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Local inequalities of the COVID-19 crisis

Augusto Cerqua\textsuperscript{1}, Marco Letta\textsuperscript{2}

Abstract

This paper assesses the impact of the first wave of the pandemic on the local economies of one of the hardest-hit countries, Italy. We combine quarterly local labor market data with the new machine learning control method for counterfactual building. Our results document that the economic effects of the COVID-19 shock are dramatically unbalanced across the Italian territory and spatially uncorrelated with the epidemiological pattern of the first wave. The heterogeneity of employment losses is associated with exposure to social aggregation risks and pre-existing labor market fragilities. Finally, we quantify the protective role played by the labor market interventions implemented by the government and show that, while effective, they disproportionately benefitted the most developed Italian regions. Such diverging trajectories and unequal policy effects call for a place-based policy approach that promptly addresses the uneven economic geography of the current crisis.

JEL Codes: C53; D22, E24; R12

Keywords: impact evaluation; counterfactual approach; machine learning; local labor markets; COVID-19; Italy

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**Introduction**

With over 127,000 deaths and more than 4,250,000 cases (as of July, 2021), Italy ranks among the worst-hit countries by COVID-19.\(^3\) The Italian government was the first in Europe to declare, on March 9, 2020, an unprecedented national lockdown that paralyzed the country. From March 25, productive activities were shut down, except for those deemed ‘essential’ for the functioning of the country’s economic system. On May 4, lockdown rules started to be lifted, and, from June 15, almost all economic activities were finally allowed to re-open, albeit under strict safety protocols. The suspension of restrictive measures continued throughout the summer until the impressive resurgence of the contagion in the fall of 2020 forced the government and regional authorities to issue new social distancing policies, including the reintroduction of restrictive measures targeting economic activities.

The Italian government tried to attenuate the impacts of such disruptive events via the adoption of several emergency measures and fiscal packages.\(^4\) In order to increase workers’ protection, the government also issued an *ad hoc* Decree-Law on March 17, 2020, which introduced two exceptional labor market policies: a special COVID-19 short-time work retroactive compensation scheme and a freezing of layoffs, which have been repeatedly extended over time and are still in place at the time of writing.

Despite the implementation of a wide range of policy interventions, Italy’s GDP contracted by 9.2% in 2020.\(^5\) Besides, the Bank of Italy reports for 2020, a reduction of 11% in the number of hours worked and a decrease of 1.9% in the number of persons employed.

Remarkably, *ex-post* evaluations of the spatial distribution of the economic effects of the crisis are still missing. Such a vacuum was hardly surprising initially, as real-time microdata is scarce, but as the epidemiological impacts finally attenuate, there is a strong case for a comprehensive analysis of the economic geography of the pandemic crisis. On top of data scarcity, rigorous impact evaluation is challenging for econometric issues: the COVID-19 shock virtually left no territory unaffected. In econometric jargon, this means that it is hard to find a control group because the treatment affected

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\(^3\) See [https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/italy/](https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/country/italy/).


all units simultaneously or with short lags. As noted by Chudik et al. (2020), this implies that in most contexts, standard evaluation techniques, such as difference-in-difference or the synthetic control method (SCM), are not applicable. This is probably the reason why, although micro literature on the pandemic is flourishing (Adams-Prassl et al., 2020; Baker et al., 2020; Bartik et al., 2020; Benedetti et al., 2020; Bick & Blandin, 2020; Bloom et al., 2021; Blundell et al., 2020; Buchheim et al., 2020; Cajner et al., 2020; Carvalho et al., 2020; Forsythe et al., 2020; Gourinchas et al., 2020; Von Gaudecker et al., 2020), almost all these works are not based on counterfactual impact evaluation methodologies. A notable exception is the study by Chetty et al. (2020), who employ private real-time anonymized data and an evaluation strategy that exploits between-state heterogeneity in the reopening’s timing to document the granular impact of the pandemic and the related policy responses on various economic outcomes in the United States.

Concerning Italy, Ascani et al. (2021) provide evidence of a close relationship between COVID-19 disease patterns and local economies’ characteristics. Casarico and Lattanzio (2020) focus on how different categories of workers were affected by the pandemic in the short-term and carry out a first evaluation of the policy responses implemented. Through a linear probability model, they find that workers already in disadvantaged conditions before the shock (young, low-skilled, and seasonal workers) have substantially higher risks of losing their jobs. Using data from the Italian Labor Force Survey, Carta and De Philippis (2021) simulate the pandemic’s effects on the labor income distribution of Italian households in the first two quarters of 2020, and assess the effects of government policies to reduce labor income losses. Their estimates suggest that the social insurance policies adopted by the Italian government were effective in preventing a significant increase in income inequality, and that the pandemic increased labor market income inequality by impacting low-income households more severely.

6 There are some exceptions: in countries and areas where no total lockdowns were implemented, one might exploit staggered or heterogeneous policy responses to generate a counterfactual scenario (see the study by Chetty et al. (2020) mentioned below). This is not the case of Italy. Yet, one could argue that since the spread of the contagion in the first wave was highly heterogeneous and predominantly affected Northern Italian regions, it would be possible to use the Southern regions as a control group or to consider the shock as ‘continuous’ treatment with different intensity levels. However, we disagree with the premise. The national lockdown implemented during the first wave involved the entire country.

7 To make up for this, Chudik et al. (2020) develop a cross-country econometric model in which the Covid-19 shock is identified using the IMF’s GDP growth forecast revisions between January and April 2020, under the assumption that Covid-19 was the main driver of these forecast revisions. In this way, they use the difference in the forecasts as a counterfactual strategy to quantify the economic impact of the shock.
These studies underline important local and sectoral components of the impacts of the crisis in Italy. Indeed, in Europe as elsewhere, the current crisis is undoubtedly a regional one, because the economic impacts are unfolding unevenly at the local level, so regional perspectives are essential to understand the unequal impacts of the pandemic (Bailey et al., 2020).

