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Racial Diversity, Electoral Preferences, and the Supply of Policy: The Great Migration and Civil Rights

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ABSTRACT

Racial Diversity, Electoral Preferences, and the Supply of Policy: The Great Migration and Civil Rights*

Between 1940 and 1970 more than 4 million African Americans moved from the South to the North of the United States, during the Second Great Migration. This same period witnessed the struggle and eventual success of the civil rights movement in ending institutionalized racial discrimination. This paper shows that the Great Migration and support for civil rights are causally linked. Predicting Black inflows with a version of the shift-share instrument, we find that the Great Migration increased support for the Democratic Party and encouraged pro-civil rights activism in northern and western counties. These effects were driven by both Black and white voters, and were stronger in counties with a lower history of discrimination and with a larger working class and unionized white population. Mirroring the changes in the electorate, non-southern Congress members became more likely to promote civil rights legislation. Yet, these average effects mask heterogeneity in the behavior of legislators, who grew increasingly polarized along party lines on racial issues. Overall, our findings indicate that the Great Migration promoted Black political empowerment outside the South. They also suggest that, under certain conditions, cross-race coalitions can be major drivers of social and political change.

JEL Classification: D72, J15, N92

Keywords: race, diversity, civil rights, great migration

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1 Introduction

Racial inequality is a pervasive feature of US society, encompassing most of its domains – from earnings to employment opportunities, from intergenerational mobility to incarceration rates.¹ One of the potential causes of the racial gap and of its unwavering persistence is the lack of political empowerment of Black Americans who, for a major part of American history, have been denied even the most fundamental civil right in a democracy, namely the right to vote (Aneja and Avenancio-Leon, 2019; Keyssar, 2009).

Black political oppression was particularly strong in the US South. Writing in 1944, Swedish economist and Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal argued that migrating outside the region represented the most effective strategy for Black Americans to achieve racial equality and finally gain political rights (Myrdal, 1944). According to Myrdal, “[t]he average Northerner does not understand the reality and the effects of such [Southern] discriminations”, and “[t]o get publicity is of the highest strategic importance to [Blacks]”. Around the time of Myrdal’s statement, many African Americans had already started to move from the South to the North and West of the US, hoping to reach a “Promised Land” (Boustan, 2016) and to leave behind them the system of disenfranchisement, violence, and discrimination perpetuated by the infamous Jim Crow laws. Eventually, more than 4 million Black Americans migrated between 1940 and 1970 in what is known as the Second Great Migration (henceforth, Great Migration).

The Great Migration temporally coincided with the development and eventual success of the civil rights movement – a turning point in the history of race relations, which culminated in the passage of the Civil and Voting Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. Given the resistance of southern politicians to extend the franchise to Black Americans, northern legislators and grassroots organizations based in the North such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) played a key role in the process of enfranchisement (Lawson, 1976). Was Myrdal right? Did northward migration allow African Americans to gain political power?

In this paper, we study this question, analyzing the political effects of Black immigration to the US North and West between 1940 and 1970. First, we examine how

¹See, among others, recent works by Bayer and Charles (2018) and Chetty et al. (2020). Previous important contributions on this topic include Smith and Welch (1989) and Neal and Johnson (1996). See also the review in Altonji and Blank (1999).

the Great Migration affected demand for civil rights and racial equality among northern voters. We measure support for civil rights in several ways, but use as main proxies the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections and the frequency of non-violent pro-civil rights demonstrations organized by grassroots organizations in the North. Even though the Democratic Party was openly segregationist and stubbornly defended white supremacy in the South until the early 1960s (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Lawson, 1976), by the end of the 1930s in the North and West it had unambiguously become the party defending Black people’s interests and pushing for racial equality (Schickler, 2016; Wasow, 2020).² Second, we analyze the effects of Black in-migration on the ideology and behavior of members of the House on race-related issues.

The political effects of the Great Migration are far from obvious. On the one hand, recent work in economics has documented that the Great Migration had substantial negative effects on African Americans in the long run. Black in-migration to northern cities increased racial residential segregation, as white residents fled urban areas for the suburbs (Boustan, 2010). In turn, whites’ residential choices, coupled with changes in the allocation of local public goods away from education and towards policing, drastically limited opportunities for economic and social mobility of African Americans (Derenoncourt, 2018). Racial residential segregation and lower economic opportunities may have been accompanied by whites’ political backlash, which reduced Black Americans’ political efficacy.

On the other hand, the Great Migration might have promoted Black Americans’ political empowerment for at least two reasons. First, around 1940, Black individuals were *de facto* or *de jure* prevented from voting in most southern states (Cascio and Washington, 2014), whereas no restrictions to their political participation existed in the North. The inflow of Black voters may have thus shifted northern politicians’ incentives to introduce civil rights legislation. Second, Black arrivals may have moved the preferences of at least some white voters in a more liberal direction. This might have happened either because the Great Migration increased whites’ awareness of the conditions prevailing in the South, as envisioned by Myrdal (1944), or because progressive segments of the Democratic coalition saw an opportunity to jointly promote racial equality and economic goals by forming a cross-race alliance, as suggested by the political science literature (Adams, 1966; Frymer and Grumbach, 2020; Schickler,

²Below, we corroborate this idea providing evidence consistent with the existing literature (Feinstein and Schickler, 2008; Schickler, 2016). On party realignment during this historical period, see also Caughey et al. (2020).

2016).

To study the political effects of the Great Migration we estimate stacked first difference regressions, controlling for state time-varying (observable and unobservable) characteristics, and allowing counties to be on differential trends depending on their initial Black share and political conditions. To further account for potentially endogenous migration, we construct a version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001; Boustan, 2010) that assigns Black outflows from each southern state to northern counties based on pre-existing settlements of African Americans outside the South.

The shift-share instrument does not merely apportion more Black migrants to counties with more Black residents in 1940, but rather, it combines two separate sources of variation. First, it leverages time-series variation in Black emigration rates from different southern states for each decade between 1940 and 1970. Second, it allocates those southern outflows to northern counties based on the “mix” – in terms of southern state composition – of Black individuals living there in 1940. Since we always condition on the 1940 Black share of the population, the instrument only exploits variation in the composition of Black migrants across southern states over time.

The validity of the instrument may be threatened if the characteristics of northern areas – such as the fraction of the workforce in manufacturing or the urban share of the population – that attracted *a different mix* of southern born African Americans before 1940 had persistent effects both on changes in racial attitudes and on migration patterns (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). We address this issue in two ways. First, we document that the instrument is not correlated with the pre-1940 change in political conditions across northern counties. Second, we allow counties to be on differential trends by interacting period dummies with several 1940 local characteristics, such as the Black, immigrant, and urban share of the population, initial support for the Democratic Party, and the employment share in manufacturing. We also interact period dummies with the share of Black Americans born in each southern state to check that the variation behind the instrument is not disproportionately driven by specific destination-origin combinations, which may also be spuriously correlated with the evolution of political conditions in the North.

The instrument may also be invalid if shocks to northern counties both influenced the local economic and political landscape and caused outmigration from southern states that already had large enclaves in those counties before 1940 (Borusyak et al., 2021). To tackle this potential concern, we first show that the instrument is uncorre-

lated with local “pull factors”, such as WWII spending and New Deal relief programs (Boustan et al., 2010; Boustan, 2016). Second, we replicate the analysis separately controlling for a measure of labor demand predicted using the 1940 industry composition of northern counties. Finally, we construct two alternative versions of the instrument. The first version, as in Boustan (2010) and Derenoncourt (2018), exploits only variation in local push factors across southern counties to predict Black outflows from the South.³ The second version is based on a linked sample of Black migrants between 1910 and 1930 from Abramitzky et al. (2020), which allows us to use a county-to-county migration matrix to construct “initial shares” for early Black residents in the US North. This version of the instrument rests on variation in predicted migration from more than 1,200 southern counties. Hence, the validity of the instrument is guaranteed as long as local conditions across southern counties are uncorrelated with changes in the political landscape of specific northern counties (Borusyak et al., 2021).

Given existing evidence that the Great Migration caused “white flight” (Boustan, 2010; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019), we verify that Black inflows did not lead to white out-migration, or to changes in the composition of white residents at the county level. Notably, these results are not in contrast with previous work (Boustan, 2010). Since county boundaries do not overlap with city-suburbs divides, and counties often include both central cities and suburban rings, changes in population triggered by Black inflows occurred *within* (and not between) the jurisdictions that we consider in our analysis.

Turning to our main results, we find that Black in-migration had a strong, positive impact on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. Our estimates imply that one percentage point increase in the Black share raised the Democratic vote share by 1.6 percentage points, or 4% relative to the 1940 mean. This is a large effect: even under the aggressive assumption that all Black migrants immediately voted for the Democratic Party upon arrival, support for the Democrats must have increased among northern residents because of Black inflows. Complementing our electoral results, we find that Black arrivals increased both the frequency of non-violent pro-civil rights demonstrations organized by CORE and the presence of local NAACP chapters.

Consistent with the view that African Americans were quickly incorporated in the political life of northern cities (Moon, 1948), we show that Black in-migration had a positive but quantitatively small and imprecisely estimated impact on turnout. This indicates that Black inflows likely induced existing voters to switch away from the GOP.

³This strategy also assuages potential concerns over serial correlation in migration flows from the same location to the same destination (Jaeger et al., 2018).

Since not all Black residents were already voting for the Democratic Party in the early 1940s, some switchers were African Americans. However, the magnitude of our estimates implies that some segments of the white electorate likely joined the Democratic voting bloc as well. Using a subset of the data on pro-civil rights demonstrations, which reports the race of participants, we indeed find that not only Black but also white individuals increased their propensity to join pro-civil rights demonstrations.

To understand which segments of the white electorate became more supportive of civil rights, we explore heterogeneity patterns in our results. Focusing on pro-civil rights demonstrations, we exploit variation in county 1940 composition and historical characteristics. First, we consider the possibility that the Great Migration raised support for civil rights among socially progressive whites by increasing the salience of the “race problem” and activating their latent demand for racial equality (Allport, 1954; Myrdal, 1944). In line with this view, we show that pro-civil rights demonstrations were concentrated in counties with a lower history of racial discrimination, and where the white population was younger and less likely to come from the US South.

Second, we document that CORE demonstrations were more frequent in areas with a higher share of whites employed in manufacturing and in the unskilled sector, where the presence of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the main force behind industrial unionism, was stronger, and where elections were more competitive. These places may have offered fertile grounds for the formation of a liberal cross-race coalition along political and economic lines, as discussed extensively in Schickler (2016). Labor unions may have supported a cross-race coalition only, or especially, when labor markets were tight (Bailer, 1944). Indeed, our results are driven by counties where labor demand, predicted using a Bartik-style approach, was stronger.

We corroborate our heterogeneity analysis by providing suggestive evidence from historical survey data. Estimating state-level cross-sectional regressions, we find that, in the years preceding the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1964, white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants between 1940 and 1960 held significantly more favorable views on race relations, considered racial equality as one of the most fundamental issues for the country, and were more likely both to identify with and to vote for the Democratic Party. These results are driven by liberal Democrats and by members of labor unions.

Our findings may seem at odds with the literature on white flight and the detrimental consequences that the latter had on Black migrants and their offspring in the long

run (Boustan, 2010; Derenoncourt, 2018).⁴ However, Black political empowerment and white flight are not necessarily in contrast with each other. For one, there is extensive evidence that the Great Migration did economically benefit Black migrants (Baran et al., 2020; Boustan, 2016; Collins and Wanamaker, 2014). In addition, whites may have supported civil rights, while at the same time moving from central cities to the suburbs. From the lens of a Tiebout (1956) framework, whites may have expressed their preferences regarding neighborhood-level diversity and school mixing with their feet, while using the ballot box to express their more abstract ideological preferences about racial equality. Supporting this conjecture, we show that whites living in counties with higher 1940 residential segregation were more likely to both support civil rights and create more school districts, potentially to separate themselves from incoming Black migrants.

In the second part of the paper, we turn to the ideology and behavior on racial issues of legislators representing non-southern congressional districts (CDs). Similar to Autor et al. (2020), we construct a cross-walk that matches counties to CDs, and then develop a procedure that assigns CD boundaries, which changed over time due to redistricting, to the geography of a baseline, the 78th, Congress. We measure legislators’ ideology on race-related issues using the scores from Bateman et al. (2017), which are based on past voting behavior on civil rights bills, and take more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology.

We find that, over time, CDs that received more African Americans were represented by legislators with a more liberal ideology on racial issues who were also more likely to sign discharge petitions aimed at promoting civil rights bills (Pearson and Schickler, 2009; Schickler, 2016). These average effects, however, mask substantial heterogeneity, as legislators of either party became increasingly polarized on racial issues.

Our results are related to the literature on the civil rights movement. Several papers have studied the consequences of the Civil Rights and the Voting Rights Acts (Aneja and Avenancio-Leon, 2019; Bernini et al., 2018; Cascio et al., 2010; Cascio and Washington, 2014; Reber, 2011), while many others, building on Carmines and Stimson (1989), have investigated the causes of the southern “dealignment” (Besley et al., 2010; Kousser, 2010; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Trende, 2012; Wright, 2013). We contribute to this literature by examining one of the causes of the civil rights movement, and showing that the Great Migration likely played a key role in the success

⁴The Great Migration also increased racial disparities in incarceration rates (Eriksson, 2019; Muller, 2012), and worsened public finances in northern cities (Tabellini, 2018). See Collins (2020) for a thorough review.

of the latter. Our findings are also consistent with and complement Schickler (2016) and Grant (2020) who, respectively, argue that the incorporation of African Americans into the Democratic coalition after the New Deal and the rising pivotal role of Black voters at the national level due to the Great Migration were important mechanisms behind party realignment in American politics.

We also complement the growing literature on the political effects of migration and the broader literature on inter-group relations (Alesina and Tabellini, 2020). Several papers find that immigration and a larger size of the minority group can lead to backlash among natives or majority members (Arzheimer, 2009; Enos, 2016; Dustmann et al., 2019; Tabellini, 2020). We instead show that, under certain conditions, inter-group contact can favor the formation of cross-race social or political coalitions, raising demand for racial equality also among members of the majority group.⁵ Several factors can explain the difference between our findings and those in the existing literature. First, Black in-migration might have increased whites' awareness of the conditions prevailing in the South (Myrdal, 1944). Second, the civil rights legislation was, by and large, about the South, and northern whites would have been only indirectly – if at all – affected, at least before 1965. Third, labor unions had incentives to incorporate African Americans in their rank and files (Adams, 1966; Bailer, 1944; Schickler, 2016), forging a shared working class identity and pursuing common goals – conditions that contributed to positive inter-group contact (Allport, 1954). Finally, our average effects mask substantial heterogeneity, indicating that, consistent with the existing literature, the Great Migration did not improve racial attitudes among all northern whites. On the voters' side, support for civil rights was stronger in more segregated counties. On the side of legislators, the Great Migration substantially increased polarization along party lines.

Our work also speaks to the literature on the relationship between voters' demand and politicians' behavior (Caughey and Warshaw, 2018; Jones and Walsh, 2018; Kroth et al., 2016; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Mian et al., 2010; Miller, 2008). Closest to our paper, Cascio and Washington (2014) document that the Voting Rights Act (VRA) shifted the distribution of local spending across southern counties towards Black Americans' preferences, once the latter became eligible to vote. We expand on their findings by focusing on the US North rather than the South, and by analyzing one of the potential

⁵Our findings are consistent with those in Lowe (2017), Rao (2019), and Steinmayr (2020) from India and Austria respectively. We complement them by providing evidence from the US and in an instance where group boundaries are defined by race rather than by caste, income, or refugee status.

causes, rather than consequences, of the VRA – i.e., the response of northern politicians to the change in the characteristics, and thus in the demands, of their constituency due to Black in-migration.

Finally, we complement the literature on the Great Migration, recently reviewed in Collins (2020). Although several papers in economics have studied the effects of the Great Migration on the residential decisions of whites, intergenerational mobility, immigrant assimilation, and public finance (Boustan, 2010; Derenoncourt, 2018; Fouka et al., 2018; Shertzer and Walsh, 2019; Tabellini, 2018), little evidence exists on its political effects. Our paper seeks to fill this gap, focusing on the role that the Great Migration played in the development and the success of the civil rights movement.

2 Historical Background

2.1 The Great Migration

Between 1940 and 1970, more than 4 million African Americans left the US South for northern and western destinations. This unprecedented migration episode is usually referred to as the (Second) Great Migration. From 1915 to 1930, the First Great Migration brought to the North 1.5 million Black Americans. However, the Second Great Migration – from now onwards the Great Migration – was substantially larger in magnitude and had more profound implications for American politics and race relations (Boustan, 2016). Most Black migrants moved to urban centers in the Northeast and mid-West, but the Great Migration was a geographically widespread phenomenon, which affected also the West and less urbanized areas outside the South (Figure 1).⁶

Black migrants were pulled to the North and West by economic opportunities and pushed out of the South by racial oppression, political disenfranchisement, and poor working conditions (Boustan, 2016). On the one hand, the outbreak of WWII increased demand for labor in northern and western factories, raising the potential gains from migration. Even after the WWII-related labor demand shock was over, higher expectations of upward social and economic mobility kept attracting African Americans to the North at least until the late 1960s. On the other hand, widespread violence and disenfranchisement, together with a separate and unequal school system, provided strong incentives for Black Americans to leave the South (Margo, 1991; Feigenbaum et al.,

⁶When defining the US South, we follow the Census classification but, as in Boustan (2010), we exclude Maryland and Delaware – two states that received net Black inflows during the Great Migration (Table A.1).

2020). Moreover, the mechanization of agricultural harvest in the 1940s and 1950s reduced demand for labor in the already depressed southern agricultural sector, further increasing the pool of prospective migrants (Grove and Heinicke, 2003; Whatley, 1985).

Out-migration from the South was strongest during the 1940s, with a Black emigration rate of almost 15%, but remained high until the late 1960s (Figure A.1). As a consequence of this migration episode, during which the US South lost 40% of its 1940 Black population, the racial profile of the United States changed dramatically. While only 25% of African Americans were living outside the South in 1940, this figure had increased to more than 50% by 1970. On average, the Black share of the population in northern and western cities moved from less than 4% to more than 15% in just three decades. These numbers were an order of magnitude higher for main hubs like Chicago, Detroit, or St. Louis, where the Black share moved from 8, 9, and 11% to 32, 43, and 41% respectively (Gibson and Jung, 2005).⁷

2.2 Black Migrants and Northern Politics

The demographic change induced by the Great Migration had the potential to alter the political equilibrium, especially in industrial and urban centers. In the US South, Black Americans faced indirect *de jure* disenfranchisement through the use of literacy tests, poll taxes, and grandfather clauses (Cascio and Washington, 2014; Lawson, 1976). On the contrary, they could, and in fact did, vote in the North (Moon, 1948). The literature on social movements has documented that the enfranchisement of Black migrants increased both the organizational capacity of the civil rights movement and pressure on local politicians (McAdam, 1982). During the First Great Migration, both Democrats and Republicans had tried to include African Americans in their voting bloc. However, since the New Deal, the Democratic Party had emerged as the party better equipped to address the demands of Black Americans outside the US South (Caughey et al., 2020; Schickler, 2016).

Figure A.2 plots the share of northern Democrats (blue bars) and Republicans (red bars) voting in favor of civil rights bills between Congresses 78 and 88 (see Table A.2 for the detailed list of bills). Both in the 1940s and in the 1950s, Democrats in the North were more likely to support civil rights bills.⁸ Using data from Pearson and Schickler (2009), Figure A.4 confirms these patterns by focusing on signatures on pro-civil rights

⁷In rural counties, the Black share remained substantially lower and rarely exceeded 2 or 3%.

⁸Figure A.3 documents that the pattern is reversed once the US South is included.

discharge petitions – another, more direct, measure of legislators’ commitment to racial equality (Schickler, 2016).⁹ Non-southern Democratic Congress members were at least 30 percentage points more likely than their Republican counterparts to sign a discharge petition to promote civil rights legislation between Congress 78 and Congress 82. The gap rose to more than 50 percentage points in the following decade (Table A.3).

Recognizing the different party position on racial issues, northern Black residents were significantly more likely to support the Democratic Party. Existing evidence indicates that at least 70% of registered Black voters outside the South were voting Democratic already in 1936 – a share that gradually increased over time (Bositis, 2012). Democrats also benefited from the behavior of labor unions – the CIO in particular – that, since the late 1930s, started to actively incorporate African Americans in their ranks.¹⁰

Abundant anecdotal evidence exists that labor unions openly endorsed civil rights and backed African Americans in their fight for racial equality (Adams, 1966; Bailer, 1944). For instance, CIO leader J. Brophy declared in 1944 that “behind every lynching is the figure of the labor exploiter...who would deny labor its fundamental rights”. Similarly, in 1942 Walter Reuther, a highly influential figure in the United Automobile Workers (UAW), declared that “[racial discrimination] must be put on top of the list with union security and other major union demands” (Zieger, 2000). In line with these statements, evidence from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac shows that, for the 42 cases in which the NAACP took a clear position on a proposed piece of legislation between 1946 and 1955, the CIO openly took the very same position in 38 cases, and never took a position conflicting with that of the NAACP (Schickler, 2016). As a result, a class-based coalition, pushing for both racial and economic liberalism, emerged. This gave additional leverage to Black activists and organizations such as the NAACP and the CORE to exert pressure on northern Democrats to pursue the civil rights agenda.

⁹At a time when southern Democrats could block any proposed civil rights-related bill even before it reached the floor of the House, discharge petitions were filed by northern legislators to circumvent congressional committees, and move bills to the floor for a vote (Beth et al., 2003). For more details see Section 3 and Appendix C.

¹⁰Using data from Gallup, Farber et al. (2018) document that, while non-southern white men were significantly more likely than Black men to be union members in 1940, this pattern had been reversed by 1960.

3 Data

This section briefly describes the key outcomes of the paper. Appendix B presents the time-invariant cross-walk used to map counties to CDs, fixing CD boundaries to the baseline Congress of 1944 (Congress 78). Appendix C provides a more detailed description of all data sources.

Demand for civil rights. We measure demand for civil rights using two main outcomes: the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections, and the frequency of pro-civil rights demonstrations. We complement these with data on the local presence of NAACP chapters and on whites’ attitudes obtained from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and Gallup public opinion polls. Our focus on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections is motivated by the fact that, by 1940, Democrats had become the main supporters of racial equality outside the US South (see Section 2.2) and that such support was more likely to emerge in Congressional rather than Presidential elections (Caughey et al., 2020; Schickler, 2016).¹¹ To more directly capture demand for racial equality among northern and western residents, we use the dataset assembled by Gregory and Hermida (2019) combining a variety of sources on the number of non-violent demonstrations organized between 1942 and 1970 by the CORE – a major inter-racial civil rights organizations that coordinated sit-ins and similar forms of civil disobedience to demand racial equality.

Supply of civil rights. To measure legislators’ support for a civil rights agenda we use the ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) and signatures on discharge petitions to promote civil rights legislation from Pearson and Schickler (2009). Ideology scores are a function of legislators’ past voting behavior on race-related bills and, as the commonly used DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), take more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) positions. Discharge petitions represented an effective tool at the disposal of non-southern legislators for overcoming the gatekeeping behavior of southern Democrats. The latter – due to the seniority system prevailing at the time – frequently controlled committees that could block bills aimed at increasing racial equality before they reached the floor of the House (Schickler, 2016).¹²

Table 1 presents summary statistics for our main variables, reporting 1940 levels in

¹¹Data on Congressional elections come from Clubb et al. (1990). See Appendix C for more details.

¹²If a proposed bill remained stuck in the Rules Committee (resp. a legislative committee) for more than seven (resp. twenty) days, a discharge petition could be filed and, were it to receive at least 218 signatures, the bill could move to the floor of the House (Beth et al., 2003).

Panel A and their (decadal) changes in Panel B. The Black share in the average county in our sample was around 3.5% in 1940, and increased to almost 9% in 1970 (not shown). These average values, however, mask substantial heterogeneity. Figure A.5 plots the 1940 Black share for the counties in our sample, and shows that, in 1940, Black migrants living outside the South were concentrated in the urban centers of the Northeast and the Midwest, in border states, and in southern California. In 1940, the Black share was already as high as 8% in Cook County (IL), and rose to 21.5% by 1970. Similarly, the Black share in Philadelphia County (PA) increased from around 12% in 1940 to almost 35% in 1970, whereas that in Alameda County (CA) rose from 2 to 15% during the same period (Figure A.6).

