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Immigration Policy and Hispanics' Willingness to Run for Office

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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 13598

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SEPTEMBER 2020

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ABSTRACT

Immigration Policy and Hispanics' Willingness to Run for Office*

For the first time in U.S. history, approximately 10 percent of the U.S. House of Representatives is Hispanic. The greater engagement of Hispanics in national politics has occurred after unprecedented growth in interior immigration enforcement disproportionately impacting Latinos. Using county-level data on all candidates running for congressional elections over the 2008–2018 decade, we find evidence of intensified immigration enforcement suppressing Hispanics' willingness to run for Congress. The effect, which is not present for female or Black minorities, is driven by local police-based measures, and more prevalent in localities without a sanctuary policy and in states with a Republican governor.

JEL Classification: D72, H0, J15

Keywords: diversity, electoral candidates, immigration enforcement, United States

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I. Introduction

For the first time in U.S. history, approximately 10 percent of U.S. House of Representatives members are Hispanic.¹ The growing participation of Hispanics and other minorities in various levels of government has sparked research interest due to the implications of having a diverse pool of leaders (Dovi, 2002; Edwards *et al.*, 2011). The election of minority representatives raises the influence of underrepresented groups in local-level politics (Griffin and Newman, 2005; Preuhs, 2006) and, in turn, contributes to address social disparities affecting their communities, including academic gaps, job opportunities and the accumulation of wealth through housing values (*e.g.* Logan, 2018; Beach *et al.*, 2018). However, despite the equity gains stemming from elected officials that better reflect population composition, minority groups continue to be underrepresented in politics.

After years of low participation, the share of Hispanics running for Congress experienced a more than two-fold increase between 2012 and 2018 (from an average of 3 percent to approximately 7 percent).² This outgrowth occurred after a period of rapid expansion in interior immigration enforcement,³ which disproportionately targeted Latinos.⁴ To better gauge these events, Figures 1 through 4 include heat maps of the shares of Hispanics running for Congress, as well as of an index indicative of the intensity of interior immigration enforcement,⁵ at the

¹ See <https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/HAIC/Hispanic-Americans-in-Congress/>. Last accessed July 2020.

² Authors' own tabulations.

³ The 21st century witnessed the activation of various interior immigration enforcement initiatives, ranging from 287(g) agreements, to employment verification mandates, omnibus immigration laws and the Secure Communities program between 2008 and 2014. Between 2007 and 2014 alone, Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained and deported close to three million people (TRAC 2020).

⁴ According to official figures, in fiscal year 2014 alone, approximately 97 percent of the more than 315,000 immigrants who were removed from the country by ICE were of Latino descent (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2014).

⁵ The index will be discussed in detail in the Data section.

beginning and at the end of our sample period. In some instances, the share of Hispanic candidates and immigration enforcement appear to be positively correlated (*e.g.* some counties in Colorado and northern New Mexico in 2008, as well as some counties in southern Arizona in 2018), whereas the opposite is the case in southern Texas in 2008, or in New Mexico, southern Texas, and south Florida in 2018. Did the expansion of immigration enforcement inhibit Hispanics' mobilization and willingness to run for office? Or, alternatively, did it contribute to their resolve to represent their communities? In this study, we seek to understand the role of immigration policy in Hispanics' political engagement and, thereby, shed some light on factors potentially affecting minorities' representation in politics.

Gaining a better understanding of how the intensification of immigration enforcement has impacted Hispanics' engagement in national politics, as captured by their willingness to run in congressional elections, is well warranted due to: (1) Hispanics' growing relevance in the country's electorate (Krogstad, Noe-Bustamante, and Flores, 2019), (2) their underrepresentation in national politics, and (3) their awareness of the difficulties encountered by family members in mixed-status households or by the communities in which they reside. A priori, it is unclear how intensified immigration enforcement could impact Hispanics' willingness to run for Congress. The political economy literature has examined how personal characteristics, the electoral context, and political institutions affect individuals' electoral aspirations,⁶ but has paid scant attention to the role played by coercive immigration policies. Based on research in the mobilization and repression literatures, coercive actions can either deter, escalate, or have no effect on political mobilization (Earl, 2011). On one hand, increased policing and surveillance of a group could discourage its

⁶ For example, Anagol and Fujiwara (2016); Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras, and Iyer (2018); Dal Bó (2017); Osborne and Slivinski (1996); Thompson et al. (2019).

political mobilization by increasing the costs of organizing (Hess and Martin, 2006) or by disrupting its organizing altogether by interfering through limited support or resources, stigmatization of the group or intimidation (Boykoff, 2007; Oliver, 2008).⁷ In the case of Hispanics, the targeting of the Latino community could discourage potential co-ethnic candidates from seeking office, even if disrupting their political participation and representation is not the aim of increased enforcement. On the other hand, the targeting of a demographic group could backfire, resulting in its greater mobilization, especially if it triggers negative emotions within the group.⁸ In our case, feelings of anger triggered by stricter immigration enforcement could foster Hispanics' willingness to run for office, even when the observed coercive actions are not directed at U.S. citizens.⁹

To assess the impact of immigration enforcement on Hispanics' willingness to run for office, we use county-level data on the universe of political candidates running for congressional elections throughout the United States over the 2008–2018 decade—a period of notorious increase in interior immigration enforcement. We then merge information on several interior immigration enforcement initiatives, which we initially combine into an index to gauge the impact of the overall tougher enforcement climate to which Hispanics are exposed by county.¹⁰ Using a difference-in-

⁷ For example, research on political participation has stressed the importance of mass incarceration, surveillance, and incapacitation of a large proportion of the Black population during the U.S. war on drugs in contributing to the decline in the Black Civil Rights Movement (Oliver, 2008).