This article quantifies and maps the heterogeneous impacts of the first COVID-19 wave (February-September 2020) on labor and firm outcomes for all 610 Italian local labor markets (LLMs), investigates the main territorial features of such unevenness, and estimates the unequal geographic effects of the policies adopted in response to the crisis. To this end, we leverage quarterly LLMs data, collected from the Business Register kept by the Union of the Italian Chambers of Commerce, combined with a counterfactual application of machine learning (ML) techniques, namely the newly developed machine learning approach for counterfactual building (Varian, 2016; Burlig et al., 2020) which we call the Machine Learning Control Method (MLCM). The MLCM draws on the predictive ability of ML algorithms to generate a no-COVID counterfactual scenario (i.e. a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario) in such a peculiar econometric setting. The use of the MLCM is made possible by constructing a comprehensive time-series cross-sectional database on LLMs.

Thanks to this counterfactual approach, we document that at the end of the third quarter of 2020, the shock has not only already caused a steep decrease in firm entry and a moderate drop in employment and firm exit at the aggregate level but, more importantly, that the effects have been markedly heterogeneous across the Italian territory. In the following step, we use a regression tree to identify the features that matter the most in explaining the heterogeneity of the main outcome variable, i.e. the estimated treatment effect of employment change. We find that the features more significantly associated with employment effects are the share of workers in sectors characterized by frequent contacts with other subjects in addition to the company’s workers and pre-existing labor market fragilities. Finally, we quantify the protective role played by the labor market interventions implemented by the government. Our estimates, based on multiple Bayesian structural time-series analyses, show that, while very effective on average, the protective labor market policies disproportionately benefitted the most developed Italian regions.

2. Data

Our primary dependent variable is the log of overall employment. In addition, we also split employment between manufacturing and services, and investigate the impact of COVID-19 on the

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8 The criteria used to determine Italian LLMs are similar to those used to define Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the US or Travel to Work Areas in the UK.
number of new business registrations (births) and cessations of trading (deaths). All these variables come from the Business Register kept by the Union of the Italian Chambers of Commerce (Unioncamere). The Business Register is based on administrative data on the Italian companies gathered by the provincial Chambers of Commerce. It contains information on the registration data of the universe of Italian private non-financial sector firms. The Business Register quarterly data on local employment have been made available by the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS) since the third trimester of 2014.

To estimate the impact of COVID-19 on each LLM, we build a comprehensive, balanced panel of all 610 Italian LLMs from 2016 Q3 to 2020 Q3 and employ the random forest algorithm described in Section 3. The counterfactual is estimated by controlling for the industrial structure of each LLM. To this end, we exploit the classification by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat), which splits the Italian LLMs into four classes: without specialization, non-manufacturing, made in Italy, and other manufacturing. Furthermore, in light of the expected plunge in tourism-related employment, we split the non-manufacturing class into touristic and non-touristic. We then control for LLM size, geographical dummies (North-East, North-West, Centre and South), population density, unemployment rate, activity rate, yearly and quarterly fixed effects, and trends in employment, business births, and business deaths. For each of the latter three variables, we control for two lags of the same quarter, the lags of the four preceding quarters, and four lags of the yearly averages. The total number of features included in the counterfactual analysis is 54.

In the second phase of the empirical analysis, the association analysis uses the estimated COVID-19 impact on employment for all LLMs as the outcome of interest to uncover its primary predictors. For this analysis, we collected variables plausibly correlated with the employment change due to COVID-19. We use the dependency ratio to control for the population structure and its implications for the productive part of the population. As a measure of the spread of COVID-19, we use the excess mortality estimates provided by Cerqua et al. (2021), updated to 30 September 2020. We also employ two variables which capture the criticality of the tasks performed by employees, the possibility of exposure to the virus and physical proximity to the workplace, all highlighted as relevant factors in the literature (see Barbieri et al., 2020): the share of jobs having a high risk of

9 Please note that for business demography variables, instead, the sample starts from 2015 Q1.

10 The ‘made in Italy’ manufacturing LLMs are characterized by industrial districts. Most of them are specialized in the manufacture of food products, furniture, textiles, apparel, leather and footwear.

11 This data is publicly available here: https://www.stimecomunalicovid19.com/.
social aggregation and the share of jobs having a high ‘integrated’ risk. These variables proxy for the demand-side changes due to peoples’ immediate response to the pandemic and are generated on the basis of the work conducted by an *ad hoc* task force, which linked a level of social aggregation to each economic sector (2-digit NACE Rev.2 classification) and integrated risks from low to high. Activities at high integrated risk are those associated with the risk of coming into contact with sources of contagion at work, especially those connected to work processes (e.g. human health services, sewerage, public administration and defense), while activities at high risk of social aggregation are those that involve contact with other subjects in addition to the company’s workers (e.g. catering, entertainment, hospitality).

As the geography of industries highly exposed to the ‘COVID-19 shock’ is heterogeneous (Krueger et al., 2020), we create a variable that incorporates the predicted supply-side sectoral shocks to each LLM. Specifically, we generate the share of jobs in suspended economic activities from March to May 2020. In addition, we build the share of temporary contracts as a metric for temporary jobs’ local relative importance.

Other economic variables included in this phase of the analysis are income per capita, unemployment rate, the share of innovative start-ups as a proxy for local innovation, and a measure of economic fragility, i.e. the share of firms having employees in *Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria* (CIGS), namely the most utilized Italian short-time work program providing subsidies for temporary reductions in the number of hours worked. We also add two variables that consider the densities of health care personnel and hospitals: i) the number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants, and ii) the share of workers employed in the NACE 2-digit sectors ‘human health activities’ and ‘residential care activities’.

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12 In April 2020, Italy’s Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte appointed Vittorio Colao, former Vodafone Group CEO, to lead a group of lawyers, economists, and experts, to outline a plan on how to restart the Italian economy after the coronavirus emergency. One of the group’s objectives was to reschedule the gradual reopening of economic activities based on two criteria: the risk of social aggregation and the ‘integrated’ risk.

13 The selection of these activities was carried out on the basis of the NACE Rev.2 classification.

14 Even if this variable refers to 2015, we argue that this is a valid proxy for 2020, as there is evidence of a strong temporal persistence in the variation of this variable across locations (Caselli et al., 2020).

15 CIGS targets firms experiencing economic shocks, broadly defined: it can be a demand or revenue shock, a company crisis, a need for restructuring or reorganization, a liquidity or insolvency issue, etc. CIGS is a subsidy for partial or full-time hour reductions, replacing approximately 80% of the worker’s earnings due to hours not worked, up to a cap (Giupponi & Landais, 2020).
Lastly, as mobility is one of the critical aspects linked to the epidemiological spread of COVID-19, we take this into account by using three variables:

- the number of road accidents per 10,000 inhabitants;
- the share of population living in peripheral areas;
- the index of relational intensity (IIRFL) within the local labor market. The higher the IIRFL, the greater the inter-municipal turbulence in terms of flows.

