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## Comrades in the Family? Soviet Communism and Informal Family Insurance

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# Comrades in the Family? Soviet Communism and Informal Family Insurance

## Abstract

We study the effect of exposure to communism (EC), a political-economic regime based on collectivist planning, on preferences for family supports, which we refer to as ‘informal family insurance’. We exploit both cross-country and cohort variation in EC in a large sample of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). Against the backdrop that ‘communism gives rise to the abolition of the family’, we find robust evidence that EC strengthens the preference for family insurance which coexists with a stronger preference for social insurance. We find a six per cent increase in preferences for care to older parents and a four per cent increase in preferences for support to pre-school children and financial support to adult children. These effects are explained by the erosion of both generalized trust and the lower confidence in public institutions, suggesting that (raising uncertainty and adversity during) communism increased the demand for all types of available insurance.

JEL-Codes: Z100, P300.

Keywords: informal family insurance, family networks, social insurance, interpersonal trust, confidence in institutions, Soviet communism, Eastern Europe.

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# 1 Introduction

Political-economic regime changes such as the adoption and exit from Soviet communism, a political-economic regime based on the collectivist planning of human needs, can provide suggestive evidence to examine the effect of institutions on preferences (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015). More specifically, they allow testing some of the contentious questions in economics and political philosophy, such as the impact of a communist regime on the family (Marx & Engels, 1848), and in particular on the preference for family insurance. So far, previous studies document a preference for social insurance drawing on evidence from Eastern Germany (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). The main purpose of this paper is to fill this gap.

Soviet communism made a profound impact on both formal and informal institutions during its half-century of constitutional adoption (Basu, Estrin & Svejnar, 2005; Di Tommaso, Raiser & Weeks, 2007; Shleifer & Treisman, 2005). Although family structures are argued to reflect the ideologies that have shaped the history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Todd, 1985) and to reinforce inequality (Marx & Engels, 1848), we contend that the family is one of the key informal institutions potentially influenced by communism. That is, against the backdrop of Todd (1985) the preference for family support (or informal family insurance) is endogenous to political regimes.

How does Soviet communism affect family support? In an environment where privilege does not reflect in wealth accumulation, only ‘internal family

connections can pave the way to privilege, including access to education and elite positions' (Filtzer, 2014). Soviet communism brought about a collective distribution of employment and its monetary returns, but it also limited the choice of career paths, rationed the access to permanent goods including housing, and in most severe cases, brought political persecution and dispossession. These events entailed not just monetary costs but also psychological effects that individuals can react to by strengthening their family ties as well as other networks of support.

Adverse life events encompass the modification of both formal and informal insurance, such as social insurance and informal support from family networks (henceforth family insurance). So far the economics literature has concentrated on examining the substitution between social insurance and family insurance (Abrams & Schitz, 1978). However, we contend that such substitution or complementary relations depend on wider institutional incentives of a political-economic regime (Bowles & Gintis, 1975).

This paper documents that along with limited precautionary saving opportunities, the exposure to Soviet communism (EC) shifts the demand for all types of formal and informal insurance (Di Tella & MacCulloch, 2002), thereby strengthening the networks of family and informal support, at the same time demanding more publicly funded social programs (Alesina, Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2001; Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Next, we disentangle the effect the life-long indoctrination and the exposure during an individual's impressionable years, which influence the formation of preferences for social

and family insurance.

We exploit various definitions of regime exposure, and different samples of countries, including the effect of historical legacies. Our results document a significant increase in the preference for informal family insurance resulting from EC. The effect complements a higher demand for social insurance not only in Eastern Germany, but in a sample of Eastern European countries. More general, these findings are consistent with the thesis that ideologies of family and social insurance are endogenous to a political regime. Our findings support the indoctrination hypothesis and document that EC leads to an erosion of both generalised trust as well as the trust in specific institutions<sup>1</sup>, which helps to understand the increase of the demand for either insurance type.

We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we show that EC exerts an influence above and beyond a shift in preferences for social insurance (Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007), and more specifically, on preferences for informal family insurance. Second, we document that this effect is consistent with the indoctrination and impressionable years hypotheses, and an erosion of trust and confidence in public institu-

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<sup>1</sup>This finding is consistent with Rainer and Siedler (2009), who document evidence of the erosion of social and institutional interpersonal trust in Eastern Germany after communism. Similarly, Booth et al. (2018) find detrimental effects in trust in China today and others establish a link between trust deterioration and the proximity to a Soviet gulag (Nikolova, Popova & Otrachshenko, 2019), and to government surveillance (by the Stasi police) (Lichter, Löffler & Siegloch, 2019). These results are consistent with Aghion et al. (2010) who document a negative correlation between government regulation, typical of communist countries, and trust.

tions. Third, we contribute to a wider discussion on the role of markets in driving social preferences (McCloskey, 2006) and ‘civilising’ individuals (Hirschman, 1997; Sandel, 2012)<sup>2</sup>. Fourth, this paper extends previous literature by examining a larger set of countries under the Soviet influence in addition to Germany<sup>3</sup>.

The next section describes how the paper adds to the wider and specific literature. Section three describes the data. Next, section four contains the empirical strategy and section five reports the main results and heterogeneity analysis, followed by mechanisms, threads to the identification, and robustness checks. A final section concludes.

## 2 Related Literature

### 2.1 Soviet Communism

*Regime Change.* Shocks in the institutional environment, such as political-economic regime changes, are extremely uncommon (Schelling, 2006). Though, there are a few exceptions (Nee & Swedberg, 2005). The institution of Soviet

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<sup>2</sup>Besley (2013), in discussing Sandel (2012), argues that the welfare effect of egalitarian alternatives to markets depends on the specific institutions of the country, and its underlying incentives. It is an empirical question whether markets or other rationing mechanisms add more welfare (Weitzman, 1977).

<sup>3</sup>Most of existing evidence refers to preferences of Eastern Germans, though a recent study by Becker et al. (2020) points to non-random selection in the exposure to communism in Germany. Therefore, we employ rich data from four different datasets that exhibit different country groups and investigate extensively geographical and historical heterogeneity to account for possible pre-existing country differences.



communism after Second World War II was imposed on a number of countries, some of which gained political independence only in 1918. The collapse of communism, even if anticipated, occurred gradually over time beginning in 1989 in Poland and Romania, and extending through USSR dissolution and the first free parliamentary election in Russia in 1991 and 1995, respectively. Thus, the exposure to Soviet communism can be treated as a natural experiment allowing for an examination of the effects of political-economic regime.

*Socialist Thought and the Family.* The Utopian Socialists Charles Fourier and Robert Owen had preceded Marx and Engels in their rejection of traditional family relationship (Weikart, 1994). Marx and Engels positioned the family in the capitalist superstructure and explicitly referred to ‘the destruction, dissolution, and abolition of the family’ while Communist Manifesto advocates for the abolition of inheritance (Marx & Engels, 1848). However, as we argue in this paper, by abolishing wealth accumulation, communism created parallel informal incentives to develop family networks.

*The ‘Wall in Head’ Theory.* A related literature has examined the existence of differences in preferences and behaviour that result specifically from a different political economic regime. Immediately after the demise of Soviet communism, some studies documented significant differences in social preferences between Eastern and Western European countries (Corneo & Grüner, 2002). Such differences result from ‘indoctrination effects’, namely the view that exposure to Soviet communism increased people’s egalitarian

preferences (Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Consistently, EC brought a reduced individual self-reliance and more egalitarian gender norms (Bauernschuster & Rainer, 2012). More recent evidence suggests that after 20 years of communism, Eastern Germans exhibit weaker pro-social behaviour (Brosig-Koch, Helbach, Ockenfels & Weimann, 2011), an effect driven by changes in the cohorts socialised prior to the demise of Soviet communism (Huber & Mikula, 2019).

However, this evidence is, on first sight, inconsistent with other studies (Ockenfels & Weimann, 1999; Shiller, Boycko & Korobov, 1990; Shiller, Boycko, Korobov, Winter & Schelling, 1992; Brosig-Koch et al., 2011)<sup>4</sup>. Some literature has attempted to reconcile the lack of empirical consensus by examining the differences in social values between East and West Germany. Van Hoorn and Maseland (2010) identify differences between Eastern and Western Germans using happiness data and conclude that, contrary to expectations, Easterners appeared to entertain values more conducive to economic growth, which questions the myth of pro-entrepreneurial values in the West. Campa and Serafinelli (2019) compare attitudes toward work in East versus West Germany. They show that women were more likely to work in Eastern Europe as state-socialist governments promoted women’s economic independence. Similarly, they show that US migrants educated under the state-socialist regimes become less traditionalistic compared to Western Eu-

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<sup>4</sup>In fact, there is evidence documenting that even during communism, there were significant informal payments to access health care (Lewis, 2000), which questions the presumed lack of inequalities under Soviet communism.

ropean countries.

*Validity of East-West Germany Experiment.* EC in Eastern Germany might have been different than in other post-communist countries due to its stronger economic, religious, and cultural ties to Western Europe. Migration flows from East to West Germany were more pronounced than in other countries from the Soviet bloc that were less attached to Western Europe. East and West of Germany were far from being randomly selected treatment and control groups (Becker et al., 2020)<sup>5</sup>. Thus, our analysis concerns a large set of post-communist countries as well as a variety of control country groups in order to account for the pre-existing differences, and check robustness to country composition of the sample.

## 2.2 Preferences for Family Insurance

*Informal Family Support.* Family support is grounded in family norms that entail social esteem and costs in the form of social isolation (Manzi, Vignoles, Regalia & Scabini, 2006). Although market economies can potentially erode family ties (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010), when wealth accumulation is not available or an economy is ‘weakly monetised’, privileged groups might turn to the family to cultivate their groups connections that provide access to elite

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<sup>5</sup>A selective fifth of the population fled from East to West Germany before the building of the Wall in 1961 which influences differences in working-class, employment in manufacturing, and self-employment prevalence. Reichstag election in 1924 already showed twice as large a communist vote share. Moreover, share of Protestants was higher in the East and exhibited lower church attendance. Finally, in 1925 female labor-force participation was higher by 6 percentage points in Eastern than in Western Germany.

positions (Filtzer, 2014). Such strategies differ across gender, and urban-rural distinctions.

Some studies find that excessive reliance on the family (so-called familism) can erode generalised trust and inhibit support for social insurance (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010), which gives rise to phenomenon known as ‘amoral familism’ (Banfield, 1967). However, familism can serve the specific instrumental role of providing care in the event of need, namely a form of informal insurance. In such a circumstance, family members are expected to subsidise or care for other family members in exchange for emotional and social pay-offs.

## 3 Data and Measurement

### 3.1 Data Sources

Our analysis refers to three primary data sources: Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), World Values Survey (WVS) and European Social Survey (ESS). We supplement the main data sources with the 2006 wave of the Life in Transition Survey (LITS)<sup>6</sup>. We use a quasi-experimental design to examine the exposure to Soviet communism (EC) by using post-communist countries varying with respect to EC at different stages of political regime maturity, along with other European countries as controls, and different co-

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<sup>6</sup>LITS samples all countries exposed to Soviet communism. For more details, see Table A.5.

horts of individuals that exhibit a differential exposure over time. Migrants are excluded, because their spatial mobility is likely to alter the EC effects<sup>7</sup>.

The surveys provide data on social attitudes and behaviours of adults observed from 1981 to 2017. We employ post-1989 observations on Europeans living in 33 countries, including citizens born in 14 post-communist countries, yielding a total of about 221 thousand, 67 thousand, and 314 thousand observations in GGS, WVS, and ESS, respectively. Table A.3 in the Appendix provides detailed information on the research samples' structure by country and wave. Table A.4 shows the composition of the research samples by country of residence and birth cohorts. Because balance tables and the results of EC regression (cf. Table A.6) point to systematic differences in basic descriptive characteristics of individuals living in the East and in the West of Europe, we address that in further empirical analysis.

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<sup>7</sup>We loosen this assumption in the robustness analysis. After the promulgation of the Soviet Constitution in 1936 migration was very rare if not existent with the exception of family reunification and some forced deportations (Dowty, 1989; Marshall, 2000). However, forced migrations between Soviet republics were frequent in the 1940s (Stola, 1992). Polian (2003) estimates that six million Soviets were resettled before Stalin's death. It is estimated that after the Second World War, twelve million ethnic Germans were deported out of Germany to other Eastern European countries, though until the early 1950s, the lines between the East and the West in some of Eastern European borders were easily crossed. Furthermore, Boenisch and Schneider (2013) document related evidence suggesting that exposure to communism affects the probability of spatial mobility.

## 3.2 Measuring Preferences and the Exposure to Communism

*Preference for Informal Family Insurance.* We operationalize the preference for family insurance with the questions on the role of one’s own family in the provision of informal support. Behavioural familiarism is frequently measured using the Family Obligations Scale (Fuligni & Tsai, 2015). In this paper we focus on measures of preferences for family support concerning intergenerational (flowing upward or downward) transfers of care and money exchanged between family members<sup>8</sup>. Descriptive statistics indicate that familiaristic attitudes are more common in the East than in the West, with the case of care for the elderly being the most pronounced example<sup>9</sup>. We examine the effects of EC both on the intensive margin (scale) and the extensive margin (binarised scale) of the preference for informal family insurance.

*Preference for Social Insurance.* Another group of measures capturing beliefs related to social insurance refers to the role of social equality ensured by the state. In order to operationalize the preference for social insurance,

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<sup>8</sup>Respondents in GGS answered ‘to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements’: ‘grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so’; ‘children ought to provide financial help for their parents when their parents are having financial difficulties’; ‘parents ought to provide financial help for their adult children when the children are having financial difficulties’; and ‘children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need’ using the following scale: ‘1 – strongly agree, 2 – agree, 3 – neither agree nor disagree, 4 – disagree, 5 – strongly disagree’. Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows distributions of responses to these questions in Eastern and Western European countries.

<sup>9</sup>See Table A.7 in the Appendix.

we refer to the measures for the following preferences: income equality, income redistribution, equality of opportunities, and equality as opposed to freedom<sup>10</sup>. Table A.8 shows descriptive statistics, suggestive of stronger support for income redistribution as observed in ESS (though not in the WVS) in the East than in the West of Europe. Again, we examine the effects of EC on the intensive margin and the extensive margin of the preference for social insurance.

In addition to the separate questions on the preference for family and for social insurance, we examine the questions asked to GGS respondents addressing directly whether they prefer the society as a whole or the family in general to be responsible for intergenerational transfers of care and money flowing upward or downward<sup>11</sup>. Unlike other measures, the wording in this

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<sup>10</sup>Using 6-point scale ESS respondents answered to what extent they agree with a statement that ‘government should reduce differences in income levels’ and on 7-point scale how much they resemble individuals believing that it is ‘important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities’. WVS respondents were asked ‘Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion? A. Incomes should be made more equal. B. We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort’. In addition, Spanish, Russian, Polish, Slovak, and Czech WVS respondents were asked about ‘A. I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hinderance. B. Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong.’ Individuals who reported to agree with statement A and B were assigned 1 and 3, respectively in the variable equality over freedom. The undecided individuals who answered agreeing with neither A nor B were assigned 2, and the ‘do not know’ answers were treated as refusals. Figure A.3 in the Appendix illustrates distributions of these measures (except for the preference for equality opposed to freedom).

<sup>11</sup>Namely ‘care for pre-school children’; ‘care for older persons in need of care at their home’; ‘financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level’; and ‘financial support for older people who live below subsistence level’. These

case points to the family in general rather than respondent’s own family, and addresses the choice between the two insurance types. Figure A.1 in the Appendix summarizes distributions of responses to these questions, to which we further refer to as measures of ‘preference for family over social insurance’. All these measures capture stated preferences, therefore inconsistencies between the effect on preference for the family over the social insurance and the difference in effects on the preferences for social and for family insurance are possible.

*Exposure to Communism.* Our study concerns post-war Soviet communism. Living in an Eastern or Western European country provides a crude measure of external margin of EC, but it fails to inform precisely on the extent of the exposure. Thus, we measure the number of years an individual lived under communist regimes to capture EC<sup>12</sup>. Because more accurate measures of actual instalment of communist regimes are unavailable, we use the year when the socialist constitution of the state was announced as an indication of the maturity of communist institutions. It ranges from 1936 to 1952 (see Table 1 for details)<sup>13</sup>. The end of communism is also country-

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forms of support could be reported as mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family on the following scale: ‘1 – mainly a task for society, 2 – more a task for society than for the family, 3 – a task equally for both society and the family, 4 – more a task for the family than for society, 5 – mainly a task for the family’.

<sup>12</sup>We exclude earlier periods from the main analysis because first, communist revolution of 1917 in Russia cannot be treated as an externally imposed change of regime for its entire population, and second, political environment at that times was very unstable. These circumstances changed after WWII with Stalin in power.

<sup>13</sup>For the robustness checks, we employ alternative EC measures (cf. Table A.2).



specific ranging from 1989 to 1995 and operationalized as the year of the first democratic parliamentary elections, with the exception of Romania and Russia where dates of the death sentence for the Romanian Communist Party general secretary and legislative election were used, respectively. In some countries (e.g. Romania) the dates of nationalization of private property and the introduction of communist constitution coincide<sup>14</sup>.

*Impressionable Years.* The ‘impressionable years’ (IY) (Osborne, Sears & Valentino, 2011) of childhood and early adulthood are characterized by particular vulnerability in the formation of preferences. An important body of literature documents that political preferences are moulded during IY (Sears & Funk, 1999; Prior, 2010; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2011), and an exposure to particular institutional environment can pose effects heterogeneous across critical periods of an individual’s life (Elder, Johnson & Crosnoe, 2003). Thus, the exposure to communism in IY and earlier life might explain later-life attitudes and behaviours<sup>15</sup>. However, one can identify different periods of Soviet communism (Stalinism, Post-Stalinism, Reformism) and its propaganda that would result in heterogeneity of EC in IY between cohorts. Most of previous studies measure the EC as the total number of years of exposure, ignoring possible differences between exposures across various stages of life.

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<sup>14</sup>See Table A.1 in the Appendix for the entry and exit dates for all countries used in additional analyses.

<sup>15</sup>This is consistent with totalitarianism using public schooling for indoctrination purposes (Lott, 1999), which is argued as an independent channel of communist impact.

### 3.3 Other Measures

To examine parallel effects of EC shedding more light on the results obtained in the main analysis, we supplement measures of the preferences with generalized trust, akin to Butler et al. (2016), as well as trust in selected public institutions available in our data sources<sup>16</sup>. We observe deep differences with respect to institutional trust in Europe, in line with the empirical studies discussed before (for more details see Table A.9 in the Appendix).

Furthermore, we refer to a number of relevant measures, including political and civic participation, certain dimensions of religiosity as well as traditionalism in gender roles. Table A.9 in the Appendix provides more details on these measures, pointing to significantly more pronounced civic participation associated with stronger secularization and gender equality in the West than in the East of Europe. These patterns are present in all three data sources.

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<sup>16</sup>In particular, respondents in all three main data sources were asked about the generalized trust in the following question: ‘generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’ with the answer ‘most people can be trusted’ opposed to ‘need to be very careful’. Additionally, we use answers to question on a belief that people in general are helpful (‘people mostly try to be helpful’ or ‘people mostly look out for themselves’). Respondents reported how much confidence they have in press, political parties, police, labour unions, and justice system measured on five point scale in WVS; and their trust in parliament, political parties, politicians, police, and legal system, measured on 11-point scale in ESS.

## 4 Empirical Strategy

Our main estimates exploit cross-section and longitudinal data as well as cohort specific variation in the exposure to communism. More specifically, we estimate the equation (1):

$$Y_{it}^m = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 EC_{it} + \gamma_2 g_i + \gamma_3 c_i + \gamma_4 X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

The effect of the extensive margin of exposure to communism ( $EC_{it}$  – ever exposed to communism) is used to explain both the intensive and extensive margins  $m = \{I, E\}$  of measures of preferences for social and family insurance  $Y_{it}^m$ , where  $i$  refers to individuals,  $t$  to survey waves,  $g$  to the country, and  $c$  to the birth cohort group. We conduct pooled OLS regressions of social preferences and behaviours which were influenced by the exposure to communism controlling for demographic, socio-economic and other individual characteristics. With the set of control variables  $X_{it}$ , we adjust the estimates for age (in a quadratic form), gender, and year of the interview. In further specifications, in order to proxy variation in socio-economic status that occurred only after communism collapse, we control for income and education, even though they might seem to be so called bad controls.

In the next step, we test the indoctrination hypothesis by examining in detail the effects of the total lengths of exposure to communism according to

equation (2):

$$Y_{it}^m = \gamma_0 + \gamma_{1j}EC_{it}^j + \gamma_2g_i + \gamma_3c_i + \gamma_4X_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

where  $EC_{it}^j$  stands for  $j$  years of total exposure to communism experienced by an individual  $i$ ,  $j = 0, \dots, J_g$ , and  $J_g$  stands for the maximum length of the exposure to communism in country  $g$ . The indoctrination hypothesis implies positive relation between the length of EC and the size of the EC effect on the preferences promoted by communism ( $\gamma_{1k} > \gamma_{1l}$  if  $k > l$ ).

Finally, we test the impressionable years hypothesis by estimating EC effects interacted with the exposure during IY according to equation (3):

$$Y_{it}^m = \gamma_0 + \gamma_{1j} + \gamma_1EC_{it}^{duringIY} + \gamma_2EC_{it}^j + \gamma_3g_i + \gamma_4c_i + \gamma_5X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (3)$$

as well as separate effects of EC during and outside IY as of equation (4):

$$Y_{it}^m = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1EC_{it}^{duringIY} + \gamma_2EC_{it}^{outsideIY} + \gamma_3g_i + \gamma_4c_i + \gamma_5X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (4)$$

We employ two alternative approaches to test IY hypothesis, because equation (3) allows for a correlation between the length of EC and the exposure during IY while (4) captures relevant indoctrination effects. The IY hypothesis implies significantly different effects of EC during IY ( $\gamma_1 \neq 0$ ).

Our identification of EC effects relies on the assumption that selection into communism was random, leading to threats we address in the empiri-

cal analysis. We conduct analysis using propensity score matching (PSM) to remove sample selection bias due to observables. Moreover, we examine alternative operationalizations of the EC and cohort measures. Furthermore, we examine a number of alternative country selections. In addition, we conduct robustness checks by controlling for other relevant factors, including those related to the effects of transformation from communism (such as occupation type, age at communism collapse, exposure to recession)<sup>17</sup>. Finally, we test the external validity of our estimates by estimating effects of exposure to communism on family-related behaviours such as fertility decisions.

Because the data used in the analyses come from years following the demise of Soviet communism, we report estimates obtained on a single wave in each sample, as well as with the inclusion of time trends (linear, quadratic, and country-specific) in multiple-wave samples, to check if the EC effects remain stable over time after communism collapsed. Moreover, we estimate random and fixed effects specifications for the panel subsample of GGS along with models for binary variables, namely logit and probit for dichotomized measures of the preferences.

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<sup>17</sup>In particular, we control for household size, individual religiosity, experience of war, especially during one’s impressionable years, country democratic index, and others, in addition to the three main model specifications. Moreover, we exclude groups of countries to check if the results remain intact.

## 5 Results

### 5.1 Main Results

#### 5.1.1 Preferences for Family and for Social Insurance

*Effects of Exposure to Soviet Communism.* Table 2 reports evidence of positive EC effects on both the preference for family insurance as well as the preference for social insurance. Individuals exposed to communism more often report that members of own family should support each other, especially when personal care to older parents and financial support to own adult children is needed (by six and four per cent, respectively), than individuals unexposed to communism. We find that a significant increase in the intensive margin of the preferences for income equality and income redistribution due to EC is present in all the specifications. These results help reconciling previous estimates from Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), who find that exposure to communism did increase preferences for redistribution.

Exposure to Soviet communism enforced the extensive margin of the preferences for income equality and for income redistribution by about 8 and 12 percentage points on average, respectively. That means that the population prevalence in European countries of individuals supporting income equality and income redistribution increased respectively by 15 and 16 per cent due to EC. These differences are not trivial.

Referring to family in general terms rather than to individual's own fam-

ily members in the questions juxtaposing family and social insurance reveals ambiguity of the EC effects. On the one hand, our estimates suggest that the probability of agreement with statement that the family rather than the state is responsible for care over older generations increased by about 0.07 due to EC. It means that for an average individual, experiencing EC would increase the preference for family over social insurance with respect to care over an older person by 3 per cent, entirely removing dispersion in the averages between the East and the West. On the other hand, we find a consistent pattern of negative EC effects of about -0.03 on the extensive margin of the preference for family versus social insurance in the case of financial support to younger generations. The discrepancy between the financial and non-financial nature of support might be relevant for understanding the net effects of EC on the preferences for family and social insurance.

*Effects in Post-Communist Countries.* Results in Table 3 shed more light on the effect of EC on the examined preferences. They can be interpreted as the average effect of EC on individuals living in countries ever exposed to Soviet communism. These results suggest a pattern of reinforced preference for family insurance accompanied by weakened preference for family over social insurance concerned with all types of support towards younger generations. In sum, EC enhanced the preference for both family as well as social insurance as far as support to younger generations is concerned.

However, in the case of support for older generations, EC effects are mixed. On the one hand, we find evidence pointing to stronger preferences

for social insurance and reduced preference for family over social insurance due to EC with respect to financial support, such as retirement pensions' system. On the other hand, we observe positive effect of EC on the preference for family support concerning care over older adults.

Furthermore, we confirm that EC enforced preferences for income equality and redistribution. In other words, Soviet communism resulted in stronger preferences for both family and social insurance, with the exception of retirement pensions where social insurance is preferred over family insurance.

The above finding helps to understand results from Table 2 where the effect of EC on the extensive margin of the preference for equality as opposed to freedom is negative. In a specification using a small subset of the treated sample (of individuals living in former Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Russia) with Spain as the only control country unlike other results, the average effect is identified mainly by the country- rather than cohort- heterogeneity, and driven mostly by those exposed to communism for about 10 years (cf. Figure 3). However cautious one should be with the interpretation of the estimate, it shows that when, contrary to other measures of preference for social insurance, equality comes at a cost of freedom, the positive effects of EC are less evident.

### **5.1.2 Indoctrination Hypothesis**

We examine whether indoctrination results are positively correlated with the length of the exposure by estimating EC effects varying by the number of



years of EC. Figure 1 shows that EC has ambiguous impact on the preference for family insurance depending on the extent of the communism exposure.

In line with the indoctrination hypothesis, the positive effects of EC on the preference for social insurance are stronger for longer periods of the exposure, particularly with respect to equality of opportunities. However, the analysis of preferences concerned with family insurance, questions simple indoctrination effects, because in all the analyzed cases there is a sharp change in the effects of EC, and in many cases the effect changes its sign (cf. Figure 1).

For example, exposure to communism for longer periods of time reduced the preference for family insurance in case of support given to younger generations accompanied with the indoctrination into increased preference for social insurance. Simultaneously, EC for periods smaller than 33 years significantly enforced preference for family insurance with respect to support to younger generations.

Consistently with our main results, EC effects in the case of family support towards older adults differ from support to the younger and so do the nonlinearities in the EC effects by its length. Estimates concerned with the preference for family over social insurance point to substantial indoctrination conditional on at least 40 years of EC, with one exception. We find insufficient evidence of the indoctrination effects that place the responsibility of care in old age on social insurance (cf. Figure 2).

It is important to note that when we turn to examine the preference for

equality as opposed to freedom, the results reveal nonlinearity in the effects of communism when the exposure was shorter than 30 years, as shown in Figure 3. We find that individuals living under communism for less than 10 years claim to prefer freedom over equality, whereas earlier cohorts exposed to Soviet communism for 30-50 years claim the opposite. This might be interpreted as an evidence for the inefficiency of the indoctrination effect in the case of a shorter exposure to communism and an indication of cohort-specific political and economic experiences, which we explore in the heterogeneity analysis.

### 5.1.3 Impressionable Years Hypothesis

In order to examine the EC effects with respect to an individual's age, and particularly during impressionable years (IY) defined as ages from 18 to 26, we control for the EC during IY in addition to total length of EC (cf. Table 4).

We find that EC during IY affects the preference for family insurance in a significantly different way than in other ages. While we find negative effects of EC in general for the preference for family insurance in almost all types of family support, the EC during IY weakens these indoctrination effects. In many cases EC during IY reverses the so far impact of EC. For example, coefficients in the model with all controls explaining general familiarism concerned with care in old age (general upwards care) show that the average increase in the preference for the social insurance due to 17 years of EC is

reversed during IY. If we consider an individual born under communism, it would take another 17 years of EC to remove the effect of the exposure during IY. These findings show that exposure to communist propaganda aimed at weakening family, might lead to strong and unintended effects if it takes place during one's IY.

The importance if IY seem to stem from the reduction indoctrination effects as documented in Table 4. However, the experience of living under communism during IY is strongly correlated<sup>18</sup> with the total span of EC, which might lead to inconsistency of the Chow test. Therefore we examine average treatment effects of EC during and outside IY (cf. Table 5) as well as the total effects of EC at any age and of EC during IY in two separate estimations (cf. Table C.1 in the Appendix).

We estimate the population average treatment effects matching individuals from the East and from the West of Europe based on the propensity score obtained in logit estimations using the dummy for being over 30 years old, and the regional percentages of agriculture workers and farmers, as well as of the unskilled workers. The analysis for EC outside of and during IY using propensity score matching (PSM, cf. Table 5) confirms positive impact on the preference for family insurance as well as on the preference for family over social insurance concerned with care. Most of these findings can be explained with the EC during IY. In sum, Soviet communism managed

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<sup>18</sup>Pearson correlation between the number of years under communism and being exposed to communism during impressionable years equals 0.8958, and is significant at 1 per cent level.

to reinforce both egalitarian values reflected in the preference for social insurance and familism reflected in the preferences concerned with family insurance; a result not anticipated by early writings of Marx and Engels.

Furthermore, we find the instability of the impact of EC during IY on the preference for social insurance in the case of the preference for income redistribution. The indoctrination effect of an average year of EC is larger by 5 per cent when it took place during the formative period of life. This finding is consistent with former studies showing the importance of IY in shaping lifelong political attitudes. However, our results for other measures of the preferences for social insurance show that the impact of EC during IY does not differ much from other ages under Soviet communism. In sum, the indoctrination instilling egalitarian preferences seems to be most effective when EC is long-lasting, in line with the indoctrination hypothesis.

## 5.2 Heterogeneity

Next, we conduct analysis of the heterogeneous impacts of EC at the intensive margins depending on demographic (gender, birth cohort), regional (rural versus urban and various country groups), and cultural (historical and religious heritage) characteristics.

*Demographics*<sup>19</sup>. Consistently with previous literature, we find that the institutions yield differential impact on social preferences for men and women.

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<sup>19</sup>See Figures B.1 - B.5 in the Appendix.

The results for the reinforcement of the preference for social insurance seem to be driven by men primarily. There is strong evidence showing that EC poses constant positive impact on the preference for family insurance among women, especially with respect to own family, and the responsibility for child-care is placed in family rather than society. These dynamics simultaneously reduce the preference for family insurance among men.

We observe significant heterogeneity with respect to cohort-specific deviations from general patterns. The results show that EC in total posed the strongest impact on the preference for social insurance in cohorts born before 1950. Interestingly, in the cohorts of individuals born after 1960, we find little evidence on EC instilling preference for income equality and even negative effects on the preference for income redistribution. As for the preference for family insurance, it seems that the rise in its strength due to EC is driven mainly by cohorts born between 1950 and 1969, entering impressionable years between 1968 and 1987. These results imply efficient indoctrination in the longer run and being ‘rebellious’ against the regime in the impressionable years.

*Regions and Countries.* We find that positive EC effects on the preference for social insurance are driven by urban areas, while the increase in the preference for family insurance (with one exception of the family role in child-care) by the rural areas (cf. Table B.2). Analysis of EC effects in various country groups reveals substantial heterogeneity between countries exposed

to Soviet communism<sup>20</sup>. This indicates that analyses of Soviet communism effects within one country provide limited insight with which to identify the repercussions in other countries of the Soviet bloc.

*Historic Heritage.* Our analysis suggests that the institutional environment preexisting on the Habsburg and Prussian lands before regime change to Soviet communism was most vulnerable to the change in the preference for social insurance, while EC made hardly any impact in lands already under Russian reign in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century. Our analysis (see Table B.6) reveals that strengthening of the preference for social insurance due to EC is driven almost entirely by individuals living in the lands of former Prussia, that is current Germany, Western Poland (Western Prussia), Western Lithuania, and lands formerly belonging to Eastern Prussia (North-Eastern Poland). Moreover, the positive effects of EC on the preference for social insurance are driven mainly by the predominantly protestant countries.

As for the preference for family insurance, the EC effects are least evident in the former countries of the Habsburg empire. Interestingly, the significant effects of EC in the former Russian empire are strongest and often operate in the opposite direction than in the former Prussian empire. We find that increase in the preference for family insurance due to EC is most evident in predominantly orthodox or Greek-catholic countries, while we observe its decrease due to EC in mostly Roman-catholic countries.

