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Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?

Games and Economic Behavior

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Supplementary Material for Does Poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating?

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This file includes:

Appendix A: Sociodemographic/economic characteristics of participants

Appendix B: Instructions of the experiment and questionnaire

Appendix C: Detailed experimental procedure

- Set up
- Procedure
- Pilots

Appendices

Appendix A: Sociodemographic/economic characteristics of participants

Table A1. Sociodemographic/economic characteristics of participants

Characteristics	Before harvest group	After harvest group	Tests	P-value
Age (years)	49.28	50.40	t-test	p = 0.21
Female (%)	70.97	73.57	proportions test	p = 0.51
Education (years in school)	6.56	6.27	t-test	p = 0.24
No. of household members	4.58	4.50	t-test	p = 0.61
No. of working household members	2.32	2.44	t-test	p = 0.20
Multi-generational household (%) ¹	86.02	82.86	proportions test	p = 0.35
Married (%)	88.89	87.50	proportions test	p = 0.69
No. of children of the participants	2.47	2.45	t-test	p = 0.85
In debt (%)	90.32	89.29	proportions test	p = 0.78
The income boost (Thai Baht)	7204	7999	t-test	p = 0.53

Note: The table shows that before- and after-harvest groups have similar characteristics, i.e., they do not differ in age, gender, education, number of children, proportion of people being in debt and the income boost generated by harvest.

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¹ Normally, in an agricultural family everyone who (still) can work will work, at least in their farms. So, only children or old people who are already retired do not work. From this, it follows that a household which contains non-working members is very likely multi-generational. Therefore, for the dummy of a multi-generational household, we calculated the difference between number of household members and number of working household members. The dummy takes a value of "1", if the difference is positive and "0" if there is no difference.

Appendix B: Instructions of the experiment and questionnaire

B.1 Instructions of the experiment

Instructions

(Used to explain the experiment to the participants verbally)

Note: Phrases/sentences in (blanket) are notes for the instructors and are not read out loud.

General information

Hello everyone. Thank you everyone for joining our activity today. Welcome. This project studies decision-making under uncertainty of rice farmers in Ubon Ratchathani. This research is collaboration between Mahidol University, Thailand and Columbia University, USA and is funded by Columbia University.

(Earn real money)

Today we are going to complete 4 activities and conduct a questionnaire. You have already earned 100 Baht for showing-up today. In addition, you will earn more money from the four activities. Your earnings depend on your decisions and decisions of others. You will receive your payoff in cash directly after today's activity. All activities will take around 3 hours.

(Anonymity)

We will identify your decisions only with your cubicle number. The experimenter outside will record your decisions by your cubicle number. He/she does not know who you are, your name or your appearance,. So now nobody will be able to link your decisions with your name and identity.

(Consent form)

It seems like everyone would like to start, doesn't it? Before we start, please sign this consent form. The consent form contains the information stated earlier. In addition, it is stated that ...

- In the data analysis, we will not link your decisions with your identity but only with your cubicle number
- Your decisions will be kept confidentially
- You participate in these activities voluntarily
- You can withdraw from the study any time. In that case, you will be paid only 100
 Baht for showing up
- If you have any questions, please contact Suparee Boonmanunt, Mahidol University. Email: suparee.boo@mahdiol.edu. Tel: 024415000 ext 2213.

(More ...)

There is another team conducting the same activities with farmers from another village. Please do not communicate with others during these activities for your own sake. If you have any questions during the activities, please raise your hand and we will come to you. If you violate the rules, we will ask you to leave the experiment without any additional payment. Any questions so far?

Activities 1-3

...

Activity 4 (Cheating experiment)

We have finished three activities already. Well done! Thank you so much. Now you are going to participate in the next activity. You will be able to earn additional money.

What you do

- (Show an example envelope and 10 pieces of paper as well as demonstrate how to draw a piece and put the piece back in the envelope according to the following steps)
- We will give you an envelope with 10 pieces of paper in it.
- The numbers on the paper pieces are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.
- They are placed in a random order.
- We will ask you to take out one piece of paper in private.
- Once you take a piece of paper out of the envelope, you will see a number.
- Then we ask you to put the piece of paper back in the envelope.
- We ask you to report the number that you saw on an answer sheet.

Payment

- The number you report determines how much money you will be paid.
- You will be paid ten times the number you report.
- (Distribute this table)

If you write	You receive
1	10 Baht
2	20 Baht
3	30 Baht
4	40 Baht
5	50 Baht

If you write	You receive
6	60 Baht
7	70 Baht
8	80 Baht
9	90 Baht
10	100 Baht

Understand?

