

Follert, Florian; Naumann, Chantal; Thieme, Lutz

Working Paper

Between scientific publication and public perception: Some economic remarks on the allocation of time in science

Diskussionspapiere des Europäischen Instituts für Sozioökonomie e.V., No. 34

Provided in Cooperation with:

European Institute for Socioeconomics (EIS)

Suggested Citation: Follert, Florian; Naumann, Chantal; Thieme, Lutz (2020) : Between scientific publication and public perception: Some economic remarks on the allocation of time in science, Diskussionspapiere des Europäischen Instituts für Sozioökonomie e.V., No. 34, Europäisches Institut für Sozioökonomie e. V., Saarbrücken, <https://doi.org/10.22028/D291-32411>

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/230884>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.


If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.



<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/de/>

Diskussionspapiere des
Europäischen Instituts für Sozioökonomie e. V.

Working Papers of the
European Institute for Socioeconomics



**Between Scientific Publication and Public
Perception:
Some Economic Remarks on the Allocation of
Time in Science**

Florian Follert, Chantal Naumann & Lutz Thieme

Nr. 34

2020

Ass.-Prof. Dr. Florian Follert,

Privatuniversität Schloss Seeburg, Fakultät für Management,
Seeburgstraße 8,
5201 Seekirchen am Wallersee (Österreich)
Tel. 00 43 6212 2626 0,
E-mail: Florian.Follert@uni-seeburg.at

Dr. Chantal Naumann

Fachrichtung Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftslehre insbesondere Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre
Universität des Saarlandes
Campus Gebäude B4 1
66123 Saarbrücken
Tel: 0049 681 302-3686
E-Mail: c.naumann@bli.uni-saarland.de

Prof. Dr. Lutz Thieme

Fachbereich Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
Hochschule Koblenz/RheinAhrCampus
Joseph-Rovan-Allee 2
53424 Remagen
Tel: +49(0) 2642 932 225
E-Mail: thieme@rheinahrcampus.de

© 2020

Europäisches Institut für Sozioökonomie e. V. / European Institute for Socioeconomics

c/o Universität des Saarlandes

Sportwissenschaftliches Institut
Arbeitsbereich Sportökonomie und Sportsoziologie
Campus, Gebäude 8.1

66123 Saarbrücken

<https://eis-online.org>

Between Scientific Publication and Public Perception: Some Economic Remarks on the Allocation of Time in Science

Ass.-Prof. Dr. Florian Follert^{a*)}, Dr. Chantal Naumann^{b)}, and Prof. PD. Dr. Lutz Thieme^{c)d)}

^{a)} Privatuniversität Schloss Seeburg, Fakultät für Management, Seekirchen/Salzburg, Österreich

^{b)} Universität des Saarlandes, Fakultät für Empirische Humanwissenschaften und Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Lehrstuhl für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insb. Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre, Saarbrücken, Deutschland

^{c)} Universität des Saarlandes, Fakultät für Empirische Humanwissenschaften und Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Saarbrücken Deutschland

^{d)} Hochschule Koblenz, RheinAhrCampus, Remagen, Deutschland.

^{*)} Corresponding author. florian.follert@uni-seeburg.at

Zusammenfassung:

Like every other human being, scientists also have to allocate their scarce resources of time and production according to their personal preferences. Today's scientific system is dominated by different (external) incentives that influence a researcher's decisions. With respect to the individual research strategy, there seems to be a conflict between scientific rigor and practical relevance. In addition, only certain scientific results actually find their way into the general public. We assume therefore that the use of virological and economic expertise are two different forms of reception of science by another social sphere. If our assumption is correct, the question arises as to how such rules of reception are formed and stabilized. This question will be investigated in the present paper. With regard to his or her publication strategy, the scientist therefore has to decide interdependently. Based on the economic approach in general, and Gary S. Becker's theory of time allocation specifically, we develop a simple model to explain scientific decision-making behavior. We derive several implications with regard to a strategy on time allocation in research processes, and thus contribute to a better understanding of scientific decision-making processes. In our paper, we concentrate on the general conditions in (business) economics, but the findings can also be applied to other (human) sciences. In order to be as up-to-date as possible, we take an additional look at the role of science in the current COVID-19 crisis as well.

Keywords:

Economics of Science, Time Allocation, Publication Strategy, Scientific System, COVID-19

1 Introduction

Periodically, the “Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung” (German Council of Economic Experts), colloquially referred to as “Wirtschaftsweisen” (“Wise Men of the Economy”), presents an annual economic report and comments on several current economic aspects. The reception of the recommendations of the collective, as well as those of other advisory bodies (e.g. ifo, ZEW, DIW, etc.) operating in the (macro-)economic context, appears to be rather low (Rürup 2009). In addition, “the relationship between top-level research and policy advice among German economists seems to be more substitutive than complementary” (Haucap and Mödl 2013).

This makes it all the more astonishing that political decision-makers in the so-called “COVID-19 crisis” are dealing with scientific expertise from the point of view of economists. Beyond the question of whether or not the recommendations for action that were made by the virologists advising politicians were appropriate to manage the pandemic, all political decision-makers relied on the scientific expertise, especially from the medical sciences, in their daily political activities. The reference to the exceptional situation as the cause falls short of the mark, because the economic consequences of political action are to be mitigated by programs which economists were essentially only able to comment on after their adoption.

Although the climate issue is hardly noticed in these times, at least in the media, similar things could also be observed in this context. While politicians, under increasing pressure from NGOs and activists, have been referring to a “consensus” among climate researchers in their measures for a few years, the economic side of the coin, which has already been worked on for decades in the context of environmental economics in general (starting with Pigou 1920; Coase 1960; Ostrom 1990; Nordhaus 1991; Frey 1993; Endres 2013) and the pricing of externalities and climate change in particular (early Nordhaus and Popp 1997; Nordhaus and Boyer 2000), has been largely ignored. The topic was not only recognized in economics, but its implementation in the practical business sphere was also put on the agenda early on by business economics (e.g. Balderjahn 2007).