In sum, the significant differences between countries exposed to commu-

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<sup>20</sup>See Tables B.8, B.9, B.10 in the Appendix.

nism and the vast heterogeneity in historic and religious heritage allows us to place the results obtained previously for Eastern and Western Germany in a wider context.

### 5.3 Other outcomes and mechanisms

*Detrimental Effects on Trust.* Based on four data sources comprised of different sets of European countries, we confirm detrimental effects of communism on various measures of trust in Table 6. Generalized trust measured on a 10-point scale in ESS, as well as its dichotomous version from GGS and WVS show major differences between individuals exposed to communism and the unexposed. The EC coefficient equal to -0.07 (and -0.10) in GGS (and in WVS) suggests that the probability of agreeing with the statement that most ‘people can be trusted’ would be reduced by 11 (19) per cent due to EC for an average individual living in the West of Europe.

Interestingly, we document that individuals exposed to communism declare substantially lower levels of trust in family than the unexposed. That might be partially explained by differences in the perceptions of the family, because in the Eastern European countries the term family is more likely to refer to extended family while in Western Europe it may only refer to nuclear family. Nonetheless, taking into account this effect as well as reduced interpersonal trust along with the negative EC effects on confidence in several public institutions including legal system, police, and political parties,

we are inclined to interpret the overall results on trust as an indication of a strong and long-lasting sense of uncertainty and insecurity as a result of living under communism.

In this following part of this section we examine a number of mechanisms that might explain linear (EC effects are stable regardless of the length of EC) and nonlinear EC effects (a substantial discontinuity in the effects of particular EC lengths occurs).

*Linear Effects.* Consistently with evidence documenting a negative correlation between government regulation and trust (Aghion et al., 2010), we find that communism reduced not only trust, but also the civic participation and importance of democratic values (cf. Table D.1). If public institutions are perceived as corrupted and people withdraw from expressing their voice in public due to little reliance on democratic institutions, then the preference for placing the responsibility for individuals in need of support on family networks rather than the state becomes a rational strategy.

Furthermore, we find that tradition (cf. Table D.2) rather than family is more important to individuals exposed to EC, and older cohorts exposed to communism used to have more children as compared to all those unexposed. Therefore, we find no evidence to credit more pronounced preference for family insurance in post-communist countries to the demise of family importance in Old Europe. Instead, this might result from stronger adherence to tradition in post-communist countries.

Against the backdrop that motherhood is less often reported as relevant



for female fulfilment and the diminished role of religion during communism, we find strong evidence of a substantial increase in the support for traditional gender roles due to EC. This finding might seem unexpected, yet, reflects the heterogeneity in child-care policy under Soviet communism (Szelewa & Polakowski, 2008). Traditional female roles as caregivers translate to preferences for family support with respect to care over older adults and children of pre-school age.

*Nonlinear Effects.* Certain outcomes examined as a potential mechanism underlying EC effects on preferences for family insurance reveal quasi-linear relationships with the length of the EC (e.g. religiosity or confidence in certain public institutions<sup>21</sup>) pointing to the simple indoctrination effects. Other outcomes however, show a large degree of non-linearity between the length of the exposure and its effects, which might explain the discontinuity in EC effects on the preference for family insurance.

We find evidence of nonlinear effects of EC on generalized trust and confidence in selected public institutions. Despite evidence that the effects on these outcomes are always negative (with the exception of confidence in labour unions), the magnitude of the impact does not grow with the increase in the exposure length. This supports the IY hypothesis, showing that the lifelong indoctrination can be significantly weakened, or even reversed, by the EC during IY.

Finally, we observe the change in the direction of EC effects in case of

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<sup>21</sup>See respectively Figures D.6 and D.1 in the Appendix.

several of the mechanisms considered. A deep change in EC effects depending on its length is observed for the traditional inequality in gender roles within the labour market and in care-giving, for confidence in trade unions, for the preferences for taxation in democracy, and for the actual number of children. Thus, it seems that the changes in formal and informal institutions occurred in parallel, creating a dynamic environment affecting the preferences for social and family insurance.

## 5.4 Threats to Identification and Robustness Checks

### 5.4.1 Threats to Identification

*Variation in the Exposure.* The dates of the beginning and the end of the communism period are critical for the identification of EC effects. Below, we examine alternative operationalization of communism timelines to see whether the results remain intact<sup>22</sup>. Results for the EC effects on the preference for family over social insurance are in line with the main specification. Furthermore, we observe almost the same results for both preference for family and for social insurance regardless of the EC measure, which is reassuring with respect to the credibility of our main results.

Another pivotal source of heterogeneity allowing identification of EC effects lies in the differential exposure to communism by cohort<sup>23</sup>. Therefore,

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<sup>22</sup>See Tables E.1 - E.4 in the Appendix for detailed results.

<sup>23</sup>See Tables E.7 - E.8 in the Appendix for detailed results.

we examine cohort groups alternative to the year of birth. Specifically, we employ as a robustness check a ten- and five-year cohort group – reflecting the five-year span of economic central planning – to find negligible changes in EC effects between alternative cohort groupings. Finally, we test alternative approaches to clustering over only the year of birth or only the country of birth, to find negligible differences from the main approach relying on the variation over birth year and country<sup>24</sup>.

*Country Groups*<sup>25</sup>. Next, we examine whether the selection of countries exposed to communism affects the results, starting with the analysis limited only to the West and East of Germany. Consistently, we find that EC effects in Eastern compared to Western Germany (cf. Table E.10) clearly comply with the general patterns observed for the whole sample of countries<sup>26</sup>. In contrast, the EC effects obtained for German subsample on the preference for family insurance are weaker than for larger set of post-communist countries, while the EC effects on the preference for social insurance are stronger.

However, removing Western Germany from the sample significantly alters the results (cf. Table E.12). Individuals exposed to communism do not differ from individuals unexposed to communism living in non-German post-communist European countries with respect to the preference for income

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<sup>24</sup>See Tables E.6 - E.5 in the Appendix for detailed results.

<sup>25</sup>See Subsections E4 and E5 in the the Appendix for detailed results.

<sup>26</sup>Effects including all other post-communist countries (cf. Table E.11) juxtaposed with Western Germany are similar to those observed only for the Germans, despite minor differences in their magnitude.

equality and income redistribution, and are significantly more inclined to report preference for family insurance only with respect to care.

The control group of countries with highest score in the current democracy index yields results in line with the argument that exposure to non-democratic regimes explains our results for Soviet communism. However, we reject this notion by showing significant EC effects using the set of countries with authoritarian past as a country control group. We find the choice of the control group highly relevant for the significance and the size of EC effects (cf. Table E.17). Regardless of the subset of post-communist countries compared with the country control group, results remain consistent, especially with respect to EC effects on the preference for family insurance<sup>27</sup>.

*Sample Selection.* We use the propensity score matching (PSM) correcting for the systematic differences between individuals exposed to communism and individuals who were not, based on observable characteristics (dummy for being over 30 years old, regional percentages of agriculture workers and farmers, as well as of the unskilled workers). These results showed significant positive effects on the preference for family insurance, supporting our main findings (cf. Table 5).

Furthermore, we address selective migration. Inclusion of migrants in the sample does not alter overall EC effects on the preference for family insurance and the preference for income redistribution<sup>28</sup>. However, results on the

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<sup>27</sup>See Tables E.19 - E.23 in the Appendix for detailed results

<sup>28</sup>See Table E.43 in the Appendix for detailed results.

preference for family over social insurance and for income equality are sensitive to the inclusion of migrants. Therefore, our precautionary decision to remove migrants from the research sample impacts the results. This implies that properly designed analysis of preferences and behaviours of individuals migrating between post-communist and other European countries, addressing endogeneity concerning the propensity to migrate and the exposure to communism, might shed more light on the current repercussions of Soviet communism.

*Regime Transformation.* Communism collapse resulted in deep economic change, which brought structural unemployment and recession. We conduct estimations controlling for the experience of recession, especially in formative years, as well as the occupation at the time of communism collapse (and, in addition, occupation interacted with graduation year) and age at communism collapse to proxy both the risk of unemployment during the transitional period as well as the chances of having relatively high socio-economic status under communism<sup>29</sup>. These factors might be relevant for the preferences for insurance examined in our study and controlling for them yields results consistent with the main analysis.

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<sup>29</sup>See Tables E.26 - E.28 and in the Appendix for detailed results.

#### 5.4.2 Robustness Checks

*Analysis for a Single Wave*<sup>30</sup>. The data on which we base our empirical analysis come from years preceded by the collapse of communism, therefore the effects observed using numerous waves should also be present for a single wave, if EC poses a long-lasting impact. Thus, we use the first wave of GGS (comprised of larger country set than the second) to find EC effects on the preference for family insurance similar to the main results. Most recent waves of WVS and ESS reveal still present positive EC effects on the preference for social insurance, especially on their intensive margins, indicating that the EC effects are indeed long-lasting.

*Discrete Models and Longitudinal Analysis*<sup>31</sup>. We examine the robustness of our results to alternative estimation techniques<sup>32</sup>. Furthermore, we employ random effects models in the estimations on the preference for family insurance for the panel subsample of GGS and find that all significant effects remain so and their magnitudes remain at a similar level.

*Omitted Variables*. Omitted variables may reduce the precision of our main estimates, therefore we use imputations on income<sup>33</sup> and control for

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<sup>30</sup>See Table E.9 in the Appendix for detailed results.

<sup>31</sup>See Tables E.44 - E.45 in the Appendix for detailed results.

<sup>32</sup>In particular, we run probit and logit models with dichotomized dependent variables on familiarism and egalitarianism, which confirmed our main results. In the Appendix, we report only one way of dichotomization (strong preference for familiarism), because other alternatives (including weak preference for familiarism and excluding the undecided) lead to the same conclusions.

<sup>33</sup>See Table E.40 in the Appendix for detailed results.

the experience of war<sup>34</sup>. In order to use more detailed data on household economic situation instead of crude measures of the ability to make ends meet or scale of incomes, we refer to multiple imputation techniques. We use household average monthly income per capita with imputations (in logs) for the GGS sample, the only one where observations on income were available. The sign and significance of EC effects in this specification remain similar to main results. We conduct additional checks, controlling for experience of war. Our results are robust to specifications controlling for these experiences, particularly during impressionable years, which are found to be relevant for the preferences in later life. In addition, we control for rural area, country democracy index, European marriage patterns, individual religiosity, and household size when such information is available, to confirm our results<sup>35</sup>.

*Alternative Specifications.* If there have been ongoing changes in individual preferences for family insurance, inclusion of a time trend might help to remove the bias in main estimations insensitive to such changes. We allow for separate time trends in the East and West of Europe in additional analyses. The EC effects on particular familiarism, especially concerned with care, remain significant and positive regardless of the analyzed time trends, which is not the case for other examined preferences. Allowing for separate time trends (either linear or quadratic) in post-communist and other countries,

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<sup>34</sup>See Table E.24 in the Appendix for detailed results.

<sup>35</sup>See Tables E.29 - E.33 in the Appendix for detailed results of estimations in which we examine a number of additional variables that might be relevant for the EC effects.

we identify negligible EC effects on the preference for income equality and income redistribution. Finally, time trends specific to country of birth show that the main results for particular familiarism remain robust<sup>36</sup>.

## 6 Conclusion

We document that, against the backdrop of communism weakening the role of the family, EC strengthened the systems of family supports. EC has led to an increase of demand for any possible form of insurance. More specifically we show evidence of an increase in the preference for family insurance by six per cent with regards to care over older parents and by four per cent with regards to pre-school children and financial support to adult children. Such effects on the preference for family insurance are robust to examined identification threats, and various country compositions of research sample and robustness checks, unlike the effect on social insurance. Finally, our findings confirm previous studies documenting a negative correlation between government regulation, typical of communist countries, and the erosion of social and institutional interpersonal trust (Rainer & Siedler, 2009; Booth et al., 2018; Aghion et al., 2010).

This study suggests that in an environment where wealth accumulation is not possible, informal family networks are an alternative pathway to privilege. These effects run through indoctrination in the formation of preferences

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<sup>36</sup>See Tables E.34 - E.39 in the Appendix for detailed results.



and via communist propaganda during an individual's impressionable years.

Furthermore, our results are explained by the perceived relative inefficiency and corruption of formal Soviet institutions, which encouraged opportunism in dominated by hierarchy public life<sup>37</sup>, and in an elite upholding significant privileges. Subordinates' fear of losing the access to a privilege by questioning the authority of their superiors, inhibited taking initiative<sup>38</sup>. Hence, passive behaviour in public was a dominant approach in communist countries, which was destructive for cooperation in building formal institutions and for generalized trust. Obedient on the surface, individuals were very creative in coping with daily living difficulties by using informal support networks organized in tight circles of trusted individuals<sup>39</sup>. Family networks were instrumentally valuable as a source of connection and status at a time when privilege could not translate to visible differences in wealth accumulation, thus the complementarity of the preference for social and family insurance found in our study. On a more general level, our results suggest that family and support networks are endogeneous and hence adapt to political regime.

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<sup>37</sup>For example, members of the communist Party belonged to it formally for the sake of opportunities it provided, but they would not identify with nor actively participate in the Party actions.

<sup>38</sup>Existing literature established a link between trust deterioration and proximity to fear-inducing Soviet gulags and Stasi police (Nikolova et al., 2019; Lichter et al., 2019).

<sup>39</sup>Under such circumstances 'Solidarność' grew underground in parallel to officially recognized trade unions representing hardly anyone's interests and supporting the Party in Poland.

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Table 1: The Dates of the Beginning and the End of the Exposure to Soviet Communism in Analysed Post-Communist Counties.

Entry							
Exit	1936	1939	1940	1947	1948	1949	1952
1989					Romania		Poland
1990	Georgia	Lithuania		Bulgaria	Czech Republic, Slovakia	Germany, Hungary	
1991	Belarus, Ukraine		Latvia				
1992		Estonia					
1995	Russia						

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on dates of the socialist constitution and first free democratic elections.



Table 2: Effects of the Exposure to Communism (EC) on the Preference for Family and Social Insurance

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin						N
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>													
Upwards care	0.0631	( 0.0423)	0.0760*	( 0.0421)	0.0729*	( 0.0413)	0.0125	( 0.0157)	0.0176	( 0.0156)	0.0173	( 0.0154)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0250	( 0.0482)	-0.0240	( 0.0483)	-0.0253	( 0.0476)	-0.0163	( 0.0238)	-0.0162	( 0.0239)	-0.0169	( 0.0236)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0252	( 0.0684)	-0.0006	( 0.0680)	0.0008	( 0.0680)	-0.0007	( 0.0108)	0.0045	( 0.0108)	0.0049	( 0.0109)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1688***	( 0.0620)	-0.1519**	( 0.0618)	-0.1505**	( 0.0613)	-0.0300**	( 0.0148)	-0.0264*	( 0.0148)	-0.0263*	( 0.0148)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>													
Upwards care	0.0861***	( 0.0188)	0.0973***	( 0.0189)	0.0960***	( 0.0187)	0.0604***	( 0.0104)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	0.0647***	( 0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	( 0.0200)	0.0420**	( 0.0199)	0.0460**	( 0.0199)	0.0356***	( 0.0091)	0.0351***	( 0.0091)	0.0369***	( 0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0221	( 0.0225)	-0.0039	( 0.0224)	-0.0062	( 0.0221)	-0.0132	( 0.0111)	-0.0043	( 0.0111)	-0.0054	( 0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	( 0.0216)	0.0396*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0219)	0.0295**	( 0.0131)	0.0357***	( 0.0132)	0.0374***	( 0.0133)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>													
Income equality	0.6279***	( 0.0680)	0.5121***	( 0.0683)	0.5422***	( 0.0698)	0.0910	( 0.0129)	0.0707***	( 0.0130)	0.0759***	( 0.0131)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3113***	( 0.0285)	0.2734***	( 0.0285)	0.2760***	( 0.0286)	0.1306***	( 0.0126)	0.1159***	( 0.0126)	0.1158***	( 0.0128)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1081***	( 0.0278)	0.0954***	( 0.0277)	0.0975***	( 0.0278)	0.0215***	( 0.0079)	0.0196**	( 0.0079)	0.0191**	( 0.0079)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2-6 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 3: Effects of the Exposure to Communism (EC) in the Sample of Post-Communist Countries

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin						N
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>													
Upwards care	-0.0570	( 0.0425)	-0.0371	( 0.0422)	-0.0360	( 0.0422)	-0.0176	( 0.0218)	-0.0102	( 0.0218)	-0.0082	( 0.0218)	115624
Downwards care	-0.1964***	( 0.0566)	-0.1924***	( 0.0566)	-0.1911***	( 0.0563)	-0.1075***	( 0.0249)	-0.1070***	( 0.0249)	-0.1059***	( 0.0247)	115569
Upwards money	-0.2770***	( 0.0449)	-0.2528***	( 0.0446)	-0.2494***	( 0.0442)	-0.0252***	( 0.0080)	-0.0195**	( 0.0080)	-0.0183**	( 0.0080)	115578
Downwards money	-0.3819***	( 0.0540)	-0.3639***	( 0.0528)	-0.3597***	( 0.0529)	-0.0555***	( 0.0161)	-0.0508***	( 0.0160)	-0.0496***	( 0.0160)	115510
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>													
Upwards care	0.0465***	( 0.0175)	0.0593***	( 0.0179)	0.0576***	( 0.0178)	0.0427***	( 0.0102)	0.0469***	( 0.0104)	0.0463***	( 0.0104)	142618
Downwards care	0.0279	( 0.0215)	0.0293	( 0.0215)	0.0348	( 0.0215)	0.0325***	( 0.0101)	0.0321***	( 0.0101)	0.0347***	( 0.0102)	139625
Upwards money	-0.0692***	( 0.0197)	-0.0493**	( 0.0199)	-0.0514***	( 0.0197)	-0.0266**	( 0.0113)	-0.0172	( 0.0114)	-0.0185	( 0.0113)	142416
Downwards money	0.0580***	( 0.0211)	0.0673***	( 0.0212)	0.0716***	( 0.0213)	0.0488***	( 0.0122)	0.0538***	( 0.0123)	0.0557***	( 0.0124)	139637
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>													
Income equality	0.6853***	( 0.0664)	0.5887***	( 0.0666)	0.6376***	( 0.0674)	0.0959	( 0.0133)	0.0792***	( 0.0134)	0.0874***	( 0.0135)	47227
Income redistribution	0.4183***	( 0.0368)	0.3766***	( 0.0351)	0.3641***	( 0.0354)	0.1759***	( 0.0167)	0.1610***	( 0.0164)	0.1564***	( 0.0166)	26299
Equality of opportunities	0.0806**	( 0.0354)	0.0661*	( 0.0353)	0.0669*	( 0.0353)	0.0150	( 0.0096)	0.0127	( 0.0095)	0.0127	( 0.0095)	25990
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2-6 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age

(quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 4: Effects of the Exposure to Communism (EC) during Impressionable Years (IY) and in Total

		(1)		(2)		(3)		
		Coef.	(Std. Err.)	Coef.	(Std. Err.)	Coef.	(Std. Err.)	N
Family preferred over social insurance								
Upwards care	EC during IY	0.0824***	( 0.0202)	0.0813***	( 0.0202)	0.0813***	( 0.0202)	148216
	total years of EC	-0.0037***	( 0.0007)	-0.0028***	( 0.0007)	-0.0028***	( 0.0007)	148216
Downwards care	EC during IY	0.0576***	( 0.0177)	0.0567***	( 0.0176)	0.0567***	( 0.0176)	159313
	total years of EC	-0.0063***	( 0.0006)	-0.0061***	( 0.0006)	-0.0061***	( 0.0006)	159313
Upwards money	EC during IY	0.0515**	( 0.0218)	0.0495**	( 0.0211)	0.0495**	( 0.0211)	142664
	total years of EC	-0.0080***	( 0.0008)	-0.0065***	( 0.0008)	-0.0065***	( 0.0008)	142664
Downwards money	EC during IY	0.0306*	( 0.0179)	0.0290*	( 0.0175)	0.0290*	( 0.0175)	149857
	total years of EC	-0.0108***	( 0.0008)	-0.0096***	( 0.0008)	-0.0096***	( 0.0008)	149857
Preference for family insurance								
Upwards care	EC during IY	0.1759***	( 0.0218)	0.1769***	( 0.0217)	0.1769***	( 0.0217)	182330
	total years of EC	0.0002	( 0.0007)	0.0006	( 0.0007)	0.0006	( 0.0007)	182330
Downwards care	EC during IY	0.1068***	( 0.0263)	0.1069***	( 0.0264)	0.1069***	( 0.0264)	172337
	total years of EC	-0.0074***	( 0.0006)	-0.0075***	( 0.0008)	-0.0075***	( 0.0008)	172337
Upwards money	EC during IY	0.1263***	( 0.0221)	0.1272***	( 0.0222)	0.1272***	( 0.0222)	169582
	total years of EC	0.0003	( 0.0007)	0.0010	( 0.0007)	0.0010	( 0.0007)	169582
Downwards money	EC during IY	0.1109***	( 0.0269)	0.1119***	( 0.0268)	0.1119***	( 0.0268)	179393
	total years of EC	-0.0065***	( 0.0008)	-0.0062***	( 0.0008)	-0.0062***	( 0.0008)	179393
Preference for social insurance								
Income equality	EC during IY	0.0135	( 0.0677)	-0.0403	( 0.0677)	-0.0538	( 0.0669)	65163
	total years of EC	0.0141***	( 0.0021)	0.0116***	( 0.0021)	0.0132***	( 0.0021)	65163
Income redistribution	EC during IY	0.1426***	( 0.0365)	0.1219***	( 0.0364)	0.1114***	( 0.0356)	65979
	total years of EC	0.0060***	( 0.0011)	0.0052***	( 0.0011)	0.0057***	( 0.0011)	65979
Equality of opportunities	EC during IY	0.0399	( 0.0375)	0.0310	( 0.0374)	0.0386	( 0.0375)	64387
	total years of EC	0.0027***	( 0.0011)	0.0025**	( 0.0011)	0.0026**	( 0.0011)	64387
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	EC during IY	-0.1895	( 0.1165)	-0.1670	( 0.1152)	-0.1670	( 0.1152)	5232
	total years of EC	0.0083***	( 0.0023)	0.0080***	( 0.0023)	0.0080***	( 0.0023)	5232
Income controls		No		No		Yes		
Education controls		No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects		Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3),

WVS waves 2-6 (release 2015.04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .


Table 5: Coefficients on the Exposure to Communism (EC) outside and during Impressionable Years (IY) using Propensity Score Matching

	Average Treatment Effect				N
	EC outside IY	(AI Robust Std. Err.)	EC during IY	(AI Robust Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>					
Upwards care	0.0366261***	(0.0169785)	0.1570022***	(0.016944)	148258
Downwards care	0.45722***	(0.018866)	0.1945311***	(0.0140519)	159355
Upwards money	0.0004808	(0.0253345)	0.0013971	(0.0198491)	142706
Downwards money	-0.0322227*	(0.0183865)	-0.114999	(0.0189894)	149899
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>					
Upwards care	0.5259766***	(0.0132419)	0.2264975***	(0.0084143)	182371
Downwards care	0.083378***	(0.0144284)	0.1183393***	(0.0121869)	172379
Upwards money	0.2922025***	(0.0150791)	0.1079016***	(0.0102135)	169623
Downwards money	0.1337755***	(0.0138679)	0.0752321***	(0.0098057)	179435

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Propensity score in logit model using dummy for being over 30 years old, regional percentage of agriculture workers and farmers, and regional percentage of unskilled workers. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Figure 1: Effects of the Exposure to Communism (EC) on the Preference for Family Insurance by the Length of the Exposure



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported.


Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”.

Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ ,

\* –  $p < 0.1$ .



Figure 2: Effects of the Exposure to Communism (EC) on Family Preferred over Social Insurance by the Length of the Exposure




Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported.

Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home. . .”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children. . .”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level. . .”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ . ‘

Figure 3: Effects of the Exposure to Communism (EC) on Preference for Social Insurance by the Length of the Exposure



Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04.18) and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Preference for social insurance: inceu – “incomes should be made more equal”, incred – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, impequ – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality - more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table 6: Effects of the Exposure to Communism (EC) on Trust

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
Generalized trust (GGS)	-0.0817***	( 0.0150)	-0.0645***	( 0.0150)	-0.0668***	( 0.0148)	137209
Generalized trust (WVS)	-0.1026***	( 0.0142)	-0.0928***	( 0.0143)	-0.0961***	( 0.0144)	64447
Generalized trust (ESS)	-0.5949***	( 0.0561)	-0.5343***	( 0.0559)	-0.5338***	( 0.0559)	75633
People being helpful (ESS)	-0.4098***	( 0.0523)	-0.3797***	( 0.0515)	-0.3619***	( 0.0503)	75516
Trust in family (WVS)	-0.1220***	( 0.0351)	-0.1651***	( 0.0427)	-0.1651***	( 0.0427)	5144
Confidence in press (WVS)	-0.1694***	( 0.0207)	-0.1659***	( 0.0206)	-0.1607***	( 0.0206)	65665
Trust in president (LITS 06)	0.1009	( 0.1060)	0.0627	( 0.0971)	0.0691	( 0.0975)	20321
Trust in parliament (LITS 06)	0.0685	( 0.0984)	0.0333	( 0.0905)	0.0481	( 0.0910)	21099
Trust in government (LITS 06)	0.1083	( 0.0979)	0.0749	( 0.0929)	0.0890	( 0.0928)	21138
Confidence in political parties (WVS)	-0.1309***	( 0.0160)	-0.1199***	( 0.0162)	-0.1208***	( 0.0163)	62632
Trust in political parties (ESS)	-0.2393***	( 0.0531)	-0.1951***	( 0.0542)	-0.1757***	( 0.0554)	74243
Trust in political parties (LITS 06)	0.0929	( 0.0811)	0.0588	( 0.0784)	0.0695	( 0.0786)	20518
Trust in politicians (ESS)	-0.2695***	( 0.0536)	-0.2193***	( 0.0544)	-0.2034***	( 0.0556)	74653
Confidence in police (WVS)	-0.1903***	( 0.0201)	-0.1830***	( 0.0202)	-0.1732***	( 0.0204)	65817
Trust in police (ESS)	-0.5187***	( 0.0562)	-0.4628***	( 0.0568)	-0.4325***	( 0.0578)	75070
Trust in armed forces (LITS 06)	0.0640	( 0.1171)	0.0443	( 0.1147)	0.0556	( 0.1141)	20879
Confidence in the army (WVS)	-0.1139***	( 0.0195)	-0.1115***	( 0.0195)	-0.1045***	( 0.0192)	64757
Confidence in labour unions (WVS)	-0.0182	( 0.0173)	-0.0189	( 0.0173)	-0.0161	( 0.0174)	60187
Confidence in justice system (WVS)	-0.2339***	( 0.0206)	-0.2251***	( 0.0207)	-0.2205***	( 0.0208)	63533
Trust in legal system (ESS)	-0.5984***	( 0.0635)	-0.5369***	( 0.0640)	-0.5216***	( 0.0649)	74168
Trust in courts (LITS 06)	0.2156**	( 0.1056)	0.1787*	( 0.0999)	0.1793*	( 0.1008)	20636
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 2-6 (release 2015\_04\_18), ESS waves 1-8, and LITS wave 1.

Notes: Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Generalized trust – “generally speaking, would

you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” with the answer “most people can be trusted” opposed to “need to be very careful”; people being helpful – “people mostly try to be helpful” or “people mostly look out for themselves.” Trust in family – how much respondents trust their own family measured on five point scale (“trust them completely” ... “do not trust them at all”). Confidence – how much confidence respondents have in the army, press, political parties, police, labour unions, and justice system measured on five point scale. Trust in ESS – how much respondents trust in parliament, political parties, politicians, police, and legal system, measured on 11-point scale (“no trust at all” ... “complete trust”). Trust in LITS – how much respondents trust in president, government, parliament, political parties, armed forces, and legal system, measured on five point scale (“complete distrust” ... “complete trust”). Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

# Appendix

## to

### “Comrades in the Family? Soviet Communism and Informal Family Insurance”

Joan Costa-Font<sup>1</sup>, Anna Nicińska<sup>2</sup>

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## A Descriptive statistics

GGG collects survey data on various aspects of intergenerational and gender relations in adults living in 17 European countries between 2002-2016, in particular on care arrangements and caregiving values being the primary social attitudes we examine from this dataset<sup>3</sup>. We employ the two available waves of GGG yielding the research sample of about 157 and 65 thousand individuals in first and second wave, respectively.

WVS investigates broader set of data concerned specifically with beliefs, values and motivations for a large sample of countries. It is comprised of six waves conducted in 58 countries between 1981 and 2014 (Inglehart et al., 2014). In the present study, we use the data on all post-communist countries and a set of European countries as a control group that participated in one (France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania), two (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia), three (Belarus, Georgia, Germany, Romania, Sweden, Ukraine), four (Poland, Russia) or five (Spain) different waves of data collection excluding first one from before communism collapsed, which yields an overall sample of about 69 thousand individuals aged from 15 to 99.

ESS collects data on social beliefs and attitudes in almost all European countries, providing eight rounds of bi-annual data since 2002. It provides the set of almost 98 thousand observations on individuals aged at least 14 years, living in post-communist countries (from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine) and the most heterogeneous control group comprised of 314 thousand observations (on individuals living in Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Island, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, former West Germany). Individuals older than 100 were excluded from the sample as outliers.

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<sup>3</sup>The GGG, WVS, and ESS data can be found in:  
<http://www.ggp-i.org/data/online-codebook>,  
<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>,  
<https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>, respectively.

Table A.1: Entry and exit from Soviet communism in the post-communist counties

Exit	Entry									
	1936	1939	1940	1941	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1952
1960						Albania <sup>a)</sup>				
1989								Romania		Poland
1990	Georgia	Lithuania					Bulgaria	Czech Republic, Slovakia	Germany, Hungary	
1991	Azerbaijan <sup>a)</sup> , Belarus, Kazakhstan <sup>a)</sup> , Moldova <sup>a)</sup> , Tajikistan <sup>a)</sup> , Ukraine, Uzbekistan <sup>a)</sup>									
1992		Estonia		Latvia	Armenia <sup>a)</sup>					
1995	Kyrgistan <sup>a)</sup> , Russia									

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on dates of the socialist constitution and first free democratic elections.

Note: <sup>a)</sup> Available in Life in Transition Survey (LITS) used only in the mechanisms section.

Table A.2: Alternative measures of the exposure to communism (EC)

	East and West			East			East subsample of the exposed		
	GGS	WVS	ESS	GGS	WVS	ESS	GGS	WVS	ESS
Baseline EC									
Mean	19.28	23.91	7.68	29.31	30.36	26.18	29.51	32.58	28.14
(Std Dev.)	(18.01)	(19.10)	(14.81)	(14.27)	(16.35)	(16.22)	(14.11)	(14.65)	(15.10)
Min	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Max	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59	59
Fixed EC									
Mean	19.01	23.26	8.03	28.90	28.51	25.75	29.05	31.05	27.89
(Std Dev.)	(17.68)	(17.64)	(14.82)	(13.76)	(15.22)	(15.73)	(13.64)	(13.17)	(14.43)
Min	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Max	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45	45
Fixed exit EC									
Mean	18.98	22.64	8.03	28.84	29.38	25.72	29.00	31.87	27.86
(Std Dev.)	(17.78)	(18.87)	(14.87)	(14.00)	(16.25)	(15.91)	(13.87)	(14.39)	(14.65)
Min	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Max	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54
Fixed entry EC									
Mean	17.91	23.43	8.26	29.79	29.74	26.48	29.79	31.91	28.38
(Std Dev.)	(18.09)	(18.21)	(15.12)	(13.79)	(15.28)	(15.82)	(13.79)	(13.46)	(14.64)
Min	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
Max	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Berlin wall EC									
Mean	14.40	21.89	22.04	17.36	21.28	23.34	6.08	19.48	21.42
(Std Dev.)	(12.36)	(8.26)	(8.09)	(12.00)	(9.65)	(7.35)	(10.73)	(10.37)	(8.76)
Min	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Max	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015.04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Baseline EC measure uses entry and exit dates as in Table 1. Fixed EC uses fixed dates of entry (1945) and exit (1990) to communism. Berlin wall EC uses the erection (1961) and the fall (1989) of the Berlin Wall as an entry and exit dates, respectively.

Table A.2 summarizes basic descriptive statistics on the measures of the exposure to communism. The average span of life spent under communist regime in GGS sample is 19 years and in WVS and ESS it is about 24 and 8, respectively, in line with the differences between the samples in age and in the set of countries included. For those exposed to communism, the averages are consistent between research samples (ranging from 27.9 to 32.6 years) These similarities are reassuring with respect to the comparability and validity of our data sources.



