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Firm or bank weakness? Access to finance since the European sovereign debt crisis

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Firm or bank weakness?
Access to finance since the
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Abstract

This paper uses a unique dataset where credit rejections experienced by euro area firms are matched with firm and bank characteristics. This allows us to study simultaneously the role that bank and firm weakness had in the credit reduction observed in the euro area during the sovereign debt crisis, and in credit developments characterising the post-crisis recovery. Compared with the existing literature matching borrowers' and lenders' characteristics, our dataset provides a better representation of euro area firms of small and medium size. Our findings suggest that, while firm balance sheet factors have been strong determinants of credit rejections, in the crisis period bank weakness made it harder to obtain external finance for firms located in stressed countries of the euro area.

KEYWORDS: Credit supply, Bank lending, Credit crunch, European sovereign debt crisis.

JEL Classification: E44, F36, G01, G21.

Non-technical summary

Since the European sovereign debt crisis, credit developments have diverged across the euro area. While bank lending to non-financial corporations located in periphery countries has strongly decreased, bank loans to enterprises based in core countries have increased. Several factors may account for such divergence. On the one hand, credit demand by firms located in the periphery may have been constrained by the lack of new business opportunities or stronger deleveraging needs. On the other hand, these firms may have faced stronger obstacles to accessing external finance. Very different policy implications could be drawn depending on which factors stand behind such divergent credit developments.

Results from the ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) provide useful information in this respect. They show that firms located in the periphery were more likely to see their bank loan applications rejected in the period that goes from 2010 to 2018. However, looking at SAFE results in isolation does not provide sufficient information to understand whether such more frequent credit rejections were due to a lower creditworthiness of firms, or there were also supply-side weaknesses at play.

Against this background, this paper builds a unique dataset where loan application information from SAFE is matched with firms' and banks' balance sheet information. Specifically, we combine the ECB proprietary SAFE-Amadeus-Orbis dataset – which augments SAFE with information on firms' financial statements from Bureau van Dijk's Orbis and Amadeus – with data on banks' asset quality, capitalisation, and profitability obtained from Fitch Connect. Using this comprehensive dataset, we are able to study whether the stronger obstacles to obtaining a bank loan faced by firms located in the periphery have been due to being less creditworthy than their peers in core countries, or rather due to confronting banks with a lower ability to grant credit.

We find that firm leverage and profitability are strongly associated with the probability of credit rejections. However, loan applications have been rejected more often in stressed countries than in core countries, and this gap is not explained fully by differences in firm characteristics. Interaction terms allowing for a different impact of firm characteristics across the two country groups do not show statistical significance.

When we include in our analysis bank health measures, results suggest that periphery-specific bank weakness can help explaining the higher rejection rates experienced by firms operating in stressed countries, even when taking into account firm creditworthiness. Additionally, we find that in times of crisis banks with a higher level of non-performing loans (NPLs) seem to lend less even to creditworthy firms, but the effect of the NPL ratio depends on its level. Specifically, at reasonably low levels, a higher NPL ratio might signal the bank use of a more aggressive business model and, as such, be associated with a fewer rejection rate. Only at the high levels, mostly observed in periphery countries, do higher NPL ratios signal weakness in the bank balance sheet, and thus a limited ability to grant loans even to sound firms.

1 Introduction

Since the European sovereign debt crisis, bank lending to euro area non-financial corporations (NFCs) located in periphery countries has decreased considerably, while bank loans to enterprises based in core countries have increased. In this paper, we examine the determinants of such divergent credit developments across the euro area.

According to economic theory, several explanations may account for the observed differences in credit dynamics across the euro area. On the one hand, it could be that firms located in the periphery may have demanded less credit, e.g. due to a lack of new business opportunities; they could have also experienced stronger deleveraging needs. On the other hand, it could also be that firms operating in the periphery faced stronger obstacles to accessing external financing. Very different policy implications could be drawn depending on which factors stand behind such divergent credit developments.

Results from the ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE) provide useful information in this respect. They show that firms located in the periphery were more likely to see their bank loan application rejected in the period that goes from 2010 to 2018, compared to their core country peers. SAFE data however do not provide sufficient information to understand whether the observed difference in credit rejections can be fully explained by a lower creditworthiness of firms operating in the periphery, or if there were also supply-side factors at play.

Against this background, in this paper we build a unique dataset where information on credit applications from SAFE is matched with firms' and banks' balance sheet information. Using this database we can examine simultaneously how firm and bank characteristics influenced bank decision to grant credit to firms operating across the euro area. Overall, we find that both firm and bank characteristics matter for the outcome of bank loan applications. In times of crisis, weak banks tend to lend less, even when taking into account firm creditworthiness. Our results also suggest that bank weakness can explain the higher credit rejection rates experienced by firms operating in stressed countries during the crisis.

We contribute to the literature by building a unique dataset which represents very well small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in the euro area. A number of papers in the literature study the causes of the credit crunch in the euro area employing the [Khwaja and Mian \(2008\)](#) identification strategy, which requires longitudinal loan level data with different banks lending to the same firm. [Acharya et al. \(2018\)](#) study European syndicated loans. While their dataset covers firms operating in different euro area countries, syndicated loans account for less than 10% of euro area lending and cater mostly to large established corporations. Their findings have therefore little to say on SMEs, which in contrast are well represented in our dataset. From a policy perspective, analysing SMEs' access to bank financing is crucial, both because they account for the majority of all businesses in Europe and for their strong reliance

on bank financing. Other papers apply the Khwaja and Mian (2008) identification strategy to credit registry data matched with bank supervisory information (Jiménez et al. 2012, 2014, 2017, and Bofondi et al. 2018). While their datasets have good coverage of SMEs and very detailed information on the characteristics of each loan granted, they cover firms operating only in one country. Thus, these papers cannot explain differences across countries, which is the main question we address in this paper.

Another crucial feature of our study is that we are able to observe if a firm has applied for a bank loan and the outcome of its loan application. SAFE indeed reports whether firms applied for loans in the previous 6 months and if their credit application was rejected, partially granted or fully granted. Most papers instead, including those based on syndicated loan data as Acharya et al. (2018), do not observe cases in which credit was demanded but not granted. We argue that observing credit rejections, as well as the share of granted credit over the amount requested, is crucial for understanding firms' obstacles to external finance. In this respect, SAFE shows that credit was not fully granted in around 40% of all cases during our sample period (see Table 1). Besides this, suppose in a certain time period a firm borrows more than in the previous period, but its borrowing needs have increased to an even larger extent. In this case, any identification strategy will fail, unless one observes the share of granted credit over the amount requested. Therefore, this information is essential in understanding whether this firm is facing stronger obstacles to access external finance.

In addition, our data allows us to observe discouraged borrowers, i.e. firms that did not apply for bank loans as they were fearing a possible rejection. This is an innovation compared to studies using credit registry data such as Jiménez et al. (2012), (2014) and (2017), and Bofondi et al. (2018). While datasets used in these studies include loan application outcomes, discouraged borrowers do not appear, given that these firms did not apply for a loan. However, covering discouraged borrowers is important for the scope of our analysis, given that these borrowers appear to be particularly credit constrained (Ferrando and Mulier 2015).

While there are a few papers that augment SAFE with information on firm and bank characteristics (e.g. Ferrando et al. 2019 and Betz and De Santis 2019), our study constitutes the first attempt to systematically combine information from the ECB proprietary SAFE-Amadeus-Orbis dataset with data on bank characteristics, which we retrieve from Fitch Connect. Matching SAFE with both firm and bank balance sheet information is crucial for the purpose of our analysis. Indeed, SAFE neither includes information on firms' financial statements, nor reports the name of the bank(s) to which firms have requested credit. However, banks are known to analyse firms' financial accounts (e.g. firm leverage and profitability) when assessing whether to grant them credit. At the same time, whether a credit application will be successful may also depend on bank soundness.

Our results can be summarised as follows. Although we find that firm characteristics strongly determine the outcome of bank loan applications, they do not fully explain the large difference be-

tween core and periphery countries. On the other hand, we find evidence that periphery-specific bank weakness can help explaining this difference. Specifically, we find that factors summarising bank weakness affected the probability of experiencing credit rejections more strongly in the periphery than in the core – while we find no evidence for a different impact of firm characteristics across the two country groups. Finally, we do not observe any evidence of capital mis-allocation, including in the euro area periphery.

Turning to the role played by individual bank characteristics, we find that credit rejections are positively and significantly associated with having a relationship with a bank displaying a higher ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs). In line with findings shown in previous studies (see e.g. [Jiménez et al. 2017](#)), bank weakness seems to have played a more prominent role during the crisis than in the post-crisis years. Additionally, we find evidence of a non-linear effect of the bank NPL ratio on credit rejections. At reasonably low levels, mostly characterising banks in core countries, a higher NPL ratio does not necessarily indicate bank weakness. It might rather signal the use of a more aggressive business model and, as such, be associated with less credit rejections. On the other hand, at the high levels observed in periphery countries, a higher NPL ratio most likely signals weak bank balance sheet, and we find it being significantly associated with a lower propensity to grant loans even to sound firms.

Results are robust to different definitions of credit rejection and are not driven by a larger concentration of distressed firms in the periphery. They are also robust to an alternative firm-bank matching criterion applied to those firms reporting multiple bank relationships. Indeed, while in the baseline specification, we match firms with their first listed bank (as e.g. in [Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2018](#) and [Ferrando et al. 2019](#)), our findings are robust to linking firms to the healthiest bank of those listed.

All in all, this paper contributes to the economic literature by studying euro area credit dynamics during and in the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis. Thanks to our unique dataset matching credit rejections with firm and bank characteristics, we are able to study the role that firm and bank weakness played in the evolution of the access to external finance of euro area firms, including those of small and medium size, since the European sovereign debt crisis.

2 Related literature

Few empirical works study loan application outcomes in conjunction with firm and bank characteristics, and they limit their analysis to specific countries only. [Bofondi et al. \(2018\)](#) use Italian credit register data to study the transmission of sovereign stress to Italian banks and their lending during the sovereign debt crisis. [Jiménez et al. \(2017\)](#) use Spanish credit register data of loan applications matched with bank and firm variables. While their analysis is able to distinguish between credit supply and demand, it focuses on Spain and does not cover the

European sovereign debt crisis period. [Jiménez et al. \(2012\)](#) and [\(2014\)](#) also use this dataset; the former paper analyses the effects of contractive monetary policy and adverse economic conditions on lending through the bank balance-sheet channel, while the latter identifies the impact of monetary policy on banks' risk-taking in the period preceding the global financial crisis.