No discipline can claim to have the only valid recipe for solving modern problems. The human being and the interaction with his or her environment are too complex for that. In the context of the current pandemic, the virologist Alexander Kekulé and the economist Jens Südekum (2020) show that different perspectives from different disciplines are required for the political treatment of complex phenomena: while virological expertise is directly translated into political action, economic decisions are preferably developed directly from the political arena in its interaction between executive and administrative bodies (Downs 1957; Niskanen 1975).

The current COVID-19 pandemic and the different perception of scientist let us assume that public and political perception could have a significant influence on a scientist's strategic decisions. Like every individual a scientist decides under uncertainty and is limited by scarce resources and time budget. To contribute to the topic of the economics of science we would like to develop a simple allocation model that emphasizes a relation between different decision pa-

rameters influencing the research strategy of a stereotypical utility-maximizing scientist. In addition to the public and political perception already mentioned, it is in particular the decision between rigor and relevance which is relevant for decision-making. The scientist is thus faced with the decision to allocate his scarce resources to the various determinants according to his individual preferences in such a way that his utility is maximized.

If our assumption, that the use of virological and economic expertise are two different forms of reception of science by another social sphere, is correct, the question arises as to how such collective rules of reception are formed and stabilized. This question will be investigated in the present paper. Our goal is to propose an explanatory model which can be empirically tested in future research.

Our model is based on the fundamental economic assumptions of methodological individualism and utility maximization (section 2), differentiates between the expected utility from rigor versus relevance against the background of the anticipated and experienced selection criteria of media, public and politics over time (section 3) and implies the retroactive effect of the degree of attention gained on the decisions considered in the model (section 4). The paper concludes with an outlook on further research (section 5).

2 Basic Assumptions:

Methodological Individualism and Utility Maximization

In the following we will present two crucial assumptions of our analysis. This seems to be important in two respects: First, they are the basis of our model and are important for its interpretation. Secondly, it is necessary for the interested public to recognize that scientists are individuals who – like other people as well – pursue their own interests.

The principle of methodological individualism founded by Joseph Schumpeter (1998) applies both to human action in general, and to the process of scientific knowledge in particular. According to this conception, individuals always act individually, whereas collectives do not act autonomously. This idea applies to states and organizations, and also to the scientific community. Thus, research is only carried out by individuals, not by an institution as a whole. However, it can be argued that scientists at public institutions tend to be oriented towards the common good, should such a thing exist despite Arrow's (1951) impossibility theorem, but it is more likely to assume that scientists, just like other people (and this also applies to judges; Follert 2020), are (also) interested in their own well-being, and are thus influenced by incentives in their decisions (e.g. Emrich and Pitsch 2014; Emrich and Follert 2019a). This is without prejudice to the fact that altruistic action can also serve one's own benefit (on volunteer labor supply see e.g., Emrich and Pierdzioch 2015).

The idea of looking at science and at scientists from an economic perspective is not new, although the economic analysis of science is still relatively young (Stigler 1969). The transfer of economic methodology once again demonstrates the flexibility of the economic approach (for more information on the economic approach, see Becker 1976) to the “economics of science”

(as overviewed in Diamond 1996; Stephan 1996). Science can be understood as competition between individuals: “Scientific competition means competition within academic or open science and its institutions: learned societies, scientific journals, the peer review system, Nobel prizes, and modern research-oriented universities” (Albert 2008). The economics of science are conceived as explanatory or “positive” science in order to give a better understanding of processes and behaviors within academia (Diamond 1996). Accordingly, a scientist bases his or her decisions on the expected benefits and then compares it with the costs incurred (e.g. Wible 2014; Emrich and Follert 2019a). Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that, due to the uncertainty inherent in every decision (fundamentally Knight 1921), the consequences may be misjudged (Kirchgässner 2013; Emrich and Follert 2019b). This is especially true in academic careers, in which a lot depends on random constellations (Weber 1930). Nevertheless, a scientist will acknowledge this uncertainty in order to try to improve his or her position and thus increase his or her benefit (e.g., Emrich and Follert 2019b). The individual benefit of a researcher may be expressed by rigor in terms of reputation, what is reflected by publications in renowned top scientific journals, citations in scientific journals (on the value of a citation Diamond 1986), invitations as speaker at conferences, and/or by relevance by mentions in newspapers or appearances on television, or even political influence (Emrich and Pitsch 2014)¹.

3 Decision Parameters

3.1 Rigor versus Relevance

Following Ludwig von Mises (1998), “human action is [always] purposeful behavior.” This also applies when information deficits and bounded rationality are taken into account (fundamentally Simon 1955, 1982). This axiom can also be applied to a scientist, who have to divide a scarce time budget according to research content and methods.² In the scientific community, the distinction between the two antagonists, rigor and relevance, has been previously established, especially for the applied sciences. While rigor in this case refers to scientific rigor, relevance regularly refers to the importance of the research for a particular addressee, so that a distinction can be made between scientific and practical relevance (Dilger 2012). For the purpose of simplification, we would like to focus in the following on rigor and practical relevance in this paper. According to Dilger (2012) we understand rigor as “the very systematic and methodical approach, the following of scientific rules and standards.” There seems to be a trade-off between rigor and (practical) relevance (Nicolai 2004), so that in a society based on the division of labor, it is not surprising that specialization occurs within the scientific community (Dilger 2012). But a danger can be seen when rigor dominates one discipline (Dilger 2012). This is a problem in many disciplines, e.g. in economics as well as in business economics.

In particular, after the recent international financial crisis, movements have formed worldwide that oppose research which is based on unrealistic assumptions and is exclusively quantitative-

¹ Depending on whether a scientist is more extrinsically or intrinsically motivated, he or she also benefits from his or her work: “Research is in many ways a kind of game, a puzzle-solving operation in which the solution of the puzzle is its own reward” (Hagstrom 1965).

² To reduce the complexity of our analysis and to concentrate on research we abstract here from administrative tasks and lectures.

empirical oriented, and which is focused on only a small number of top journals (to this problem see e.g., Küting et al. 2013; Haucap and Mödl 2013; Kußmaul et al. 2017). Within the scientific community of business economics, especially in management science, the discussion about rigor and relevance had already reached a peak in the early 2000s (e.g., Huff 2000; Rynes, Bartunek and Daft 2001; Nicolai 2004), and is still ongoing (e.g. Hamet and Michel 2018).