The 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections was on average 45.7%; in the 78th Congress, civil rights scores were on average negative (-0.87), indicating that northern legislators were relatively liberal on racial issues already by 1940. The average decadal change in ideology scores was very close to zero, even though this masks important differences both between parties and between Congress periods (Bateman et al., 2017; Schickler, 2016). Signatures on discharge petitions were significantly more common in the 78th- 82nd than in the 83rd - 88th Congress period (Table A.4), and their subjects changed markedly over time. While the poll tax and FECP legislation were the most common topics during the 1940s, 5 of the 8 discharge petitions filed between the 83rd and the 88th Congress concerned the CRA.¹³

4 Empirical Strategy

4.1 Estimating Equation

Our empirical analysis is divided in two parts. First, we estimate the effects of the Great Migration on demand for civil rights legislation; second, we analyze the response of northern legislators to changes in the composition and preferences of their electorate. To be clear: we do not attempt to isolate the impact of changes in voters' demand, due to Black inflows, on legislators' behavior. In fact, both parties likely re-optimized their platforms strategically because of the Great Migration, in turn influencing the actions of voters – both Black and white Americans. Our goal is instead to estimate the “reduced form” effect of Black in-migration on voters' demand and politicians' supply

¹³See Appendix C for the list of discharge petitions on civil rights by topic and Congress (Table C.1).

without taking a stance on how the two influenced each other.

Starting from the demand side and stacking the data for the three decades between 1940 and 1970, we estimate

$$\Delta y_{c\tau} = \delta_{s\tau} + \beta \Delta Bl_{c\tau} + \gamma X_{c\tau} + u_{c\tau} \quad (1)$$

where $\Delta y_{c\tau}$ is the change in the outcome of interest in county c during decade τ . When focusing on electoral outcomes, $y_{c\tau}$ refers to the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections. When considering grassroots activism, $y_{c\tau}$ is the probability of pro-civil rights demonstrations organized by the CORE and the presence of local NAACP chapters. In order to identify the effects for the average county, we weigh regressions by 1940 county population, but, as shown in Appendix D, results are robust to estimating unweighted regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

The key regressor of interest, $\Delta Bl_{c\tau}$, is the change in the Black share in county c during decade τ . $\delta_{s\tau}$ includes interactions between decade and state dummies, and $X_{c\tau}$ is a vector of interactions between decade dummies and 1940 county characteristics. Our preferred specification includes the 1940 Black share and a dummy equal to one for Democratic incumbency in 1940 Congressional elections. In Appendix D, we add more interactions to probe the robustness of our results. Since equation (1) is taken in stacked first differences and always controls for interactions between period and state dummies, the coefficient of interest, β , is estimated from changes in the Black share within the same county over time, as compared to other counties in the same state in a given period.

Turning to the supply of civil rights, c no longer refers to the county but, instead, to the CD.¹⁴ When considering ideology scores, we restrict attention to two – rather than three – periods, so as to end our analysis with the Congress that passed the CRA (Congress 88). Instead, for signatures on discharge petitions, we are forced to estimate equation (1) only for the 78-82 Congress period, when a sufficient number of petitions were filed both at the beginning and at the end of the decade.¹⁵

¹⁴We construct a time-invariant unit, described in Appendix B, to deal with redistricting. Regressions are weighed by CD population, and standard errors are clustered at the CD level.

¹⁵We also estimate a “levels on changes” specification stacking data from both Congress periods (see Appendix E.3).

4.2 Instrument for Changes in Black Population

The key empirical challenge for our analysis is that Black migrants might have sorted in places that were already undergoing economic and political changes. To overcome these and similar concerns, we predict Black inflows in northern area c during decade τ using a version of the shift-share instrument commonly adopted in the migration literature (Boustan, 2010; Card, 2001). The instrument predicts the change in the Black population in county c during decade τ by interacting the share of Black migrants born in southern state j and living in northern county c in 1940 (relative to all Black migrants born in state j living outside that state in 1940), sh_{jc} , with the number of Black migrants who left state j during period τ , $Bl_{j\tau}$:

$$Z_{c\tau} = \sum_{j \in \text{South}} sh_{jc} Bl_{j\tau} \quad (2)$$

Since we are interested in the effects of changes in the Black share, we scale $Z_{c\tau}$ by 1940 county population.

As discussed in Boustan (2010) among others, Black settlements in the North were highly persistent over time. At the turn of the twentieth century, as African Americans started to move northwards, migration patterns were influenced by the newly constructed railroad network. For instance, the presence of the *Illinois Central*, which was connecting several Mississippi counties to Chicago and a number of southern railroads to northern hubs in Missouri and Illinois, explains why Black migrants from Mississippi were disproportionately concentrated in Chicago or St. Louis (Grossman, 1991). The stability of Black enclaves was further reinforced by the process of chain migration during the First Great Migration (Collins and Wanamaker, 2015). Figure A.7 plots the share of Black migrants born in Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas living in selected northern counties in 1940, documenting the wide variation in settlement patterns across both destination and origin areas.

4.2.1 Identifying Assumptions and Instrument Validity

Several recent papers have discussed the potential threats to the validity of shift-share designs (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2021; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020; Jaeger et al., 2018).

In our setting, one threat to identification is that the characteristics of counties that pulled Black migrants from specific states before 1940 may be correlated both with post-

1940 Black migration and with changes in support for civil rights in northern counties (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). We deal with this concern by performing two sets of robustness checks, which are described in detail in Appendix D. First, we show that pre-period changes in the outcomes of interest are not correlated with the instrument. Second, we interact period dummies with several 1940 county characteristics, such as the share of Black residents, support for the Democratic Party, the urban share of the population, and the share of employment in manufacturing.

Controlling for the interaction between the 1940 Black share and period dummies implies that the instrument only exploits variation in the (southern state) composition of African Americans’ enclaves across counties, holding constant the size of their Black populations. We also replicate our analysis by interacting period dummies with the share of Black migrants born in each southern state living in northern and western counties in 1940, i.e. sh_{jc} in equation (2). This exercise reduces the concern that our estimates may be sensitive to variation coming from the initial shares of Black Americans born in specific southern states and concentrated in selected northern counties (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020).

A second threat to the validity of the instrument is that it may be spuriously correlated with specific shocks hitting northern counties that both affected local conditions and influenced emigration across southern states over time (Borusyak et al., 2021). We address this concern in different ways. First, we document that the instrument is uncorrelated with either WWII spending or the generosity of New Deal relief programs. Second, similar to Sequeira et al. (2020), we replicate the analysis by separately controlling for a measure of predicted labor demand, constructed by interacting the 1940 industrial county composition with the national growth rate of different industries between 1940 and 1970. Third, as in Boustan (2010) and Derenoncourt (2018), we replace actual outmigration from the South with that estimated by exploiting only initial conditions across southern counties. This strategy also deals with the potential concern of serial correlation in migration flows from the same location to the same destination (Jaeger et al., 2018). Finally, we develop an alternative version of the shift-share instrument, based on a linked sample of African American migrants between 1910 and 1930 from Abramitzky et al. (2020). This instrument, which is based on a county-to-county (rather than state-to-county) migration matrix, effectively exploits variation in predicted migration from more than 1,200 southern counties. As long as conditions in southern counties are orthogonal to the evolution of political preferences across

northern counties, this ensures that the instrument is valid (Borusyak et al., 2021).

5 Demand for Civil Rights

5.1 Main Results

5.1.1 Congressional Elections

We start by studying the effects of the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections, which we interpret as a proxy for voters' demand for civil rights. Panel A of Table 2 estimates equation (1) with OLS in columns 1 to 3, and with 2SLS from column 4 onwards. Column 1 only includes state by decade fixed effects, while columns 2 and 3 add interactions between decade dummies and, respectively, the 1940 Black share and an indicator for Democratic incumbency in 1940. In all cases, the point estimate on the change in the Black share is positive and statistically significant.

Turning to 2SLS, Panel C shows that the instrument is strong, and the F-stat for weak instruments is always above conventional levels. In our preferred specification – which includes interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) an indicator for Democratic incumbency in 1940 – the first stage coefficient implies that one percentage point increase in the predicted Black share raises the actual Black share by 1.15 percentage points (column 6).

2SLS estimates confirm OLS results, but are larger in magnitude, especially for our preferred specification (column 6) and when estimating long difference regressions (column 7). According to our preferred specification, one percentage point increase in the Black share raised the Democratic vote share by 1.65 percentage points, or 4% relative to the 1940 mean. For large recipient counties such as Cook (IL) or Wayne (MI) county, where the Black share increased by more than 15 percentage points between 1940 and 1970, Black in-migration likely altered the political landscape dramatically. These findings likely reflect a combination of *i*) migrants' direct political engagement, and *ii*) changes in the preferences and voting behavior of existing residents. We return to this point in Section 5.3 below, when exploring the heterogeneity of our results.

The difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates indicates that Black migrants selected areas where support for the Republican Party was rising faster. This might have happened because these counties were experiencing faster income growth.¹⁶ Another

¹⁶Consistent with this idea, in our sample there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between

possibility, not in contrast with the previous one, is that the IV identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE) for counties that received more Black migrants because of family networks and not because of economic conditions. If Black individuals moving to a specific location due to the presence of networks were more politically engaged relative to “economic migrants”, this could explain why OLS coefficients are smaller than 2SLS ones.

Panel B of Table 2 estimates the impact of Black in-migration on turnout in Congressional elections. Our preferred specification (column 6) indicates that this effect was positive, but small and imprecisely estimated. As for the Democratic vote share, OLS coefficients are smaller than 2SLS ones – in fact, in this case negative. The quantitatively small effect on turnout is in line with qualitative evidence that Black migrants were quickly incorporated in the political life of northern and western counties (Moon, 1948; Schickler, 2016).

In Appendix E.1.1, we examine how results vary across decades (Table E.1), showing that the effects of the Great Migration were stronger in the 1940s and in the 1960s, and were, instead, muted in the 1950s.¹⁷ Appendix E.1.1 also verifies that Black inflows had a positive, but smaller, effect on the Democratic vote share in Presidential elections. This is consistent with Schickler (2016), who documents that support for racial equality was stronger within the local fringes of the Democratic Party.

5.1.2 Pro-Civil Rights Demonstrations and NAACP Chapters

In Table 3, we turn to the frequency of non-violent demonstrations organized by CORE in support of civil rights. The structure of the table mirrors that of Table 2, reporting OLS and 2SLS estimates in columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 7 respectively, and presenting first stage coefficients in Panel B. For brevity, we focus on our 2SLS preferred specification (column 6).

Black in-migration had a strong, positive effect on the probability of CORE demonstrations. One percentage point increase in the Black share led to a 4.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of protests. CORE was created in 1942, and the frequency of events in our sample of counties between 1942 and 1944 (included) was 0.09. Our estimates thus imply that one percentage point increase in the Black share raised CORE

the change in the Democratic vote share and a number of proxies for economic growth, such as population growth, population density, and industrial expansion.

¹⁷One interpretation for these patterns is that the economic downturns of the 1950s temporarily halted the progress of race relations, cooling off whites’ support for racial equality (Sugrue, 2014).

demonstrations by more than 50% relative to their pre-1945 values. Another way to gauge the magnitude of these estimates is to consider that the average change in the probability of CORE-led protests in our sample is 0.143. Thus, one percentage point increase in the Black share can explain almost one third of the change in pro-civil rights demonstrations across non-southern counties between 1940 and 1970. We refer the interested reader to Appendix E.1.2, where we use information on the cause and the target of the protest to analyze the heterogeneity of results across type of events (Figures E.1-E.2 and Table E.2).

In Table 4, we turn to the 1940-1960 change in the probability that a county had a NAACP chapter in place.¹⁸ In the full sample, there is no statistically significant effect on the presence of NAACP (column 3). However, the impact of Black in-migration becomes positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively relevant for counties that did not have a chapter in 1940 (column 4). The fact that we do not find any effect for counties that already had a chapter in place in 1940 is not surprising. In these places, Black inflows likely increased the number of members of NAACP chapters – something that we are not able to measure in our data. Instead, in counties where the NAACP was not present at baseline, Black in-migration likely created a critical mass of activists that justified the opening of new local chapters.

5.2 Robustness Checks

5.2.1 Addressing White Flight

A potential concern with the interpretation of our findings is that Black arrivals induced white residents to move to another county (Boustan, 2010). We provide different pieces of evidence, detailed in Appendix D and briefly summarized here, that our results are not due to white flight. First, we replicate the analysis considering a larger geographic unit, the commuting zone (CZ), which contained both central cities and their suburbs (Tables D.1 and D.2). Any potential white flight induced by Black inflows should thus take place within, and not across, CZs. Second, we replicate the analysis conducted in Boustan (2010), and document that Black in-migration did lead to white departures in central cities, but not in counties in our sample (Tables D.3, D.4, D.5, and D.6). Since the central city-suburb divide does not overlap with county boundaries, the reallocation of whites *between* cities and suburbs was likely absorbed *within* counties. Finally, we

¹⁸We use this specification because, as noted in Appendix C, data on NAACP chapters are only available for 1940 (or earlier) and 1960.

show that Black inflows were not associated with changes in the composition of white residents and, consistent with Boustan (2009), did not have any impact on whites' labor market outcomes (Tables D.7, D.8, D.9, and D.10).¹⁹

5.2.2 Summary of Additional Robustness Checks

Appendix D performs additional robustness checks. First, we verify that the instrument is uncorrelated with three potential pull factors: WWII spending, New Deal relief programs, and the vote share of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1932 elections (Table D.11). Second, we interact period dummies with several 1940 county characteristics (e.g. the urban and the immigrant share, the employment share in manufacturing, the employment to population ratio, and county population) and replicate the analysis controlling for predicted industrialization, constructed by exploiting the 1940 industrial composition of non-southern counties (Tables D.12 and D.13). To deal with the possibility that variation behind the instrument may be driven by specific combinations of northern counties-southern states (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020), we separately interact period dummies with the share of Black migrants from each southern state (Figures D.1, D.2, and D.3).

Finally, we show that there are no pre-trends (Tables D.14 and D.23), and that results: *i*) are robust to excluding potential outliers, estimating alternative specifications, and measuring electoral outcomes in different ways (Tables D.15, D.16, D.17, and D.18); *ii*) are not driven by the simultaneous inflow of southern whites (Tables D.15 and D.16); *iii*) are robust to using Conley adjusted or CZ-level clustered standard errors (Table D.19); and, *iv*) remain unchanged when constructing versions of the instrument that only exploit variation in “push factors” across southern counties (Tables D.20 and D.21) and that rely on a county-to-county migration matrix to construct the initial shares (Table D.22).²⁰

5.3 Mechanisms

5.3.1 Black in-Migration and Whites' Attitudes Towards Civil Rights

Bounds on whites' voting behavior. We begin with a back of the envelope calculation that suggests not only Black but also white voters' behavior changed in a

¹⁹Due to data limitation this exercise is conducted at the CZ level, estimating long difference regressions for the 1940-1960 period.

²⁰Appendix D also performs additional robustness checks on CD results presented in Section 6.

progressive direction in response to Black in-migration. The coefficient reported in Table 2, column 6, indicates that Black in-migration increased the Democratic vote share by more than one for one.²¹ This points to the importance of changes in northern residents' voting patterns. In Figure E.3, we compute how many white Republican voters would need to switch to the Democratic Party under different assumptions on Black turnout and voting preferences, in order to explain away our estimated effect on Democratic vote share.²² The results indicate that, if Black residents voted for the Democratic Party at a rate of 70%, as estimated by the literature (Bositis, 2012), and if we assume a similar behavior for Black migrants, then our 2SLS coefficient implies two white voters switching from the Republican to the Democratic party for every ten incoming Black migrants.

This exercise is suggestive, and we thus only report it in detail in Appendix E.2.1. Yet, it shows that, under reasonable assumptions, Black migrants alone are not sufficient to explain the increase in the Democratic vote share estimated above, and that at least some northern residents – both Black *and* white – would have to start voting for the Democrats in response to the Great Migration.

Additional evidence from CORE demonstrations. To provide additional evidence in support of the idea that Black in-migration increased support for racial equality among at least some white voters, we focus again on pro-civil rights protests organized by CORE, and exploit the fact that, for a subset of events, we can identify the race of participants. In column 7 of Table 3, we estimate our preferred specification using as dependent variable the change in the probability of CORE demonstrations with *both* Black and white participants. Notably, this represents a (very conservative) lower-bound for the probability that whites joined pro-civil rights demonstrations, since participants' race was reported only for approximately 40% of CORE events, and we define a protest as having white participants only when their presence was explicitly reported. The point estimate is half that of the baseline specification (column 6), but remains positive and statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.058.

Evidence from historical survey data. We complement the previous results with historical survey data from the ANES. As explained in Appendix C, this dataset only reports the state of residence of respondents, and questions on racial views are available

²¹We can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on changes in the Black share is equal to 1 at the 5% level.

²²When performing this exercise, we fix turnout, assuming that the inflow of Black migrants can change the preferences of existing voters but does not alter the number of northern residents (of either race) voting. This assumption is consistent with our previous results for turnout (Table 2, Panel B).

only from the end of the 1950s onwards.²³ Thus, we estimate cross-sectional regressions, correlating whites' racial attitudes and political preferences in surveys conducted in years close to the CRA with the (instrumented) 1940-1960 change in the Black share in their state of residence. We acknowledge that the cross-sectional nature of this exercise implies this evidence is more suggestive than our main results. We include survey year and Census region fixed effects and a set of 1940 state (manufacturing share, urban share, share of unionized workers, Black share, indicator for Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections) and individual (gender, marital status, and fixed effects for both age and education) controls.²⁴ We always restrict attention to white respondents living in non-southern states.

In Table 5, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if support for civil rights was considered by respondents as one of the most important problems for the country in 1960 and 1964 (see Appendix C for more details). In the same survey years, respondents were also asked whether they opposed school and housing or working space integration. Combining these questions, columns 1 to 3 verify that considering civil rights as one of the most important problems is negatively correlated with opposition to racial integration. We thus interpret the dependent variable in Table 5 as a proxy of support for racial equality. Columns 4 and 5 then turn to the relationship between the 1940-1960 change in the Black share and the dummy for civil rights being the most important issue, using OLS and 2SLS respectively.

2SLS estimates indicate that white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants between 1940 and 1960 were significantly more likely to consider civil rights one of the country's most important problems. This relationship is quantitatively large: according to the coefficient reported in column 5, one percentage point increase in the Black share between 1940 and 1960 is associated with a 1.8 percentage points (or, 17%) higher probability of reporting civil rights as the most important problem in the two ANES surveys asked before the CRA. In column 6, we exploit the fact that the ANES asked respondents not only their state of residence, but also their state of birth. We restrict attention to whites who, at the time of the survey, lived in the same

²³The first year for which ANES data are available at the county level is 1978 – well after the period considered in our analysis. Although some of these questions were asked also after 1964, we refrain from using any post-CRA survey dataset because of the potential direct effect of the bill on whites' racial attitudes (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Wheaton, 2020).

²⁴Since party identification and union membership may be endogenous to Black inflows, we do not include them in our baseline specification. Adding these controls does not change any of our results. Results are also robust to including further 1940 state level controls such as the immigrant share, the share of unskilled workers, and other socioeconomic or political variables.

state as the one they were born in. Reassuringly, results are unchanged.²⁵

Finally, we consider whites' political preferences. Focusing on survey waves between 1956 and 1964 and estimating 2SLS regressions, Table A.6 documents that white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants between 1940 and 1960 were significantly more likely to vote for (column 1) and identify with (column 4) the Democratic Party. This relationship becomes slightly stronger when restricting attention to non-movers (columns 2 and 5) and when considering only 1964 (columns 3 and 6). The fact that coefficients are higher for 1964 is consistent with the civil rights issue featuring more prominently during the year that led to the passage of the CRA. Appendix E.2.2 verifies that similar patterns hold when using data from Gallup (Table E.3).

5.3.2 Unpacking the Channels Behind Whites' Support for Civil Rights

At least two mechanisms can explain the positive effects of Black in-migration on support for racial equality among (at least some) northern whites. First, as envisioned by Myrdal (1944), exposure to Black migrants might have increased whites' awareness of the brutal conditions prevailing in the South, in turn fostering demand for more racial equality. Inter-group contact might have also reduced negative stereotypes and prejudice held by whites, changing their attitudes towards Black Americans (Allport, 1954; Schindler and Westcott, 2020). Second, progressive Democrats and labor unions may have made civil rights part of their agenda in order to attract Black migrants, forging a class-based cross-race coalition between white and Black members of the working class (Adams, 1966; Sugrue, 2008).

Economic and social factors may have interacted, reinforcing each other. For instance, frequent contacts in an environment where Black and white workers had common goals and where they shared a common, class-based, identity may have reduced some of the barriers that traditionally inhibited the formation of a racially diverse coalition.²⁶ In what follows, we focus on CORE demonstrations and exploit cross-county heterogeneity to shed light on which segments of the white electorate became more supportive of civil rights.

²⁵Table A.5 confirms the lack of correlation between Black in-migration and whites' mobility across states by regressing a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent lived in a state other than her state of birth against the (instrumented) 1940-1960 change in the Black share in the state of residence. This holds for different subsets of respondents (see the bottom row of the table).

²⁶Using recent data, Frymer and Grumbach (2020) find that white union members hold more liberal attitudes towards minorities in the US.

Social forces. According to the information mechanism, the Great Migration should have led to a larger shift in whites’ racial attitudes in counties that were already more socially progressive. The salience of southern racial violence and institutionalized discrimination would have led to greater sensitization of northern whites with existing liberal tendencies. To test this idea, we split the sample above and below the median of different proxies for progressive attitudes in the local electorate. Figure 2 plots the coefficient on the change in the Black share for counties above (orange bars) and below (blue bars) the median of each such proxy. To ease the interpretation of results, we always rescale the variables so that higher (resp. lower) values refer to socially more (resp. less) progressive counties.²⁷

First, we consider the discrimination index constructed in Qian and Tabellini (2020) using historical data from a variety of sources, such as local presence of the KKK and the lynching of Black Americans up to 1939. Consistent with Myrdal (1944)’s hypothesis, results are an order of magnitude larger in counties with lower historical discrimination. The same pattern, though less pronounced, is evident when splitting counties as belonging to states with (blue bars) and without (orange bars) miscegenation laws (Dahis et al., 2020). Second, we find that pro-civil rights demonstrations increased more in places with a larger 1940 immigrant population. A higher immigrant share captures tolerance of the local population, as the foreign-born are more likely to sort into areas that are open to minorities. This result is also in line with historical accounts noting that minorities were more likely to join African Americans in their demand for racial equality (Schickler, 2016; Sugrue, 2008).²⁸

Finally, we explore how results are mediated by the characteristics of the white electorate. The last two sets of bars in Figure 2 split the sample according to the 1940 share of whites who were: *i*) young (defined as individuals of age 35 or younger); and *ii*) born in the South. The former proxy is motivated by the fact that young individuals are more open to social change (Inglehart, 2015; Miles, 2000; Parker et al., 2016). The latter is motivated by the fact that southern born whites were less likely to support racial equality (Bailer, 1944; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Even though coefficients are less precisely estimated than before, they indicate that CORE demonstrations increased

²⁷The corresponding estimates are reported in Table A.7. Given that the values of the F-stat are often below conventional levels, results should be interpreted with caution.

²⁸Exceptions may be the Irish and the Poles, who were more likely to compete for status and jobs with Black Americans, and who had been historically antagonistic to the latter (Bailer, 1943; Sugrue, 2014). In unreported results, we examined heterogeneity depending on the local presence of Irish and Polish first or second generation immigrants, but did not find any statistically or economically significant difference for the effects of the Great Migration.

more in counties where the white population was more progressive and open to social change.

Political and economic forces. Whites’ support for civil rights might have also increased as the labor movement placed increasing emphasis on civil rights, especially in northern cities that were home to a growing African American workforce. Labor unions were a crucial ally to African Americans’ struggle for equality, and their agenda joined civil rights and progressive economic policy with the aim of creating a cross-race class-based coalition (Schickler, 2016). As before, we split counties above and below different proxies for the presence and strength of organized labor, or for its incentives to incorporate African Americans. We report results in Figure 3 and Table A.8, always defining the variables so that higher (resp. lower) values refer to stronger (resp. weaker) presence of, or incentives for, unions to support the civil rights movement.