Among recent studies using SAFE data, [Ferrando et al. \(2017\)](#) find that firms in stressed countries became more likely to be denied credit, to be credit rationed, and to face higher loan rates in the crisis period. [Holton et al. \(2014\)](#) find that private sector indebtedness has important effects on SMEs' credit access, also underlining a negative impact of a bank balance sheet channel. Both these studies neither control for firm-level leverage and profitability ratios nor for bank characteristics. Looking at the papers that use the ECB's SAFE-Amadeus-Orbis confidential dataset, [Ferrando and Mulier \(2015\)](#) study the behaviour of discouraged borrowers in the euro area in the 2010-14 period. They find that, all other factors being equal, firms are more likely to be discouraged in countries where the average interest rate charged by banks is higher. However, given that they do not match firms with their banks, they cannot exploit within-country variability in bank characteristics, which is what we have done in this paper. [Ferrando et al. \(2019\)](#) and [Betz and De Santis \(2019\)](#) augment the SAFE-Amadeus dataset managed by the ECB with information on bank characteristics. Compared to this paper, they do not control for firm financial ratios and focus on a limited time span, as they evaluate the impact of a specific policy such as the announcement of the ECB Outright Monetary Transaction programme (OMTs) or the ECB corporate sector purchase programme. They also focus on firms linked to a much narrower sample of banks than ours, since they restrict their analysis to banks that are active in the sovereign bond market or participate in syndicated loans – e.g. [Ferrando et al. \(2019\)](#) include information on 126 banks from Bankscope and 25 banks from the EBA stress tests, compared with 826 banks in our sample. Moreover, they focus their study on the impact of a different set of bank characteristics. Related to this literature, [Altavilla et al. \(2018\)](#) use data from a different ECB survey, the Bank Lending Survey, to study whether borrowers demand less credit from banks with weak balance sheet positions.

Among others, [Kalemli-Ozcan et al. \(2018\)](#) stress the importance of taking into account the role played by firm leverage in explaining recent credit dynamics in the euro area. They find that excessive corporate debt accumulated during the boom years can be linked to weak investment in the aftermath of the crisis, and that interacts with weak credit supply from banks. Compared with this paper, we are able to match firm and bank characteristics with credit application rejections. A number of recent papers, including [Acharya et al. \(2019\)](#), [Storz et al. \(2017\)](#), and [Schivardi et al. \(2018\)](#), find that loan 'evergreening' to distressed firms in the euro area periphery has produced capital mis-allocation. However, [Schivardi et al. \(2018\)](#) show that previous studies largely over-estimate the macroeconomic effects of this source of capital mis-allocation.

Our paper also relates to the literature that studies credit supply shocks. A recent contribution by [Acharya et al. \(2018\)](#) applies a version of the [Khwaja and Mian \(2008\)](#) estimator to European

syndicated loan data, so as to identify the effect of supply factors by analysing the change in credit granted to the same firm by different banks. However, syndicated loans account for just 10% of euro area lending and cater mostly to large established corporations rather than SMEs. Alternative identification strategies have been proposed by [Gilchrist et al. \(2018\)](#), who estimate supply-induced contractions in the availability of bank credit exploiting the fact that US banks originate loans across multiple local markets. [Greenstone et al. \(2017\)](#) also study US data, obtaining county-level lending shocks thanks to variation in preexisting bank market shares and estimated bank supply-shifts.

In addition, our paper is related to a vast literature that studies the effects of bank asset quality during the crisis, focusing in particular on direct sovereign exposures (see e.g. [Acharya and Steffen 2015](#) and [Ongena et al. 2019](#)). [Popov and van Horen \(2015\)](#), [Altavilla et al. \(2017\)](#) and [Acharya et al. \(2018\)](#) find that domestic sovereign exposures amplified the transmission of sovereign stress to banks, so causing a reduction in bank lending to the private sector. [Gennaioli et al. \(2018\)](#) show similar findings analysing a number of sovereign stress episodes which occurred from 1998 to 2012 around the world. On the other hand, [Bofondi et al. \(2018\)](#) find that sovereign portfolio diversification helped little against the transmission of sovereign stress to Italian banks, which reduced lending irrespectively of their direct sovereign exposures. In line with this finding, [Corbisiero \(2016\)](#) and [Tabellini \(2018\)](#) argue that euro area banks may suffer from domestic sovereign stress irrespectively of portfolio diversification, being unlikely to survive capital flights and bank runs due to the fear of home sovereign default and a following euro exit. Also in light of these conflicting findings, in our paper we use indicators of bank weakness alternative to direct sovereign exposures.

3 Data and stylised facts

3.1 Data

To study the role of firm and bank weakness in credit dynamics since the European sovereign debt crisis, we construct a unique dataset where credit rejections experienced by euro area firms are matched with firm and bank characteristics.

3.1.1 Firm-level characteristics

We obtain data on loan application outcomes (our main variable of interest) from the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), a survey conducted on behalf of the ECB and the European Commission every six months since 2009. The dataset is constructed by randomly selecting NFCs operating in the euro area and neighbouring countries, with the number of firms adjusted to increase the accuracy of the survey across countries, economic activity, and size

classes. Sectors covered by the survey include construction, industry, services, and trade within the European Union. As the survey questionnaire was significantly revised at the beginning of 2010, we restrict our analysis, starting from wave 3.

While some of the SAFE waves also cover non-euro area countries, we restrict our analysis to firms operating in the euro area only, so as to keep monetary policy constant across countries (Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2018 and Altavilla et al. 2017).¹ For the same reason, we exclude firms operating in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as these countries joined the euro area only after the starting point of our sample period. Out of this sample, we extract data for firms that reported having applied for bank credit in the preceding six months or not having applied because of the fear of a possible rejection (discouraged firms).

Using the information provided by SAFE, we are able to classify firms according to the outcome of their bank loan applications in the previous 6 months: (i) received all the credit demanded, (ii) received most (i.e. 75% or more) of the credit demanded, (iii) received a limited part (i.e. less than 75%) of the credit demanded, (iv) refused the loan offered as the interest charged was too high, (v) its credit demand was fully rejected, or (vi) did not apply being discouraged. In addition, we extract from SAFE data on firms' perception on their business outlook in terms of profitability, sales and business plan, as well as on changes in firms' credit history and own capital. We also obtain data on firms' turnover, number of employees, sector of activity, and on the year of establishment.

Given respondents' difficulties in answering on the phone questions related to quantitative accounting elements, SAFE does not collect firms' balance sheet and profit & loss account information. However, such information is crucial for the purpose of our analysis. Banks are indeed known to analyse firms' financial statements when deciding whether to grant credit. Consequently, the ECB has developed, together with Bureau van Dijk (BvD), a proprietary dataset that augments the responses of the firms participating in SAFE with information on their financial accounts. The latter is extracted from BvD's Amadeus and Orbis, commercial datasets covering around 21 million companies across Europe and 310 millions companies worldwide, respectively. From these datasets, we extract data on firms' pre-existing leverage, return on asset, investment, and debt servicing capacity. The latter three variables are also used in the empirical analysis to identify highly distressed firms, also known in the literature as 'zombie firms' (see e.g. Storz et al. 2017). Data retrieved from Amadeus and Orbis have annual frequency and span back to 2007 to allow for the construction of indicators of firm soundness based on lagged financial variables.

As BvD is able to match around 80% of the firms in SAFE with firms' balance sheet information,

¹The smallest euro area countries (Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia) are not systematically included in each wave, but appear at least in one wave per year. However, as they represent less than 3% of the number of employees in the euro area, this should have only a marginal effect on the results for the euro as a whole.

we are left with 34,038 firm-wave observations, corresponding to 20,945 firms for the period H1 2010 - H1 2018 (SAFE waves 3 to 19). This relatively limited number of observations is explained by the fact that a large share of the firms in SAFE reported not having applied for loans in the previous six months as they had sufficient funds. Therefore they are not included in our dataset.

3.1.2 Linking firm-level data with banks' balance sheet information

In addition to firms' financial information, BvD also reports the name of each firm's current bank(s). Such information is available only for a subset of 12 euro area countries, namely: Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Slovenia. Approximately 50% of the firms operating in these countries in our SAFE-Amadeus-Orbis dataset report the name of their current main bank(s), corresponding to 57% of the firm-wave observations. For these firms, we extract data on their banks' relationships from the latest available release of the SAFE-Amadeus-Orbis dataset. Following [Giannetti and Ongena \(2012\)](#), [Storz et al. \(2017\)](#) and [Kalemli-Ozcan et al. \(2018\)](#), we assume that bank-firm relationships do not change over short horizons of time, such as the time-span of our analysis;² likewise, in line with [Ferrando et al. \(2019\)](#), we assume that a firm's reported banks correspond to the banks a firm borrows from.

Should a firm report multiple bank relationships, we match it with its first listed bank. Banks are not listed generally in alphabetical order; thus, we assume that the respondent's ordering conveys information on the relevance of its relationship with each of its banks.³ As a robustness, we also perform an alternative matching, which links firms with the 'healthiest' bank listed.⁴ This is also motivated by the fact that [Altavilla et al. \(2018\)](#) find that banks soundness is a factor taken into account by firms when selecting who to borrow from.

Matching firms with banks is not straightforward as Bureau van Dijk's Amadeus and Orbis do not report any additional information on the bank, beside its name. Moreover, bank names are not reported in a consistent manner across firms. For example, while in some instances the full name of the bank (including the geographical location of the local bank branch) is reported, in other cases, acronyms are used. At the same time, different banks often have very similar names, making it difficult to use approximate-matching algorithms. As a consequence, we often need to match observations manually to avoid incurring type I errors.

Nevertheless, our matching rate is extremely high: out of the firms that report their banks' name,

²[Kalemli-Ozcan et al. \(2018\)](#) compare the 2015 vintage of Amadeus with that of 2013. [Giannetti and Ongena \(2012\)](#) compare the 2010 vintage of KOMPASS (the original data source of information contained in Amadeus) with that of 2005. Both studies find that bank-firm relationships are extremely sticky over time.

³[Kalemli-Ozcan et al. \(2018\)](#) and [Ferrando et al. \(2019\)](#) follow the same approach. [Storz et al. \(2017\)](#) instead match firms with the largest domestic bank reported (in terms of total assets in 2007).

⁴To identify the 'healthiest' bank among those listed, we rank banks in terms of the average NPL ratio in the period 2009-2018 and select that with the lowest NPL ratio.

we are able to successfully match over 98% of our observations.⁵ As in Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018), unmatched observations often relate to small cooperative banks, for which information is not available in online data platforms. As many firms happen to borrow from the same bank, our dataset includes information of 826 individual banks when considering the first listed bank.⁶ From Fitch Connect, we retrieve data on the bank's financial position (e.g. equity, net income, deposits, assets, and liabilities) and asset quality (NPL ratios). Bank level data have annual frequency. Finally, we complement our dataset by including information of country real GDP forecasts (2-years ahead) retrieved from the European Commission's AMECO dataset.

Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in our empirical specification. The detailed definition of all variables can be found in Table 2 (firm and macro variables) and Table 6 (bank variables).

[Table 1 here]

3.2 Stylised facts

From June 2010 to September 2014, bank loans to NFCs decreased by around 23% in stressed countries but increased by around 4% in the rest of the euro area (Figure 1).

[Figure 1 here]

This difference could be entirely due to a lower demand for loans in the periphery, as a result of, for instance, a stronger decline in business opportunities. SAFE provides useful information to understand which factors stand behind these dynamics. Figure 2 shows how many SAFE respondents reported to have been totally denied credit, as a percentage of those who reported to have applied for bank loans. The euro area average peaked in the middle of the sovereign debt crisis and has decreased since then. However, cross-country differences are relevant, with Italy and Spain, the two largest economies in the periphery, showing a higher percentage of credit rejections than the rest of the euro area, particularly during the crisis.

[Figure 2 here]

Another interesting stylised fact is shown in Figure 3. Besides those that got denied credit, a relevant share of firms reported not having even applied for loans, because of being discouraged. Again, periphery countries display larger shares of discouraged firms compared to the rest of the euro area; and such shares tend to decline, overall, in the years following the sovereign debt crisis.