Table A.3: Percentage of individuals in the research samples by country and wave of data collection

	GGS		WVS					ESS							
Wave	1	2	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Year	2002-15	2006-13	1989-1993	1994-1998	1999-2004	2005-2009	2010-2014	2002-03	2004-05	2006-07	2008-09	2010-11	2012-13	2014-15	2016-17
Austria	2.66	5.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.86	5.16	5.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.85	0.00
Belarus	0.00	0.00	14.90	8.40	0.00	0.00	8.88	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Belgium	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.97	4.03	4.34	3.73	3.40	3.63	4.72	0.00
Bulgaria	8.13	14.34	0.00	4.31	0.00	5.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.66	5.20	5.41	5.08	0.00	0.00
Croatia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.18	3.31	0.00	0.00	0.00
Cyprus	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.49	2.63	2.28	2.24	0.00	0.00
Czech Republic	6.13	4.70	13.56	4.61	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.70	7.19	0.00	4.65	5.25	4.40	6.44	6.06
Denmark	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.06	3.52	3.70	3.55	3.31	3.47	4.23	0.00
Estonia	3.95	0.00	0.00	4.10	0.00	0.00	8.34	0.00	4.02	3.16	3.07	3.40	4.50	5.05	4.71
Finland	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.96	0.00	5.43	0.00	5.53	4.93	4.85	5.03	4.07	4.76	6.09	5.05
France	5.72	9.16	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.36	0.00	3.86	4.15	4.72	4.49	3.53	3.98	5.19	5.08
Georgia	6.26	12.60	0.00	8.07	0.00	8.03	7.47	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Germany	5.56	0.00	0.00	8.14	0.00	11.05	11.50	7.23	6.16	6.64	5.58	5.95	5.78	7.98	6.68
East	1.07	0.85	0.00	4.05	0.00	5.76	0.00	2.70	2.23	2.34	1.96	2.15	2.03	2.64	2.24
West	4.22	3.70	0.00	4.08	0.00	5.29	5.95	4.52	3.92	4.30	3.62	3.81	3.75	5.34	4.44
Greece	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	6.57	5.38	0.00	4.59	5.49	0.00	0.00	0.00
Hungary	8.64	16.45	0.00	2.61	0.00	5.39	5.55	4.70	3.64	3.91	3.56	3.41	4.50	5.12	4.34
Iceland	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.59	0.00	2.53	0.00
Ireland	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	11.91	6.11	3.88	3.90	5.10	5.03	4.69	7.06	0.00
Italy	5.93	9.72	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.42	7.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.99	0.00	7.33	0.00
Latvia	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.82	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Lithuania	6.10	3.36	0.00	4.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.20	4.81	4.88	0.00	0.00	0.00
Luxemburg	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.05	2.85	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Netherlands	4.91	9.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.62	10.62	6.30	4.27	4.51	3.79	3.79	3.79	5.32	4.23
Norway	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.53	0.00	5.49	0.00	5.43	4.06	4.29	3.33	3.08	3.21	3.88	3.76
Poland	12.44	0.00	13.77	4.63	0.00	5.35	5.99	5.94	4.22	4.47	3.75	3.86	4.23	4.90	4.60
Portugal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.06	4.81	5.48	5.24	4.50	4.57	3.58	3.21
Romania	7.64	0.00	0.00	4.98	0.00	9.50	9.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Russia	6.48	10.92	28.78	8.19	0.00	10.88	14.93	0.00	0.00	6.01	5.59	5.46	5.28	0.00	6.30
Slovakia	0.00	0.00	6.84	4.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.64	4.49	4.14	4.04	4.11	0.00	0.00
Spain	0.00	0.00	22.16	4.86	100.00	6.42	7.49	4.71	3.84	4.56	5.51	3.80	3.78	5.38	4.78
Sweden	5.44	0.00	0.00	4.05	0.00	5.37	6.76	0.01	4.38	4.51	3.80	2.97	3.65	4.76	3.74
Switzerland	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.84	4.35	3.86	3.27	2.59	2.62	3.49	3.02
Ukraine	0.00	0.00	0.00	11.29	0.00	5.35	8.58	0.00	4.39	4.64	3.89	3.85	4.54	0.00	0.00
United Kingdom	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.31	4.29	5.69	4.95	4.82	4.57	5.97	4.63
N	156,673	64,653	6,814	24,897	1,209	18,686	15,870	35,017	40,193	37,921	42,522	44,581	44,211	32,636	36,558

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Table A.4: Percentage of individuals in the research samples by birth cohort and wave of data collection

	GGS			WVS				ESS							
Wave	1	2	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Year	2002-15	2006-13	1989-93	1994-98	1999-2004	2005-09	2010-14	2002-03	2004-05	2006-07	2008-09	2010-11	2012-13	2014-15	2016-17
1900-05	0.00	0.00	0.22	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1905-10	0.00	0.00	0.58	0.15	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1910-15	0.00	0.00	1.99	0.75	0.17	0.04	0.01	0.44	0.28	0.13	0.31	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00
1915-20	1.06	0.08	2.69	1.32	1.90	0.24	0.04	1.20	0.84	0.64	1.46	0.17	0.07	0.04	0.02
1920-25	4.59	3.30	4.44	3.74	3.80	1.19	0.27	3.26	2.50	2.09	3.14	0.99	0.63	0.41	0.18
1925-30	8.01	7.61	7.00	5.91	5.71	2.57	1.44	4.84	4.01	3.78	4.77	2.61	1.64	1.38	0.89
1930-35	8.93	9.00	7.59	6.44	7.69	4.50	3.05	5.88	5.57	5.30	6.18	4.24	3.35	3.04	2.19
1935-40	9.64	10.28	7.07	7.86	7.20	6.74	5.29	6.69	6.62	6.14	7.19	5.95	5.38	4.59	4.05
1940-45	9.93	11.08	7.24	7.40	6.70	7.07	6.20	7.32	7.34	7.27	8.22	7.16	6.77	6.38	5.30
1945-50	9.64	10.68	9.59	8.31	6.29	7.85	7.72	8.39	8.34	8.14	8.56	8.31	8.21	8.51	7.82
1950-55	9.18	9.48	12.19	9.89	8.27	8.56	8.66	8.67	8.54	8.25	8.63	8.58	8.61	8.46	8.94
1955-60	9.20	9.04	12.48	10.50	7.20	9.18	8.70	8.57	8.44	8.60	8.54	8.42	8.73	8.65	8.69
1960-65	8.45	8.42	10.91	10.44	9.26	9.21	8.77	9.46	8.99	9.04	8.29	8.45	8.60	8.89	8.61
1965-70	7.02	7.47	10.69	9.70	10.84	9.53	8.60	9.11	8.77	8.57	8.33	8.14	8.34	8.39	8.57
1970-75	6.54	6.22	5.31	9.56	9.43	8.85	8.10	7.96	8.07	8.15	7.54	7.75	8.16	7.86	7.90
1975-80	4.86	4.63	0.00	7.59	10.34	8.55	8.40	6.73	7.27	7.31	7.31	7.45	7.56	7.67	7.84
1980-85	2.87	2.58	0.00	0.45	5.21	8.20	8.31	6.85	7.22	6.94	6.60	6.97	7.15	6.94	7.28
1985-90	0.11	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	7.11	9.09	4.02	7.07	7.23	4.85	6.85	6.67	6.36	7.17
1990-95	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.61	7.36	0.00	0.11	2.42	0.00	6.83	6.46	6.22	6.34
1995 and later	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.12	3.65	6.19	8.21
N	156,673	64,653	5,873	24,722	1,209	18,582	15,795	34,835	39,98	37,672	42,412	44,486	44,125	32,578	36,452


Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Table A.5: Percentage of individuals in the LITS 2006 sample by country and birth year

Birth year	Country																							
	Albania	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Bulgaria	Croatia	Czech Republic	Estonia	Georgia	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Latvia	Lithuania	Moldova	Mongolia	Poland	Romania	Russia	Slovakia	Tajikistan	Ukraine	Uzbekistan	N
1985-90	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.12	0.01	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.05	0.11	0.06	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.03	274
1980-85	0.03	0.33	0.13	0.09	0.20	0.13	0.18	0.18	0.12	0.10	0.32	0.14	0.05	0.11	0.24	0.16	0.13	0.17	0.15	0.24	0.23	0.07	0.10	797
1975-80	0.09	0.32	0.25	0.23	0.40	0.28	0.25	0.23	0.26	0.14	0.43	0.22	0.17	0.27	0.17	0.31	0.27	0.23	0.17	0.41	0.31	0.21	0.26	1,303
1970-75	0.23	0.33	0.25	0.17	0.36	0.25	0.32	0.26	0.28	0.22	0.40	0.20	0.32	0.32	0.25	0.37	0.44	0.32	0.32	0.63	0.38	0.39	0.50	1,667
1965-70	0.36	0.47	0.30	0.32	0.45	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.38	0.19	0.38	0.41	0.56	0.28	0.38	0.56	0.53	0.30	0.30	0.63	0.34	0.58	0.51	2,066
1960-65	0.54	0.81	0.37	0.42	0.40	0.32	0.51	0.32	0.39	0.26	0.49	0.53	0.72	0.35	0.54	0.63	0.68	0.45	0.36	0.68	0.55	0.76	0.73	2,620
1955-60	0.64	0.51	0.47	0.49	0.50	0.45	0.59	0.45	0.59	0.23	0.45	0.65	0.81	0.36	0.57	0.46	0.57	0.36	0.37	0.55	0.57	0.68	0.63	2,656
1950-55	0.61	0.30	0.54	0.49	0.46	0.52	0.54	0.43	0.53	0.25	0.40	0.48	0.53	0.45	0.50	0.45	0.51	0.36	0.36	0.32	0.50	0.54	0.50	2,350
1945-50	0.51	0.30	0.54	0.39	0.44	0.45	0.39	0.41	0.39	0.23	0.35	0.34	0.25	0.44	0.38	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.41	0.37	0.34	0.38	0.28	1,913
1940-45	0.46	0.24	0.44	0.46	0.41	0.45	0.39	0.32	0.36	0.15	0.30	0.25	0.29	0.41	0.32	0.41	0.28	0.49	0.42	0.26	0.27	0.29	0.32	1,772
1935-40	0.36	0.30	0.45	0.53	0.32	0.35	0.41	0.32	0.36	0.21	0.37	0.49	0.36	0.47	0.51	0.36	0.31	0.41	0.45	0.15	0.42	0.27	0.30	1,881
1930-35	0.26	0.28	0.29	0.46	0.30	0.41	0.25	0.26	0.35	0.14	0.23	0.32	0.25	0.42	0.30	0.19	0.18	0.43	0.45	0.09	0.21	0.18	0.20	1,432
1925-30	0.14	0.09	0.26	0.26	0.17	0.25	0.22	0.17	0.26	0.12	0.25	0.26	0.13	0.36	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.31	0.45	0.05	0.16	0.10	0.09	1,000
1920-25	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.09	0.10	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.16	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.14	0.15	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.01	370
1915-20	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	87
1910-15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	17
1905-1910	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4


Source: Authors' own tabulation based on LITS wave 1.

Figure A.1: Distribution of responses to questions on family preferred over social insurance (i.e. general familiarism) in the East and the West



Source: Authors' own calculations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).  
Notes: Family preferred over social insurance (general familiarism): upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home...”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children...”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level...”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level... is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”.

Figure A.2: Distribution of responses to questions on the preference for family insurance (i.e. particular familiarism) in the East and the West



Source: Authors' own calculations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).  
 Notes: Preference for family insurance (particular familiarism): upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”.

Table A.6: Descriptive statistics of the East and the West subsamples

		East				West			
		Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max	Mean	Std Dev.	Min	Max
GGS									
Age		47.02	(16.65)	17	85	46.00	(15.39)	17	89
Household size		3.30	(2.18)	1	16	2.71	(1.31)	1	14
Number of children		1.75	(1.80)	0	19	1.44	(1.36)	0	12
Female		0.56	(0.50)	0	1	0.55	(0.50)	0	1
Education									
	ISCED 0	0.01	(0.09)	0	1	0.01	(0.08)	0	1
	ISCED 1	0.07	(0.26)	0	1	0.06	(0.24)	0	1
	ISCED 2	0.14	(0.35)	0	1	0.16	(0.36)	0	1
	ISCED 3	0.42	(0.49)	0	1	0.34	(0.47)	0	1
	ISCED 4	0.13	(0.33)	0	1	0.03	(0.18)	0	1
	ISCED 5	0.21	(0.40)	0	1	0.17	(0.38)	0	1
	ISCED 6	0.02	(0.15)	0	1	0.01	(0.10)	0	1
	unknown	0.01	(0.08)	0	1	0.22	(0.42)	0	1
N		145,602					75,724		
WVS									
Age		45.12	(17.12)	16	99	46.98	(17.42)	15	94
Household size		3.08	(1.14)	1	5				
Number of children		1.53	(1.26)	0	8	1.51	(1.33)	0	8
Female		53.62	(0.50)	0	1	0.52	(0.50)	0	1
Education									
	incomplete primary	0.04	(0.20)	0	1	0.03	(0.18)	0	1
	primary	0.11	(0.31)	0	1	0.18	(0.38)	0	1
	incomplete secondary: technical	0.05	(0.23)	0	1	0.09	(0.29)	0	1
	complete secondary: technical	0.22	(0.42)	0	1	0.16	(0.37)	0	1
	incomplete secondary: general	.05	(0.22)	0	1	0.09	(0.28)	0	1
	complete secondary: general	0.15	(.036)	0	1	0.13	(0.33)	0	1
	incomplete higher	0.04	(0.20)	0	1	0.11	(.032)	0	1
	complete higher	0.15	(0.36)	0	1	0.20	(0.40)	0	1
	unknown	0.17	(0.38)	0	1	0.01	(0.11)	0	1
N		57,071					12,872		
EES									
Age		47.74	(18.34)	16	100	48.58	(18.52)	16	100
Household size		2.78	(1.44)	1	15	2.62	(1.35)	1	22
Female		0.56	(0.50)	0	1	0.52	(0.50)	0	1
Education									
	ISCED 0-1	0.04	(0.19)	0	1	0.11	(0.31)	0	1
	ISCED 2	0.17	(0.38)	0	1	0.13	(0.34)	0	1
	ISCED 3a	0.16	(0.36)	0	1	0.15	(0.35)	0	1
	ISCED 3b	0.27	(0.44)	0	1	0.11	(0.32)	0	1
	ISCED 4	0.11	(0.32)	0	1	0.08	(0.28)	0	1
	ISCED 5a	0.05	(0.23)	0	1	0.08	(0.27)	0	1
	ISCED 5b	0.12	(0.32)	0	1	0.08	(0.26)	0	1
	unknown	0.07	(0.27)	0	1	0.25	(0.44)	0	1
N			97,886				215,753		

Source: Authors' own tabulation on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Household size unobserved in WVS for the West. Number of children observed up to 8th child in WVS, only coresiding children are observed in ESS. All variables statistically significantly different between the East and the West with the t-test significant at 1 per cent level.

Table A.7: Strong and weak caregiving and monetary familiarisms in the East and the West


	East				West			
	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max
Caregiving familiarism								
Strong	2.85	(1.08)	0	4	1.93	(1.21)	0	4
Weak	3.70	(0.59)	0	4	3.06	(1.02)	0	4
N	113,273				34,807			
Monetary familiarism								
Strong	1.65	(0.97)	0	4	1.37	(1.11)	0	4
Weak	2.77	(1.01)	0	4	2.41	(1.14)	0	4
N	113,145				29,256			

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).

Notes: Caregiving strong (weak) familiarism is a non-weighted sum of responses indicating strong (weak) preference for family care in upwards and downwards intergenerational non-financial support. Analogously, monetary strong (weak) familiarism is a non-weighted sum of responses indicating strong (weak) preference for family upwards and downwards intergenerational financial support. All variables statistically significantly different between the East and the West with the t-test significant at 1 per cent level.

In Table A.7 we build simple indexes of strong and weak familiarism observed in general and attitudes for the monetary and caregiving support, for both to younger and older generations. Adding up strong (weak) preference for family support, we obtain a discrete measure of strong (weak) familiarism ranging from 0 to 4. We find the East to be significantly more familiaristic than the West, especially as far as the strong preferences are concerned.

Figure A.3: Distribution of responses to questions on preference for social insurance (i.e. egalitarian preferences) in the East and the West



Source: Authors' own calculations based on WVS waves 2-5 (release 2015\_04\_18) and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. All variables statistically significantly different between the East and the West with the t-test significant at 1 per cent level.



Table A.8: Measures of preferences in the East and the West

	East				West			
	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max
Family preferred over social insurance								
Upwards care	4.12	(0.73)	1	5	3.48	(1.05)	1	5
N	113,293				49,078			
Downwards care	3.74	(0.93)	1	5	3.50	(1.14)	1	5
N	130,338				42,041			
Upwards money	3.86	(0.81)	1	5	3.33	(1.11)	1	5
N	133,129				36,494			
Downwards money	3.70	(0.87)	1	5	3.47	(1.03)	1	5
N	130,331				49,104			
Preference for family insurance								
Upwards care	3.62	(1.12)	1	5	2.94	(1.14)	1	5
N	113,291				34,967			
Downwards care	4.16	(0.95)	1	5	3.60	(1.18)	1	5
N	113,228				46,127			
Upwards money	2.38	(1.10)	1	5	2.12	(1.19)	1	5
N	133,244				29,462			
Downwards money	2.27	(1.07)	1	5	2.20	(1.15)	1	5
N	113,214				36,685			
Preference for social insurance								
Income equality (WVS)	5.27	(2.97)	1	10	5.66	(2.44)	1	10
N	52,557				12,629			
Income redistribution (ESS)	4.03	(1.02)	1	5	3.80	(1.04)	1	5
N	95,517				212,209			
Equality of opportunities (ESS)	4.74	(1.11)	1	6	4.96	(1.01)	1	6
N	94,853				206,855			
Equality over freedom (WVS) <sup>a</sup>	1.88	(0.90)	1	3	-	-	-	-
N	3,506				-			

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015.04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a</sup> Observed only for Spain, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Russia. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home...”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children...”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level...”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level... is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom - important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. All comparable variables statistically significantly different between the East and the West with the t-test significant at 1 per cent level.

Table A.9: Trust, civic participation, religiosity, and traditional gender roles in the East and the West

	East				West			
	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max	Mean	(Std Dev.)	Min	Max
Trust								
Generalized trust (GGS)	0.38	(0.48)	0	1	0.63	(0.48)	0	1
Generalized trust (WVS)	0.27	(0.45)	0	1	0.53	(0.50)	0	1
Generalized trust (ESS)	4.35	(2.51)	0	10	5.34	(2.36)	0	10
People being helpful (ESS)	4.19	(2.42)	0	10	5.17	(2.34)	0	10
Confidence in press (WVS)	2.32	(0.78)	1	4	2.23	(0.68)	1	4
Trust in parliament (ESS)	3.37	(2.52)	0	10	4.77	(2.48)	0	10
Confidence in political parties (WVS)	1.94	(0.78)	1	4	2.09	(0.66)	1	4
Trust in politicians (ESS)	2.80	(2.31)	0	10	3.82	(2.35)	0	10
Confidence in police (WVS)	2.37	(0.87)	1	4	2.88	(0.68)	1	4
Trust in police (ESS)	4.68	(2.26)	0	10	6.46	(2.33)	0	10
Confidence in labour unions (WVS)	2.20	(0.84)	1	4	2.39	(0.74)	1	4
Confidence in justice system (WVS)	2.38	(0.86)	1	4	2.68	(0.76)	1	4
Trust in legal system (ESS)	3.93	(2.65)	0	10	5.52	(2.53)	0	10
Civic participation								
Interest in politics (ESS)	2.22	(0.85)	1	4	2.45	(0.91)	1	4
Discussing politics (WVS)	2.07	(0.65)	1	3	1.93	(0.59)	1	3
Political actions (WVS)	0.06	(0.24)	0	1	0.18	(0.39)	0	1
Active organization membership (WVS)	0.15	(0.36)	0	1	0.50	(0.50)	0	1
Passive organization membership (WVS)	0.30	(0.46)	0	1	0.61	(0.49)	0	1
Ever trade union membership (ESS)	0.45	(0.50)	0	1	0.42	(0.49)	0	1
Current trade union membership (ESS)	0.08	(0.27)	0	1	0.23	(0.42)		
Religiosity								
Church answers social problems (WVS)	0.37	(0.48)	0	1	0.27	(0.45)	0	1
Church answers family problems (WVS)	0.51	(0.50)	0	1	0.32	(0.46)	0	1
Frequency of praying (WVS)	4.10	(2.61)	1	8	2.97	(2.47)	1	8
Frequency of praying (ESS)	3.29	(2.36)	1	7	3.32	(2.44)	1	7
Importance of religion (WVS)	2.57	(1.08)	1	4	2.21	(1.00)	1	4
Importance of God (WVS)	6.18	(3.27)	1	10	4.81	(3.21)	1	10
Religiosity (ESS)	2.72	(1.51)	1	7	2.50	(1.51)	1	7
Religiosity (GGS)	1.69	(1.49)	0	4	1.41	(1.47)	0	4
Traditional gender roles								
Financial independence (GGS)	2.63	(1.09)	1	5	2.17	(1.20)	1	5
Working women (GGS)	3.08	(1.23)	1	5	3.85	(1.22)	1	5
Working mothers (GGS)	2.39	(1.06)	1	5	3.05	(1.27)	1	5
Marriage (GGS)	2.35	(0.92)	1	5	-	-	-	-
Motherhood (GGS)	2.04	(1.00)	1	5	3.17	(1.34)	1	5
Parenting after divorce (GGS)	2.36	(0.96)	1	5	3.14	(1.06)	1	5
Importance of tradition (ESS)	4.49	(1.26)	1	6	4.19	(1.38)	1	6
Importance of family (WVS)	3.85	(0.43)	1	4	3.83	(0.46)	1	4
Family trust (WVS)	4.18	(1.40)	1	5	-	-	-	-

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015.04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Trust: generalized trust – “generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” with the answer

“most people can be trusted” opposed to “need to be very careful”; people being helpful – “people mostly try to be helpful” or “people mostly look out for themselves”; confidence – how much confidence respondents have in press, political parties, police, labour unions, and justice system measured on five point scale; trust – how much respondents trust in parliament, political parties, politicians, police, and legal system, measured on 11-point scale (“no trust at all” ... “complete trust”). Civic participation: interest in politics – “how interested in politics”; discussing politics – “discussing political matters with friends”; political actions – dummy generated using responses to questions on undertaking various political actions; active (passive) organization membership – dummy using data on membership in up to ten civil society organizations, excluding religious ones; current (ever) trade union membership – “membership of trade union or similar organization” currently (currently or previously). Religiosity: church answers social (family) problems – whether “your church is giving, in your country, adequate answers” to the “social problems facing our country today” (“the problems of family life”); frequency of praying – praying “outside of religious services” in ESS ranging from “never” to “every day” and in WVS from “never or practically never” to “several times a day”; importance of religion (God; family) – “how important in life is religion (God; family)” on four point scale (“not at all important ... “very important”); religiosity – “attending religious services apart from special occasions” in GGS recoded to the scale 0 – never, 1 – less than once every 3 months, 2 – one to three times every three months, 3 – one to three times every month, 4 – at least once a week, and in ESS ranging from “every day” to “never” at seven point scale. We use questions to what extent individuals disagree with statements presenting traditional gender roles: financial independence – women should be financially independent from their husbands; working women – men have more right to job than women, if jobs are scarce; working mother – pre-school children suffer when their mothers work; marriage – women should try to marry and have a child; motherhood – a women without children is fulfilled; parenting after divorce – children should stay with mother rather than father after divorce; importance of tradition – “important to follow traditions and customs”. Family trust based on question “how much do you trust your family” (“do not trust them at all” ... “trust them completely”). All comparable variables statistically significantly different between the East and the West with the t-test significant at 1 per cent level.

We observe deep differences in generalized trust, reaching to 25 percentage points in favour for the West in GGS and WVS. Dichotomizing ESS measure of generalized trust by removing the middle answer in the scale, we obtain slightly less pronounced difference between the East and the West of 18 percentage points. The other measure of trust towards others (people being helpful) is in line with these findings. Similar deficit of trust is observed for the confidence in the number of state institutions, especially with respect to country’s parliament, legal system and the police.

In general, the East reports lower levels of participation in civil society than the West. Only activities in the private realm, such as discussing politics with friends, are more frequent in the East than in the West, where

activity is placed foremost in the public realm. Interestingly, prevalence of trade union membership popular under communism, is currently three times smaller in the post-communist countries than in the West, reaching only eight per cent in the ESS research sample. The most drastic differences are seen for the membership in organizations: in the West in concerns at least half of the respondents who answered this question, while in the East respective prevalence is below a quarter. Hardly any involvement in political actions was observed in the East.

Descriptive statistics indicate that communism failed to weaken religiosity, as despite the proportion of individuals raised religiously, it is almost the same in the East and the West. Frequency of praying and adherence to God show that spirituality is more important in the post-communist countries, and to a lesser extent also ritual religiosity, than in other European countries. Church seems to play important role in post-communist countries, as about half of individuals in the East believe that church provides answers to family problems, and about third seeks answer to social problems in church. Therefore, it might be less surprising to find that traditionalism and traditional gender roles concerning parenthood (but not the financial independence of women) are reported to be stronger in the East than in the West, despite communist atheization.

In sum, the more nuanced analysis of the data shows that more pronounced interest in politics in the East is associated with slightly more frequent discussions concerned with politics with friends (in the private realm) and more rare public activity than in the West. Moreover, individuals in post-communist countries seem to share more traditionalistic views on gender equality if it concerns parenting, which might be associated with stronger adherence to spiritual and religious norms, but with respect to financial independence of women from their husbands, that is not the case.

## B Heterogeneity

### B.1 Gender heterogeneity

Table B.1: Effects of EC for men and women


	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
Family preferred over social insurance							
Upwards care							
men	0.0015	( 0.0128)	0.0011	( 0.0129)	-0.0005	( 0.0129)	148216
women	0.0051	( 0.0129)	0.0070	( 0.0129)	0.0082	( 0.0129)	148216
Downwards care							
men	-0.1572***	( 0.0157)	-0.1583***	( 0.0158)	-0.1633***	( 0.0158)	159313
women	0.1536***	( 0.0157)	0.1548***	( 0.0157)	0.1597***	( 0.0157)	159313
Upwards money							
men	0.0185	( 0.0167)	0.0205	( 0.0168)	0.0197	( 0.0167)	142664
women	-0.0213	( 0.0169)	-0.0204	( 0.0170)	-0.0195	( 0.0170)	142664
Downwards money							
men	0.0046	( 0.0159)	0.0049	( 0.0158)	0.0039	( 0.0158)	149857
women	-0.0236	( 0.0155)	-0.0221	( 0.0155)	-0.0209	( 0.0154)	149857
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care							
men	-0.1532***	( 0.0120)	-0.1518***	( 0.0121)	-0.1505***	( 0.0121)	182330
women	0.1694***	( 0.0113)	0.1703***	( 0.0113)	0.1688***	( 0.0113)	182330
Downwards care							
men	-0.0950***	( 0.0122)	-0.0955***	( 0.0122)	-0.0986***	( 0.0121)	172337
women	0.1039***	( 0.0157)	0.1039***	( 0.0120)	0.1078***	( 0.0119)	172337
Upwards money							
men	-0.1296***	( 0.0135)	-0.1254***	( 0.0135)	-0.1219***	( 0.0135)	169582
women	0.1213***	( 0.0135)	0.1218***	( 0.0134)	0.1178***	( 0.0135)	169582
Downwards money							
men	-0.1177***	( 0.0110)	-0.1160***	( 0.0110)	-0.1185***	( 0.0110)	179393
women	0.1220***	( 0.0109)	0.1226***	( 0.0108)	0.1259***	( 0.0108)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality							
men	0.1965***	( 0.0489)	0.1607***	( 0.0476)	0.1632***	( 0.0483)	56017
women	0.1685***	( 0.0484)	0.1393***	( 0.0471)	0.1579***	( 0.0483)	56017
Income redistribution							
men	0.0714***	( 0.0174)	0.0606***	( 0.0172)	0.0434**	( 0.0171)	74421
women	-0.0335**	( 0.0170)	-0.0352**	( 0.0168)	-0.0158	( 0.0167)	74421
Equality of opportunities							
men	0.0393**	( 0.0182)	0.0352*	( 0.0182)	0.0406**	( 0.0182)	72642
women	0.0007	( 0.0178)	0.0005	( 0.0178)	-0.0050	( 0.0179)	72642
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015.04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make


ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Figure B.1: Effects of EC for men and women on family preferred over social insurance (*general* familism) concerning *care*



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. General upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .


Figure B.2: Effects of EC for men and women on family preferred over social insurance (*general* familism) concerning *money*



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. General upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .




Figure B.3: Effects of EC for men and women on preference for family insurance (*particular* familiarism) concerning *care*



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Particular upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Figure B.4: Effects of EC for men and women on preference for family insurance (*particular* familism) concerning *money*



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Particular upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$


Figure B.5: Effects of EC for men and women on preferences for income equality and redistribution



Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Income equality (incequ) – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution (incredi) – “government should reduce differences in income levels”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Figure B.6: Effects of EC for men and women on preferences for equality of opportunities and over freedom



Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Equality of opportunities (impequ) – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom (equality) – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

## B.2 Regional heterogeneity

Table B.2: Effects of EC in urban and rural areas


	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
Family preferred over social insurance							
Upwards care							
rural	-0.0749***	( 0.0208)	-0.0965***	( 0.0211)	-0.0993***	( 0.0211)	100300
urban	0.0775***	( 0.0209)	0.0997***	( 0.0212)	0.1024***	( 0.0211)	100300
Downwards care							
rural	0.0749***	( 0.0204)	0.0719***	( 0.0202)	0.0755***	( 0.0198)	111436
urban	-0.0705***	( 0.0207)	-0.0673***	( 0.0205)	-0.0708***	( 0.0202)	111436
Upwards money							
rural	-0.0872***	( 0.0227)	-0.1195***	( 0.0227)	-0.1117***	( 0.0227)	100223
urban	0.0863***	( 0.0229)	0.1191***	( 0.0230)	0.1111***	( 0.0230)	100223
Downwards money							
rural	-0.0849***	( 0.0200)	-0.1107***	( 0.0197)	-0.1035***	( 0.0196)	104219
urban	0.0753***	( 0.0196)	0.1015***	( 0.0195)	0.0940***	( 0.0194)	104219
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care							
rural	-0.0073	( 0.0146)	-0.0097	( 0.0148)	-0.0091	( 0.0148)	120977
urban	0.0500***	( 0.0172)	0.0572***	( 0.0172)	0.0568***	( 0.0172)	120977
Downwards care							
rural	-0.0041	( 0.0166)	-0.0042	( 0.0166)	0.0063	( 0.0164)	124376
urban	0.0269	( 0.0207)	0.0265	( 0.0218)	0.0132	( 0.0217)	124376
Upwards money							
rural	-0.0352**	( 0.0157)	-0.0384**	( 0.0157)	-0.0445***	( 0.0157)	113784
urban	0.0447**	( 0.0207)	0.0579***	( 0.0205)	0.0665***	( 0.0205)	113784
Downwards money							
rural	-0.0152	( 0.0125)	-0.0172	( 0.0127)	-0.0110	( 0.0127)	131414
urban	0.0436***	( 0.0140)	0.0494***	( 0.0141)	0.0426***	( 0.0141)	131414
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality							
rural	0.2410***	( 0.0557)	0.2090***	( 0.0543)	0.2484***	( 0.0550)	46019
urban	0.3740***	( 0.0767)	0.2885***	( 0.0753)	0.2799***	( 0.0751)	46019
Income redistribution							
rural	-0.0533***	( 0.0175)	-0.0661***	( 0.0173)	-0.0497***	( 0.0171)	74326
urban	0.1015***	( 0.0179)	0.1012***	( 0.0177)	0.0857***	( 0.0176)	74326
Equality of opportunities							
rural	-0.0117	( 0.0186)	-0.0161	( 0.0186)	-0.0190	( 0.0187)	72557
urban	0.0575***	( 0.0195)	0.0573***	( 0.0194)	0.0605***	( 0.0194)	72557
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>							
rural	-0.1654***	( 0.0379)	-0.1603***	( 0.0381)	-0.1603***	( 0.0381)	3096
urban	0.1654***	( 0.0379)	0.1603***	( 0.0381)	0.1603***	( 0.0381)	3096
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015.04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or


scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Figure B.7: Effects of EC in rural and urban areas on family preferred over social insurance (*general* familiarity) concerning *care*



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. General upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .


Figure B.8: Effects of EC in rural and urban areas on family preferred over social insurance (*general* familism) concerning *money*



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. General upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .




Figure B.9: Effects of EC in rural and urban areas on family preferred over social insurance (*particular* familism) concerning *care*



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Particular upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Figure B.10: Effects of EC in rural and urban areas on family preferred over social insurance (*particular* familism) concerning *money*



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).  
Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Particular upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$


Figure B.11: Effects of EC in rural and urban areas on preference for income equality and redistribution



Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Figure B.12: Effects of EC in rural and urban areas on preference for equality



Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

## B.3 Cohort heterogeneity

Table B.3: Effects of EC in different cohorts on family preferred over social insurance

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
	Family preferred over social insurance						
Upwards care							
1990-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	148216
1980-89	-0.0041	( 0.0145)	-0.0132	( 0.0148)	-0.0143	( 0.0146)	148216
1970-89	-0.0229**	( 0.0098)	-0.0285***	( 0.0100)	-0.0268***	( 0.0100)	148216
1960-89	0.0284***	( 0.0095)	0.0293***	( 0.0097)	0.0278***	( 0.0096)	148216
1950-89	0.0391***	( 0.0099)	0.0414***	( 0.0101)	0.0400***	( 0.0100)	148216
1940-89	0.0067	( 0.0102)	0.0066	( 0.0102)	0.0053	( 0.0101)	148216
1930-89	-0.0678***	( 0.0140)	-0.0582***	( 0.0137)	-0.0539***	( 0.0138)	148216
1920-89	-0.0699**	( 0.0273)	-0.0602**	( 0.0275)	-0.0579**	( 0.0279)	148216
1910-89	1.7385***	( 0.0197)	1.7267***	( 0.0200)	1.7007***	( 0.0223)	148216
Downwards care							
1990-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	159313
1980-89	0.0088	( 0.0164)	0.0068	( 0.0163)	0.0043	( 0.0157)	159313
1970-79	0.0081	( 0.0101)	0.0065	( 0.0101)	0.0117	( 0.0099)	159313
1960-69	0.0395***	( 0.0094)	0.0397***	( 0.0094)	0.0370***	( 0.0093)	159313
1950-59	0.0182**	( 0.0087)	0.0190**	( 0.0087)	0.0157*	( 0.0086)	159313
1940-49	-0.0119	( 0.0095)	-0.0123	( 0.0095)	-0.0151	( 0.0094)	159313
1930-39	-0.0823***	( 0.0147)	-0.0803***	( 0.0145)	-0.0726***	( 0.0144)	159313
1930-29	-0.1217***	( 0.0202)	-0.1183***	( 0.0202)	-0.1128***	( 0.0205)	159313
1910-19	0.7978***	( 0.0199)	0.7905***	( 0.0201)	0.7547***	( 0.0212)	159313
Upwards money							
1990-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	142664
1980-89	0.0399**	( 0.0184)	0.0262	( 0.0177)	0.0241	( 0.0175)	142664
1970-79	0.0103	( 0.0105)	0.0021	( 0.0103)	0.0059	( 0.0102)	142664
1960-69	0.0269**	( 0.0106)	0.0285***	( 0.0105)	0.0283***	( 0.0106)	142664
1950-59	0.0210*	( 0.0114)	0.0243**	( 0.0115)	0.0234**	( 0.0114)	142664
1940-49	-0.0288**	( 0.0128)	-0.0288**	( 0.0127)	-0.0302**	( 0.0127)	142664
1930-39	-0.0941***	( 0.0161)	-0.0797***	( 0.0152)	-0.0797***	( 0.0155)	142664
1920-29	-0.0301	( 0.0274)	-0.0160	( 0.0267)	-0.0138	( 0.0272)	142664
1910-19	2.7837***	( 0.0224)	2.7680***	( 0.0219)	-0.0138***	( 0.0244)	142664
Downwards money							
1990-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	149857
1980-89	0.1003***	( 0.0180)	0.0884***	( 0.0173)	0.0872***	( 0.0169)	149857
1970-79	-0.0007	( 0.0103)	-0.0079	( 0.0100)	-0.0038	( 0.0100)	149857
1960-69	0.0291***	( 0.0098)	0.0307***	( 0.0097)	0.0300***	( 0.0099)	149857
1950-59	0.0097	( 0.0106)	0.0129	( 0.0104)	0.0119	( 0.0104)	149857
1940-49	-0.0462***	( 0.0110)	-0.0462***	( 0.0107)	-0.0473***	( 0.0107)	149857
1930-39	-0.1031***	( 0.0161)	-0.0907***	( 0.0153)	-0.0914***	( 0.0155)	149857
1920-29	-0.0358	( 0.0258)	-0.0237	( 0.0252)	-0.0211	( 0.0255)	149857
1910-19	2.8484***	( 0.0225)	2.8327***	( 0.0220)	2.8520***	( 0.0247)	149857
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table B.4: Effects of EC in different cohorts on preference for family insurance

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
	Preference for family insurance						
Upwards care							
1990-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	182330
1980-89	-0.1134***	( 0.0146)	-0.1182***	( 0.0147)	-0.1164***	( 0.0146)	182330
1970-79	-0.0299***	( 0.0084)	-0.0322***	( 0.0085)	-0.0334***	( 0.0084)	182330
1960-69	0.0244***	( 0.0072)	0.0250***	( 0.0072)	0.0244***	( 0.0072)	182330
1950-59	0.0317***	( 0.0083)	0.0329***	( 0.0083)	0.0334***	( 0.0083)	182330
1940-49	0.0481***	( 0.0075)	0.0489***	( 0.0076)	0.0497***	( 0.0075)	182330
1930-39	0.0037	( 0.0109)	0.0083	( 0.0108)	0.0074	( 0.0108)	182330
1920-29	-0.0479**	( 0.0214)	-0.0452**	( 0.0212)	-0.0473**	( 0.0209)	182330
1910-19	0.6886***	( 0.0161)	0.7007***	( 0.0164)	0.7053***	( 0.0171)	182330
Downwards care							
1990-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	172337
1980-89	0.0802***	( 0.0174)	0.0807***	( 0.0173)	0.0800***	( 0.0167)	172337
1970-79	-0.0003	( 0.0098)	-0.0001	( 0.0098)	0.0048	( 0.0097)	172337
1960-69	-0.0287***	( 0.0107)	-0.0288***	( 0.0107)	-0.0285***	( 0.0107)	172337
1950-59	0.0236**	( 0.0101)	0.0236**	( 0.0101)	0.0227**	( 0.0100)	172337
1940-49	0.0685***	( 0.0125)	0.0684***	( 0.0125)	0.0673***	( 0.0125)	172337
1930-39	-0.0843***	( 0.0201)	-0.0849***	( 0.0202)	-0.0879***	( 0.0203)	172337
1920-29	-0.2525***	( 0.0266)	-0.2529***	( 0.0267)	-0.2506***	( 0.0268)	172337
1910-19	0.6505***	( 0.0252)	0.6468***	( 0.0253)	0.6923***	( 0.0258)	172337
Upwards money							
1990-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	169582
1980-89	-0.0891***	( 0.0172)	-0.0964***	( 0.0174)	-0.0926***	( 0.0168)	169582
1970-79	-0.0329***	( 0.0091)	-0.0363***	( 0.0093)	-0.0407***	( 0.0090)	169582
1960-69	0.0200***	( 0.0072)	0.0211***	( 0.0072)	0.0204***	( 0.0072)	169582
1950-59	0.0329***	( 0.0082)	0.0348***	( 0.0082)	0.0361***	( 0.0082)	169582
1940-49	0.0261***	( 0.0078)	0.0273***	( 0.0079)	0.0295***	( 0.0078)	169582
1930-39	-0.0024	( 0.0105)	0.0047	( 0.0105)	0.0037	( 0.0103)	169582
1920-29	-0.0348*	( 0.0178)	-0.0306*	( 0.0178)	-0.0347**	( 0.0174)	169582
1910-19	-0.0615***	( 0.0160)	-0.0501***	( 0.0163)	-0.0570***	( 0.0171)	169582
Upwards money							
1999-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	169582
1989-89	-0.0891***	( 0.0172)	-0.0964***	( 0.0174)	-0.0926***	( 0.0168)	169582
1979-79	-0.0329***	( 0.0091)	-0.0363***	( 0.0093)	-0.0407***	( 0.0090)	169582
1969-69	0.0200***	( 0.0072)	0.0211***	( 0.0072)	0.0204***	( 0.0072)	169582
1959-59	0.0329***	( 0.0082)	0.0348***	( 0.0082)	0.0361***	( 0.0082)	169582
1949-49	0.0261***	( 0.0078)	0.0273***	( 0.0079)	0.0295***	( 0.0078)	169582
1939-39	-0.0024	( 0.0105)	0.0047	( 0.0105)	0.0037	( 0.0103)	169582
1929-29	-0.0348*	( 0.0178)	-0.0306*	( 0.0178)	-0.0347**	( 0.0174)	169582
1919-19	-0.0615***	( 0.0160)	-0.0501***	( 0.0163)	-0.0570***	( 0.0171)	169582
Downwards money							
1999-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	179393
1989-89	0.0966***	( 0.0191)	0.0923***	( 0.0190)	0.0923	( 0.0183)	179393
1979-79	-0.0380***	( 0.0109)	-0.0398***	( 0.0108)	-0.0361	( 0.0107)	179393
1969-69	-0.0000	( 0.0096)	0.0004	( 0.0096)	0.0006	( 0.0096)	179393
1959-59	0.0460***	( 0.0095)	0.0470***	( 0.0095)	0.0461	( 0.0094)	179393
1949-49	0.0359***	( 0.0115)	0.0371***	( 0.0114)	0.0361	( 0.0113)	179393
1939-39	-0.0918***	( 0.0178)	-0.0878***	( 0.0177)	-0.0897	( 0.0177)	179393
1929-29	-0.1985***	( 0.0262)	-0.1962***	( 0.0260)	-0.1944	( 0.0259)	179393
1919-19	0.8628***	( 0.0258)	0.8632***	( 0.0255)	0.8991	( 0.0255)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .



Table B.5: Effects of EC in different cohorts on preference for social insurance

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality							
1990-99	0.2245**	( 0.1088)	0.1970*	( 0.1197)	0.1583	( 0.1251)	65163
1980-89	0.0223	( 0.0648)	0.0392	( 0.0644)	0.0427	( 0.0642)	65163
1970-79	-0.0458	( 0.0440)	-0.0159	( 0.0427)	-0.0167	( 0.0425)	65163
1960-69	-0.0340	( 0.0397)	-0.0424	( 0.0380)	-0.0433	( 0.0378)	65163
1950-59	-0.0446	( 0.0366)	-0.0623*	( 0.0362)	-0.0539	( 0.0368)	65163
1940-49	0.1230***	( 0.0426)	0.1220***	( 0.0421)	0.1318***	( 0.0421)	65163
1930-39	0.1246***	( 0.0478)	0.0954**	( 0.0467)	0.0974**	( 0.0463)	65163
1920-29	0.2054***	( 0.0629)	0.1549**	( 0.0625)	0.1430**	( 0.0613)	65163
1910-19	0.1591	( 0.1431)	0.1397	( 0.1388)	0.1748	( 0.1372)	65163
1900-09	0.6465	( 0.5290)	0.7615	( 0.5360)	0.7978	( 0.5402)	65163
Income redistribution							
1990-99	-0.2018**	( 0.0892)	-0.2049**	( 0.0888)	-0.2052**	( 0.0900)	71730
1980-89	-0.0817***	( 0.0249)	-0.0650***	( 0.0247)	-0.0768***	( 0.0245)	71730
1970-79	-0.0727***	( 0.0243)	-0.0740***	( 0.0242)	-0.0800***	( 0.0239)	71730
1960-69	0.0299	( 0.0270)	0.0158	( 0.0266)	0.0196	( 0.0259)	71730
1950-59	0.0515*	( 0.0286)	0.0381	( 0.0279)	0.0456*	( 0.0276)	71730
1940-49	0.1544***	( 0.0263)	0.1401***	( 0.0260)	0.1444***	( 0.0263)	71730
1930-39	0.2261***	( 0.0312)	0.2321***	( 0.0302)	0.2292***	( 0.0308)	71730
1920-29	0.2394***	( 0.0507)	0.2413***	( 0.0485)	0.2354***	( 0.0479)	71730
1910-19	0.2494**	( 0.1272)	0.2731**	( 0.1281)	0.2588**	( 0.1275)	71730
Equality of opportunities							
1990-99	-0.1091	( 0.0849)	-0.1113	( 0.0847)	-0.1165	( 0.0845)	69904
1980-89	-0.0356	( 0.0225)	-0.0309	( 0.0226)	-0.0286	( 0.0227)	69904
1970-79	-0.0285	( 0.0248)	-0.0302	( 0.0248)	-0.0269	( 0.0249)	69904
1960-69	-0.0193	( 0.0243)	-0.0239	( 0.0243)	-0.0227	( 0.0245)	69904
1950-59	-0.0224	( 0.0232)	-0.0258	( 0.0231)	-0.0262	( 0.0231)	69904
1940-49	0.0776***	( 0.0246)	0.0727***	( 0.0246)	0.0702***	( 0.0247)	69904
1930-39	0.1229***	( 0.0334)	0.1250***	( 0.0334)	0.1235***	( 0.0336)	69904
1920-29	0.1426***	( 0.0522)	0.1465***	( 0.0521)	0.1474***	( 0.0522)	69904
1910-19	0.3170**	( 0.1438)	0.3343**	( 0.1451)	0.3334**	( 0.1463)	69904
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>							
1990-99	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	5232
1980-89	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	5232
1970-79	-0.0281	( 0.0946)	-0.0156	( 0.0928)	-0.0156	( 0.0928)	5232
1960-69	0.0129	( 0.0449)	0.0121	( 0.0443)	0.0121	( 0.0443)	5232
1950-59	-0.0147	( 0.0365)	-0.0206	( 0.0371)	-0.0206	( 0.0371)	5232
1940-49	0.0025	( 0.0403)	0.0117	( 0.0400)	0.0117	( 0.0400)	5232
1930-39	-0.0095	( 0.0411)	-0.0052	( 0.0416)	-0.0052	( 0.0416)	5232
1920-29	0.0266	( 0.0453)	0.0172	( 0.0458)	0.0172	( 0.0458)	5232
1910-19	0.0281	( 0.0775)	0.0156	( 0.0767)	0.0156	( 0.0767)	5232
1900-09	0.0222	( 0.2774)	0.0262	( 0.2774)	0.0262	( 0.2774)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015.04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic

controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

## B.4 Historic heritage heterogeneity

Table B.6: Effects of EC in the lands of former Russian, Prussian, and Habsburg empires

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
Family preferred over social insurance							
Upwards care							
Russian empire	0.0872***	( 0.0216)	0.0822***	( 0.0214)	0.0849***	( 0.0215)	147262
Prussian empire	-0.0531***	( 0.0174)	-0.0529***	( 0.0173)	-0.0538***	( 0.0174)	147262
Habsburg empire	0.0251	( 0.0243)	0.0277	( 0.0241)	0.0260	( 0.0241)	147262
Downwards care							
Russian empire	-0.0161	( 0.0202)	-0.0171	( 0.0202)	-0.0103	( 0.0202)	158359
Prussian empire	-0.1150***	( 0.0140)	-0.1147***	( 0.0140)	-0.1164***	( 0.0141)	158359
Habsburg empire	0.0706***	( 0.0226)	0.0703***	( 0.0226)	0.0679***	( 0.0224)	158359
Upwards money							
Russian empire	0.0771***	( 0.0202)	0.0688***	( 0.0198)	0.0732***	( 0.0198)	141710
Prussian empire	-0.0321*	( 0.0172)	-0.0315*	( 0.0171)	-0.0317*	( 0.0173)	141710
Habsburg empire	0.0256	( 0.0259)	0.0304	( 0.0257)	0.0309	( 0.0258)	141710
Downwards money							
Russian empire	0.0734***	( 0.0204)	0.0662***	( 0.0200)	0.0711***	( 0.0199)	148904
Prussian empire	-0.0615***	( 0.0170)	-0.0609***	( 0.0168)	-0.0611***	( 0.0167)	148904
Habsburg empire	0.0243	( 0.0257)	0.0282	( 0.0254)	0.0289	( 0.0253)	148904
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care							
Russian empire	0.0449***	( 0.0139)	0.0422***	( 0.0140)	0.0407***	( 0.0140)	181377
Prussian empire	0.0058	( 0.0090)	0.0083	( 0.0092)	0.0080	( 0.0091)	181377
Habsburg empire	-0.0361***	( 0.0112)	-0.0341***	( 0.0112)	-0.0336***	( 0.0112)	181377
Downwards care							
Russian empire	0.0630***	( 0.0160)	0.0635***	( 0.0159)	0.0684***	( 0.0158)	171385
Prussian empire	-0.0468***	( 0.0119)	-0.0471***	( 0.0119)	-0.0454***	( 0.0119)	171385
Habsburg empire	-0.0124	( 0.0160)	-0.0126	( 0.0160)	-0.0152	( 0.0159)	171385
Upwards money							
Russian empire	0.1218***	( 0.0153)	0.1175***	( 0.0153)	0.1120***	( 0.0154)	168629
Prussian empire	-0.0363***	( 0.0100)	-0.0322***	( 0.0099)	-0.0324***	( 0.0099)	168629
Habsburg empire	-0.0784***	( 0.0132)	-0.0752***	( 0.0133)	-0.0728***	( 0.0131)	168629
Downwards money							
Russian empire	0.1218***	( 0.0153)	0.1175***	( 0.0153)	0.1120***	( 0.0154)	168629
Prussian empire	-0.0363***	( 0.0100)	-0.0322***	( 0.0099)	-0.0324***	( 0.0099)	168629
Habsburg empire	-0.0784***	( 0.0132)	-0.0752***	( 0.0133)	-0.0728***	( 0.0131)	168629
Income equality							
Russian empire	0.1470	( 0.1063)	0.1194	( 0.1138)	0.1465	( 0.1139)	65114
Prussian empire	0.6414***	( 0.0611)	0.5710***	( 0.0601)	0.5987***	( 0.0603)	65114
Habsburg empire	0.1133	( 0.1758)	0.1383	( 0.1805)	0.1613	( 0.1901)	65163
Income redistribution							
Russian empire	0.0438	( 0.0368)	-0.0065	( 0.0370)	0.0480	( 0.0382)	72405
Prussian empire	0.3601***	( 0.0293)	0.3085***	( 0.0303)	0.3094***	( 0.0301)	72405
Habsburg empire	0.1316**	( 0.0644)	0.0739	( 0.0644)	0.0987	( 0.0711)	72405
Equality of opportunities							
Russian empire	-0.0656*	( 0.0372)	-0.0832**	( 0.0372)	-0.0903**	( 0.0374)	70652
Prussian empire	0.0589**	( 0.0275)	0.0396	( 0.0277)	0.0457	( 0.0278)	70652
Habsburg empire	0.1441***	( 0.0545)	0.1233**	( 0.0548)	0.1241**	( 0.0555)	70652
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>							
Russian empire	-0.0395	( 0.0393)	-0.0378	( 0.0401)	-0.0378	( 0.0401)	5214
Prussian empire	0.1078**	( 0.0433)	0.1086**	( 0.0438)	0.1086**	( 0.0438)	5214
Habsburg empire	-0.0570	( 0.0520)	-0.0640	( 0.0520)	-0.0640	( 0.0520)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8. Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Russian empire: Russia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, mazowieckie, podlaskie, świątokrzyskie vojevodships in Poland (lubelskie, warszawskie, białostockie, bielskie, chełmskie, częstochowskie, kieleckie, konińskie, łomżyńskie, ostrołęckie, piotrkowskie, płockie, radomskie, siedleckie, sieradzkie, skierniewickie, suwalskie, wrocławskie, zamojskie). Prussian empire: Germany and dolnośląskie, kujawsko-pomorskie, opolskie, pomorskie, śląskie, wielkopolskie, zachodniopomorskie and lubuskie vojevodships in Poland (bydgoskie, elbląskie, gdańskie, gorzowskie, jeleniogórskie, koszalińskie, legnickie, leszczyńskie, olsztyńskie, pilskie, poznańskie, śląskie, toruńskie, wrocławskie, zielonogórskie). Habsburg empire: Czech Republic, Hungary, Transylvania, Banat and Crisana-Maramureș in Romania (Bihor, Bistrița-Năsăud, Caraș-Severin, Cluj, Covasna, Harghita, Hunedoara, Iași, Maramureș, Mureș, Neamț, Sălaj, Vrancea), małopolskie and podkarpackie vojevodships in Poland (białkopodlaskie, krakowskie, krośnieńskie, nowosadeckie, przemyskie, rzeszowskie, tarnowskie, NUTS-2 regions). Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

The lack of significant EC effects in former Habsburg empire supports trust as a main mechanism through which communism affected the preference for insurance. Long-lasting feudal relations in Russian empire<sup>4</sup> accompanied with relatively recent establishment of independent state institutions before the introduction of communism in such former lands of Russian empire as Poland and Baltic countries, resulted in the weakness of generalized

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<sup>4</sup>Formally abolished in 1860s, in practice lasted till late 1890s in Russia, and seem to be still present in many dimensions of social life in Russia (Shlapentokh & Woods, 2007) and Poland (Leder, 2014)

trust as compared to the lands of former Habsburg empire. Capitalist relations enhancing bridging social capital formation (Putnam & others, 2000) had matured in Prussian and Habsburg empires before the rise of Soviet communism. However, in the lands of Eastern Prussia (currently in Poland and Lithuania), generalized trust seems to be less developed, due to underdeveloped markets, low urbanization, persistently low density of population leading to little interpersonal relations (Braudel, 1988), and finally due to forced migrations resettling original citizens with newcomers from formerly Russian lands in 1939-1949 (Stola, 1992), we find predominantly significant EC effects in the former Prussia.

Table B.7: Effects of EC by predominant confession

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
Family preferred over social insurance							
Upwards care							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	-0.0105	( 0.0563)	0.0424	( 0.0567)	0.0481	( 0.0570)	148216
Roman-catholic	-0.0193	( 0.0228)	-0.0224	( 0.0244)	-0.0204	( 0.0256)	148216
Protestant	-0.0562	( 0.0431)	-0.0413	( 0.0429)	-0.0401	( 0.0428)	148216
Downwards care							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	-0.1100*	( 0.0619)	-0.0957	( 0.0620)	-0.0721	( 0.0622)	159313
Roman-catholic	-0.0290	( 0.0250)	-0.0302	( 0.0253)	-0.0176	( 0.0277)	159313
Protestant	-0.1914***	( 0.0568)	-0.1910***	( 0.0568)	-0.1885***	( 0.0563)	159313
Upwards money							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	-0.1571	( 0.4614)	-0.0475	( 0.4542)	-0.0332	( 0.4540)	142664
Roman-catholic	0.0674***	( 0.0255)	0.0617**	( 0.0243)	0.0787***	( 0.0252)	142664
Habsburg empire	-0.2782***	( 0.0447)	-0.2487***	( 0.0441)	-0.2458***	( 0.0438)	142664
Protestant							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	0.2573	( 0.5281)	0.4125	( 0.5268)	0.4170	( 0.5275)	149857
Roman-catholic	-0.0381	( 0.0340)	-0.0426	( 0.0325)	-0.0257	( 0.0337)	149857
Protestant	-0.3839***	( 0.0539)	-0.3601***	( 0.0525)	-0.3563***	( 0.0526)	149857
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	0.2607***	( 0.0247)	0.2814***	( 0.0246)	0.2764***	( 0.0248)	182330
Roman-catholic	0.0055	( 0.0254)	0.0054	( 0.0262)	-0.0063	( 0.0266)	182330
Protestant	0.0492***	( 0.0173)	0.0611***	( 0.0176)	0.0610***	( 0.0175)	182330
Downwards care							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	0.4631***	( 0.0258)	0.4604***	( 0.0259)	0.4735***	( 0.0257)	172337
Roman-catholic	-0.1106***	( 0.0329)	-0.1105***	( 0.0329)	-0.0868***	( 0.0319)	172337
Protestant	0.0311	( 0.0217)	0.0298	( 0.0217)	0.0352	( 0.0217)	172337
Upwards money							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	0.4551***	( 0.0235)	0.4875***	( 0.0236)	0.4747***	( 0.0238)	169582
Roman-catholic	-0.0197	( 0.0291)	-0.0202	( 0.0291)	-0.0452*	( 0.0274)	169582
Protestant	-0.0671***	( 0.0194)	-0.0478**	( 0.0196)	-0.0492**	( 0.0195)	169582
Upwards money							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	0.4551***	( 0.0235)	0.4875***	( 0.0236)	0.4747***	( 0.0238)	169582
Roman-catholic	-0.0197	( 0.0291)	-0.0202	( 0.0291)	-0.0452*	( 0.0274)	169582
Protestant	-0.0671***	( 0.0194)	-0.0478**	( 0.0196)	-0.0492**	( 0.0195)	169582
Downwards money							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	0.3739***	( 0.0248)	0.3911***	( 0.0248)	0.3973***	( 0.0247)	179393
Roman-catholic	-0.2011***	( 0.0318)	-0.2004***	( 0.0318)	-0.1834***	( 0.0340)	179393
Protestant	0.0621***	( 0.0210)	0.0742***	( 0.0212)	0.0793***	( 0.0213)	179393
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	-0.0884	( 0.1408)	-0.1784	( 0.1542)	-0.1382	( 0.1518)	65163
Roman-catholic	-0.0766	( 0.2578)	-0.0980	( 0.2842)	0.0385	( 0.2890)	65163
Protestant	0.7544***	( 0.0668)	0.6397***	( 0.0666)	0.6835***	( 0.0664)	65163
Income redistribution							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	0.0014	( 0.0624)	0.0108	( 0.0627)	0.0957	( 0.0653)	74421
Roman-catholic	0.1151***	( 0.0397)	0.0660*	( 0.0386)	0.0890**	( 0.0414)	74421
Protestant	0.4339***	( 0.0363)	0.4093***	( 0.0356)	0.4036***	( 0.0352)	74421
Equality of opportunities							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	-0.1300**	( 0.0642)	-0.1238*	( 0.0647)	-0.1393**	( 0.0649)	72642
Roman-catholic	0.1325***	( 0.0357)	0.1156***	( 0.0357)	0.1154***	( 0.0362)	72642
Protestant	0.0509	( 0.0397)	0.0421	( 0.0395)	0.0466	( 0.0393)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>							
Othodox and Greek-catholic	-0.0645*	( 0.0362)	-0.0727*	( 0.0373)	-0.0727*	( 0.0373)	5232
Roman-catholic	-0.0127	( 0.0522)	-0.0169	( 0.0556)	-0.0169	( 0.0556)	5232
Protestant	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Our results are consistent with previous studies such as Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007)<sup>5</sup>, but suggest that Eastern Germany was a unique country given its stronger connections to capitalist Western Europe tradition and therefore, received a relatively weaker influence of the Soviet domination<sup>6</sup>. Although communist regimes regarded religions as a social problem ‘to be eradicated’, western Christians denominations such as Polish Catholics and German protestants were tolerated and kept links with counterpart churches in the West (Djankov & Nikolova, 2018). In contrast, orthodox Christians faced significant religious persecution in several Eastern European countries including Bulgaria and Romania, as did protestants in Hungary and Czechoslovakia<sup>7</sup>. Affiliated but not practicing Christians were significantly more frequent in the East than West Germany (40% and 21%, respectively) and so were the non-religious (21% and 3%, respectively) in the mid-70s (O’Brien & Palmer, 2007). In the USSR 29% of population was

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<sup>5</sup>We show that EC in Germany leads to a preference for income inequality.

<sup>6</sup>Religion or religiosity, endured more in Germany and Poland than in other communist countries.

<sup>7</sup>The relation between number of protestants and Roman-Catholics in mid-70’s was similar in West Germany and East Germany, while in other post-communist countries in our sample Orthodox or Roman-Catholicism were dominant religions (O’Brien & Palmer, 2007).

non-religious whereas respective proportion was below 1% in Austria and 10% in France (O'Brien & Palmer, 2007). It suggests that religion might be important factor in the process of preference formation by communism.



## B.5 Country heterogeneity

Table B.8: Effects of EC in selected country groups on family preferred over social insurance

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
	Family preferred over social insurance						
Upwards care							
Russia	0.1245***	( 0.0127)	0.1102***	( 0.0128)	0.1128***	( 0.0131)	148216
Germany	-0.0562	( 0.0431)	-0.0413	( 0.0429)	-0.0401	( 0.0428)	148216
Poland	-0.0193	( 0.0228)	-0.0224	( 0.0244)	-0.0204	( 0.0256)	148216
Baltics	0.0040	( 0.0415)	-0.0451	( 0.0417)	-0.0503	( 0.0419)	148216
Uprisings	-0.0562	( 0.0431)	-0.0413	( 0.0429)	-0.0401	( 0.0428)	148216
Downwards care							
Russia	0.1290***	( 0.0125)	0.1236***	( 0.0124)	0.1380***	( 0.0131)	159313
Germany	-0.1914***	( 0.0568)	-0.1910***	( 0.0568)	-0.1885***	( 0.0563)	159313
Poland	-0.0290	( 0.0250)	-0.0302	( 0.0253)	-0.0176	( 0.0277)	159313
Baltics	0.2535***	( 0.0548)	0.2399***	( 0.0549)	0.2305***	( 0.0547)	159313
Uprisings	-0.1914***	( 0.0568)	-0.1910***	( 0.0568)	-0.1885***	( 0.0563)	159313
Upwards money							
Russia	-0.1038***	( 0.0139)	-0.1230***	( 0.0136)	-0.1031***	( 0.0138)	142664
Germany	-0.2782***	( 0.0447)	-0.2487***	( 0.0441)	-0.2458***	( 0.0438)	142664
Poland	0.0674***	( 0.0255)	0.0617**	( 0.0243)	0.0787***	( 0.0252)	142664
Baltics	0.1958	( 0.4626)	0.0947	( 0.4554)	0.0938	( 0.4553)	142664
Uprisings	-0.2782***	( 0.0447)	-0.2487***	( 0.0441)	-0.2458***	( 0.0438)	142664
Downwards money							
Russia	-0.0050	( 0.0130)	-0.0224*	( 0.0129)	-0.0033	( 0.0132)	149857
Germany	-0.3839***	( 0.0539)	-0.3601***	( 0.0525)	-0.3563***	( 0.0526)	149857
Poland	-0.0381	( 0.0340)	-0.0426	( 0.0325)	-0.0257	( 0.0337)	149857
Baltics	0.1870	( 0.5283)	0.0969	( 0.5269)	0.0990	( 0.5275)	149857
Uprisings	-0.3839***	( 0.0539)	-0.3601***	( 0.0525)	-0.3563***	( 0.0526)	149857
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3). Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Baltics: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Uprisings in: Czech Republic (1968), Germany (1953), Slovakia (1968) and Hungary (1956). Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table B.9: Effects of EC in selected country groups on preference for family insurance

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
	Preference for family insurance						
Upwards care							
Russia	0.1799***	( 0.0093)	0.1777***	( 0.0094)	0.1743***	( 0.0097)	182330
Germany	0.0492***	( 0.0173)	0.0611***	( 0.0176)	0.0610***	( 0.0175)	182330
Poland	0.0055	( 0.0254)	0.0054	( 0.0262)	-0.0063	( 0.0266)	182330
Baltics	-0.2114***	( 0.0296)	-0.2292***	( 0.0296)	-0.2260***	( 0.0296)	182330
Uprisings	0.0492***	( 0.0173)	0.0611***	( 0.0176)	0.0610***	( 0.0175)	182330
Downwards care							
Russia	-0.0253**	( 0.0125)	-0.0258**	( 0.0124)	-0.0018	( 0.0133)	172337
Germany	0.0311	( 0.0217)	0.0298	( 0.0217)	0.0352	( 0.0217)	172337
Poland	-0.1106***	( 0.0329)	-0.1105***	( 0.0329)	-0.0868***	( 0.0319)	172337
Baltics	-0.4331***	( 0.0281)	-0.4309***	( 0.0281)	-0.4361***	( 0.0282)	172337
Uprisings	0.0311	( 0.0217)	0.0298	( 0.0217)	0.0352	( 0.0217)	172337
Upwards money							
Russia	0.0770***	( 0.0092)	0.0734***	( 0.0093)	0.0520***	( 0.0095)	169582
Germany	-0.0671***	( 0.0194)	-0.0478**	( 0.0196)	-0.0492**	( 0.0195)	169582
Poland	-0.0197	( 0.0291)	-0.0202	( 0.0291)	-0.0452*	( 0.0274)	169582
Baltics	-0.3817***	( 0.0385)	-0.4085***	( 0.0385)	-0.4121***	( 0.0387)	169582
Uprisings	-0.0671***	( 0.0194)	-0.0478**	( 0.0196)	-0.0492**	( 0.0195)	169582
Downwards money							
Russia	-0.0221	( 0.0137)	-0.0246*	( 0.0136)	-0.0113	( 0.0140)	179393
Germany	0.0621***	( 0.0210)	0.0742***	( 0.0212)	0.0793	( 0.0213)	179393
Poland	-0.2011***	( 0.0318)	-0.2004***	( 0.0318)	-0.1834	( 0.0340)	179393
Baltics	-0.3919***	( 0.0256)	-0.4066***	( 0.0255)	-0.4149	( 0.0254)	179393
Uprisings	0.0621***	( 0.0210)	0.0742***	( 0.0212)	0.0793	( 0.0213)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).  
Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Baltics: Estonia and Lithuania. Uprisings in: Czech Republic (1968), Germany (1953), and Hungary (1956). Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table B.10: Effects of EC in selected country groups on preference for social insurance