In 2009 a dispute arose in the German economics community about the (methodological) orientation of the discipline (Wilgeroth 2009; Bachmann and Uhlig 2009), with one side oriented towards economic policy in the sense of relevance and one, primarily internationally oriented side in the sense of rigor, which can be seen as “Neuer Methodenstreit” (e.g. Caspari and Scheffold 2011; Feld and Köhler 2011).

The fact that the topic is also important for the broader economically interested public is shown by an article by Matthias Binswanger (2012, with 40,088 reads as of 3/31/20) on the German-speaking blog “Ökonomenstimme”, in which he critically discusses the article by Edlund and Korn (2002) entitled “A Theory of Prostitution,” which was published in the *Journal of Political Economy*. In his critique, Binswanger follows Mankiw (2007):

“[M]ore young economists today are doing Levitt-style economics and fewer are studying the classic questions of economic policy. That is disconcerting, to a degree. It could be especially problematic twenty years from now, when President Chelsea Clinton looks for an economist to appoint to head the Federal Reserve, and the only thing she can find in the American Economic Association are experts on game shows and sumo wrestling.”

Concerning the discussion about rigor and relevance, however, it must be countered by the fact that practical relevance cannot be obtained solely by advising political decision-makers. Relevance is primarily a subjective category, so that the demand of a broad public also leads to relevance (“public relevance”), which may lead to political relevance. The opposite case, in which political relevance encourages public relevance, is also conceivable. Although Steven Levitt does not research in areas that are (explicitly) relevant to economic policy, the worldwide success of his book *Freakonomics*, written together with Stephen Dubner (2005), shows that he is able to convey the economic approach to a broad public, which can by no means be dismissed as irrelevant. Therefore, relevance seems to exist both in the expression “political” and in the expression “public,” whereby it can be assumed that both expressions influence each other.

3.2 Selection Mechanisms of Public, Politics, and Science

Scientific findings presented by economists are always related to a specific historical point in time that is more or less connectable to the criteria of rigor and public or political relevance. While the criteria for rigor are generally an outcome of a negotiation of processes within the scientific community, concrete public interests form the demand from politics and the specific public for the respective results.

Rigor can be understood as a concrete form within the framework of a particular style of thinking (Fleck 1980), a paradigm (Kuhn 1976), or a research program (Lakatos 1970), which has been formed by the cooperation of scientists who feel committed to it. Rigor determines which

characteristics are used to assess knowledge gains. The disregard of rigor or the deliberate deviation from it is connected with a high risk of rejection or disregard of the presented knowledge in the scientific community. At the same time, for example, the acceptance of a journal article that does not comply with rigor by a reviewer is also associated with kind of risks for the reviewer,³ but at least with increased effort for the reviewer (Haucap and Mödl 2013). Over time, this development converges to a high degree of standardization and typification, with a decrease in originality and research diversity (e.g. Frey 2011). Frey and Osterloh (2020) call the problem within a peer-review as

“conservative bias, that is the bias against unconventional ideas. Referees subjectively have more information on research projects that are close to existing knowledge. Moreover, information on those contributions is more consistent. With unorthodox contributions referees have less – and usually inconsistent – information.”

The importance of scientific findings for political and administrative decision-makers lies on the one hand in the acquisition of control knowledge, and on the other hand in the production of legitimacy for decisions. Both can occur either coupled or decoupled with each other. Thus, it is conceivable that control knowledge is adapted from scientific knowledge without referring to the production of legitimacy by explicitly referring to the origin of the knowledge from the scientific system. As Max Weber (1958) has already pointed out, the separation of specialized expertise and political decision-making power is by no means unproblematic. This appears to have been the case, for example, in the context of nudging (Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Schnellenbach 2016) and the establishment of corresponding experts in governmental centers in the UK, the US and Germany (Dams et al. 2015; see also Bundesregierung 2019). Several countries have written guidelines for scientific policy advice (Mayntz 2009). The market for political consulting is being worked on intensively. On the supply side, there are ministerial advisers (e.g. Maley 2010), (private) consulting firms, NGOs, think tanks, and lobbyists on the one hand (e.g. Howlett and Migone 2017), and scientific policy advisors on the other, who may be privately or publicly funded (e.g. Mayntz 2009). Such approaches to the incorporation of experts on new scientific findings that are relevant to control ultimately accumulate over time in a so-called departmental research (“Ressortforschung”). This refers to subordinate authorities whose task it is to work on politically relevant issues using established scientific theories and methods. From time to time, the scope of action of such authorities is extended by a budget for contract research, which enables the tendering of specific research projects. Such calls signal political relevance for the topic in question to scientists who are free to decide on funding. A general problem of scientific policy advice is the conflict between facts and power (“Sachbezug” and “Machtbezug”, Mayntz 2009).

³ One of the risks is, that the article does not represent the reviewer’s scientific position. To maximize his own utility, he has strong incentives to support his own point of view and to reject others. Towards the characteristics and problems of the scientific (peer) review system, particularly concerning status differences between reviewer and other and the influence on the results of the review process see Zuckerman and Merton (1971) who differentiate between “*status-solidarity*”, “*status-competition*”, “*status-deference*”, “*status-envy*”, “*status-patronage*” and “*status-subordination*”.

The link between the acquisition of control knowledge and the pursuit of legitimacy is established when political decision-makers refer to scientific evidence when announcing or explaining their decisions. In most cases, this legitimacy production takes place in a personalized form, i.e., a specific scientist or a small group is used as evidence for the assumptions of impact associated with the political decision. The suitability as a “supplier of legitimacy” depends, among other things, on the perceived independence of the scientist from the interests of third parties, and ultimately on his or her commitment to the ethos of science and the associated CUDOS norms (Merton 1985). The instrumentalization of scientific findings in the course of the production of political legitimacy can also lead, due to the polarization between the governing parties and the opposition parties, to the legitimization of other control proposals with other experts, and thus to the start of a politicization spiral of the scientists who generate legitimacy.