We start by noting that labor unions, and white workers more generally, should have supported racial equality more when labor markets were tighter. Indeed, intergroup contact is more likely to lead to cooperation when it happens in contexts with no competition over scarce resources (Allport, 1954; Blalock, 1967).²⁹ Consistent with this idea, Black in-migration led to more demonstrations only where predicted labor demand was stronger.³⁰ These findings are in line with anecdotal accounts, such as Bailer (1943) and Sugrue (2014), noting that white backlash was more likely to emerge during economic downturns. They are also in line with the electoral results discussed in Appendix E.1.1 (Table E.1), which document that the Great Migration had no effect on the Democratic vote share in the 1950s – a decade characterized by slack labor markets and economic recession.

Next, we split the sample by the share of white men employed in manufacturing and in the unskilled sector, respectively (second and third set of bars from the left). The surge in civil rights protests was concentrated in counties with a higher share of white workers in the two sectors where unions were most widespread (Bailer, 1944; Farber et al., 2018). In line with these results, the effects of the Great Migration were stronger, although not statistically different, in counties belonging to states where CIO membership rates were higher.³¹

²⁹Several papers document that anti-minority sentiments are more likely to arise during times of hardship (Grosfeld et al., 2020; Oster, 2004; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012).

³⁰We predict labor demand using a Bartik-style approach, interacting 1940 industry shares at the county level with national growth rates of each industry in each subsequent decade.

³¹CIO membership rates are not available at the county level in a systematic way. We thus rely on 1939 state-level CIO membership from Troy (1957).

Finally, the last set of bars on the right documents that pro-civil rights protests were more frequent where political competition – defined as one minus the absolute value of the margin of victory in 1940 Congressional elections – was higher. This finding is consistent with labor unions (and the Democratic Party) having stronger incentives to coordinate events where the Black vote was more valuable. Precisely in these areas, a better organized political machine could have made a difference in attracting and mobilizing pivotal, Black and white, voters (McAdam, 1982; Pons, 2018).

Appendix E.2.3 presents two additional pieces of evidence on the role of labor unions in increased support for civil rights among whites using ANES data. First, the positive relationship between whites’ attitudes towards racial equality and Black in-migration documented in Table 5 above was stronger among members of labor unions and self-identified Democrats (Figure E.4). Second, the change in the Black share was positively associated with feelings towards Democrats and labor unions among white respondents (Table E.5).

5.3.3 Residential Segregation and Independent Local Governments

Our findings do not necessarily imply that white residents welcomed Black migrants into their neighborhoods. Both existing work (Boustan, 2010) and our own findings (Table D.5) indicate that the Great Migration increased within-county racial segregation as whites exerted more effort to avoid sharing public goods with Black Americans (Alesina et al., 1999). In turn, this may have amplified the positive effect of the Great Migration on demand for civil rights. On the one hand, residential segregation might have defused whites’ animosity caused by Black migration into white neighborhoods. On the other hand, it may have reinforced liberal whites’ perceptions that the civil rights legislation was about the South, and that their privileges would not be significantly eroded.

Appendix E.2.4 provides evidence consistent with these conjectures (Table E.6). First, Black in-migration increased the frequency of CORE demonstrations only in counties with higher 1940 residential segregation. That is, support for civil rights increased *more* in counties where inter-group contact in the housing market was *lower*. Second, Black inflows led to the creation of more school districts in counties where residential segregation was higher.³² One interpretation of these patterns, consistent with historical evidence (Sugrue, 2008), is that population sorting within counties and

³²These results are in line with those in Alesina et al. (2004).

the creation of independent jurisdictions might have reduced potential backlash by allowing whites to live in racially homogeneous communities, where the probability of sharing public goods with Black Americans was low. This, in turn, could have facilitated support for civil rights as a national-level policy issue, and progressive voting motivated by abstract principles of racial equality.

6 Legislators' Behavior

6.1 Ideology Scores and Discharge Petitions

6.1.1 Ideology Scores

We begin the analysis of legislators' behavior by focusing on the ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017), which take more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) voting behavior on civil rights bills. Columns 1 to 3 in Table 6 present results for the change in agnostic ideology scores, stacking the data for the 78-82 and the 82-88 Congress periods, reporting OLS, 2SLS, and first stage coefficients in Panels A, B, and C. Following Autor et al. (2020) and Bonomi et al. (2020), to deal with mean reversion, in addition to the controls included in our preferred specification above, we also add the interaction between period dummies and the baseline ideology score of legislators. The 2SLS coefficient reported in column 1 (Panel B) is negative, but quantitatively small and imprecisely estimated.³³

When examining results separately by Congress period, a more nuanced picture emerges. Black in-migration had a strong, negative effect on the ideology scores of legislators in the first Congress period (column 2), and a negligible, positive, and not statistically significant effect in the second period (column 3). While the F-stat falls below conventional levels in column 2, suggesting that our estimates should be interpreted with some caution, these findings indicate that legislators' ideology moved to the left between Congress 78 and Congress 82, and did not change significantly afterwards. Results are robust to focusing on the constrained version of the ideology scores (columns 4 to 6).

In our baseline specification, we map the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) Black in-migration to the 78-82 (resp. 82-88) Congress period, so as to both have the longest

³³As for other tables, the discrepancy between OLS and 2SLS estimates indicates that Black migrants were more likely to move to areas with growing support for Republican, more conservative legislators.

periods without redistricting and end the analysis with the Congress that passed the CRA. Appendix D.7 verifies that our findings are robust to different timing conventions. It also shows that there are no pre-trends and that results are not influenced by strategic gerrymandering of CD boundaries, possibly induced by Black in-migration (Kaufman et al., 2017).

6.1.2 Signatures on Discharge Petitions

Due to gatekeeping imposed by southern Democrats, civil rights bills were unlikely to reach the floor of the House, unless northern legislators were willing to undertake non-standard actions. Discharge petitions represent the best example of such non-conventional tools at disposal of non-southern legislators (Pearson and Schickler, 2009). Since there are not enough discharge petitions filed during the 82-88 Congress period, we focus on the 1940s, when several discharge petitions were filed and signed on the same topics – fair employment legislation (FEPC), the poll tax, and anti-lynching legislation – both at the beginning and at the end of the decade.

Although all three topics featured prominently in the political debate during the 1940s, legislation against discrimination in federal employment likely represented the most salient category, where northern legislators may have tried to signal their (pro-civil rights) stance the most. First, the salience of the poll tax and anti-lynching legislation gradually declined relative to that of FEPC during the 1940s.³⁴ Second, anti-lynching legislation and, to a lesser extent, the abolition of the poll tax almost exclusively concerned racial relations in the South; conversely, employment protection legislation had a direct impact both in the South and in the North (Sugrue, 2014).

Figure 4 plots the 2SLS point estimate (with 95% confidence intervals), showing that Black in-migration had a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of signing a discharge petition on all topics. Yet, consistent with the previous discussion, the coefficient is larger and more precisely estimated for FEPC legislation than for other categories.³⁵ Appendix E.3 confirms these patterns by estimating a levels on

³⁴The last discharge petition on either the poll tax or anti-lynching legislation was filed during the 80th Congress, whereas discharge petitions on FEPC were filed also in the early 1950s (Table C.1).

³⁵Table A.9 reports the coefficients associated with Figure 4. The change in the probability of signing a petition on FEPC, anti-lynching legislation, and the poll tax is taken over Congresses 81 to 78, 80 to 77, and 79 to 77 respectively. Since petitions on the three topics were not always signed in the same Congress year and were not always comparable with each other (see Table C.1), we checked the robustness of our results using a number of alternative time windows. Reassuringly, they always remained similar to those presented in Figure 4. Results in Figure 4 and in Table A.9 are obtained from a slightly larger number of CDs relative to those for which legislators' ideology is available. Restricting attention to these CDs leaves our results

changes specification and stacking data from the two Congress periods (Table E.7).

6.2 Heterogeneous Effects

6.2.1 Within vs Between Party Changes

The shift in legislators’ ideology documented in Table 6 might come from two, non-mutually exclusive forces. First, it may reflect changes taking place between parties, if Republican legislators were replaced by Democrats. Second, it might capture changes taking place within parties, if the ideology of Congress members of the same party shifted towards more liberal positions on racial issues.

To disentangle these mechanisms, we create four separate dummies for each possible party transition experienced by a CD between the beginning and the end of a Congress period – from Republican to Democratic, from Republican to Republican, from Democratic to Democratic, and from Democratic to Republican. Next, we interact such dummies with the change in the Black share, and include all interactions in the same specification (in addition to the direct effect of Black in-migration). We omit the interaction with the Democratic-to-Democratic dummy, so that coefficients on the included interaction terms can be interpreted as the effects of Black in-migration in a CD undergoing a given transition, as compared to CDs that remained Democratic during the Congress period.

We report 2SLS estimates from the baseline stacked first difference regression in Table A.10, for the agnostic and the constrained version of the ideology scores in columns 1 and 2 respectively.³⁶ The main effect of Black in-migration is negative and statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.056. Focusing on the interaction terms, the coefficient on the “Republican to Democratic” transition is negative and marginally significant, indicating that the Great Migration produced a more pronounced liberal shift in CDs that switched from the Republican to the Democratic Party – evidence of a *between* party adjustment. Instead, the interaction for the “Republican to Republican” transition is positive and statistically significant, implying that legislators became less liberal on racial issues in CDs that were Republican both at the beginning and at the end of the period. The *within* party adjustment taking place in GOP dominated CDs

unchanged.

³⁶Since there are now four endogenous regressors and four instruments, we report the AP F-stat associated with each instrument, as suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2008). In two out of four cases, these are below conventional levels, likely due to the highly demanding nature of the exercise.

suggests that the average effects estimated above may mask between party polarization on racial issues.

6.2.2 Political Polarization

To examine the possibility that the Great Migration increased political polarization, we follow the approach used in Autor et al. (2020) and Tabellini (2020) for trade and immigration respectively. We define liberal (resp. moderate) Democrats those legislators with an ideology score below (resp. above) the median score for Democrats in Congress 78. Likewise, moderate (resp. conservative) Republicans are defined as Congress members with an ideology score below (resp. above) the median score for Republicans in Congress 78. Table A.10 estimates our baseline stacked first difference specification, using as dependent variable the change in the probability of electing a liberal Democrat (column 3), a moderate Democrat (column 4), a moderate Republican (column 5), and a conservative Republican (column 6).

Black in-migration had a positive, statistically significant effect on the probability of electing a liberal Democrat. The remaining coefficients are imprecisely estimated, but suggest that this was accompanied by a reduction in the probability of electing moderate legislators (either Democratic or Republican). If anything, the point estimate for the probability of electing a conservative Republican is positive, albeit small and not statistically significant.

In Figure 5, we re-estimate the regressions reported in columns 3 to 6 of Table A.10 separately for each of the two decades in Panels A and B respectively (see also Table A.11). In the 1940s, Black in-migration had a strong, positive effect on the probability of electing a liberal Democrat, while reducing the probability of electing both moderate Democrats and conservative Republicans. If anything, the probability of electing a moderate Republican increased with Black inflows, even though results are not statistically significant. These findings reflect the combination of *between* and *within* party adjustments discussed above.

The 1950s, instead, saw the increase in the probability of electing a conservative Republican, with a corresponding decline in the probability of electing a moderate Republican. The effects of Black in-migration on the probability of electing Democrats with different ideological stances are very small in size and imprecisely estimated. The rightward shift of Republican legislators during the 1950s may have been motivated by strategic considerations, as the GOP tried to win the votes of whites who were becoming

increasingly concerned about the racial mixing of their neighborhoods (Sugrue, 2014).

Since quantitatively results in Panel A are larger than those in Panel B, on average, legislators' ideology moved to the left. However, when inspecting these dynamics more carefully, polarization becomes evident. These findings are also consistent with the possibility that local responses to the Great Migration might have been partly influenced by national considerations. Even though Democrats "lost the South" by promoting the civil rights agenda (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018), this strategy might have allowed them to win urban areas of the West and the North. At the same time, the Republican Party might have tried to strengthen its conservative position at the national level, so as to attract dissatisfied southern whites leaving the Democratic Party.

7 Conclusions

The Great Migration was the single largest episode of internal migration in American history. Between 1940 and 1970, more than 4 million Black Americans left the US South for northern and western destinations. During this same period, the civil rights movement struggled and eventually succeeded to eliminate institutionalized discrimination and formal impediments to Black political participation. In this paper, we study the effects that Black in-migration had on both voters' demand for and legislators' supply of civil rights.

Using a version of the shift-share instrument, we show that Black in-migration increased the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections and raised the frequency of pro-civil rights demonstrations. Our estimates suggest that these effects were at least in part due to the behavior of white voters, who also joined grassroots civil rights activities. Next, we document that legislators representing CDs that received more African Americans became more liberal on racial issues, and more actively supported civil rights legislation. These average effects, however, mask substantial polarization between parties on racial issues.

Our paper complements the existing literature on the Great Migration, which has, especially in recent times, emphasized the long run, negative impact that the Migration had on both racial residential segregation and economic mobility for African Americans. Our findings, instead, paint a more nuanced picture. They indicate that, as predicted by Gunnar Myrdal in 1944, Black in-migration to the US North and West was instrumental for the development of the civil rights movement, and for the concomitant

political changes that led to Black political empowerment and progress towards racial equality in the United States.

When contrasted with other works on the political effects of migration, our results raise an intriguing set of questions. Under what conditions can migration and inter-group contact more broadly lead to the formation of cross-group coalitions? When, instead, is backlash from original residents more likely to prevail? In the specific context of the Great Migration and of the civil rights movement, our evidence suggests that cross-race cooperation can emerge when individuals belonging to different groups share similar (in this context, more liberal) values, or when group members interact in domains, such as the working environment, where the emergence of a common identity and the existence of common goals can sustain political or social coalitions. At the same time, contact in other domains, such as residential markets and public goods' consumption, might lead to inter-group conflict and majority backlash.

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
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
Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Change in the Black Share across US Counties, 1940 to 1970




Notes: The map plots the change in the share of Black individuals in the population between 1940 and 1970 for the non-southern counties in our sample.

Figure 2. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics - Social and Cultural Forces




Notes: The bars report the marginal effect of changes in the Black share (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights for counties with each 1940 variable above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). Section 5.3.2 describes how each variable is constructed. Coefficients and standard errors reported in Table A.7.

Figure 3. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics - Political and Economic Forces



Notes: The bars report the marginal effect of changes in the Black share (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights for counties with each 1940 variable above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). Section 5.3.2 describes how each variable is constructed. Coefficients and standard errors reported in Table A.8.


Figure 4. Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions




Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of the 1940-1950 change in the Black share on the corresponding change in the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator. The first dot on the left (“All”) includes discharge petitions on employment protection legislation (FEPC), to promote anti-lynching legislation, and to abolish the poll tax. The three remaining dots refer to each of the three issues. Results and details of the specification are reported in Table A.9.

Figure 5. Black in-Migration and Political Polarization

Panel A: 1940s



Panel B: 1950s



Notes: Each bar reports 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effect of changes in the Black share on the change in the probability of electing a member of the House with the corresponding political orientation between Congress 78 and Congress 82 (Panel A) and between Congress 82 and Congress 88 (Panel B). The ideology indicators are defined in the main text (Section 6.2.2).

Table 1. Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
<i>Panel A: 1940 levels</i>						
Black Share (County)	3.60	2.10	0.042	0	46.50	1,139
Black Share (CD)	6.80	7.20	0.047	0	25.40	286
Democratic Vote Share	45.757	49.10	14.564	0	85.00	1,139
Turnout	68.938	69.20	8.479	23.00	97.60	1,139
Civil Rights Scores	-0.872	-0.811	0.712	-2.008	1.431	286
<i>Panel B: Changes</i>						
Black Share (County)	1.789	0.87	2.303	-4.93	7.537	3,418
Black Share (CD)	5.243	6.686	2.450	-0.808	10.205	571
Democratic Vote Share	1.695	1.80	6.189	-19.267	52.17	3,418
Turnout	-6.409	-6.433	3.33	-19.20	9.70	3,418
Civil Rights Scores	0.068	0.065	0.375	-1.177	1.284	571

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. When relevant, county variables are collapsed at the Congressional District level, fixing boundaries to Congress 78 as explained in the text. Democratic vote share and turnout refer to Congressional elections, and civil rights scores are the ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017). Panel A presents 1940 values, while Panel B reports decadal changes for each of the variables.

Table 2. Congressional Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
<i>Panel A: Democratic vote share (1940 mean: 45.89)</i>							
Change Black Share	0.628*** (0.099)	0.607*** (0.107)	0.769*** (0.131)	0.839*** (0.144)	1.165*** (0.197)	1.650*** (0.286)	2.062*** (0.476)
<i>Panel B: Turnout (1940 mean: 68.95)</i>							
Change Black Share	-0.262*** (0.098)	-0.292*** (0.092)	-0.268*** (0.086)	0.020 (0.140)	0.194 (0.172)	0.390* (0.235)	0.883** (0.371)
<i>Panel C: First stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share				1.186*** (0.267)	1.357*** (0.308)	1.148*** (0.311)	0.778*** (0.245)
Specification	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	LD
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
F-Stat				19.69	19.36	13.65	10.13
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	1,138

Notes: The sample includes the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table reports stacked first difference regressions in columns 1 to 6, and long difference regressions in column 7. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in Congressional elections in Panel A (resp. Panel B). Panel C reports the first stage associated with 2SLS regressions. Columns 1 to 3 estimate equation (1) in the text with OLS, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp 1940 Dem dummy) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3. CORE Demonstrations

Dep. Variable	Change in 1[Pro-Civil Rights Demonstration]						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
<i>Panel A: Main estimates</i>							
Change Black Share	0.036*** (0.006)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.010)	0.048*** (0.009)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.022* (0.012)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share				1.186*** (0.267)	1.357*** (0.308)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.311)
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
White Participants							X
F-Stat				19.69	19.36	13.65	13.65
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418

Notes: The sample includes the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights coordinated by the CORE. Columns 1 to 3 estimate equation (1) in the text with OLS, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp 1940 Dem dummy) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 7 includes only those demonstrations that were joined by at least some white participants. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 4. NAACP Chapters

Dep. Variable	1940-1960 Change in 1[NAACP Chapter]			
	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) 2SLS
<i>Panel A: Main estimates</i>				
Change Black Share	-0.023*** (0.008)	0.048*** (0.17)	-0.028 (0.024)	0.075** (0.035)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share			0.761*** (0.228)	0.609** (0.240)
NAACP in 1940	YES	NO	YES	NO
F-stat			11.18	6.438
Observations	1,139	932	1,139	932

Notes: The sample includes the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The dependent variable is the change (between 1940 and 1960) in the presence of NAACP chapters. Columns 2 and 4 restrict attention to counties with no NAACP chapter in 1940. Columns 1 and 2 estimate OLS regressions, whereas columns 3 and 4 present 2SLS results. The main regressor of interest is the 1940-1960 Change Black Share, and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument constructed in the text in columns 3 and 4. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5. Whites' Most Important Problem (ANES)

Dep. Variable	1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS
<i>Panel A: Main estimates</i>						
1[Pro Segregation]	-0.078*** (0.023)					
1[Against School Integration]		-0.078*** (0.019)				
1[Against Housing/Work Integration]			-0.077** (0.031)			
Change Black Share				0.010 (0.010)	0.017** (0.008)	0.022** (0.011)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share					2.184*** (0.321)	2.270*** (0.340)
Geography FE	State	State	State	Region	Region	Region
State Controls				X	X	X
Non-Movers						X
F-Stat					46.17	44.57
Observations	1,570	1,407	1,423	1,602	1,602	927
Mean Dep. Var.	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.105	0.110

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North in years 1960 and 1964. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent reports that supporting civil rights is among the most important issues facing the country at the time of the interview (see online appendix D for exact wording and additional details on the construction of the variable). The regressor of interest in column 2 (resp. column 3) is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is against the integration of schools (resp. of working environment and housing). Pro-segregation in column 1 is a dummy if the respondent is either against school integration or against working-housing integration. *Change Black share* (columns 4 to 6) is the change in the Black share at the state level between 1940 and 1960. Column 4 reports OLS estimates, while columns 5 and 6 present 2SLS estimates, instrumenting the change in the Black share with the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 state population. All regressions include survey year fixed effects and individual controls of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects and marital status). Columns 1 to 3 control for state fixed effects, while columns 4 to 6 control for region fixed effects and 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). Column 6 restricts the sample to respondents who were born in the same state where they lived at the time of the interview. The bottom row reports the average of the dependent variable. F-stat in columns 5 and 6 is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Panel B reports the first stage. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.


Table 6. Changes in Legislators' Ideology

Dep. Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower Values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: OLS</i>						
Change Black Share	0.008 (0.014)	-0.140*** (0.036)	0.049** (0.020)	0.001 (0.015)	-0.150*** (0.041)	0.044** (0.022)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.055 (0.042)	-0.307** (0.121)	0.047 (0.059)	-0.058 (0.043)	-0.345*** (0.130)	0.059 (0.063)
<i>Panel C: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.472*** (0.441)	1.006*** (0.379)	1.809*** (0.555)	1.455*** (0.445)	1.002*** (0.378)	1.783*** (0.562)
F-Stat	11.14	7.068	10.60	10.71	7.038	10.08
Observations	571	286	285	571	286	285
Congress Period	78-82; 82-88	78-82	82-88	78-82; 82-88	78-82	82-88

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – “Agnostic” scores in columns 1 to 3, and “Constrained” scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress period 78-82 and 82-88). Panel A reports OLS results and Panel B reports 2SLS results, while Panels C presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.


A Additional Figures and Tables - Online Appendix

Figure A.1. Black Emigration Rates from the South, by Decade




Notes: The figure plots the Black emigration rate from the US South for each decade. *Source:* Adapted from Boustan (2016).

Figure A.2. Northern Legislators Support for Civil Rights Bills, by Party




Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of Congress in the non-South US voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between the 78th and the 88th Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills voted upon in Congress between the 78th and the 88th Congress are listed in Table A.2.

Figure A.3. Overall Support for Civil Rights Bills, by Party




Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of US Congress voting in favor of bills in support of civil rights between the 78th and the 88th Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each Congress period separately. The 9 bills voted upon between the 78th and the 88th Congress are listed in Table A.2.

Figure A.4. Discharge Petitions on Civil Rights Signed by Northern Legislators




Notes: Blue (resp. red) bars plot the share of Democrat (resp. Republican) members of Congress in the non-South US signing discharge petitions in favor of civil rights bills between the 78th and the 88th Congresses. The first two bars refer to the average between the 78-82 and the 83-88 periods, while the remaining bars display results for each of the two Congress periods separately.

Figure A.5. Black Share in 1940




Notes: The map plots the 1940 share of Black Americans (divided by county population) for the non-southern counties in our sample.

Figure A.6. Black Share in Northern Counties, 1940 vs 1970



Notes: Black share of the population for selected non-southern counties in 1940 (light blue) and in 1970 (Black). *Source:* Authors' calculation from IPUMS data.

Figure A.7. Share of Southern Born Black migrants in Northern Counties, 1940



Notes: Share of African Americans born in selected southern states living in non-southern counties in 1940.
Source: Authors' calculation from IPUMS data.

Table A.1. List of Southern States

Alabama	North Carolina
Arkansas	Oklahoma
Florida	South Carolina
Georgia	Tennessee
Kentucky	Texas
Louisiana	Virginia
Mississippi	West Virginia

Notes: The table presents the list of southern states considered in our analysis. We follow the Census definition except for Delaware and Maryland: as Boustan (2010) we assign these to the North, as they were net recipient of Black migrants during this period.

Table A.2. Civil Rights Bills Voted in the House, 1943-1964

Congress	Year	Bill Number	Northern Democrats Voting Yes	Northern Republicans Voting Yes
78	1943	HR-7	0.830	0.795
79	1945	HR-7	0.842	0.697
80	1947	HR-29	0.913	0.982
81	1949	HR-3199	0.942	0.696
81	1950	HR-4453	0.790	0.720
84	1956	HR-627	0.914	0.875
85	1957	HR-6127	0.927	0.843
86	1960	HR-8601	0.843	0.813
88	1964	HR-7152	0.918	0.817

Notes: The table lists the bills voted upon in the House of Representatives between Congress 78 and Congress 88. The last two columns report the share of northern Democrats (resp. Republicans) who voted in favor of each bill relative to all northern Democrats (resp. Republicans).

