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Why Escalate?: Symbolic Territory and Strategy Choice in Conflicts Over Self-Determination

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Supplemental Information for:

Defending the Land, Saving the People:

Symbolic Territory and Strategy Choice in

Conflicts over Self-Determination

1. Descriptive Information

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Nonconventional Strategies	981	0.36	0.48	0	1
Conflict Strategy	1059	0.74	1.01	0	3
Symbolic Value	1408	0.63	0.48	0	1
Group Share (log)	1408	1.17	1.6	-6.5	4.04
Economic Differential (log)	1206	3.05	1.37	0.15	9.08
Exclusion (lag)	1210	0.68	0.47	0	1
Democracy (lag)	1280	.59	.49	0	1
Capital Distance (log)	1408	6.44	0.92	3.84	8.95
Factions (log)	1023	1.16	0.78	0	3.53
Freedom of Press (lag)	1275	54.72	21.83	11	97
Border Distance (log)	1408	0	1.09	-2.52	3.25
Ruggedness (log)	1408	0	1.1	-3.29	1.88
Capital Distance (log)	1408	0	.92	-2.6	2.51
Oil	1408	.67	.47	0	1
Diamonds	1408	.14	.35	0	1
Oil and/or Diamonds	1408	0.7	0.46	0	1

Table A2: Covariance Matrix

	Non- conventional Strategies	Conflict Strategy	Symbolic Value	Group Share (log)	Economic Differential (log)	Exclusion (lag)	Democracy (lag)	Exclusion (lag)	Factions (log)	Freedom of Press (lag)
Nonconventional Strategies	1									
Conflict Strategy	0.934***	1								
Symbolic Value	0.0326	-0.0370	1							
Group Share (log)	-0.147***	-0.0968*	-0.444***	1						
Economic Differential (log)	-0.223***	-0.225***	0.170***	0.0123	1					
Exclusion (lag)	0.213***	0.211***	0.331***	-0.429***	0.150***	1				
Democracy (lag)	-0.263***	-0.249***	0.139**	-0.181***	0.311***	0.0664	1			
Capital Distance (log)	0.0578	0.0265	0.247***	-0.539***	-0.0256	0.224***	0.0652	1		
Factions (log)	0.246***	0.292***	-0.00739	0.0462	0.150***	-0.0557	0.0654	-0.157***	1	
Freedom of Press (lag)	0.375***	0.380***	-0.108*	0.159***	-0.483***	-0.00700	-0.649***	-0.0257	-0.188***	1

	Conflict Strategy	Symbolic Value	Border Distance (log)	Ruggedness (log)	Capital Distance (log)	Oil	Diamonds	Oil and/or Diamonds
Conflict Strategy	1							
Symbolic Value	0.0517	1						
Border Distance (log)	-0.0615*	0.0767*	1					
Ruggedness (log)	-0.0747*	0.0356	-0.211***	1				
Capital Distance (log)	0.0724*	0.167***	0.411***	0.106***	1			
Oil	0.0146	0.0265	0.0767*	0.102***	0.221***	1		
Diamonds	-0.0680*	-0.0202	0.273***	-0.0872**	0.191***	0.115***	1	
Oil and/or Diamonds	-0.0131	-0.0483	0.123***	0.0481	0.233***	0.942***	0.264***	1

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

2. Case List

STATE	GROUP
Afghanistan	Tajiks
Afghanistan	Uzbek
Algeria	Berbers
Angola	Bakongo
Angola	Cabindans
Australia	Aborigines
Azerbaijan	Armenians
Azerbaijan	Lezgins
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tribes/Tracts
Belgium	Fleming
Belgium	Walloon
Bhutan	Ethnic Nepalese/Lhotshampas
Bolivia	Aymara
Bolivia	Quechua
Bosnia	Bosnian Serbs
Bosnia	Croats
Brazil	Amazonian Indians
Burma	Arakanese/Rohingya
Burma	Kachins
Burma	Karens
Burma	Mons
Burma	Shan
Burma	Wa, Parauk of Burma
Burma	Zomis/Chins
Cameroon	Westerner/Anglophone/Southern Cameroons
Canada	Indigenous
Canada	Quebecois
Chad	Southerners
Chile	Indigenous peoples
China	Mongolian
China	Tibetans
China	Uygur
Colombia	Indigenous peoples
Croatia	Serbs
Cyprus	Turks
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Lunda-Yeke