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
Preference for social insurance							
Income equality							
Russia	-0.6032***	( 0.1239)	-0.3420***	( 0.1239)	-0.2755**	( 0.1224)	65163
Germany	0.7544***	( 0.0668)	0.6397***	( 0.0666)	0.6835***	( 0.0664)	65163
Poland	-0.3713*	( 0.1909)	-0.4418**	( 0.1938)	-0.3203*	( 0.1853)	65163
Baltics	0.1732	( 0.2955)	0.0628	( 0.3591)	0.1800	( 0.3421)	65163
USSR	-0.4788**	( 0.2363)	-0.5735**	( 0.2762)	-0.4898*	( 0.2865)	65163
Uprisings	0.7581***	( 0.0657)	0.6480***	( 0.0659)	0.6949***	( 0.0660)	65163
Income redistribution							
Russia	-0.0296	( 0.1054)	-0.0284	( 0.1058)	0.0753	( 0.1026)	74421
Germany	0.4339***	( 0.0363)	0.4093***	( 0.0356)	0.4036***	( 0.0352)	74421
Poland	0.2409***	( 0.0529)	0.1626***	( 0.0535)	0.1583***	( 0.0529)	74421
Baltics	-0.0244	( 0.0436)	-0.0149	( 0.0438)	0.0407	( 0.0512)	74421
USSR	-0.0504	( 0.0513)	-0.0469	( 0.0513)	0.0214	( 0.0553)	74421
Uprisings	0.3461***	( 0.0358)	0.3117***	( 0.0360)	0.3156***	( 0.0365)	74421
Equality of opportunities							
Russia	-0.2268**	( 0.0919)	-0.2257**	( 0.0920)	-0.2455***	( 0.0914)	72642
Germany	0.0509	( 0.0397)	0.0421	( 0.0395)	0.0466	( 0.0393)	72642
Poland	0.1951***	( 0.0652)	0.1681**	( 0.0655)	0.1699**	( 0.0667)	72642
Baltics	-0.0070	( 0.0464)	-0.0008	( 0.0463)	-0.0080	( 0.0464)	72642
USSR	-0.0734	( 0.0517)	-0.0717	( 0.0518)	-0.0819	( 0.0522)	72642
Uprisings	0.0792**	( 0.0326)	0.0668**	( 0.0325)	0.0701**	( 0.0325)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>							
Russia	-0.0645*	( 0.0362)	-0.0727*	( 0.0373)	-0.0727*	( 0.0373)	5232
Germany	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	5232
Poland	-0.4770***	( 0.0375)	-0.4831***	( 0.0383)	-0.4831***	( 0.0383)	5232
Baltics	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	0.0000	( 0.0000)	5232
USSR	-0.0645*	( 0.0362)	-0.0727*	( 0.0373)	-0.0727*	( 0.0373)	5232
Uprisings	0.4770***	( 0.0375)	0.4831***	( 0.0383)	0.4831***	( 0.0383)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18) and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Baltics: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Uprisings in: Czech Republic (1968), Germany (1953), Slovakia (1968) and Hungary (1956). Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

## C EC during impressionable years

Table C.1: Effects of exposure to communism (EC) during and outside of the impressionable years (IY) preferences concerned with family insurance

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef.	(Std. Err.)	Coef.	(Std. Err.)	Coef.	(Std. Err.)	N
Family preferred over social insurance							
Upwards care							
EC in impressionable years	0.0631	( 0.0423)	0.0760*	( 0.0421)	0.0729*	( 0.0413)	148216
EC in non-impressionable years	0.0096	( 0.0145)	0.0273*	( 0.0143)	0.0268*	( 0.0142)	148216
Downwards care							
EC in impressionable years	-0.0250	( 0.0482)	-0.0240	( 0.0483)	-0.0253	( 0.0476)	159313
EC in non-impressionable years	-0.0681	( 0.0160)	-0.0649	( 0.0158)	-0.0641	( 0.0158)	159313
Upwards money							
EC in impressionable years	-0.0252	( 0.0684)	-0.0006	( 0.0680)	0.0008	( 0.0680)	142664
EC in non-impressionable years	-0.1009	( 0.0240)	-0.0734	( 0.0221)	-0.0706	( 0.0222)	142664
Downwards money							
EC in impressionable years	-0.1688***	( 0.0620)	-0.1519**	( 0.0618)	-0.1505**	( 0.0613)	149857
EC in non-impressionable years	-0.1677***	( 0.0232)	-0.1456**	( 0.0217)	-0.1441**	( 0.0218)	149857
Preference for family insurance							
Upwards care							
EC in impressionable years	0.0861***	( 0.0188)	0.0973***	( 0.0189)	0.0960***	( 0.0187)	182330
EC in non-impressionable years	0.1802***	( 0.0145)	0.1908***	( 0.0147)	0.1888***	( 0.0147)	182330
Downwards care							
EC in impressionable years	0.0436**	( 0.0200)	0.0420**	( 0.0199)	0.0460**	( 0.0199)	172337
EC in non-impressionable years	-0.0545**	( 0.0160)	-0.0561**	( 0.0173)	-0.0545**	( 0.0176)	172337
Upwards money							
EC in impressionable years	-0.0221	( 0.0225)	-0.0039	( 0.0224)	-0.0062	( 0.0221)	169582
EC in non-impressionable years	0.1323	( 0.0165)	0.1493	( 0.0169)	0.1450	( 0.0168)	169582
Downwards money							
EC in impressionable years	0.0289	( 0.0216)	0.0396*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0219)	179393
EC in non-impressionable years	-0.0332	( 0.0148)	-0.0249*	( 0.0148)	-0.0245**	( 0.0148)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3).  
Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table C.2: Effects of the exposure to communism during impressionable years by the stage of communism for family preferred over social insurance

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin						N
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
Family preferred over social insurance													
<i>Upwards care</i>													
EC	0.0515	( 0.0446)	0.0459	( 0.0448)	0.0438	( 0.0440)	0.0167	( 0.0164)	0.0156	( 0.0165)	0.0148	( 0.0162)	148216
IY under stalinism	-0.0906**	( 0.0351)	-0.0648*	( 0.0348)	-0.0609*	( 0.0348)	-0.0572***	( 0.0148)	-0.0487***	( 0.0145)	-0.0497***	( 0.0146)	148216
IY under post-stalinism	-0.0426**	( 0.0193)	-0.0256	( 0.0191)	-0.0238	( 0.0191)	-0.0274***	( 0.0083)	-0.0219***	( 0.0082)	-0.0219***	( 0.0082)	148216
IY under reformism	0.0391**	( 0.0199)	0.0541***	( 0.0201)	0.0521***	( 0.0201)	0.0101	( 0.0082)	0.0160**	( 0.0080)	0.0160**	( 0.0080)	148216
<i>Downwards care</i>													
EC	-0.0031	( 0.0498)	-0.0055	( 0.0500)	-0.0070	( 0.0494)	-0.0207	( 0.0246)	-0.0217	( 0.0247)	-0.0225	( 0.0245)	159313
IY under stalinism	-0.1443***	( 0.0313)	-0.1387***	( 0.0311)	-0.1327***	( 0.0314)	-0.0338**	( 0.0135)	-0.0317**	( 0.0134)	-0.0303**	( 0.0136)	159313
IY under post-stalinism	-0.0889***	( 0.0191)	-0.0863***	( 0.0191)	-0.0824***	( 0.0191)	-0.0424***	( 0.0086)	-0.0400***	( 0.0086)	-0.0400***	( 0.0086)	159313
IY under reformism	0.0153	( 0.0203)	0.0177	( 0.0203)	0.0161	( 0.0204)	0.0228**	( 0.0090)	0.0231**	( 0.0091)	0.0231**	( 0.0091)	159313
<i>Upwards money</i>													
EC	0.0664	( 0.0714)	0.0622	( 0.0712)	0.0595	( 0.0713)	0.0306**	( 0.0123)	0.0305**	( 0.0123)	0.0296**	( 0.0124)	142664
IY under stalinism	-0.1486***	( 0.0488)	-0.1102**	( 0.0454)	-0.1113**	( 0.0464)	-0.0464***	( 0.0132)	-0.0399***	( 0.0126)	-0.0416***	( 0.0129)	142664
IY under post-stalinism	-0.1648***	( 0.0299)	-0.1364***	( 0.0282)	-0.1381***	( 0.0286)	-0.0410***	( 0.0083)	-0.0368***	( 0.0081)	-0.0368***	( 0.0081)	142664
IY under reformism	-0.0470	( 0.0290)	-0.0246	( 0.0279)	-0.0182	( 0.0281)	-0.0215***	( 0.0073)	-0.0151**	( 0.0072)	-0.0151**	( 0.0072)	142664
<i>Downwards money</i>													
EC	-0.0010	( 0.0646)	-0.0055	( 0.0644)	-0.0067	( 0.0640)	0.0130	( 0.0161)	0.0130	( 0.0161)	0.0126	( 0.0161)	149860
IY under stalinism	-0.2378***	( 0.0566)	-0.2074***	( 0.0532)	-0.2128***	( 0.0541)	-0.0622***	( 0.0179)	-0.0577***	( 0.0173)	-0.0603***	( 0.0175)	149860
IY under post-stalinism	-0.2083***	( 0.0342)	-0.1837***	( 0.0321)	-0.1860***	( 0.0326)	-0.0568***	( 0.0105)	-0.0536***	( 0.0104)	-0.0536***	( 0.0104)	149860
IY under reformism	-0.1342***	( 0.0243)	-0.1175***	( 0.0233)	-0.1130***	( 0.0234)	-0.0332***	( 0.0071)	-0.0294***	( 0.0070)	-0.0294***	( 0.0070)	149860
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: stalinism 1936-1953, post-stalinism 1954-1964, reformism from 1965 till the communism collapse. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care

at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Table C.3: Effects of the exposure to communism during impressionable years by the stage of communism for by the stage of communism for preference for family insurance

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin						N
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
	Preference for family insurance												
<i>Upwards care</i>													
EC	-0.1382***	( 0.0262)	-0.1354***	( 0.0263)	-0.1355***	( 0.0261)	-0.0385***	( 0.0134)	-0.0378***	( 0.0134)	-0.0380***	( 0.0134)	182330
IY under stalinism	0.1380***	( 0.0326)	0.1484***	( 0.0324)	0.1448***	( 0.0324)	0.0621***	( 0.0143)	0.0672***	( 0.0143)	0.0660***	( 0.0143)	182330
IY under post-stalinism	0.0579***	( 0.0198)	0.0661***	( 0.0196)	0.0654***	( 0.0195)	0.0338***	( 0.0089)	0.0370***	( 0.0089)	0.0370***	( 0.0089)	182330
IY under reformism	0.2590***	( 0.0193)	0.2670***	( 0.0194)	0.2658***	( 0.0193)	0.1110***	( 0.0090)	0.1148***	( 0.0091)	0.1148***	( 0.0091)	182330
<i>Downwards care</i>													
EC	0.1031***	( 0.0328)	0.1024***	( 0.0328)	0.1051***	( 0.0331)	0.0565***	( 0.0143)	0.0560***	( 0.0143)	0.0571***	( 0.0142)	172337
IY under stalinism	-0.0809**	( 0.0378)	-0.0833**	( 0.0379)	-0.0923**	( 0.0386)	-0.0195	( 0.0145)	-0.0198	( 0.0145)	-0.0240*	( 0.0145)	172337
IY under post-stalinism	-0.2111***	( 0.0233)	-0.2134***	( 0.0235)	-0.2163***	( 0.0239)	-0.0676***	( 0.0079)	-0.0696***	( 0.0080)	-0.0696***	( 0.0080)	172337
IY under reformism	0.0091	( 0.0272)	0.0075	( 0.0272)	0.0126	( 0.0275)	-0.0006	( 0.0113)	0.0016	( 0.0111)	0.0016	( 0.0111)	172337
<i>Upwards money</i>													
EC	-0.2302***	( 0.0315)	-0.2268***	( 0.0316)	-0.2241***	( 0.0313)	-0.0831***	( 0.0146)	-0.0818***	( 0.0147)	-0.0807***	( 0.0146)	169582
IY under stalinism	0.0907**	( 0.0353)	0.1077***	( 0.0356)	0.1016***	( 0.0354)	0.0261*	( 0.0146)	0.0346**	( 0.0146)	0.0332**	( 0.0147)	169582
IY under post-stalinism	0.0535***	( 0.0190)	0.0687***	( 0.0195)	0.0684***	( 0.0192)	0.0143*	( 0.0079)	0.0220***	( 0.0081)	0.0220***	( 0.0081)	169582
IY under reformism	0.2463***	( 0.0224)	0.2592***	( 0.0229)	0.2532***	( 0.0227)	0.0848***	( 0.0093)	0.0885***	( 0.0095)	0.0885***	( 0.0095)	169582
<i>Downwards money</i>													
EC	0.0381	( 0.0299)	0.0410	( 0.0299)	0.0460	( 0.0299)	0.0433***	( 0.0163)	0.0450***	( 0.0164)	0.0472***	( 0.0163)	179393
IY under stalinism	-0.0840**	( 0.0387)	-0.0766**	( 0.0389)	-0.0841**	( 0.0382)	-0.0568***	( 0.0188)	-0.0525***	( 0.0190)	-0.0550***	( 0.0186)	179393
IY under post-stalinism	-0.1476***	( 0.0217)	-0.1418***	( 0.0220)	-0.1432***	( 0.0218)	-0.0639***	( 0.0100)	-0.0611***	( 0.0100)	-0.0611***	( 0.0100)	179393
IY under reformism	0.0551**	( 0.0229)	0.0613***	( 0.0229)	0.0622***	( 0.0226)	0.0141	( 0.0104)	0.0177*	( 0.0102)	0.0177*	( 0.0102)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: stalinism 1936-1953, post-stalinism 1954-1964, reformism from 1965 till the communism collapse. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Table C.4: Effects of the exposure to communism during impressionable years by the stage of communism for preference for social insurance

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin						N
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
	Preference for social insurance												
<i>Income equality</i>													
EC	0.4317***	( 0.0956)	0.4103***	( 0.0941)	0.4278***	( 0.0939)	0.0540	( 0.0172)	0.0498***	( 0.0170)	0.0529***	( 0.0169)	65163
IY under stalinism	0.3105***	( 0.1145)	0.2247**	( 0.1109)	0.2185**	( 0.1091)	0.0507	( 0.0210)	0.0362*	( 0.0204)	0.0345*	( 0.0202)	65163
IY under post-stalinism	0.3315***	( 0.0638)	0.2985***	( 0.0621)	0.3403***	( 0.0612)	0.0584	( 0.0113)	0.0526***	( 0.0110)	0.0593***	( 0.0109)	65163
IY under reformism	0.1269	( 0.0889)	0.0145	( 0.0848)	0.0203	( 0.0838)	0.0266	( 0.0164)	0.0075	( 0.0157)	0.0087	( 0.0156)	65163
<i>Income redistribution</i>													
EC	0.2071***	( 0.0326)	0.1840***	( 0.0327)	0.1811***	( 0.0325)	0.0935***	( 0.0149)	0.0842***	( 0.0150)	0.0817***	( 0.0150)	74421
IY under stalinism	0.2109***	( 0.0397)	0.2059***	( 0.0388)	0.2110***	( 0.0390)	0.0869***	( 0.0170)	0.0846***	( 0.0168)	0.0853***	( 0.0169)	74421
IY under post-stalinism	0.1226***	( 0.0258)	0.1246***	( 0.0253)	0.1259***	( 0.0256)	0.0429***	( 0.0109)	0.0435***	( 0.0107)	0.0447***	( 0.0108)	74421
IY under reformism	0.0882***	( 0.0227)	0.0671***	( 0.0226)	0.0762***	( 0.0226)	0.0301***	( 0.0105)	0.0224**	( 0.0105)	0.0262**	( 0.0105)	74421
<i>Equality of opportunities</i>													
EC	0.0663**	( 0.0322)	0.0580*	( 0.0320)	0.0611*	( 0.0320)	0.0162*	( 0.0091)	0.0149	( 0.0091)	0.0145	( 0.0091)	72642
IY under stalinism	0.1465**	( 0.0400)	0.1486***	( 0.0401)	0.1493***	( 0.0402)	0.0220*	( 0.0118)	0.0228*	( 0.0119)	0.0220*	( 0.0119)	72642
IY under post-stalinism	0.0682***	( 0.0253)	0.0680***	( 0.0253)	0.0658***	( 0.0255)	0.0203***	( 0.0077)	0.0205***	( 0.0077)	0.0201***	( 0.0077)	72642
IY under reformism	0.0220	( 0.0227)	0.0153	( 0.0228)	0.0155	( 0.0229)	-0.0011	( 0.0068)	-0.0021	( 0.0068)	-0.0019	( 0.0069)	72642
<i>Equality over freedom<sup>a)</sup></i>													
EC	-0.0175	( 0.1920)	-0.0203	( 0.2023)	-0.0203	( 0.2023)	0.0154	( 0.0862)	0.0148	( 0.0886)	0.0148	( 0.0886)	5232
IY under stalinism	0.1165	( 0.1940)	0.1017	( 0.2046)	0.1017	( 0.2046)	0.0071	( 0.0873)	-0.0029	( 0.0898)	-0.0029	( 0.0898)	5232
IY under post-stalinism	-0.0517	( 0.0580)	-0.0464	( 0.0582)	-0.0464	( 0.0582)	-0.0410	( 0.0312)	-0.0385	( 0.0312)	-0.0385	( 0.0312)	5232
IY under reformism	-0.0268	( 0.1878)	-0.0276	( 0.1986)	-0.0276	( 0.1986)	-0.0784	( 0.0834)	-0.0798	( 0.0861)	-0.0798	( 0.0861)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Stalinism 1936-1953, post-stalinism 1954-1964, reformism from 1965 till the communism collapse. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong” Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$



## **D Mechanisms**

### **D.1 Linear mechanisms**

Results on various measures of interpersonal trust and confidence in certain public institutions show significant and negative effects of EC, when we compare individuals exposed to Soviet communism to the unexposed living in post-communist and other European countries. The insignificance of EC effects on the trust measures from the 2006 Life in Transition Survey (LITS 06) most likely results from the lack of individuals from other than post-communist countries in the control group.

Table D.1: Average effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on civic participation and democratic values

	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Civic participation</i>							
Interest in politics (ESS)	0.0470**	( 0.0225)	0.0697***	( 0.0227)	0.0370*	( 0.0208)	75696
Discussing politics (WVS)	-0.0116	( 0.0273)	-0.0226	( 0.0276)	0.0097	( 0.0266)	32432
Political actions (WVS)	-0.0083	( 0.0090)	-0.0048	( 0.0090)	-0.0070	( 0.0092)	64679
Active membership (WVS)	-0.1227***	( 0.0114)	-0.1112***	( 0.0118)	-0.1190***	( 0.0117)	59360
Passive membership (WVS)	-0.1665***	( 0.0125)	-0.1563***	( 0.0125)	-0.1620***	( 0.0125)	59368
Ever trade union membership (ESS)	0.1915***	( 0.0179)	0.1960***	( 0.0178)	0.1830***	( 0.0178)	75861
Current trade union membership (ESS)	-0.0511***	( 0.0082)	-0.0413***	( 0.0081)	-0.0433***	( 0.0081)	75861
<i>Democratic values</i>							
Democracy (WVS)	-0.3448***	( 0.0551)	-0.3062***	( 0.0546)	-0.3401***	( 0.0532)	33522
Taxation in democracy (WVS)	0.1344*	( 0.0749)	0.0719	( 0.0761)	0.0684	( 0.0766)	31559
Incomes in democracy (WVS)	0.7500***	( 0.1397)	0.6640***	( 0.1396)	0.6549***	( 0.1407)	14950
Rules in democracy (WVS)	0.5372***	( 0.0994)	0.5286***	( 0.0981)	0.5268***	( 0.0938)	14857
Women rights in democracy(WVS)	0.1931***	( 0.0586)	0.1968***	( 0.0590)	0.1716***	( 0.0576)	32441
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Civic participation: interest in politics – “how interested in politics”; discussing politics – “discussing political matters with friends”; political actions – dummy generated using responses to questions on undertaking various political actions; active (passive) membership – dummy using data on membership in up to ten civil society organizations, excluding religious ones; current (ever) trade union membership – “membership of trade union or similar organization” currently (currently or previously). Democratic values: democracy - importance of democracy, taxation in democracy - taxes on the rich subsidizing the poor essential to democracy; incomes in democracy - state making incomes equal essential to democracy, rules in democracy - obeying the rules essential to democracy; women rights in democracy - women having the same rights as men essential to democracy. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Democracy seems to be less important to those exposed to communism than to the unexposed, especially if the exposure was relatively long (more than 40 years). At the same time, we find that EC makes individuals more inclined to agree that obedience is important in democracy. Moreover, results show that EC facilitates beliefs that income redistribution and income taxation are important feature of democratic regimes. These results are in line with limited civic participation and reduced trust in public institutions due to EC, which might explain why the social insurance, although desired,

is insufficient and needs to be accompanied with private insurance.

Table D.2: Average effects of the exposure to communism (EC) on religiosity and traditional family and gender roles


	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Religiosity</i>							
Social problems (WVS)	-0.0413*	( 0.0211)	-0.0394*	( 0.0213)	-0.0355*	( 0.0215)	15329
Family problems (WVS)	-0.0677***	( 0.0251)	-0.0691***	( 0.0252)	-0.0644**	( 0.0256)	15777
Frequency of praying (WVS)	-0.8876***	( 0.1083)	-0.8969***	( 0.1083)	-0.8796***	( 0.1078)	15456
Frequency of praying (ESS)	-0.9069***	( 0.0721)	-0.9264***	( 0.0713)	-0.8917***	( 0.0721)	74475
Importance of religion (WVS)	-0.5349***	( 0.0291)	-0.5438***	( 0.0290)	-0.5365***	( 0.0289)	65502
Importance of God (WVS)	-2.1951***	( 0.1004)	-2.2297***	( 0.1003)	-2.2075***	( 0.0997)	62759
Religiosity(ESS)	-0.4157***	( 0.0438)	-0.4185***	( 0.0435)	-0.4057***	( 0.0442)	75455
Religiosity (GGS)	-0.7819***	( 0.0597)	-0.7713***	( 0.0599)	-0.7782***	( 0.0602)	163516
<i>Traditionalism</i>							
Number of children (GGS)	0.0422	( 0.0334)	0.0258	( 0.0337)	0.0453	( 0.0341)	91822
Number of children (WVS)	0.1511***	( 0.0480)	0.1416***	( 0.0483)	0.1808***	( 0.0484)	26564
Financial independence (GGS)	0.1934***	( 0.0269)	0.1721***	( 0.0264)	0.1777***	( 0.0266)	172214
Working women (GGS)	0.1149***	( 0.0252)	0.1390***	( 0.0244)	0.1244***	( 0.0243)	170077
Working mothers (GGS)	0.7318***	( 0.0607)	0.7550***	( 0.0614)	0.7523***	( 0.0611)	173729
Motherhood (GGS)	-0.3825***	( 0.0306)	-0.3633***	( 0.0298)	-0.3664***	( 0.0300)	186974
Parenting after divorce (GGS)	0.0144	( 0.0217)	0.0265	( 0.0217)	0.0214	( 0.0218)	177676
Importance of tradition (ESS)	0.1046***	( 0.0306)	0.1010***	( 0.0307)	0.1214***	( 0.0300)	72848
Importance of family (WVS)	-0.0413*	( 0.0211)	-0.0394*	( 0.0213)	-0.0355*	( 0.0215)	15329
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015.04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Number of children in the population of individuals aged at least 50. Religiosity: church answers social (family) problems – dummies whether “your church is giving, in your country, adequate answers” to the “social problems facing our country today” (“the problems of family life”); frequency of praying – praying “outside of religious services” in ESS on seven point scale ranging from “never” to “every day” and in WVS on eight point scale ranging from “never or practically never” to “several times a day”; importance of religion (God) – “how important in life is religion (God)” on four point scale (“not at all important ... “very important”); religiosity – “attending religious services apart from special occasions” in GGS recoded to the scale 0 – never, 1 – less than once every 3 months, 2 – one to three times every three months, 3 – one to three times every month, 4 – at least once a week, and in ESS ranging from “every day” to “never” at seven point scale. Traditionalism: financial independence – women should be financially independent from their husbands on five point scale; working women – men have more right to job than women, if jobs are scarce on five point scale; working mothers – pre-school children suffer when their mothers work on five point scale; marriage – women should try to marry and have a child on five point scale; motherhood – women without children is fulfilled; parenting after divorce – children should stay with mother rather than father after divorce on five point scale; importance of tradition – “important to follow traditions and customs” and importance of family – “how important in life is family” on four point scale (“not at all important ... “very important”). Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

## D.2 Nonlinearity mechanisms


Figure D.1: Effects of each year of exposure to communism (EC) on generalized trust



Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18) and ESS waves 1-8.


Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Generalized trust in WVS and ESS (trustWVS, trustESS) - "generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" with the answer "most people can be trusted" opposed to "need to be very careful." People being helpful (pplhlp)- "people mostly try to be helpful" or "people mostly look out for themselves."

Figure D.2: Effects of each year of exposure to communism (EC) on confidence in selected public institutions



Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015.04.18).  
Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Confidence in the army (Carmy) press (Cpress), trade unions (Cunion), police (Cpolice), political parties (Cpolp), justice system (Cjust) measured on five point scale.

Figure D.3: Effects of each year of exposure to communism (EC) on trust in selected public institutions in post-communist countries




Source: Authors' own estimations based on LITS wave 1

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Trust in president (Cpresident), government (CgovLITS), armed forces (CarmyLITS), in courts (Ccourt) measured on five point scale.

The insignificance of EC effects on the trust measures from the 2006 Life in Transition Survey (LITS 06) comprised of all post-communist countries and no other observed in Table D.1 concerned the average effect of EC in post-communist countries. Figure D.3 shows that in fact for those exposed to communism for longer periods of time, including impressionable period, we observe significantly reduced trust in such institutions as court system, armed forces, and government, being cornerstones of the state. Interestingly, we do not observe it among individuals exposed to communism for less than 18 year, that is those whose impressionable years occurred after the communism collapsed. Thus, the IY contribute to the explanation of the discontinuity in EC effects for the treated.

Figure D.4: Effects of each year of exposure to communism (EC) on civic participation




Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015.04.18).

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Active (passive) - active (passive) membership in up to ten organizations excluding religious ones. Political actions (politact) - dummy generated using responses to questions on undertaking various political actions. Interest in politics (politics2) - "how interested in politics" measured on four point scale.



Figure D.5: Effects of each year of exposure to communism (EC) on democratic values




Source: Authors' own estimations based on WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18) and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Democracy (democracy) - importance of democracy. Rules in democracy (obey) - obeying the rules essential to democracy. Incomes in democracy (demoinc) - state making incomes equal essential to democracy. Taxation in democracy (taxes) - taxes on the rich subsidizing the poor essential to democracy.

We find little evidence of communism affecting democratic values for individuals who were exposed to it only prior to the impressionable years. Furthermore, the belief that it is essential for democracy to use taxes levied on the rich to subsidize the poor, is more common only for those with longest periods of EC. In fact, the discontinuity in the EC effects on the taxation in democracy shown in Figure D.5 points to the change of the sign of the EC effects around 40 years of EC. That might explain why younger individuals would like to rely on family insurance after regime change from peoples

democracy to democratic republic.


Figure D.6: Effects of each year of exposure to communism (EC) on religiosity



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015.04.18).

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Importance of God (God) measured on 10-point scale. Importance of religion (religion) measured on four point scale. Frequency of praying (pray) measured on eight point scale. Religiosity (relig) - attendance to religious services measured on five point scale.


Figure D.7: Effects of each year of exposure to communism (EC) on traditional gender roles



Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Motherhood (mother) – women without children is fulfilled. Financial independence (femindep) – women should be financially independent from their husbands. Working mothers (workingmom) – pre-school children suffer when their mothers work. Working women (jobsformen) – men have more right to job than women, if jobs are scarce. Parenting after divorce (divorcemom) – children should stay with mother rather than father after divorce. All measured on five point scale where 1 denotes the least and 5 the most pronounced gender inequality.

Figure D.8: Effects of each year of exposure to communism (EC) on family



Source: Authors' own estimations based GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) and WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015.04.18).

Notes: Dashed line shows the average effect of EC. Insignificant coefficients not reported. Importance of family (family) measured on four point scale. Trust in family (famtrust) measured on five point scale. Number of children in GGS and WVS (nkids, nkidsWVS).



## E Threads to identification

### E.1 Alternative EC measurement

Table E.1: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *fixed dates of entry and exit* to communism

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		N
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0563	( 0.0491)	0.0695	( 0.0489)	0.0662	( 0.0479)	148216	0.0121	( 0.0181)	0.0174	( 0.0180)	0.0175	( 0.0178)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0701	( 0.0520)	-0.0696	( 0.0520)	-0.0722	( 0.0506)	159313	-0.0420*	( 0.0244)	-0.0423*	( 0.0244)	-0.0434*	( 0.0237)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0357	( 0.0781)	-0.0092	( 0.0775)	-0.0074	( 0.0773)	142664	0.0050	( 0.0111)	0.0107	( 0.0110)	0.0114	( 0.0109)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1682**	( 0.0739)	-0.1485**	( 0.0734)	-0.1473**	( 0.0727)	149857	-0.0228	( 0.0158)	-0.0185	( 0.0156)	-0.0183	( 0.0155)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0751***	( 0.0186)	0.0868***	( 0.0188)	0.0855***	( 0.0185)	182330	0.0545***	( 0.0103)	0.0592***	( 0.0104)	0.0589***	( 0.0103)	182330
Downwards care	0.0421**	( 0.0208)	0.0403*	( 0.0208)	0.0449**	( 0.0208)	172337	0.0348***	( 0.0094)	0.0342***	( 0.0094)	0.0363***	( 0.0095)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0317	( 0.0230)	-0.0127	( 0.0230)	-0.0150	( 0.0227)	169582	-0.0155	( 0.0115)	-0.0062	( 0.0115)	-0.0074	( 0.0114)	169582
Downwards money	0.0380*	( 0.0219)	0.0491**	( 0.0220)	0.0536**	( 0.0220)	179393	0.0343***	( 0.0132)	0.0406***	( 0.0133)	0.0425***	( 0.0134)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6208***	( 0.0717)	0.5058***	( 0.0704)	0.5358***	( 0.0724)	65163	0.0936	( 0.0133)	0.0734***	( 0.0133)	0.0786***	( 0.0135)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3208***	( 0.0272)	0.2851***	( 0.0272)	0.2878***	( 0.0274)	74421	0.1372***	( 0.0120)	0.1234***	( 0.0120)	0.1233***	( 0.0123)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1180***	( 0.0277)	0.1062***	( 0.0276)	0.1088***	( 0.0276)	72642	0.0245***	( 0.0077)	0.0228***	( 0.0077)	0.0223***	( 0.0077)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	0.0734*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Particular familiarism: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Egalitarian values: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.2: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *fixed date of exit* from communism

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0563	( 0.0491)	0.0695	( 0.0489)	0.0662	( 0.0479)	148216	0.0121	( 0.0181)	0.0174	( 0.0180)	0.0175	( 0.0178)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0701	( 0.0520)	-0.0696	( 0.0520)	-0.0722	( 0.0506)	159313	-0.0420*	( 0.0244)	-0.0423*	( 0.0244)	-0.0434*	( 0.0237)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0357	( 0.0781)	-0.0092	( 0.0775)	-0.0074	( 0.0773)	142664	0.0050	( 0.0111)	0.0107	( 0.0110)	0.0114	( 0.0109)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1682**	( 0.0739)	-0.1485**	( 0.0734)	-0.1473**	( 0.0727)	149857	-0.0228	( 0.0158)	-0.0185	( 0.0156)	-0.0183	( 0.0155)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0751***	( 0.0186)	0.0868***	( 0.0188)	0.0855***	( 0.0185)	182330	0.0545***	( 0.0103)	0.0592***	( 0.0104)	0.0589***	( 0.0103)	182330
Downwards care	0.0421**	( 0.0208)	0.0403*	( 0.0208)	0.0449**	( 0.0208)	172337	0.0348***	( 0.0094)	0.0342***	( 0.0094)	0.0363***	( 0.0095)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0317	( 0.0230)	-0.0127	( 0.0230)	-0.0150	( 0.0227)	169582	-0.0155	( 0.0115)	-0.0062	( 0.0115)	-0.0074	( 0.0114)	169582
Downwards money	0.0380*	( 0.0219)	0.0491**	( 0.0220)	0.0536**	( 0.0220)	179393	0.0343***	( 0.0132)	0.0406***	( 0.0133)	0.0425***	( 0.0134)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6147***	( 0.0708)	0.4907***	( 0.0694)	0.5217***	( 0.0713)	60830	0.0929	( 0.0133)	0.0712***	( 0.0133)	0.0766***	( 0.0134)	60830
Income redistribution	0.3208***	( 0.0272)	0.2851***	( 0.0272)	0.2878***	( 0.0274)	74421	0.1372***	( 0.0120)	0.1234***	( 0.0120)	0.1233***	( 0.0123)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1180***	( 0.0277)	0.1062***	( 0.0276)	0.1088***	( 0.0276)	72642	0.0245***	( 0.0077)	0.0228***	( 0.0077)	0.0223***	( 0.0077)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	0.0712*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.3: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *fixed date of entry* to communism

	Intensive margin				Extensive margin			
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>								
Upwards care	-0.0571	( 0.0429)	-0.0439	( 0.0428)	-0.0447	( 0.0428)	116785	-0.0172 ( 0.0220)
Downwards care	-0.1931***	( 0.0566)	-0.1894***	( 0.0565)	-0.1890***	( 0.0562)	127888	-0.1052*** ( 0.0248)
Upwards money	-0.2759***	( 0.0445)	-0.2438***	( 0.0440)	-0.2418***	( 0.0437)	111246	-0.0252*** ( 0.0080)
Downwards money	-0.3815***	( 0.0536)	-0.3551***	( 0.0522)	-0.3518***	( 0.0523)	118441	-0.0554*** ( 0.0161)
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>								
Upwards care	0.0490***	( 0.0173)	0.0614***	( 0.0177)	0.0607***	( 0.0176)	150895	0.0443*** ( 0.0102)
Downwards care	0.0255	( 0.0214)	0.0223	( 0.0213)	0.0264	( 0.0213)	140901	0.0318*** ( 0.0100)
Upwards money	-0.0678***	( 0.0195)	-0.0487**	( 0.0197)	-0.0506***	( 0.0196)	138167	-0.0256** ( 0.0113)
Downwards money	0.0552***	( 0.0209)	0.0657***	( 0.0210)	0.0702***	( 0.0211)	147958	0.0479*** ( 0.0121)
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>								
Income equality	0.6279***	( 0.0680)	0.5121***	( 0.0683)	0.5422***	( 0.0698)	65163	0.0910 ( 0.0129)
Income redistribution	0.3113***	( 0.0285)	0.2734***	( 0.0285)	0.2760***	( 0.0286)	74421	0.1306*** ( 0.0126)
Equality of opportunities	0.1081***	( 0.0278)	0.0954***	( 0.0277)	0.0975***	( 0.0278)	72642	0.0215*** ( 0.0079)
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497 ( 0.0251)
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No	
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No	
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .



Table E.4: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using dates of the *Berlin Wall* erection and fall as entry and exit from communism

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0636	( 0.0422)	0.0765*	( 0.0421)	0.0735*	( 0.0412)	148216	0.0130	( 0.0156)	0.0181	( 0.0156)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0235	( 0.0481)	-0.0225	( 0.0482)	-0.0238	( 0.0475)	159313	-0.0153	( 0.0237)	-0.0152	( 0.0238)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0234	( 0.0683)	0.0013	( 0.0680)	0.0028	( 0.0680)	142664	-0.0006	( 0.0108)	0.0046	( 0.0108)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1673***	( 0.0620)	-0.1502**	( 0.0618)	-0.1488**	( 0.0613)	149857	-0.0299**	( 0.0148)	-0.0263*	( 0.0148)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0857***	( 0.0188)	0.0970***	( 0.0189)	0.0956***	( 0.0187)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0104)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	182330
Downwards care	0.0430**	( 0.0200)	0.0414**	( 0.0199)	0.0454**	( 0.0199)	172337	0.0354***	( 0.0091)	0.0349***	( 0.0091)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0225	( 0.0225)	-0.0043	( 0.0224)	-0.0066	( 0.0221)	169582	-0.0133	( 0.0111)	-0.0043	( 0.0111)	169582
Downwards money	0.0282	( 0.0216)	0.0389*	( 0.0218)	0.0429*	( 0.0219)	179393	0.0293**	( 0.0131)	0.0355***	( 0.0132)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.5666***	( 0.0740)	0.4520***	( 0.0726)	0.4808***	( 0.0745)	65163	0.0853	( 0.0135)	0.0653***	( 0.0134)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3031***	( 0.0272)	0.2681***	( 0.0270)	0.2718***	( 0.0272)	74421	0.1310***	( 0.0119)	0.1176***	( 0.0119)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1202***	( 0.0266)	0.1087***	( 0.0265)	0.1112***	( 0.0265)	72642	0.0245***	( 0.0074)	0.0228***	( 0.0074)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	0.0653*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality vs freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

## E.2 Alternative clustering

Table E.5: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) with robust standard errors clustered by country

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		N
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0631	( 0.0985)	0.0760	( 0.0960)	0.0729	( 0.0928)	148216	0.0125	( 0.0242)	0.0176	( 0.0233)	0.0173	( 0.0217)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0250	( 0.1180)	-0.0240	( 0.1172)	-0.0253	( 0.1135)	159313	-0.0163	( 0.0614)	-0.0162	( 0.0613)	-0.0169	( 0.0595)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0252	( 0.2057)	-0.0006	( 0.2010)	0.0008	( 0.2003)	142664	-0.0007	( 0.0225)	0.0045	( 0.0215)	0.0049	( 0.0212)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1688	( 0.1645)	-0.1519	( 0.1608)	-0.1505	( 0.1590)	149857	-0.0300	( 0.0241)	-0.0264	( 0.0233)	-0.0263	( 0.0228)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0861**	( 0.0395)	0.0973**	( 0.0378)	0.0960**	( 0.0365)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0173)	0.0650***	( 0.0167)	0.0647***	( 0.0163)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	( 0.0199)	0.0420*	( 0.0202)	0.0460**	( 0.0198)	172337	0.0356***	( 0.0047)	0.0351***	( 0.0053)	0.0369***	( 0.0052)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0221	( 0.0497)	-0.0039	( 0.0489)	-0.0062	( 0.0478)	169582	-0.0132	( 0.0136)	-0.0043	( 0.0136)	-0.0054	( 0.0132)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	( 0.0288)	0.0396	( 0.0286)	0.0435	( 0.0291)	179393	0.0295	( 0.0196)	0.0357*	( 0.0191)	0.0374*	( 0.0193)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6279***	( 0.1405)	0.5121***	( 0.1380)	0.5422***	( 0.1484)	65163	0.0910	( 0.0187)	0.0707***	( 0.0183)	0.0759***	( 0.0201)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3113***	( 0.0996)	0.2734**	( 0.1030)	0.2760**	( 0.1042)	74421	0.1306***	( 0.0435)	0.1159**	( 0.0447)	0.1158**	( 0.0456)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1081**	( 0.0398)	0.0954**	( 0.0372)	0.0975***	( 0.0346)	72642	0.0215**	( 0.0086)	0.0196**	( 0.0082)	0.0191**	( 0.0078)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185**	( 0.0050)	-0.0240*	( 0.0110)	-0.0240*	( 0.0110)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0033)	-0.0527***	( 0.0055)	-0.0527***	( 0.0055)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality vs freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.6: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) with robust standard errors clustered by year of birth

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0631	( 0.0480)	0.0760	( 0.0472)	0.0729	( 0.0461)	148216	0.0125	( 0.0169)	0.0176	( 0.0168)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0250	( 0.0591)	-0.0240	( 0.0591)	-0.0253	( 0.0588)	159313	-0.0163	( 0.0304)	-0.0162	( 0.0305)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0252	( 0.0798)	-0.0006	( 0.0785)	0.0008	( 0.0782)	142664	-0.0007	( 0.0125)	0.0045	( 0.0124)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1688**	( 0.0665)	-0.1519**	( 0.0654)	-0.1505**	( 0.0647)	149857	-0.0300*	( 0.0159)	-0.0264	( 0.0159)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0861***	( 0.0227)	0.0973***	( 0.0228)	0.0960***	( 0.0226)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0119)	0.0650***	( 0.0120)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	( 0.0214)	0.0420**	( 0.0211)	0.0460**	( 0.0211)	172337	0.0356***	( 0.0096)	0.0351***	( 0.0094)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0221	( 0.0277)	-0.0039	( 0.0272)	-0.0062	( 0.0268)	169582	-0.0132	( 0.0127)	-0.0043	( 0.0126)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	( 0.0236)	0.0396*	( 0.0237)	0.0435*	( 0.0239)	179393	0.0295**	( 0.0141)	0.0357**	( 0.0141)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.6279***	( 0.0838)	0.5121***	( 0.0812)	0.5422***	( 0.0850)	65163	0.0910	( 0.0146)	0.0707***	( 0.0144)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3113***	( 0.0352)	0.2734***	( 0.0361)	0.2760***	( 0.0347)	74421	0.1306***	( 0.0153)	0.1159***	( 0.0157)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1081***	( 0.0265)	0.0954***	( 0.0267)	0.0975***	( 0.0263)	72642	0.0215**	( 0.0086)	0.0196**	( 0.0086)	72642
Equality over freedom	-0.0185	( 0.0531)	-0.0240	( 0.0575)	-0.0240	( 0.0575)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0273)	-0.0527*	( 0.0296)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality vs freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

### E.3 Alternative cohort groupings

Table E.7: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for 5-year cohort groups

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		N
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0670	( 0.0453)	0.0771*	( 0.0463)	0.0775*	( 0.0460)	148216	0.0145	( 0.0136)	0.0185	( 0.0138)	0.0184	( 0.0135)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0438	( 0.0405)	-0.0430	( 0.0406)	-0.0414	( 0.0410)	159313	-0.0240	( 0.0195)	-0.0240	( 0.0196)	-0.0235	( 0.0197)	159313
Upwards money	0.0140	( 0.0609)	0.0330	( 0.0612)	0.0334	( 0.0603)	142664	0.0036	( 0.0101)	0.0076	( 0.0106)	0.0074	( 0.0104)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1281**	( 0.0622)	-0.1134*	( 0.0625)	-0.1123*	( 0.0612)	149857	-0.0249*	( 0.0129)	-0.0218*	( 0.0132)	-0.0218*	( 0.0130)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0698***	( 0.0201)	0.0799***	( 0.0208)	0.0790***	( 0.0209)	182330	0.0515***	( 0.0110)	0.0557***	( 0.0113)	0.0554***	( 0.0113)	182330
Downwards care	0.0315	( 0.0238)	0.0300	( 0.0236)	0.0326	( 0.0236)	172337	0.0291***	( 0.0105)	0.0287***	( 0.0105)	0.0299***	( 0.0105)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0384*	( 0.0216)	-0.0220	( 0.0223)	-0.0236	( 0.0222)	169582	-0.0208*	( 0.0115)	-0.0127	( 0.0119)	-0.0134	( 0.0119)	169582
Downwards money	0.0132	( 0.0280)	0.0229	( 0.0288)	0.0254	( 0.0292)	179393	0.0212	( 0.0152)	0.0268*	( 0.0156)	0.0279*	( 0.0158)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6183***	( 0.0670)	0.5028***	( 0.0672)	0.5347***	( 0.0684)	65105	0.0901	( 0.0128)	0.0699***	( 0.0130)	0.0754***	( 0.0131)	65105
Income redistribution	0.3120***	( 0.0286)	0.2737***	( 0.0285)	0.2763***	( 0.0288)	74421	0.1315***	( 0.0127)	0.1166***	( 0.0127)	0.1162***	( 0.0129)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1065***	( 0.0280)	0.0937***	( 0.0278)	0.0969***	( 0.0279)	72642	0.0211***	( 0.0079)	0.0193**	( 0.0079)	0.0189**	( 0.0079)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0193	( 0.0510)	-0.0239	( 0.0545)	-0.0239	( 0.0545)	5232	-0.0530	( 0.0273)	-0.0554*	( 0.0290)	-0.0554*	( 0.0290)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-6 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Table E.8: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for 10-year cohort groups

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0629	( 0.0466)	0.0724	( 0.0480)	0.0729	( 0.0476)	148216	0.0126	( 0.0137)	0.0164	( 0.0141)	0.0167	( 0.0136)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0479	( 0.0396)	-0.0473	( 0.0396)	-0.0447	( 0.0403)	159313	-0.0268	( 0.0187)	-0.0269	( 0.0187)	-0.0259	( 0.0190)	159313
Upwards money	0.0179	( 0.0597)	0.0361	( 0.0599)	0.0376	( 0.0589)	142664	0.0040	( 0.0096)	0.0079	( 0.0101)	0.0080	( 0.0098)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1259**	( 0.0614)	-0.1120*	( 0.0618)	-0.1100*	( 0.0604)	149857	-0.0244*	( 0.0125)	-0.0214*	( 0.0128)	-0.0213*	( 0.0125)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0706***	( 0.0200)	0.0807***	( 0.0207)	0.0794***	( 0.0209)	182330	0.0518***	( 0.0111)	0.0559***	( 0.0114)	0.0555***	( 0.0115)	182330
Downwards care	0.0283	( 0.0260)	0.0268	( 0.0259)	0.0302	( 0.0255)	172337	0.0278**	( 0.0114)	0.0273**	( 0.0114)	0.0289**	( 0.0113)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0376*	( 0.0214)	-0.0212	( 0.0220)	-0.0236	( 0.0222)	169582	-0.0208*	( 0.0116)	-0.0128	( 0.0120)	-0.0138	( 0.0122)	169582
Downwards money	0.0103	( 0.0309)	0.0201	( 0.0317)	0.0232	( 0.0318)	179393	0.0192	( 0.0168)	0.0248	( 0.0172)	0.0263	( 0.0173)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6133***	( 0.0675)	0.4968***	( 0.0677)	0.5291***	( 0.0688)	65163	0.0897	( 0.0130)	0.0693***	( 0.0131)	0.0749***	( 0.0132)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3818***	( 0.0320)	0.3452***	( 0.0321)	0.3373***	( 0.0322)	71730	0.1653***	( 0.0140)	0.1507***	( 0.0141)	0.1468***	( 0.0144)	71730
Equality of opportunities	0.0929***	( 0.0327)	0.0807**	( 0.0325)	0.0854***	( 0.0325)	69904	0.0188**	( 0.0090)	0.0170*	( 0.0090)	0.0169*	( 0.0090)	69904
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0132	( 0.0517)	-0.0176	( 0.0551)	-0.0176	( 0.0551)	5232	-0.0511	( 0.0274)	-0.0538*	( 0.0291)	-0.0538*	( 0.0291)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

## E.4 Single wave analysis

Table E.9: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using single survey wave

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.2501***	( 0.0556)	0.2584***	( 0.0561)	0.2503***	( 0.0553)	104325	0.0584***	( 0.0142)	0.0620***	( 0.0145)	0.0587***	( 0.0147)	104325
Downwards care	0.1933***	( 0.0385)	0.1937***	( 0.0386)	0.1824***	( 0.0361)	115432	0.0993***	( 0.0168)	0.0996***	( 0.0169)	0.0946***	( 0.0166)	115432
Upwards money	0.3678***	( 0.1034)	0.3832***	( 0.1055)	0.3845***	( 0.1073)	104248	0.0371	( 0.0229)	0.0402*	( 0.0232)	0.0400*	( 0.0237)	104248
Downwards money	0.1355	( 0.1063)	0.1448	( 0.1085)	0.1425	( 0.1089)	108239	0.0012	( 0.0295)	0.0027	( 0.0297)	0.0016	( 0.0297)	108239
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.1295***	( 0.0211)	0.1400***	( 0.0213)	0.1384***	( 0.0211)	138405	0.0784***	( 0.0107)	0.0828***	( 0.0108)	0.0825***	( 0.0108)	138405
Downwards care	0.0600***	( 0.0199)	0.0581***	( 0.0198)	0.0613***	( 0.0197)	117932	0.0400***	( 0.0099)	0.0392***	( 0.0099)	0.0411***	( 0.0099)	117932
Upwards money	0.0216	( 0.0238)	0.0390	( 0.0238)	0.0362	( 0.0234)	131149	-0.0006	( 0.0113)	0.0084	( 0.0114)	0.0071	( 0.0113)	131149
Downwards money	0.0381	( 0.0240)	0.0473*	( 0.0242)	0.0515**	( 0.0243)	124929	0.0295**	( 0.0147)	0.0352**	( 0.0148)	0.0370**	( 0.0149)	124929
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.3408***	( 0.0881)	0.2212***	( 0.0856)	0.2224**	( 0.0863)	15398	0.0339	( 0.0159)	0.0146	( 0.0157)	0.0153	( 0.0158)	15398
Income redistribution	0.1531***	( 0.0326)	0.1531***	( 0.0326)	0.1540***	( 0.0325)	35743	0.0532***	( 0.0135)	0.0532***	( 0.0135)	0.0536***	( 0.0135)	35743
Equality of opportunities	0.0871***	( 0.0306)	0.0871***	( 0.0306)	0.0917***	( 0.0309)	35697	0.0191**	( 0.0088)	0.0191**	( 0.0088)	0.0201**	( 0.0088)	35697
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2), WVS wave 6 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS wave 8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality vs freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

## E.5 Alternative country groups

Table E.10: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *Eastern and Western Germany* only

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	-0.0739*	( 0.0437)	-0.0604	( 0.0440)	-0.0598	( 0.0440)	2922	-0.0212	( 0.0229)	-0.0139	( 0.0234)	-0.0115	( 0.0236)	2922
Downwards care	-0.2049***	( 0.0602)	-0.2097***	( 0.0621)	-0.1972***	( 0.0626)	2930	-0.1093***	( 0.0264)	-0.1112***	( 0.0264)	-0.1049***	( 0.0262)	2930
Upwards money	-0.2830***	( 0.0455)	-0.2483***	( 0.0466)	-0.2424***	( 0.0469)	2921	-0.0288***	( 0.0085)	-0.0244***	( 0.0082)	-0.0215***	( 0.0082)	2921
Downwards money	-0.3845***	( 0.0559)	-0.3522***	( 0.0527)	-0.3410***	( 0.0530)	2877	-0.0582***	( 0.0168)	-0.0482***	( 0.0169)	-0.0444***	( 0.0170)	2877
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0491***	( 0.0179)	0.0607***	( 0.0185)	0.0624***	( 0.0186)	11580	0.0431***	( 0.0104)	0.0493***	( 0.0108)	0.0504***	( 0.0108)	11580
Downwards care	0.0228	( 0.0219)	0.0189	( 0.0216)	0.0214	( 0.0215)	11539	0.0297***	( 0.0105)	0.0271**	( 0.0103)	0.0279**	( 0.0107)	11539
Upwards money	-0.0676***	( 0.0197)	-0.0517**	( 0.0200)	-0.0545***	( 0.0200)	11528	-0.0275**	( 0.0114)	-0.0210*	( 0.0117)	-0.0214*	( 0.0118)	11528
Downwards money	0.0542**	( 0.0208)	0.0591***	( 0.0207)	0.0554***	( 0.0206)	11559	0.0462***	( 0.0120)	0.0480***	( 0.0121)	0.0463***	( 0.0123)	11559
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.7902***	( 0.0684)	0.6709***	( 0.0695)	0.6987***	( 0.0708)	5773	0.1113	( 0.0148)	0.0911***	( 0.0154)	0.0971***	( 0.0156)	5773
Income redistribution	0.5104***	( 0.0335)	0.4626***	( 0.0328)	0.4569***	( 0.0339)	4739	0.2162***	( 0.0147)	0.1997***	( 0.0151)	0.1972***	( 0.0157)	4739
Equality of opportunities	0.0782*	( 0.0412)	0.0669	( 0.0419)	0.0718*	( 0.0417)	4783	0.0200*	( 0.0115)	0.0194*	( 0.0112)	0.0207*	( 0.0111)	4783
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.11: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *post-communist countries and Western Germany* only

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	-0.0570	( 0.0425)	-0.0371	( 0.0422)	-0.0360	( 0.0422)	115624	-0.0176	( 0.0218)	-0.0102	( 0.0218)	-0.0082	( 0.0218)	115624
Downwards care	-0.1964***	( 0.0566)	-0.1924***	( 0.0566)	-0.1911***	( 0.0563)	115569	-0.1075***	( 0.0249)	-0.1070***	( 0.0249)	-0.1059***	( 0.0247)	115569
Upwards money	-0.2770***	( 0.0449)	-0.2528***	( 0.0446)	-0.2494***	( 0.0442)	115578	-0.0252***	( 0.0080)	-0.0195***	( 0.0080)	-0.0183***	( 0.0080)	115578
Downwards money	-0.3819***	( 0.0540)	-0.3639***	( 0.0528)	-0.3597***	( 0.0529)	115510	-0.0555***	( 0.0161)	-0.0508***	( 0.0160)	-0.0496***	( 0.0160)	115510
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0465***	( 0.0175)	0.0593***	( 0.0179)	0.0576***	( 0.0178)	142618	0.0427***	( 0.0102)	0.0469***	( 0.0104)	0.0463***	( 0.0104)	142618
Downwards care	0.0279	( 0.0215)	0.0293	( 0.0215)	0.0348	( 0.0215)	139625	0.0325***	( 0.0101)	0.0321***	( 0.0101)	0.0347***	( 0.0102)	139625
Upwards money	-0.0692***	( 0.0197)	-0.0493**	( 0.0199)	-0.0514***	( 0.0197)	142416	-0.0266**	( 0.0113)	-0.0172	( 0.0114)	-0.0185	( 0.0113)	142416
Downwards money	0.0580***	( 0.0211)	0.0673***	( 0.0212)	0.0716***	( 0.0213)	139637	0.0488***	( 0.0122)	0.0538***	( 0.0123)	0.0557***	( 0.0124)	139637
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6853***	( 0.0664)	0.5887***	( 0.0666)	0.6376***	( 0.0674)	47227	0.0959	( 0.0133)	0.0792***	( 0.0134)	0.0874***	( 0.0135)	47227
Income redistribution	0.4183***	( 0.0368)	0.3766***	( 0.0351)	0.3641***	( 0.0354)	26299	0.1759***	( 0.0167)	0.1610***	( 0.0164)	0.1564***	( 0.0166)	26299
Equality of opportunities	0.0806**	( 0.0354)	0.0661*	( 0.0353)	0.0669*	( 0.0353)	25990	0.0150	( 0.0096)	0.0127	( 0.0095)	0.0127	( 0.0095)	25990
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .



Table E.12: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) on the sample excluding *Western Germany*

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.2509***	( 0.0552)	0.2602***	( 0.0559)	0.2518***	( 0.0541)	145841	0.0586***	( 0.0141)	0.0624***	( 0.0145)	0.0588***	( 0.0143)	145841
Downwards care	0.1948***	( 0.0372)	0.1961***	( 0.0373)	0.1901***	( 0.0353)	156930	0.1000***	( 0.0166)	0.1006***	( 0.0167)	0.0972***	( 0.0164)	156930
Upwards money	0.3705***	( 0.1051)	0.3862***	( 0.1072)	0.3864***	( 0.1087)	140288	0.0377	( 0.0232)	0.0409*	( 0.0235)	0.0406*	( 0.0239)	140288
Downwards money	0.0849	( 0.1093)	0.0930	( 0.1116)	0.0919	( 0.1102)	147519	0.0003	( 0.0269)	0.0016	( 0.0271)	0.0008	( 0.0269)	147522
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.1952***	( 0.0333)	0.1988***	( 0.0335)	0.1953***	( 0.0331)	173389	0.0986***	( 0.0188)	0.1000***	( 0.0190)	0.0991***	( 0.0189)	173389
Downwards care	0.1039***	( 0.0339)	0.1039***	( 0.0338)	0.1030***	( 0.0338)	163430	0.0430***	( 0.0149)	0.0434***	( 0.0148)	0.0428***	( 0.0149)	163430
Upwards money	0.0712	( 0.0459)	0.0775*	( 0.0465)	0.0762*	( 0.0457)	160679	0.0155	( 0.0206)	0.0187	( 0.0208)	0.0183	( 0.0207)	160679
Downwards money	-0.0618	( 0.0382)	-0.0581	( 0.0376)	-0.0581	( 0.0377)	170468	-0.0418*	( 0.0227)	-0.0393*	( 0.0222)	-0.0396*	( 0.0223)	170468
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	-0.1581	( 0.1783)	-0.2391	( 0.1835)	-0.2656	( 0.1882)	62361	-0.0113	( 0.0253)	-0.0261	( 0.0261)	-0.0310	( 0.0264)	62361
Income redistribution	0.1018***	( 0.0364)	0.0542	( 0.0357)	0.0560	( 0.0360)	71349	0.0392**	( 0.0166)	0.0208	( 0.0164)	0.0190	( 0.0165)	71349
Equality of opportunities	0.1386***	( 0.0367)	0.1232***	( 0.0364)	0.1204***	( 0.0369)	69533	0.0219**	( 0.0110)	0.0199*	( 0.0110)	0.0185*	( 0.0110)	69533
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.13: Countries entering alternative control groups by the research sample

	GGS	WVS	ESS
South	Italy	Italy, Spain	Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
North	Sweden	Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden	Finland, Norway, Sweden
West	Belgium, France, Netherlands	France, Netherlands	Belgium, Great Britain, France, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Switzerland
Authoritarian past	-	Spain	Croatia, Portugal, Spain
Current democracy	Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden	Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden	Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland

Notes: Current democracy group defined with The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index equal to 8.20 or higher.

Table E.14: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *South* countries as the control group

	Intensive margin				Extensive margin			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	N	(1)	(2)	(3)	N
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>								
Upwards care	-0.0422**	( 0.0212)	-0.0419*	( 0.0216)	-0.0413*	( 0.0223)	115624	-0.0011
Downwards care	-0.0802***	( 0.0305)	-0.0815***	( 0.0303)	-0.0778**	( 0.0323)	115569	-0.0395***
Upwards money	-0.0347	( 0.0417)	-0.0351	( 0.0384)	-0.0253	( 0.0393)	115578	0.0048
Downwards money	-0.1224**	( 0.0477)	-0.1234***	( 0.0448)	-0.1134**	( 0.0457)	115510	-0.0149
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>								
Upwards care	0.0086	( 0.0183)	0.0161	( 0.0196)	0.0106	( 0.0205)	142618	0.0238**
Downwards care	-0.0137	( 0.0227)	-0.0129	( 0.0228)	-0.0012	( 0.0217)	139625	0.0048
Upwards money	-0.0705***	( 0.0160)	-0.0585***	( 0.0163)	-0.0681***	( 0.0165)	142416	-0.0297***
Downwards money	-0.0214	( 0.0318)	-0.0158	( 0.0327)	-0.0073	( 0.0320)	139637	0.0004
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>								
Income equality	0.5065***	( 0.0704)	0.4201***	( 0.0703)	0.4667***	( 0.0703)	54346	0.0715
Income redistribution	0.2649***	( 0.0317)	0.2494***	( 0.0299)	0.2591***	( 0.0301)	36903	0.1194***
Equality of opportunities	0.0675**	( 0.0274)	0.0605**	( 0.0273)	0.0455*	( 0.0272)	36734	0.0178**
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0127	( 0.0522)	-0.0169	( 0.0556)	-0.0169	( 0.0556)	5232	-0.0504
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No	
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No	
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. South countries: Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.15: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *North* countries as the control group

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	-0.0308	( 0.0219)	-0.0310	( 0.0221)	-0.0294	( 0.0228)	121743	0.0008	( 0.0102)	0.0009	( 0.0101)	0.0039	( 0.0101)	121743
Downwards care	-0.0757**	( 0.0307)	-0.0770**	( 0.0305)	-0.0719**	( 0.0325)	121654	-0.0369**	( 0.0149)	-0.0376**	( 0.0148)	-0.0344**	( 0.0154)	121654
Upwards money	-0.0226	( 0.0435)	-0.0225	( 0.0405)	-0.0119	( 0.0416)	121692	0.0059	( 0.0089)	0.0063	( 0.0086)	0.0087	( 0.0091)	121692
Downwards money	-0.1113**	( 0.0491)	-0.1113**	( 0.0464)	-0.1003**	( 0.0474)	121621	-0.0135	( 0.0115)	-0.0130	( 0.0111)	-0.0115	( 0.0113)	121621
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0148	( 0.0173)	0.0218	( 0.0184)	0.0167	( 0.0192)	148745	0.0267***	( 0.0094)	0.0293***	( 0.0098)	0.0277***	( 0.0100)	148745
Downwards care	-0.0093	( 0.0220)	-0.0088	( 0.0221)	0.0026	( 0.0210)	145756	0.0064	( 0.0118)	0.0064	( 0.0118)	0.0119	( 0.0111)	145756
Upwards money	-0.0651***	( 0.0160)	-0.0532***	( 0.0161)	-0.0622***	( 0.0161)	148545	-0.0280***	( 0.0094)	-0.0219**	( 0.0096)	-0.0259***	( 0.0096)	148545
Downwards money	-0.0208	( 0.0317)	-0.0139	( 0.0327)	-0.0059	( 0.0321)	145767	0.0005	( 0.0183)	0.0045	( 0.0190)	0.0089	( 0.0185)	145767
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.5197***	( 0.0700)	0.4212***	( 0.0705)	0.4822***	( 0.0706)	54390	0.0768	( 0.0125)	0.0594***	( 0.0126)	0.0700***	( 0.0125)	54390
Income redistribution	0.2276***	( 0.0329)	0.1901***	( 0.0327)	0.2020***	( 0.0326)	38760	0.0986***	( 0.0142)	0.0863***	( 0.0141)	0.0905***	( 0.0142)	38760
Equality of opportunities	0.0703**	( 0.0273)	0.0487*	( 0.0272)	0.0439	( 0.0273)	37739	0.0130*	( 0.0078)	0.0094	( 0.0078)	0.0080	( 0.0078)	37739
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. North countries: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.16: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using *West* countries as the control group

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	-0.0378*	( 0.0213)	-0.0371*	( 0.0216)	-0.0361	( 0.0223)	127348	-0.0007	( 0.0101)	-0.0005	( 0.0100)	0.0038	( 0.0100)	127348
Downwards care	-0.0833***	( 0.0299)	-0.0847***	( 0.0299)	-0.0774**	( 0.0314)	134306	-0.0393***	( 0.0145)	-0.0402***	( 0.0145)	-0.0370**	( 0.0150)	134306
Upwards money	-0.0370	( 0.0414)	-0.0364	( 0.0381)	-0.0254	( 0.0392)	121814	0.0031	( 0.0087)	0.0037	( 0.0083)	0.0069	( 0.0090)	121814
Downwards money	-0.1279***	( 0.0470)	-0.1276***	( 0.0441)	-0.1163**	( 0.0452)	121706	-0.0174	( 0.0111)	-0.0168	( 0.0107)	-0.0146	( 0.0110)	121706
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0230	( 0.0161)	0.0293*	( 0.0170)	0.0252	( 0.0177)	161431	0.0303***	( 0.0089)	0.0324***	( 0.0092)	0.0310***	( 0.0094)	161431
Downwards care	-0.0113	( 0.0223)	-0.0121	( 0.0222)	0.0006	( 0.0211)	151359	0.0051	( 0.0121)	0.0042	( 0.0119)	0.0100	( 0.0112)	151359
Upwards money	-0.0649***	( 0.0160)	-0.0533***	( 0.0161)	-0.0631***	( 0.0161)	148670	-0.0275***	( 0.0094)	-0.0220**	( 0.0096)	-0.0263***	( 0.0095)	148670
Downwards money	-0.0219	( 0.0320)	-0.0164	( 0.0328)	-0.0065	( 0.0321)	158442	-0.0005	( 0.0185)	0.0028	( 0.0190)	0.0074	( 0.0186)	158442
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.5164***	( 0.0696)	0.4336***	( 0.0694)	0.4957***	( 0.0692)	50881	0.0739	( 0.0125)	0.0598***	( 0.0125)	0.0703***	( 0.0124)	50881
Income redistribution	0.2557***	( 0.0309)	0.2224***	( 0.0303)	0.2524***	( 0.0302)	47603	0.1146***	( 0.0131)	0.1018***	( 0.0129)	0.1130***	( 0.0129)	47603
Equality of opportunities	0.0281	( 0.0266)	0.0202	( 0.0266)	0.0251	( 0.0268)	46334	0.0117	( 0.0076)	0.0099	( 0.0076)	0.0102	( 0.0077)	46334
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. West countries: Belgium, Great Britain, France, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Switzerland. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.17: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using countries with the *authoritarian past* as the control group

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	-0.0422**	( 0.0212)	-0.0419*	( 0.0216)	-0.0413*	( 0.0223)	115624	-0.0011	( 0.0101)	-0.0011	( 0.0100)	115624
Downwards care	-0.0802***	( 0.0305)	-0.0815***	( 0.0303)	-0.0778**	( 0.0323)	115569	-0.0395***	( 0.0146)	-0.0403***	( 0.0146)	115569
Upwards money	-0.0347	( 0.0417)	-0.0351	( 0.0384)	-0.0253	( 0.0393)	115578	0.0048	( 0.0088)	0.0052	( 0.0084)	115578
Downwards money	-0.1224**	( 0.0477)	-0.1234***	( 0.0448)	-0.1134**	( 0.0457)	115510	-0.0149	( 0.0114)	-0.0144	( 0.0109)	115510
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0086	( 0.0183)	0.0161	( 0.0196)	0.0106	( 0.0205)	142618	0.0238**	( 0.0098)	0.0261**	( 0.0102)	142618
Downwards care	-0.0137	( 0.0227)	-0.0129	( 0.0228)	-0.0012	( 0.0217)	139625	0.0048	( 0.0121)	0.0045	( 0.0121)	139625
Upwards money	-0.0705***	( 0.0160)	-0.0585***	( 0.0163)	-0.0681***	( 0.0165)	142416	-0.0297***	( 0.0095)	-0.0240**	( 0.0097)	142416
Downwards money	-0.0214	( 0.0318)	-0.0158	( 0.0327)	-0.0073	( 0.0320)	139637	0.0004	( 0.0183)	0.0035	( 0.0188)	139637
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.5022***	( 0.0707)	0.4165***	( 0.0705)	0.4625***	( 0.0705)	53359	0.0710	( 0.0128)	0.0566***	( 0.0128)	53359
Income redistribution	0.2616***	( 0.0323)	0.2440***	( 0.0304)	0.2516***	( 0.0306)	32511	0.1175***	( 0.0137)	0.1115***	( 0.0131)	32511
Equality of opportunities	0.0662**	( 0.0277)	0.0619**	( 0.0277)	0.0470*	( 0.0276)	32290	0.0176**	( 0.0079)	0.0166**	( 0.0079)	32290
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0127	( 0.0522)	-0.0169	( 0.0556)	-0.0169	( 0.0556)	5232	-0.0504	( 0.0276)	-0.0527*	( 0.0292)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Countries with authoritarian past: Croatia, Portugal, Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.18: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) using countries with highest *current democracy index* as the control group