Table A.3. Discharge Petitions, by Party

	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
<i>Panel A: Congress period: 78th – 82nd</i>						
Share Democrats	0.564	0.552	0.500	0.138	-	0.422
Share Republicans	0.304	0.239	0.132	0.024	-	0.147
<i>Panel B. Congress period: 83rd – 88th</i>						
Share Democrats	-	-	0.632	-	0.677	0.651
Share Republicans	-	-	0.043	-	0.175	0.154

Notes: The table presents the share of Democrats and Republicans signing discharge petitions on each topic reported in the top row for the 78-82 (resp. 83-88) Congresses in Panel A (resp. Panel B). When no discharge petition of a given type was filed in a congress period, the corresponding entry is left missing. Table A.4 reports additional summary statistics for signatures on discharge petitions. See Table C.1 for the complete list of discharge petitions (by date and by topic). *Source:* authors' calculation from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

Table A.4. Discharge Petitions: Summary Statistics

<i>Panel A: Discharge Petitions by Issue - Congress Period</i>						
	Poll Tax	Lynching	FECP	Housing	Civil Rights Act	Total
78 th to 82 nd	4	3	5	2	0	14
83 rd to 88 th	0	0	2	1	5	8
<i>Panel B: Discharge Petitions by Legislator – Summary Statistics</i>						
	Mean	Median	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs.
78 th to 82 nd	0.772	0.600	0.553	0	2.333	298
83 rd to 88 th	0.441	0.385	0.298	0	1.286	298

Notes: Panel A presents the number of discharge petitions filed in the two Congress periods (78-82 and 83-88) by type. Panel B reports the summary statistics for the number of petitions signed per legislator for the Congressional Districts in our sample, in either Congress period.

Table A.5. Placebo: Black in-Migration and White Movers (ANES)

Dep. Variable	1[Mover]			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A. 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	-0.003 (0.018)	0.002 (0.022)	-0.023 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.020)
<i>Panel B. First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	2.305*** (0.351)	2.180*** (0.321)	2.280*** (0.345)	2.262*** (0.336)
F-Stat	43.20	46.22	43.57	45.20
Observations	3,911	1,598	1,562	1,307
Sample	all	MIP sample	democrats	republicans
Mean Dep. Variable	0.429	0.436	0.446	0.403

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North during the survey waves 1956 to 1964. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is living in a state different from his/her state of birth. Column 2 restricts attention to respondents in the sample of Table 5, while columns 3 and 4 consider self-identified Democrats and Republicans respectively. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include region fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Panel B reports the first stage. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.6. Whites' Voting Behavior and Party Identification (ANES)

Dep. Variable	1[Vote Democratic]			1[Identify Democratic]		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	0.029*** (0.006)	0.038*** (0.007)	0.056** (0.028)	0.028*** (0.007)	0.030* (0.016)	0.048*** (0.011)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	2.317*** (0.374)	2.383*** (0.388)	2.041*** (0.278)	2.282*** (0.358)	2.382*** (0.378)	2.047*** (0.277)
F-Stat	38.47	37.81	54.01	40.56	39.62	54.47
Observations	3,207	1,648	695	4,699	2,296	1,035
Sample	all	non-movers	1964	all	non-movers	1964
Mean Dep. Variable	.488	.489	.593	.412	.398	.441

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North for ANES survey waves 1956 to 1964. In columns 1 to 3 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent voted (resp. intended to vote) for the Democratic Party in the previous (resp. upcoming) Congressional election. In columns 4 to 6 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent identified with the Democratic Party. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include survey year and region fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). Columns 2 and 5 restrict the sample to respondents who did not migrate across states during their life (as of the year of the interview). Columns 3 and 6 focus on survey wave 1964. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Panel B reports the first stage. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.7. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics - Social and Cultural Forces

Dep. Variable	Change Pr.(Civil Rights Demonstration)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A: Socially progressive counties</i>					
Change Black Share	0.240** (0.106)	0.088*** (0.033)	0.097** (0.043)	0.048 (0.030)	0.148* (0.083)
F-Stat	6.48	4.43	4.29	4.05	2.70
Observations	1,683	2,089	1,709	1,699	1,701
<i>Panel B: Socially conservative counties</i>					
Change Black Share	0.039** (0.016)	0.025** (0.010)	0.011 (0.029)	-0.017 (0.020)	0.005 (0.024)
F-stat	10.42	8.634	7.531	4.926	13.68
Observations	1,680	1,329	1,709	1,703	1,701
Proxy	discrimination index	miscegenation laws	immigrant share	young whites	southern born whites

Notes: Socially progressive (resp. conservative) counties are defined as those with: the discrimination index from Qian and Tabellini (2020) below (resp. above) the median in column 1, miscegenation laws not in place (resp. in place) in column 2, immigrant share of the population above (resp. below) the median in columns 3, share of the white population of age 35 or less above (resp. below) the median in column 4, share of whites born in a southern state below (resp. above) the median in column 5. The table reports 2SLS results replicating the baseline specification (with interactions between period dummies and: i) 1940 Black share; ii) 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy; iii) state fixed effects. All regressions are weighed by 1940 population. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.8. Heterogeneity by County Characteristics - Economic and Political Forces

Dep. Variable	Change Pr.(Civil Rights Demonstration)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Panel A: Above median</i>					
Change Black Share	0.095** (0.039)	0.063*** (0.024)	0.070*** (0.026)	0.057*** (0.015)	0.071*** (0.012)
F-Stat	15.99	9.97	8.67	18.33	24.49
Observations	1,695	1,699	1,700	1,703	1,720
<i>Panel B: Below median</i>					
Change Black Share	0.004 (0.039)	-0.025 (0.021)	-0.022 (0.026)	0.038*** (0.013)	-0.009 (0.040)
F-Stat	11.75	6.89	7.61	6.74	3.66
Observations	1,696	1,703	1,702	1,715	1,694
1940 Characteristic	predicted economic growth	share in manufacturing	share unskilled	share CIO workers	political competition

Notes: Political competition in column 1 is defined as (one minus) the absolute value of the margin of victory in 1940 Congressional elections. Predicted economic growth in column 6 is constructed by interacting the 1940 industry shares in a county with the national growth in that industry over each of the subsequent three decades (and then summed across industries). The employment share in manufacturing and the share of unskilled workers refer to white men in working age (15-64). The table reports 2SLS results replicating the baseline specification (with interactions between period dummies and: i) 1940 Black share; ii) 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy; iii) state fixed effects. All regressions are weighed by 1940 population. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.9. Change in Signatures of Discharge Petitions

Dep. Variable	Change in Signatures on Discharge Petitions per Legislator (1940s)			
	Total (1)	FEPC (2)	Anti-Lynching (3)	Poll-Tax (4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	1.011** (0.417)	0.648** (0.294)	0.197 (0.133)	0.168* (0.101)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.940*** (0.350)	0.940*** (0.349)	0.940*** (0.350)	0.940*** (0.350)
F-stat	7.218	7.243	7.218	7.218
Observations	294	293	294	294
Baseline Mean	1.742	0.357	0.338	1.046
Dep. Variable				

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in number of signatures on discharge petition per legislator between the beginning and the end of the 1940 decade (see the main text for more details). Column 1 considers all discharge petitions, while columns 2 to 4 focus on employment protection legislation (FEPC), Anti-Lynching legislation, and Poll Tax discharge petitions respectively. Data on discharge petitions were kindly shared by Kathryn Pearson and Eric Schickler (see also Pearson and Schickler, 2009). Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, include state fixed effects, and control for: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.10. Heterogeneous Effects on Legislators' Ideology

Dep. Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology		Change in Ideology Indicator of Elected Congress Members			
	Agnostic Score (1)	Constrained Score (2)	Liberal Democrat (3)	Moderate Democrat (4)	Moderate Republican (5)	Conservative Republican (6)
Change Black Share	-0.095* (0.050)	-0.096* (0.050)	0.081** (0.039)	-0.078 (0.053)	-0.025 (0.031)	0.026 (0.035)
Change Black Share*DR	-0.011 (0.033)	-0.014 (0.033)				
Change Black Share*RR	0.058** (0.025)	0.056** (0.025)				
Change Black Share*RD	-0.072* (0.038)	-0.071* (0.036)				
F-stat (Main)	5.98	6.02	11.14	11.14	11.14	11.14
F-stat (DR)	7.13	7.02				
F-stat (RR)	13.35	13.67				
F-stat (RD)	14.68	16.14				
Observations	567	567	571	571	571	571

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology score from Bateman et al. (2017) in columns 1 and 2, and the change in the ideology indicator of the Congress member in office in columns 3 to 6. The ideology indicators are defined as: i) liberal (resp. moderate) Democrat if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Democratic Party members in the 78th Congress; ii) moderate (resp. conservative) Republican if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Republican Party members in the 78th Congress. Columns 1 and 2 present 2SLS results where the change in the Black share is interacted with dummies for a party transition during the Congress period. The omitted category is that of districts remaining Democratic throughout the period. F-stats in columns 1 and 2 refer to the Angrist and Pischke F-stat for weak instruments in each first stage, and to the K-P F-stat for weak instruments in columns 3 to 6. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.11. Black in-Migration and Political Polarization

Dep. Variable	Change in Ideology Indicator of Elected Congress Members			
	Liberal Democrat (1)	Moderate Democrat (2)	Moderate Republican (3)	Conservative Republican (4)
<i>Panel A: 78-82 congresses</i>				
Change Black Share	0.331** (0.135)	-0.306* (0.181)	0.165 (0.136)	-0.177** (0.082)
F-Stat	7.068	7.068	7.068	7.068
Observations	286	286	286	286
<i>Panel B: 82-88 congresses</i>				
Change Black Share	-0.020 (0.042)	0.013 (0.056)	-0.101* (0.057)	0.108** (0.046)
F-Stat	10.60	10.60	10.60	10.60
Observations	285	285	285	285

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the ideology indicator of the Congress member in office. The ideology indicators are defined as: i) liberal (resp. moderate) Democrat if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Democratic Party members in the 78th Congress; ii) moderate (resp. conservative) Republican if the legislator's score was below (resp. above) the median score of the Republican Party members in the 78th Congress. Panel A refers to Congress period 78-82; Panel B refers to Congress period 82-88. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Additional Material (Not for publication)

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B Matching Counties to Time-Invariant Congressional Districts

When studying the effects of Black inflows on the behavior of northern legislators, we face two main difficulties. First, while the African American population and other demographic variables are measured at the county level, legislators' behavior is available at the CD level. Second, the boundaries of CDs change over time due to redistricting. We overcome both challenges by first matching counties to CDs, and then by constructing a time-invariant cross-walk to map CDs that get redistricted over time to their baseline geography.


B.1 County-CD Crosswalk

To overcome the first problem, and to assign to each CD the corresponding “Black in-migration shock” we perform a spatial merge of 1940 county maps with CDs, following the procedure used in Feigenbaum and Hall (2015).³⁷ Since there is no one-to-one mapping between counties and CDs, two cases can arise. First, some CDs are wholly contained within a single county; in this case, we directly assign county level variables to CDs, assuming that the effect of Black in-migration is uniform within the county. Second, some CDs straddle county boundaries. In such cases, we assign county level values to the CD, weighting them by a county's area share of the CD.³⁸ Figure B.1 displays the county (gray lines) to CD (Black lines) mapping just described for the 78th Congress, restricting attention to non-southern states.

³⁷The only difference with their procedure is that we use counties rather than CZs.

³⁸Following Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), we test the robustness of our results using other weights, such as maximum area.

Figure B.1. CD-County Map



Notes: The figure presents a map of counties (gray lines) and Congressional Districts (Black lines) for the non-South US during the 78th Congress.

B.2 Time Invariant CD Crosswalk

Until the early 1960s, there was no pre-determined rule mandating states to redraw CD boundaries after each decennial Census. Moreover, especially in the North, gerrymandering was substantially less common than it is today (Snyder and Ansolabehere, 2008). Between 1900 and 1964, despite major demographic shifts induced by international and internal migration (Boustan et al., 2018), redistricting across non-southern districts was typically non-strategic (Engstrom, 2013). If anything, the lack of systematic redistricting rules likely introduced a pro-rural bias: more densely populated areas (i.e. urban areas) grew gradually under-represented at the CD level, likely diluting the effects of Black inflows, which were concentrated in urban centers (see Figure 1 in the main text).³⁹ However, even during the 1940-1965 period, the boundaries of many CDs were changed, often multiple times. To overcome this empirical challenge, we develop a procedure that allows us to match all CDs between 1930 and 1970 to a

³⁹This observation suggests that our analysis should identify a lower bound for the effects of Black inflows on legislators' (pro-civil rights) behavior.

baseline Congress.⁴⁰

We define the 78th Congress (January 6, 1943 to December 19, 1944) as our baseline Congress year for two main reasons. First, although the 76th Congress might have been a more natural choice (as it corresponds to the 1940 Census year), several CDs underwent redistricting between this Congress year and the 78th Congress. In contrast, very few states redistricted between the 78th and the 82nd Congress. Second, Congress 78th is the earliest Congress for which CD-level population estimates are available from Adler (2003), thus allowing us to benchmark the population figures estimated in our procedure with other measures. We thus rely on Congress 78 as our baseline year, and consider the following two Congress periods: 78 to 82, which we match to the 1940 to 1950 Census decade; and, 83 to 88, which we match to the 1950 to 1960 year.⁴¹ We perform a number of robustness checks to show that our results do not depend on the choice of the baseline Congress year, and that they are qualitatively similar when restricting the sample to CDs that did not undergo redistricting over the 78 to 82 Congress period.

Using this timing convention, for every Congress between 71 and 91, we perform a spatial merge between CD maps and the map corresponding to the 78th Congress. Then, political outcomes (e.g. ideology scores, number of discharge petitions signed by legislators, etc.) are collapsed to the 78th Congress using a weighting procedure similar to that adopted when matching counties to CDs. The logic of our strategy is simple: we fix the 1944 (i.e. the 78th Congress) geography of CDs, and we link them to CDs that represented the same geographic area in subsequent (or previous) Congress years.⁴² Then, we calculate a weighted average of political outcomes that correspond to the area originally represented by CDs according to the 1944 map.

To illustrate this procedure, we ask how the 78th Congress would have looked like, had its geography persisted until Congress 86. We now explain how we proceed to collapse the political outcomes corresponding to the geography of Congress 86 “back” to that of Congress 78. Suppose that the area represented by a single CD in Congress 78 gets split in two separate CDs by Congress 86. To assign political variables of new CDs back to the level of the original CD, we adopt a weighting procedure, based on

⁴⁰While our analysis focuses on years after 1940, we also construct the cross-walk for the pre-1940 decade in order to perform several robustness and falsification checks.

⁴¹The reason to consider the 88th Congress in the second decade is that this was the Congress that approved the CRA.

⁴²When states have more than one district, we drop at-large Congressional seats from the spatial merge (e.g. at-large seats for the state of New York are dropped between 1933 and 1945).

weights constructed in four steps. First, we overlay the map of the initial CD to that of the two CDs in Congress 86, and divide the area in cells derived by this spatial merge. Second, we assign the 1940 county population to each cell in proportion to the area share of the cell that is included in the county. Third, we sum over all cells that compose the CD to obtain an estimate of CD population as of Congress 78. Finally, we divide the area of each cell by such estimated CD population.

Political variables corresponding to the geography of the 78th Congress for subsequent Congress years are computed by taking the weighted average of the outcomes of the newly formed CDs, using the weights constructed as explained above. In Appendix D, we validate the accuracy of this approach by replicating our (baseline) county-level results for the Democratic vote share using CD level data from Swift et al. (2000). Reassuringly, when conducting the analysis at the CD level, results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in the main text (see Table 2).

C Data Appendix

In what follows we first provide additional details about the data used in the paper (Appendix C.1), and then describe the survey data from the ANES and Gallup (Appendix C.2).

C.1 Additional Details

Black in-migration and demographic variables. Data on Black and total population as well as on other demographic variables for non-southern counties come from the County Databooks, from Haines et al. (2010), and from the 1940 full count Census of Population (Ruggles et al., 2015). We also collected data on Black migration rates from Gardner and Cohen (1992) and Bowles et al. (1990) for 1940-1950 and for 1950 to 1970 respectively.

Electoral outcomes. As discussed in the main text, we focus on the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections. This choice is motivated by the fact that, since the New Deal, Democrats had become the pro-Black party outside the US South (Caughey et al., 2020; Moon, 1948). Such racial realignment was more likely to emerge in Congressional than in nation-wide Presidential elections (Schickler, 2016).⁴³ In addition to the Democratic vote share, we also consider voter turnout, defined as the share of votes cast in the election over the total number of eligible voters in the county. Moreover, in Appendix E below, we provide additional results for Presidential elections. Data are taken from Clubb et al. (1990). Since Census data are available at the decennial level, and because Congressional elections are held every two years, we focus on electoral returns for exact Census years from 1940 to 1970. When considering Presidential elections, before taking the first difference with the baseline election decade, we assign the 1948 (resp. 1968) elections to Census year 1950 (resp. 1970).⁴⁴

Local support for civil rights. We obtain measures of local support for the civil rights movement from two sources. First, we use the dataset assembled by Gregory and Hermida (2019) combining a variety of sources that includes the number of non-violent demonstrations organized between 1942 and 1970 by the CORE – an inter-racial group of students from the University of Chicago that coordinated sit-ins and similar forms of civil disobedience mainly across northern cities to protest against segregation in the

⁴³See also the discussion conducted in Section 2.2 of the paper.

⁴⁴Results remain similar when using different timing conventions.

South. Second, we collect data on the presence of NAACP chapters from Gregory and Estrada (2019). These data are available only for the early 1940s and the early 1960s. For both CORE and NAACP datasets, we match the geographic coordinates of an event or of a NAACP chapter to the centroid of each county in our sample.

Whites’ attitudes. We collect data on whites’ racial attitudes and stance on civil rights from two, nationally representative surveys: the ANES and Gallup. Both are cross-sectional datasets that report individuals’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics as well as their political ideology. Starting from the mid to late 1950s, both surveys began to elicit respondents’ views on racial equality and their support for civil rights. Even though neither dataset includes a county or city identifier, they both report respondents’ state of residence, allowing us to correlate the change in the Black share at the state level with attitudes of white respondents interviewed between the late 1950s and the mid-1960s (when the CRA was passed).⁴⁵ See Appendix C.2 below for more details.

Legislators’ ideology. As explained in the main text, we measure the ideology of northern legislators on civil rights using the scores constructed by Bateman et al. (2017). As for the commonly used DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal, 1985), legislators are assigned a score that is a function of their past voting behavior and takes more negative (resp. positive) values for more liberal (resp. conservative) positions. We rely on the Bateman et al. (2017) scores for two reasons. First, they are calculated by restricting attention solely to civil rights bills, as classified by Katznelson and Lapinski (2006). Second, they allow the policy content to be Congress specific and to vary over time. Bateman et al. (2017) develop two versions of the scores – one that assumes that the ideal points of legislators remain constant over time, and one that instead does not make such assumption. As shown in the paper, all results are robust to using either of the two versions.

Signatures on discharge petitions. During the historical period considered in our analysis, the prevailing seniority system gave southern committee chairs substantial control over the type of bills that were discussed in the House. In particular, since southern Democrats controlled key committees, such as the Rules Committee, they could block any proposed civil rights-related bill (Schickler, 2016). In most cases, civil rights bills reached the floor and were voted in the House only when a discharge petition

⁴⁵Since a more comprehensive set of questions on racial attitudes was asked in the ANES relative to Gallup, we focus most of our analysis on the former, using the latter to validate results. The restricted use version of the ANES includes county of residence of respondents from 1978 onwards.

was successful at collecting at least 218 signatures. A discharge petition can be filed if a bill or a resolution has remained stuck in the Rules Committee for at least seven days or in a legislative committee for at least twenty days. Once a petition is filed, it moves to the floor, where it can be voted on, if it is signed by at least 218 Congress members (Beth et al., 2003). We rely on the dataset assembled by Pearson and Schickler (2009), who were able to locate the names of legislators who signed any discharge petition between the 71st and the 94th Congress.⁴⁶ Following the definition used in Pearson and Schickler (2009) and Schickler (2016), we restrict attention to discharge petitions relating to racial issues filed between Congress 78 and Congress 88, and use signatures on such petitions as a proxy for a legislator’s involvement with (and support for) civil rights. Table C.1 reports the list of discharge petitions on civil rights from Pearson and Schickler (2009) filed between Congress 73 and Congress 91, by Congress and topic. The last column presents the number of signatures on the corresponding petition.

⁴⁶Except for this recently assembled dataset, the names of congressmen who sign the discharge petitions are made public only when the petition is able to collect at least 218 signatures. We thank the authors for kindly agreeing to share their data with us.

Table C.1. Discharge Petitions by Type and Date

Congress	Number	Topic	Total Signatures
73	14	House Restaurant Desegregation	145
74	32	Lynching	218
75	1	Lynching	75
75	5	Lynching	218
76	10	Lynching	218
76	12	Lynching	59
76	34	Poll Tax	49
77	1	Poll Tax	218
77	3	Lynching	59
77	4	Poll Tax	31
77	15	Lynching	29
78	1	Poll Tax	10
78	3	Poll Tax	219
78	5	Lynching	82
78	18	FEPC	41
79	1	Poll Tax	218
79	3	Lynching	150
79	4	FEPC	187
79	24	Public Accommodation	6
80	2	Poll Tax	41
80	9	Lynching	80
81	7	Housing Discrimination	24
81	20	FEPC	110
81	21	FEPC	100
82	6	FEPC	16
83	4	Public Accommodation	71
83	5	FEPC	72
84	5	Civil Rights Act	148
85	1	Civil Rights Act	105
85	6	Civil Rights Act	3
86	3	Civil Rights Act	214
88	2	Anti-Discrimination	4
88	5	Civil Rights Act	174
91	11	Fair Employment	136

Notes: The table reports the list of all pro-civil rights discharge petitions filed between Congresses 73 and 91. Source: adapted from Pearson and Schickler (2009).

C.2 Survey Data

C.2.1 The American National Election Studies (ANES)

The American National Election Studies (ANES) is a cross-sectional, nationally representative survey conducted since 1948 by the University of Michigan every two or four years depending on the waves. As noted in Gentzkow (2016), the ANES is considered the “gold standard” when it comes to measure political ideology and cultural or social attitudes of Americans in the second part of the twentieth century. The ANES asks questions on demographics, party affiliation, political attitudes, and ideology. Moreover, and crucially for our purposes, since the mid-late 1950s, respondents are asked about their views on civil rights legislation and racial equality and, in some instances, about their attitudes towards integration.⁴⁷

In each wave, between 1,500 and 2,000 respondents were interviewed. Restricting the sample to whites living in non-southern states leaves us with an average of roughly 1,000 individuals for whom we can consistently include the following controls: marital status, gender, and fixed effects for education and age.⁴⁸ In principle, additional characteristics, such as union status, party affiliation and identification, and state of birth, are available. Since these may be endogenous to Black migration, however, we do not control for them in our baseline specification. Most of our analysis uses data from the surveys of 1960 and 1964, but, in a few cases, we were able to obtain data also from other years. Before 1978, the ANES never reported the county, but only the state, of residence of respondents. For this reason, our analysis is conducted at the state level.

Table C.2 presents the questions considered to measure racial attitudes and views towards civil rights. The first column presents the name of the variable; the second one includes the exact wording of the question; and the last column lists the years for which the question was available. The first variable listed, “Most Important Problem” refers to an open-ended question in which respondents were asked what they considered (up to) the three most important problems for the US in the year of the survey. From such open-ended question the ANES created one specific category that includes racial and public order related issues. For 1960 and 1964, the ANES coded respondents’ answers in categories that reflected their attitudes towards civil rights and integration.⁴⁹ We

⁴⁷More details on ANES sampling methodology and data are available at <http://www.electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/nes012492.pdf>

⁴⁸We create dummies for: high school dropouts; high school graduates; having at least some college; having at least a college degree.