Do you have any questions so far? Let's do some test questions to see whether you understand this activity. (*Distribute test questions*)

Test questions

- 1. If you report "1", how much will you receive? Baht
- 2. If you report "5", how much will you receive? Baht
- 3. If you report "10", how much will you receive? Baht

(Collect test questions)

Norm treatment (in the afternoon session only!)

We ran a survey on farmers in this province and the majority finds cheating for one's own benefit unacceptable.

We are about to start (Distribute the materials)

Now you have ...

- The envelope with 10 pieces of paper,
- The answer sheet,
- The table that you can look up how much you will receive when you report each number 1-10.

How can you report a number you saw?

(Show the answer sheet)

- The answer sheet looks like this.
- Please write down the number you see here.

Date/ 9 (or 12) / 2017 session: Morning Afternoon
Seat no.:
Answer sheet for Activity 4
Please write down the number you saw

Let's start!

- Please take one piece of paper out of the envelope in private.
- Please see what number you get.
- Please put the piece of paper back in the envelope.
- Please report the number you saw on the answer sheet. (Wait until everyone finished)
- Please write down your cubicle number on the upper right corner.
- If you are done, please close the folder.
- Please wait quietly until everyone is done.

All decision activities are done.

We have finished all four decision activities. You are doing great. Now please let us interview you one-by-one, while the researchers outside are preparing the payment for you. For answering this questionnaire, you will get 100 Baht in addition. Please wait until the interviewer comes to you. When the interview is done, please wait until you are called out to get your payment. We will inform you about the results of all activities in private as well. Thank you very much for your participation and attention.

B.2 Post-experiment questionnaire

Questionnaire									
Date: Sep	tember / I	December	:, 20	17	1.Morr	ning	2.A	fternoon	
ID numbe	r				Team	1	Те	am 2	
Interview	er								
Checker									
Please ma	ke a tick	in the □ t	hat you a	gree wit	h				
1. All thir			· ·	_		ır life as a	a whole th	ese days?	?
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
very uns	atisfied							very s	satisfied
□ 0. Kee	p circle the	·	[□ 1. Ser	nd				tch will do?
	othe r		l othe r) (l other		I ot	he r	
		other		oth	ner		other		
4. Please from anot		•	hat best o	describes	s your cu	rrent rela	tionship v	with an a	verage person
	othe r		l othe r) (l othe	}	I ot	he r	
		other		oth	ne		other		

5. All things considered, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? (*Choose one answer*)

□ 0. N	eed to be	e very ca	reful			<u> </u>	Most pe	ople can	be trust	ed	
6. Do yo	ou think t	hat othe	r people	only hav	ve the be	st intenti	ions?				
0 do not a	1 agree at	2 all	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 agree p	10 erfectly	
7. How	willing w	vould yo	u be to g	give to go	ood caus	es witho	ut expec	ting any	thing in	return?	
0 comple	1 tely unw	2 villing	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 very	10 willing	
8. Are ye	ou a pers	son who	is genera	ally willi	ng to tak	ke risks,	or do yo	u try to a	woid tak	ing risks'	?
0 comple	1 tely unw	2 villing	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 very	10 willing	
9. Are your Please us "very pa	se a scal	-	-	-			•	_	-	ence? neans you	ı are
0 comple	1 tely unw	2 villing	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 very	10 willing	
10. Are in order			_	•	0 0	•	U			for you to	oday
0 comple	1 tely unw	2 villing	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 very	10 willing	

Expenditure 1) Plowing the field							
		TATOTICIT O	- capciiui	uit	mir (I Of	, tiidt 11101	LILLI
17. Expenditure for	fai		of expendi	ture	Raht (Tota	al) in that mo	nth
16. How many Rai do yo	-		Owned	Rai, ren	ted Ra	i, public R	Cai.
Total							
10) Others, specify							
9) Harvesting cost							
8) Rent (if any)							
7) Organic fertilizer (if an	•						
6) Chemical fertilizer (if a	•						
5) Herbicide/Pesticide (if							
4) Transplanting of rice (i	• .						
3) Sowing of rice seeds (i	f any)						
 Plowing the field Rice seeds (if any) 							
Expenditure		Month o	of expendi	ture	Bant (Tota	al) in that mo	nth
5. Expenditure for rice	rarming	3.6	8 34	<u>, I</u>	D 14 /75 :	1) • 41 •	41
14. How many Rai do yo	=	? Rai.	Owned	Rai, ren	ted Ra	i, public R	ai.
☐ 4. To pay debt / rent		□ 5. Oth	ers, spec	ify			
\Box 3. To give to my family	ly members	(who do	not live to	gether)			
☐ 1. To sell		□ 2. To	my own o	consump	tion		
23. To what purposes do dessions)	you use you	-				oly)'? (only aft	ter-hai
☐ 1.Lower than expected			•		Ü	han expected	
12. Does this year's rice	•	•	-				s)
very unsatisfied						very satis	
1 2 3	4	5	6	7	8	9 1	10
11. How satisfied are you	a 17101 UIC II	114110141 51	taution Oi	your no	asciioiu:		