Finally, in the policy analysis, we leverage the total number of hours worked for each of the five Italian macro-areas (NUTS-1) to model employment trends in the no-policy scenario, using updated quarterly data drawn from the Italian Labor Force Survey.

In the Appendix, Table A1 includes a more detailed description of all the variables, while Table A2 provides descriptive statistics. The availability of these indicators will allow us to identify the LLM characteristics that matter the most in explaining the treatment effects’ heterogeneity.

3. Methods

Our empirical exercise consists of three tasks – a counterfactual analysis, an association analysis, and a policy analysis. For all three steps, we harness ML’s predictive power: the random forest algorithm for the counterfactual analysis, a regression tree for the association analysis, Bayesian structural time-series for the policy evaluation. Below, we discuss the three methodologies and their different purposes and empirical frameworks separately.

3.1 Counterfactual analysis: the machine learning control method

To tackle the econometric challenges related to the pandemic shock’s pervasive nature and establish causality, we draw on the newly developed MLCM to generate a counterfactual scenario in which the COVID-19 crisis never hit Italy. In other words, we employ the MLCM to address the fundamental problem of causal inference, i.e. the impossibility of observing the potential outcome in the no-treatment scenario, a curse that affects all LLMs.

Although ML algorithms primarily deal with out-of-sample predictions or ‘prediction policy problems’ (see Kleinberg et al., 2015), more recently, they have been combined with causal inference approaches (Athey & Imbens, 2016; Athey et al., 2017; Athey et al., 2019; Belloni et al., 2017; Varian, 2014, 2016; Wager & Athey, 2018). Varian (2014, 2016) was among the first to note that counterfactual building is essentially a predictive task, which is exactly the task at which ML excels. In a panel or time-series setting, he noted that one could exploit pre-treatment observations to generate
an artificial control group that acts as a counterfactual in the no-treatment, ‘business-as-usual’ scenario. This way, one could readily retrieve treatment effects as the difference between the observed outcome and the ML-generated potential outcome. Varian called this straightforward counterfactual method the ‘train-test-treat-compare’ process. This process is similar to the SCM developed by Abadie et al. (2010), with the key difference that it does not require the availability of untreated units, as it draws on pre-treatment information to generate a credible estimate of the ‘outcome for the treated if not treated’.

Early empirical applications of this intuitive methodology for counterfactual building have recently appeared (Abrell et al., 2019; Benatia, 2020; Benatia and de Villemeur, 2020; Bijnens et al., 2019; Burlig et al., 2020; Cerqua et al., 2021; Souza, 2019). Except Burlig et al. (2020) and Souza (2019), all the other studies cannot rely on an original control group in their research design because they only observe treated units in settings with simultaneous treatment, just as in our case.

Benatia (2020) and Cerqua et al. (2021) are the most closely related to this study because they both investigate the causal effects of the COVID-19 crisis. Benatia (2020) applies a neural network model to study the impact of containment measures on the demand reduction in New York’s electricity markets; Cerqua et al. (2021) employ three different ML routines (LASSO, random forest, and stochastic gradient boosting) to derive municipality-level excess mortality estimates during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy.

In the spirit of this nascent evaluation approach, we apply the MLCM to pursue our causal inference analysis of COVID-19 local economic impacts in Italy. Our artificial control group comes from an ML predictive model developed to forecast a post-treatment counterfactual for each LLM. In this way, under the crucial assumption of stable trends in the absence of the shock, we can assess the LLM-specific causal impact of the exogenous shock by comparing the observed post-shock trajectory with the most credible trajectory the LLM unit would have followed in a no-shock scenario. A critical requirement for this approach’s validity is that the predictive ML model must not include predictors that may be affected by the treatment (Varian, 2016). We avert this issue by employing only pre-2020 features in our counterfactual building. Finally, the use of the MLCM is made possible from the construction of a comprehensive time-series cross-sectional database on LLMs (see Section 2).

We apply a powerful and popular ML method: the random forest, which has been defined the most successful general-purpose algorithm in modern times (Howard & Bowles, 2012; Varian, 2014).  

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16 We also tested the forecasting performance of another well-known ML technique, the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO), but it was always inferior to that of the random forest.
The random forest is a fully non-linear technique based on the aggregation of many decision trees. In particular, random forest builds many trees (1000, in our case) based on bootstrapped training samples and, at each split of a tree, uses only a random subset of the predictors as split candidates, thus introducing a double layer of decorrelation of the trees from one another (Hastie et al., 2009).

Drawing from the routine established by Cerqua et al. (2021), our counterfactual analysis is based, for each outcome variable, on the following 7-step methodological sequence:

1) We randomly split the pre-2019 quarterly dataset into a training sample, made up of 80% of the LLMs, and a test set, consisting of the remaining 20%;\(^{17}\)

2) We train our random forest algorithm on the training set and perform a 10-fold cross-validation to select the best-performing tuning hyperparameter;\(^ {18}\)

3) We test the out-of-sample predictive performance on the corresponding pre-2019 testing sample;

4) We test model accuracy on the entire 2019 sample and compare its predictive performance with that of a before-after analysis, which has become a common and intuitive metric to gauge the magnitude of the pandemic’s impact;

5) We repeat the same routine on the entire pre-2020 dataset and finally predict, for the first three quarters of the 2020 sample, employment levels, business births, and business deaths in a ‘no-COVID’ (‘business-as-usual’) scenario;

6) We derive individual treatment effects for all LLMs as the difference between the observed 2020 outcomes and the ML-generated potential outcomes;

7) We map the individual treatment effects of the LLM-level economic impacts of COVID-19.

The critical assumption behind this MLCM routine is that the difference between our observed and counterfactual economic outcomes is the causal impact of the COVID-19 shock. We deem it plausible given the massive disruption to the economy brought about by the sudden unexpected arrival of the pandemic. Finally, please note that, by ‘COVID-19 shock’, we mean the economic shock, i.e. we refer not only to the epidemiological spread of the virus *per se*, but also to the national lockdown and

\(^{17}\) We apply the random splitting of the sample at the LLM level, not on *LLM-year* pairs so that there is no data leakage, i.e. the same LLM only appears either in the training or the testing set.