⁴⁹Unfortunately, for other years, it was not possible to tell whether the respondent identified civil rights as

use the ANES pre-classified category “Pro integration - anti discrimination in schools, employment, etc.” to create a dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that promoting integration in schools, employment, etc. is one of the top three problems facing the country in that survey year. This is the variable *1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]* considered in Table 5 in the main text.

Table 5 verifies that the variable *1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]* is negatively correlated with opposition to school and housing or work integration. Again for 1960 and 1964, from the ANES survey, we created dummies (reported in the second and third row of Table C.2) equal to one if the respondent, respectively, agreed that the federal government should not intervene to promote racial integration in schools and disagreed with the idea that the government should promote racial integration in housing and labor markets.

As discussed in the main text, we exploit ANES questions concerning political preferences in surveys in years between 1956 and 1964. In particular, individuals were asked to indicate the party they had voted (resp. intended to vote) in the previous (resp. upcoming) elections. From this variable, we create a dummy equal to one if respondents answered that they voted or intended to vote for the Democratic Party (*Vote Democratic*). Similarly, the ANES asked respondents whether they identified with either the Democratic or the Republican Party. As for voting behavior, we create a dummy equal to one if respondents identified themselves with the Democratic Party (*Identify Democratic*). We use these outcomes in the analysis reported in Table A.6.

Finally, for 1964 only, ANES respondents were asked about their feeling thermometers towards different political and socio-demographic groups, including the Democratic Party, labor unions, Blacks and the NAACP. Thermometer values are such that higher values refer to warmer feelings towards members of the group.⁵⁰ We use the answers given by respondents in Appendix Table E.5.

C.2.2 Gallup

We validate the results obtained using the ANES with Gallup, which elicited respondents’ views about salient political and social issues since 1935.⁵¹ As for the ANES,

something to promote or instead as an issue that was undesirable to her.

⁵⁰The ANES asked respondents about their feeling thermometers towards the two parties also in years other than 1964. However, since we are interested in studying whites’ racial attitudes, we limit our analysis to 1964, i.e. the only year for which both political and racial groups or organizations were included.

⁵¹See also <https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/featured-collections/gallup-data-collection>.

also Gallup is a repeated cross-sectional dataset from which individual level characteristics are available.⁵² Starting from the mid-1950s, Gallup asked questions about racial attitudes. As discussed extensively in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), Gallup data have been only recently made available due to the efforts of the Roper Center, which digitized hundreds of historical surveys.⁵³ As for the ANES, we restricted attention to white respondents living in non-southern states in years before 1965. In practice, so as to keep the sample consistent across questions, we focused on years 1963 and 1964, when different questions, comparable to those from the ANES, were asked. We report the wording and the survey years for which these two questions are available in Panel B of Table C.2.

Starting from the top of Panel B, Gallup respondents who had at least one child in school were asked whether they would object to send their kids to a school with few, half, and more than half Black pupils. Parents who responded that they would not object to sending their kids to a school with few Black students were subsequently asked if they would object to a situation with half Black pupils in the school. If they had no objections to such question, they were asked about a situation in which the school was more than half Black. Most parents (90%) did not object to send their kids to schools with only a few Black pupils. Instead, more heterogeneity existed when parents were asked about a situation in which half or more than half of the school were racially mixed. Specifically, 30% of parents who did not object to send a kid to a school that had few Black pupils were against sending their kid to a school where half of the pupils were Black. Of those that did not object to send their kid to a school where half of the pupils were Black 38% were against a situation in which more than half of the pupils in the school were Black.

Given these patterns, we decided to focus on the answer to the scenario in which half of the pupils in the school were Black. In our view, and consistent with existing evidence (Sugrue, 2008, 2014), racial mixing was not perceived as a threat when (school or neighborhood) integration entailed only a limited number of Black migrants. Instead, racial animosity and whites' backlash was more likely to emerge as the share of Black Americans in the local (white) community increased. The variable *1[Object to Half Black Pupils in School]* at the top of column 1 in Table E.3 is thus a dummy equal to

⁵²With the exception of union membership, marital status, and state of birth, all individual characteristics available in the ANES (see Appendix C.2.1) are available for Gallup as well.

⁵³More information about Roper Center data can be found here: <https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/>. We thank Kathleen Joyce Weldon for invaluable help in the data collection and data cleaning process.

1 if parents did object to sending their kids to a school with at least half of students being Black.⁵⁴

The second question used in our analysis is meant to capture whites respondents' acceptance of racial diversity in politics. Specifically, as in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), we consider whether respondents would vote for a Black candidate had their party nominated the individual for the Presidential race (see second row in Panel B of Table C.2).⁵⁵ In column 2 of Table E.3, we create a dummy equal to one if respondents answered that they would vote for a Black candidate, $1[Vote\ for\ Black\ Candidate]$.⁵⁶

In 1964, given the prominence of the issue, Gallup questionnaires included a question about the Civil Rights Act (CRA). Among the about 1,000 respondents, approximately 70% of them did approve the law just passed by Congress. We create a dummy equal to one if a respondent supported the CRA (*Approve Civil Rights Act* in Panel B of Table C.2). This variable is considered as outcome in column 3 of Table E.3.

Finally, we consider a question that elicits respondents' view on how the Kennedy Administration was handling the process of racial integration. Specifically, we create a dummy equal to one if an individual stated that in her view, racial integration was proceeding "at the right pace or not fast enough" (see the last row in Table C.2, Panel B). This variable is used as outcome in column 4 of Table E.3.⁵⁷

⁵⁴The sample size is relatively small – 851 respondents – since only parents with kids in school were asked this question.

⁵⁵In 1963 this question was asked to around 2,000 respondents.

⁵⁶Kuziemko and Washington (2018) investigate whites' respondents to this question also for years after 1965. Instead, in order not to confound our results with potential whites' backlash we stop in 1963 – the last year before the passage of the CRA.

⁵⁷As it appears from Table E.3, this question is available for a significantly larger number of respondents (more than 17,000) relative to all other questions. This is because the question was asked repeatedly in 1963.

Table C.2. Questions from Survey Data

Variable Name	Wording	Years
	Panel A. ANES	
Most Important Problem	What would you personally feel are the most important problems the government should try to take care of when the new president and congress take office in January. (Do you think of any other problems important to you)	1960 and 1964
Against School Integration	The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and [Black] children go to the same school.	1960 and 1964
Against Work and Residential Integration	If [Blacks] are not getting fair treatment in jobs and housing, the government should see to it that they do.	1960 and 1964
Vote Democratic	1 if voted/intend to vote for the Democratic Party in the last/upcoming Presidential Elections	1956-1964
Party Identification	Was there ever a time when you thought of yourself as a Democrat or a Republican?	1956-1964
Feeling Thermometer Towards [Group]	There are many groups in America that try to get the government of the American people to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these groups... Where would you put (group) on the thermometer?	1964
	Panel B. Gallup	
Object to Half Black Pupils in School	Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where half of the children are [Black]	1963
Black Candidate	There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a [Black] would you vote for him	1963
Approve Civil Rights Act	As you know, a civil rights law was recently passed by Congress and signed by the President. In general, do you approve or disapprove this law?	1964
Racial Integration at the Right Pace/Not Fast Enough	Do you think the Kennedy Administration is pushing racial integration too fast or not fast enough?	1963

Notes: Panel A (resp. B) lists variables and questions taken from the ANES (Gallup). The wording reported for variables *Most Important Problem*, *Against School Integration*, and *Against Work and Residential Integration* in Panel A is taken from the 1960 survey, but remains almost identical in all other years considered.

D Robustness Checks

In this section we present a variety of robustness checks. We start by providing evidence that Black in-migration did not systematically trigger white out-migration in the counties in our sample. We also document that there was no change either in the characteristics of white residents or in their labor market outcomes. Next, we show that the instrument is uncorrelated with county-specific “pull factors” that might have influenced pre-1940 Black settlements, and verify that results are unchanged when interacting period dummies with a variety of 1940 county characteristics. Then, we document that our findings are not driven either by pre-existing trends or by the simultaneous inflow of southern born white migrants. We also show that results are robust to omitting potential outliers, considering alternative proxies for support for the Democratic Party, and estimating different specifications. In addition, we construct an alternative version of the instrument that predicts Black out-migration from each southern state exploiting only variation across local push factors. Finally, we document that CD-level results: *i*) are robust to using different timing conventions to map Black inflows to Congress periods; *ii*) are not influenced by pre-existing trends; and, *iii*) are unlikely to be driven by strategic gerrymandering.

D.1 Addressing White Flight

As discussed in the main text, a potential concern with our findings is that Black in-migration triggered white flight among northern residents (Boustan, 2010). This scenario would be problematic because our estimates would conflate the causal effect of the Great Migration with compositional changes in the county electorate due to whites’ out-migration. In what follows, we provide different pieces of evidence that, in our sample, the Great Migration was not associated with white departures at the county level.

We begin by replicating the analysis conducted in the main text by focusing on a larger geographic unit, the commuting zone (CZ), which contained both central cities and the neighboring suburbs.⁵⁸ Table D.1 replicates Table 2, documenting that the effects of the Great Migration on the Democratic vote share remain statistically

⁵⁸As discussed also in the main text, CZs have become the standard measure of “labor markets” in the US since the work by Autor and Dorn (2013). CZs were developed by Tolbert and Sizer (1996) using commuting patterns to create clusters of counties characterized by strong commuting ties within CZs and weak commuting ties across CZs.

significant and become, if anything, larger in magnitude.⁵⁹ In Table D.2, we conduct a similar exercise for CORE demonstrations. Also in this case, 2SLS coefficients remain statistically significant and quantitatively close to – in fact somewhat larger than – those reported in the county-level specification of Table 3. Tables D.1 and D.2 suggest that our main results are unlikely to be driven by white out-migration systematically triggered by Black in-migration.

Next, to more directly inspect the presence of white flight, we replicate the analysis conducted in Boustan (2010) for the counties in our sample. We regress the decadal change in white population against the corresponding change in Black population. We consider the number of white and Black residents both to make our analysis directly comparable to that in Boustan (2010) and because this is the most appropriate specification to examine the migration response of northern residents (see also Peri and Sparber, 2011, and Shertzer and Walsh, 2019). We report 2SLS results in Panel A of Table D.3, presenting the associated first stage in Panel B.

We start from a parsimonious specification, which only includes interactions between state and period dummies (column 1). Panel B verifies that the instrument is strong, and the F-stat is well above conventional levels.⁶⁰ Turning to Panel A, 2SLS coefficients are positive, quantitatively small, and imprecisely estimated. In column 2, we include the same set of controls as in our preferred specification (see Section 5.1 in the paper). Also in this case, Black in-migration is associated with a small, positive, and imprecisely estimated effect on white population.

The bottom rows of Table D.3 report the average 1940 white population and the average change in Black and white population during the period for the counties in our sample. The coefficient in column 2 (Panel A) implies that 1,000 more Black residents in a county – or, half of the average change in Black population over the period – were associated with around 300 more white residents. Considering that, on average, the 1940 white population was 71,000, this represents a negligible change (0.4% relative to the baseline white population). Columns 3 and 4 show that results are robust to including only counties with baseline urban share of the population above the sample median (0.356), and to interacting the 1940 urban share of the population with period dummies. Results are also unchanged when estimating long-difference

⁵⁹Panels B and C report, respectively, results for turnout and the first stage.

⁶⁰The point estimate in Panel B indicates that one additional predicted Black migrant is associated with 2.5 more Black residents in the county. The magnitude of the coefficient is smaller than, but in line with, that reported in Boustan (2010).

regressions (Table D.4).

Two observations help reconcile our findings with those in Boustan (2010). First, Boustan (2010) focuses on central city to suburb migration, fixing city boundaries to 1940, whereas we consider counties. Second, the (historical) central city-suburb divide does not overlap with county boundaries; hence, the reallocation of white population *between* central cities and suburbs was likely absorbed *within* counties. Table D.5 provides evidence consistent with this conjecture. Specifically, in columns 1 and 2, we restrict attention to the 117 counties that are included in the MSAs considered in Boustan (2010), and replicate our previous analysis. Also in this sample, the Great Migration had no effect on changes in white population. In columns 3 and 4, we instead focus on central cities, and define the dependent variable as the change in white population living there. Now, as in Boustan (2010), Black in-migration becomes strongly associated with white out-migration.⁶¹

This analysis indicates that, at the county level, Black in-migration did not trigger white out-migration. However, one may still be concerned that the Great Migration led to selective white departures, which altered the composition of white residents. To address this possibility we proceed as follows. First, we collect data from the 5% sample of the 1960 Census of Population and from the full count Census of 1940.⁶² Given the limited sample size and geographic coverage of the 1960 Census, we aggregate the data to the CZ and conduct the analysis at this level.⁶³ Next, restricting attention to white men above the age of 18 and not enrolled in school, we create the share of residents in this group who were: *i*) high skilled; *ii*) employed in manufacturing; *iii*) in the labor force; *iv*) homeowners; and *v*) above the age of 65. Finally, we estimate long difference regressions, where the 1940 to 1960 change in each of the variables above is regressed against the corresponding (instrumented) change in the Black share, including our preferred set of controls. 2SLS and first stage results are reported, respectively, in Panels A and B of Table D.8. The coefficient on the change in the Black share is always imprecisely estimated, quantitatively small, and does not display any consistent pattern across outcomes.

Using the approach just described, we also show that Black inflows did not increase

⁶¹Results are unchanged when estimating long difference regressions (Table D.6).

⁶²For 1950 and 1970, only a 1% sample is available, limiting substantially the geographic coverage of the datasets.

⁶³Not all CZs spanning the counties in our sample can be identified in the 1960 Census. Table D.7 shows that restricting attention to the sample of CZs that can be identified in the 1960 Census leaves our political results unchanged.

labor market competition for white residents (Tables D.9 and D.10).⁶⁴ This confirms existing evidence that northern labor markets were highly segmented along racial lines, and African Americans rarely – if at all – directly competed for jobs with whites (Boustan, 2009).

⁶⁴As before, we restrict attention to men of age 18 or more who were not in school. Since data on employment, occupation, or wages are separately available by race (and gender or age) only from micro-censuses, we focus on years 1940 and 1960, and conduct the analysis at the CZ level.

Table D.1. Congressional Elections (CZ)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	OLS	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
<i>Panel A: Democrat vote share</i>							
Change Black Share	0.968*** (0.246)	0.937** (0.404)	1.245*** (0.381)	1.310*** (0.399)	1.965*** (0.695)	2.909*** (0.779)	3.072*** (0.803)
<i>Panel B: Turnout</i>							
Change Black Share	-0.494*** (0.144)	-0.469*** (0.172)	-0.396** (0.177)	-0.441** (0.194)	0.209 (0.360)	0.511 (0.478)	0.499 (0.516)
<i>Panel C: First stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share				0.943*** (0.096)	0.813*** (0.157)	0.705*** (0.153)	0.729*** (0.163)
Specification	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	FD	LD
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
F-stat				97.02	26.80	21.20	19.98
Observations	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125	375

Notes: The table replicates Table 2 by aggregating the unit of analysis to the commuting zone (CZ). The dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (resp. turnout) in Panel A (resp. in Panel B). Panel C reports first stage coefficients. Columns 1 to 3 estimate OLS regressions, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp. 1940 Dem dummy) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.2. CORE Demonstrations (CZ)

Dep. Variable	Change in Pr.(Pro-Civil Rights Demonstration)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>							
Change Black Share	0.060*** (0.015)	0.011 (0.022)	0.015 (0.020)	0.107*** (0.014)	0.058** (0.026)	0.061* (0.032)	0.051** (0.025)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share				0.943*** (0.096)	0.813*** (0.157)	0.705*** (0.153)	0.705*** (0.153)
1940 Black Share		X	X		X	X	X
1940 Dem Incumbent			X			X	X
White Participants							X
F-stat				97.02	26.80	21.20	21.20
Observations	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125	1,125

Notes: This table replicates Table 3 by aggregating the unit of analysis to the commuting zone (CZ). The dependent variable is the change in the probability of non-violent demonstrations in support of civil rights coordinated by the CORE. Columns 1 to 3 estimate equation (1) in the text with OLS, while remaining columns report 2SLS estimates. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for state by period fixed effects. 1940 Black share (resp 1940 Dem dummy) refers to interactions between period dummies and the 1940 Black share (resp. a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 7 includes only those demonstrations that were joined by at least some white participants. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.3. Black in-Migration and Changes in White Population

Dep. Variable	Change in White Population			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Population	0.343 (0.435)	0.318 (0.428)	0.278 (0.410)	0.191 (0.445)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Population	2.430*** (0.352)	2.442*** (0.339)	2.456*** (0.324)	2.396*** (0.340)
F-Stat	47.75	52.01	57.30	49.82
Observations	3,418	3,418	1,712	3,418
Baseline Controls		X	X	X
High Urban			X	
Urban Share				X
Avg. Change Black Pop.	2,314	2,314	4,456	2,314
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	71,001	71,001	120,557	71,001
Avg. Change White Pop.	12,058	12,058	19,860	12,058

Notes: The sample is a panel of the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table estimates stacked first difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B respectively. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county, instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects. Columns 2 to 4 further include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 3 restricts attention to counties with 1940 urban share of the population above the sample median (0.356). Column 4 replicates column 2 by including interactions between period dummies and the 1940 urban share of the population. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.4. Black in-Migration and White Population (Long Differences)

Dep. Variable	Change White Population			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A. 2SLS</i>				
Change Black population	0.471 (0.412)	0.441 (0.405)	0.384 (0.383)	0.320 (0.413)
<i>Panel B. First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black population	2.504*** (0.365)	2.516*** (0.353)	2.526*** (0.339)	2.474*** (0.352)
F-Stat	46.96	50.69	55.46	49.53
Observations	1,139	1,139	569	1,139
Baseline controls		X	X	X
High urban			X	
Urban share				X
Avg. Change Black Pop.	2,314	2,314	4,456	2,314
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	71,001	71,001	120,557	71,001
Avg. Change White Pop.	12,058	12,058	19,860	12,058

Notes: The sample includes a panel of the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table estimates long difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B respectively. The dependent variable is the 1940-1970 change in the white population in the county. The main regressor of interest is the corresponding change in the Black population, instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions control for state fixed effects. Columns 2 to 4 further include i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share). Column 3 restricts attention to counties with 1940 urban share of the population above the sample median (.356). Column 4 replicates column 2 by including the 1940 urban share of the population. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.5. Black in-Migration and White Flight

Dep. Variable:	Change White Population in the County		Change White Population in Central Cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Population	0.155 (0.399)	0.236 (0.347)	-1.783*** (0.299)	-1.713*** (0.293)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black population	2.784*** (0.274)	2.701*** (0.266)	1.722*** (0.134)	1.876*** (0.203)
F-stat	102.9	103.1	166.3	85.40
Observations	351	351	154	154
Baseline Controls		X		X
Geography	County	County	MSA	MSA
Avg. Change Black Pop.	18,661	18,661	42,919	42,919
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	361,119	361,119	575,513	575,513
Avg. Change White Pop.	59,198	59,198	-21,488	-21,488

Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the sample includes a panel of the 117 non-southern US counties contained in the 52 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) included in Boustan (2010), for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Columns 3-4 focus on the 52 central cities contained in the 52 MSAs included in Boustan (2010). The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1-2 (resp. 3-4). The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1-2 (resp. 3-4), instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The table estimates stacked first difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A and B, respectively. All regressions control for state by period fixed effects, and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table D.6. Black in-Migration and White Flight (Long Differences)

Dep. Variable:	Change White Population in the County		Change White Population in Central Cities	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Population	0.313 (0.373)	0.365 (0.320)	-1.765*** (0.308)	-1.659*** (0.278)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>				
Change Predicted Black Population	2.872*** (0.304)	2.762*** (0.300)	5.249*** (0.555)	5.596*** (0.584)
KP F-stat	71.52	66.51	102.7	89.23
Observations	115	115	52	52
Baseline Controls		X		X
Geography	County	County	MSA	MSA
Avg. Change Black Pop.	18,661	18,661	42,919	42,919
Avg. 1940 White Pop.	361,119	361,119	575,513	575,513
Avg. Change White Pop.	59,198	59,198	-21,488	-21,488

Notes: In columns 1 and 2, the sample includes a panel of the 117 non-southern US counties contained in the 52 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) included in Boustan (2010), for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Columns 3-4 focus on the 52 central cities contained in the 52 MSAs included in Boustan (2010). The dependent variable is the decadal change in the white population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1-2 (resp. 3-4). The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black population in the county (resp. in the central city) in columns 1-2 (resp. 3-4), instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. The table estimates long difference regressions, reporting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels A, and B, respectively. All regressions control for state fixed effects, and include: i) the 1940 Black share; and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.7. Congressional Elections (CZ), Restricted Sample

Dep. Variable	Change in			
	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	2.909*** (0.779)	3.126*** (0.795)	0.511 (0.478)	0.755 (0.601)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.705*** (0.153)	0.745*** (0.167)	0.705*** (0.153)	0.745*** (0.167)
Sample	baseline	restricted (1960 census)	baseline	restricted (1960 census)
F-Stat	21.20	19.99	21.20	19.99
Observations	1,125	375	1,125	375

Notes: The table replicates the CZ level results reported in Table D.1 by restricting the sample to CZs for which 1960 US Census data are available in columns 2 and 4 (columns 1 and 3 report results in column 6 of Table D.1). The dependent variable is the change in the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (resp. turnout) in columns 1-2 (resp. in columns 3-4). Panel B reports first stage coefficients. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text from column 4 onwards. All regressions are weighed by 1940 CZ population, and control for interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table D.8. Black in-Migration and Changes in Whites' Characteristics

	(1) High Skilled	(2) In Manufacture	(3) In Labor Force	(4) Homeowner	(5) 65+
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>					
Change Black Share	-0.178 (0.648)	0.899 (0.793)	-0.035 (0.361)	0.210 (0.551)	-0.031 (0.288)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>					
Predicted Change Black Share	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)
F-stat	26.88	26.88	26.88	26.88	26.88
Observations	125	125	125	125	125
1940 Mean Dep. Var.	13.34	20.87	85.75	50.25	10.18
Avg. Change Black Share	3.268	3.268	3.268	3.268	3.268

Notes: The dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the share of white men above 18 not enrolled in school who are: i) high skilled (column 1); ii) employed in manufacturing (column 2); iii) in the labor force (column 3); iv) homeowner (column 4); v) above the age of 65 (column 5). The table reports 2SLS results for the 1940-1960 change in the Black share, instrumented with the shift-share IV described in the main text. The analysis is restricted to the 125 CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. All regressions are weighed by 1940 population, control for state fixed effects, and include i) the 1940 Black share, and ii) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the KP F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.9. Black Inflows and Whites' Economic Outcomes

Dep. Variable	1940-1960 Change in				
	Labor Force (1)	Employed (2)	Manufacturing (3)	Log Occupational Scores (4)	Log Wages (5)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>					
Change Black Share	-0.035 (0.361)	-0.066 (0.411)	0.899 (0.793)	0.000 (0.007)	0.032 (0.065)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>					
Predicted Change Black Share	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (176)
F-Stat	26.88	26.88	26.88	26.88	26.88
Observations	125	125	125	125	125
1940 Mean Dep. Var.	85.75	78.32	20.87	3.11	6.07

Notes: In columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the share of white men above 18 not enrolled in school who are: i) in the labor force (column 1); ii) employed (column 2); iii) employed in manufacturing (column 3). In columns 4 and 5, the dependent variable is the 1940-1960 change in the log occupational score and in log wages for white men above 18 not enrolled in school. The table reports 2SLS results for the effects of the 1940-1960 change in the Black share, instrumented with the shift-share IV described in the main text. The analysis is restricted to the 125 CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. All regressions are weighted by 1940 population, and control for state fixed effects, and include: the 1940 Black share, and the 1940 Democratic winner dummy. The bottom row reports the 1940 mean of the dependent variable. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.10. Black Inflows and Whites' Economic Outcomes: Unskilled and Manufacturing

Dep. Variable	1940-1960 Change in			
	Share Employed (1)	Log Wages (2)	Share Employed (3)	Log Wages (4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.029 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.026)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)	0.911*** (0.176)
F-Stat	26.88	26.88	26.88	26.88
Observations	125	125	125	125
1940 Mean Dep. Var. Sector	87.13 unskilled	6.24 unskilled	89.85 manufacturing	6.58 manufacturing

Notes: The dependent variable is the 1940 to 1960 change in the probability of employment and in log wages for white men not enrolled in school and above the age of 18 working in the unskilled sector (resp. in manufacturing) in columns 1 and 2 (resp. columns 3 and 4). The table reports 2SLS results for the effects of the 1940-1960 change in the Black share, instrumented with the shift-share IV described in the main text. The analysis is restricted to the 125 CZs for which demographic variables were available from the 1960 5% sample of the micro-census. All regressions are weighted by 1940 population, and control for state fixed effects, and include: the 1940 Black share, and the 1940 Democratic winner dummy. The bottom row reports the 1940 mean of the dependent variable. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CZ level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

D.2 Initial Shares, County Characteristics, and Local Shocks

In Table D.11, we start by investigating if the instrument constructed in equation (2) in the main text is correlated with county-specific pull factors, such as WWII contracts, New Deal spending, and the vote share of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) in 1932 Presidential elections. As discussed in Boustan (2016), the surge in demand across northern and western factories triggered by WWII was one of the pull factors of the Great Migration. Similarly, the generosity of New Deal spending and local support for FDR might have influenced the location decision of African Americans prior to 1940, while at the same time having long-lasting effects on political conditions across northern counties.