Djibouti	Afar
Ecuador	Lowland (Amazonian) Indigenous Peoples
Equatorial Guinea	Bube/Bubi
Ethiopia	Afar
Ethiopia	Oromo
Ethiopia	Somali (Ogaden)
France	Basques
France	Bretons
France	Corsicans
Georgia	Abkhazians
Georgia	Adzhars
Georgia	Ossetians (South)
India	Assamese
India	Bodos/Kachari
India	Kashmiri Muslims
India	Mizos/Lushai
India	Nagas
India	Scheduled Tribes of East India
India	Scheduled Tribes of North India
India	Scheduled Tribes of Northeast India
India	Scheduled Tribes of South India
India	Scheduled Tribes of West India
India	Sikhs
India	Tripuras
Indonesia	Aceh
Indonesia	Dayaks
Indonesia	Papuans
Iran	Kurds
Iraq	Kurds
Israel	Palestinian
Italy	Sardinians
Italy	South Tyrolians
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbek
Lebanon	Palestinians
Macedonia	Albanians
Mali	Touareg
Mexico	Mayans
Mexico	Other indigenous
Mexico	Zapotecs
Moldova	Gagauz
Moldova	Slavs
Morocco	Saharawis

Namibia	East Caprivians/Lozi
Nicaragua	Indigenous peoples
Niger	Tuareg
Nigeria	Ibo
Nigeria	Ijaw
Nigeria	Ogoni
Nigeria	Yoruba
Pakistan	Baluchis
Pakistan	Pashtuns (Pushtuns)
Pakistan	Seraiki/Saraiki
Pakistan	Sindhi
Peru	Lowland indigenous
Philippines	Igorots
Philippines	Muslim Malay
Romania	Hungarian
Russia	Avars
Russia	Buryats
Russia	Chechens
Russia	Kumyk
Russia	Lezgins
Russia	Tatar/Tartar
Russia	Yakuts
Senegal	Jola/Diola
Serbia and Montenegro	Albanian
Slovakia	Hungarian
South Africa	Afrikaner
South Africa	Zulu
Spain	Basques
Spain	Catalans
Sri Lanka	Moor/Muslims
Sri Lanka	Sri Lankan Tamils
Sudan	Darfur Black Muslims
Sudan	Nuba
Sudan	Southern Sudanese
Taiwan	Aborigine
Tanzania	Zanzibar Africans/Shirazi
Tanzania	Zanzibar Arabs
Thailand	Malay-Muslims
Turkey	Kurds
Uganda	Baganda
UK	Catholics in Northern Ireland
UK	Scots

Ukraine	Crimean Russians
Ukraine	Crimean Tatars/Tartars
USA	Native American
USA	Native Hawaian
Uzbekistan	Tajiks
Vietnam	Montagnards/Degar/Highlanders
Zambia	Lozi
Zimbabwe	Ndebele

3. Data Sources

VARIABLE	DATA SOURCE
Symbolic Value	The coding of the four dimensions is based on a wealth of sources, in particular the MAR Risk Assessments ¹ and the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples ² . In addition, I rely on reports by human rights organizations and NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or the International Crisis Group, and on various case study articles from academic journals, academic working papers, as well as news reports. I include information from group advocacy websites or blog posts only after cross checking with additional reliable sources. Furthermore, the UNCESO World Heritage website, encyclopedias by Olson ³ , Weekes ⁴ , and Minahan ⁵ as well as the Britannica and country studies by the Library of Congress provide additional information. I seek to counter potential reporting biases by relying on this range of diverse sources. These data have been published in a cross-sectional design in Author (2017).
Conflict Strategy	The coding is based on multiple sources. For violent conflicts with more than 25 battle-related deaths, the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia is an invaluable source ⁶ . Of the overall 128 groups, 51 are in general included in the Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-2015, but not necessarily in 2005-2015 ^{7, 8} . The coding of other unconventional and conventional strategies is based on news reports available from the Nexis database, which includes news reports worldwide in different languages. Empirically, it is in some cases difficult to disentangle which site initiated the violence, how many victims are to be lamented on which side, and who is responsible for the dead. I seek to minimize these issues by intensive cross-referencing. These data are introduced in this manuscript.
Settlement Pattern	Some of the coding relies on geographically specific information, which I link to the settlement patterns of the respective group. In order to determine the spatial extent of the settled areas, I use the georeferenced Ethnic Power Relations Dataset GeoEPR 2.0 ⁹ . Of the 128 group-state units in my dataset, 20 are not included in EPR. Using ArcGIS, I georeference the settlement patterns of these groups myself, relying on the maps and descriptions provided in the Ethnologue database ¹⁰ , and other