This mutually relationship between science and politics is currently evident due to the COVID-19 crisis. There seems to be a broad scientific, political and generally accepted consensus reached on the assumptions that some intervention must be taken, to slow down the spreading of infections. But each country takes different actions, because this pandemic is completely new and there is little empirical evidence. As a result of this uncertainty the assessments concerning the most effective actions differ, because even in natural sciences, the interpretation of empirical findings depends on (subjective) preferences and assumptions. Spoken with Ludwik Fleck (1980), scientific findings follow a social conditionality. In Sweden, for example, esp. Anders Tegnell advises the government as an epidemiologist and this appeals to a common sense to issue recommendations instead of strict prohibitions. In the UK and the Netherlands, so-called “herd immunity” was initially pursued, but its supporters have been heavily criticized, so that they adjusted their strategies, but not quite strictly. Deviating from these rather *laissez-fair* measures, there are countries like Spain and Italy that early adopted very strict restrictions on the advice of their leading scientists (example). In Germany, Christian Drosten, Alexander Kekulé, and Hendrik Streeck seems to be the scientists that get the most public attention. In a situation characterized by uncertainty such as the current one, political actors seek the advice from scientific experts. Two aspects should be pointed out in this context. On the one hand, it should be emphasized that, in Max Weber's sense, scientists do not set normative goals themselves and thus leave all political decisions to the elected representatives. On the other hand, it should also be pointed out that there is a possible danger that leading scientists could be politically instrumentalized to underline political wishful thinking with scientific reputation.

Obviously, in the current pandemic there is a trade-off between the goal “Protection against infection” and those effects that results by actions to realize that goal, e.g., negative economic, social or mental (what of course is a medical aspect as well) effects. From a theoretical perspective, an optimum can be found where the marginal utility of the actions to contain infections correspond the marginal costs. The individual weighting within the target function is a normative decision and is not answerable by science. In particular, a constructive debate about the pros and cons is required to balance these conflicting goals. What we can also learn from the current situation is, that an actual optimum can only be found if an interdisciplinary approach is followed (Follert 2020). Consequently, the scientists consulted for policy advice must focus different aspects: In addition to virologists who primarily pursue health protection, economists, psychologists and lawyers, for example, must also be involved in the discussion.

At this point, we can remark that scholars can achieve public attention or even relevance through their role as producers of legitimacy for political decisions. It should be noted that the individual legitimacy resources do not seem to be infinite, and must be replenished by a return to scientific rigor and originality, although this can also be done by colleagues within the same institution. This would also explain the divergence between international top-level research and policy advisory within economics (Haucap and Mödl 2013). However, scientists can also gain public attention by translating complex problems into a broadly understandable form (e.g. the works of Stephen Hawking) or by applying scientific models to interesting everyday phenomena (e.g. Becker and Nashat Becker 1997; Levitt and Dubner 2005; Kahneman 2011) in an entertaining way.

4 Modelling Scientific Decision-Making

In economics, life cycles are often assumed, for example for products or business enterprises (e.g. Mueller 1972; Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Klepper 1996). On this research we build a career cycle for the professional life of a scientist. To reduce the complexity of our analysis, we assume three stereotypical phases:

- (I) **Core research:** This first phase is characterized through the subject area in which the researcher engages in scientific discourse through his own publications. Here he or she produces knowledge and can achieve rigor and/or relevance within a limited scientific community.
- (II) **Discipline:** After building a certain reputation within his core research the contributions to subject areas that follow his or her field of research, but which he or she has not worked on. He or she extends the area but still remains within the overall discipline. Here the scientist can achieve relevance, but does not produce knowledge and cannot achieve rigor in his core research.
- (III) **Non-specialist:** The consumption in III requires prior investments in I and II. In particular, a minimum level of activity in the scientists' core research area is necessary. In this phase, the subject does not have any relation to the scientist's discipline.⁴ When the scientist comments on those topics, he or she produces neither knowledge nor rigor nor relevance as a scientist. Nevertheless, he or she (as an individual) can attain political or public relevance, e.g., on social media channels. We can assume that this should be easier for a well-established scientist, because the legitimacy produced by the CUDOS norms as a member of the scientific community is transferred to the other (external) subject area. However, if an abuse of the role as a scientist for this (III) subject area is recognized by the public, this reduces c.p. the effect of CUDOS legitimacy as a scientist in the successor period. By obtaining academic degrees and titles, the position can be strategically expanded so that public credibility increases. Whether the individual exploits the possibilities gained in phase III depends on his or her personal preference, e.g. whether he or she attaches importance to being in the public.

⁴ We understand this in terms of the content and not from the methodical perspective.

In phase I, relevance is limited to a small scientific community. However, if political or public relevance is sought and it is expected by the scientist that this cannot be achieved with the core research, he or she decides to make contributions on areas that lie outside the core research field (phase II) as well. For the scientist, it may be necessary to invest again in rigor and scientific relevance in this new field of research. This new field is not aligned at gain in knowledge or rigor, but at achieving political or public relevance, which is needed for phase III. With Bourdieu one could argue that knowledge, rigor and academic relevance as places of capital can only be exchanged for public or political relevance as another place of capital once a certain minimum level of resources has been reached. Consequently, phase II could be interpreted as the phase in which the connectivity to political and/or public relevance is established. Scientists without a preference for political or public relevance have chosen their topics according to other preferences. But, scientists with preferences for public/political relevance will choose their topics in the way they think they will become "relevant".

To illustrate our ideal-typical phase-model graphically, we built on the common approach of a product life cycle, see Figure 1. In the actual core research area, additional gain in knowledge and reputation can only be gained if the resource consumption is high (decreasing marginal utility). The scientist recycles his or her own ideas, which have reached the maximum of the life cycle. If necessary, the scientist even fears a decline in reputation. In order to develop further, the scientist moves on to phase II and expands his or her research area. Once the optimum is reached in phase II, the scientist begins to invest resources in phase III.