The dependent variable in Table D.11 is the change in predicted Black in-migration, scaled by 1940 county population. The main regressor of interest is one of the three variables described above – WWII spending per capita (Panel A), generosity of New Deal (Panel B), and 1932 FDR vote share (Panel C). Columns 1 to 3 consider each decade separately, whereas column 4 focuses on the long difference (1940-1970) change in predicted Black in-migration. We always include the set of controls used in our most preferred specification – i.e., state dummies, the 1940 Black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if in 1940 the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republican vote share in Congressional elections – and weigh regressions by 1940 county population. Reassuringly, in all cases the coefficient is imprecisely estimated and quantitatively small.

Table D.11. Placebo Checks

Dep. Variable	Predicted Change in Black Share (Mean: 0.916)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: WWII (mean: 0.648)</i>				
Spending Per Capita	0.041 (0.035)	0.051 (0.043)	0.043 (0.037)	0.092 (0.107)
Observations	1,139	1,139	1,140	1,139
<i>Panel B: New Deal (mean: 0.143)</i>				
Spending Per Capita	-0.284 (0.183)	-0.268 (0.225)	-0.148 (0.192)	-0.514 (0.525)
Observations	1,139	1,139	1,140	1,139
<i>Panel C: Vote share FDR (mean: 53.93)</i>				
1932 Vote Share FDR	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.010)
Observations	1,117	1,115	1,116	1,117
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970	1940-1970

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 county population. Each column considers the period specific to the decade reported at the bottom of the table. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and control for state dummies, for the 1940 Black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. In Panels A, B, and C the main regressor of interest is WWII spending per capita, New Deal spending per capita, and the vote share for FDR in the 1932 Presidential elections. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Next, to address concerns that 1940 Black settlements (from each southern state) might be correlated with county-specific characteristics that may have had a time varying effect on changes in political conditions, we interact period dummies with several 1940 county characteristics. Column 1 of Table D.12 and Table D.13 replicates the baseline specification estimated in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) in the main text. For completeness, we also report first stage estimates at the bottom of each table. Columns 2 to 6 augment the baseline specification by including interactions between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940: *i*) urban share; *ii*) share of employment in manufacturing; *iii*) male employment to population ratio; *iv*) fraction of immigrants; and, *v*) county population. Reassuringly, the coefficient remains stable and, for both the Democratic vote share and CORE demonstrations, highly statistically significant.⁶⁵ In column 7, we augment the baseline specification by separately controlling for a predicted measure of labor demand growth constructed using a Bartik-type approach (similar to e.g. Sequeira et al., 2020, and Tabellini, 2020). Restricting attention to non-southern counties, we first compute the 1940 share of employment in each 1-digit industry in each county; then, we interact these initial shares with the national growth rate of employment in that industry.⁶⁶ Once again, results are quantitatively similar to, in fact slightly larger than, those reported in column 1.

Finally, we deal with the possibility that the 1940 share of Black migrants from each southern state were not independent of cross-county pull factors systematically related to settlers' state of origin (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). To do so, we replicate our county-level results by interacting period dummies with the share of Black migrants from each southern state, i.e. sh_{sc} in equation (2) in the main text. In Figures D.1, D.2, and D.3, we plot 2SLS coefficients for the effects of changes in the Black share on the change in the Democratic vote share, in turnout, and in CORE demonstrations respectively. The very first dot on the left of the graphs represents the coefficient from our baseline specification (see also column 6 in Tables 2 and 3). Reassuringly, both the precision and the magnitude of our estimates are stable across specifications.

⁶⁵In columns 5 and 6, the KP F-stat falls below conventional levels, due to the stringent nature of the exercise performed.

⁶⁶To more precisely proxy for labor demand shocks in non-southern industries, we compute the national growth rate for the non-South only. Results are unchanged when including the US South to compute national demand growth.

Table D.12. Congressional Elections: Controlling for 1940 County Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
<i>Panel A: Democratic vote share</i>							
Change Black Share	1.650*** (0.286)	2.337*** (0.555)	1.673*** (0.363)	1.636*** (0.279)	1.700*** (0.456)	2.304*** (0.718)	1.920*** (0.417)
<i>Panel B: Turnout</i>							
Change Black Share	0.390* (0.235)	0.795* (0.438)	0.381 (0.268)	0.394* (0.235)	0.746 (0.466)	0.874 (0.653)	0.286 (0.280)
<i>Panel C: First stage</i>							
Change Predicted Black share	1.148*** (0.311)	0.741*** (0.240)	0.994*** (0.300)	1.153*** (0.311)	0.806*** (0.308)	0.710*** (0.322)	0.999*** (0.312)
Control	baseline	urban share	manufacturing share	employment to population	immigrant share	county population	predicted demand growth
F-Stat	13.65	9.523	10.96	13.76	6.825	4.857	10.26
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,391


Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for results reported in Table 2 (column 6) by including the interaction between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940: *i*) urban share (column 2); *ii*) employment share in manufacturing (column 3); *iii*) male employment to population ratio (column 4); *iv*) immigrant share (column 5); *v*) county population. In column 7, the baseline specification is augmented by separately controlling for a measure of predicted industrial growth constructed with a Bartik-style strategy described in the text of the Appendix. Panel C reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panels A and B. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.13. CORE Demonstrations: Controlling for 1940 County Characteristics

Dep. Variable	Change in Pr.(Pro-Civil Rights Demonstration)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>							
Change Black Share	0.047*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.017)	0.054*** (0.013)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.053*** (0.018)	0.037** (0.017)	0.032** (0.014)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black share	1.148*** (0.311)	0.741*** (0.240)	0.994*** (0.300)	1.153*** (0.311)	0.806*** (0.308)	0.710** (0.322)	0.999*** (0.312)
Control	baseline	urban share	manufacturing share	employment to population	immigrant share	county population	predicted demand growth
F-stat	13.65	9.523	10.96	13.76	6.825	4.857	10.26
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,391


Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for results reported in Table 3 (column 6) by including the interaction between period dummies and, respectively, the 1940: *i*) urban share (column 2); *ii*) employment share in manufacturing (column 3); *iii*) male employment to population ratio (column 4); *iv*) immigrant share (column 5); *v*) county population. In column 7, the baseline specification is augmented by separately controlling for a measure of predicted industrial growth constructed with a Bartik-style strategy described in the text of the Appendix. Panel B reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panel A. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Figure D.1. Interacting Year Dummies with Initial Shares: Democratic Vote Share




Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS point estimate (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of a change in the Black share on the Democratic vote share, augmenting the baseline specification reported in Table 2 with interactions between period dummies and the 1940 share of Black Americans born in each southern state. The very first dot on the left reports the coefficient for the baseline specification.

Figure D.2. Interacting Year Dummies with Initial Shares: Turnout



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS point estimate (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of a change in the Black share on turnout, augmenting the baseline specification reported in Table 2 with interactions between period dummies and the 1940 share of Black migrants born in each southern state. The very first dot on the left reports the coefficient for the baseline specification.

Figure D.3. Interacting Year Dummies with Initial Shares: CORE Demonstrations



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS point estimate (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of a change in the Black share on turnout, augmenting the baseline specification reported in Table 3 with interactions between period dummies and the 1940 share of Black migrants born in each southern state. The very first dot on the left reports the coefficient for the baseline specification.

D.3 Testing for Pre-Trends

In Table D.14, we perform a key placebo check, and show that there is no correlation between pre-period changes in the outcomes of interest and the (instrumented) change in the Black share. Since 1942 is the first year in which CORE demonstrations occurred, we conduct this exercise only for the Democratic vote share and for turnout in Congressional elections.⁶⁷ Table D.14 reports results for the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6). To ease comparisons, columns 1 and 4 present the baseline specification (Table 2, column 6); next, in columns 2 and 5, we replicate our analysis restricting attention to counties for which “pre-trends” regressions can be estimated. As it appears, while results for the Democratic vote share become slightly larger, those for turnout double in size and become more precisely estimated.

Finally, in columns 3 and 6, we turn to the formal test for pre-trends, regressing the 1934 to 1940 change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout against the 1940 to 1970 instrumented change in the Black share.⁶⁸ When constructing the “pre-1940”

⁶⁷ Appendix D.7 below conducts a similar test (at the CD level) for legislators’ ideology.

⁶⁸ As noted in the main text, the instrument is scaled by 1940 population so as not to contaminate it with the potentially endogenous contemporaneous population (Card and Peri, 2016).

change in political outcomes, we consider the first election year after 1932 in order to make sure that results are not confounded by post-New Deal realignment (Caughey et al., 2020; Schickler, 2016). However, our findings are unchanged when using other election years, such as 1930 or 1932. Focusing on “pre-trends” regressions, reassuringly, the coefficient is not statistically significant and, especially for the Democratic vote share (column 3), very different from that estimated in the baseline specification.⁶⁹

Table D.14. Testing for Pre-Trends: Congressional Elections

Dep. Variable	Change Democratic Vote Share			Change Turnout		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	1.650*** (0.286)	1.954*** (0.453)	-0.400 (0.370)	0.390* (0.235)	0.809** (0.357)	0.312 (0.212)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Change Predicted Black Share	1.148*** (0.311)	0.738*** (0.229)	0.778*** (0.245)	1.148*** (0.311)	0.738*** (0.229)	0.778*** (0.245)
F-Stat	13.65	10.39	10.13	13.65	10.39	10.13
Observations	3,418	3,401	1,138	3,418	3,401	1,138
Specification	baseline	restricted	pre-trends	baseline	restricted	pre-trends

Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates for the change in the Democratic vote share (resp. turnout) in Congressional elections in columns 1-3 (resp. 4-6). Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline specification (see Table 2, column 6), and columns 2 and 5 replicate the baseline specification restricting attention to counties for which the change in the Democratic vote share and turnout between 1934 and 1940 can be computed. Columns 3 and 6 estimate first difference regressions for the 1934-1940 change in the Democratic vote share and in turnout against the 1940 to 1970 instrumented change in the Black share. The pre-period is defined using the first election year after the New Deal election of 1932, i.e. 1934. However, results are unchanged when using other timing conventions. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population and include state dummies, the 1940 Black share, and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. These variables are interacted with period dummies in columns 1-2 and 4-5 (as in the main text). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

⁶⁹For turnout, the point estimate is close to that of the baseline specification for the full sample. Yet, once compared to the baseline estimates obtained for the “restricted” sample (column 5), the coefficient is almost one third smaller.

D.4 Additional Robustness Checks

D.4.1 Alternative Specifications

In our baseline analysis, we interact period dummies with a dummy equal to 1 if the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections were greater than the Republican one to allow counties to be on different trends depending on Democratic incumbency (and potentially deal with mean reversion). To more flexibly account for initial support for the Democratic Party, in column 2 of Tables D.15 and D.16, we replicate the baseline analysis (reported in column 1 to ease comparisons) by interacting the 1940 Democratic vote share with period dummies. Reassuringly, all results remain in positive and statistically significant. If anything, they become larger, and more precisely estimated, especially for turnout (Panel B of Table D.15).⁷⁰

⁷⁰Reassuringly, the first stage, reported in the bottom panel of both tables, remains strong and the KP F-stat for weak instruments above conventional levels.

Table D.15. Additional Robustness Checks: Congressional Elections

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Democrat vote share</i>								
Change Black Share	1.650*** (0.286)	2.095*** (0.424)	1.936*** (0.555)	1.649*** (0.286)	1.650*** (0.288)	1.757*** (0.377)	2.662*** (0.651)	1.534*** (0.243)
<i>Panel B: Turnout</i>								
Change Black Share	0.390* (0.235)	0.690** (0.301)	0.198 (0.328)	0.392* (0.236)	0.394* (0.234)	0.515* (0.292)	0.700* (0.383)	0.356* (0.215)
<i>Panel C: First stage</i>								
Predicted Change	1.148*** (0.311)	0.808*** (0.232)	0.392*** (0.137)	1.147*** (0.311)	1.146*** (0.311)	0.981*** (0.286)	0.762*** (0.246)	1.250*** (0.290)
F-Stat	13.65	12.11	8.199	13.61	13.58	11.80	9.597	18.62
Specification	baseline	1940 dem vote share	unweighted	drop IV equal to 0	drop black share equal to 0	trim top 99 and bottom 1 pctile	trim top 95 and bottom 5 pctile	southern white in-migration 3,418
Observations	3,418	3,414	3,418	3,295	3,251	3,342	3,081	3,418

Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for results reported in Table 2 (column 6) by: *i*) replacing the interaction between period dummies and the 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy with that with the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (column 2); *ii*) estimating unweighted regressions (column 3); *iii*) considering only counties with predicted (resp. actual) Black share strictly positive in all decades in column 4 (resp. column 5); *iv*) trimming counties at the top 1st (resp. 5th) and at the bottom 99th (resp. 95th) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration in column 6 (resp. column 7); and *v*) controlling for predicted southern white in-migration (column 8). Panel C reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panels A and B. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table D.16. Additional Robustness Checks: CORE Demonstrations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>								
Change Black Share	0.047*** (0.011)	0.056*** (0.016)	0.032** (0.013)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.068*** (0.018)	0.051** (0.021)	0.046*** (0.010)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>								
Predicted Change Black Share	1.148*** (0.311)	0.808*** (0.232)	0.392*** (0.137)	1.147*** (0.311)	1.146*** (0.311)	0.981*** (0.286)	0.762*** (0.246)	1.250*** (0.290)
F-Stat	13.65	12.11	8.199	13.61	13.58	11.80	9.597	18.62
Specification	baseline	1940 dem vote share	unweighted	drop IV equal to 0	drop black share equal to 0	trim top 99 and bottom 1 pctile	trim top 95 and bottom 5 pctile	southern white in-migration
Observations	3,418	3,414	3,418	3,295	3,251	3,342	3,081	3,418

Notes: The table replicates the main specification (which is also reported in column 1) for results reported in Table 3 (column 6) by: *i*) replacing the interaction between period dummies and the 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy with that with the 1940 Democratic vote share in Congressional elections (column 2); *ii*) estimating unweighted regressions (column 3); *iii*) considering only counties with predicted (resp. actual) Black share strictly positive in all decades in column 4 (resp. column 5); *iv*) trimming counties at the top 1st (resp. 5th) and at the bottom 99th (resp. 95th) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration in column 6 (resp. column 7); and *v*) controlling for predicted southern white in-migration (column 8). Panel B reports the first stage for the 2SLS results presented in Panel A. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Next, in column 3 of Tables D.15 and D.16, we replicate the baseline specification by estimating unweighted regressions. Reassuringly, even though results for turnout are no longer statistically significant, they remain strong and precisely estimated for both the Democratic vote share and CORE demonstrations. In this case, the KP F-stat for weak instruments falls slightly below conventional levels. But, the main message remains unchanged.

D.4.2 Dropping Potential Outliers

As discussed in the main text, some areas of the US North and West, such as Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles, received a disproportionately large inflow of Black migrants between 1940 and 1970. Others, instead, received very few African Americans. In our main analysis we omit counties with zero Black individuals in 1940, so as to compare counties that received different numbers of migrants with each other (and exclude from this comparison counties that did not have any Black resident in 1940). We now show that all results are robust to restricting the sample in different ways.

First, in columns 4 and 5 of Tables D.15 and D.16, we restrict attention to counties for which the predicted and the actual Black share was strictly positive in all decades between 1940 and 1970. Not surprisingly, results are unchanged. Next, in column 6 (resp. 7), we exclude counties at the top 1st (resp. 5th) and at the bottom 99th (resp. 95th) percentiles of the distribution of changes in Black migration. Also in this case, results remain in line with – in fact stronger than – those of our baseline specification.

D.4.3 Controlling for Southern White In-Migration

Yet another potential concern is that Black in-migration might be correlated with simultaneous white inflows from the South. As documented in Gregory (2006) among others, between 1940 and 1970 even more whites than Black Americans left the US South. The historical evidence suggests that African Americans were significantly more likely than whites to settle in metropolitan areas either in the Northeast or in the West, while white migration was more evenly distributed across the non-South (Gregory, 1995). However, it is still possible that the patterns of white and Black migration from the South were correlated with each other. If this were to be the case, at least part of our findings might be due to the arrival of white – rather than Black – migrants. Due to data limitations, we cannot measure the actual change in southern born white migrants after 1940 at the county level. However, to at least

partly overcome this problem, we construct a predicted measure of white in-migration from the US South implementing the same procedure used to construct the instrument for Black in-migration (see equation (2) in the main text).

Specifically, we first compute the share of whites born in each southern state who were living in a non-southern county as of 1940. Next, we interact these shares with the number of white migrants from each southern state in each decade between 1940 and 1970. Finally, for each non-southern county and for each decade, we sum the predicted number of whites moving from each origin over all southern states to obtain the total number of (predicted) white migrants moving to county c during decade τ . In formulas, this measure is given by:

$$ZW_{c\tau} = \sum_{j \in \text{South}} sh_{jc}^w Wh_{j\tau} \quad (3)$$

where sh_{jc}^w is the share of whites born in southern state j and living in non-southern county c in 1940, relative to all whites born in j living outside this state; and $Wh_{j\tau}$ is the number of whites who left southern state j during decade τ .

Then, in column 8 of Tables D.15 and D.16, we augment our baseline specification by separately controlling for the predicted southern white in-migration. Reassuringly, in all cases, results are barely affected.

D.4.4 Additional Outcomes

In the paper, we focus on the Democratic vote share as the main electoral outcome of interest. In Table D.17, we verify that results are unchanged when considering different proxies for support for the Democratic Party in Congressional elections. Column 1 presents our main 2SLS results for the Democratic vote share (Table 2, column 6). Next in columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is defined respectively as the Democratic vote margin and as a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was larger than the Republicans vote share. In both cases, Black in-migration is associated with an increase in support for the Democratic Party.

Table D.17. Additional Outcomes: Congressional Elections

Dep. Variable	Democratic Vote Share (1)	Democrats-Republicans Vote Margin (2)	1[Higher Democratic Vote Share] (3)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>			
Change Black Share	1.650*** (0.286)	3.184*** (0.555)	0.031*** (0.010)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>			
Predicted Change Black Share	1.148*** (0.311)	1.147*** (0.309)	1.152*** (0.312)
F-Stat	13.65	13.79	13.62
Observations	3,418	3,401	3,325

Notes: Panel A presents 2SLS results. Column 1 replicates the baseline specification for the effects of changes in the Black share on the Democratic vote share (Table 2, column 6). In columns 2 and 3, the dependent variable is, respectively, the Democrats-Republicans vote margin in Congressional elections, and a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share was higher than the Republicans vote share in Congressional elections. Panel B reports the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.4.5 Stacked Panel Specification

In this section, we verify that our results are robust to estimating stacked panel regressions separately controlling for county fixed effects, rather than taking the model in (stacked) first differences. Specifically, we stack the data for the four decades between 1940 to 1970 (included), and run a regression of the form:

$$y_{ct} = \xi_c + \delta_{st} + \beta Bl_{ct} + \gamma X_{ct} + u_{ct} \quad (4)$$

where y_{ct} refers to the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections or to the probability of CORE demonstrations in county c in year t , ξ_c and δ_{st} are county and state by year fixed effects, and Bl_{ct} is the Black share in county c in year t . As for the stacked first difference specification, X_{ct} includes interactions between period dummies and baseline: *i*) Black share; and *ii*) Democratic incumbency in Congressional

elections.⁷¹

In our baseline specification, we used predicted Black inflows in each decade to instrument for the change in Black population. However, when estimating equation (4), an instrument is needed for Black population in each year from 1940 to 1970. That is, 1940 can no longer be used as “baseline” year to predict Black inflows. Also, since we are now interested in Black population (relative county population) rather than in its change, we need an instrument for the stock – and not the change – of Black Americans in the county. We thus modify the baseline instrument constructed in the main text in two ways. First, we use 1930 settlements of African Americans across northern counties to apportion post-1930 outmigration from the South. Second, after predicting the inflow of Black migrants to county c in the ten years prior to year t , we recursively add previous predicted inflows to generate a measure of predicted stock.⁷²

With this instrument at hand, we proceed to estimate equation (4) with 2SLS. We report results in Panel A of Table D.18, presenting first stage in Panel B. Focusing on Democratic vote share, turnout, and CORE demonstrations respectively, we report the baseline (stacked first difference) specification in columns 1-3-5 to ease comparisons, and the stacked panel regressions in columns 2-4-6. The KP F-stat for weak instrument falls below conventional levels when estimating the stacked panel specifications. However, the main take-away is unchanged. Black in-migration has a positive and statistically significant effect on the Democratic vote share and on the frequency of CORE demonstrations, and a small and imprecisely estimated effect on turnout.

⁷¹Since in a stacked panel setting 1940 is our first estimation year, we measure the baseline Black share in 1930 and the Democratic incumbency in 1934. Results are unchanged if we measure both variables in 1940.

⁷²As before, we scale the predicted number of Black migrants by 1940 county population. Results are unchanged when dividing it by 1930 population.

Table D.18. Stacked Panel Specification

Dep. Variable	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[CORE Demonstrations]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	1.650*** (0.286)	1.394*** (0.413)	0.390* (0.235)	0.128 (0.172)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.015)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.148*** (0.311)	1.118*** (0.405)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.118*** (0.405)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.118*** (0.405)
F-Stat	13.65	7.438	13.65	7.438	13.65	7.438
Observations	3,418	4,328	3,418	4,328	3,418	4,328
Specification	stacked first differences	stacked panel	stacked first differences	stacked panel	stacked first differences	stacked panel

Notes: : The table replicates the baseline stacked first difference specification using a stacked panel specification. The dependent variable is the (resp. the change in) Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations in columns 2-4-6 (resp. in columns 1-3-5). Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighted by 1940 county population. Columns 1-3-6 include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. Columns 2-4-6 include county and state by year fixed effects, and control for interactions between period dummies and: *i*) the 1930 Black share; and, *ii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1934 was higher than the Republicans vote share. Results in columns 2-4-6 are unchanged when including interactions using 1940 (rather than pre-1940 values). F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D.4.6 Dealing with Spatial Correlation

Finally, we address the concern that standard errors clustered at the county level may be too small due to spatial correlation. In Table D.19, Panel A, we replicate our baseline results for Democratic vote share, turnout, and CORE demonstrations (reported in columns 1-4-7 to ease comparisons) by using Conley adjusted standard errors (in columns 2-5-8) and clustering standard errors at the CZ level (in columns 3-6-9). Reassuringly, results remain unchanged, and the precision of the estimates is barely affected.⁷³

D.5 Push Factors Instrument

D.5.1 Instrument Construction and Zeroth Stage

Borusyak et al. (2021) note that the validity of shift-share designs can be guaranteed if the “shifts” – in our case, decadal Black migration from each southern state – are exogenous to local conditions. They propose a correction method, where the “shift-share” instrument is expressed in terms of the “shift” components. This method, however, can be implemented only when the number of “shifts” is large. Unfortunately, in our setting, we can only rely on 15 southern states, and so we cannot directly implement the transformation proposed in Borusyak et al. (2021).