	sources (see appendix section 3). In a second step, I cross-check the coding for the groups covered in GeoEPR. Overall, almost all of the groups are settled in a territorially concentrated pattern.
Group Share (%)	Own coding, based on reports, newspaper articles, the Ethnologue ¹⁰ and others. When figures differed across sources, I calculated the mean of the available values. For national population figures I use world Bank data ¹¹ .
Economic Differential	This variable is computed from the difference between, first, logged regional economic development for 2005, taken from Nordhaus ¹² in PRIO-Grid ¹³ , and group population of 2005 (own coding. For many groups there are only estimates of group size available). The second component is logged national GDP per capita, calculated from the ratio of national GDP and population size, which are largely taken from the World Bank data ¹¹ .
Democracy	Regime type indicator based on the Polity IV dataset 2017 version ¹⁴ . The original indicator ranges from -10 (full autocracies) to + 10 (full democracies) and is recoded as a dichotomous variable. Polity scores equal to or larger than +5 indicate that the group is a democracy, and are assigned the value of 1.
Exclusion	Variable “status_excluded” EPR version 2018 ¹⁵ , including groups that are discriminated, powerless or self-excluded, otherwise coded 0.
Factions	The number of veto factions within each group is taken from Cunningham ¹⁶ . Given the time frame of this dataset, the most recent year for which this variable is available is 2005, which is included as a constant for the period of analysis. This control variable therefore does not reflect the dynamics induced by the variation in group factions. See Cunningham ¹⁷ , Cunningham ¹⁸ for more details on the mechanisms and empirical patterns in civil wars.
Settlement Area	The geospatial extent of the group territory is determined based on the GeoEPR ¹⁹ , and adjusted and extended where necessary. The following groups are not included in GeoEPR: Bretons (France), Adzhar (Georgia), East Caprivians/Lozi (Namibia), Seraiki (Pakistan), Southern Sudanese (Sudan), Crimean Russians (Ukraine), Degar/Montagnards (Vietnam). The coding of the settlement areas for these groups as well as adjustments for other groups where necessary are based on maps and descriptions provided in the Ethnologue database ¹⁰ , maps from the Map Collection of the University of Texas ²⁰ , the qualitative MAR ²¹ , as well as group specific newspaper articles,

	various policy reports, and advocacy group websites.
Border Distance	The border distance measure is the average distance in kilometer of the group territory to the closest international land border. I aggregate this value over all cells on the group territory, log transform and mean-center. The measure is based on the variable “bdist2” from PRIO-Grid ¹³ and originates in the CShapes dataset ²² .
Ruggedness	For measuring terrain ruggedness I use global data available from the NASA Oak Ridge National Laboratory Distributed Active Archive Center ²³ . I transform the data into a measure of ruggedness at the squared (30 arc seconds) grid level corresponding to the group territory. This approach is based on Riley, et al. ²⁴ and follows Shaver, Carter and Shawa ²⁵ . The resulting “Terrain Ruggedness Indicator” is a relative measure that is calculated as a function of absolute elevation change between equally sized neighboring square units ²⁴ . It is aggregated over all cells on the group territory, logged and mean-centered.
Capital Distance	I include the absolute distance in kilometers of a given grid cell on the group territory from the capital of the state. This value is aggregated over all cells on the group territory, logged and mean-centered. The measure corresponds to the variable “capdist” and is taken from PRIO-Grid ¹³ and the CShapes dataset ²²
Oil	I take georeferenced data on oil and gas deposits on the group territory from the PRIO petroleum dataset PETRODATA ²⁶ . I connect this information to the settlement area of the group, and create a binary measure of oil resources, which is coded 1 where these are present on the group territory, and 0 otherwise.
Diamonds	Georeferenced information on alluvial and kimberlite diamond deposits is based on the PRIO diamond dataset DIADATA ²⁷ . I match these data with the respective groups’ settlement area to create a binary measure of diamond deposits, which is coded 1 if there are deposits, and 0 otherwise.
Freedom of Press	Freedom of press score by Freedom House ²⁸ . I follow Freedom House’s distinction of states as being “free”, “partly free”, and “not free”, and recode the continuous variable into three categories. High values in the score (≥ 61) correspond to 0 (not free), whereas low score values (≤ 30) are recoded as a 2 to indicate a free press. Partly free states, coded 1, range between 31 and 60 on the freedom of press score.