[Figure 3 here]

⁵Using Bankscope, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2018) are able to successfully match 87.6% of all the bank name observations. Storz et al. (2017) are able to match 95% of the firms reporting the name if the bank.

⁶When we match firms with the 'healthiest' bank, we are left with 758 individual banks in our dataset.

Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that the lower aggregate lending in the periphery during the crisis was not entirely due to a lower demand. At least part of the difference, indeed, was due to firms being more often denied credit. However, a difference in the financial soundness and/or in the profitability of firms applying for bank loans could still be the main or the only reason explaining diverging credit dynamics across euro area countries. Such consideration underlines the importance of controlling for appropriate firm characteristics, which we obtain thanks to the SAFE-Amadeus-Orbis dataset.

Moving towards examining facts related to bank weakness, Figure 4 shows the median ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans of banks operating in selected euro area countries, and in the euro area as a whole.

[Figure 4 here]

During the crisis and its aftermath, banks in stressed countries registered much larger NPL ratios – one of the several proxies that, following the literature (e.g. Schivardi et al. 2018 and Storz et al. 2017), we use below to measure bank soundness – compared to banks in the rest of the euro area. This suggests to further explore the role played by bank weakness, and underlines the importance of an empirical specification that can examine loan rejections not only in conjunction with firm characteristics, but also with measures of bank soundness.

4 Empirical analysis

We analyse a number of empirical models that can be broadly summarised according to the following specification:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Credit rejection}_i = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Periphery}_i + \beta_2 \text{Firm leverage}_i + \beta_3 \text{Firm ROA}_i + \sum_{j=4}^{n+3} \beta_j \text{Firm characteristics}_i \\ & + \sum_{l=n+4}^{n+m+3} \beta_l \text{Bank characteristics}_i + \sum_{z=n+m+4}^{n+m+r+3} \beta_z \text{Other control variables}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

In our baseline specification, the dependent variable ‘credit rejection’ equals 1 if the firm reported (i) to have applied for bank loans in the previous six months but got nothing, or (ii) to have applied but only got a limited part (i.e. strictly less than 75%) of its demand, or (iii) not to have applied being discouraged, or (iv) to have refused credit because it was offered at a too high cost.⁷ It equals 0 if the firm reported (i) to have applied for bank credit and got everything, or (ii) to have applied and got most (i.e. 75% or more) of its demand. We analyse below the robustness of results to a more agnostic specification of the dependent variable following an ordered probit model.

⁷Ferrando and Mulier (2015) estimate that the majority of discouraged borrowers would be unable to get a loan if they would apply.

‘Periphery’ is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the firm applying for the loan operates in a stressed country and 0 otherwise. Following the sovereign debt crisis literature (see e.g. [Altavilla et al. 2017](#)), we classify as periphery countries Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain; the core countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Slovakia. ‘Firm leverage’ and ‘firm ROA’ proxy for firm j ’s financial soundness and profitability, respectively; ‘firm characteristics’ is a vector of additional n characteristics of firm j ; and ‘bank characteristics’ is a vector of m characteristics of the bank that firm j reports being its main bank. Other control variables include wave (semester) dummies, which control for shifts over time due, for instance, to monetary policy, global factors, or euro area-level business cycle dynamics; and yearly GDP growth forecasts for the country where firm i operates, which control for the country-specific business cycle.

It is important to note that our regressions are not run at the loan level, i.e. we do not match a firm and a bank to each single loan application. Our dependent variable refers instead to the overall outcome of bank loan applications submitted by each firm during the past semester. Subsequently, this outcome is matched with the bank that each firm reports being its main bank.⁸

SAFE includes some panel structure, but only for a limited number of firms. Each of these panellist firms, moreover, are not interviewed systematically, i.e. they appear only in a small subset of the survey waves. This makes the panel structure not only small in size and possibly poorly representative, but also heavily unbalanced. For this reason, the models analysed in this paper are estimated as pooled cross section.

The dependent variable ‘credit rejection’ in [Equation 1](#) is a vector of dimension $1 \times g$, where g is the number of realisation of the dependent variable in our sample. A certain realisation of ‘credit rejection,’ say i , corresponds to a certain firm, say j , that experiences or not credit rejection at a certain time, say t ; values assumed by each of the independent variables will then refer to values associated to the firm j at time t .⁹ Time t refers to the semester of realisation of ‘credit rejection’. The value of ‘firm leverage’ and ‘firm ROA’ associated to a realisation of ‘credit rejection’ in semester t refers to $t - s$, where $s = 1$ semester, if the realisation of the dependent variable is observed in the first half of the year; and $s = 2$ semesters, if the realisation is observed in the second half of the year.¹⁰

As SAFE is semiannual, while Amadeus-Orbis and FitchConnect are annual, we need to make an assumption on how to treat a firm possibly appearing twice in a year, to avoid counting the same value of an annual variable twice. We include data of the first semester if the firm reported

⁸If the firm reports multiple bank relationship, we use a number of different matching criteria. See [Section 4.2](#) for more details.

⁹The use of a pooled cross section implies that, if a firm is interviewed more than once, each observation is treated as a separate event. The issue of potential bias due to autocorrelation is discussed in [Section 4.1](#).

¹⁰We regress credit rejections of the lagged value of firm leverage and profitability given that this is the information possibly available to banks receiving loan applications.

the same outcome in both semesters, and data of the semester of credit rejection otherwise.

We split the sample period into ‘crisis’ and ‘post-crisis’ in a number of model specifications. The ‘crisis’ period includes SAFE waves from 3 (covering the semester March-September 2010) to 11 (April-September 2014), while the ‘post-crisis’ period includes waves from 12 (October 2014-March 2015) to 19 (April 2018-September 2018). Choosing the starting point of the post-sovereign debt crisis period is obviously subject to a risk of arbitrariness. We choose the second half of 2014 given that, starting from this semester, both Spanish and Italian 10-year sovereign bonds have yielded below 3% and displayed spreads below 200 basis points compared to German sovereign bonds of the same maturity.

4.1 The role of firm characteristics

In this section, we investigate whether the higher credit rejection rates observed in the periphery can be entirely explained by differences in the creditworthiness and profitability of the firms in the two country groups.

4.1.1 The baseline empirical model

The first two columns of [Table 2](#) report the impact of firm characteristics on the outcome of bank credit applications, estimated for the full sample period (March 2010 to September 2018). They show that being located in a stressed country and being more leveraged are both associated with a higher probability of credit rejection; in contrast, being more profitable is associated with fewer rejections.

[Table 2 here]

Other firm characteristics are also significantly associated with credit rejections and display the expected sign. Firms that report a deteriorated business outlook, own capital and credit history experience higher probability of credit rejection. Having a smaller turnover, a lower number of employees, and being established more recently are associated with a higher probability of credit rejection. Moreover, firms operating in industry and construction are estimated to be more likely to experience credit rejections compared to firms operating in services (the omitted sector in the regressions).

Turning to macroeconomic indicators, the positive and significant coefficient of GDP growth forecast suggests that operating in a country with a better growth outlook is associated with a higher probability of credit rejection. While being counterintuitive, this can be explained by the ‘mean reversion’ components of GDP forecasts. If the estimated potential growth of GDP is not correctly revised, the more realised growth is below its estimated potential, the more forecasts

tend to over-state recovery in the near- to the medium-term ahead.¹¹ At the same time, all regressions estimate that an improvement in the firm-specific business outlook is significantly associated with a smaller probability of experiencing credit rejections.

When we interact ‘firm leverage’ with the crisis years, we do not find a statistically significant change in its estimated effect. In contrast, we find a significant and stronger negative impact of ‘periphery’ on the access to finance during the crisis, while the opposite holds for ‘firm ROA.’ To further explore such differences, in columns (3) to (6) we allow the impact of all variables to vary from crisis to post-crisis, re-estimating the linear probability and the probit model separately for the two periods. Estimated average marginal effects from the probit models strongly confirm a sizeable economic significance of ‘periphery.’ Else equal, being located in a stressed country of the euro area is estimated to increase the probability that a firm will experience credit rejection by 17% during the crisis and by 11% in the post-crisis (or by 18% and 13%, according to the linear probability model).

Interestingly, we find no evidence of different impact of firm leverage and profitability on the likelihood of credit rejections across the two country groups (see the insignificant interactions of ‘firm leverage’ and ‘firm ROA’ with ‘periphery’).

Figure 5 shows the adjusted predictions at representative values that the firm leverage ratio and return on asset assume over the whole range of their values computed from the probit model, for periphery and core firms, in the crisis and the post-crisis period. Operating in a stressed country is associated with a substantially higher probability of being denied credit, at *any level* of firm leverage and profitability in both periods. A difference remains but attenuates in the post-crisis period. In all cases the curves are parallel, consistently with the insignificance in the interaction of firm leverage and profitability with periphery. Turning to the economic significance of variables, during the crisis, moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the distribution of firm leverage increased the probability of credit rejection by about 25%. The result is very similar for the post-crisis period, while the curves are shifted down. The impact of firm profitability on credit rejection is found to be significant in the post-crisis period, where moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the distribution increases the probability of credit rejection by above 10%, while during the crisis period the curves display only a slightly negative slope.

[Figure 5 here]

SAFE collects random samples from a large population of firms at each wave independently of each other. Therefore, autocorrelation should not be an issue in the use of a pooled cross section. However, independent sampling does not hold within the subset of firms appearing in

¹¹We use GDP growth forecasts instead of contemporaneous GDP growth because of endogeneity concerns. However, replacing forecasts with realised growth rates leaves results unchanged; and, as expected, a higher realised growth rate is found to be significantly associated with a lower probability of credit rejections.

more than one wave (i.e. ‘panellist’ firms), and autocorrelation might still occur among them. For instance, we might have a firm that is discouraged due to a past rejection, and include both events in our sample without accounting for their serial correlation. To take into account this source of potential bias, we run regressions on a restricted sample that includes ‘panellist’ firms only the first time they are sampled in SAFE, i.e. only the time they were randomly selected. Results are reported in Table 10 in the Appendix and strongly confirm those shown in Table 2, both in terms of statistical and economic significance.

We also perform an additional robustness check by estimating the same linear probability model as in Table 2 separately for each SAFE wave. In this way, we can verify that the results obtained so far are not driven by our definition of crisis and post-crisis periods. Figure 6 reports the estimated coefficients of ‘periphery,’ ‘firm leverage’ and ‘firm ROA’, and the related confidence intervals.¹²

[Figure 6 here]

In line with previous findings, the economic significance of firm leverage remains above zero in each semester and is statistically significant. On the other hand, the coefficients of firm ROA and ‘periphery’ vary substantially, with the latter peaking in 2012 and then reducing in a rather consistent manner. This suggests that, in times of lower sovereign stress, credit rejections seem to be due relatively less to country-specific stress factors.

4.1.2 Controlling for distressed firms

A number of recent papers, including Acharya et al. (2019), Storz et al. (2017), and Schivardi et al. (2018), argue that a substantial amount of distressed (or “zombie”) firms have emerged in periphery countries following the crisis; and that granting credit to these firms has generated capital mis-allocation.¹³

To avoid interpreting credit rejections to distressed firms as obstacles to external finance, regressions shown in Table 3 include a dummy variable, which accounts for the presence of distressed firms. Following Storz et al. (2017), we classify a firm as “distressed” if it reported negative return on asset, negative net investment, and an EBITDA-to-total financial debt ratio smaller than 5% in both the two years preceding the bank loan application. As a result, we are able to single out highly-indebted non-profitable firms that do not invest beyond the value of depreciation of their fixed assets. The negative net investment requirement ensures that we do not classify as “distressed” young firms that are expanding their business and are not yet profitable. At the same time, the use of a debt servicing capacity measure rather than the interest rate cov-

¹²Complete estimates are included in Table 12 in the Appendix.