3) Planning (if any)	
4) Herbicide/Pesticide (if any)	
5) Chemical fertilizer (if any)	
6) Organic fertilizer (if any)	
7) Rent (if any)	
8) Harvesting	
9) Others, specify	
Total	

- 18. How many Rai do you plant? ... Rai. Owned ... Rai, rented ... Rai, public ... Rai.
- 19. Expenditure for farming

Expenditure	Month of expenditure	Baht (Total) in that month
1) Plowing the field		
2) Young plants (if any)		
3) Planning (if any)		
4) Herbicide/Pesticide (if any)		
5) Chemical fertilizer (if any)		
6) Organic fertilizer (if any)		
7) Rent (if any)		
8) Harvesting		
9) Others, specify		
Total		

20. Monthly "basic" household expenditure

Expenditure	Baht/Month
1) Rent/Montage	
2) Water	
3) Electricity	
4) Telephone/internet/mobile phone	
5) Food	
6) Transportation	
7) Consumption goods (e.g. soap, shampoo, detergent)	
8) School fee for family members	
9) Cigarette/tobacco & alcohol	
10) Parties/celebrations	

11) Merit/donations			
12) Cloths/cosmetics/decorations			
13) Installment for vehicles or elect	ronic machines		
14) Lottery/Gambling			
15) Others, specify			
Total			
21. Household income around the year	-		
Item	Month of the income	Amount in that particular month	Is it an estimation?
1. Rice			
2. Plant 1			
3. Plant 2			
4. Livestock 1			
5. Livestock 2			
6. Regular work			
7. Wage labor			
8. Transfer from family members (who work outside the village)			
9. Government transfers for old people			
10. Government transfers for poor people			
11. Other			
12. Other			
22. Which months are usually the best i	in terms of net inco	ome for you? (the f	irst three months)
1		3	
☐ No difference			
23. Which months are usually the mos months)	t difficult in terms	s of net income for	you? (the first three
1 2		3	
☐ No difference			
24. Which months are usually the best i	in terms of food fo	r you? (the first thr	ree months)

	on this are usually the 2		•	? (the first three months
☐ No difference	ce			
26. Does any a	dult in the househol	ld currently have a	loan?	
□ 0. No (Go to	30)	□ 1. Ye	S	
27 How much	does your househol	d borrow from you	r friends and relati	ves? Baht.
28 How much	loan does your hous	sehold have?	Baht.	
•	n which months do		•	ny the loan? Do you havelow)
Month	Loan receipt?	Interest paid?	Loan repaid?	Difficulties with payment?
April				
May				
June				
July				
August				
September				
October				
November				
December				
January				
February				
March				
	nonth has the housel	_		f the following problems

☐ 3. Dea Medical exp				arner in	the hous	sehold (p	lease cho	ose): Los	s of income	; /
☐ 4. Dea				arners in	the hou	sehold (p	lease cho	oose): Los	ss of income	: /
☐ 5. Loss	_	-	•	nntion as	sets / live	estock / cr	ops due t	o flood		
□ 6. Loss	-			-			-			
☐ 7. Loss	•			•			•			
31. Do you c				•	seis / IIve	Stock / CI	ops due t	ome		
•	-	nave an	iy saviliş		☐ 1. Yes					
□ 0. No (Go	10 33)			L	」 1. 1 es					
32. Where do	o you sa	ve?								
□1. At home			□2. Bank			□3. Savings groups/cooperatives				
□4. Insurance company			□5. Gold □6. Livestock (cows / buffalos)					s)		
□7. ROSCAs			□8. Savings programs for retirement							
□9. Cremation group			□10. Others, specify							
33. Does you	ır family	live in	your ow	n house o	on your o	wn land?				
□ 0. No			\square 1. Yes, we live in our own house in our own land							
34. Have you	ı lived ir	n this vi	llage sin	ce you w	ere born?					
□ 0. No			□ 1. Yes							
35. How acc	eptable i	s it to cl	neat for	one's owr	n private	benefit?				
				П		П			П	
			_	_						
1 very unacce	2 eptable	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 very acc	10 ceptable	
36. In the las in your life?	t month,	, how of	ten have	you felt	that you v	were unat	ole to con	trol the in	nportant thin	gs
1		2		3		4		5		