\(^{18}\) We use cross-validation to solve the bias-variance trade-off and maximize the out-of-sample performance of the random forest algorithm. (Hastie et al., 2009). Specifically, we employ 10-fold cross-validation on the training sample to select, among different alternatives \((p/2, p/3, \text{ and } p/6)\), the optimal value of the tuning hyperparameter \(m\), i.e. the number of features \(p\) randomly sampled as candidates at each split.
the non-pharmaceutical interventions that were adopted to contain the health crisis. This implies that, via our counterfactual approach, we capture the total net impact of the first wave on each LLM, that results from different degrees and combinations of supply and demand shocks generated by the dynamic interactions between the pandemic and intrinsic characteristics of the affected areas.

3.2 Association analysis: the employment change regression tree

To estimate the relationship between the estimated employment outcomes and potentially relevant covariates linked to economic, mobility, and pandemic-related LLM features, we harness the efficacy and power of another well-known ML algorithm: the regression tree.

First and foremost, bear in mind that here we abandon the causal inference setting to go back to the original ML habitat, i.e. the realm of pure prediction. What we want to do in this analysis is to get an idea of the factors which matter most in predicting the heterogeneous local economic impact of the pandemic.

Regression trees are an ideal tool to fulfill this purpose for two reasons: i) differently from complex, black-box ML methods such as random forest, regression trees allow an intuitive understanding of the mechanism through which the outcome variable of interest is linked to its most relevant predictors, thus producing an easy-to-interpret output which can be particularly valuable when the model must be shared to support public decision-making (Andini et al., 2018; Lantz, 2019); ii) regression trees are extremely flexible methods that can easily capture, in the sequence of splits, the entire range of potential non-linearities and interactions between the features, without imposing any parametric functional form to the underlying data-generating process.

From a technical point of view, this ML algorithm divides the data into progressively smaller subsets to identify significant patterns that are then used to predict the continuous output. Compared to standard regression tree analyses, two necessary clarifications are in order. First, we do not divide our sample into a training and testing set. The reason is straightforward: instead of testing for the out-of-sample accuracy of our regression tree model, we want to investigate the main predictors of our outcome variable, i.e. the estimated treatment effect for employment change in 2020 Q3, on the full sample of Italy’s LLMs. Second, and related, we do not apply cross-validation to select the hyperparameter of the regression tree method (named ‘complexity parameter’, cp) and adopt the commonly adopted default value of 0.01.

Therefore, we run a basic regression tree model of the employment effects to uncover the most relevant predictors of treatment effect unevenness at the local level. Notably, the associations
emerging from the regression tree should not be interpreted in a causal sense, but rather as a way to uncover significant correlations between the most important features and the outcome variable of interest.

3.3 Policy analysis: Bayesian structural time-series no-policy simulations

After having estimated local economic impacts via the MLCL counterfactual analysis, and having detected the main predictors of the estimated treatment effects, a crucial question arises: what would employment losses have been in the absence of the protective labor market policies adopted by the Italian government in response to the crisis?

This is a difficult question to answer, from an econometric viewpoint, because the COVID-19 shock and the policy response to it simultaneously took place. To infer causality, we exploit the effect of the crisis on the observed trends of another, closely related variable, the number of hours worked. Our reasoning is the following: the labor market interventions implemented, mainly the extension of the CIGS scheme and the freezing of layoffs, aimed at transforming the extensive margin losses (a reduction in the number of persons employed) into intensive margin ones (a decrease in the number of hours worked per capita) (Viviano, 2020). However, the product between the extensive and intensive margins, i.e. the total number of hours worked, was unaffected by such interventions. This intuition is confirmed by the observed 2020 national trend of this variable, which saw a sharp drop of 11% according to updated estimates by the Bank of Italy. Therefore, we maintain, the total number of hours worked has been affected by the pandemic, but not by the protective policies. Following previous literature (Carta & De Philippis, 2021), we exploit this fact to carry out a simulation of what employment trends would have been in a post-pandemic, no-policy world.

Specifically, we leverage a machine learning routine designed to estimate the causal impact of an intervention in a single time-series setting, the Bayesian structural time-series (BSTS) approach introduced by Brodersen et al. (2015). This method can be employed to predict a counterfactual of an outcome of interest in a time-series setting by exploiting the predictive power of a very correlated ‘control’ time-series (Varian 2014, 2016). The key assumption of the BSTS approach is that there is a set of control time-series that were themselves not affected by the treatment.

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19 We mainly refer to the post-pandemic protective policies adopted, i.e. the extension of the short-time work compensation scheme to almost all sectors of the economy and the layoff freeze, but our estimates will also incorporate the protective role played by the pre-pandemic policies in place, namely the short-time work scheme that was in place for the industry and building sectors as well as for firms with more than five employees.
In our case, the treatment is now the policy response, not the pandemic. The assumption is thus that the control time-series was affected by the pandemic but not by the protective policies. We construct a synthetic counterfactual of employment trends during the pre- and post-pandemic period using the de-seasonalized total number of hours worked, and its four lags, as the only predictors of employment levels.\(^2\) We repeat this simulation for all the five macro-areas in which Italy is divided (North-East, North-West, Centre, South, and the Islands) and for the country as a whole.\(^2\) In this way, we are able to model, for each of these areas, the evolution of employment had no policy response been undertaken, by exploiting the observed post-pandemic drops in a highly correlated control series affected by the crisis but not by the protective interventions.

4. Counterfactual analysis

We begin by reporting in Table 1 the random forest technique’s predictive performance compared to the intuitive before-after method often adopted to gauge the magnitude of the COVID-19 shock. The before-after analysis estimates the impact of COVID-19 as the difference between the trend of a given outcome (in this case, employment) in 2020 (after the pandemic’s arrival) and the pre-pandemic average figures of the past year(s). The underlying assumption is that, without the pandemic, the trend would have been flat, i.e. the number of employees would have remained constant. Examples of this intuitive approach to gauge the magnitude of the COVID-19 impact on employment and firm outcomes in the Italian context can be found in Casarico and Lattanzio (2020), Giacomelli et al. (2021), and Viviano (2020).