¹³It is less clear whether this has had large or negligible aggregate effects. Acharya et al. (2019) and Storz et al. (2017) argue in favour of the first hypothesis; Schivardi et al. (2018) find that their estimates are flawed.

erage indicator ensures that highly-indebted firms receiving subsidised credit are not mistakenly classified as healthy firms.¹⁴

[Table 3 here]

Table 3 shows that, as expected, distressed firms face a higher probability of credit rejections.¹⁵ This notwithstanding, findings strongly confirm those in Table 2. Being located in a stressed country of the euro area is estimated to increase the probability of credit rejection by the exact same percentage, i.e. 17% during the crisis and 10% in the post-crisis years (or by 19% and 11% respectively, according to the linear probability model).

Most importantly, we check whether a larger concentration of distressed firms in the periphery can explain the higher rejection rates in such countries. The interaction of ‘periphery’ with ‘distressed firm’ shows no statistical significance. At the same, the coefficient associated to ‘periphery’ remains unchanged, signalling that a relevant part of the higher rejection rates observed in the periphery remains unexplained even taking into account this additional source of firm weakness.

We also check whether our results are robust to an alternative definition of firm distress, based on Altman (1968). In line with the literature, we classify as distressed firms those firms that display an Altman Z-score with value smaller than 1.8.¹⁶ Results are broadly confirmed, as shown by Table 11 in the appendix. In the rest of the paper, we proxy firm distress as in Storz et al. (2017) because the indicator based on the Altman criterion would imply classifying a too large share of firms as distressed – that is, above 40% of firms in our sample.

4.1.3 Refining the definition of credit rejection: Ordered probit

We also exploit the richness of our dependent variable using an ordered probit model (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975).¹⁷ We classify the dependent variable into four categories, ordered according to whether the firm applied for bank credit and (i) got everything, (ii) got most of it (i.e. 75% or more), (iii) got only a limited part of it (i.e. strictly less than 75%), or (iv) got nothing. We exclude firms discouraged from applying, as well as those which refused credit because of its too high cost, so as to be rigorous about the ordering of responses.¹⁸

¹⁴Caballero et al. 2008 assumes that “distressed” firms receive subsidised credit. Therefore, using the interest coverage indicator may be misleading.

¹⁵AMEs of ‘distressed firm’ during crisis vs. post-crisis are computed from regressions that do not include interaction terms; this explains the difference in the significance between AMEs and the probit coefficients.

¹⁶As in Ferrando and Mulier (2015), we compute the Z-score for non-financial corporations using the following formula: $0.717 \times \frac{\text{working capital}}{\text{total assets}} + 0.847 \times \frac{\text{retained earnings}}{\text{total assets}} + 3.107 \times \frac{\text{EBIT}}{\text{total assets}} + 0.420 \times \frac{\text{equity}}{\text{debt}} + 0.998 \times \frac{\text{sales}}{\text{total assets}}$.

¹⁷While preserving the ordering of responses, the ordered probit makes no assumptions about the interval distances between them. OLS estimates, in contrast, would assume equal distance when dealing with more than two outcomes – which is not appropriate in this setting.

¹⁸Obviously this choice comes at the expense of a reduction in the sample size.

Table 4 broadly confirms the results discussed above. Being located in a stressed country, as well as being more leveraged and less profitable, are estimated to increase significantly the chances of experiencing a worse credit application outcome.

[Table 4 here]

Table 4 also includes estimated AMEs of ‘periphery’ for the four different categories, splitting the sample period into crisis and post crisis. All else equal, firms in the periphery are estimated to be 8% more likely to be totally denied credit, but 19% less likely to obtain their entire demand than their peers based in core countries during the crisis period. In line with previous results, significant differences remain, but decreased in magnitude, in the post-crisis period. Following the crisis, firms operating in periphery countries are still estimated to be 4% more likely to be totally denied credit, and 11% less likely to obtain the entire amount demanded.

4.2 Accounting for the role played by bank weakness

The findings discussed so far suggest that the financial soundness of firms demanding loans goes a long way in explaining credit rejections. Other characteristics related, for instance, to the firm-specific business outlook, the size, both in terms of turnover and number of employees, the age and the sector are also significantly associated with the likelihood of obtaining the requested credit.

In spite of the explanatory power of such variables, however, our findings suggest that the higher rejection rates that firms located in the euro area periphery have experienced since the sovereign debt crisis are not entirely due to firm-specific factors. This leads us to investigate further the role that bank weakness might have played, as well as its possible determinants.

To do so, we augment the empirical model by including variables that can identify the soundness of banks in our sample. As our dataset includes a number of small and non-listed banks, market-based measures, such as CDS spreads, are often either not available or insufficiently accurate. Thus, we use instead bank balance sheet information, which we obtain from the Fitch Connect database.

We are able to retrieve the name of each firm’s main bank(s) only for firms operating in a subset of the euro area countries in our sample, namely: Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, and the Netherlands (core countries); and Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Slovenia (periphery countries). As the sample is reduced substantially, we employ as the baseline specification a more parsimonious model than the one used in Table 3 to avoid incurring further loss of observations. Specifically, in the baseline specification the only Amadeus-Orbis variable we retain is ‘firm leverage’ – which is found to have the strongest and most significant explanatory power in the regressions discussed above.¹⁹ However, we check the robustness of all

¹⁹Thanks to this more parsimonious specification, models including bank characteristics have sample size in

our main results to including firm ROA and the firm distress dummy in the regressions.

Before studying the role played by bank characteristics, we verify that our smaller sample remains representative of the larger one we used in the models described in Section 4.1. Table 5 shows results from linear probability models separately estimated for the following different samples: (1) the full SAFE-Amadeus sample analysed in Section 4.1; (2) the smaller sample obtained excluding observations from the four countries where no firm reports its bank(s) in Amadeus (namely, Belgium, Finland, Italy, and Slovakia); and (3) the even smaller sample limited only to observations where both firms report their bank(s) and Fitch Connect provides values for all the bank characteristics we include in the subsequent regressions. In column (4) of Table 5 we show the results obtained by re-estimating the model for the same sample as in (3), but this time also including bank variables in the regression. Columns (5) to (8) repeat the same exercise as in (1) to (4), but with a model that includes in addition ‘firm ROA’ and ‘distressed firm’.

[Table 5 here]

The results in columns (2) and (3), as well as those in columns (6) and (7), are very comparable to those obtained in the full sample (columns 1 and 5 respectively). However, when we include bank characteristics (columns 4 and 8), the coefficient associated with periphery becomes smaller and it is not significant. This different result is not explained by a change in the sample: the models (3) and (4), as well as (7) and (8), are estimated on the same sample, respectively, and use the same regressors, apart from bank variables. Therefore, once we control for bank weakness – possibly a lasting consequence of the sovereign debt crisis shock that hit particularly periphery banks – we do not find evidence of an unexplained difference in credit rejection rates across the two country groups in the post-crisis years. This is a first sign of how linking credit rejections to bank characteristics can be important, when one analyses euro area credit dynamics since the sovereign debt crisis.

4.2.1 The role of bank characteristics

The firm-bank matching performed in the baseline specification follows the approach undertaken by e.g. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. 2018 and Ferrando et al. 2019; namely, we match each firm that reports multiple bank relationships with its first listed bank.²⁰ The results discussed in this section, however, are tested against a meaningful alternative firm-bank matching criterion (discussed in more details below).

Following the recent literature that focuses on the role of weakness of euro area banks (see e.g. Schivardi et al. 2018 and Storz et al. 2017), we proxy for the soundness of a bank by including the

range between 7,474 and 8,437 observations, depending on the number of bank variables included. The sample size of the full specification varies instead from 5,262 to 5,741 – corresponding to about 30% reduction.

²⁰This criterion is preferred because generally banks are not listed in alphabetic order, so the ordering can convey relevant information about the relative importance of the relationships the firm has with the banks reported.

following variables: *(i)* bank capitalisation, measured as the ratio between a bank's equity and its total assets; *(ii)* bank NPLs ratio, corresponding to the share of the bank's non-performing loans over its total gross loans; *(iii)* bank return on assets (ROA), equal to net income over total assets; *(iv)* bank Z-score, computed as the ROA plus equity-to-assets ratio, divided by the standard deviation of ROA over the sample period of a bank; and *(v)* bank maturity mismatch, corresponding to the difference between total deposits and liquid assets, divided by the bank's total assets. Furthermore, we control for the bank size, expressed as the logarithm of the bank's average total assets over the sample period.

In Table 6, we start by adding to the model one bank variable at a time (columns 1 to 5), also including an interaction term with 'crisis.' Each of these variables is estimated to be significantly associated with credit rejections. Having a relationship with a bank whose NPL ratio is higher, is associated with a higher probability of credit rejection. Being linked to a better capitalised bank also seems to marginally reduce the chance of facing a credit rejection during the crisis, but shows the opposite sign in the post-crisis years – which might suggest better capitalised banks have switched to tougher standards for granting credit. Both the Z-score and the ROA, which provide different measures of the profitability of a bank, show the expected negative relationship with credit rejections. A higher value of the bank maturity mismatch might signal balance sheet liquidity risks; its estimated association with higher rejection rates in the post-crisis years seems consistent with this interpretation. On the other hand, a higher value of this indicator might be mainly due to a larger reliance of the bank on customer deposits, generally considered as a stable source of funding; this might explain its small negative relationship with credit rejections during the crisis period.

[Table 6 here]

When we re-estimate the model including all bank characteristics (columns 6 and 7), the only variable retaining its significance unchanged is the bank NPL ratio. This is not surprising, given the primary role the literature assigns to NPLs as a proxy for bank weakness (see e.g. Schivardi et al. 2018). We find again that having a relationship with a bank whose NPL ratio is higher, is significantly associated with a higher probability of experiencing credit rejections, both in the crisis and in the post-crisis years. This finding is confirmed when we re-estimate the model splitting the sample period across the crisis and the post-crisis period. Results also support the hypothesis of a role played by bank capitalisation, in this case with evidence being limited only to the crisis period, and with the coefficient displaying the expected sign. Namely, having a relationship with a better capitalised bank results in being significantly associated with a lower probability of credit rejection. Evidence relative to bank maturity mismatch remains mixed, consistent with the above mentioned hypothesis that a greater value of this indicator may be prone to different interpretations.

Table 7 repeats the same exercise performed in Table 6, but including 'firm ROA' and 'distressed firm,' as well as their interaction with the crisis years. Both variables are generally found to

be significantly associated with the probability of experiencing credit rejections. This notwithstanding, and despite the drop in the sample size, the results of [Table 6](#) are strongly confirmed. Again, all bank variables are significant when included one at a time, but the NPL ratio is the only one that remains significant at the 1% level when they are all simultaneously included. The model still predicts that having a relationship with a bank with a higher NPL ratio increases the probability of experiencing credit rejections.