4. Symbolic Value: Coding Rationale and Examples


The following table illustrates the coding process across the four dimensions of symbolic value. In addition to briefly describing the underlying concepts, I provide representative examples from the dataset as well as exemplary references. Please note that for individual cases, other dimensions of symbolic value might apply at the same time.

		Concept	Coding examples	
			coded 1	coded 0
Dimension of symbolic value	Political	historical relevance, e.g. past independent kingdom, loss of autonomy etc.	<i>Acehnese in Indonesia:</i> Independent sultanate of Aceh 15 th to late 19 th century, loss of autonomy (special region status) in 1968 ^{21, 29}	<i>Kurds in Iraq:</i> Long-term residence and homeland, culturally distinct, varying degrees of collective political organization and governance since the 1920s, part of the Ottoman Empire before World War II ³⁰⁻³⁴
	Religious	presence of holy places sacred to the group	<i>Tibetans in China:</i> Sacred lakes and mountains, e.g. Mt. Kailash ³⁵	<i>Quebecois in Canada:</i> Distinct identity, cultural and political distinctiveness due to francophone heritage, but no explicit religious territorial attachments ²¹
	Cultural	cultural identity linked to the land, e.g. cultural sites or traditional lifestyles bound to the land	<i>Lezgins in Azerbaijan:</i> Culturally distinct. Traditional burial grounds predominantly in Azerbaijan. Soviet division of traditional territories between Azerbaijan and Russia limited free passage across Samur for sheep herders during the summer, leading to their demise. Split also ended Samur water sharing	<i>Flemings in Belgium:</i> Historical language divide and area of residence since 4th century, but cultural survival not dependent on territorial characteristics ^{21, 29, 36}

			regime leading to environmental degradation ²¹	
	Landrights	dispossession and forced displacement	<i>Chechens in Russia:</i> Deported from their homeland in the 1940s, bore high cost of returning privately following Khrushchev's secret speech 1956 ³⁷	<i>Sardinians in Italy:</i> No history of forced relocation or displacement ²¹ , in contrast to other groups in Italy, for instance Alto Adige, which saw both Italianization policies, the resettlement of Italians to Alto Adige since the early 1920s, and the organized, half-voluntary resettlement of German speakers to Nazi Germany mostly in 1940 and until 1943 ³⁸

5. Predicted Values of Nonconventional Conflict Strategies

Figure A1: Predictive margins of strategy choice



6. Model Robustness

In what follows, I present the alternative specifications aimed at testing the robustness of the findings, and assess a potential selection process underlying the choice of conflict strategies.

6.1 Alternative Model Specifications

Note that the inclusion of the measure for internal divisions, which is taken from external sources with specific case selection criteria, leads to the reduction of the sample size to $n=589$. Table A3 and Figure A2 report the coefficients of three models, including the base model reported above, and two models including the measures of distance to the capital and of distance and factions variables, respectively. The negative and statistically significant association between symbolic value and armed conflict holds only for the base model, which is probably a function of the significantly reduced sample size when accounting for internal divisions. Figures A3 and A4 plot predictive margins for limited escalation and armed conflict based on the models in the second and third column of Table A3, respectively. The findings are in line with Figure 4, showing a positive association between symbolic value and the two nonconventional strategies in general. Moreover, they confirm that it is primarily the absence of symbolic value that matters for armed conflict.