To assess the predictive performance of the MLCM and the intuitive method, we use two different measures of the typical prediction error, i.e. the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Root Median Squared Error (RMEDSE). The figures reported in Table 1 reveal that random forest predictions substantially outperform this intuitive methodology in the out-of-sample predictive test on the 2019 sample. Using RMSE as the reference metric, the typical prediction error of the random forest is 1.98%.\(^2\) The predictive gain of the random forest performance is of more than 24.43% compared to

\(^2\) Note that a simple regression of our outcome variable on these predictors in the pre-COVID-19 period returns an adjusted R-squared higher than 94%, thus confirming the predictive power of the chosen control time-series.

\(^2\) The Italian Labor Force Survey data are only available up to the regional level. We aggregate regional-level information on the total number of hours worked for each geographic area.

\(^2\) This figure would appear rather large in the context of big economies. However, since many LLMs are small, their trends tend to be highly volatile. See, in particular, the distribution of the RMSE for all methods reported in Figure A1 in the Appendix.
last year’s figures, and of 62.21% compared to the three-year (2016-2018) average of the outcome variable. RMEDSE performances are even more dramatically unbalanced in favor of the random forest. This test demonstrates that data-driven methodologies lead to far more accurate predictions of potential outcomes in a given, ‘ordinary’ year.

### Table 1 – Predictive performances for 2019 (log) overall employment levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictive method</th>
<th>RMSE</th>
<th>RMEDSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corresponding quarter – Last year (2018)</td>
<td>0.0262</td>
<td>0.0225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corresponding quarter – 3-year average (2016-2018)</td>
<td>0.0524</td>
<td>0.0496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random forest</td>
<td>0.0198</td>
<td>0.0139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: Estimates on the 2019 full LLM sample (2440 observations; 610 per quarter). RMSE stands for Root Mean Squared Error; RMEDSE for Root Median Squared Error.*

Having established that ML algorithms exploit past information to predict future outcomes much better than standard methods, we take a quick look at the aggregate treatment effects of the coronavirus crisis for the employment outcome. By the end of the third quarter of 2020, the pandemic has entailed a 1.86% decrease in overall employment in Italy, compared to what employment levels would have been had the pandemic never reached the country. This national-level estimate is perfectly in line with the 1.9% annual reduction in the number of persons employed in 2020 estimated by the Bank of Italy and the 1.8% figure reported by Istat.23

As we mainly focus on the local heterogeneous impact of COVID-19, in the following sections, we first map LLM-specific treatment effects and then gauge the heterogeneity in COVID-19 impacts across local economies.

#### 4.1 Employment

Figure 1 shows the map of the 2020 Q3 employment change at the LLM level. The degree of treatment effect heterogeneity is striking. Except for a few small clusters, the crisis does not seem to unfold along well-defined spatial dimensions or the North-South axis. Nevertheless, some local economies have been hit much harder than others, with impacts ranging from drops larger than 20% in some

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LLMs of Lombardy, Veneto, Liguria, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia, to small decreases or even mildly positive effects in Piedmont, Marche, Umbria, Lazio, Abruzzi and Molise. What is even more striking is the within-region heterogeneity, which shows how, in all Italian regions, some LLMs fared much better than others despite being geographically close and often contiguous. From an economic geography perspective, our findings suggest that the spatial dimension played a minor role as a transmission channel of the crisis’s impacts and suggests a far more prominent role of LLM-specific sectoral characteristics and labor market features. Figure A2 (see the Appendix) displays the temporal evolution of the employment effects over the first three quarters of 2020: only in the third quarter of 2020, do the impacts appear, and local trajectories start to diverge.

Figure 1 – Employment change 2020 Q3
We then inspect the geographic distribution of the employment and epidemiological outcomes engendered by COVID-19. Figure A5 in the Appendix presents a visual comparison between the economic vs. epidemiological effects of COVID-19 in Italy. Looking at the maps, the geographic distribution of impacts does not mirror the COVID-19 epidemiological spread during the first wave, which is proxied by excess mortality estimates from February 21, 2020, to September 30, 2020. To test the spatial correlation between these outcomes, we measure their overall spatial relationship across all LLMs using the bivariate Moran’s I. This index ranges from -1 (perfect negative spatial correlation) to 1 (perfect positive spatial correlation), and we obtained a Moran’s I coefficient close to 0 (-0.089), which suggests a lack of significant spatial correlation between employment and epidemiological outcomes.

It is worth noting that the documented employment impacts are net of the Italian government’s protective measures. This means that without these protective measures (the layoff freeze and CIGS extensions in particular), local impacts would have likely been even more sizeable.

4.2 Employment by sector

If LLMs’ regional or spatial location is not a primary driver, where does the heterogeneous impact on overall employment originate? Sectoral specialization of LLMs is part of the answer. As shown in the maps of employment change in manufacturing and services, depicted in Figure 2 below, the tertiary sector was much more severely affected than the manufacturing one and appears to be the leading cause of the overall employment change observed in Figure 1.24 This is not unexpected, as workplace closures primarily affected economic activities in the tertiary sector. At the same time, a large share of manufacturing firms could avert the shutdown thanks to being comprised in the list of ‘essential activities’ that the government decided to keep open to guarantee the basic functioning of Italy’s economic system. The tertiary sector is also notably the one with the highest prevalence of temporary jobs and seasonal workers, which could only marginally benefit from the layoff freeze measure. Given these facets, it comes as no surprise that employment losses primarily affected LLMs specialized in services.

Figures A3 (for manufacturing) and A4 (for services) in the Appendix also provide the evolution of impacts by quarter: while the manufacturing sector experienced only a moderate negative trend over the year, the services sector suffered a massive blow during the third quarter, in line with the trajectory

24 This is confirmed by the national-level estimates, which reveal an aggregate 0.28% decrease in manufacturing compared to a 2.13% decrease in services.
of overall employment illustrated in Figure A2.