[Table 7 here]

We test the robustness of these findings to an alternative firm-bank matching criterion. Specifically, we match firms reporting multiple bank relationships with their healthiest bank, i.e. the bank displaying the lowest average NPL ratio over the sample period ([Table 13](#)). Note that, in terms of firm-bank matching criteria, this is the most severe robustness we can employ against our finding that banks with a higher NPL ratio are more likely to reject credit applications. Previous findings are confirmed, which shows that they do not depend on the approach followed in the baseline.

4.2.2 Bank weakness and credit rejections: Core vs. periphery countries

In [Table 8](#) we check whether the impact of bank characteristics differs across euro area core and periphery countries. We estimate the same regressions as in columns (8) to (11) of [Table 6](#), but also including an interaction term with ‘periphery’ for each of the five bank characteristics introduced above.

[Table 8 here]

In [Section 4.1](#), we found no evidence of a different impact of firm characteristics on credit rejections across the two country groups. On the other hand, [Table 8](#) shows that both the NPL ratio and the maturity mismatch of banks significantly interact with periphery, suggesting that periphery-specific bank weakness can help to explain the higher rejection rates experienced by firms operating in stressed countries.

The heterogeneity in the impact of the bank NPL ratio across the two country groups is particularly interesting. During the crisis, being associated to a bank with a higher NPL ratio is estimated to increase the probability of credit rejections in the periphery, while the opposite holds in core countries.²¹ [Table 9](#) shows that the same heterogeneous impact of the bank NPL ratio is found when the model includes firm ROA and distress.

²¹When we match firms with their healthiest bank, regressions still show a negative coefficient of NPL for core countries, but not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, they fully support the finding that being associated to a bank with a higher NPL ratio in the periphery is estimated to significantly increase the probability of credit rejections. See columns (8) to (11) of [Table 13](#).

The very different distribution of the bank NPL ratio across the two country groups seems to be the main driver of this apparently puzzling result. During the crisis, the median core countries' bank in our sample displayed an NPL ratio of about 5%, a 10th percentile of just above 2%, and a 90th percentile of around 7.5%. During the same time period, the median NPL ratio for periphery banks was instead 15%, the 10th percentile was equal to 4% and the 90th was as high as 45%.

In the light of such different distributions, we may interpret a higher NPL ratio in core countries' banks as a signal of a more aggressive business model – possibly implying the bank's willingness to grant more loans – rather than as an indicator of bank balance sheet weakness. On the other hand, NPL ratios of well above 10% characterised the majority of banks in the periphery; at such high levels, a higher NPL ratio could rather signal bank weakness and, as such, a limited ability to grant loans even to sound firms. Therefore, the apparently contrasting results in periphery and core countries could be due to a non-linear effect of the NPL ratio on the probability of credit rejections.

The probit estimation, which allows for non-linearities, helps to verify the consistency of this hypothesis. [Figure 7](#) shows the adjusted prediction at representative values of the NPL ratio in the crisis period. Estimates confirm the hypothesis of a non-linear impact of the bank NPL ratio on the probability of credit rejection. For values below 10%, both in periphery and in core countries, a higher NPL ratio is estimated to be associated with a lower probability of credit rejection; by contrast, once the NPL ratio exceeds levels above 15%, its relationship with the probability of credit rejections clearly switches to the opposite sign.

[Figure 7 here]

[Figure 8 here]

In the post-crisis period, the NPL ratio is no longer estimated to be a significant determinant of credit rejections when the sample is split into the two country groups.²² As such, [Figure 8](#) does not show a similar pattern to the one found for the NPL ratio in the crisis period.

Apart from testing the robustness of the results of [Table 8](#) to including firm ROA and distress, in [Table 9](#) we test whether firms in distress are differently impacted than other firms by having a relationship with a weaker bank. We do this by including in the model an interaction term between 'distressed firm' and 'bank NPL ratio.' Also here we allow estimates to differ across the core and periphery country groups, including the triple interaction between 'distressed firm,' 'bank NPL ratio' and 'periphery.'

[Table 9 here]

²²A less significant role of supply-side factors in the post-crisis years is consistent e.g. with [Jiménez et al. \(2017\)](#), who analyse credit developments in the Spanish economy in the pre-crisis against the crisis period (2002 to mid-2007 versus mid-2007 to mid-2010), and find that while demand-side components continuously matter for obtaining credit, supply-side factors only play a role during the crisis.

The estimated coefficients of both these interaction terms are not statistically different from zero. Therefore, in contrast with the message of [Storz et al. \(2017\)](#) and [Acharya et al. \(2019\)](#), we find no evidence that distressed firms – either if they are located in core or periphery countries of the euro area – have better chances to obtain credit from weaker banks. On the other hand, results still point to an important role played by periphery-specific bank weakness in explaining the higher credit rejection rates.

5 Conclusion

This paper studies the role that firm and bank weakness played in the evolution of the access to external finance of euro area firms, with a particular focus on small and medium size firms, during and after the European sovereign debt crisis. To do so, in this paper we build a unique dataset where information on loan applications from SAFE is matched with firms’ and banks’ balance sheet information. Specifically, we combine the ECB proprietary SAFE-Amadeus-Orbis dataset – which augments SAFE with information on firms’ financial statements from Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis and Amadeus – with data on banks’ asset quality, capitalisation, and profitability obtained from Fitch Connect. Using this comprehensive dataset, we are able to study whether the stronger financing obstacles faced by firms located in the periphery have been due to being less creditworthy than their peers in core countries, or rather due to confronting banks with a lower ability to grant credit.

We find that, while firm characteristics, and leverage in particular, are strongly associated with the probability of experiencing credit rejections, they leave a relevant part of the observed difference across periphery and core countries unexplained, even taking into account the incidence of firm distress in the periphery. On the other hand, our findings suggest that periphery-specific bank weakness is able to explain at least part of this difference. We also find evidence of a non-linear effect of the bank NPL ratio. Only beyond a certain level, a higher NPL ratio signals weakness in the bank balance sheet; at such higher levels, we find that it implies a lower ability to grant loans even to sound firms. Finally, we do not find any evidence of capital mis-allocation, including in the euro area periphery.

We show that our results are robust to a number of different model specifications, definitions of credit rejections, as well as firm-bank matching criteria.

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
6 Figures and tables

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Obs.	Data Source	Type	5pc	25pc	Median	Mean	75pc	95pc
<i>Firms</i>									
<i>Firms' access to finance</i>									
Credit rejection	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.318	-	-
Discouraged	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.166	-	-
Totally rejected	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.068	-	-
Obtained a limited part of it	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.070	-	-
Cost too high	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.014	-	-
Obtained most of it	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.067	-	-
Obtained everything	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.615	-	-
<i>Firm soundness</i>									
Leverage	27,146	Amadeus-Orbis	Continuous	0.277	0.54	0.708	0.715	0.864	1.127
ROA	23,977	Amadeus-Orbis	Continuous	-0.139	-0.001	0.013	0.011	0.049	0.144
Altman Z-score	21,677	Amadeus-Orbis	Continuous	0.27	1.244	1.946	2.129	2.818	4.586
Distressed firm (Storz et al. 2017)	19,221	Amadeus-Orbis	Dummy	-	-	-	0.030	-	-
Distressed firm (Altman 1968)	21,677	Amadeus-Orbis	Dummy	-	-	-	0.445	-	-
Outlook deteriorated	33,407	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.261	-	-
Capital deteriorated	33,780	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.182	-	-
Credit history deteriorated	33,461	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.173	-	-
<i>Other firm characteristics</i>									
Sector: industry	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.325	-	-
Sector: construction	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.108	-	-
Sector: trade	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.248	-	-
Sector: services	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.319	-	-
Employees: 1 to 9	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.248	-	-
Employees: 10 to 49	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.326	-	-
Employees: 50 to 249	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.310	-	-
Employees: above 250	34,038	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.116	-	-
Turnover: up to 2mln	33,617	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.378	-	-
Turnover: 2 to 10 mln	33,617	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.283	-	-
Turnover: 10 to 50 mln	33,617	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.223	-	-
Turnover: above 2mln	33,617	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.115	-	-
Firm age	33,579	SAFE	Dummy	-	-	-	0.052	-	-
<i>Banks</i>									
<i>Bank soundness indicators</i>									
NPL ratio	11,534	Fitch Connect	Continuous	1.800	3.430	5.660	11.094	12.290	44.890
Capitalisation	12,617	Fitch Connect	Continuous	3.429	4.922	6.475	7.537	9.047	14.024
ROA	12,497	Fitch Connect	Continuous	-1.92	0.070	0.290	0.190	0.500	1.200
Z-score	12,476	Fitch Connect	Continuous	-1.152	0.364	1.671	2.789	3.712	10.632
Maturity mismatch	12,737	Fitch Connect	Continuous	0.045	0.412	0.584	0.526	0.709	0.803
<i>Other bank characteristics</i>									
Total assests (ln)	13,414	Fitch Connect	Continuous	6.719	9.567	11.205	10.998	12.402	14.102
<i>Macro indicators</i>									
GDP forecast 2-yrs ahead	34,038	AMECO	Continuous	0.800	1.400	1.700	1.714	2.000	3.000


Notes: This table shows number of observations, data sources, type, and summary statistics (i.e. mean, 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles) for each variable included in the empirical models estimated in this paper, as distributed in our sample. All variables obtained from SAFE and AMECO databases are semiannual, while those obtained from Amadeus-Orbis and Fitch Connect are annual.

Figure 1: Bank loans to domestic firms in the euro area




Notes: This figure shows monthly outstanding amounts of bank loans to domestic non financial corporations (NFC) in the euro area. Core: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Slovakia. Periphery: Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. Data source: ECB SDW.

Figure 2: SAFE – Firms that applied for bank loans but got rejected




Notes: This figure shows how many SAFE respondents reported a total credit rejection over the past six months, as a percentage of those who reported to have applied for bank loans. 'Euro area' refers to euro area-19 (changing composition). Data source: SAFE, ECB and European Commission.

Figure 3: SAFE – Firms that did not apply for bank loans being discouraged



Notes: This figure shows how many SAFE respondents reported not to have applied for bank loans over the past six months because of being discouraged, as a percentage of total respondents. ‘Euro area’ refers to euro area-19 (changing composition). Data source: SAFE, ECB and European Commission.

Figure 4: Bank soundness – NPL ratio



Notes: This figure shows the median non-performing loans to total gross loans ratio of banks in a country. Bank non-performing loans to total gross loans are the value of nonperforming loans divided by the total value of the loan portfolio (including nonperforming loans before the deduction of specific loan-loss provisions). ‘Euro area’ refers to euro area-19 (changing composition). Data source: International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report.