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)				(1)	(2)	(3)			
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	-0.0266	( 0.0220)	-0.0266	( 0.0222)	-0.0262	( 0.0230)	127215	0.0021	( 0.0103)	0.0022	( 0.0101)	127215
Downwards care	-0.0851***	( 0.0297)	-0.0860***	( 0.0296)	-0.0779**	( 0.0312)	138315	-0.0385***	( 0.0145)	-0.0389***	( 0.0145)	138315
Upwards money	-0.0226	( 0.0435)	-0.0225	( 0.0405)	-0.0119	( 0.0416)	121692	0.0059	( 0.0089)	0.0063	( 0.0086)	121692
Downwards money	-0.1185**	( 0.0482)	-0.1184***	( 0.0456)	-0.1076**	( 0.0466)	129126	-0.0140	( 0.0114)	-0.0137	( 0.0110)	129129
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0227	( 0.0162)	0.0296*	( 0.0171)	0.0262	( 0.0177)	161303	0.0302***	( 0.0089)	0.0327***	( 0.0093)	161303
Downwards care	-0.0086	( 0.0219)	-0.0081	( 0.0219)	0.0043	( 0.0209)	151240	0.0064	( 0.0118)	0.0064	( 0.0118)	151240
Upwards money	-0.0651***	( 0.0160)	-0.0532***	( 0.0161)	-0.0622***	( 0.0161)	148545	-0.0280***	( 0.0094)	-0.0219**	( 0.0096)	148545
Downwards money	-0.0218	( 0.0320)	-0.0149	( 0.0330)	-0.0050	( 0.0323)	158319	-0.0003	( 0.0185)	0.0038	( 0.0191)	158319
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.3023***	( 0.0787)	0.1818**	( 0.0795)	0.2660***	( 0.0792)	54128	0.0458	( 0.0134)	0.0251*	( 0.0135)	54128
Income redistribution	0.3083***	( 0.0399)	0.2686***	( 0.0369)	0.3009***	( 0.0370)	40384	0.1339***	( 0.0170)	0.1196***	( 0.0160)	40384
Equality of opportunities	0.0540*	( 0.0280)	0.0445	( 0.0278)	0.0465*	( 0.0280)	38518	0.0041	( 0.0082)	0.0014	( 0.0082)	38518
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Countries with current The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index of at least 8.2: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

## E.6 Robustness to the exclusion of selected post-communist countries from the sample

Table E.19: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the research samples excluding *Russia*

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		N
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0625	( 0.0421)	0.0758*	( 0.0420)	0.0736*	( 0.0412)	131023	0.0126	( 0.0157)	0.0178	( 0.0156)	0.0179	( 0.0155)	131023
Downwards care	-0.0256	( 0.0482)	-0.0253	( 0.0483)	-0.0264	( 0.0474)	142128	-0.0163	( 0.0238)	-0.0164	( 0.0239)	-0.0170	( 0.0235)	142128
Upwards money	-0.0269	( 0.0677)	-0.0016	( 0.0674)	-0.0004	( 0.0672)	125488	-0.0010	( 0.0107)	0.0043	( 0.0107)	0.0050	( 0.0108)	125488
Downwards money	-0.1707***	( 0.0615)	-0.1534**	( 0.0613)	-0.1513**	( 0.0608)	132698	-0.0305**	( 0.0147)	-0.0270*	( 0.0147)	-0.0267*	( 0.0147)	132701
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0864***	( 0.0189)	0.0977***	( 0.0189)	0.0968***	( 0.0187)	165133	0.0606***	( 0.0104)	0.0653***	( 0.0105)	0.0652***	( 0.0105)	165133
Downwards care	0.0434***	( 0.0200)	0.0415**	( 0.0199)	0.0462**	( 0.0199)	155145	0.0356***	( 0.0091)	0.0350***	( 0.0091)	0.0371***	( 0.0092)	155145
Upwards money	-0.0220	( 0.0225)	-0.0036	( 0.0225)	-0.0055	( 0.0222)	152398	-0.0131	( 0.0111)	-0.0040	( 0.0111)	-0.0049	( 0.0110)	152398
Downwards money	0.0284	( 0.0216)	0.0394*	( 0.0218)	0.0445**	( 0.0219)	162202	0.0295**	( 0.0131)	0.0358***	( 0.0132)	0.0378***	( 0.0133)	162202
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6463***	( 0.0671)	0.5306***	( 0.0675)	0.5671***	( 0.0691)	57294	0.0936	( 0.0130)	0.0727***	( 0.0132)	0.0788***	( 0.0133)	57294
Income redistribution	0.3328***	( 0.0281)	0.2934***	( 0.0281)	0.2940***	( 0.0283)	72177	0.1412***	( 0.0122)	0.1258***	( 0.0123)	0.1248***	( 0.0125)	72177
Equality of opportunities	0.1269***	( 0.0280)	0.1138***	( 0.0279)	0.1171***	( 0.0279)	70392	0.0268***	( 0.0080)	0.0249***	( 0.0080)	0.0245***	( 0.0080)	70392
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0256	( 0.0492)	-0.0405	( 0.0543)	-0.0405	( 0.0543)	3517	-0.0472	( 0.0259)	-0.0511*	( 0.0289)	-0.0511*	( 0.0289)	3517
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .



Table E.20: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the research samples excluding *Germany*

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.2509***	( 0.0552)	0.2602***	( 0.0560)	0.2519***	( 0.0541)	145294	0.0586***	( 0.0141)	0.0624***	( 0.0145)	0.0588***	( 0.0143)	145294
Downwards care	0.1947***	( 0.0372)	0.1961***	( 0.0374)	0.1900***	( 0.0354)	156383	0.1000***	( 0.0166)	0.1006***	( 0.0167)	0.0973***	( 0.0164)	156383
Upwards money	0.3704***	( 0.1051)	0.3861***	( 0.1073)	0.3862***	( 0.1087)	139743	0.0377	( 0.0232)	0.0409*	( 0.0235)	0.0406*	( 0.0239)	139743
Downwards money	0.0849	( 0.1092)	0.0930	( 0.1115)	0.0918	( 0.1100)	146980	0.0003	( 0.0269)	0.0017	( 0.0271)	0.0008	( 0.0269)	146983
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.3271***	( 0.0288)	0.3329***	( 0.0292)	0.3251***	( 0.0296)	170750	0.1657***	( 0.0193)	0.1682***	( 0.0195)	0.1664***	( 0.0197)	170750
Downwards care	0.1558***	( 0.0475)	0.1553***	( 0.0469)	0.1540***	( 0.0468)	160798	0.0585***	( 0.0210)	0.0589***	( 0.0207)	0.0581***	( 0.0207)	160798
Upwards money	0.2740***	( 0.0504)	0.2840***	( 0.0517)	0.2767***	( 0.0503)	158054	0.0687***	( 0.0272)	0.0739***	( 0.0277)	0.0713***	( 0.0277)	158054
Downwards money	-0.1425***	( 0.0521)	-0.1369***	( 0.0515)	-0.1376***	( 0.0504)	167834	-0.0892***	( 0.0339)	-0.0854***	( 0.0330)	-0.0857***	( 0.0329)	167834
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	-0.1733	( 0.1850)	-0.2733	( 0.1915)	-0.2971	( 0.1953)	59390	-0.0175	( 0.0263)	-0.0358	( 0.0271)	-0.0402	( 0.0273)	59390
Income redistribution	0.1245***	( 0.0370)	0.0763**	( 0.0364)	0.0749**	( 0.0366)	69682	0.0495***	( 0.0167)	0.0307*	( 0.0165)	0.0283*	( 0.0166)	69682
Equality of opportunities	0.1474***	( 0.0378)	0.1312***	( 0.0376)	0.1269***	( 0.0380)	67859	0.0247**	( 0.0113)	0.0228**	( 0.0113)	0.0211*	( 0.0114)	67859
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.21: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the research samples excluding *Poland*

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	-0.0565	( 0.0429)	-0.0414	( 0.0428)	-0.0417	( 0.0428)	128756	-0.0170	( 0.0220)	-0.0110	( 0.0219)	-0.0094	( 0.0219)	128756
Downwards care	-0.1928***	( 0.0566)	-0.1879***	( 0.0565)	-0.1870***	( 0.0562)	139859	-0.1051***	( 0.0248)	-0.1037***	( 0.0248)	-0.1028***	( 0.0246)	139859
Upwards money	-0.2761***	( 0.0447)	-0.2439***	( 0.0442)	-0.2411***	( 0.0438)	123217	-0.0253***	( 0.0081)	-0.0185**	( 0.0080)	-0.0175**	( 0.0080)	123217
Downwards money	-0.3815***	( 0.0536)	-0.3559***	( 0.0522)	-0.3520***	( 0.0523)	130412	-0.0555***	( 0.0162)	-0.0498***	( 0.0160)	-0.0488***	( 0.0160)	130415
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0486***	( 0.0173)	0.0612***	( 0.0177)	0.0609***	( 0.0176)	162866	0.0441***	( 0.0102)	0.0494***	( 0.0103)	0.0493***	( 0.0103)	162866
Downwards care	0.0257	( 0.0214)	0.0240	( 0.0214)	0.0284	( 0.0214)	152872	0.0318***	( 0.0100)	0.0315***	( 0.0101)	0.0337***	( 0.0101)	152872
Upwards money	-0.0683***	( 0.0195)	-0.0492***	( 0.0197)	-0.0507***	( 0.0196)	150138	-0.0258**	( 0.0113)	-0.0172	( 0.0114)	-0.0181	( 0.0113)	150138
Downwards money	0.0557***	( 0.0209)	0.0672***	( 0.0210)	0.0717***	( 0.0211)	159929	0.0481***	( 0.0121)	0.0544***	( 0.0122)	0.0563***	( 0.0123)	159929
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6471***	( 0.0683)	0.5333***	( 0.0687)	0.5633***	( 0.0704)	61293	0.0937	( 0.0129)	0.0738***	( 0.0130)	0.0790***	( 0.0132)	61293
Income redistribution	0.3067***	( 0.0304)	0.2751***	( 0.0302)	0.2810***	( 0.0303)	71161	0.1291***	( 0.0132)	0.1168***	( 0.0132)	0.1181***	( 0.0133)	71161
Equality of opportunities	0.0916***	( 0.0290)	0.0806***	( 0.0289)	0.0822***	( 0.0289)	69352	0.0180**	( 0.0082)	0.0164**	( 0.0082)	0.0158*	( 0.0082)	69352
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0192	( 0.0482)	-0.0319	( 0.0528)	-0.0319	( 0.0528)	4367	-0.0512	( 0.0252)	-0.0561**	( 0.0278)	-0.0561**	( 0.0278)	4367
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.22: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the research samples excluding *Baltic countries*

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0636	( 0.0422)	0.0764*	( 0.0420)	0.0737*	( 0.0413)	136513	0.0128	( 0.0156)	0.0178	( 0.0156)	136513
Downwards care	-0.0236	( 0.0483)	-0.0231	( 0.0484)	-0.0243	( 0.0477)	147628	-0.0155	( 0.0239)	-0.0158	( 0.0240)	147628
Upwards money	-0.0246	( 0.0683)	0.0005	( 0.0680)	0.0023	( 0.0681)	130962	-0.0007	( 0.0108)	0.0047	( 0.0108)	130962
Downwards money	-0.1691***	( 0.0620)	-0.1519**	( 0.0618)	-0.1503**	( 0.0613)	138157	-0.0300**	( 0.0148)	-0.0263*	( 0.0148)	138160
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0860***	( 0.0189)	0.0975***	( 0.0189)	0.0966***	( 0.0187)	165755	0.0605***	( 0.0104)	0.0652***	( 0.0105)	165755
Downwards care	0.0428**	( 0.0200)	0.0409**	( 0.0200)	0.0459**	( 0.0199)	155759	0.0353***	( 0.0091)	0.0348***	( 0.0091)	155759
Upwards money	-0.0224	( 0.0225)	-0.0040	( 0.0224)	-0.0059	( 0.0221)	153032	-0.0133	( 0.0111)	-0.0043	( 0.0111)	153032
Downwards money	0.0288	( 0.0217)	0.0401*	( 0.0218)	0.0443**	( 0.0219)	162821	0.0297**	( 0.0131)	0.0361***	( 0.0133)	162821
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.6343***	( 0.0683)	0.5199***	( 0.0685)	0.5505***	( 0.0697)	60732	0.0921	( 0.0130)	0.0718***	( 0.0131)	60732
Income redistribution	0.3527***	( 0.0299)	0.3088***	( 0.0301)	0.3118***	( 0.0302)	69158	0.1490***	( 0.0131)	0.1316***	( 0.0133)	69158
Equality of opportunities	0.1125***	( 0.0305)	0.0967***	( 0.0304)	0.1017***	( 0.0305)	67387	0.0229***	( 0.0085)	0.0206**	( 0.0085)	67387
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.23: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the research samples excluding *countries with anti-communism uprisings*

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)				(1)	(2)	(3)			
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.2506***	( 0.0547)	0.2581***	( 0.0552)	0.2505***	( 0.0535)	135137	0.0584***	( 0.0139)	0.0616***	( 0.0142)	135137
Downwards care	0.1952***	( 0.0377)	0.1966***	( 0.0378)	0.1912***	( 0.0360)	146248	0.1002***	( 0.0167)	0.1010***	( 0.0169)	146248
Upwards money	0.3708***	( 0.1054)	0.3855***	( 0.1075)	0.3857***	( 0.1089)	129593	0.0379	( 0.0232)	0.0410*	( 0.0235)	129593
Downwards money	0.0838	( 0.1095)	0.0916	( 0.1117)	0.0909	( 0.1105)	136782	0.0001	( 0.0268)	0.0014	( 0.0270)	136785
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.3289***	( 0.0286)	0.3339***	( 0.0290)	0.3254***	( 0.0294)	154127	0.1665***	( 0.0191)	0.1686***	( 0.0193)	154127
Downwards care	0.1491***	( 0.0443)	0.1468***	( 0.0435)	0.1423***	( 0.0441)	147087	0.0568***	( 0.0202)	0.0563***	( 0.0199)	147087
Upwards money	0.2709***	( 0.0495)	0.2782***	( 0.0506)	0.2733***	( 0.0494)	141473	0.0670**	( 0.0273)	0.0709**	( 0.0276)	141473
Downwards money	-0.1482***	( 0.0521)	-0.1441***	( 0.0516)	-0.1440***	( 0.0503)	154142	-0.0910***	( 0.0339)	-0.0882***	( 0.0332)	154142
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	-0.1830	( 0.1745)	-0.2747	( 0.1794)	-0.3056*	( 0.1798)	58511	-0.0187	( 0.0255)	-0.0356	( 0.0262)	58511
Income redistribution	0.1205***	( 0.0410)	0.0958**	( 0.0396)	0.1076***	( 0.0395)	63635	0.0421**	( 0.0186)	0.0323*	( 0.0181)	63635
Equality of opportunities	0.1158***	( 0.0436)	0.1100**	( 0.0433)	0.1128**	( 0.0438)	62224	0.0167	( 0.0144)	0.0169	( 0.0144)	62224
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0228	( 0.0461)	-0.0255	( 0.0510)	-0.0255	( 0.0510)	4313	-0.0520	( 0.0246)	-0.0543**	( 0.0272)	4313
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

## E.7 Additional controls

Table E.24: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the experience of war

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		N
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0631	( 0.0423)	0.0760*	( 0.0421)	0.0729*	( 0.0413)	148216	0.0125	( 0.0157)	0.0176	( 0.0156)	0.0173	( 0.0154)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0250	( 0.0482)	-0.0240	( 0.0483)	-0.0253	( 0.0476)	159313	-0.0163	( 0.0238)	-0.0162	( 0.0239)	-0.0169	( 0.0236)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0252	( 0.0684)	-0.0006	( 0.0680)	0.0008	( 0.0680)	142664	-0.0007	( 0.0108)	0.0045	( 0.0108)	0.0049	( 0.0109)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1688***	( 0.0620)	-0.1519**	( 0.0618)	-0.1505**	( 0.0613)	149857	-0.0300**	( 0.0148)	-0.0264*	( 0.0148)	-0.0263*	( 0.0148)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0861***	( 0.0188)	0.0973***	( 0.0189)	0.0960***	( 0.0187)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0104)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	0.0647***	( 0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	( 0.0200)	0.0420**	( 0.0199)	0.0460**	( 0.0199)	172337	0.0356***	( 0.0091)	0.0351***	( 0.0091)	0.0369***	( 0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0221	( 0.0225)	-0.0039	( 0.0224)	-0.0062	( 0.0221)	169582	-0.0132	( 0.0111)	-0.0043	( 0.0111)	-0.0054	( 0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	( 0.0216)	0.0396*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0219)	179393	0.0295**	( 0.0131)	0.0357***	( 0.0132)	0.0374***	( 0.0133)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6279***	( 0.0680)	0.5121***	( 0.0683)	0.5422***	( 0.0698)	65163	0.0910	( 0.0129)	0.0707***	( 0.0130)	0.0759***	( 0.0131)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3113***	( 0.0285)	0.2734***	( 0.0285)	0.2760***	( 0.0286)	74421	0.1306***	( 0.0126)	0.1159***	( 0.0126)	0.1158***	( 0.0128)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1081***	( 0.0278)	0.0954***	( 0.0277)	0.0975***	( 0.0278)	72642	0.0215***	( 0.0079)	0.0196**	( 0.0079)	0.0191**	( 0.0079)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Table E.25: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the experience of war during impressionable years (IY)

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0631	( 0.0423)	0.0760*	( 0.0421)	0.0729*	( 0.0413)	148216	0.0125	( 0.0157)	0.0176	( 0.0156)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0250	( 0.0482)	-0.0240	( 0.0483)	-0.0253	( 0.0476)	159313	-0.0163	( 0.0238)	-0.0162	( 0.0239)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0252	( 0.0684)	-0.0006	( 0.0680)	0.0008	( 0.0680)	142664	-0.0007	( 0.0108)	0.0045	( 0.0108)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1688***	( 0.0620)	-0.1519**	( 0.0618)	-0.1505**	( 0.0613)	149857	-0.0300**	( 0.0148)	-0.0264*	( 0.0148)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0861***	( 0.0188)	0.0973***	( 0.0189)	0.0960***	( 0.0187)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0104)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	( 0.0200)	0.0420**	( 0.0199)	0.0460**	( 0.0199)	172337	0.0356***	( 0.0091)	0.0351***	( 0.0091)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0221	( 0.0225)	-0.0039	( 0.0224)	-0.0062	( 0.0221)	169582	-0.0132	( 0.0111)	-0.0043	( 0.0111)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	( 0.0216)	0.0396*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0219)	179393	0.0295**	( 0.0131)	0.0357***	( 0.0132)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.6279***	( 0.0680)	0.5121***	( 0.0683)	0.5422***	( 0.0698)	65163	0.0910	( 0.0129)	0.0707***	( 0.0130)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3113***	( 0.0285)	0.2734***	( 0.0285)	0.2760***	( 0.0286)	74421	0.1306***	( 0.0126)	0.1159***	( 0.0126)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1081***	( 0.0278)	0.0954***	( 0.0277)	0.0975***	( 0.0278)	72642	0.0215***	( 0.0079)	0.0196**	( 0.0079)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Table E.26: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the experience of economic recession during impressionable years (IY)

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		N
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0630	( 0.0423)	0.0758*	( 0.0421)	0.0728*	( 0.0413)	148216	0.0125	( 0.0157)	0.0175	( 0.0156)	0.0172	( 0.0154)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0209	( 0.0486)	-0.0199	( 0.0487)	-0.0216	( 0.0480)	159313	-0.0176	( 0.0235)	-0.0176	( 0.0236)	-0.0185	( 0.0232)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0255	( 0.0684)	-0.0009	( 0.0681)	0.0006	( 0.0681)	142664	-0.0007	( 0.0108)	0.0045	( 0.0108)	0.0049	( 0.0109)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1519**	( 0.0635)	-0.1351**	( 0.0630)	-0.1351**	( 0.0627)	149857	-0.0304*	( 0.0156)	-0.0269*	( 0.0156)	-0.0271*	( 0.0156)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0861***	( 0.0188)	0.0973***	( 0.0189)	0.0960***	( 0.0187)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0104)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	0.0647***	( 0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	( 0.0200)	0.0419**	( 0.0199)	0.0459**	( 0.0199)	172337	0.0355***	( 0.0091)	0.0350***	( 0.0091)	0.0369***	( 0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0222	( 0.0225)	-0.0040	( 0.0224)	-0.0064	( 0.0221)	169582	-0.0132	( 0.0110)	-0.0043	( 0.0111)	-0.0054	( 0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	( 0.0217)	0.0396*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0220)	179393	0.0296**	( 0.0132)	0.0357***	( 0.0133)	0.0374***	( 0.0133)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6250***	( 0.0684)	0.5099***	( 0.0687)	0.5399***	( 0.0702)	65163	0.0907	( 0.0130)	0.0705***	( 0.0131)	0.0757***	( 0.0133)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3105***	( 0.0285)	0.2723***	( 0.0285)	0.2748***	( 0.0287)	74421	0.1306***	( 0.0125)	0.1157***	( 0.0126)	0.1156***	( 0.0128)	74421
Equality of opportunities	0.1100***	( 0.0279)	0.0972***	( 0.0278)	0.0993***	( 0.0279)	72642	0.0219***	( 0.0079)	0.0200**	( 0.0079)	0.0194**	( 0.0079)	72642
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Economic recession based on the World Bank data on unemployment rate. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Table E.27: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the occupation

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0583	( 0.0405)	0.0693*	( 0.0406)	0.0661	( 0.0401)	148216	0.0101	( 0.0156)	0.0150	( 0.0156)	0.0151	( 0.0155)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0346	( 0.0475)	-0.0321	( 0.0476)	-0.0325	( 0.0474)	159313	-0.0206	( 0.0236)	-0.0198	( 0.0236)	-0.0199	( 0.0235)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0192	( 0.0701)	0.0015	( 0.0701)	0.0044	( 0.0702)	142664	-0.0005	( 0.0113)	0.0042	( 0.0113)	0.0052	( 0.0114)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1632**	( 0.0633)	-0.1475**	( 0.0633)	-0.1449**	( 0.0629)	149857	-0.0289*	( 0.0152)	-0.0255*	( 0.0152)	-0.0252*	( 0.0151)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0870***	( 0.0189)	0.0973***	( 0.0189)	0.0958***	( 0.0187)	182330	0.0606***	( 0.0104)	0.0648***	( 0.0105)	0.0644***	( 0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0414**	( 0.0202)	0.0424**	( 0.0202)	0.0455**	( 0.0201)	172337	0.0344***	( 0.0091)	0.0350***	( 0.0092)	0.0366***	( 0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0184	( 0.0227)	-0.0030	( 0.0226)	-0.0053	( 0.0222)	169582	-0.0116	( 0.0111)	-0.0041	( 0.0111)	-0.0052	( 0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0293	( 0.0213)	0.0409*	( 0.0215)	0.0444**	( 0.0216)	179393	0.0299**	( 0.0130)	0.0362***	( 0.0131)	0.0377***	( 0.0131)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6081***	( 0.0669)	0.5116***	( 0.0672)	0.5322***	( 0.0682)	65163	0.0874	( 0.0127)	0.0704***	( 0.0128)	0.0739***	( 0.0129)	65163
Income redistribution	0.2895***	( 0.0289)	0.2648***	( 0.0288)	0.2675***	( 0.0289)	70207	0.1200***	( 0.0127)	0.1105***	( 0.0127)	0.1106***	( 0.0128)	70207
Equality of opportunities	0.1005***	( 0.0280)	0.0858***	( 0.0278)	0.0900***	( 0.0279)	68507	0.0200**	( 0.0081)	0.0178**	( 0.0080)	0.0178**	( 0.0081)	68507
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0456	( 0.0499)	-0.0674	( 0.0532)	-0.0674	( 0.0532)	5232	-0.0630	( 0.0265)	-0.0739***	( 0.0283)	-0.0739***	( 0.0283)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .



Table E.28: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the graduation year interacted with the occupation

	Intensive margin				Extensive margin			
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>								
Upwards care	0.0274	( 0.0389)	0.0385	( 0.0389)	0.0371	( 0.0387)	117651	-0.0030 ( 0.0160)
Downwards care	-0.0319	( 0.0476)	-0.0297	( 0.0476)	-0.0300	( 0.0474)	122398	-0.0181 ( 0.0229)
Upwards money	-0.0328	( 0.0637)	-0.0114	( 0.0641)	-0.0080	( 0.0644)	117586	-0.0017 ( 0.0106)
Downwards money	-0.1685***	( 0.0603)	-0.1522**	( 0.0602)	-0.1508**	( 0.0601)	124547	-0.0337** ( 0.0144)
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>								
Upwards care	0.0734***	( 0.0208)	0.0847***	( 0.0208)	0.0833***	( 0.0206)	131388	0.0531*** ( 0.0117)
Downwards care	0.0394*	( 0.0205)	0.0401*	( 0.0206)	0.0415**	( 0.0205)	139986	0.0359*** ( 0.0091)
Upwards money	-0.0258	( 0.0230)	-0.0081	( 0.0228)	-0.0085	( 0.0225)	130566	-0.0128 ( 0.0118)
Downwards money	0.0270	( 0.0221)	0.0401*	( 0.0223)	0.0414*	( 0.0224)	140724	0.0330** ( 0.0135)
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>								
Income equality	0.6053***	( 0.0661)	0.5112***	( 0.0660)	0.5376***	( 0.0669)	65163	0.0856 ( 0.0127)
Income redistribution	0.3119***	( 0.0284)	0.2741***	( 0.0284)	0.2766***	( 0.0286)	74337	0.1310*** ( 0.0125)
Equality of opportunities	0.1085***	( 0.0279)	0.0952***	( 0.0277)	0.0971***	( 0.0278)	72561	0.0217*** ( 0.0079)
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0662	( 0.0532)	-0.0761	( 0.0569)	-0.0761	( 0.0569)	5232	-0.0798 ( 0.0278)
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No	
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No	
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.29: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the rural areas

	Intensive margin						N	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)			(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0384	( 0.0288)	0.0421	( 0.0315)	0.0393	( 0.0322)	100300	0.0051	( 0.0089)	0.0063	( 0.0093)	0.0034	( 0.0094)	100300
Downwards care	0.1377**	( 0.0664)	0.1396**	( 0.0669)	0.1448**	( 0.0637)	111436	0.0843**	( 0.0329)	0.0856**	( 0.0332)	0.0876***	( 0.0328)	111436
Upwards money	-0.0632*	( 0.0362)	-0.0633**	( 0.0320)	-0.0668**	( 0.0314)	100223	-0.0508***	( 0.0077)	-0.0513***	( 0.0068)	-0.0533***	( 0.0066)	100223
Downwards money	-0.2136***	( 0.0509)	-0.2166***	( 0.0483)	-0.2175***	( 0.0487)	104219	-0.0847***	( 0.0228)	-0.0860***	( 0.0223)	-0.0865***	( 0.0228)	104219
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.1065***	( 0.0216)	0.1169***	( 0.0218)	0.1171***	( 0.0217)	120977	0.0691***	( 0.0110)	0.0731***	( 0.0111)	0.0733***	( 0.0111)	120977
Downwards care	0.0406**	( 0.0204)	0.0396*	( 0.0203)	0.0434**	( 0.0202)	124376	0.0344***	( 0.0106)	0.0335***	( 0.0105)	0.0355***	( 0.0106)	124376
Upwards money	-0.0142	( 0.0214)	0.0018	( 0.0214)	0.0009	( 0.0213)	113784	-0.0078	( 0.0114)	0.0003	( 0.0114)	-0.0002	( 0.0114)	113784
Downwards money	0.0629***	( 0.0226)	0.0717***	( 0.0229)	0.0754***	( 0.0232)	131414	0.0455***	( 0.0136)	0.0504***	( 0.0137)	0.0521***	( 0.0139)	131414
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6382***	( 0.0640)	0.5268***	( 0.0645)	0.5709***	( 0.0653)	49842	0.0921	( 0.0128)	0.0730***	( 0.0130)	0.0803***	( 0.0130)	49842
Income redistribution	0.3140***	( 0.0286)	0.2758***	( 0.0285)	0.2763***	( 0.0286)	74326	0.1320***	( 0.0126)	0.1171***	( 0.0126)	0.1161***	( 0.0128)	74326
Equality of opportunities	0.1021***	( 0.0278)	0.0892***	( 0.0276)	0.0921***	( 0.0277)	72557	0.0200**	( 0.0079)	0.0182**	( 0.0079)	0.0177**	( 0.0079)	72557
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0577	( 0.0504)	-0.0705	( 0.0547)	-0.0705	( 0.0547)	4360	-0.0727	( 0.0265)	-0.0777***	( 0.0289)	-0.0777***	( 0.0289)	4360
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$

Table E.30: Coefficients on the exposure to communism controlling for democracy index

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0633	( 0.0423)	0.0761*	( 0.0421)	0.0735*	( 0.0414)	148202	0.0126	( 0.0157)	0.0177	( 0.0156)	0.0176	( 0.0155)	148202
Downwards care	-0.0249	( 0.0482)	-0.0239	( 0.0483)	-0.0249	( 0.0476)	159299	-0.0162	( 0.0238)	-0.0162	( 0.0239)	-0.0167	( 0.0236)	159299
Upwards money	-0.0253	( 0.0684)	-0.0007	( 0.0680)	0.0007	( 0.0680)	142650	-0.0007	( 0.0108)	0.0045	( 0.0108)	0.0050	( 0.0109)	142650
Downwards money	-0.1688***	( 0.0620)	-0.1519**	( 0.0618)	-0.1505**	( 0.0613)	149843	-0.0300**	( 0.0148)	-0.0264*	( 0.0148)	-0.0262*	( 0.0148)	149846
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0861***	( 0.0188)	0.0974***	( 0.0189)	0.0960***	( 0.0187)	182316	0.0604***	( 0.0104)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	0.0647***	( 0.0104)	182316
Downwards care	0.0437**	( 0.0200)	0.0421**	( 0.0199)	0.0461**	( 0.0199)	172323	0.0356***	( 0.0091)	0.0351***	( 0.0091)	0.0369***	( 0.0092)	172323
Upwards money	-0.0221	( 0.0225)	-0.0039	( 0.0224)	-0.0062	( 0.0221)	169568	-0.0132	( 0.0111)	-0.0043	( 0.0111)	-0.0054	( 0.0110)	169568
Downwards money	0.0290	( 0.0216)	0.0397*	( 0.0218)	0.0438**	( 0.0219)	179379	0.0296**	( 0.0131)	0.0357***	( 0.0132)	0.0375***	( 0.0133)	179379
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.5795***	( 0.0770)	0.4295***	( 0.0767)	0.4561***	( 0.0774)	31553	0.0879	( 0.0140)	0.0615***	( 0.0141)	0.0666***	( 0.0143)	31553
Income redistribution	0.5652***	( 0.0452)	0.5106***	( 0.0449)	0.5029***	( 0.0446)	38678	0.2677***	( 0.0210)	0.2459***	( 0.0211)	0.2434***	( 0.0213)	38678
Equality of opportunities	0.0269	( 0.0504)	0.0096	( 0.0504)	0.0102	( 0.0503)	36945	0.0002	( 0.0150)	-0.0029	( 0.0150)	-0.0034	( 0.0150)	36945
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own estimations based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Cohorts: year of birth. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.31: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the Hajnal line of marriage patterns in Europe

	Intensive margin				Extensive margin			
	(1)	(2)	(3)		(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>								
Upwards care	0.0631	( 0.0423)	0.0760*	( 0.0421)	0.0729*	( 0.0413)	148216	
Downwards care	-0.0250	( 0.0482)	-0.0240	( 0.0483)	-0.0253	( 0.0476)	159313	
Upwards money	-0.0252	( 0.0684)	-0.0006	( 0.0680)	0.0008	( 0.0680)	142664	
Downwards money	-0.1688***	( 0.0620)	-0.1519**	( 0.0618)	-0.1505**	( 0.0613)	149857	
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>								
Upwards care	0.0861***	( 0.0188)	0.0973***	( 0.0189)	0.0960***	( 0.0187)	182330	
Downwards care	0.0436**	( 0.0200)	0.0420**	( 0.0199)	0.0460**	( 0.0199)	172337	
Upwards money	-0.0221	( 0.0225)	-0.0039	( 0.0224)	-0.0062	( 0.0221)	169582	
Downwards money	0.0289	( 0.0216)	0.0396*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0219)	179393	
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>								
Income equality	0.6279***	( 0.0680)	0.5121***	( 0.0683)	0.5422***	( 0.0698)	65163	
Income redistribution	0.3113***	( 0.0285)	0.2734***	( 0.0285)	0.2760***	( 0.0286)	74421	
Equality of opportunities	0.1081***	( 0.0278)	0.0954***	( 0.0277)	0.0975***	( 0.0278)	72642	
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.6053***	( 0.0306)	-0.6206***	( 0.0341)	-0.6206***	( 0.0341)	5232	
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No	
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No	
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.32: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for individual religiosity