4.3 *Business demography*

We then look at how COVID-19 affected business demography outcomes. At the national level, by the end of the third quarter of 2020, the crisis determined a 20.99% decrease in business births and a 2.11% decrease in business deaths. Figure 3 disaggregates these country-level estimates and maps the cumulative impact of COVID-19 for business births change (i.e. firm entries) and business deaths change (firm exits) over the first three quarters of 2020.25

The impact on business births is particularly acute and, with almost no exception, involves the entire national territory. This anomalous plunge happened despite the so-called *Decreto Rilancio* (May 14, 2020), which included a set of protective measures intended to support investments in start-ups (Fini & Sobrero, 2020). By contrast, the impact on firm exits is more polarized and geographically dispersed, with several regions experiencing substantial reductions in cessations of trading, e.g. Emilia-Romagna and Marche, whereas others (Lazio, Abruzzi, Basilicata and, in particular, Sardinia) saw a significant increase in firm exits. Sardinia’s case is emblematic as tourism, arguably the hardest-hit sector, plays a vital role in its economy.

The generalized drop in the number of newly-born firms across the country is particularly troublesome because start-ups and young firms are usually the most innovative ones, thus pointing to dire forecasts about the potentially long-lasting effects of the fall in business births in terms of aggregate productivity growth. Moreover, this lost generation of firms creates a persistent dent in overall employment as subsequent years will be characterized by a lower number of firms (Sedláček, 2020). This is all the more worrying in Italy, a country whose economic dynamism – its ability and willingness to allocate resources efficiently – has been steadily declining in the last quarter of a century (Rossi & Mingardi, 2020). The results on firm closures, instead, should be interpreted with caution, as many firm exits could have been temporarily ‘frozen’ by the supportive measures adopted by the government.

---

25 In our business demography analyses, we considered all types of firms, including those registered to the Business Register but having 0 employees.
Figure 2 – Employment change 2020 Q3 by sector

Legend

Manufacturing

Employment change in manufacturing 2020 Q3

- <=-20%
- [-20%,-10%]
- (-10%,-5%)
- (-5%, 0%]
- >0%

Services

Employment change in services 2020 Q3

- <=-20%
- [-20%,-10%]
- (-10%,-5%)
- (-5%, 0%]
- >0%
Figure 3 – Business births and deaths change 2020 Q1-Q3

Legend
Business births change over the first 3 quarters of 2020
- <=-20%
- (-20%,-10%]
- (-10%,-5%]
- (-5%, 0%]
- >0%

Legend
Business deaths change over the first 3 quarters of 2020
- <=-20%
- (-20%,-10%]
- (-10%,-5%]
- (-5%, 0%]
- (0%,5%]
- (5%,10%]
- (10%,20%]
- >=20%
5. Association analysis

The counterfactual analysis revealed a substantial heterogeneity of the pandemic economic effects. Such heterogeneity does not stem from regional or intra-regional clusters but is partly driven by the territorial sectoral specialization. Nevertheless, we want to go further than this and understand the factors that matter the most in generating such a fragmented landscape. Therefore, we use a regression tree to examine the main predictors of employment losses.

Figure 4 illustrates the regression tree of the LLM-specific overall employment treatment effects. The tree reveals interesting patterns. First, the few variables that generate the tree belong exclusively to two variable groups: aggregation risk features and labor market characteristics. Second, the most severely affected LLMs are those in which there is a high share of jobs at a high risk of social aggregation and a high share of jobs suspended in March 2020, and, even more importantly, a high share of temporary contracts. For instance, the tree predicts that LLMs with a share of jobs having a risk of aggregation equal to or higher than 43% and a share of temporary contracts equal to or higher than 29%, will experience a 33% drop in employment.26

Exposure to high aggregation and proximity risk seems to be a primary discriminant of impacts across LLMs with different shares or ‘workers at risk’ (Barbieri et al., 2020). In turn, the relevance of the labor market attributes in generating the regression tree provides empirical support for the above discussion on the unequal exposure of different workers’ categories and types of contracts in the face of the crisis, in line with the heterogeneous findings of Casarico and Lattanzio (2020) and Carta and De Philippis (2021) for Italy and Blundell et al. (2020) for the UK. This analysis also suggests that emergency measures were by design effective only for specific categories of workers and types of contracts. More fragile categories (think of seasonal workers and occasional jobs) proved to be more vulnerable to the crisis’s labor market consequences. As a consequence, LLMs characterized by economic sectors having high social aggregation risks and fragile labor markets saw sharp drops in overall employment levels.

Finally, as a sensitivity check, we replace our variables on the share of jobs having a high risk of social aggregation, the share of jobs having a high ‘integrated’ risk, and the share of jobs in suspended economic activities with alternative measures of the expected sectoral shocks: the demand- and supply-side changes. These two variables weight the expected supply and demand sectoral shocks reported in del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020) by each LLM’s sectoral composition (see Tables A1 and

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26 Note that (cf. Table A.2) the average LLM share of jobs having a high risk of social aggregation is 23% (with a 11% standard deviation) and the average share of temporary contracts is 19% (standard deviation = 8%).
A2 in the Appendix for definitions and descriptive statistics), and are highly correlated with the three replaced features. The reason why we opt for a replacement, rather than an enrichment, of variables related to supply and demand shocks, is rooted in the intuition provided by Mullainathan and Spiess (2017): if variables are highly correlated with each other, then such variables are substitutes, rather than complements, in predicting the outcome of interest. Indeed, the corresponding regression tree is presented in Figure A6. The tree confirms the predominant role of demand and supply changes and the extensive overlap between the two alternative sets of variables capturing the magnitude of local sectoral shocks.
Figure 4 – Regression tree on employment change 2020 Q3

Regression Tree for Employment Q3 Treatment Effects

- Share of jobs having a high risk of social aggregation $\geq 0.43$
  - Share of temporary contracts $\geq 0.19$
    - Share of temporary contracts $\geq 0.29$
      - $-33$
    - $-20$
  - $-7.4$
- Share of jobs having a high risk of social aggregation $< 0.43$
  - $< 0.19$
    - Share of jobs suspended in March 2020 $\geq 0.41$
      - $-3.9$
    - $-0.5$
  - $-0.27$
  - $< 0.27$
    - Share of jobs having a high integrated risk $< 0.03$
      - $-3.4$
    - $\geq 0.03$
      - $-9.4$
    - $-5.0$
6. Policy analysis