Table A3: Multinomial logit estimation of symbolic territorial value on conflict strategies, alternative specifications

	Base Model			...with distance			... with distance and factions		
	limited	armed	mixed	limited	armed	mixed	limited	armed	mixed
Symbolic Value	1.87*** (0.67)	-0.08 (0.59)	0.97 (0.69)	1.88*** (0.68)	-0.08 (0.60)	0.96 (0.69)	0.91 (0.76)	-0.78 (0.69)	0.43 (0.69)
Group Size (% , log)	-0.21 (0.13)	0.11 (0.27)	-0.08 (0.20)	-0.23* (0.12)	0.14 (0.31)	-0.05 (0.24)	-0.27* (0.15)	-0.07 (0.28)	-0.29* (0.17)
Economic Differential (log)	-0.28** (0.13)	-0.45** (0.20)	-0.87*** (0.33)	-0.28** (0.13)	-0.45** (0.20)	-0.87** (0.34)	-0.29* (0.17)	-0.54** (0.23)	-0.70** (0.33)
Excluded (lag)	-0.83 (0.60)	1.43* (0.76)	0.38 (0.78)	-0.83 (0.60)	1.43* (0.76)	0.39 (0.79)	0.44 (0.82)	2.38** (1.17)	0.37 (0.79)
Democracy (lag)	-1.03* (0.54)	-0.79 (0.51)	-0.62 (0.71)	-1.04** (0.53)	-0.78 (0.51)	-0.60 (0.73)	-1.47** (0.60)	-1.46** (0.67)	-1.19** (0.58)
Capital Distance (log)				-0.06 (0.34)	0.08 (0.34)	0.10 (0.32)	-0.06 (0.40)	0.06 (0.42)	-0.04 (0.37)
Factions (log)							0.55* (0.33)	1.60*** (0.42)	0.29 (0.62)
Constant	-0.38 (0.84)	-0.34 (1.01)	-0.05 (1.08)	0.01 (2.27)	-0.90 (2.53)	-0.75 (2.75)	-0.56 (2.73)	-2.31 (3.20)	0.57 (3.24)
Group fixed effects		yes			yes			yes	
AIC		1529.294			1534.431			1133.923	
BIC		1612.431			1631.425			1239.005	
Pseudo R ²		0.1812			0.1182			0.1857	
Observations		749			749			589	

Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A2: Coefficient plot of multinomial logit estimation of symbolic territorial value on conflict strategies, alternative specifications




Figure A3: Predictive margins of strategy choice for symbolic territorial value, including covariates with distance





Figure A4: Predictive margins of strategy choice for symbolic territorial value, including covariates with distance and factions

Predictions of Conflict Strategies, w distance and factions



6.2 Component Terms of Symbolic Territory

The measure of symbolic territory is composed of overall four components, cultural, religious, political and landrights-related issues. How do the component terms behave individually? The predictions for limited escalation and armed conflict plotted in Figure A6 support the earlier results: While all four component terms increase the probability of limited escalation and, even more so, armed conflict, their absence increases the probability of armed conflict, which manifests in parallel trends. Comparing the explanatory value of the four terms in the coefficient plot in Figure A5 suggests two observations: First, assessing the individual components of symbolic attachments shows that their association with strategy choice varies and is not systematic. Individually, moreover, the component terms are rarely statistically significant. The second observation stems from comparing the relative explanatory power of the individual components to the original symbolic value measure I use throughout the paper, which is coded 1 if at least two of the four component terms are salient for the group (see Figure 3).

The findings for the joint inclusion of more than one component of symbolic territorial value, which is discussed throughout the paper, suggests that the mere presence of any kind of symbolic attachment is insufficient to account for strategy choice. While many self-determination groups might thus have some connection to the territory, a variety or combination of territorial attachments seems to be relevant for strategy choice.

Figure A5: Coefficient plot of multinomial logit estimation of component terms of symbolic territorial value on conflict strategies






Figure A6: Predictive margins of strategy choice for component terms of symbolic territorial value, including covariates



6.3 Intensity of Symbolic Value

Figure A7: Coefficient plot of multinomial logit estimation of the intensity of symbolic territorial value on conflict strategies



6.4 Alternative Sources of Territorial Value

Table A4: Multinomial logit estimation of symbolic and other sources of territorial value on conflict strategies