Table 2: Credit rejection and firm characteristics

Dependent variable:	Full sample		Crisis period		Post-crisis period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Credit rejection _t	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit
Periphery	0.12*** (0.01)	0.42*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.68*** (0.10)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.54*** (0.10)
			AME:	0.17*** (0.01)	AME:	0.11*** (0.01)
Periphery × Crisis _t	0.05*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.04)				
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.27*** (0.02)	0.86*** (0.06)	0.32*** (0.03)	1.09*** (0.10)	0.26*** (0.02)	0.96*** (0.10)
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Periphery			-0.02 (0.04)	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.18 (0.13)
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Crisis _t	0.04 (0.03)	0.12 (0.09)				
Firm ROA _{t-s}	-0.19*** (0.06)	-1.03*** (0.19)	-0.14* (0.08)	-0.35 (0.25)	-0.15** (0.06)	-1.10*** (0.28)
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Periphery			0.02 (0.13)	0.07 (0.40)	-0.13 (0.09)	0.21 (0.37)
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Crisis _t	0.06 (0.09)	0.74*** (0.28)				
Business outlook deteriorated _t	0.07*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.04)
Own capital deteriorated _t	0.14*** (0.01)	0.42*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.49*** (0.05)
Credit history deteriorated _t	0.15*** (0.01)	0.43*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.40*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.05)
Size _t – 1 to 9 employees	0.08*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.05* (0.02)	0.12 (0.08)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.35*** (0.08)
Size _t – 10 to 49 employees	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.03* (0.02)	0.15* (0.08)
Size _t – 50 to 249 employees	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.01)	0.08 (0.07)
Turnover _t – up to €2mn	0.14*** (0.02)	0.49*** (0.06)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.43*** (0.07)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.55*** (0.08)
Turnover _t – €2mn to €10mn	0.08*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.05)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.07)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.33*** (0.07)
Turnover _t – €10mn to €50mn	0.03*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.05)	0.03** (0.02)	0.13** (0.06)	0.02 (0.01)	0.14** (0.07)
Sector _t – Industry	0.03*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.04)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.04)
Sector _t – Construction	0.06*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.04)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.05)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.05)
Sector _t – Trade	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.04)
Age _t – Young	0.07*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.05)	0.05** (0.02)	0.15** (0.06)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.10)
2y-ahead GDP growth forecast _t	0.07*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.27*** (0.02)
Wave dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	18,846	18,846	9,693	9,693	9,153	9,153
R ²			0.18		0.21	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$


Notes: ‘Credit rejection’ equals 1 if the firm applied for bank credit but got totally rejected, got a limited part of it (< 75%), refused the credit because it was too costly, or did not apply being discouraged; it equals 0 if the firm obtained it fully or mostly ($\geq 75\%$). For firms interviewed twice in a year, we include the first semester if they reported the same outcome, and the semester of credit rejection otherwise. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets, ROA the one between net income and total assets, both as reported in the calendar year preceding the realisation of ‘credit rejection’. Periphery equals 1 if the firm is located in a stressed country and 0 otherwise. Business outlook deteriorated, own capital deteriorated and credit history deteriorated equal 0 if firms reported improvement or no change. The omitted firm size is 250 employees or above; the omitted firm turnover is above €50mn; and the omitted sector is services. ‘Age: Young’ equals 1 if the firm was established within the last 5 years and 0 otherwise. Crisis: wave 3 to 11 (Mar-10 to Sep-14); Post-crisis: wave 12 to 19 (Oct-14 to Sep-18).

Figure 5: Probit – Adjusted predictions of ‘Firm leverage’ and ‘Firm ROA’



Notes: Panels in this figure show adjusted predictions at representative values and 95% confidence bands of firm leverage ratio (top panels) and ROA (bottom panels) in terms of the probability of experiencing credit rejections. Adjusted predictions are derived from the probit model in Table 2. Left panels refers to the crisis period, while right panels to the post-crisis period.

Figure 6: 'Periphery,' 'Firm leverage' and 'Firm ROA' across waves



Notes: Panels in this figure show how coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of the variables Periphery (top panel), Firm leverage (middle panel) and Firm ROA (bottom panel) vary across regressions separately run for each wave of the SAFE in the sample. Coefficients and confidence intervals are derived from the linear probability models in Table 12.

Table 3: Credit rejection and firm characteristics – Distressed firms

Dependent variable:	Full sample		Crisis period		Post-crisis period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Credit rejection _t	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit
Periphery	0.10*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.79*** (0.14)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.48*** (0.12)
			AME:	0.17*** (0.01)	AME:	0.10*** (0.01)
Periphery × Crisis _t	0.07*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.05)				
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.28*** (0.02)	0.99*** (0.08)	0.35*** (0.03)	1.28*** (0.15)	0.26*** (0.03)	1.07*** (0.12)
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Periphery			-0.03 (0.05)	-0.32* (0.18)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.14 (0.16)
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Crisis	0.05* (0.03)	0.11 (0.12)				
Firm ROA _{t-s}	-0.26*** (0.06)	-1.06*** (0.24)	-0.18 (0.11)	-0.49 (0.39)	-0.28*** (0.08)	-1.53*** (0.37)
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Periphery			-0.08 (0.15)	-0.36 (0.56)	0.06 (0.12)	0.81* (0.46)
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Crisis	0.06 (0.10)	0.45 (0.38)				
Distressed firm _t	0.18*** (0.04)	0.47*** (0.11)	0.13** (0.06)	0.37* (0.20)	0.13** (0.06)	0.26 (0.21)
			AME:	0.11*** (0.03)	AME:	0.13*** (0.04)
Distressed firm _t × Periphery			-0.01 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.23)	0.06 (0.07)	0.28 (0.25)
Distressed firm _t × Crisis	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.11 (0.15)				
Business outlook deteriorated _t	0.07*** (0.01)	0.21*** (0.03)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.04)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.05)
Own capital deteriorated _t	0.14*** (0.01)	0.40*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.01)	0.37*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.06)
Credit history deteriorated _t	0.15*** (0.01)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.42*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.47*** (0.05)
<i>Other firm characteristics</i>	Size _t , Turnover _t , Sector _t , Age _t					
2y-ahead GDP growth forecast _t	0.06*** (0.01)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.03)
Wave dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	15,156	15,156	7,780	7,780	7,376	7,376
R ²	0.20		0.19		0.19	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: This table includes results from regressions including a dummy variable, distressed firm, which equals 1 if, for at least two consecutive years, the firm registered at the same time negative return on asset, negative net investment, and EBITDA-to-total financial debt ratio smaller than 5%; distressed firm equals 0 otherwise. The dependent variable and the other independent variables are defined as in Table 2.

Table 4: Ordered probit model

Dependent variable:	Ordered probit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ordered credit application outcome _t	Full sample	Crisis	Post-crisis
Periphery	0.44*** (0.04)	0.64*** (0.04)	0.44*** (0.04)
Periphery × Crisis _t	0.21*** (0.05)		
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.87*** (0.09)	0.97*** (0.09)	0.85*** (0.09)
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Crisis	0.08 (0.12)		
Firm ROA _{t-s}	-1.20*** (0.27)	-1.05*** (0.24)	-1.18*** (0.27)
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Crisis	0.20 (0.36)		
Distressed firm _t	0.22* (0.13)	0.15 (0.11)	0.19 (0.13)
Distressed firm _t × Crisis	-0.08 (0.17)		
Cut-1	2.41*** (0.10)	2.29*** (0.12)	2.27*** (0.12)
Cut-2	2.75*** (0.11)	2.64*** (0.12)	2.61*** (0.12)
Cut-3	3.36*** (0.11)	3.29*** (0.13)	3.15*** (0.12)
<i>Firm characteristics</i>	Business outlook _t , Own capital _t , Credit history _t Size _t , Turnover _t , Sector _t , Age _t		
<i>Other controls</i>	GDP growth forecast _t , Wave dummies		
Observations	13,038	6,600	6,438

Credit application outcome _t	AMEs of 'Periphery'	
	Crisis	Post-crisis
Totally rejected	0.08*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)
Obtained a limited part of it (< 75%)	0.08*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)
Obtained most of it (≥ 75%)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
Obtained everything	-0.19*** (0.01)	-0.11*** (0.01)

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: The the dependent variable is composed of four categories, ordered according to whether the firm applied for bank credit and (1) got everything, (2) got most of it (i.e. 75% or more), (3) got only a limited part of it (i.e. strictly less than 75%), or (4) got nothing. Independent variables are defined as in Table 2.

Table 5: Comparison across the different samples

Dependent variable:	Linear probability model							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Credit rejection _t	16 cntrs.	12 cntrs. w/o banks	12 cntrs. w/ banks	12 cntrs. w/ banks	16 cntrs.	12 cntrs. w/o banks	12 cntrs. w/ banks	12 cntrs. w/ banks
Periphery	0.10*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.07** (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.10*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Periphery × Crisis	0.08*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Leverage _{t-s}	0.29*** (0.01)	0.30*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.03)	0.35*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.02)	0.31*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.03)	0.33*** (0.03)
Leverage _{t-s} × Crisis	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)	-0.00 (0.04)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.10* (0.06)
ROA _{t-s}					-0.26*** (0.06)	-0.27*** (0.08)	-0.38*** (0.11)	-0.35*** (0.11)
ROA _{t-s} × Crisis					0.06 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.12)	0.08 (0.20)	0.05 (0.19)
Distress _t					0.18*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.05)	0.18*** (0.05)
Distress _t × Crisis					-0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.06)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)
B. outlook det _t	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Own capital det _t	0.14*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)
Cr. history det _t	0.15*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.01)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.17*** (0.02)
1 to 9 employees	0.09*** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07** (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
10 to 49 employees	0.03** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
50 to 249 employees	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Up to €2mn	0.14*** (0.01)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)
€2mn to €10mn	0.08*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
€10mn to €50mn	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Industry	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Construction	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Trade	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Young firm	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.07*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)
Bank variables _t	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
GDP forecast _t	0.07*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.08*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)
Wave dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,625	14,997	7,474	7,474	15,156	9,964	5,262	5,262
R ²	0.19	0.20	0.22	0.23	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.22

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: Firm-bank matching is available only for a subset of the euro area countries in our sample, namely: Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Slovenia. This table includes results from regression separately run for the following different samples: (1) the full sample used in Section 4.1, (2) a sample obtained excluding observations from countries where no firm reports its bank(s), (3) the sample limited only to those firms reporting their bank(s), and (4) the same sample limited to firms reporting their bank(s), but this time also including bank variables in the regression. Columns (5) to (8) repeat the same exercise, but in addition the model includes firm ROA and distress. Dependent and independent variables are defined as in Table 2.