⁸ Research in political psychology and candidate emergence contends that negative emotions—particularly anger—have a significant positive effect on political participation (Best and Krueger, 2011; Valentino et al., 2011; Banks, White, and McKenzie, 2019). As Scott and Collins (2020) point out, anger in the African American community in the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential election positively affected Black people's likelihood of considering running for office, although feelings of fear and sadness were not found to significantly impact political ambition.

⁹ Research on the effects of immigration enforcement by legal status and nativity reveals that foreign-born and U.S.-born Latinos alike are targets of microaggressions and increased surveillance resulting from the stricter policies. Further, both groups have been found to exhibit high rates of psychological distress caused by the vulnerability of family and community members (Szkupinski Quiroga, Medina, and Glick, 2014).

¹⁰ We also conduct the analysis separately for various interior immigration enforcement initiatives to better gauge their individual contribution.

difference approach that exploits the temporal and geographic variation in interior immigration enforcement initiatives as a source of identification, we examine how the tougher climate created by the implementation of the policies might have affected Hispanics' willingness to run as candidates in congressional elections. Identification relies on the exogenous geographic and temporal variation in immigration enforcement with respect to Hispanics' willingness to run for Congress. We assess the validity of this assumption by conducting various checks, including: (1) confirming that the timing and intensity of enforcement is not driven by the participation of Hispanics in congressional elections; (2) verifying that there are not pre-existing differences in Hispanic's involvement in congressional elections between counties that implement tougher immigration enforcement policies and those that adopt more lenient measures through an event study; and (3) corroborating that the impacts are not driven by changes in local demographic composition, as opposed to by changes in immigration enforcement.

We find that immigration enforcement suppresses Hispanics' willingness to run for Congress, especially during midterm elections, in states with a Republican governor, and in localities without a sanctuary policy in place. The effect of intensified immigration enforcement, which is not observed for other underrepresented groups in politics like women or Blacks, proves robust to several identification checks. Specifically, we find no evidence that Hispanics behave differently during elections that take place prior to the adoption of interior immigration enforcement policies, but observe a clear break in its trend thereafter. In addition, the adoption of immigration enforcement initiatives appears unrelated to past shares of Hispanic candidates running for office, or to the ethnic composition of counties with a stricter enforcement climate. Finally, the chilling effect of intensified immigration enforcement appears primarily driven by the more coercive police-based measures at the county level—especially Secure Communities.

Overall, our findings underscore the impact of policy aimed at curtailing unauthorized immigration on the representation of Hispanics in national politics. In this regard, the analysis makes two important contributions. *First*, it extends our understanding of how immigration policy, as embodied by the intensification of interior immigration enforcement over the past decades, affects the U.S.-citizen Hispanic community. While a growing literature has addressed the role of intensified immigration enforcement on a range of outcomes—from residential choices to employment, fertility, or household composition; less is known about its impacts on Hispanics’ political engagement. For instance, Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez (2017) document how intensified enforcement negatively affected Latino registration and voter turnout. Yet, we still do not know how a tougher immigration climate might be impacting U.S.-citizen Hispanics’ willingness to proactively participate in national politics by running for office.

Second, the study informs a broad literature on the determinants of minorities’ political engagement. Thus far, this literature has primarily focused on the main drivers of registration and voting among minorities as the main caliber of their political engagement (*e.g.*, Hayes and McKee 2012; Fairdosi and Rogowski 2015; Fraga 2016; Amuedo-Dorantes and Bucheli 2020). Not much is known about the factors driving minorities’ willingness to run as candidates in national elections. Given the growing share of eligible voters that are Hispanic, their traditionally low voter turnout rates, and the importance of having co-ethnic minorities representing community interests in guaranteeing better outcomes,¹¹ understanding how immigration policy can influence minority engagement in national politics is well-warranted.

¹¹ For example, by improving the transfer of welfare benefits (Preuhs, 2006) and narrowing the housing prices gap between minority and non-minority neighborhoods (Beach *et al.*, 2018).

II. Immigration Enforcement and Hispanics' Willingness to Run in National Elections

A) The Political Engagement of Minorities

A long-standing literature has examined the participation of minorities in the electoral process and how it can contribute to the social inclusion of underrepresented groups. The presence of candidates that better reflect the composition of the population can help in the election of representatives that defend the interests and preferences of diverse groups and strengthens their political influence. At the national level, Griffin and Newman (2005) found that U.S. senators' roll-call behavior between 1974 and 2002 responded to voters' opinions and was unrelated to the preferences of nonvoters. The nature of this responsiveness means that higher participation and potential representation among minority groups can strengthen their influence over the policy-making process. For example, focusing on legislative support for welfare benefits, Preuhs (2006) shows that the election of Black state representatives may lead to an increase in the level of cash-transfer benefits for families in their jurisdictions. Using historical data on Black representation during the reconstruction years after the American Civil War, Logan (2018) shows that Black politicians were more effective at decreasing the white-Black literacy gap. Using recent data from city council candidates in California, Beach *et al.* (2018) show that the election of nonwhite candidates can lead to a reduction in the housing prices gap between minority and non-minority neighborhoods through increased business activity and changes in police behavior. Overall, this literature identifies the election of minority representatives as instrumental to the advancement of underrepresented groups' interests in social and policy issues.