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0944**	( 0.0457)	0.1063**	( 0.0456)	0.1015**	( 0.0446)	133395	0.0194	( 0.0170)	0.0243	( 0.0169)	0.0235	( 0.0167)	133395
Downwards care	-0.0160	( 0.0512)	-0.0149	( 0.0513)	-0.0172	( 0.0504)	137450	-0.0103	( 0.0249)	-0.0102	( 0.0250)	-0.0111	( 0.0247)	137450
Upwards money	0.0349	( 0.0751)	0.0590	( 0.0748)	0.0608	( 0.0746)	133334	0.0101	( 0.0112)	0.0156	( 0.0110)	0.0160	( 0.0109)	133334
Downwards money	-0.1464**	( 0.0659)	-0.1321**	( 0.0663)	-0.1308**	( 0.0655)	140543	-0.0270*	( 0.0145)	-0.0239	( 0.0145)	-0.0239*	( 0.0144)	140546
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0943***	( 0.0192)	0.1057***	( 0.0196)	0.1036***	( 0.0193)	140414	0.0636***	( 0.0106)	0.0680***	( 0.0107)	0.0677***	( 0.0107)	140414
Downwards care	0.0666***	( 0.0214)	0.0666***	( 0.0214)	0.0709***	( 0.0214)	140414	0.0461***	( 0.0097)	0.0463***	( 0.0097)	0.0488***	( 0.0098)	140414
Upwards money	-0.0135	( 0.0251)	0.0030	( 0.0251)	0.0020	( 0.0247)	140306	-0.0125	( 0.0118)	-0.0043	( 0.0118)	-0.0050	( 0.0117)	140306
Downwards money	0.0501**	( 0.0240)	0.0609**	( 0.0241)	0.0646***	( 0.0243)	140361	0.0428***	( 0.0146)	0.0487***	( 0.0147)	0.0507***	( 0.0147)	140361
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6244***	( 0.0677)	0.5016***	( 0.0680)	0.5287***	( 0.0693)	63388	0.0916	( 0.0129)	0.0701***	( 0.0130)	0.0746***	( 0.0132)	63388
Income redistribution	0.3069***	( 0.0285)	0.2689***	( 0.0284)	0.2723***	( 0.0286)	74064	0.1297***	( 0.0126)	0.1149***	( 0.0126)	0.1151***	( 0.0128)	74064
Equality of opportunities	0.1118***	( 0.0279)	0.0991***	( 0.0277)	0.1009***	( 0.0277)	72287	0.0225***	( 0.0079)	0.0207***	( 0.0079)	0.0200***	( 0.0079)	72287
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0181	( 0.0478)	-0.0228	( 0.0523)	-0.0228	( 0.0523)	4803	-0.0479	( 0.0250)	-0.0497*	( 0.0274)	-0.0497*	( 0.0274)	4803
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.33: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for household size

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		N
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0749*	( 0.0443)	0.0874**	( 0.0441)	0.0841*	( 0.0433)	148216	0.0168	( 0.0162)	0.0217	( 0.0162)	0.0212	( 0.0159)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0184	( 0.0485)	-0.0174	( 0.0486)	-0.0190	( 0.0478)	159313	-0.0140	( 0.0239)	-0.0139	( 0.0240)	-0.0148	( 0.0236)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0211	( 0.0694)	0.0030	( 0.0690)	0.0042	( 0.0689)	142664	0.0008	( 0.0112)	0.0060	( 0.0112)	0.0063	( 0.0113)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1670***	( 0.0626)	-0.1502**	( 0.0623)	-0.1491**	( 0.0617)	149857	-0.0292*	( 0.0150)	-0.0257*	( 0.0150)	-0.0257*	( 0.0149)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0865***	( 0.0189)	0.0982***	( 0.0190)	0.0968***	( 0.0187)	182330	0.0609***	( 0.0105)	0.0656***	( 0.0105)	0.0653***	( 0.0105)	182330
Downwards care	0.0474**	( 0.0203)	0.0457**	( 0.0203)	0.0490**	( 0.0203)	172337	0.0377***	( 0.0093)	0.0371***	( 0.0093)	0.0387***	( 0.0094)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0241	( 0.0223)	-0.0054	( 0.0222)	-0.0075	( 0.0219)	169582	-0.0140	( 0.0110)	-0.0050	( 0.0110)	-0.0059	( 0.0109)	169582
Downwards money	0.0339	( 0.0217)	0.0444**	( 0.0219)	0.0480**	( 0.0220)	179393	0.0322**	( 0.0132)	0.0382***	( 0.0133)	0.0398***	( 0.0133)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income redistribution	0.3119***	( 0.0284)	0.2741***	( 0.0284)	0.2766***	( 0.0286)	74337	0.1310***	( 0.0125)	0.1162***	( 0.0126)	0.1161***	( 0.0127)	74337
Equality of opportunities	0.1085***	( 0.0279)	0.0952***	( 0.0277)	0.0971***	( 0.0278)	72561	0.0217***	( 0.0079)	0.0197**	( 0.0079)	0.0191**	( 0.0079)	72561
Income controls	No		No		Yes		No		No		Yes		Yes	
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		No		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3) and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.34: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the *linear* time trend

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0631	( 0.0423)	0.0760*	( 0.0421)	0.0729*	( 0.0413)	148216	0.0125	( 0.0157)	0.0176	( 0.0156)	0.0173	( 0.0154)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0250	( 0.0482)	-0.0240	( 0.0483)	-0.0253	( 0.0476)	159313	-0.0163	( 0.0238)	-0.0162	( 0.0239)	-0.0169	( 0.0236)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0252	( 0.0684)	-0.0006	( 0.0680)	0.0008	( 0.0680)	142664	-0.0007	( 0.0108)	0.0045	( 0.0108)	0.0049	( 0.0109)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1688***	( 0.0620)	-0.1519**	( 0.0618)	-0.1505**	( 0.0613)	149857	-0.0300**	( 0.0148)	-0.0264*	( 0.0148)	-0.0263*	( 0.0148)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0861***	( 0.0188)	0.0973***	( 0.0189)	0.0960***	( 0.0187)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0104)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	0.0647***	( 0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	( 0.0200)	0.0420**	( 0.0199)	0.0460**	( 0.0199)	172337	0.0356***	( 0.0091)	0.0351***	( 0.0091)	0.0369***	( 0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0221	( 0.0225)	-0.0039	( 0.0224)	-0.0062	( 0.0221)	169582	-0.0132	( 0.0111)	-0.0043	( 0.0111)	-0.0054	( 0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	( 0.0216)	0.0396*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0219)	179393	0.0295**	( 0.0131)	0.0357***	( 0.0132)	0.0374***	( 0.0133)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6279***	( 0.0680)	0.5121***	( 0.0683)	0.5422***	( 0.0698)	65163	0.0910	( 0.0129)	0.0707***	( 0.0130)	0.0759***	( 0.0131)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3065***	( 0.0260)	0.2877***	( 0.0256)	0.2878***	( 0.0259)	304532	0.1183***	( 0.0107)	0.1112***	( 0.0105)	0.1108***	( 0.0107)	304532
Equality of opportunities	0.0845***	( 0.0156)	0.0784***	( 0.0154)	0.0789***	( 0.0153)	298660	0.0122***	( 0.0040)	0.0113***	( 0.0039)	0.0112***	( 0.0039)	298660
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.35: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for separate *linear* time trends in post-communist and other countries

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.2513***	( 0.0555)	0.2604***	( 0.0561)	0.2516***	( 0.0541)	148216	0.0588***	( 0.0142)	0.0625***	( 0.0145)	0.0588***	( 0.0144)	148216
Downwards care	0.1948***	( 0.0374)	0.1963***	( 0.0376)	0.1905***	( 0.0356)	159313	0.1002***	( 0.0167)	0.1009***	( 0.0168)	0.0975***	( 0.0165)	159313
Upwards money	0.3712***	( 0.1056)	0.3868***	( 0.1077)	0.3879***	( 0.1093)	142664	0.0379	( 0.0233)	0.0410*	( 0.0236)	0.0408*	( 0.0241)	142664
Downwards money	0.0842	( 0.1100)	0.0925	( 0.1122)	0.0919	( 0.1113)	149857	0.0002	( 0.0270)	0.0016	( 0.0272)	0.0008	( 0.0271)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.3267***	( 0.0285)	0.3329***	( 0.0290)	0.3252***	( 0.0293)	182330	0.1655***	( 0.0192)	0.1681***	( 0.0194)	0.1664***	( 0.0196)	182330
Downwards care	0.1550***	( 0.0474)	0.1540***	( 0.0467)	0.1529***	( 0.0468)	172337	0.0581***	( 0.0209)	0.0582***	( 0.0206)	0.0573***	( 0.0207)	172337
Upwards money	0.2739***	( 0.0505)	0.2835***	( 0.0517)	0.2767***	( 0.0503)	169582	0.0687***	( 0.0273)	0.0736***	( 0.0277)	0.0716***	( 0.0276)	169582
Downwards money	-0.1425***	( 0.0521)	-0.1373***	( 0.0517)	-0.1376***	( 0.0507)	179393	-0.0892***	( 0.0339)	-0.0859***	( 0.0332)	-0.0860***	( 0.0332)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.1009	( 0.1475)	0.0109	( 0.1575)	0.0041	( 0.1583)	65163	0.0205	( 0.0241)	0.0042	( 0.0254)	0.0028	( 0.0253)	65163
Income redistribution	0.0080	( 0.0223)	0.0062	( 0.0218)	0.0122	( 0.0223)	304532	-0.0047	( 0.0105)	-0.0054	( 0.0103)	-0.0031	( 0.0105)	304532
Equality of opportunities	0.0709***	( 0.0209)	0.0704***	( 0.0206)	0.0662***	( 0.0209)	298660	0.0117**	( 0.0055)	0.0116**	( 0.0055)	0.0107*	( 0.0056)	298660
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .



Table E.36: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the *linear* country-specific time trend

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0629	( 0.0423)	0.0758*	( 0.0421)	0.0730*	( 0.0413)	148216	0.0125	( 0.0157)	0.0176	( 0.0156)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0258	( 0.0484)	-0.0247	( 0.0485)	-0.0257	( 0.0478)	159313	-0.0167	( 0.0239)	-0.0166	( 0.0240)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0254	( 0.0684)	-0.0009	( 0.0681)	0.0006	( 0.0681)	142664	-0.0008	( 0.0108)	0.0044	( 0.0109)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1691***	( 0.0621)	-0.1522**	( 0.0619)	-0.1508**	( 0.0615)	149857	-0.0302**	( 0.0148)	-0.0267*	( 0.0148)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0863***	( 0.0189)	0.0975***	( 0.0190)	0.0961***	( 0.0188)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0105)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	182330
Downwards care	0.0440**	( 0.0200)	0.0423**	( 0.0199)	0.0464**	( 0.0199)	172337	0.0356***	( 0.0091)	0.0351***	( 0.0091)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0226	( 0.0224)	-0.0044	( 0.0224)	-0.0066	( 0.0221)	169582	-0.0135	( 0.0110)	-0.0046	( 0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0287	( 0.0217)	0.0394*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0219)	179393	0.0294**	( 0.0132)	0.0355***	( 0.0132)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.6754***	( 0.0612)	0.5493***	( 0.0609)	0.5908***	( 0.0619)	65163	0.0982	( 0.0125)	0.0763***	( 0.0126)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3094***	( 0.0262)	0.2967***	( 0.0253)	0.2970***	( 0.0254)	304532	0.1192***	( 0.0107)	0.1141***	( 0.0104)	304532
Equality of opportunities	0.0672***	( 0.0152)	0.0639***	( 0.0151)	0.0636***	( 0.0150)	298660	0.0083**	( 0.0038)	0.0080**	( 0.0038)	298660
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.37: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for the *quadratic* time trend

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0631	( 0.0423)	0.0760*	( 0.0421)	0.0729*	( 0.0413)	148216	0.0125	( 0.0157)	0.0176	( 0.0156)	0.0173	( 0.0154)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0250	( 0.0482)	-0.0240	( 0.0483)	-0.0253	( 0.0476)	159313	-0.0163	( 0.0238)	-0.0162	( 0.0239)	-0.0169	( 0.0236)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0252	( 0.0684)	-0.0006	( 0.0680)	0.0008	( 0.0680)	142664	-0.0007	( 0.0108)	0.0045	( 0.0108)	0.0049	( 0.0109)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1688***	( 0.0620)	-0.1519**	( 0.0618)	-0.1505**	( 0.0613)	149857	-0.0300**	( 0.0148)	-0.0264*	( 0.0148)	-0.0263*	( 0.0148)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0861***	( 0.0188)	0.0973***	( 0.0189)	0.0960***	( 0.0187)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0104)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	0.0647***	( 0.0104)	182330
Downwards care	0.0436**	( 0.0200)	0.0420**	( 0.0199)	0.0460**	( 0.0199)	172337	0.0356***	( 0.0091)	0.0351***	( 0.0091)	0.0369***	( 0.0092)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0221	( 0.0225)	-0.0039	( 0.0224)	-0.0062	( 0.0221)	169582	-0.0132	( 0.0111)	-0.0043	( 0.0111)	-0.0054	( 0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0289	( 0.0216)	0.0396*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0219)	179393	0.0295**	( 0.0131)	0.0357***	( 0.0132)	0.0374***	( 0.0133)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.6279***	( 0.0680)	0.5121***	( 0.0683)	0.5422***	( 0.0698)	65163	0.0910	( 0.0129)	0.0707***	( 0.0130)	0.0759***	( 0.0131)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3065***	( 0.0260)	0.2877***	( 0.0256)	0.2878***	( 0.0259)	304532	0.1183***	( 0.0107)	0.1112***	( 0.0105)	0.1108***	( 0.0107)	304532
Equality of opportunities	0.0845***	( 0.0156)	0.0784***	( 0.0154)	0.0789***	( 0.0153)	298660	0.0122***	( 0.0040)	0.0113***	( 0.0039)	0.0112***	( 0.0039)	298660
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.38: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for separate *quadratic* time trends in post-communist and other countries

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)				(1)	(2)	(3)			
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.2513***	( 0.0555)	0.2604***	( 0.0561)	0.2516***	( 0.0541)	148216	0.0588***	( 0.0142)	0.0625***	( 0.0145)	148216
Downwards care	0.1948***	( 0.0374)	0.1963***	( 0.0376)	0.1905***	( 0.0356)	159313	0.1002***	( 0.0167)	0.1009***	( 0.0168)	159313
Upwards money	0.3712***	( 0.1056)	0.3868***	( 0.1077)	0.3879***	( 0.1093)	142664	0.0379	( 0.0233)	0.0410*	( 0.0236)	142664
Downwards money	0.0842	( 0.1100)	0.0925	( 0.1122)	0.0919	( 0.1113)	149857	0.0002	( 0.0270)	0.0016	( 0.0272)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.3267***	( 0.0285)	0.3320***	( 0.0290)	0.3252***	( 0.0293)	182330	0.1655***	( 0.0192)	0.1681***	( 0.0194)	182330
Downwards care	0.1550***	( 0.0474)	0.1540***	( 0.0467)	0.1529***	( 0.0468)	172337	0.0581***	( 0.0209)	0.0582***	( 0.0206)	172337
Upwards money	0.2739***	( 0.0505)	0.2835***	( 0.0517)	0.2767***	( 0.0503)	169582	0.0687**	( 0.0273)	0.0736***	( 0.0277)	169582
Downwards money	-0.1425***	( 0.0521)	-0.1373***	( 0.0517)	-0.1376***	( 0.0507)	179393	-0.0892***	( 0.0339)	-0.0859***	( 0.0332)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.1009	( 0.1475)	0.0109	( 0.1575)	0.0041	( 0.1583)	65163	0.0205	( 0.0241)	0.0042	( 0.0254)	65163
Income redistribution	0.0080	( 0.0223)	0.0062	( 0.0218)	0.0122	( 0.0223)	304532	-0.0047	( 0.0105)	-0.0054	( 0.0103)	304532
Equality of opportunities	0.0709***	( 0.0209)	0.0704***	( 0.0206)	0.0662***	( 0.0209)	298660	0.0117**	( 0.0055)	0.0116**	( 0.0055)	298660
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.39: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) controlling for *quadratic* country-specific time trends

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0629	( 0.0423)	0.0758*	( 0.0421)	0.0730*	( 0.0413)	148216	0.0125	( 0.0157)	0.0176	( 0.0156)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0258	( 0.0484)	-0.0247	( 0.0485)	-0.0257	( 0.0478)	159313	-0.0167	( 0.0239)	-0.0166	( 0.0240)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0254	( 0.0684)	-0.0009	( 0.0681)	0.0006	( 0.0681)	142664	-0.0008	( 0.0108)	0.0044	( 0.0109)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1691***	( 0.0621)	-0.1522**	( 0.0619)	-0.1508**	( 0.0615)	149857	-0.0302**	( 0.0148)	-0.0267*	( 0.0148)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0863***	( 0.0189)	0.0975***	( 0.0190)	0.0961***	( 0.0188)	182330	0.0604***	( 0.0105)	0.0650***	( 0.0105)	182330
Downwards care	0.0440**	( 0.0200)	0.0423**	( 0.0199)	0.0464**	( 0.0199)	172337	0.0356***	( 0.0091)	0.0351***	( 0.0091)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0226	( 0.0224)	-0.0044	( 0.0224)	-0.0066	( 0.0221)	169582	-0.0135	( 0.0110)	-0.0046	( 0.0110)	169582
Downwards money	0.0287	( 0.0217)	0.0394*	( 0.0218)	0.0435**	( 0.0219)	179393	0.0294**	( 0.0132)	0.0355***	( 0.0132)	179393
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.6754***	( 0.0612)	0.5493***	( 0.0609)	0.5908***	( 0.0619)	65163	0.0982	( 0.0125)	0.0763***	( 0.0126)	65163
Income redistribution	0.3094***	( 0.0262)	0.2967***	( 0.0253)	0.2970***	( 0.0254)	304532	0.1192***	( 0.0107)	0.1141***	( 0.0104)	304532
Equality of opportunities	0.0672***	( 0.0152)	0.0639***	( 0.0151)	0.0636***	( 0.0150)	298660	0.0083**	( 0.0038)	0.0080**	( 0.0038)	298660
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0185	( 0.0471)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	-0.0240	( 0.0511)	5232	-0.0497	( 0.0251)	-0.0527*	( 0.0272)	5232
Income controls	no		no		yes			no		yes		
Education controls	no		yes		yes			no		yes		
Demographic controls	yes		yes		yes			yes		yes		
Country effects	yes		yes		yes			yes		yes		
Year effects	yes		yes		yes			yes		yes		
Cohort effects	yes		yes		yes			yes		yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

## E.8 Alternative estimation strategies

Table E.40: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) with imputed income

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0523	( 0.0435)	0.0539	( 0.0431)	0.0499	( 0.0422)	214782	0.0093	( 0.0165)	0.0066	( 0.0157)	214782
Downwards care	-0.0372	( 0.0489)	-0.0235	( 0.0484)	-0.0274	( 0.0477)	237002	-0.0235	( 0.0238)	-0.0126	( 0.0234)	237002
Upwards money	-0.0473	( 0.0672)	-0.0223	( 0.0667)	-0.0222	( 0.0668)	203716	-0.0037	( 0.0105)	-0.0019	( 0.0109)	203716
Downwards money	-0.1811***	( 0.0629)	-0.1724***	( 0.0609)	-0.1724***	( 0.0604)	214823	-0.0338**	( 0.0154)	-0.0322**	( 0.0145)	214827
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>												
Upwards care	0.0820***	( 0.0182)	0.0809***	( 0.0211)	0.0798***	( 0.0208)	271254	0.0589***	( 0.0102)	0.0566***	( 0.0117)	271254
Downwards care	0.0388*	( 0.0200)	0.0515**	( 0.0209)	0.0514**	( 0.0209)	252572	0.0337***	( 0.0092)	0.0400***	( 0.0092)	252572
Upwards money	-0.0276	( 0.0216)	-0.0182	( 0.0237)	-0.0171	( 0.0234)	245854	-0.0151	( 0.0108)	-0.0110	( 0.0117)	245854
Downwards money	0.0291	( 0.0215)	0.0316	( 0.0228)	0.0318	( 0.0228)	266694	0.0298**	( 0.0130)	0.0333**	( 0.0141)	266694
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>												
Income equality	0.6304***	( 0.0673)	0.6425***	( 0.0670)	0.6600***	( 0.0689)	120527	0.0914	( 0.0128)	0.0941***	( 0.0128)	120527
Income redistribution	0.2725***	( 0.0289)	0.2915***	( 0.0289)	0.2937***	( 0.0291)	121518	0.1119***	( 0.0125)	0.1218***	( 0.0128)	121518
Equality of opportunities	0.1131***	( 0.0273)	0.0962***	( 0.0282)	0.0969***	( 0.0283)	119443	0.0235***	( 0.0078)	0.0184**	( 0.0081)	119443
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.0101	( 0.0482)	-0.9130***	( 0.2779)	-0.9130***	( 0.2779)	7514	-0.0469	( 0.0257)	-0.6116***	( 0.1548)	7514
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.41: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the fixed effects panel estimation

	Intensive margin						N	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)			(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	-0.1815***	( 0.0332)	-0.1879***	( 0.0333)	-0.1938***	( 0.0334)	148216	-0.0593***	( 0.0150)	-0.0617***	( 0.0150)	-0.0643***	( 0.0151)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0698**	( 0.0325)	-0.0749**	( 0.0326)	-0.0753**	( 0.0326)	159313	-0.0375***	( 0.0140)	-0.0394***	( 0.0140)	-0.0400***	( 0.0141)	159313
Upwards money	0.2925***	( 0.0338)	0.2831***	( 0.0338)	0.2838***	( 0.0339)	142664	0.0502***	( 0.0104)	0.0476***	( 0.0104)	0.0468***	( 0.0104)	142664
Downwards money	0.2980***	( 0.0327)	0.2926***	( 0.0327)	0.2918***	( 0.0328)	149857	0.0291***	( 0.0097)	0.0275***	( 0.0097)	0.0263***	( 0.0097)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	-0.0423*	( 0.0220)	-0.0427*	( 0.0220)	-0.0455**	( 0.0221)	182330	-0.0173	( 0.0111)	-0.0173	( 0.0111)	-0.0180	( 0.0111)	182330
Downwards care	-0.1060***	( 0.0267)	-0.1027***	( 0.0267)	-0.1044***	( 0.0268)	172337	-0.0418***	( 0.0127)	-0.0417***	( 0.0127)	-0.0422***	( 0.0127)	172337
Upwards money	0.1079***	( 0.0235)	0.1050***	( 0.0235)	0.1019***	( 0.0235)	169582	0.0567***	( 0.0127)	0.0551***	( 0.0127)	0.0536***	( 0.0128)	169582
Downwards money	0.0089	( 0.0231)	0.0076	( 0.0231)	0.0067	( 0.0231)	179393	-0.0025	( 0.0123)	-0.0037	( 0.0123)	-0.0045	( 0.0124)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.42: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the random effects panel estimation

	Intensive margin						N	Extensive margin						
	(1)		(2)		(3)			(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0626*	( 0.0329)	0.0752**	( 0.0329)	0.0721**	( 0.0329)	148216	0.0124	( 0.0161)	0.0174	( 0.0161)	0.0171	( 0.0161)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0251	( 0.0379)	-0.0242	( 0.0379)	-0.0257	( 0.0379)	159313	-0.0163	( 0.0172)	-0.0163	( 0.0172)	-0.0170	( 0.0172)	159313
Upwards money	-0.0254	( 0.0343)	-0.0014	( 0.0342)	0.0001	( 0.0342)	142664	-0.0008	( 0.0080)	0.0043	( 0.0080)	0.0047	( 0.0080)	142664
Downwards money	-0.1657***	( 0.0371)	-0.1491***	( 0.0368)	-0.1479***	( 0.0368)	149857	-0.0300***	( 0.0108)	-0.0265**	( 0.0107)	-0.0265**	( 0.0107)	149860
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0941***	( 0.0183)	0.1041***	( 0.0183)	0.1024***	( 0.0183)	182330	0.0645***	( 0.0093)	0.0684***	( 0.0093)	0.0681***	( 0.0093)	182330
Downwards care	0.0441**	( 0.0187)	0.0420**	( 0.0187)	0.0457***	( 0.0188)	172337	0.0352***	( 0.0094)	0.0345***	( 0.0094)	0.0362***	( 0.0095)	172337
Upwards money	-0.0095	( 0.0207)	0.0075	( 0.0207)	0.0049	( 0.0207)	169582	-0.0079	( 0.0114)	0.0005	( 0.0114)	-0.0007	( 0.0114)	169582
Downwards money	0.0273	( 0.0192)	0.0373*	( 0.0192)	0.0408**	( 0.0192)	179393	0.0277***	( 0.0108)	0.0335***	( 0.0108)	0.0351***	( 0.0108)	179393
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.43: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) including migrants and controlling for migrations

	Intensive margin						Extensive margin							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		N	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)		Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	N
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>														
Upwards care	0.0534	( 0.0408)	0.0649	( 0.0410)	0.0552	( 0.0395)	155711	0.0110	( 0.0152)	0.0138	( 0.0154)	0.0104	( 0.0151)	155711
Downwards care	-0.0311	( 0.0450)	-0.0347	( 0.0449)	-0.0363	( 0.0440)	167843	-0.0185	( 0.0224)	-0.0211	( 0.0224)	-0.0202	( 0.0219)	167843
Upwards money	-0.0416	( 0.0657)	-0.0209	( 0.0659)	-0.0230	( 0.0658)	150023	-0.0028	( 0.0099)	0.0013	( 0.0098)	0.0001	( 0.0098)	150023
Downwards money	-0.1807***	( 0.0582)	-0.1652***	( 0.0579)	-0.1624***	( 0.0575)	158561	-0.0310**	( 0.0138)	-0.0287**	( 0.0137)	-0.0293**	( 0.0135)	158564
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>														
Upwards care	-0.0775***	( 0.0182)	-0.0797***	( 0.0181)	-0.0712***	( 0.0184)	179295	0.0542***	( 0.0103)	0.0535***	( 0.0104)	0.0519***	( 0.0104)	179295
Downwards care	-0.0313*	( 0.0178)	-0.0268	( 0.0180)	-0.0323*	( 0.0182)	171980	0.0298***	( 0.0082)	0.0274***	( 0.0082)	0.0312***	( 0.0082)	171980
Upwards money	0.0453**	( 0.0221)	0.0322	( 0.0219)	0.0449**	( 0.0220)	166255	-0.0245**	( 0.0106)	-0.0181*	( 0.0107)	-0.0230**	( 0.0106)	166255
Downwards money	-0.0110	( 0.0203)	-0.0187	( 0.0209)	-0.0202	( 0.0214)	179219	0.0194	( 0.0125)	0.0240*	( 0.0128)	0.0270**	( 0.0132)	179219
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>														
Income equality	0.2932***	( 0.0852)	0.1793**	( 0.0836)	0.1811**	( 0.0841)	15334	0.0218	( 0.0155)	0.0037	( 0.0153)	0.0055	( 0.0153)	15334
Income redistribution	0.3009***	( 0.0280)	0.2650***	( 0.0278)	0.2674***	( 0.0280)	81698	0.1272***	( 0.0121)	0.1134***	( 0.0120)	0.1133***	( 0.0122)	81698
Equality of opportunities	0.1094***	( 0.0274)	0.0980***	( 0.0273)	0.0991***	( 0.0274)	79913	0.0224***	( 0.0077)	0.0209***	( 0.0077)	0.0200***	( 0.0077)	79913
Income controls	No		No		Yes			No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes			No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes			Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .



Table E.44: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the probit model

	Extensive margin						N
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>							
Upwards care	0.0414	( 0.0549)	0.0570	( 0.0550)	0.0587	( 0.0548)	148216
Downwards care	159307	-0.0451	( 0.0625)	-0.0446	( 0.0628)	-0.0463	( 0.0620)
159307							
Upwards money	-0.0546	( 0.1078)	-0.0299	( 0.1094)	-0.0273	( 0.1104)	142660
Downwards money	-0.1691*	( 0.0945)	-0.1512	( 0.0946)	-0.1493	( 0.0948)	149847
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>							
Upwards care	0.1763***	( 0.0334)	0.1937***	( 0.0337)	0.1924***	( 0.0336)	182325
Downwards care	0.1233***	( 0.0313)	0.1218***	( 0.0313)	0.1264***	( 0.0314)	172330
Upwards money	-0.0290	( 0.0288)	-0.0018	( 0.0290)	-0.0059	( 0.0288)	169568
Downwards money	0.0815**	( 0.0360)	0.0992***	( 0.0364)	0.1040***	( 0.0366)	179390
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>							
Income equality	0.2578	( 0.0369)	0.2025***	( 0.0376)	0.2186***	( 0.0383)	65155
Income redistribution	0.3904***	( 0.0364)	0.3440***	( 0.0366)	0.3479***	( 0.0375)	74415
Equality of opportunities	0.1226***	( 0.0429)	0.1115***	( 0.0428)	0.1086**	( 0.0429)	72615
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.1312	( 0.0638)	-0.1370*	( 0.0706)	-0.1370*	( 0.0706)	5226
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015\_04\_18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

Table E.45: Coefficients on the exposure to communism (EC) in the logit model

	Extensive margin						N
	(1)		(2)		(3)		
	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	Coef. on EC	(Std. Err.)	
<i>Family preferred over social insurance</i>							
Upwards care	0.0335	( 0.0871)	0.0584	( 0.0870)	0.0618	( 0.0869)	148216
Downwards care	-0.0791	( 0.1021)	-0.0791	( 0.1028)	-0.0824	( 0.1013)	159307
Upwards money	-0.1722	( 0.2251)	-0.1350	( 0.2272)	-0.1370	( 0.2288)	142660
Downwards money	-0.3703**	( 0.1845)	-0.3323*	( 0.1855)	-0.3296*	( 0.1864)	149847
<i>Preference for family insurance</i>							
Upwards care	0.2932***	( 0.0578)	0.3242***	( 0.0583)	0.3224***	( 0.0582)	182325
Downwards care	0.2126***	( 0.0543)	0.2102***	( 0.0543)	0.2183***	( 0.0548)	172330
Upwards money	-0.0461	( 0.0464)	-0.0009	( 0.0467)	-0.0079	( 0.0464)	169568
Downwards money	0.1313**	( 0.0588)	0.1600***	( 0.0593)	0.1678***	( 0.0597)	179390
<i>Preference for social insurance</i>							
Income equality	0.4268	( 0.0618)	0.3365***	( 0.0628)	0.3618***	( 0.0640)	65155
Income redistribution	0.6481***	( 0.0604)	0.5694***	( 0.0607)	0.5760***	( 0.0624)	74415
Equality of opportunities	0.2354***	( 0.0811)	0.2155***	( 0.0810)	0.2094***	( 0.0812)	72615
Equality over freedom <sup>a)</sup>	-0.2116	( 0.1027)	-0.2213*	( 0.1138)	-0.2213*	( 0.1138)	5226
Income controls	No		No		Yes		
Education controls	No		Yes		Yes		
Demographic controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Country effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Year effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		
Cohort effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		

Source: Authors' own tabulation based on GGS wave 1 (release 4.2) and 2 (release 1.3), WVS waves 1-5 (release 2015.04.18), and ESS waves 1-8.

Notes: <sup>a)</sup> Observed in Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Spain. Demographic controls: age (quadratic), gender. Income controls: ability to make ends meet (GGS) or scale of incomes (WVS, ESS). Education controls: highest education level attained. Family preferred over social insurance: upwards care – “care for older persons in need of care at their home”, downwards care – “care for pre-school children”, upwards money – “financial support for older people who live below subsistence level”, downwards money – “financial support for younger people with children who live below subsistence level is mainly a task for society or mainly a task for family”. Preference for family insurance: upwards care – “children should take responsibility for caring for their parents when parents are in need”, downwards care – “grandparents should look after their grandchildren if the parents of these grandchildren are unable to do so”, upwards (downwards) money – “children (parents) ought to provide financial help for their parents (adult children) when their parents (the children) are having financial difficulties”. Preference for social insurance: income equality – “incomes should be made more equal”, income redistribution – “government should reduce differences in income levels”, equality of opportunities – “important that people are treated equally and have equal opportunities”, equality over freedom – more important that “nobody is underprivileged and that social class differences are not so strong”. Robust standard errors clustered by year of birth and country. \*\*\* –  $p < 0.01$ , \*\* –  $p < 0.05$ , \* –  $p < 0.1$ .

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