	limited	Base Model armed	mixed	limited	w/ Border Distance armed	mixed	limited	w/ Ruggedness armed	mixed
Symbolic Value	1.87*** (0.67)	-0.08 (0.59)	0.97 (0.69)	2.03*** (0.67)	-0.08 (0.62)	1.26* (0.74)	1.92*** (0.74)	-0.11 (0.59)	0.91 (0.77)
Group Size (% , log)	-0.21 (0.13)	0.11 (0.27)	-0.08 (0.20)	-0.22* (0.13)	0.11 (0.28)	-0.06 (0.20)	-0.20 (0.15)	0.10 (0.27)	-0.10 (0.19)
Economic Differential (log)	-0.28** (0.13)	-0.45** (0.20)	-0.87*** (0.33)	-0.32** (0.13)	-0.44** (0.19)	-0.94*** (0.34)	-0.29** (0.13)	-0.43** (0.19)	-0.84** (0.35)
Excluded (lag)	-0.83 (0.60)	1.43* (0.76)	0.38 (0.78)	-0.88 (0.60)	1.41* (0.76)	0.30 (0.81)	-0.88 (0.62)	1.45* (0.75)	0.44 (0.72)
Democracy (lag)	-1.03* (0.54)	-0.79 (0.51)	-0.62 (0.71)	-1.12** (0.53)	-0.78 (0.51)	-0.87 (0.69)	-1.04* (0.53)	-0.77 (0.51)	-0.60 (0.69)
Border Distance (log)				-0.33 (0.23)	0.02 (0.21)	-0.64** (0.30)			
Ruggedness (log)							0.07 (0.26)	-0.10 (0.26)	-0.12 (0.39)
Constant	-0.38 (0.84)	-0.34 (1.01)	-0.05 (1.08)	-0.35 (0.85)	-0.34 (1.02)	-0.03 (1.12)	-0.37 (0.84)	-0.38 (1.01)	-0.09 (1.02)
Group fixed effects		yes			yes			yes	
AIC		1529.294			1511.287			1533.155	
BIC		1612.431			1608.28			1630.148	
Pseudo R ²		0.1177			0.1318			0.1189	
Observations		749			749			749	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

	w/ Capital Distance			w/ Oil			w/ Oil and/or Diamonds		
	limited	armed	mixed	limited	armed	mixed	limited	armed	mixed
Symbolic Value	1.88*** (0.68)	-0.08 (0.60)	0.96 (0.69)	1.87*** (0.67)	-0.05 (0.59)	0.98 (0.68)	1.90*** (0.66)	-0.06 (0.59)	1.00 (0.68)
Group Size (% , log)	-0.23* (0.12)	0.14 (0.31)	-0.05 (0.24)	-0.25 (0.15)	0.11 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.15)	0.11 (0.25)	-0.09 (0.20)
Economic Differential (log)	-0.28** (0.13)	-0.45** (0.20)	-0.87** (0.34)	-0.31** (0.13)	-0.40** (0.19)	-0.88*** (0.34)	-0.31** (0.13)	-0.40** (0.19)	-0.87*** (0.34)
Excluded (lag)	-0.83 (0.60)	1.43* (0.76)	0.39 (0.79)	-0.91 (0.61)	1.50** (0.76)	0.30 (0.80)	-0.92 (0.62)	1.46* (0.76)	0.33 (0.79)
Democracy (lag)	-1.04** (0.53)	-0.78 (0.51)	-0.60 (0.73)	-0.99* (0.53)	-0.89* (0.53)	-0.63 (0.69)	-1.00* (0.53)	-0.86 (0.53)	-0.64 (0.69)
Capital Distance (log)	-0.06 (0.34)	0.08 (0.34)	0.10 (0.32)						
Oil				0.64 (0.62)	-0.62 (0.51)	0.37 (0.80)			
Oil and/or Diamonds							0.74 (0.65)	-0.57 (0.51)	0.31 (0.77)
Constant	-0.36 (0.82)	-0.38 (1.03)	-0.09 (1.14)	-0.71 (0.86)	-0.12 (1.09)	-0.20 (1.01)	-0.81 (0.84)	-0.10 (1.11)	-0.22 (1.03)
Group fixed effects		yes			yes			yes	
AIC		1534.431			1514.699			1514.302	
BIC		1631.425			1611.693			1611.296	
Pseudo R ²		0.1182			0.1298			0.1301	
Observations		749			749			749	

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A8: Coefficient plot of multinomial logit estimation, excluding cases with high correlation between symbolic value and strategic¹ or material² value



¹ Excludes Armenians (Azerbaijan), Chittagong Hill Tribes (Bangladesh), Aymara (Bolivia), Tibetans (China), Corsicans (France), Kashmiri Muslims (India), South Tyroleans (Italy), Saharawis (Morocco), Crimean Russians (Ukraine), Crimean Tartars (Ukraine), Native Hawaiians (USA), Degar/Montagnards (Vietnam).