A more diverse composition of the candidate pool can also promote electoral participation among minorities by increasing their political attentiveness. This argument was first advanced by Bobo and Gilliam (1990), who found that Black eligible voters were more engaged in political

affairs in cities with co-racial mayors because the co-racial representation created a more trusting and efficacious political environment for Black voters. In a similar study including data on Hispanic and Black candidates to state legislatures over the 1998 through 2006 period, Rocha *et al.* (2010) find that the presence of these minority candidates has a positive effect on the voting likelihood of individuals in states with a higher percentage of co-racial legislators. Using data on U.S. House representatives in post-redistricting elections in five states, Hayes and McKee (2012) find that Black voters are more likely to participate in congressional districts with Black representatives. Evidence of increased political engagement when co-racial candidates are on the ballot is also documented for Hispanics (Barreto, 2007) and Black voters (Fairdosi and Rogowski, 2015; Washington, 2006).

Despite the robust and compelling evidence of minority candidates being beneficial to the democratic process and to the advancement of traditionally disenfranchised groups, our understanding of the determinants of minority candidates' willingness to run for office is surprisingly limited. In this study, we address this gap by examining the role played by policy, particularly immigration policy that disproportionately affects Hispanics, on this underrepresented minority's willingness to run as candidates in national elections.

B) Interior Immigration Enforcement and Hispanics' Political Engagement

The surge in the enforcement of immigration laws and regulations has generated a sizable body of literature examining the impact of these policies on targeted immigrants, their families, and the communities in which they reside. A relatively recent direction in this literature has focused on the impact of increased enforcement on the exclusion of migrants, mixed-status families, and U.S. citizens from the use of public services and participation in the political process. In general, this literature finds that immigration enforcement curtails program participation and

results in worse outcomes in health, education, food assistance, domestic violence, and electoral engagement, to name a few (*e.g.* Watson, 2014; Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez, 2017; Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo, and Sevilla 2018; Dee and Murphy, 2020; Muchow and Amuedo-Dorantes, 2020).

The literature attributes this disenfranchisement to the increased likelihood of displacement and alienation among immigrant and minority groups. Targeted individuals and their communities may minimize their contact with society or re-locate to jurisdictions with a lower risk of apprehension and deportation. In this regard, Dee and Murphy (2020) find that the collaboration between local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities has led to a drop in Hispanic student enrollment in public schools. The authors compile a county-year panel over the 2000–2011 period with information on ICE partnerships and the universe of K–12 public schools from the National Center for Education Statistics. They show that counties that signed 287(g) agreements with ICE experienced, at least, a 7.3 percent drop in Hispanic student enrollment, while there were no measurable effects among non-Hispanic pupils. The authors attribute this effect to the displacement of over 300,000 Hispanic students as a direct consequence of the 287(g) agreements signed by local law enforcement agencies. Although more sensitive to control group selection, similar evidence of population displacement as a consequence of local immigration enforcement has also been documented in Arizona with the adoption of the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) and SB 1070 (Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano, 2019).

The literature also documents the existence of “chilling” effects as individuals worry that their participation in society and use of social services might expose them or their communities to immigration authorities, especially in areas with intensified enforcement efforts. In this vein, Watson (2014) uses government data on apprehensions of unauthorized immigrants during the

1990s and early 2000s to analyze Medicaid participation among non-US-citizens. The analysis finds a reduction in the participation of would-be Medicaid users because of increased enforcement activity and increased fear of deportation. This chilling effect is also documented by Muchow and Amuedo-Dorantes (2020) in Hispanic and immigrant communities in Los Angeles, where increased awareness of immigration enforcement, as measured by online searches on ICE and related terms, lowers domestic violence calls to police in areas with a higher concentration of Hispanic non-citizens.

Focused on political participation, Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez (2017) use CPS data covering general elections between 2002–2014 to assess the impact of immigration enforcement on voting and registration among U.S. citizens living in mixed-status families. Even though Hispanics are already less likely to register to vote than their non-Hispanic counterparts, the analysis reveals how an increase in immigration enforcement leads to a further 5 percent drop in the propensity to register among Hispanics, although no effect is found on the propensity to vote. In addition, the authors document how disenchantment with politics and the belief that their participation is inconsequential are key reasons for their lower engagement in politics. It is in this complex context that we aim to gain a better understanding of how the tougher climate created by the intensification of interior immigration enforcement might have impacted Hispanics' political engagement, as captured by their willingness to run for Congress.

III. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics

With the purpose of learning how changes in immigration enforcement in the United States impact Hispanics' willingness to run for office, as well as the aspects of enforcement driving any found impacts, we gather data from various sources.

A) Data on Political Candidates

Our main data on the ethnicity of every House candidate running in general elections over the 2008–2018 period comes from the Center for Responsive Politics.¹² We use this information to compute the share of Hispanic candidates at the congressional district level. This measure of Hispanics’ participation is then cross walked to the county level using the congressional district population in each county as weights.¹³

Despite being a growing minority group, Hispanics remain underrepresented in politics relative to their share in the general U.S. population (Bialik, 2019). As shown in Table 1, the average share of Hispanic candidates over the period under examination was close to 4 percent, whereas its corresponding share in the eligible-to-vote population in 2016 was three times larger at 12 percent (Cilluffo and Fry, 2019). Further, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, there is significant geographic and temporal variation in the share of Hispanic candidates running for Congress. For example, their presence was greater in some counties in Colorado, northern New Mexico and southern Texas in 2008. By 2018, it had increased in southern California, Arizona and even in some counties in Washington state, strengthened in New Mexico, but weakened in Colorado and southern Texas.