Table 6: Credit rejection and bank characteristics

Dependent variable	Full sample		Full sample		Full sample		Full sample		Crisis period		Post-crisis period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	
Credit rejection _t	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	
Periphery	0.009 (0.014)	0.049*** (0.013)	0.053*** (0.014)	0.062*** (0.013)	0.048*** (0.014)	-0.007 (0.017)	0.011 (0.061)	0.140*** (0.022)	0.457*** (0.074)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.020 (-0.005)	
Periphery × Crisis _t	0.120*** (0.024)	0.124*** (0.019)	0.121*** (0.021)	0.114*** (0.019)	0.128*** (0.019)	0.142*** (0.027)	0.430*** (0.095)	0.247*** (0.028)	0.793*** (0.099)	0.334*** (0.023)	1.158*** (0.090)	
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.334*** (0.022)	0.319*** (0.022)	0.327*** (0.022)	0.323*** (0.022)	0.317*** (0.022)	0.336*** (0.022)	1.157*** (0.089)	0.247*** (0.028)	0.793*** (0.099)	0.334*** (0.023)	1.158*** (0.090)	
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Crisis _t	-0.083** (0.035)	-0.079** (0.033)	-0.089*** (0.033)	-0.084** (0.033)	-0.079** (0.033)	-0.089** (0.035)	-0.368*** (0.134)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.002)	
Bank NPL ratio _t	0.006*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.002)	
Bank NPL ratio _t × Crisis _t	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.019* (0.010)	0.003 (0.002)	0.011 (0.008)	
Bank Capitalisation _t												
Bank Capitalisation _t × Crisis _t												
Bank Z-score _t			-0.004*** (0.002)									
Bank Z-score _t × Crisis _t			0.004 (0.002)									
Bank ROA _t				-0.045*** (0.008)								
Bank ROA _t × Crisis _t				0.041*** (0.010)								
Bank maturity mismatch _t												
Bank maturity mismatch _t × Crisis _t												
Bank size	0.012*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.043*** (0.015)	0.003 (0.007)	0.015 (0.022)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.064*** (0.019)	
Control variables	Firms: Business outlook _t , Own capital _t , Credit history _t , Size _t , Turnover _t , Sector _t , and Age _t ; 2y-ahead GDP growth forecast _t ; Wave dummies.											
Observations	7,669	8,353	8,263	8,275	8,437	7,474	7,474	2,969	2,969	4,505	4,505	
R ²	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.24	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.24	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis - ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: 'Bank capitalisation' is measured as the ratio between a bank's equity and its total assets. 'Bank NPLs ratio' corresponds to the share of the bank's non-performing loans divided by its total gross loans. 'Bank ROA' is the bank return on assets, equal to net income over total assets. 'Bank z-score' is computed as the ROA plus equity-to-assets ratio, divided by the standard deviation of bank ROA over the sample period. 'Bank maturity mismatch' is the difference between total deposits and liquid assets divided by total assets. 'Bank size' is the logarithm of the bank's average total assets over the sample size. The dependent variable and the remaining independent variables are defined as in Table 2.

Table 7: Credit rejection and bank characteristics – with firm ROA and distress

Dependent variable	Full sample		Full sample		Full sample		Full sample		Crisis period		Post-crisis period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	
Credit rejection _t	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	
Periphery	0.021 (0.016)	0.037** (0.016)	0.029* (0.017)	0.043*** (0.016)	0.027 (0.017)	0.005 (0.020)	0.072 (0.085)	0.155*** (0.027)	0.534*** (0.096)	0.004 (0.021)	0.060 (0.093)	
Periphery × Crisis _t	0.111*** (0.028)	0.125*** (0.023)	0.122*** (0.026)	0.118*** (0.023)	0.140*** (0.024)	0.140*** (0.033)	0.423*** (0.127)	0.224*** (0.047)	0.796*** (0.156)	0.329*** (0.032)	1.263*** (0.132)	
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.328*** (0.031)	0.331*** (0.031)	0.337*** (0.032)	0.331*** (0.032)	0.328*** (0.031)	0.330*** (0.032)	1.251*** (0.130)	0.224*** (0.047)	0.796*** (0.156)	0.329*** (0.032)	1.263*** (0.132)	
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Crisis _t	-0.091* (0.055)	-0.124** (0.053)	-0.124** (0.054)	-0.117** (0.053)	-0.113** (0.053)	-0.103* (0.056)	-0.450** (0.202)	0.224*** (0.047)	0.796*** (0.156)	0.329*** (0.032)	1.263*** (0.132)	
Firm ROA _{t-s}	-0.300*** (0.110)	-0.251** (0.106)	-0.280** (0.109)	-0.271** (0.107)	-0.249** (0.106)	-0.350*** (0.109)	-1.318*** (0.430)	-0.319** (0.162)	-1.158* (0.609)	-0.338*** (0.109)	-1.249*** (0.437)	
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Crisis _t	-0.017 (0.198)	-0.085 (0.181)	-0.065 (0.184)	-0.077 (0.181)	-0.100 (0.181)	0.049 (0.193)	0.246 (0.736)	0.224*** (0.047)	0.796*** (0.156)	0.329*** (0.032)	1.263*** (0.132)	
Distressed firm _t	0.172*** (0.050)	0.193*** (0.049)	0.205*** (0.050)	0.193*** (0.050)	0.195*** (0.050)	0.178*** (0.050)	0.563*** (0.168)	0.124** (0.060)	0.337* (0.192)	0.174*** (0.051)	0.550*** (0.171)	
Distressed firm _t × Crisis _t	-0.087 (0.077)	-0.072 (0.075)	-0.121 (0.074)	-0.107 (0.075)	-0.115 (0.074)	-0.055 (0.078)	-0.223 (0.256)	0.124** (0.060)	0.337* (0.192)	0.174*** (0.051)	0.550*** (0.171)	
Bank NPL ratio _t	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.003)	
Bank NPL ratio _t × Crisis _t	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.021 (0.014)	0.004*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.012)	0.005*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.012)	
Bank Capitalisation _t	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.009 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.014 (0.012)	0.003 (0.002)	0.012 (0.010)	
Bank Capitalisation _t × Crisis _t	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.021 (0.014)	0.004*** (0.003)	0.012*** (0.012)	0.005*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.012)	
Bank Z-score _t	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006 (0.006)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.012 (0.012)	
Bank Z-score _t × Crisis _t	-0.006*** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.003)	-0.006*** (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.017)	0.003 (0.003)	0.006 (0.024)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.024 (0.046)	
Bank ROA _t	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	
Bank ROA _t × Crisis _t	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	
Bank maturity mismatch _t	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	0.117*** (0.038)	
Bank maturity mismatch _t × Crisis _t	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	-0.135*** (0.046)	
Bank size	0.005* (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.010*** (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.013 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.027)	0.009 (0.006)	0.035 (0.025)	
Control variables	Firms: Business outlook _t , Own capital _t , Credit history _t , Size _t , Turnover _t , and Age _t ; 2y-ahead GDP growth forecast _t ; Wave dummies.											
Observations	5,416	5,672	5,622	5,626	5,741	5,262	5,262	2,133	2,133	3,129	3,129	
R ²	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.23	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: This table repeats the exercise done in Table 6, but including firm leverage and ROA and their interaction terms with the crisis years.

Table 8: Bank characteristics interacted with Periphery

Dependent variable:	Crisis period		Post-crisis period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Credit rejection _t	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit
Periphery	0.140** (0.065)	0.329 (0.222)	-0.116* (0.069)	-0.445* (0.244)
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.242*** (0.028)	0.779*** (0.100)	0.333*** (0.023)	1.160*** (0.090)
Bank NPL ratio _t	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.056*** (0.021)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.014)
Bank NPL ratio _t × Periphery	0.021*** (0.005)	0.080*** (0.021)	0.006* (0.004)	0.023 (0.015)
Bank Capitalisation _t	-0.010* (0.006)	-0.034 (0.022)	0.003 (0.004)	0.012 (0.014)
Bank Capitalisation _t × Periphery	0.004 (0.006)	0.017 (0.024)	0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.017)
Bank Z-score _t	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.008)
Bank Z-score _t × Periphery	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.037)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.013 (0.031)
Bank ROA _t	-0.020 (0.049)	-0.105 (0.214)	0.014 (0.024)	0.017 (0.096)
Bank ROA _t × Periphery	0.027 (0.050)	0.129 (0.216)	-0.022 (0.028)	-0.040 (0.106)
Bank maturity mismatch _t	-0.044 (0.063)	-0.144 (0.234)	0.032 (0.047)	0.097 (0.191)
Bank maturity mismatch _t × Periphery	-0.307*** (0.099)	-0.887*** (0.327)	0.158* (0.091)	0.667** (0.326)
Bank size	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.023)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.062*** (0.020)
<i>Firm characteristics</i>	Business outlook _t , Own capital _t , Credit history _t Size _t , Turnover _t , Sector _t , Age _t			
<i>Other controls</i>	GDP growth forecast _t , Wave dummies			
Observations	2,969	2,969	4,505	4,505
R ²	0.23		0.24	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: The bank variables in these regressions are defined as in Table 6. The dependent variable and the remaining independent variables are defined as in Table 2.


Table 9: Firm distress and bank weakness

Dependent variable:	Crisis period		Post-crisis period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Credit rejection _t	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit
Periphery	0.229*** (0.084)	0.624** (0.292)	-0.039 (0.082)	-0.117 (0.301)
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.219*** (0.047)	0.780*** (0.157)	0.327*** (0.033)	1.262*** (0.133)
Firm ROA _{t-s}	-0.317** (0.157)	-1.146* (0.585)	-0.342*** (0.110)	-1.281*** (0.439)
Distressed firm _t	0.481 (0.356)	1.248 (1.151)	0.262 (0.268)	0.727 (0.852)
Distressed firm _t × Periphery	-0.416 (0.370)	-1.147 (1.186)	-0.033 (0.281)	-0.260 (0.893)
Distressed firm _t × Bank NPL ratio _t	-0.010 (0.052)	-0.003 (0.173)	-0.034 (0.055)	-0.085 (0.186)
Distressed _t × Periphery × NPL ratio _t	0.010 (0.052)	0.004 (0.173)	0.032 (0.055)	0.093 (0.187)
Bank NPL ratio _t	-0.015*** (0.006)	-0.071** (0.028)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.015 (0.018)
Bank NPL ratio _t × Periphery	0.021*** (0.006)	0.089*** (0.029)	0.008** (0.004)	0.031* (0.018)
Bank Capitalisation _t	0.001 (0.006)	0.011 (0.025)	0.007* (0.004)	0.031* (0.018)
Bank Capitalisation _t × Periphery	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.039 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.027 (0.022)
Bank Z-score _t	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.014)
Bank Z-score _t × Periphery	0.000 (0.014)	0.003 (0.043)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.028 (0.038)
Bank ROA _t	-0.070 (0.055)	-0.376 (0.235)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.043 (0.140)
Bank ROA _t × Periphery	0.068 (0.057)	0.370 (0.237)	0.001 (0.036)	0.051 (0.153)
Bank maturity mismatch _t	-0.093 (0.070)	-0.254 (0.292)	-0.009 (0.055)	-0.066 (0.256)
Bank maturity mismatch _t × Periphery	-0.310*** (0.117)	-0.913** (0.401)	0.129 (0.105)	0.559 (0.395)
Bank size	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.022 (0.028)	0.008 (0.006)	0.032 (0.026)
<i>Firm characteristics</i>	Business outlook _t , Own capital _t , Credit history _t Size _t , Turnover _t , Sector _t , Age _t			
<i>Other controls</i>	GDP growth forecast _t , Wave dummies			
Observations	2,133	2,133	3,129	3,129
R ²	0.22		0.23	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$


Notes: The bank variables in these regressions are defined as in Table 6. The dependent variable and the remaining independent variables are defined as in Table 2.

Figure 7: Adjusted predictions of NPL ratio – Crisis period



Notes: This figure shows the adjusted predictions at representative values and confidence bands (± 2 standard deviations) of the bank NPL ratio in the crisis period, in terms of the probability that a firm linked with the bank having that NPL ratio will experience credit rejections (shown in decimals on the vertical axis). Adjusted predictions are derived from the probit model in Table 8. The left panel refers to periphery countries, while the right panel to core countries.

Figure 8: Adjusted predictions of NPL ratio – Post-crisis period



Notes: This figure shows the adjusted predictions at representative values and confidence bands (± 2 standard deviations) of the bank NPL ratio in the post-crisis period, in terms of the probability that a firm linked with the bank having that NPL ratio will experience credit rejections (shown in decimals on the vertical axis). Adjusted predictions are derived from the probit model in Table 8. The left panel refers to periphery countries, while the right panel to core countries.