² Excludes Kachins (Burma), Karens (Burma), Zomis/Chins (Burma), Aceh (Indonesia), Papuans (Indonesia), Kurds (Iraq), Igbo (Nigeria), Ijaw (Nigeria), Ogoni (Nigeria), Yoruba (Nigeria), Scots (UK).

6.5 Selection Model

Group's choices and their constraints determine the two outcomes we observe: first, the choice of irregular strategies, and second, the employment of armed conflict. Two stage selection models are well suited to account for this situation. Most commonly, Heckman selection models are used to incorporate this form of non-random selection ³⁹. This requires the specification of an exclusion restriction, one or more variables that affect the selection process (Y_1 : nonconventional strategies) but not the final outcome (Y_2 : armed conflict³). For many issues covered in political science the identification of a theoretically meaningful exclusion criterion is challenging, particularly as selection and outcome often share the same causes and similar decision making processes. I include the freedom of the press as exclusion restriction. This is based on the assumption that groups operating in a more accessible political environment are more likely to engage in conventional politics, which is the cheapest option when negotiating the demand with the government. Where little access to basic political freedoms exist, groups are incentivized to escalate in order to make their claims heard. As a basic civil right in open political systems, the freedom of the press guarantees that injustices, grievances and political contests get reported on and can reach a wider audience both domestically and internationally. I recode the press freedom indicator by Freedom House ²⁸ into a categorical variable with the categories "free", "partly free", and "not free" proposed by Freedom House. Higher values in the recoded variable correspond to higher degrees of press freedom.

I estimate a Heckman probit model to account for the two binary dependent variables. The coefficient estimates are reported in model 3 in Table A5. I confirm the earlier results, showing that symbolic value is statistically significant in the selection equation, and that the negative association with armed conflict identified in earlier estimations holds in the outcome equation. The Wald test of independent equations is not significant, suggesting that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of independent equations. While this does not establish that the two selection processes are in fact

³ Armed conflict is operationalized as a subset of the nonconventional strategies.

independent, it increases confidence in specifying two independent probit models. In line with the earlier findings, the predicted values from the outcome equation, plotted in Figure A7, show that conditional on the selection process, the probability of armed conflict is higher in the absence of symbolic value than where symbolic attachments are salient.


For robustness, I thus compare the two stage selection model to the findings from two independent equations modeling irregular strategies and armed conflict choice, respectively, using a probit link (Table A5). While these do not take into account the dependence among the choices, the coefficients align with the selection model when it comes to irregular strategies (model 1), and to a limited degree with regard to armed conflict (model 2).

Table A5: Models of employment of nonconventional strategies and armed conflict in demands for self-determination

	(1) Nonconventional strategies	(2) Armed conflict	(3) Nonconventional and armed conflict
Y₁: Nonconventional Strategies			
Symbolic Value	0.36*** (0.12)		0.35*** (0.12)
Group Size (% , log)	-0.05 (0.04)		-0.07* (0.04)
Economic Differential (log)	-0.17*** (0.05)		-0.17*** (0.05)
Excluded (lag)	0.08 (0.13)		0.06 (0.13)
Democracy (lag)	-0.05 (0.15)		-0.07 (0.17)
Freedom of Press (lag)	0.02*** (0.00)		0.02*** (0.00)
Constant	-0.84** (0.33)		-0.80** (0.36)
Y₂: Armed Conflict			
Symbolic Value		-0.17 (0.13)	-0.83*** (0.19)
Group Size (% , log)		0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Economic Differential (log)		-0.21*** (0.06)	0.08 (0.08)
Excluded (lag)		0.80*** (0.17)	0.36 (0.33)
Democracy (lag)		-0.34*** (0.13)	0.22 (0.16)
Constant		-0.50** (0.21)	0.76** (0.33)
Observations	687	691	Y ₁ : 687, Y ₂ : 262
AIC	825.6309	655.8554	1150.445
BIC	857.3573	683.0843	1213.897
Wald X ²	105.65***	52.82***	32.49***
Pseudo R ²	0.1114	0.0998	
Rho	-	-	-1.15 (0.22)

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A8: Adjusted predictions of armed conflict (Y₂) conditional on selection into nonconventional strategies for symbolic territorial value, including covariates



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