B) Data on Immigration Enforcement

Since 9/11, the United States has witnessed a drastic increase in interior immigration enforcement. In the absence of a comprehensive immigration reform, several local and state governments have taken matters into their own hands enacting several policies aimed at targeting

¹² This information is mainly self-reported by the candidates and complemented with publicly available data (Bryner and Haley, 2018).

¹³ We use the Missouri Census Data Center (MCDC) Geographic Correspondence Engine to conduct the congressional-district-to-county crosswalk. Available at <http://mcdc.missouri.edu/applications/geocorr2018.html>. Last accessed on May 26, 2020.

undocumented immigration. Our goal is to gauge how the tougher climate created by a compendium of interior immigration enforcement measures has impacted Hispanics' willingness to run as candidates in national elections.

To that end, we gather historical and current data on the implementation of the interior immigration enforcement initiatives described in Table A in the appendix—namely, 287(g) agreements between local or state police and ICE, the Secure Communities program,¹⁴ omnibus immigration laws, and employment verification (E-Verify) mandates. Data on 287(g) agreements are gathered from ICE's 287(g) Fact Sheet website, from Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2014), and from Kostandini *et al.* (2013).¹⁵ Data on the rolling out of the Secure Communities program at the county level is compiled from ICE publications on activated jurisdictions.¹⁶ Finally, data on state-level omnibus immigration laws (OIL) and employment verification (E-Verify) mandates is gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures.¹⁷

To better capture the overall climate created by the measures cited above, we construct a county×election year immigration enforcement index equal to the sum of interior immigration enforcement initiatives in place at the county level in any given electoral year. The index serves as a proxy for the intensity of immigration enforcement to which potential candidates might be exposed to. Ultimately, the true intensity of any enforcement measure will inevitably vary across

¹⁴ Officially, Secure Communities was active from 2008 to 2014, to then be reactivated in 2017. Nevertheless, the exchange of biometric information at the core of the program “remained constant [and uninterrupted] since full implementation” in 2013 (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2018). In the interim years, Secure Communities was replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which kept most of the program components largely unchanged (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2020).

¹⁵ Since the ICE website contains only a list of the current active agreements, we review old websites and prior research using these agreements to ensemble a complete dataset spanning over the period under consideration. Once we have the start date of each 287(g) agreement, we calculate the period during which these agreements have been in place.

¹⁶ See: <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf>

¹⁷ See: http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/omnibus_laws.pdf

jurisdictions depending on who oversees its implementation and/or other unobserved local traits. We include county fixed-effects intended to capture such idiosyncrasies.

The index, which ranges from 0 (no initiative in place) to 4 (all initiatives in place), offers two important advantages. *First*, it provides a *tractable way of gauging the impact of the tougher climate* created by the diversity of interior immigration enforcement initiatives put in place. The decision to run as a political candidate is not likely to result from the adoption of a single enforcement initiative but, rather, by the overall environment created by multiple policies. Therefore, a comprehensive enforcement index is a better proxy for such a climate change. In subsequent heterogeneity analyses, we distinguish between police-based and employment-based enforcement measures given the distinct resources they rely upon (police vs. employers), as well as their different consequences.¹⁸ We also differentiate between the geographic scope of the adopted measures—some at the county level and others at the state level—as well as by individual policy. Finally, in a series of identification checks, we carefully assess endogeneity concerns rising from the optional, and other times non-optional but still non-arbitrary, implementation of the various immigration enforcement measures being considered.

Second, immigration enforcement in the United States is best described as an *interconnected system of initiatives* administered by federal, state, and local agencies with

¹⁸ It is possible to group the above-mentioned immigration enforcement measures based on their objectives and operability into *police-based* and *employment-based* immigration enforcement. Police-based immigration enforcement, as captured by 287(g) agreements, Secure Communities or police enforcement included in omnibus immigration laws, is generally aimed at identifying and apprehending undocumented immigrants. The various programs involve either local and/or state police, and are indistinguishable from a migrant's perspective. Individuals can be stopped by police, inquired about their immigration status, and their fingerprints entered in a database shared by the FBI and DHS to confirm their immigration status. If they are determined to be undocumented, they can be held and transferred over to ICE custody. These programs have been responsible for the largest share of interior removals. In contrast, the goal of employment-based enforcement, as epitomized by E-Verify mandates, is to ensure the work eligibility of prospective employees. Unlike police-based enforcement, migrants are generally alerted of whether the prospective employer e-verifies. The employer, as opposed to a local or state level police, gathers information that is entered in an electronic program. The program alerts the employer if there is any anomaly that needs to be resolved prior to legally hiring the migrant, and the employee is given roughly a week to resolve those issues.

overlapping procedures and missions. This is particularly true of police-based immigration enforcement measures, which, as noted above, build on each other and, for practical matters, do not differ much in their operability. Given the correlation among the various measures, the index seems a more suitable way of gauging the overall impact of intensified immigration enforcement.

To gain a better sense of where the variation in the index is stemming from, Table B in the appendix displays summary statistics for the index throughout the sample period, as well as for the various groupings of interior immigration enforcement initiatives being considered and their individual components. On average, counties had an immigration enforcement index equal to 1 for the period under examination, denoting the national coverage of Secure Communities by the end of our sample period. Most of this enforcement is police-based enforcement, which grew rapidly between 2008 and 2012, although E-Verify also had an important expansion during that period. In terms of its geographic scope, all jurisdictions had at least one county-level immigration enforcement initiative in place by 2012, as opposed to 37 percent of counties with some state-level immigration enforcement measure. By type of policy, we see a quick expansion of Secure Communities between 2008 and 2012, after which point all the variation stemming from that policy is mute. However, we continue to observe changes in other interior immigration enforcement initiatives, including 287(g) and E-Verify mandates.

