father live together in the same household?

- yes     no (please specify):  
 I am a single parent     I live with a partner  
 other: \_\_\_\_\_

Which language is spoken at home predominantly?

- German     Turkish     other: \_\_\_\_\_

The child has \_\_\_\_\_ *younger* sisters, \_\_\_\_\_ *younger* brothers,  
 \_\_\_\_\_ *older* sisters and \_\_\_\_\_ *older* brothers.

Which religion (community of faith) do you associate with?  \_\_\_\_\_  not religious

How important do you deem the transmission of religious values to your child?

- not important at all     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)    very important

What is the highest education level of the mother of the participating child?

- middle school or lower     university degree (please indicate highest)  
 vocational education     bachelor  
 high school     master, diploma, MD  
 other: \_\_\_\_\_     doctorate, PhD

What is the highest education level of the father of the participating child?

- middle school or lower     university degree (please indicate highest)  
 vocational education     bachelor  
 high school     master, diploma, MD  
 other: \_\_\_\_\_     doctorate, PhD

Occupation of mother: \_\_\_\_\_ Occupation of father: \_\_\_\_\_

(in case of parental leave, previous occupation of mother: \_\_\_\_\_, father: \_\_\_\_\_)

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