Column 1 of Table 2 presents the employment impact obtained by aggregating the population-weighted MLCM estimates for each macro-area and for Italy as a whole, while Column 2 reports the results of the BSTS no-policy simulations for the same areas.\(^{27}\) A comparison between the two sets of estimates reveals that: i) the protective labor market policies adopted by the Italian government offset the vast majority of employment losses the pandemic and the containment policies would have brought about, consistently with the findings of other studies (Viviano, 2020); ii) the policies disproportionately benefited Northern and Central Italian regions, at the expense of the South and the Islands: for instance, while employment in the North-West, the South and the Islands dropped by more than 3%, in the no policy-scenario, North-West Italy would have experienced a dramatic 16% drop in employment in 2020 Q3, twice as much as the other two macro-areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Estimated impact (MLCM)</th>
<th>No-policy scenario (BSTS)</th>
<th>Number of employed persons protected by the policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North-East</td>
<td>0.315%</td>
<td>-11.777%</td>
<td>673,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-West</td>
<td>-3.564%</td>
<td>-16.462%</td>
<td>561,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>-1.483%</td>
<td>-14.415%</td>
<td>472,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>-3.195%</td>
<td>-8.855%</td>
<td>177,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islands</td>
<td>-3.359%</td>
<td>-6.653%</td>
<td>42,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-1.863%</td>
<td>-12.568%</td>
<td>1,928,053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lastly, we also report an estimate of the total number of jobs that were saved by protective policies, calculated as the difference between the observed 2020 Q3 data and the BSTS employment predictions, which emphasize once again the heterogeneity in the policy effects adopted to contain the employment impacts of the crisis. Remarkably, according to our estimates, at the national level, the policies implemented protected almost two million workers, but only slightly more than 10% of them work in the South or in the Islands. Building on Table 2, Figure 5 below maps the heterogeneity in the share of employment losses offset by the protective policies in each NUTS-1 area.

\(^{27}\) See Figure A7 in the Appendix for a graphical representation of the estimated simulations, in which the difference between the observed and predicted trends represents the additional employment losses in the no-policy scenario.
Figure 5 – Share of employment losses offset by the protective policies in each macro-area (2020 Q3)

Notes: each percentage stands for the share of the total employment losses in the no-policy scenario that has been offset by the protective policies implemented, calculated as one minus the ratio between the estimated impact and the corresponding simulated no-policy impact.

While not fully surprising, given the structural differences between the economies and the labor markets of Northern and Central Italy and those of Southern regions, the relevance of these imbalances cannot be overstated, especially in a country characterized by a historic and chronically persistent North-South divide.
7. Conclusion

We have documented the striking local inequalities of the first wave of the coronavirus crisis across the Italian territory. The heterogeneous employment losses are associated with LLM-specific features such as sectoral specialization, exposure of economic activities to high social aggregation risks, and pre-existing labor market vulnerabilities. These associations overlap with the patterns of demand and supply shocks that drive the detected treatment effects (del Rio-Chanona et al., 2020). By contrast, there is no discernible spatial correlation between the economic and epidemiological patterns of the pandemic. Besides, the protective labor market interventions of the Italian government primarily shielded the most developed Italian regions from the negative occupational consequences of the pandemic shock.

As far as Italy is concerned, we deem these local and spatial dimensions of the crisis to be policy-relevant, especially in light of the imminent partial lifting of the layoff freeze and of the forthcoming resources from the NextGenerationEU initiative. More broadly, there is growing evidence that the pandemic is increasing inequality at all levels, including territorial and regional divides (Stantcheva, 2021). In this respect, the Italian case is emblematic, and our results can be thoughtfully extended to similar dynamics that might be taking place in other countries too.

From a prescriptive viewpoint, our findings call for more research to untangle and monitor the spatial distribution of the economic effects of the subsequent waves of the pandemic and, crucially, for a place-based approach in the policy response to the crisis. As national policies and top-down plans will be insufficient to lead the recovery (Bailey et al., 2020), policymakers should not neglect the local evolution of this unprecedented shock.

Therefore, such diverging trajectories and unequal policy effects emphasize the urgent need for ad hoc, timely, and well-targeted policy interventions based on the territorial profile and sectoral specialization of local economic systems (Ascani et al., 2021). The place-based policy perspective we advocate, coupled with rigorous, granular, and constantly updated empirical evidence, is, in our view, the best possible approach to prevent the unfolding crisis from further exacerbating pre-existing territorial disparities.
REFERENCES


• Cajner T, Crane LD, Decker RA, Grigsby J, Hamins-Puertolas A, Hurst E, ... & Yildirimaz A (2020). The US labor market during the beginning of the pandemic recession. National Bureau