Figure 1: Scientific career life cycle (t = time; U = Utility)

Since scientists are also subject to the law of scarcity, they must choose between various alternatives. Our model to explain the decision-making behavior of a stereotypical scientist assumes an individual who maximizes his or her expected utility in accordance with his or her intertemporally stable utility function, or strives to do so under incomplete information and uncertainty. For the scientist, it is therefore a matter of maximizing the allocation of his or her time budget for different scientific activities in accordance with his or her utility function, which can provide him or her with different anticipated consumption benefits.⁵

Emrich and Pitsch (2014) apply the religious-economic household models of Becker (1965) and Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) to sports science, distinguishing the consumption of a scientist into internal (C_i) and external (C_e) recognition (Emrich and Pitsch 2014), presenting a model that we now use as a proxy for rigor and relevance.⁶ The scientist thus maximizes his intertemporal utility U of the following function (for the basic model, see Emrich and Pitsch 2014):

$$U = U(C_i + C_e) \quad (1)$$

Of course, it is important to optimize its benefits over time. For this purpose, the costs (CO) of the investment are compared with the present values of the earnings (U):

$$\max \left(\sum_{t=0}^n \frac{U_t}{(1+\delta)^t} - \sum_{t=0}^n \frac{CO_t}{(1+\delta)^t} \right); \text{ with } \delta \text{ as discount rate } > 0 \quad (2)$$

Since a researcher's academic reputation (Emrich and Pitsch 2014; in the context of entrepreneurship theory, e.g. Gerbaulet 2016) is the decisive factor for career opportunities, and represents *the* crucial currency, it directly determines the decision-making calculation (e.g. Emrich and Follert 2019a). The reputation of a researcher is not a static quantity, but rather a dynamic one, which depends in particular on past reputation, academic background in the sense of social networks, and publication activity (for a satirical formalization in the context of the "PARK model," see Emrich and Pierdzioch 2011). The determinants "past reputation" and "academic background" favor a "Matthew effect", so that once a certain success has been achieved, the current success can be attributed more to previous success (Merton 1968). In addition to these non-financial flows of benefits, financial benefits can also of course play a role, although this benefit component is likely to tend to be less important, especially for state universities in German-speaking countries and the fixed part of the remuneration. However, since financial incentives and other influencing factors cannot be completely neglected, they should be expressed using a confounder e . Variable earnings can be understood as a function of reputation, so that they often increase in the course of a career.⁷ Total consumption C is dependent on the total time T available for consumption purposes (for the theory of the allocation of time, fundamentally, see Becker 1965), which results from individual weighting, based on the subjective preferences. We assume a stereotypical scientist who has to allocate his scarce time budget on activities that produce C_i and/or C_e .

⁵ Another assumption is that the scientist considered here is already established within the scientific community, so that his initial investment can be neglected. Ideally, the model is considered for a full-professor.

⁶ It should be noted that the scientist can of course also be interested only in gaining knowledge ("motive of salvation," Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975; Emrich and Pitsch 2014), but he must also live "from science" (Emrich and Pitsch 2014) ("motive of consumption," Azzi and Ehrenberg 1975; Emrich and Pitsch 2014), so that the motive of consumption regularly precedes the motive of salvation.

⁷ With regard to the earning potential in the context of lectures, see Chan et al. (2013).

The individual weighting of C_i and C_e depends on the respective target function of the scientist.

The researcher's time budget can be defined as:

$$t_r = 24 \text{ h} - t_l \quad (3)$$

with t_l = leisure time; t_r = research time

$$t_{Ci}(w) = w \cdot t_r, \quad (4)$$

with t_{Ci} = time budget for C_i

$$t_{Ce}(w) = (1 - w) \cdot t_r \quad (5)$$

with t_{Ce} = time budget for C_e

$$C(w) = w \cdot C_i + (1 - w) \cdot C_e + e \quad (6)$$

with e = other influencing factors

To receive the total consumption, the scientist has to carry out an intrinsic weighting of C_i and C_e . The variables rigor (RI) and relevance (RE) – outlined above – as well as the preferred level of gain in knowledge (K), so that the weighting can be written as a function of those variables.

$$w = w(\text{RI}, \text{RE}, \text{K}) \quad (7)$$

Therefore, the height of w follows from the individual preference for RE, RI and K. This connection can be described as follows:

- The more important RI, the higher w .
- The more important RE, the lower w .
- The more important K, the higher w .

The individual preference for RE, RI and K is, of course, a dynamic variable, which the researcher particularly makes depending on the respective phase (I, II, III). For example, if the researcher primarily aims for external reputation in phase III, he will consider RI and K as unimportant and RE as very important. As a result, he will choose w as low as possible and consequently maximize C_e .

The researcher must allocate the time budget on his or her internal and external consumption. He or she divides the time on the basis of a personal weighting, which will mostly shift significantly during his or her career cycle. While the weighting of internal consumption will inevitably predominate at the beginning of the career, the importance shifts more and more to external consumption with increasing reputation and thus additional work by the own team and other scientists. The so-called “Heinsberg-study” for example (Streeck et al. 2020), which determines

the COVID-19 infection fatality rate, was published by 22 authors, while Hendrik Streeck is the scientist that is well-known from talk-shows and newspapers.

We have to acknowledge that investments to gain knowledge, rigor, and relevance are not dis-junctive. For example, a unit of time invested to gain knowledge may also partially benefit rigor, relevance, or both.

If one illustrates this in a VENN diagram, it becomes clear that by considering the size of the overlapping areas α , β , γ , and δ as prototypes for the decision situations of scientists in the choice of their research object, the optimization function according to the individual preferences of the choosing scientists can be derived (Fig. 2).