Nevertheless, we provide evidence that southern (state) migration flows are orthogonal to northern (county) conditions. We construct a modified version of the instrument that, rather than using actual Black out-migration, estimates it exploiting variation solely induced by local push factors. Following Boustan (2010, 2016) and Derenoncourt (2018), we model emigration from each southern county for each decade between 1940 and 1970 as a function of local push factors. In particular, we estimate an equation of the form

$$mig_{kj\tau} = \alpha_j + \beta_\tau Push_{kjt_0} + u_{kj\tau} \quad (5)$$

where $mig_{kj\tau}$ is the Black net migration rate in county k of southern state j during decade τ , and $Push_{kjt_0}$ is a vector of economic and political conditions at baseline, which we allow to have a time-varying effect across decades. These include the 1940: share of land cultivated in cotton; share of farms operated by tenants; share of the labor force in, respectively, manufacturing, mining, and agriculture. As in Boustan

⁷³Panel B of Table D.19 reports the corresponding first stage.

(2016), we also include WWII spending per capita and the 1948 vote share of Strom Thurmond in Presidential elections.⁷⁴

Our most preferred specification includes state fixed effects, α_j , but results are unchanged when omitting them (see also Boustan, 2016). Finally, in contrast with Boustan (2010, 2016), we fix the characteristics of southern counties to 1940 (or, for Thurmond vote share, 1948) rather than using the beginning of each decade to reduce concerns of correlated shocks between northern and southern counties.⁷⁵ As an additional robustness check, we also selected the southern county characteristics to predict Black out-migration using the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (“LASSO”), as done in Derenoncourt (2018). Below, we report results obtained using this alternative procedure to construct the “push” version of the instrument.

Results from equation (5) are reported in Table D.20. Columns 1 to 3 refer to, respectively, the 1940-1950, the 1950-1960, and the 1960-1970 decade. All coefficients have the expected sign. A higher share of land in cotton and of farms operated by tenants in 1940 are associated with subsequent emigration. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the coefficient is not statistically significant for the 1940-1950 decade, possibly because cotton mechanization was more prevalent in the 1950s (Grove and Heinicke, 2003). As in Boustan (2016), a higher share of the labor force in mining and agriculture is associated with a larger emigration rate. Similarly, reflecting a more hostile political environment, counties with a higher vote share for Thurmond in 1948 are predicted to have a higher emigration rate throughout the period. Finally, consistent with WWII spending increasing labor demand, the Black in-migration rate is higher in counties with more WWII contracts.

After estimating equation (5), we construct the predicted number of migrants by multiplying the fitted values from (5) by the beginning of decade Black population. We then aggregate these (predicted) flows to obtain the predicted number of Black migrants from each state in each decade, $B\hat{l}_{s\tau}$. Finally, we replace the actual number of Black migrants, $B l_{s\tau}$, with this predicted value to construct a modified version of the shift-share instrument in equation (2) in the main text.

⁷⁴Data on the cotton share comes from the Census of Agriculture, the vote share of Thurmond was taken from David Leip’s Atlas, while all remaining variables were collected from the County Databooks.

⁷⁵Following Boustan (2016), in counties where the Black migration rate was above 100, we replace it with the latter value. We also exclude counties with less than 30 Black residents in 1940. All results are robust to omitting these restrictions.

D.5.2 Results

Table D.21 replicates our preferred specification for the Democratic vote share (columns 1-2), turnout (columns 3-4), and CORE demonstrations (columns 5-6) using the push-factor version of the instrument. In Panel A, we present 2SLS estimates, while in panel B we present the associated first stage. Columns 1-3-5 report results obtained using the push instrument constructed with the southern characteristics described above in the zeroth stage. Columns 2-4-6 turn to the version of the push instrument obtained by selecting predictors of southern Black out-migration with the LASSO procedure (Derenoncourt, 2018).

Reassuringly, both versions of the instrument are strong, with the KP F-stat above conventional levels. Moreover, the 2SLS estimates are in line with – in fact, for the Democratic vote share and CORE demonstrations, stronger than – those presented in the main text. Also in this case, Black in-migration has a positive and statistically significant effect on both the Democratic vote share in Congressional elections and the probability of CORE demonstrations. The effect on turnout remains positive, but small and imprecisely estimated.

Table D.19. Correct for Spatial Correlation

Dep. Variable	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout			1[CORE Demonstrations]		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>									
Change Black Share	1.650*** (0.286)	1.650*** (0.470)	1.650*** (0.262)	0.390* (0.235)	0.390 (0.295)	0.390 (0.263)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.047* (0.025)	0.047*** (0.012)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>									
Predicted Change Black Share	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.206)	1.148*** (0.281)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.206)	1.148*** (0.281)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.206)	1.148*** (0.281)
F-stat	13.65	31.04	16.67	13.65	31.04	16.67	13.65	31.04	16.67
Observations	3418	3418	3418	3418	3418	3418	3418	3418	3418

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification correcting standard errors for spatial correlation. The dependent variable is the (change in the) Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations in columns 1 to 3, 4 to 6, and 7 to 9 respectively. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population. Columns 1-4-7 report the baseline results; columns 2-5-8 (resp. 3-6-9) present results obtained with Conley adjusted (resp. CZ clustered) standard errors. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table D.20. Zeroth Stage

Dep. Variable	Net Black Migration Rate		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share Land in Cotton	-0.012 (0.088)	-0.302** (0.123)	-0.163** (0.077)
Share Farms with Tenants	0.042 (0.056)	0.045 (0.064)	-0.173*** (0.047)
WWII Spending per Capita	2.228*** (0.352)	0.393 (0.359)	0.046 (0.313)
Thurmond Vote Share	-0.085** (0.037)	-0.083** (0.037)	-0.158*** (0.042)
Share LF in Manufacturing	-0.348*** (0.090)	-0.248*** (0.074)	-0.080 (0.070)
Share LF in Mining	-0.440** (0.197)	-0.697*** (0.179)	-0.522*** (0.152)
Share LF in Agriculture	-0.504*** (0.050)	-0.486*** (0.047)	-0.209*** (0.045)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.256	0.283	0.163
Observations	1,163	1,163	1,163
Decade	1940-1950	1950-1960	1960-1970

Notes: The dependent variable is the net Black migration rate for southern counties for each decade indicated at the bottom of the table. All regressors refer to 1940, except for Thurmond vote share, which is the vote share of Thurmond in 1948 Presidential elections. All regressions include state fixed effects. See the appendix for the definition and source of variables included in the table. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table D.21. Replicating Results with Push Instrument

Dep. Variable	Democratic Vote Share		Turnout		1[<i>CORE</i> Demonstrations]	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black share	1.856*** (0.331)	2.298*** (0.504)	0.420* (0.233)	0.481* (0.276)	0.050*** (0.012)	0.056*** (0.013)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.289*** (0.348)	1.025*** (0.303)	1.289*** (0.348)	1.025*** (0.303)	1.289*** (0.348)	1.025*** (0.303)
F-Stat	13.68	11.40	13.68	11.40	13.68	11.40
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418
Push Instrument	baseline	LASSO	baseline	LASSO	baseline	LASSO

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification using the version of the instrument constructed with southern specific “push” factors. Columns 1-3-5 (resp. columns 2-4-6) report results for the “push” instrument constructed using the baseline (resp. LASSO) procedure. The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of *CORE* demonstrations. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.6 Alternative Instrument: Linked Data Initial Black Shares

In this section, we perform an additional robustness check, constructing the instrument using a county-to-county (rather than a state-to-county) migration matrix. Using the linked dataset made available by Abramitzky et al. (2020), we consider African Americans who were living in a southern county in 1910 and who had moved to another county by 1930. We choose this time frame because it spans the two decades during which the First Great Migration occurred, but results are robust to using other time windows as well.⁷⁶ For each (non-southern) county in our sample, we then compute the number of African Americans who were living in that county in 1930 and originated from any southern county.⁷⁷ We scale this by the total number of African Americans who were living in the (southern) origin county in 1910 and moved to another county by 1930. We take these as our “initial Black settlements”. They are identical, in the spirit, to those used to construct the baseline instrument, but vary at the county-to-county (rather than state-to-county) level.⁷⁸

Then, we proceed as before: for each origin, we interact the initial share of African Americans in each non-southern county in our sample with the decadal number of Black migrants who left the southern county in each decade between 1940 and 1970. We thus obtain the predicted number of Black migrants who moved to a non-southern county in each decade from each southern county. Aggregating this across all origins, we obtain the decadal predicted number of African American migrants, which we then scale by the 1940 (non-southern) county population to recover the predicted change in the Black share. We construct two versions of this alternative instrument: one that uses actual migration flows; and, one that instead uses the predicted flows computed in Appendix D.5 above.

While this instrument rests on initial shares that are constructed using a linked sample, and may thus be at least partly “selected” (Bailey et al., 2017), it has a key advantage: it implies that the shift-share instrument now depends on a very large (more than 1,200) number of shifts. As discussed above, Borusyak et al. (2021) note that the validity of shift-share designs can be guaranteed if the “shifts” – in our case, decadal

⁷⁶This approach is similar to that used in Derenoncourt (2018), but has the advantage of including migrants that moved between 1910 and 1930, rather than only between 1935 and 1940.

⁷⁷As documented in Dahis et al. (2020), this time period was characterized by a high “passing rate”, with African Americans changing their racial identity so as to “pass for whites”. We keep only African Americans whose race was coded as “Black” in both 1910 and 1930.

⁷⁸As for the baseline instrument, the denominator of the initial shares of African Americans includes all individuals from the origin county who were living in any other county – in or out the US South – by 1930.

Black migration from each southern state – are exogenous to local conditions. Thus, as long as outmigration flows across southern counties are uncorrelated with changes in the political conditions of specific non-southern counties, the identifying assumption of the instrument is not violated. Using predicted rather than actual county outmigration flows further corroborates support for the validity of this condition.

In Table D.22 (Panel A), we replicate our baseline results using the two versions of the alternative instrument just described, focusing on the Democratic vote share, turnout, and CORE demonstrations in columns 1 to 3, 4 to 6, and 7 to 9 respectively.⁷⁹ Columns 1, 4, and 7 replicate the baseline specification reported in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6) in the main text. Columns 2, 5, and 8 show that results remain similar when considering the alternative version, constructed with the actual southern decadal migration flows. If anything, the point estimate for turnout is larger than in the baseline specification, but the main message is unchanged: Black in-migration increases support for the Democratic Party and raises the frequency of CORE demonstrations. Coefficients become somewhat larger when conducting the analysis using predicted outmigration (columns 3, 6, and 9), but they are not statistically different from those in previous columns.

Together with results in Appendix D.5, this exercise increases the confidence that our main findings are not driven by local pull shocks simultaneously correlated with the pre-1940 distribution of Black settlements across northern counties.

⁷⁹Panel B reports the first stage. When using the alternative instrument that relies on predicted migration flows, the F-stat falls slightly below conventional levels. The number of observations is lower for the alternative instruments because for 16 southern counties migration data were missing. This issue is irrelevant when flows are aggregated to the state level (as in the case of the baseline instrument).

Table D.22. Replicating Results with IV based on Linked Data

Dep. Variable	Democratic Vote Share			Turnout			1[CORE Demonstrations]		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>									
Change Black Share	1.650*** (0.286)	1.939*** (0.395)	2.221*** (0.446)	0.390* (0.235)	0.760** (0.347)	0.772** (0.348)	0.047*** (0.011)	0.040** (0.015)	0.052*** (0.016)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>									
Predicted Change Black	1.148*** (0.311)	1.654*** (0.501)	1.841*** (0.637)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.654*** (0.501)	1.841*** (0.637)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.654*** (0.501)	1.841*** (0.637)
F-Stat	13.65	10.92	8.353	13.65	10.92	8.353	13.65	10.92	8.353
Observations	3,418	3,402	3,402	3,418	3,402	3,402	3,418	3,402	3,402
Instrument	Baseline	Linked	Linked	Baseline	Linked	Linked	Baseline	Linked	Linked

Notes: The table replicates the baseline specification using the version of the instrument constructed with the linked sample from Abramitzky et al. (2020), for which a county-to-county migration matrix is used to define the initial Black shares. Columns 1, 4, and 7 replicate the baseline specification reported in Tables 2 and 3 (column 6). Columns 2, 5, and 8 (resp. columns 3, 6, and 9) report results with the alternative instrument using actual (resp. predicted) migration flows. The dependent variable is the change in Democratic vote share, turnout, and probability of CORE demonstrations. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, and Panel B presents the first stage. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and, *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 for Democratic incumbency in 1940 Congressional elections. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D.7 Robustness Checks on CD Results

D.7.1 Testing for Pre-Trends

Our main results in Table 6 showed that Black in-migration moved legislators' ideology to the left between 1940 and 1950. In Table D.23, we check that this pattern does not capture pre-existing trends. Similar to what we did for the Democratic vote share and turnout in Congressional elections (Section D.3 above), we construct the pre-period change in the ideology scores, considering the first Congress after the New Deal, i.e. Congress 73. Then, we estimate 2SLS regressions for the pre-period change in the agnostic and the constrained version of the scores against the instrumented change in the Black share, controlling for the same variables included in our baseline specification (i.e. state dummies, and baseline: *i*) Black share; *ii*) Democratic incumbency indicator; and, *iii*) ideology score).⁸⁰

To ease comparisons, we report the baseline specification for the 78-82 Congress period – when Black in-migration induced a liberal shift in legislators' ideology – in columns 1 and 4 for the agnostic and the constrained version of the scores respectively. Since the pre-period change in ideology could not be estimated for all CDs, in columns 2 and 5, we replicate columns 1 and 4 restricting attention to CDs for which the pre-trend check can be performed. When doing so, the F-stat falls, suggesting that results should be interpreted with caution. However, the point estimate remains negative, quantitatively close to that obtained for the full sample, and statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.08 and 0.063 for agnostic and constrained scores respectively). Finally, in columns 3 and 6, we turn to the formal test for pre-trends. Reassuringly, the point estimate is positive, close to zero, and imprecisely estimated. These patterns indicate that the main results documented above are not influenced by a spurious correlation between the instrument and potential pre-existing trends in ideology of legislators.

⁸⁰As usual, regressions are weighed by baseline CD population.

Table D.23. Testing for Pre-Trends: Ideology Scores

Dep. Variable	Agnostic Scores			Constrained Scores		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.307** (0.121)	-0.231* (0.134)	0.037 (0.027)	-0.345*** (0.130)	-0.292* (0.157)	0.035 (0.033)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.006*** (0.379)	0.985* (0.536)	2.403*** (0.275)	1.002*** (0.378)	0.973* (0.535)	2.416*** (0.269)
F-Stat	7.068	3.380	76.23	7.038	3.312	80.78
Observations	286	202	202	286	202	202
Specification	Baseline	Restricted	Pre-Trends (1940-1960)	Baseline	Restricted (1940-1960)	Pre-Trends

Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates for the change in agnostic (resp. constrained) ideology scores in columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6). Panel B reports first stage estimates. Columns 1 and 4 report the baseline specification for Congress period 78-82 (see Table 6, columns 2 and 5), and columns 2 and 5 replicate this by restricting attention to counties for which the change in the scores for the pre-period can be constructed. Columns 3 and 6 estimate 2SLS regressions for the change in the ideology scores between Congress 73 and Congress 78 against the instrumented 1940-1960 change in the Black share. The pre-period is defined using the first Congress year after the New Deal (i.e. Congress 73). All regressions are weighed by 1940 CD population, and include state dummies, and the baseline: Black share, Democratic incumbency dummy, and ideology score. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

D.7.2 Alternative Timing Conventions for Congress Periods

In our baseline specification for the effects of the Great Migration on legislators' ideology, we mapped the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black share to the 78-82 (resp. 82-88) Congress period. This was done in order to include the longest periods without redistricting while at the same time ending the analysis with the Congress that passed the CRA. We now verify that our results above are robust to different timing conventions.

First, in Table D.24, we define the second period as ending with Congress 87 (rather than Congress 88). The structure of the table mirrors that of Table 6 in the main text: columns 1 to 3 consider the agnostic version of the scores, while columns 4 to 6 focus on the constrained one. Panel A reports 2SLS estimates, whereas Panel B presents the first stage. Not only results are in line with those in the main text. But also, the point estimate for the stacked specification doubles in size and becomes marginally significant. Second, in Table D.25, we define the end of the first Congress period with Congress 83, in order to have two symmetric periods. While the coefficient on the Great Migration remains highly negative and precisely estimated in the first period, it becomes statistically significant (and positive) in the second period (reinforcing the results on polarization discussed in Section 6.2.2 in the main text).

Table D.24. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Ending Analysis with Congress 87

Dep. Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.094* (0.054)	-0.307** (0.121)	-0.007 (0.068)	-0.092* (0.054)	-0.345*** (0.130)	0.011 (0.069)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.473*** (0.441)	1.006*** (0.379)	1.811*** (0.556)	1.456*** (0.445)	1.002*** (0.378)	1.785*** (0.562)
F-Stat	11.15	7.068	10.60	10.72	7.038	10.08
Observations	571	286	285	571	286	285
Congress Period	78-82; 82-87	78-82	82-87	78-82; 82-87	78-82	82-87

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – “Agnostic” scores in columns 1 to 3, and “Constrained” scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress period 78-82 and 82-87). Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table D.25. Changes in Legislators' Ideology: Symmetric Congress Periods

Dep. Variable	Change in Civil Rights Ideology (Lower values = More Liberal Ideology)					
	Agnostic Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.872)			Constrained Scores (Baseline Mean: -0.853)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.041 (0.038)	-0.456*** (0.165)	0.127** (0.050)	-0.044 (0.040)	-0.503*** (0.175)	0.143*** (0.054)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.471*** (0.440)	1.006*** (0.377)	1.808*** (0.554)	1.454*** (0.443)	1.002*** (0.377)	1.782*** (0.560)
F-Stat	11.20	7.099	10.66	10.76	7.069	10.12
Observations	562	281	281	562	281	281
Congress Period	78-83; 83-88	78-83	83-88	78-83; 83-88	78-83	83-88

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the civil rights ideology scores from Bateman et al. (2017) – “Agnostic” scores in columns 1 to 3, and “Constrained” scores in columns 4 to 6. Lower (resp. higher) values of the score refer to more liberal (resp. conservative) ideology (see also Bateman et al., 2017, for more details). Columns 1 and 4 (resp. 2-3, and 5-6) estimate stacked first difference regressions (resp. first difference regressions for Congress period 78-83 and 83-88). Panel A reports 2SLS results, while Panel B presents first stage estimates. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population and control for state by year fixed effects and include interactions between period dummies and: i) the 1940 black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. First difference regressions do not include interactions with period dummies since these are automatically dropped. F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Robust standard errors, clustered at the congressional district level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

D.7.3 Redistricting, Black Inflows, and Political Outcomes

One potential concern with results in Section 6 is that the decision of redistricting a CD may have been at least partly driven by the arrival of African Americans. If this were to be the case, and if redistricting had an effect on political outcomes, our results may be biased. As noted in Appendix B, until 1964 (i.e. the end of our sample period), redistricting was unlikely to be strategic (Engstrom, 2013), and was typically mandated at the state level. We exploit the fact that between Congress 78 and Congress 82, five states in our sample (Arizona, Illinois, New York, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) required their CDs to redistrict, and test whether redistricting was systematically correlated with either Black inflows or changes in political conditions (e.g. party switches, changes in legislators’ ideology, etc.).⁸¹

In Table D.26, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a CD belongs to a state that did not mandate redistricting, and is regressed against: i) changes in the Black share (with OLS in column 1 and with 2SLS in column 2); ii) a dummy if the CD underwent a party switch; iii) the change in the Bateman et al. (2017) ideology score (column 4); and iv) the number of discharge petitions signed per legislator (column 5). Since the dependent variable varies at the state level, we cannot control for state fixed effects; yet, we include (as in our baseline specifications) the 1940 Black share and the 1940 Democratic dummy. Reassuringly, the coefficient is never statistically significant, does not display any systematic pattern, and is always quantitatively small. Overall, this exercise thus suggests that neither changes in the Black share nor changes in political conditions were systematically associated with state-mandated redistricting.

Next, we inspect more directly the possibility that Black inflows led to strategic gerrymandering across CDs. In particular, we rely on the measure of (non-)compactness recently introduced by Kaufman et al. (2017), which is based on the geographic shape of CDs, and captures the “compactness evaluations” made by judges and public officials responsible for redistricting.⁸² We prefer to use this measure, instead of an alternative proxy based on the vote distribution, because it provides evidence of (potential) gerrymandering at the CD level. In turn, this allows us to investigate the relationship between non-compactness and Black inflows. The measure of compactness can take values between 1 and 100, with higher values indicating less compact districts, i.e. a higher probability of gerrymandering.

⁸¹This check cannot be performed between Congress 83 and Congress 88 because most CDs were subject to redistricting in this period.

⁸²We thank the authors for making their codes available to us.

We start by analyzing descriptively the trends of non-compactness between Congress 71 and Congress 90 in Figure D.4. Consistent with the existing literature discussed in Appendix B, for the period considered in our analysis – between Congress 78 and Congress 88 – average compactness changes very little. Reassuringly, other aggregate measures, such as the standard deviation and the interquantile range, do not show any detectable changes either (not shown). Interestingly, and again consistent with existing studies, non-compactness starts to increase precisely after Congress 88, suggesting that after 1964 strategic gerrymandering might have become gradually more common.

Then, we study the relationship between Black inflows and non-compactness during our sample period. To do so, we proceed as follows. First, we assign the 1940-1950 (resp. 1950-1960) change in the Black share to each Congress in the 78-82 (resp. 83-88) Congress period. Second, we estimate 2SLS regressions where the dependent variable is the measure of non-compactness specific to each Congress number (for the relevant decade) and the main regressor of interest is the instrumented change in the Black share. Figure D.5 reports the implied 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) from previous regressions corresponding to a one standard deviation change in the Black share.


If the arrival of African Americans induced northern politicians to strategically change the boundaries of CDs, we would expect the association between changes in the Black share and non-compactness to increase over time. Reassuringly, there is no statistically significant relationship between the change in the Black share and the measure of non-compactness in any Congress year. Our estimates are also quantitatively small. For instance, one standard deviation increase in the Black share (around 2.8 percentage points) increases compactness of Congress 78 by 2 points – a negligible effect when compared to a mean of 45 and to a standard deviation of 16. Moreover, coefficients do not display any increasing trend over time, suggesting that strategic gerrymandering in response to Black arrivals was very unlikely to occur during our sample period.

Table D.26. Redistricting Checks

Dep. Variable	1[Non-Redistricting State]				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Change Black Share	0.014 (0.013)	0.039 (0.038)			
Party Switch			0.084 (0.061)		
Change Ideology Scores				-0.007 (0.049)	
Signatures on Discharge Petitions					-0.035 (0.023)
F-Stat		17.31			
Observations	286	286	286	286	298


Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the CD belongs to a state that did not mandate redistricting between Congress 78 and Congress 82. In columns 1 and 2, the main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share during the 1940-1950 decade. Column 1 (resp. column 2) presents OLS (resp. 2SLS) results. Columns 3, 4, and 5 regress the redistricting state dummy against, respectively, a dummy equal to 1 if the CD experienced a party transition during the 78-82 Congress period, the change in Bateman et al. (2017) scores, and the signatures on discharge petitions per legislator. All regressions control for the 1940 Black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. Robust standard errors, clustered at the CD level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Figure D.4. Average Non-Compactness, Congress 71st-90th



Notes: The figure presents the area-weighted average non-compactness for each Congress between Congress 71 and Congress 90. The red, vertical lines, corresponding to Congresses 78 and 88 isolate the sample period considered in our paper.

Figure D.5. Black In-Migration and Non-Compactness



Notes: The figure presents the 2SLS coefficient with the corresponding 95% confidence interval implied by one standard deviation change in the Black share during the corresponding decade. The dependent variable is the CD non-compactness score from Kaufman et al. (2017). The main regressor of interest is the 1940 to 1950 (resp. 1950 to 1960) change in the Black share for Congresses between 78 and 82 (resp. between 83 and 88), and is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text. All regressions control for state dummies, for the 1940 Black share, and for a dummy equal to 1 if the district was represented by a Democrat in each Congress.