Finally, Figures 3 and 4 include heat maps for the intensity of the enforcement index at the beginning of our sample period (*i.e.*, 2008) and at the end (*i.e.*, 2018). Supporting the descriptive statistics in Table B in the appendix, the maps confirm the intensification of interior immigration enforcement over the sample period under consideration, as well as the geographic and temporal variation of the index.

C) Other Data

In addition to the datasets described above, we gather data on county and state-level traits known to impact political participation. First, we include information on the gender, race, ethnic and age-group composition of each county (Washington, 2006; Fraga, 2016) from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) WONDER database. Based on the descriptive statistics in Table 1, the average county was more diverse than the electoral candidate pool, with an average share of Hispanics equal to 17 percent.

We also collect data on local unemployment rates from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, which averaged 6.3 percent for the period under consideration (see Table 1). Additionally, we gather data on both poverty incidence and median household income from the U.S. Census Bureau's Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE) program. Throughout our study period, poverty incidence stood at 14.6 percent and median household income averaged \$57,000.

Finally, we account for various state-level policy and political variables likely shaping political participation (Card and Moretti, 2007; Kaplan and Yuan, 2020), including: (1) data on whether same-day voter registration is allowed and on the enactment of restrictive laws regulating early voting, absentee voting, and ID requirements from the National Conference of State Legislatures;¹⁹ (2) state governors' political affiliation from the National Governors Association; (3) states' civic standards, collected from the Education Commission of the States; and (4) information on whether the state was a "swing" or "toss-up" state in the election cycle, identified by RealClearPolitics as states in which either major party has equal chances of winning. Overall, based on the descriptive statistics in Table 1, about 45 percent of counties were located in states

¹⁹ Recent research has found that stricter ID laws might not have a negative effect on registration or turnout (Cantoni and Pons, 2019). Removing this variable from our specification does not change our main findings.

with a Democratic governor, 22 percent in a jurisdiction with same-day voter registration, 7 percent in a state restricting early voting, 1.5 percent in states where absentee voting is restricted, and 17 percent in a state with a photo ID requirement in order to vote. Finally, 31 percent of counties in the sample are located in a swing state.

IV. Methodology

The purpose of this study is to gauge how the toughening of immigration enforcement might affect Hispanic diversity in the pool of candidates running for Congress. To that end, we start by estimating the following benchmark regression:

$$(1) \quad Y_{ct} = \alpha + \beta IE_{ct} + X_{c(s)t}\gamma + \theta_c + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{ct},$$

where Y_{ct} is share of Hispanic candidates in the candidate pool in county c during election year t .

Our key regressor is the vector IE_{ct} —an interior immigration enforcement index that serves as a proxy for the intensity and overall immigration enforcement climate in county c at time t . As noted in the data section, the index ranges between 0 and 4, based on the number of enforcement initiatives in place. In follow-up specifications, we differentiate among the various programs, as well as based on the nature of the various enforcement initiatives. In all instances, we rely on the temporal and geographic variation in IE_{ct} , illustrated by Figures 3 and 4, to identify its effect on Hispanics’ willingness to run as candidates for Congress.

The vector $X_{c(s)t}$ includes county-level data on population composition and economic conditions, as well as state-level information on civic education, politics and voting regulations. Finally, equation (1) includes county (θ_c) and election year (θ_t) fixed-effects to account for time-invariant county- or year-level unobservable factors potentially affecting Hispanic candidates’ decision to run for office.

The coefficient of interest β captures the relationship between the intensity of local- and state-level immigration enforcement and the share of Hispanics running for Congress. Foreign-born and native Latinos alike have been the target of microaggressions and exhibited high rates of psychological distress caused by the vulnerability of family and community members (Szkupinski Quiroga, Medina and Glick, 2014). In line with the political psychology literature, a positive coefficient would be suggestive of stricter immigration policy leading to a higher likelihood of Hispanics running for Congress, possibly triggered by negative emotions derived from the intensified enforcement and an increased desire to represent their communities' interests. In contrast, a negative coefficient would be suggestive of Hispanics shying away from national politics due to discrimination, fear or increased isolation as an unwelcoming climate towards immigrants galvanized. This scenario would support prevailing theories in the mobilization literature, which point at intimidation and stigmatization as two important deterrents of political mobilization (Earl, 2011). Finally, it is also possible for the changing policy climate to have no impact on Hispanics' willingness to run for Congress, in which case the coefficient would be non-statistically different from zero. This would not necessarily imply that immigration enforcement is irrelevant to the U.S.-born Latino community; rather, that it does not significantly impact their willingness to run for office.

In what follows, we test the abovementioned hypotheses using ordinary least squares (OLS) and county populations as estimate weights. We subsequently conduct a variety of robustness and identification tests, pondering various mechanisms for the observed impacts.

V. Immigration Enforcement and Hispanics' Willingness to Run for Office

Table 2 displays the results from estimating three specifications of the benchmark model in equation (1). Specification (1) is our baseline model, and it only includes our key regressor,

along with county and election year fixed effects. Specification (2) adds several county-specific population and economic controls, including the share of Hispanics in the county, unemployment rates, and the incidence of poverty. Finally, specification (3) adds state-level controls, including whether the state has a Democratic governor, as well as regulations and restrictions likely affecting registration and voting, for instance, whether the state has civic standards for high school graduation, if it allows for same-day registration, if it has enacted early voting restrictions, and if it has restricted absentee voting or has voting ID laws in place.