Figure 2: Investments in RI, RE, K

With respect to the individual nature of human beings, scientists also have different preferences. A scientist with a strong preference for relevance will therefore choose research topics that maximize the sum of β , γ , and δ . A preference for rigor will maximize the sum of α , γ , and δ . In both cases, δ decreases, which is in line with the findings of Haucap and Mödl (2013). A scientist who is only oriented on gaining knowledge will sometimes achieve more rigor, sometimes more relevance, and sometimes neither of the two with his research results. His internal (C_i) and external (C_e) recognition (Emrich and Pitsch 2014) are likely to be systematically lower than that of scientists with a higher preference for rigor or relevance, due to the randomness of meeting rigor or relevance with the knowledge gained. Since the academic market is a form of “winner-take-all” competition (Stephan 1996), following Feld, Necker, and Frey (2015, fundamentally Frank and Cook 1995), the group of scientists appointed to relevant chairs should be more likely to include researchers with a clear preference for rigor or relevance. However, since the assignment of rigor and relevance are also winner-take-all markets, these produce a relatively high proportion of less successful researchers with a preference for relevance or rigor.

For them, the opportunity costs of spending time outside of science would decrease, leading to less time spent inside science, and also to a reduction in the number of research objects processed. This should primarily affect research objects for which a high degree of connectivity to rigor or relevance was originally anticipated. At the collective level, this weakens the orientation towards rigor and relevance as criteria for the selection of research objects, which leads to an approximation to the ethos of science, and stabilizes it.

If one follows our model and accepts that

- neither rigor nor relevance as a scientist can be achieved without substantial gain in knowledge, and
- public or political relevance can be promoted through rigor,

then it would be advisable for young scientists to allocate their time on rigor, regardless of their individual preferences. If the young researcher has established himself or herself, for example, by being appointed to a (full) professorship, he or she can shift the focus of his or her research topics according to his or her concrete preferences toward relevance or pure knowledge gain, or maintain the focus on rigor. If it becomes clear that the selected research topics do not fulfil the expected benefits over the course of time, which were considered in the decision-making process, this leads to a reduction in the amount of time invested in research, as well as the relative strengthening of research for the purpose of a pure gain in knowledge.

5 Concluding Remarks and Outlook

Science plays an extremely important role in modern society, and is also one of the primary drivers of growth. Because of their scarce time budget of 24/7, scientists have to choose between different alternatives in how to spend their time. By valuing their preferences, they have to consider several interdependencies between their orientation concerning content and methods, which we summarize as a decision between rigor and relevance and the perception in media, politics, and the scientific community. We explain the decision of a stereotypical individual researcher by developing a simple model that builds on the rational choice approach, in particular on Schumpeter's methodological individualism and Becker's utility maximizing man that has been adopted to the economics of science. For further research, we see four especially important pathways:

1. The model that we suggest could be tested empirically by future research in order to gain more knowledge on the individual behaviors of modern scientists. In particular, these findings could be compared to the traditional understanding of scientists that is proposed by Merton (1985). In this context, Sztompka (2007) notes that the scientific ideal type is threatened by an increasing instrumentalization of scientific knowledge, financial pressures, and dependencies.
2. In our analysis, we focus on the current conditions within a scientific system that is characterized by external incentives. One aspect that could be reflected in future research is the individual well-being of the scientists. Feld, Necker, and Frey (2015) found that economists' life satisfaction is unrelated to publication success, which is measured

by publishing a paper in one of the top journals. They show that spending more time on research is more important for the well-being of the economists, which is in line with the intrinsic motivation by “solving a puzzle” (Feld, Necker, and Frey 2015) or to “hunt myths” (Elias 2014). Following the “crowding out” approach by Deci (1971) or Frey (1994), the pressure to publish in the top journals could have a contrary effect.

3. A gain in scientific knowledge is a public good – especially in times of internet and open access, SSRN, ResearchGate, etc. – which is primarily produced in institutions financed by taxes. To this extent, it has no market price, which results from supply and demand, and is a first indication of the value of market participants. However, research in the field of public goods has developed various methods that allow valuation, at least heuristically (e.g., Kahneman and Knetsch 1992). With regard to the economics of well-being, the life satisfaction approach appears to be particularly promising (e.g., Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer 2009), so that future research could address the empirical value measurement of scientific findings.

References

- Albert, M. (2008). Introduction. In *Scientific Competition*, ed. by M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen, S. Voigt, 1–9. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Arrow, K.J. (1951). *Social Choice and Individual Values*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Azzi, C., & Ehrenberg, R. (1975). Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance. *Journal of Political Economy*, 83, 27–56
- Bachmann, R., & Uhlig, H. (2009). Die Welt ist nicht schwarz und weiß. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 3/29/09.
- Balderjahn, I. (2007). Ist der globale Klimawandel ein Thema für die Betriebswirtschaftslehre? *Die Betriebswirtschaft*, 67, 253–256
- Becker, G.S. (1965). A Theory of the Allocation of Time. *The Economic Journal* 75(299): 493–517
- Becker, G.S. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An economic Approach. *Journal of Political Economy* 76, 169–217
- Becker, G.S. (1976). *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Becker, G.S., & Nashat Becker, G. (1997). *The Economics of Life*. New York et al.: McGraw-Hill.
- Binswanger, M. (2012). Wie die Uni-Ökonomen versagen – die Theorie der Prostitution als Mahnmal. 02 August 2020 <https://www.oekonomenstimme.org/artikel/2012/01/wie-die-uni-oekonomen-versagen--die-theorie-der-prostitution-als-mahnmal/>.
- Bundesregierung. (2019). Nudging als Regierungsinstrument der Bundesregierung. Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 19/13042. 02 August 2020 <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/130/1913042.pdf>.
- Caspari, V., & Schefolg, B. (2011). *Wohin steuert die ökonomische Wissenschaft? – Ein Methodenstreit in der Volkswirtschaftslehre*. Frankfurt/M: Campus.
- Chan, H.F., Frey, B.S., Gallus, J., Schaffner, M., Torgler, B., & Whyte, S. (2013). Do the Best Scholars and Economists Attract the Highest Speaking Fees? *QuBE Working Papers* 021, QUT Business School.
- Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3, 1–44
- Dams, J., Ettel, A., Greive, M., & Zschöplitz, H. 2015. Merkel will die Deutschen durch Nudging erziehen. Die Welt. 02.08.2020 <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article138326984/Merkel-will-die-Deutschen-durch-Nudging-erziehen.html>.
- Dasgupta, P., & David, P.A. (1994). Toward a new economics of science. *Research Policy*, 23, 487–521
- Diamond, A.M. (1986). What is a Citation Worth? *The Journal of Human Resources*, 21, 200–215
- Diamond, A.M. (1996). The Economics of Science. *Knowledge & Policy*, 9, 6–49
- Dilger, A. (2012). Rigor, wissenschaftliche und praktische Relevanz, Diskussionspapier des Instituts für Organisationsökonomik 03/2012. 02 August 2020 https://www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/io/sites/io/files/forschen/downloads/dp-io_03_2012.pdf.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Edlund, L., & Korn, E. (2002). A theory of prostitution. *Journal of Political Economy*, 110, 181–214
- Elias, Norbert. (2014). *Was ist Soziologie?* Weinheim et al.: Beltz Juventa.