E Additional Results

E.1 Additional Evidence on Demand for Civil Rights

E.1.1 Electoral Outcomes

Columns 1 to 3 of Table E.1 replicate the analysis conducted in the main text (Section 5.1) separately for each of the three decades, focusing on the preferred specification (Table 2, column 6). The Great Migration had a very strong effect on the Democratic vote share in the 1940-1950 (column 1) and, though to a lesser extent, in the 1960-1970 (column 3) decades. Conversely, the point estimate becomes smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant for the 1950s (column 2). Turnout follows a similar pattern, with a higher point estimate in the 1940s and in the 1960s, but results are imprecise and never statistically significant.

One interpretation of these findings is that the 1940s saw the dawn of the civil rights movement, which was partly spurred by the Double V Campaign organized by African American activists during WWII (Qian and Tabellini, 2020). The 1960s culminated with the passage of the CRA and the VRA and, even though in the later period whites' backlash erupted in many northern and western cities (Collins and Margo, 2007; Reny and Newman, 2018), this may have been partly offset by greater engagement among Black Americans. The lack of significance and the smaller magnitude of the coefficient for the 1950s is consistent with the idea that the economic downturn at least temporarily halted the progress of race relations, and cooled off whites' support for racial equality (Sugrue, 2014).

As discussed in Schickler (2016), support for racial equality was stronger within the local fringes of the Democratic Party. Moreover, when it came to national politics, African Americans remained more skeptical about the commitment of Democrats to the civil rights cause. Replicating the preferred specification of Table 2 in the main text for Presidential elections, column 4 of Table E.1 confirms this idea. For the Democratic vote share (Panel A), the coefficient on the change in the Black share remains statistically significant and positive, but is one third smaller than for Congressional elections. The point estimate on turnout (Panel B) is somewhat larger, but not statistically significant.

E.1.2 CORE Demonstrations

Using detailed information on the cause and the target of the protest available in the CORE dataset, we classified the pro-civil rights demonstrations in different categories. Figure E.1 plots the number of events in each of the top four categories – discrimination in access to goods and services (e.g. restaurants or hotels), school segregation, residential segregation, and police brutality – as a share of all demonstrations in our sample.⁸³ Each bar in the figure also indicates the share of events within each category that concerned national (dotted bar area) and local (Black bar area) issues. Almost two thirds of the events concerned local issues – such as boycotting a local taxi company for its discriminating hiring process in Seattle or protesting against a white-only barbershop in Chicago – but there existed substantial heterogeneity across categories. For instance, while more than 80% of the events organized to demand a reduction in residential discrimination were focused on local issues, almost 40% of demonstrations in the “access to goods” category were conducted on a more national platform.

Relying on this classification, Figure E.2 replicates the analysis of Table 3 (column 6) in the main text for each category separately. The first four dots from the left report 2SLS coefficients when the dependent variable is the change in the probability of demonstrations for each of the causes reported in Figure E.1. The remaining two crosses on the right report results for the change in the probability of local and national demonstrations respectively.⁸⁴ Even though the point estimate is always positive, it is statistically significant and quantitatively larger for protests against discrimination in access to goods and services and against school segregation (first and second dots from the left). The coefficient is also larger and more precisely estimated for demonstrations with local, rather than national, targets – something to be expected, since the CORE was operating through local branches.

⁸³Since events were classified according to either the cause or the target of the demonstration, the categories in Figure E.1 do not add to one.

⁸⁴Table E.2 presents the corresponding 2SLS coefficients.

Table E.1. Congressional Elections by Decade and Presidential Elections

Dep. Variable	Congressional Elections			Presidential Elections
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Democrat vote share</i>				
Change Black Share	3.051** (1.513)	0.461 (0.317)	2.374*** (0.608)	0.577*** (0.144)
<i>Panel B: Turnout</i>				
Change Black Share	1.035 (0.695)	0.033 (0.337)	0.504 (0.490)	0.550** (0.215)
<i>Panel C: First stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	0.787*** (0.244)	1.175*** (0.305)	1.412*** (0.441)	1.148*** (0.311)
F-Stat	10.41	14.84	10.27	13.21
Observations	1,139	1,139	1,140	3,416
Decade	1940s	1950s	1960s	All
Avg. Change Black Share	1.384	1.994	2.331	1.907


Notes: The sample includes the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. The table replicates column 6 of Table 2 for Congressional elections separately for each decade in columns 1 to 3, and for Presidential elections in column 4. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republicans vote share. In column 4, these controls are interacted with period dummies. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table E.2. CORE Demonstrations, by Type

Dep. Variable	Cause			Relevance			
	All	School/ College	Housing	Police Brutality	Access to Goods	Local	National
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>							
Change Black Share	0.047*** (0.011)	0.025* (0.013)	0.019 (0.012)	0.011 (0.010)	0.049*** (0.012)	0.053*** (0.011)	0.020* (0.012)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>							
Predicted Change Black Share	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.311)	1.148*** (0.311)
F-Stat	13.65	13.65	13.65	13.65	13.65	13.65	13.65
Observations	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418	3,418


Notes: The sample includes the 1,139 non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for the definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, and with at least one African American resident in 1940. Panel A (resp. B) reports 2SLS (resp. first stage) estimates. The dependent variable is the decadal change in the probability of a protest in each category occurring over a decade. The main regressor of interest is the change in the Black share, which is instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in equation (2) in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 county population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parenthesis. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Figure E.1. Frequency of CORE Demonstrations, by Type



Notes: The figure plots the number of CORE demonstrations as share of all events occurring in our sample period, for each of the four main categories described in the text. The portion of the bar filled with oblique lines (resp. dots) refers to the share of events of each category that involved local (resp. national) issues.

Figure E.2. Effects of Black in-Migration on CORE Demonstrations, by Type



Notes: The figure plots the 2SLS coefficient (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effects of the change in the Black share on the change in CORE demonstrations. The first dot from the left considers all demonstrations in our sample; the next four dots refer to each specific cause, reported on the x-axis; the last two dots on the right refer to demonstrations that involved, respectively, local and national issues. All regressions are weighed by 1940 population, and include interactions between period dummies and: *i*) state fixed effects; *ii*) the 1940 Black share; and *iii*) a dummy equal to 1 if the Democratic vote share in 1940 was higher than the Republican vote share. The corresponding estimates are reported in Table E.2.

E.2 Additional Evidence on Mechanisms

E.2.1 Bounds on Whites' Voting Behavior

As discussed in Section 5.1 of the paper, the fact that changes in the Black share increased the Democratic vote share by more than one for one points to the importance of changes in northern voters' behavior. While northern Black residents certainly played a role, in order to explain our previous estimates, at least some white residents had to switch to the Democratic Party too. In Figure E.3, we provide bounds on the number of white voters who had to switch from the Republican to the Democratic Party in order to match the 2SLS coefficient estimated in column 6 of Table 2 in the main text for the average county in our sample, under different assumptions on turnout and voting preferences of African Americans.⁸⁵

Red diamonds represent the number of votes for the Democratic Party that are implied by the coefficient in Table 2, column 6, following one percentage point increase in the Black share for the average county in our sample. The light blue (resp. dark blue) parts of each bar represent the number of votes from northern Black (resp. white) residents in 1940, before the inflow of African American migrants. The grey area refers to votes for the Democratic Party cast by Black migrants, whereas the white area stands for the total number of Black voters who, in a given scenario, could theoretically switch to the Democratic party in response to the Great Migration. Whenever the diamond falls within the white area of the bar, there are enough African American voters who can switch from the GOP to the Democratic Party to match the coefficient estimated in our preferred specification. When, instead, there is a gap between the bar and the diamond, at least some white voters would need to change their voting behavior to explain our results.

We consider three difference scenarios. In all cases, we fix the turnout rate for Black northern residents at 50%.⁸⁶ The first bar from the left assumes that, consistent with Bositis (2012), 70% of African American northern residents voted for the Democratic Party. We instead make the extreme assumption that all Black migrants immediately voted, and that all of them voted for the Democratic Party. Under this (rather unrealistic) scenario, if Black northerners switched first, no white voter would have to change

⁸⁵When performing this exercise, we fix turnout, assuming that the inflow of Black migrants may have changed the preferences of northern residents without altering the number of voters. This assumption is consistent with results for turnout obtained in Panel B of Table 2.

⁸⁶We chose this number so that it is roughly 30% lower than the average turnout in our sample (70%). The exact figures do not matter for our results.

her voting behavior in order to explain the coefficient in our preferred specification. This is because, under our assumptions about Black voters' behavior, there would still be "enough" African Americans that could potentially switch, before any white does so. Assuming that only 70% of Black migrants voted upon arrival, but that all of them voted for Democrats, yields similar results (second bar from the left). However, in this case, African American northern residents are just enough for the white area to reach the red diamond.

Finally, we consider a more realistic scenario, where turnout of both northern Black residents and Black migrants were 50%, and 70% of voters in both groups voted for Democrats.⁸⁷ In this case, northern Black voters alone are no longer sufficient to explain our results, and some whites would also have to switch from the GOP to the Democratic Party in response to Black arrivals (third bar from the left).⁸⁸ In the figure, the number of white switchers corresponds to the gap between the red diamond and the white portion of the bar. Under the third scenario, approximately two white voters would have to switch for every ten Black migrants to explain the 2SLS coefficient estimated in Table 2.

Clearly, this exercise is not meant to compute the exact number of white and Black voters switching to the Democratic Party for each new Black migrant. Our goal is instead to show that, under reasonable assumptions, Black migrants' behavior alone is not sufficient to explain the increase in the Democratic vote share estimated in Section 5.1, and that at least some northern residents – both Black *and* whites – started to vote for the Democrats.

E.2.2 Evidence from Gallup

Table E.3 complements the analysis presented in Section 5.3.2 of the paper using data from Gallup for the 1963 and 1964 waves (see Appendix C.2.2 for more details on the data). Consistent with results obtained when using data from the ANES, white respondents living in states that received more Black migrants were less likely to object to the idea of racial mixing in schools (column 1), more likely to state that they would vote for a Black president were their party to nominate one (column 2), and more supportive of the CRA (column 3). There is instead no relationship between the Great Migration and respondents' views on whether the process of racial integration was

⁸⁷Given the evidence in Bosisis (2012), we consider the assumption that 70% of registered Black Americans – both northern residents and migrants – voted Democratic the most preferred one.

⁸⁸It is also possible that Black in-migration induced previously disengaged whites to start voting.

proceeding at the right pace (column 4).⁸⁹

E.2.3 Evidence on the Role of Labor Unions from the ANES

In Section 5.3.2 of the paper we discussed the role that labor unions might have played in increasing demand for racial equality in the northern and western electorate. Here, we provide two more pieces of evidence on this mechanism using the ANES data. First, we investigate the heterogeneity behind results presented in column 5 of Table 5, which showed that the Great Migration was positively correlated with the probability that white respondents considered the civil rights issue as the most important problem for the country. Figure E.4 documents that these patterns are significantly stronger for union members (second, black bar) and for Democrats (fourth, blue bar).⁹⁰ If anything, for Republicans we observe a negative, albeit not statistically significant, relationship between state level increases in the Black share and support for civil rights. Since union status and partisanship may be endogenous to the Great Migration, results in Figure E.4 should be viewed as merely suggestive. However, they paint a picture coherent with our previous discussion.

Second, we exploit the fact that, in 1964, the ANES included questions on respondents' "feeling thermometers" towards different political, demographic, and socioeconomic groups, with higher values reflecting warmer feelings towards a group. 2SLS estimates in Table E.5 show that Black inflows were positively associated with feelings towards Democrats (column 1) and labor unions (column 2). The 1940-1960 change in the Black share was also positively correlated with whites' feelings thermometers towards African Americans (column 3) and the NAACP (column 4), even though these results are not statistically significant.

E.2.4 Residential Segregation and Independent Local Governments

The lack of (between county) white flight and the higher support for civil rights among some white voters do not imply that white residents welcomed Black migrants into their neighborhoods. In fact, Black migration may have increased racial segregation and efforts of whites to avoid sharing public goods with Black Americans (Alesina et al., 1999, 2004). In this section, we confirm that these patterns were at play in our

⁸⁹The number of observations varies substantially across questions, since some of these were asked repeatedly during 1963 and 1964. This was particularly true for the question on the pace of racial integration (column 4).

⁹⁰See Table E.4 for the 2SLS coefficients plotted in Figure E.4.

context. We also provide evidence that this mechanism may have amplified, rather than dampening, the positive effect of the Great Migration on demand for civil rights. On the one hand, residential segregation may have diffused whites' animosity triggered by the inflow of Black migrants into white neighborhoods. On the other hand, segregation might have sustained and reinforced perceptions among liberal whites that the civil rights legislation was mostly about the South, and that their privileges would not be significantly eroded.

Column 1 of Table E.6 provides evidence consistent with these ideas focusing on CORE demonstrations. Panel A replicates results in Table 3 (column 6), whereas Panels B and C split the sample in counties with 1940 residential segregation (constructed using the procedure in Logan and Parman, 2017) below and above the median, respectively. The F-stat falls below conventional levels in Panel C, and so results should be interpreted with caution. However, the pattern that emerges is clear: Black in-migration increased the frequency of pro-civil rights demonstrations only in counties with higher residential segregation. Said differently, support for civil rights increased *more* in counties where inter-group contact in the housing market was *lower*. This may have happened because residents of initially segregated counties had little contact with Black Americans, and were able to further isolate themselves from inter-racial tensions that Black migration may have brought to neighborhoods and housing markets. To achieve this goal, whites could create more homogeneous local jurisdictions.

In columns 2 to 5 of Table E.6, we examine whether the Great Migration increased the number of local jurisdictions using data from the Census of Government. We replicate the regressions in column 1 focusing on the change in the (log of) number of: *i*) total jurisdictions (column 2); *ii*) school districts (column 3); *iii*) special districts (column 4); and, *iv*) municipalities (column 5). In the full sample (Panel A), Black in-migration had a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of local jurisdictions (column 2) – a pattern driven entirely by school districts (column 3). Yet, this happened only in counties with residential segregation above the median (Panel C).

One interpretation, consistent with the historical evidence (Sugrue, 2008), is that, since higher residential segregation lowered the probability that Black and white pupils shared the same school district, whites' incentives to create local jurisdictions were stronger in more segregated counties. Coupled with findings in column 1, this suggests that population sorting within counties and the creation of independent jurisdictions

might have reduced potential backlash by allowing whites to live in racially homogeneous communities, where the probability of sharing public goods with Black Americans was low.

Table E.3. Additional Evidence on Whites' Attitudes: Gallup

Dep. Variable	1[Object to Half Pupils in School]	1[Vote for Black Candidate]	1[Approve Civil Rights Act]	1[Racial Integration: Right Pace vs Not Fast Enough]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	-0.051*** (0.019)	0.088*** (0.025)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.008 (0.012)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	2.025*** (0.209)	2.191*** (0.352)	2.177*** (0.322)	2.248*** (0.302)
F-Stat	93.71	38.79	45.67	55.30
Observations	851	2,073	931	17,478
Mean Dep. Variable	0.289	0.525	0.705	0.319

Notes: The sample is restricted to white Gallup respondents living in the US North and to years 1963-1964. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if respondent: i) objects to having half of the classroom composed of Black pupils (column 1); ii) would vote for a Black candidate, were her party nominating one (column 2); iii) approves the Civil Rights Act introduced in 1964 (column 3); and iv) thinks that the process of racial integration is occurring at the right pace or not fast enough (column 4). All regressions include region and survey year fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender and age and education fixed effects) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Panel B reports the first stage. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.4. Probability that Civil Rights is Most Important Issue for Whites

Dep. Variable	1[Pro Civil Rights: Most Important Problem]					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	0.107*** (0.020)	0.002 (0.007)	0.032** (0.015)	-0.000 (0.010)	-0.020 (0.013)	0.025** (0.011)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	2.138*** (0.319)	2.186*** (0.316)	2.247*** (0.337)	2.148*** (0.309)	2.149*** (0.297)	2.235*** (0.334)
F-Stat	44.95	47.95	44.36	48.41	52.28	44.66
Observations	465	1,133	670	930	517	1,083
Sample	union members	non-union members	identified democrat	identified non-democrat	identified republican	identified non-republican
Mean Dep. Var.	0.53	0.53	0.49	0.52	0.54	0.48

Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North in years 1960 and 1964. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent reports that supporting civil rights is among the most important issues facing the country at the time of the interview (see online appendix D for exact wording and additional details on the construction of the variable). The regressor of interest is the change in the Black share at the state level between 1940 and 1960, which is instrumented with the predicted number of Black migrants over 1940 state population. All regressions include survey year and region fixed effects and individual controls of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects and marital status), and control for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). Each column restricts attention to white respondents who belong to the group reported at the bottom of the table. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Panel B reports the first stage. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.5. Whites' Feeling Thermometers

Dep. Variable	Feeling Thermometer Towards			
	(1) Democrats	(2) Unions	(3) Blacks	(4) NAACP
<i>Panel A. 2SLS</i>				
Change Black Share	2.646*** (0.863)	2.924*** (0.855)	0.843 (0.944)	1.329 (0.903)
<i>Panel B. First Stage</i>				
Predicted Change Black Share	2.045*** (0.276)	2.041*** (0.276)	2.041*** (0.276)	2.031*** (0.263)
F-stat	54.88	54.59	54.87	59.78
Observations	1,011	1,012	1,010	830
Mean Dep. Var.	68.70	57.64	60.82	53.55


Notes: The sample is restricted to white ANES respondents living in the US North in 1964. The dependent variable is the feeling thermometer towards each group at the top of the corresponding column. Higher values of the thermometer refer to warmer feelings. All regressions are weighed with ANES survey weights, include region fixed effects, and control for individual characteristics of respondents (gender, age and education fixed effects, and marital status) as well as for 1940 state characteristics (Black share; Democratic incumbency in Congressional elections; share in manufacturing; share of workers in the CIO; urban share). F-stat refers to the K-P F-stat for weak instrument. Panel B reports the first stage. Robust standard errors, clustered at the state level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table E.6. Black in-Migration, Residential Segregation, and Local Governments

Dep. Variable	Change in		Change Log(Number of local governments)			
	1[Pro-civil rights protest]	(1)	Total	School districts	Special districts	Municipalities
		(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
<i>Panel A: Full sample</i>						
Change Black Share	0.047*** (0.011)	0.052*** (0.010)	0.103*** (0.017)	0.000 (0.023)	0.008 (0.009)	
KP F-Stat	13.65	13.41	13.41	13.41	13.41	
Observations	3,418	3,399	3,399	3,399	3,399	
<i>Panel B: Residential segregation below median</i>						
Change Black Share	-0.004 (0.017)	0.014 (0.051)	-0.050 (0.086)	-0.056 (0.110)	0.037 (0.026)	
KP F-stat	14.66	14.66	14.66	14.66	14.66	
Observations	1,445	1,445	1,445	1,445	1,445	
<i>Panel C: Residential segregation above median</i>						
Change Black Share	0.053*** (0.023)	0.048*** (0.015)	0.109*** (0.025)	-0.028 (0.026)	0.018 (0.012)	
F-Stat	7.524	7.555	7.555	7.555	7.555	
Observations	1,443	1,428	1,428	1,428	1,428	

Notes: Panel A estimates the baseline specification with 2SLS (with interactions between period dummies and: i) 1940 Black share; ii) 1940 Democratic incumbency dummy; iii) state fixed effects). Panel B (resp. C) estimates the same set of regressions for counties with residential segregation below (resp. above) the sample median. Residential segregation refers to the index constructed in Logan and Parman (2017). The table reports 2SLS results replicating the baseline specification. All regressions are weighted by 1940 population. Standard errors, clustered at the county level, in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.


Figure E.3. Scenarios on Black Behavior and Implied Number of White Switchers



Notes: The red diamonds indicate the number of votes for the Democratic Party implied by the 2SLS point estimate in column 6 of Table 2 in a county with average native-born population and average change in the share of Black Americans. Bars indicate votes cast for the Democratic Party by different segments of the population under different assumptions about turnout and voting preferences of Black voters. In each scenario, “baseline” refers to voting behavior of Black and white northern residents prior to the arrival of southern Black migrants. “Potential Black switchers” is the total number of Black voters voting for the Republicans (and could thus potentially switch to the Democratic party) in each scenario.

Scenario 1: turnout is 70% for northern voters, all Black migrants voted, 70% of northern Black residents, and all Black migrants voted Democrats. *Scenario 2:* Black turnout rate is 50%, 70% of northern Black residents, and all Black migrants voted for Democrats, given a turnout rate of 70% among migrants. *Scenario 3:* Black turnout rate is 50%, 70% of Black voters (both migrants and northern residents) voted for Democrats.

Figure E.4. Probability that Civil Rights is Most Important Issue for Whites



Notes: The figure plots 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for a regression where the dependent variable is the “pro civil rights” dummy reported in Table 5. The first two bars refer to respondents who are not and who are union members (light and dark colors respectively); the third and fourth (resp. fifth and sixth) bars restrict attention to individuals who are not and who are Democrats (resp. Republicans), with darker colors referring to members of the group.

E.3 Supply of Civil Rights: Discharge Petitions

As discussed in Section 6.1.2, when focusing on signatures on discharge petitions, we can estimate a specification in (first) differences only for the 78-82 Congress period. This is because, during the 82-88 Congress period, there were not enough petitions filed both at the beginning and at the end of the decade. To partly overcome this limitation, we thus stack the data from the two Congress periods, and estimate a “levels on changes” regression. The key limitation of this strategy is that unobservable CD fixed characteristics cannot be controlled for. However, it allows us to provide evidence also for the second Congress period.

We report 2SLS results in Panel A of Table E.7.⁹¹ In columns 1 to 3 (resp. 4 to 6), the dependent variable is the number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislator signed (resp. the share of petitions signed prior to the 50th signature) during the 78-82 and the 83-88 Congress periods.⁹² 2SLS coefficients show that Black in-migration was positively associated with a higher number of signatures per legislator. Moreover, legislators representing CDs that received more African Americans were more likely to sign petitions earlier in the process – a pattern consistent with higher legislators’ support for civil rights legislation (Schickler, 2016).

⁹¹We estimate our preferred specification, always controlling for interactions between period dummies and *i*) state dummies; *ii*) the baseline Black share in the CD; *iii*) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the CD at baseline; and *iv*) the baseline Bateman et al. (2017) score in the CD. When estimating first difference regressions separately by decade, we only include the variables in *i*) to *iv*) (with only one period, the interaction with a period dummy is equivalent to un-interacted controls). Panel B reports the first stage.

⁹²Only one petition was filed during Congress 82, obtaining merely 16 signatures (Table C.1). For this reason, defining the end (resp. the beginning) of the first (resp. second) Congress period with Congress 82 or Congress 83 makes no difference.

Table E.7. Discharge Petitions (Levels on Changes)

Dep. Variable	Number of Petitions per Legislator			Share of Petitions Signed Before 50 th Signature		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS</i>						
Change Black Share	0.216* (0.123)	0.412 (0.269)	0.138* (0.078)	0.030** (0.013)	0.053* (0.028)	0.020* (0.012)
<i>Panel B: First stage</i>						
Predicted Change Black Share	1.357*** (0.405)	0.940*** (0.326)	1.649*** (0.471)	1.357*** (0.405)	0.940*** (0.326)	1.649*** (0.471)
F-stat	11.24	7.218	10.69	11.24	7.218	10.69
Observations	588	294	294	588	294	294
Congress Period	78-82; 83-88	78-82	83-88	78-82; 83-88	78-82	83-88

Notes: The sample includes the 298 non-southern Congressional Districts that were representing non-southern US counties (see Table A.1 for our definition of southern states) for which electoral returns in Congressional elections are available for all Census years between 1940 and 1970, with at least one African American resident in 1940, and for which data on signatures for discharge petitions (Pearson and Schickler, 2009) were available. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the total number of signatures on discharge petitions per legislators during Congresses. In columns 4-6, the dependent variable is the share of discharge petitions signed before the 50th signature. Columns 1 and 4 refer to both Congress periods 78-82 and 83-88, columns 2 and 5 to Congresses 78-82 and columns 3 and 6 to Congresses 83-88. The main regressor of interest is the decadal change in the Black share in the Congressional District instrumented with the shift-share instrument described in the text. All regressions are weighed by 1940 congressional district population, include state fixed effects, and control for: i) the 1940 Black share in the congressional district; ii) a dummy for Democratic incumbency in the 78th Congress in the district; and iii) the ideology score in the district in the 78th Congress. F-stat is the K-P F-stat for weak instruments. Robust standard errors, clustered at the Congressional District level, in parenthesis Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.