Overall, regardless of the specification being used, we find that the intensity of interior immigration enforcement in the county is inversely related to the share of Hispanics in the congressional candidate pool. Since the index fluctuates between 0 and 4, based on the average number of interior immigration enforcement initiatives in place, a one-unit increase in the index (equivalent to the adoption of one enforcement initiative) lowers the share of Hispanics in the congressional candidates pool by 31 percent.²⁰ As suggested by the research on political mobilization (*e.g.* Hess and Martin, 2006; Boykoff, 2007; Oliver, 2008; Earl, 2011), this finding supports the notion that increased policing accompanying the intensification of immigration enforcement might have discouraged the political mobilization of the Latino community, possibly through the intimidation and fear instilled in the foreign-born and their native family and friends. After all, the vast majority of deportees during the intensification of immigration enforcement have been of Latino descent (U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2014).

How does this impact compare to that of other county or state-level traits? A one-percent increase in the share of women in the county raises the share of Hispanics in the candidate pool for Congress by 14 percent, and a similar increase in the share of Hispanics in the county raises

²⁰ This is computed as: $(\beta * \Delta IE / \mu_{DV}) * 100$, where $\beta = -0.013$, $\Delta IE = 1$ and $\mu_{DV} = 0.042$, based on Table 1.

their share in the candidate pool by 4.4 percent. In contrast, a one-percent increase in the share of Blacks in the county lowers the share of Hispanics running for Congress by 3.4 percent. Finally, we find that some of the voting laws play a non-negligible role. For instance, the adoption of restrictive absentee voting laws is associated with a 69 percent higher share of Hispanics in the candidate pool, whereas the adoption of strict voting ID laws lowers the participation of Hispanics in the candidate pool for Congress by 43 percent.

To verify that the estimated effect in Table 2 is unique to the Hispanic community and, thus, captures a chilling effect of intensified immigration enforcement, we repeat the analysis replacing the share of Hispanics in the candidate pool with the share of female candidates and the share of Black candidates. As shown in Table 3, regardless of the model specification used, the placebo checks reveal that interior immigration enforcement is uncorrelated with the presence of these minorities in the candidate pool.²¹ In other words, the impacts reported in Table 2 are unique to Hispanics—the one minority group largely affected by the expansion of interior immigration enforcement given that most undocumented immigrants during the period under consideration were Hispanic (Passel and Cohn, 2018).

VI. Identification Checks

One of the limitations stemming from the difference-in-difference methodology being used in Table 2 refers to the possibility that our estimates might be capturing pre-existing differences in the participation of Hispanics in the candidate pool between counties that eventually adopt tougher immigration enforcement policies and counties that do not. To gauge whether that is the case, we conduct an event study, which allows us to identify any differential pre-trends in the impact of

²¹ In separate checks available from the authors, we experiment with using the share of non-Hispanic female candidates. Results prove robust to the use of that alternative share.

immigration enforcement on Hispanics' representation in the congressional candidate pool, as well as to document the time path of enforcement effects. Because our identification relies on the changes in the *intensity* of enforcement across counties at different time periods (a continuous treatment measure), our event-study model defines the leads as the periods before the enforcement index first turned positive, whereas the lags are interacted with the enforcement index to capture the intensity effect, as in recent literature utilizing a continuous treatment variable (*e.g.*, Clemens, Lewis, and Postel 2018; Goodman-Bacon 2018). Specifically, the event-study model takes the following form:

$$(2) \quad Y_{ct} = \alpha + \sum_{t=-3}^{-1} \tau_t \cdot 1(IE > 0)_{ct} + \sum_{t=1}^3 \rho_t \cdot [1(IE > 0)_{ct} \cdot IE_{ct}] + X'_{c(s)t} \gamma + \theta_c + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

where the indicator function $1(IE > 0)_{ct}$ represents the t^{th} election year before or after IE first turned positive in the county. We examine the existence of pre-trends up to three election cycles prior, as captured by coefficients τ_t (period 4 and over prior to IE turning positive are used as the base group). The coefficients ρ_t measure the dynamics of the enforcement effects up to three election cycles after their implementation, and they are interacted with IE_{ct} to capture the intensity effects. Figure 5 displays the coefficients from the event study, along with 95 percent confidence intervals. All estimates for the election years prior to the adoption of immigration enforcement policies are close to zero, strongly supporting the assumption of no pre-trends. In addition, there is a clear break in the trend in the share of Hispanics running for Congress surrounding the adoption of immigration enforcement policies, with the coefficient estimates becoming statistically different from zero and negative after the implementation of the enforcement policies (estimates are provided in Table C in the appendix).

An additional concern when assessing policy impacts refers to the potentially endogenous nature of the policy in question. Immigration enforcement policies are no exception in this regard.

Even if their implementation is non-optional, as in the case of Secure Communities, the policy is still non-random. In our case, we are concerned with enforcement being endogenous to the share of Hispanics in the county's candidate pool—the outcome of interest. To gauge if that is the case, we examine whether the implementation timing of tougher immigration policies can be predicted by the share of Hispanics in the candidate pool in each county *prior to* the implementation of any immigration enforcement policy in the county. To that end, we collapse the data at the county level and use the election year in which the enforcement index first turned positive as the dependent variable. The results from this exercise are displayed in Panel A of Table 4. In column 1, we model the implementation timing, whereas in column 2 we model the intensity of interior immigration enforcement when the index first turned positive in the county. In both instances, the results confirm that the share of Hispanics in the county's candidate pool prior to the implementation of any enforcement is not a good predictor of either the election year when the immigration enforcement index first turned positive or its level at that point in time.