Appendix: Additional tables

Table 10: Credit rejection and firm leverage, including panellist firms the first time only

Dependent variable:	Full sample		Crisis period		Post-crisis period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Credit rejection _t	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit
Periphery	0.12*** (0.01)	0.43*** (0.04)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.66*** (0.11)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.71*** (0.12)
			AME:	0.17*** (0.01)	AME:	0.12*** (0.01)
Periphery × Crisis _t	0.05*** (0.02)	0.11** (0.05)				
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.25*** (0.02)	0.80*** (0.08)	0.32*** (0.03)	1.10*** (0.11)	0.27*** (0.03)	1.00*** (0.11)
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Periphery			-0.01 (0.04)	-0.17 (0.14)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.39** (0.15)
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Crisis _t	0.06** (0.03)	0.21** (0.10)				
Firm ROA _{t-s}	-0.13** (0.06)	-0.74*** (0.19)	-0.14 (0.08)	-0.34 (0.27)	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.86*** (0.28)
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Periphery			0.05 (0.13)	0.16 (0.39)	-0.06 (0.10)	0.33 (0.38)
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Crisis _t	0.03 (0.09)	0.51* (0.28)				
Business outlook deteriorated _t	0.08*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.05)
Own capital deteriorated _t	0.13*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.36*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.07)
Credit history deteriorated _t	0.14*** (0.01)	0.41*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.40*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.44*** (0.06)
Size _t – 1 to 9 employees	0.06*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.07)	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.09)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.39*** (0.11)
Size _t – 10 to 49 employees	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.03 (0.02)	0.11 (0.10)
Size _t – 50 to 249 employees	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.09)
Turnover _t – up to €2mn	0.13*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.07)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.08)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.11)
Turnover _t – €2mn to €10mn	0.08*** (0.02)	0.33*** (0.06)	0.10*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.08)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.32*** (0.10)
Turnover _t – €10mn to €50mn	0.04*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.06)	0.04** (0.02)	0.16** (0.07)	0.04** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.09)
Sector _t – Industry	0.02*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.02** (0.01)	0.09** (0.04)	0.02* (0.01)	0.10** (0.05)
Sector _t – Construction	0.06*** (0.01)	0.20*** (0.04)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.05** (0.02)	0.16** (0.07)
Sector _t – Trade	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.01)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.06)
Age _t – Young	0.06*** (0.02)	0.19*** (0.06)	0.04 (0.02)	0.11 (0.07)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.39*** (0.10)
2y-ahead GDP growth forecast _t	0.07*** (0.01)	0.22*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.03)
Wave dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,273	13,273	7,913	7,913	5,360	5,360
R ²	0.19		0.18		0.19	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: This table repeats the exercise done in Table 2, with dependent and independent variables being defined likewise, but including panellist firms only the first time they appear in the sample.

Table 11: Distressed firms: Altman Z-score

Dependent variable:	Full sample		Crisis period		Post-crisis period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Credit rejection _t	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit
Periphery	0.09*** (0.01)	0.32*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.56*** (0.10)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.45*** (0.11)
			AME:	0.14*** (0.01)	AME:	0.09*** (0.01)
Periphery × Crisis _t	0.05*** (0.01)	0.13*** (0.05)				
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.20*** (0.02)	0.65*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.90*** (0.11)	0.21*** (0.03)	0.82*** (0.12)
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Periphery			-0.04 (0.04)	-0.22 (0.14)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.29** (0.15)
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Crisis	0.04 (0.03)	0.11 (0.10)				
Firm ROA _{t-s}	-0.23*** (0.04)	-0.84*** (0.18)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.31 (0.27)	-0.25*** (0.06)	-1.11*** (0.30)
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Periphery			0.07 (0.12)	0.18 (0.35)	0.07 (0.09)	0.55 (0.38)
Firm ROA _{t-s} × Crisis	0.15** (0.07)	0.66** (0.26)				
Distressed firm _t	0.11*** (0.01)	0.36*** (0.04)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.30*** (0.06)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.06)
			AME:	0.11*** (0.01)	AME:	0.10*** (0.01)
Distressed firm _t × Periphery			0.05** (0.02)	0.09 (0.07)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.15** (0.08)
Distressed firm _t × Crisis	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.05)				
Business outlook deteriorated _t	0.07*** (0.01)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.04)
Own capital deteriorated _t	0.13*** (0.01)	0.40*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.01)	0.36*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.02)	0.50*** (0.06)
Credit history deteriorated _t	0.14*** (0.01)	0.41*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.01)	0.39*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.44*** (0.05)
<i>Other firm characteristics</i>	Size _t , Turnover _t , Sector _t , Age _t					
2y-ahead GDP growth forecast _t	0.07*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.01)	0.26*** (0.02)
Wave dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17,148	17,148	8,848	8,848	8,300	8,300
R ²	0.21		0.19		0.22	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: This table repeats the exercise done in Table 3, but the ‘distressed firm’ dummy variable now equals 1 if the Altman Z-score, computed as in Ferrando and Mulier (2015), displays a value smaller than 1.8, and 0 otherwise.

Table 12: Credit rejection and firm leverage, wave by wave

	Linear probability model																		
	W3	W4	W5	W6	W7	W8	W9	W10	W11	W12	W13	W14	W15	W16	W17	W18	W19		
Cr. rejection _t	0.05	0.11***	0.12***	0.20***	0.24***	0.16***	0.16***	0.13***	0.12***	0.12***	0.09***	0.10***	0.12***	0.10***	0.08***	0.11***	0.05**		
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Leverage _{t-s}	0.37***	0.33***	0.24***	0.27***	0.40***	0.31***	0.26***	0.24***	0.37***	0.25***	0.34***	0.31***	0.20***	0.21***	0.22***	0.24***	0.17***		
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)		
ROA _{t-s}	-0.40**	-0.15	-0.23***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.30**	-0.07	-0.41***	-0.18*	-0.46***	-0.03	-0.19***	-0.21*	-0.33**	-0.20*	-0.28**	-0.43***		
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.15)		
B. outlook _t	0.03	0.11***	0.12***	0.04	0.06**	0.03	0.08***	0.07**	0.04*	0.07***	0.08***	0.12***	0.09***	0.09***	0.07**	0.06*	0.09***		
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Own capital _t	0.16***	0.05	0.07**	0.17***	0.11***	0.17***	0.11***	0.14***	0.16***	0.15***	0.16***	0.17***	0.08*	0.24***	0.19***	0.22***	0.03		
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Cr. history _t	0.13***	0.17***	0.12***	0.09***	0.14***	0.11***	0.13***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.20***	0.18***	0.17***	0.06	0.14***	0.15***	0.25***		
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)		
<i>Other firm characteristics</i>																			
Size _t , Turnover _t , Sector _t , and Age _t																			
GDP forecast _t	0.02	0.05	0.05	-0.04	0.04	-0.02	0.14***	0.12***	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***	0.05**		
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		
W. dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Obs	899	1,169	1,171	1,229	1,150	1,202	1,377	1,310	1,568	1,649	1,433	1,617	1,408	1,586	1,259	1,373	1,017		
R ²	0.18	0.14	0.16	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.23	0.24	0.22	0.23	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.20	0.16		

Robust standard errors in parenthesis — ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: This table includes results from regression separately run for each wave of SAFE in the sample (with W3 corresponding to the first semester of 2010, W4 to the second semester of 2010, and so forth until W19, corresponding to the first semester of 2018). Dependent and independent variables are defined as in Table 2; in particular, Business outlook, Own capital and Credit history correspond to Business outlook *deteriorated*, Own capital *deteriorated* and Credit history *deteriorated*, respectively.

Table 13: Alternative matching: Healthiest bank

Dependent variable	Full sample		Full sample		Full sample		Full sample		Crisis period		Post-crisis period	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	
Credit rejection _t	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	LPM	Probit	
Periphery	0.013 (0.014)	0.050*** (0.013)	0.039*** (0.014)	0.054*** (0.013)	0.049*** (0.013)	0.011 (0.015)	0.075 (0.056)	0.094 (0.060)	0.261 (0.195)	-0.074 (0.065)	-0.290 (0.233)	
Periphery × Crisis _t	0.111*** (0.022)	0.112*** (0.019)	0.121*** (0.021)	0.111*** (0.019)	0.116*** (0.019)	0.116*** (0.024)	0.338*** (0.084)					
Firm leverage _{t-s}	0.340*** (0.022)	0.337*** (0.022)	0.344*** (0.022)	0.341*** (0.022)	0.336*** (0.022)	0.341*** (0.022)	1.183*** (0.088)	0.247*** (0.028)	0.802*** (0.100)	0.340*** (0.022)	1.188*** (0.089)	
Firm leverage _{t-s} × Crisis _t	-0.090*** (0.035)	-0.083** (0.034)	-0.097*** (0.034)	-0.091*** (0.034)	-0.083** (0.034)	-0.093*** (0.035)	-0.387*** (0.133)					
Bank NPL ratio _t	0.007*** (0.001)			0.006*** (0.001)	0.019*** (0.002)			-0.005 (0.005)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.014)	
Bank NPL ratio _t × Crisis _t	-0.002* (0.001)			-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.004)							
Bank NPL ratio _t × Periphery								0.013*** (0.005)	0.043** (0.020)	0.007** (0.004)	0.024 (0.015)	
Bank Capitalisation _t	0.001 (0.002)			0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)		-0.001 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.005)	-0.030 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.014)	
Bank Capitalisation _t × Crisis _t	-0.005* (0.003)			-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)		-0.016 (0.013)					
Bank Capitalisation _t × Periphery								0.004 (0.007)	0.018 (0.024)	0.002 (0.004)	0.008 (0.017)	
Bank Z-score _t			-0.005*** (0.001)			-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.007)	
Bank Z-score _t × Crisis _t			0.003 (0.002)			0.002 (0.002)	0.007 (0.010)					
Bank Z-score _t × Periphery								-0.002 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.028)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.027)	
Bank ROA _t				-0.059*** (0.007)		-0.022** (0.009)	-0.068** (0.030)	0.020 (0.043)	0.082 (0.190)	-0.016 (0.025)	-0.101 (0.104)	
Bank ROA _t × Crisis _t				0.048*** (0.010)		0.028** (0.012)	0.091** (0.039)					
Bank ROA _t × Periphery								-0.009 (0.044)	-0.046 (0.193)	-0.004 (0.028)	0.040 (0.111)	
Bank maturity mismatch _t					0.062* (0.034)	0.068* (0.037)	0.234* (0.140)	-0.058 (0.059)	-0.224 (0.220)	0.061 (0.047)	0.225 (0.188)	
Bank maturity mismatch _t × Crisis _t					-0.111*** (0.037)	-0.097** (0.045)	-0.373** (0.169)					
Bank maturity mismatch _t × Periphery								-0.126 (0.094)	-0.321 (0.307)	0.087 (0.079)	0.348 (0.293)	
Bank size	0.013*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.005 (0.006)	0.017 (0.020)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.061*** (0.018)	
<i>Control variables</i>												
Observations	7,883	8,214	8,183	8,212	8,296	7,740	7,740	3,066	3,066	4,674	4,674	
R ²	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.24	

Robust standard errors in parenthesis – ***: $p < 0.01$, **: $p < 0.05$, *: $p < 0.1$

Notes: This table repeats the exercise done in Table 6 (in the first 7 columns) and Table 8 (in the last 4 columns), but each firm is matched with its listed bank that has the lowest NPL ratio.

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