- Emrich, E. (2014). Evaluation zwischen Angebot und Nachfrage – Vom Ethos der Forschung und dessen Wirkung auf die Wissensmärkte. Diskussionspapier des Europäischen Instituts für Sozioökonomie Nr. 9. 02 August 2020 https://publikationen.sulb.uni-saarland.de/bitstream/20.500.11880/23486/1/EIS_Workingpaper_9_2014.pdf.
- Emrich, E., & Follert, F. (2019a). Eigenplagiate aus ökonomischer Sicht: Eine institutionenökonomische Betrachtung. *ORDO – Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 70, 239–255.
- Emrich, E., & Follert, F. (2019b). Totgesagte leben länger! Einige Anmerkungen zum homo oeconomicus als Methode. *Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter*, 66, 337–347.
- Emrich, E., & Pierdzioch, Ch. (2011). *Im Biotop der Wissenschaft. Das PARK-Modell der Makroökonomie*. Saarbrücken: universaar.
- Emrich, E., & Pierdzioch, Ch. (2015). Testing economic models of volunteer labour supply: some empirical evidence for the German Red Cross. *Applied Economics*, 47, 4247–4259.
- Emrich, Eike, & Pitsch, W. (2014). Sportwissenschaft als Kirche der Vernunft und ihre Gläubigen – Die normativen Grundlagen wissenschaftlicher Rationalität. Diskussionspapier des Europäischen Instituts für Sozioökonomie Nr. 10. 02 August 2020 https://publikationen.sulb.uni-saarland.de/bitstream/20.500.11880/23502/1/EIS_Workingpaper_10_2014.pdf.
- Emrich, E., & Thieme, L. (2017). Der Sportwissenschaftler als Unternehmer im Wissensmarkt. *German Journal of Exercise and Sport Research*, 47, 25–41.
- Endres, A. (2013). *Umweltökonomie*, 4th ed. Stuttgart.
- Feld, L.P., & Köhler, E.A. (2011). Zur Zukunft der Ordnungsökonomik, Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik, No. 11/2. 02 August 2020 <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/55033/1/684376075.pdf>.
- Feld, L. P., Necker, S., & Frey, B.S. (2015). Happiness of economists. *Applied Economics*, 47, 990–1007.
- Fleck, L. (1980). *Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache*. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
- Follert, F. (2020). *Zur Unternehmensbewertung im Spruchverfahren aus interessentheoretischer Sicht. Der aktienrechtliche Minderheitenausschluss im Lichte der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie*. Wiesbaden: Springer Gabler.
- Frank, R.H., & Cook, P.J. (1995). *The winner-take-all society. How more and more Americans compete for ever fewer and bigger prizes, encouraging economic waste, income inequality, and an impoverished cultural life*. New York: Free Press.
- Frey, B.S. (1992). *Umweltökonomie*, 3rd ed. Göttingen.
- Frey, B.S. (2003). Publishing as prostitution? – Choosing between one's own ideas and academic success. *Public Choice*, 116, 205–223.
- Frey, B.S. (2011). Ökonomisierung der Wissensgesellschaft – pro. In *Ökonomisierung der Wissensgesellschaft. Wie viel Ökonomie braucht und wie viel Ökonomie verträgt die Wissensgesellschaft?*, ed. by R. Diedrich, and U. Heilemann, 231–244. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Frey, B.S., Luechinger, S., & Stutzer, A. (2009). The life satisfaction approach to valuing public goods: The case of terrorism. *Public Choice*, 138, 317–345.
- Frey, B.S., & Osterloh, M. (2020). How to avoid borrowed plumes in academia. *Research Policy*, 49, 103831.
- Gerbaulet, D. (2016). *Der Unternehmer als Reputator*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