In addition, in Panel B of Table 4, we explore the possibility that tougher immigration enforcement might be endogenous to our outcome of interest via the selective residential choices made by many Hispanic immigrant families amid intensified immigration enforcement. Suppose that, fearing that undocumented relatives might be identified and deported, some mixed-status households relocate to counties with lesser immigration enforcement. Or, alternatively, that entire families, even those with U.S.-citizen members, leave the country to reunite with their deported relatives. In both instances, the share of Hispanic candidates running for office might decrease. To assess whether this selective relocation is a source of concern in our case, we examine the county population composition and whether it is affected by immigration enforcement. Specifically, we first model the *share* of Hispanics in the county as a function of the intensity of

interior immigration enforcement in the locality (see column 1). Then, in column 2, we model *changes* in the local population composition, as captured by the growth rate in the Hispanic population. As can be seen in Panel B of Table 4, we are unable to find evidence of immigration enforcement significantly altering the presence of Hispanics at the county level.

In sum, the event study, along with the identification checks in Table 4, support the causal interpretation of the estimated impact in Table 2. In other words, interior immigration enforcement appears to have deterred Hispanics from running for office.

VII. Robustness Checks

In what follows, we further assess the robustness of our findings to the exclusion of outliers, to the focus on Secure Communities—an immigration enforcement arguably more exogenous given the fact that participating counties could not opt-in (East *et al.* 2018)²²—and to the use of constant 2000 Census county population weights that would be unaffected by immigration enforcement.

Although the entire country experienced an intensification in the enforcement of immigration law throughout our study period, the state of Arizona stands out as a noteworthy outlier in its targeting of immigrant communities. The escalation in immigration enforcement measures, especially with the passing of Senate Bill 1070 and its “show me your papers” clause, has been widely considered the country’s most stringent anti-immigration effort.²³ In Table 5, we exclude Arizona, as well as other counties with the highest levels of immigration enforcement in the sample—mainly in Georgia and South Carolina. Regardless of whether we drop Arizona

²² See: <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac/ice-response-to-task-force-on-secure-communities.pdf> (second paragraph, page 12/20) for an explanation of how the implementation of Secure Communities was not optional.

²³ Archibold, Randal C. “Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration,” *The New York Times*. April 23, 2010.

(column 1), or counties with an immigration enforcement index equal to or greater than 3 (out of 4) and 4 (columns 2 and 3, respectively), we continue to find results similar to those in Table 2. That is, a one-unit increase in the index (equivalent to one enforcement initiative) lowers the share of Hispanic candidates running for Congress by roughly 36 to 37 percent (vs. an estimated 31 percent in Table 2).

Next, we explore if our results substantially differ when we gauge the independent impact of Secure Communities—an enforcement initiative deemed as potentially more exogenous since localities could not opt-in. While we still control for the presence of other initiatives, column 4 in Table 5 displays the results from this exercise. As can be seen therein, our results only get stronger. The implementation of Secure Communities lowers the Hispanics’ participation in the candidate pool by 51 percent.²⁴

Finally, in column 5, we explore whether our estimates prove robust to the use of alternative weights. Instead of using contemporaneous county populations as weights, which could potentially change with the level of interior immigration enforcement, we use information on each county’s population from the 2000 Census—that is, prior to the adoption of any interior immigration enforcement. The result from this exercise shows that the estimated effect is practically unchanged from the one in Table 2.

Summarizing, our findings prove robust to the exclusion of counties that could be considered outliers in regard to their level of interior immigration enforcement, to the focus on potentially less endogenous interior immigration enforcement initiatives, and to the use of alternative weights.

²⁴ Figure A in the appendix checks on the exogeneity of Secure Communities with regards to our outcome of interest—the share of Hispanics running for Congress. We find no evidence that the estimated effect in column 4 of Table 5 pre-dates the implementation of Secure Communities. Additionally, there is a clear break in the trend following program implementation.

VIII. Mechanisms

Thus far, we have shown that the intensification of interior immigration enforcement seems to have deterred Hispanics from running for office. In this section we aim to gain a better understanding of the mechanics behind the observed impact. To that end, we first distinguish between police-based and employment-based interior immigration enforcement. This distinction is relevant, not only because of *who* is involved in the implementation of each measure (*i.e.* police agents vs. employers), but also because of the consequences of both types of measures. Police-based immigration enforcement has been responsible for most interior removals and, as such, can be conceived as potentially more coercive than employment-based enforcement—typified by employment verification mandates such as E-Verify. Hence, we reconstruct the immigration enforcement index to create two indices: (1) one that uses information on enforcement initiatives that require the involvement of local or state law enforcement personnel, including 287(g) agreements, Secure Communities and omnibus immigration laws; and (2) another index for the presence of enforcement initiatives that solely involve the employer, *i.e.*, E-Verify. The estimates in Panel A of Table 6 suggest that only police-based interior immigration enforcement has a significant impact on the share of Hispanics running for office. A one-unit increase in the index, equivalent to the adoption of one more police-based initiative, lowers the share of Hispanics in the candidate pool by 33 percent. This result is consistent with the political mobilization literature, which finds that coercive practices may have resulted in the political de-mobilization of Hispanics through the deterrence, incapacitation, and surveillance of their co-ethnics (Oliver, 2008). Certainly, the mandatory reporting, detention, and deportation of immigrants in the Latino community constitutes a coercive strategy (Ayling and Grabosky, 2006), which seems to have affected the political aspirations of its members.