## Appendix

### Table A1 – Definition of the variables included in the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterfactual analysis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Overall employment</td>
<td>2014 Q3 – 2020 Q3</td>
<td>Business Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in manufacturing</td>
<td>Overall manufacturing employment</td>
<td>2014 Q3 – 2020 Q3</td>
<td>Business Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in services</td>
<td>Overall services employment</td>
<td>2014 Q3 – 2020 Q3</td>
<td>Business Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business births</td>
<td>Companies that have registered in the period under review</td>
<td>2014 Q1 – 2020 Q3</td>
<td>Business Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business deaths</td>
<td>Companies that went out of business in the period under review</td>
<td>2014 Q1 – 2020 Q3</td>
<td>Business Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic classification dummies</td>
<td>Without specialization, non-manufacturing (touristic), non-manufacturing (non-touristic), made in Italy, other manufacturing</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical dummies</td>
<td>North-East, North-West, Centre, South</td>
<td></td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>Resident population per unit area</td>
<td>2014-2019</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>Resident population aged 15+ not in employment but currently available for work</td>
<td>2014-2019</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
<td>The number of people employed and those unemployed as a % of the total population</td>
<td>2014-2019</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Association analysis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment change Q3 2020</td>
<td>Treatment effect of the COVID-19 crisis on overall employment levels</td>
<td>2020 Q3</td>
<td>Estimated via the MLCM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>Resident population aged 15+ not in employment but currently available for work</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess mortality estimates</td>
<td>Municipality-level excess mortality estimated by applying ML techniques to all-cause deaths data</td>
<td>From Feb 21, 2020 to Sep 30, 2020</td>
<td>Cerqua et al. (2021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of jobs having a high risk of social aggregation</td>
<td>Number of employees exposed to a medium-high or high risk of social aggregation divided by the number of employees</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Own calculations using Business Register data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table A1 – Continued</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of jobs having a high integrated risk</strong></td>
<td>Number of employees exposed to a medium-high or high integrated risk divided by the number of employees</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Own calculations using Business Register data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of temporary contracts</strong></td>
<td>Number of employees with temporary contracts in October divided by the number of employees in October</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of jobs in suspended economic activities</strong></td>
<td>Share of jobs in activities suspended in March 2020 by the Italian Government due to the spread of the pandemic</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income per capita</strong></td>
<td>The amount of money earned per person</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Ministry of Economy and Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of innovative start-ups</strong></td>
<td>The ratio between innovative start-ups and the universe of firms registered in the Business Register</td>
<td>Average (2016-2019)</td>
<td>Business Register</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of firms having employees in CIGS</strong></td>
<td>The number of firms with employees in CIGS divided by the universe of firms registered in the Business Register</td>
<td>Average (2015-2018)</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor and Social Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of road accidents per 10,000 inhabitants</strong></td>
<td>The number of road accidents with injuries to persons divided by resident population * 10,000</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependency ratio</strong></td>
<td>The ratio of those typically not in the labor force (the dependent part, ages 0 to 14 and 65+) and those typically in the labor force (the productive part, ages 15 to 64)</td>
<td>Jan 1, 2020</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of population living in peripheral areas</strong></td>
<td>Share of population living in areas defined by Istat as peripheral or ultra-peripheral</td>
<td>Jan 1, 2020</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Index of relational intensity (IIRFL)</strong></td>
<td>The percentage of flows within an LLM that connect different municipalities on the total of flows within the LLM. This indicator ranges from values close to 0 to 100 (case in which all the workers of the municipalities of the LLM go to work in another municipality). The higher the indicator, the greater the inter-municipal turbulence in terms of flows</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Istat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants</strong></td>
<td>Number of hospital beds divided by resident population * 1,000</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Share of workers employed in health care occupations</strong></td>
<td>Share of jobs in the NACE 2-digit sectors ‘human health activities’ and ‘residential care activities’</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Own calculations using Business Register data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A1 – Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supply-side changes</th>
<th>Supply-side changes due to the closure of non-essential industries and workers not being able to perform their activities at home</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>Own calculations using forecasts by del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand-side changes</td>
<td>Demand-side changes due to people’s immediate response to the pandemic, such as reduced demand for goods or services that are likely to place people at risk of infection</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>Own calculations using forecasts by del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Policy analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of hours worked</th>
<th>The number of hours worked per quarter in all jobs</th>
<th>2014 Q3 – 2020 Q3</th>
<th>Own calculations using the Istat’s Labor Force Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Notes: To determine the flow of registrations in a given period – e.g. 2nd trimester 2019 – the firms’ universe extracted from the archive on June 30 is compared with that extracted in the previous quarter (March 31). Firms that are present in the 2nd (1st) quarter but not in the 1st (2nd) are classified as new registrations (companies that went out of business). Outcome variables in bold.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterfactual analysis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment (log)</td>
<td>9.31</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>14.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in manufacturing (log)</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>12.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in services (log)</td>
<td>8.89</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>14.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business births</td>
<td>55.97</td>
<td>236.18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business deaths</td>
<td>44.63</td>
<td>202.79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of LLMs without specialization</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of touristic LLMs</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-manufacturing (non-touristic) LLMs</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of made in Italy LLMs</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of manufacturing LLMs</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;=10,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,000; 50,000]</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50,000; 100,000]</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(100,000; 500,000]</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 500,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activity rate</td>
<td>48.26</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>30.15</td>
<td>63.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>11.85</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>39.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>3.17</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Association analysis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment change Q3 2020 (%)</td>
<td>-5.17</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>-44.73</td>
<td>6.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>10.99</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>36.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess mortality estimates (%)</td>
<td>7.99</td>
<td>19.72</td>
<td>-34.30</td>
<td>148.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of jobs in suspended economic activities</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income per capita (€)</td>
<td>12705</td>
<td>3588</td>
<td>5882</td>
<td>22118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of firms having employees in CIGS</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of population living in peripheral areas</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of temporary contracts</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of road accidents per 10,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of relational intensity (IIRFL)</td>
<td>25.70</td>
<td>14.48</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency ratio</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of innovative start-ups</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of jobs having a high risk of social aggregation</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of jobs having a high integrated risk</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hospital beds per 1,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of workers employed in health care occupations</td>
<td>0.0253</td>
<td>0.0265</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply-side changes (used in the sensitivity check)</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand-side changes (used in the sensitivity check)</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of LLM-quarters (whole sample)</td>
<td>10,370</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of LLMs</td>
<td>610</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure A1 – Distribution of the RMSE for all methods
Figure A2 – 2020 Employment change by quarter

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Quarter 3
Figure A3 – 2020 Employment change in manufacturing by quarter
Figure A4 – 2020 Employment change in services by quarter

Quarter 1

Quarter 2

Quarter 3

Legend
Employment change in services 2020 Q1

Legend
Employment change in services 2020 Q2

Legend
Employment change in services 2020 Q3

<20%
[20%,10%]
[-50%,5%]
[-5%,0%]
>5%
Figure A5 – Economic versus epidemiological impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic across Italy

Employment change 2020 Q3

Excess mortality (21 Feb 2020 – 30 Sep 2020)

Legend

Employment change 2020 Q3
- <=-20%
- [-20%, -10%]
- [-10%, -5%]
- [-5%, 0%]
- >0%

Legend

Excess mortality estimates
- <=0%
- (0%; +20%]
- (+20%; +50%]
- (+50%; +100%]
- >100%

Notes: Municipality-level excess mortality estimates are from Cerqua et al. (2021).
Figure A6 – Regression tree on employment change 2020 Q3 using demand- and supply-side changes reported in del Rio-Chanona et al. (2020)
Figure A7 – BSTS estimates

Italy

North-West

North-East

Centre

South

Islands

Number of employees in logs

2019Q4

ITALY

NORTH-WEST

NORTH-EAST

CENTRE

SOUTH

ISLANDS

SYNTHETIC ITALY

SYNTHETIC NORTH-WEST

SYNTHETIC NORTH-EAST

SYNTHETIC CENTRE

SYNTHETIC SOUTH

SYNTHETIC ISLANDS