- Hands, D. W. 1994. The Sociology of Scientific knowledge: Some Thoughts on the Possibilities. In *New Directions in Economic Methodology*, ed. by R. Backhouse, 75–106. London: Routledge.
- Hagstrom, W.O. (1965). *The scientific community*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hamet, J., & Michel, S. (2018). Rigor, relevance, and the knowledge “market”. *European Business Review*, 30, 183–201.
- Haucap, J., & Mödl, M. (2013). Zum Verhältnis von Spitzenforschung und Politikberatung: Eine empirische Analyse vor dem Hintergrund des Ökonomenstreits. *Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik*, 14, 346–378
- Howlett, M., & Migone, A. (2017). Policy advice through the market: The role of external consultants in contemporary policy advisory systems. *Policy and Society*, 32, 241–254.
- Hujer, M. 2005. Die verlorene Ehre des Professor K. Der Spiegel. 02 August 2020 <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-42658513.html>.
- Huff, A. S. (2000). Changes in Organizational Knowledge Production. *Academy of Management Review*, 25, 288–293
- Kahneman, D. (2011). *Thinking, fast and slow*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Kahneman, D., & Knetsch, J.L. (1992). Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral Satisfaction. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 22, 57–70
- Kekulé, A., & Südekum, J. (2020). Interview. Ein Virologe und ein Ökonom diskutieren über die Corona-Pandemie. by H. Müller. Neue Zürcher Zeitung 03/28/20. 02 August 2020 <https://www.nzz.ch/international/virologe-kekule-und-oekonom-suedekum-ueber-corona-was-ist-zu-tun-ld.1548836>.
- Kirchgässner, G. (2013). *Homo Oeconomicus*. 4th ed. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Klepper S. (1996). Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over Product Life Cycle. *The American Economic Review*, 86, 562–583
- Knight, F.H. (1921). *Risk, Uncertainty and Profit*. Boston/New York: The Univ. Press Cambridge.
- Kuhn, T.S. (1976). *Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen*. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Kußmaul, H., H. Bieg, C.-P. Weber, G. Waschbusch, A. Baumeister, W. Wegener, M. Olbrich, A.P. Knobloch, R. Schäfer, and V. Tcherveniachki (2017). Normative theorie- und praxisbezogene Betriebswirtschaftslehre. *Der Betrieb*, 70, 1337–1343
- Küting, K., H. Kußmaul, H Bieg, C.-P. Weber, G. Waschbusch, A. Baumeister, W. Wegener, M. Olbrich, and A.P. Knobloch (2013). Saarbrücker Plädoyer für eine normative theorie- und praxisbezogene Betriebswirtschaftslehre. *Der Betrieb*, 66, 2097–2099
- Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In *Criticism and the growth of knowledge*, ed. by I. Lakatos, and A. Musgrave, 91–196. Cambridge: University Press.
- Leek, J.T., Taub, M.A., & Pineda, F.J. (2011). Cooperation between Referees and Authors Increases Peer Review Accuracy. *PlosOne*, 6, e26895
- Levitt, S.D., & Dubner, S.J. (2005). *Freakonomics. A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything*. New York: William Morrow.
- Maley, M. (2000). Conceptualising advisers’ policy work: The distinctive policy roles of ministerial advisers In the Keating government, 1991-96. *Australian Journal of Political Science*, 35, 449–470

- Mankiw, G. (2007). Is Steve Levitt Ruining Economics? 02 August 2020 <http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2007/04/is-steve-levitt-ruining-economics.html>.
- Mayntz, R. (2009). Speaking Truth to Power: Leitlinien für die Regelung wissenschaftlicher Politikberatung. *der moderne staat*, 2, 5–16
- Merton, R.K. (1968). The Matthew Effect in Science. *Science*, 159, 56–63
- Merton, R.K. (1985). Die normative Struktur der Wissenschaft. In *Entwicklung und Wandel von Forschungsinteressen*, ed. by R.K. Merton. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- Mueller D. (1972). A life cycle theory of the firm. *The Journal of Industrial Economics*, 20, 199–219
- von Mises, L. (1998). *Human Action. A Treatise on Economics*. The Scholar's Ed., Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute.
- Necker, S. (2016). Why do scientists cheat? Insights from behavioral economics. *Review of Social Economy*, 74, 98–108
- Nicolai, A.T. (2004). Der „trade-off“ zwischen „rigour“ und „relevance“ und seine Konsequenzen für die Managementwissenschaft. *Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft*, 74, 99–118
- Niskanen, W.A. (1975). Bureaucrats and Politicians. *The Journal of Law & Economics*, 18, 617–643
- Nordhaus, W. D. (1991). To Slow or Not to Slow: The economics of The Greenhouse Effect. *The Economic Journal*, 101, 920–937
- Nordhaus, W. D., & Boyer, J. (2000). *Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Nordhaus, W. D., & Popp, D. (1997). What is the Value of Scientific Knowledge? An Application to Global Warming Using the PRICE Model. *The Energy Journal*, 18, 1–46.
- Osterloh, M., & Frey, B.S. (2020). How to avoid borrowed plumes in academia. *Research Policy* 49, doi: [10.1016/j.respol.2019.103831](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2019.103831).
- Ostrom, E. (1990). *Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
- Popper, K.R. (2005). *Logik der Forschung*. 11th ed. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Pigou, A.C. (1920). *The Economics of Welfare*. London: MacMillan.
- Rürup, B. (2009). Vom Elend der wissenschaftlichen Politikberatung. *Sozialer Fortschritt*, 58, 177–182
- Schumpeter, J.A. (1998). *Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie*. 3rd ed. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Schnellenbach, J. (2016). A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism. *Kyklos*, 69, 135–156
- Simon, H.A. (1955). A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69, 99–118
- Simon, H.A. (1982). *Models of Bounded Rationality*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Stephan, P.E. (1996). The Economics of Science. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 34, 1199–1235
- Stigler, G.J. (1969). Does Economics Have a Useful Past? *History of Political Economy*, 1, 217–230
- Sztompka, P. (2007). Trust in Science. *Journal of Classical Sociology*, 7, 211–220
- Thaler, R.H., & Sunstein, C.R. (2008). *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Streeck, H., B. Schulte, B.M. Kümmerer, E. Richter, T. Höller, C. Fuhrmann, E. Bartok, R. Dolscheid, M. Berger, L. Wessendorf, M. Eschbach-Bludau, A. Kellings, A. Schwaiger, M. Coenen, P. Hoffmann, B. Stoffel-Wagner, M.N. Nöthen, A.-M. Eis-Hübinger, M. Exner, R.M. Schmithausen, M. Schmid and G. Hartmann (2020). Infection fatality rate of SARS-CoV-2 Infection in a German community with a super-spreading event. Version of May 8, 2020. DOI: 10.1101/2020.05.04.2009007.
- Utterback J.M., Abernathy W.J. (1975). A Dynamic Model of Process and Product Innovation. *Omega*, 3, 639–656
- Weber, M. (1930). *Wissenschaft als Beruf*. 3rd ed. (Wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen und Reden zur Philosophie, Politik und Geistesgeschichte). München: Duncker & Humblot.
- Weber, M. (1951). *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*. 2nd ed. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
- Weber, M. (1958). Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland. Zur politischen Kritik des Beamtentums und Parteiwesens. In M. Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, 294–431. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Wible, J.R. (2014). *Economics of Science: Methodology and Epistemology as If Economics Really Mattered*. London: Routledge.
- Zuckerman, H., & Merton, R.K. (1971). Patterns of Evaluation in Science: Institutionalisation, Structure and Functions of the Referee System. *Minerva*, 9, 66–100