Never	Almost never	Sometimes	Fairly often	Very often				
37. In the last month, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle your personal problems?								
1	2	3	4	5				
Never	Almost never	Sometimes	Fairly often	Very often				
38. In the last month, how often have you felt that things were going your way?								
1	2	3	4	5				
Never	Almost never	Sometimes	Fairly often	Very often				
39. In the last month, how often have you felt difficulties were piling up so high that you could not overcome them?								
1	2	3	4	5				
Never	Almost never	Sometimes	Fairly often	Very often				
40. Gender:	□ 0. Male	□ 1. Female						
41. Age:	years old							
42. Marriage stat	us: \square 0. Single	☐ 1. Married	\square 2. Divorced /	Widow				
43. Children:								
44. How many members are there in your family?								
45. Amount of members who are working								
46. Your level of	education							
1.No School			2.Primary school (level)					
3.Secondary	school (level)		4.Diploma (level)					
5.Bachelor degree (level)								

47. Main occupation (select one choice)

1.Rice farmer	2.Farmer, specify				
3.Wageworker	4.Government officer				
5.Company employee	6.Business owner				
7.Others, specify					
48. Supplemental occupation (select all that apply)					
1.Rice farmer	2.Farmer, specify				
3.Wageworker	4.Livestocks, specify				
5.Government officer	6.Company employer				
7.Public health volunteer	8.Others, specify				
49. Are you a community leader, e.g. village headman, assistant headman, savings group committee, informal leader, etc.?					
□ 0. No □ 1 Yes					
50. Are you a member of any of these following groups? (Only after-harvest sessions)					
□ 0.No					
1.Savings group / Cooperatives	2.Cremation group				
3.Female occupational group	4.Organic farming group				
5.Volunteering group in development project	6.Scouts				
7.Resource conservation group	8.Others, specify				
51. Could we contact you in case we have further q	uestions?				
0. No 1 Yes, mobile number					

Thank you very much for participating in this survey

Appendix C: Detailed experimental procedure

Set up

We conducted a cheating experiment with 568 rice farmers who grow rice once a year. We used a between-subjects experimental design with 283 farmers before harvest and 285 farmers after harvest. We conducted 24 before-harvest sessions (12 sessions of baseline cheating game and 12 sessions of social-norm-reminder game) in 24 villages with one session in each village (on 25-30th of September 2017) and 24 after-harvest sessions (12 sessions of baseline cheating game and 12 sessions of social-norm-reminder game) in other 24 villages (on 8-14th of December 2017). See Figure C1 for the location of the different villages.

We recruited 12 farmers in each village through brochures. Interested farmers had to register for the experiment with a community leader suggested by the Community Development Department. If more than 12 farmers registered, we randomly chose 12 farmers who could participate in the study. Since some registered farmers did not show up, there were 3 sessions with fewer than 12 participants: 10 participants in one before-harvest and one after-harvest session and 9 participants in one before-harvest session.




Figure C1. Map of study sites

Note: We conducted our experiments in 48 villages in Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand: 24 villages before-harvest marked with red symbols and another 24 villages after-harvest marked with green symbols.

Procedure

We conducted four one-shot pen-and-paper experiments in all sessions. Prior to the Cheating experiment, farmers played Prisoner's Dilemma, Prisoner's Dilemma with third party punishment and the Dictator game. All decisions were made in private. The order of the experiments remained the same for all participants in all 48 sessions. No feedback about experimental earnings from each game was provided during the experiment. In this study, we focus only on decisions in the Cheating experiment. To be on the safe side, we checked whether farmer's earnings and decisions in the

previous games have an effect on their cheating behavior. We find no significant effect of the previous decisions or earnings on the cheating behavior in regressions.

The protocol was as follows. First, participants drew a random seat number (from 1 to 12) and took the seat correspondingly. After they signed the consent form, we explained the experiments to them. They were informed that there would be four decision activities and we would explain the rules of each game at the beginning of that particular game. After describing the game through a written script and presentation materials, subjects had to answer test questions correctly. Only then we proceeded with the experiment.

Plastic cubicles and folders for putting answer sheets inside were used to keep decisions private. Furthermore, in each session there was one experimenter who instructed the experiments and another one who sat outside and typed farmers' decisions in computer after each decision. The experimenter inside could see participants faces but not their decisions, while the experimenter outside could see participants decisions but not their faces. With this procedure we could not identify participants' answers. After the experiment, participants answered a questionnaire face-to-face with an interviewer, who was unaware of any of their decisions in the experiments. Finally, we paid farmers directly at the end of each session in cash.

Pilots

Prior to the experiments, we conducted two pilots in order to test the protocol, instructions and other instruments and to train our research assistants to conduct the experiments. We ran the first pilot with 24 Thai undergraduate students of Mahidol University divided in two sessions (on August 2nd, 2017). Later, on August 20th, 2017, we ran a second pilot with 24 actual rice farmers in another district of Ubon Ratchathani, also divided in two sessions.