Next, we distinguish between local-level policies and enforcement initiatives adopted at the state-level—possibly more detached from the conditions encountered by potential candidates in their communities. As before, we reconstruct our immigration enforcement index to create two indices: (1) one that uses information on state-level enforcement initiatives, including state-level 287(g) agreements, omnibus immigration laws and E-Verify; and (2) another index for local-level initiatives, such as county-level 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the impact is driven primarily by local initiatives, with the adoption of one more program at the county level lowering Hispanic participation in the candidate pool by 52 percent.

In sum, it is local police-based enforcement, as typified by the Secure Communities program (see Table D in the appendix), that appears to have had the largest impact on Hispanics' willingness to run for office. Coincidentally, Secure Communities has been responsible for most interior removals,²⁵ hinting on the potential intimidation created by these programs among Hispanics.

IX. Heterogeneous Impacts: *When and Where Does Immigration Enforcement Matter?*

To conclude, we explore the heterogeneous effects of immigration enforcement on Hispanics' willingness to run as candidates in congressional elections. Are Hispanic candidates affected similarly by immigration enforcement in all counties and elections? Or do policy changes matter more for certain elections and under certain conditions? Table 7 addresses these questions.

First, we estimate equation (1) separately for congressional races taking place in presidential-election years and during midterm elections. Historically, and throughout our study period, voter turnout, has been notoriously lower during midterms than during presidential

²⁵ “Deportations Under ICE's Secure Communities Program.” Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Syracuse University. Available at: <https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/509/#f3>. Last accessed July, 2020.

elections, especially among Hispanics.²⁶ It is likely that a tougher climate created by immigration enforcement affects potential candidates differently depending on the community's political participation. Column 1 indicates that changes in immigration policy do not seem to significantly affect Hispanics' willingness to run for office during presidential-election years. However, a one-unit increase in immigration enforcement during midterm-election years causes Hispanics' share in the candidate pool to drop by 2.4 percentage points, or 50 percent (column 2).

Next, we ask whether immigration enforcement has a differential impact on Hispanics' willingness to run for office depending on state governors' political party. Prior research has found that states with Republican governors are more likely to cooperate with immigration authorities or experience tougher immigration policies (Creek and Yoder, 2012; Chand and Schreckhise, 2015). Based on the estimates in columns 3 and 4, we find that the adoption of an additional immigration enforcement initiative causes a 29 percent drop in the share of Hispanic candidates in Republican-controlled states, but has no significant impact in jurisdictions with a Democratic governor.

Along the same line, we then question whether enforcement has had a differential impact in counties with a sanctuary policy in place—policies that allow for local law enforcement to limit their cooperation with federal immigration officials. The estimates in columns 5 and 6 reveal that immigration enforcement does not affect the share of Hispanic candidates in counties with a sanctuary policy in place, whereas it does in those without one. These results are suggestive of the important role that sanctuary policies may play in protecting and promoting the political engagement of Hispanics.

²⁶ See: <https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/time-series/demo/voting-historical-time-series.html>.

X. Summary and Conclusions

The intensification in the enforcement of immigration law in the United States interior since 9/11 and a concurrent surge in the political representation of minorities has produced a growing literature on the consequences of enforcement activities on immigrants, mixed-status families, and co-ethnic U.S. citizens. Our analysis informs this literature with an assessment of how local immigration enforcement measures have affected Hispanics' willingness to run as candidates in congressional elections and, therefore, their engagement in national politics.

Using data from every congressional candidate during the 2008–2018 period and a panel on immigration enforcement initiatives, we find that the tougher climate created by these policies curtails the share of Hispanics in the candidate pool for Congress by 31 percent. The impact appears more harmful during midterm elections, in states with a Republican governor, and in localities without a sanctuary policy in place. The effect of intensified immigration enforcement, which is not observed for other underrepresented groups in politics like women or Blacks, proves robust to several identification checks and seems to be primarily driven by police-based measures implemented at the county level—especially the Secure Communities program.

Overall, our findings show that current coercive efforts aimed at curtailing unauthorized immigration undermine the participation of U.S.-citizen Hispanics in national politics, as captured by their willingness to run in congressional races. With Hispanics projected to become the largest minority group of eligible voters in the upcoming 2020 elections, compelling evidence on how minority candidates are instrumental to the advancement of underrepresented groups' interests in social and policy issues, and intensified immigration enforcement efforts disproportionately affecting Hispanic families, gaining a better understanding of how immigration policy is impacting Hispanics' engagement in national elections is well warranted.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Hispanic share in candidate pool (%)	0.042	0.112	0.00	1
Immigration Enforcement	0.976	0.688	0.00	4
<i>County-level controls</i>				
Female population (%)	0.508	0.012	0.268	0.572
Hispanic population (%)	0.172	0.169	0.00	0.964
Black population (%)	0.138	0.131	0.00	0.866
Population age 65+ (%)	0.143	0.039	0.032	0.576
Unemployment rate (%)	0.065	0.027	0.011	0.288
Poverty incidence	0.146	0.054	0.026	0.544
Median household income (\$)	56,882.47	15,977.27	19,182	140,382
<i>State-level controls (I=yes)</i>				
Swing state	0.312	0.463	0	1
Democratic governor	0.449	0.497	0	1
High school civics standards	0.682	0.466	0	1
Same-day voter registration allowed	0.220	0.415	0	1
Restrictive early voting laws	0.042	0.201	0	1
Restrictive absentee voting laws	0.015	0.123	0	1
Strict voting ID laws	0.176	0.380	0	1

Notes: We observe 3,107 counties during the six national election cycles spanning from 2008 to 2018 (N=18,642).

Table 1: The Impact of Immigration Enforcement on Hispanic Candidates' Participation

Outcome: Hispanic Share in Candidate Pool	Specification (1)	Specification (2)	Specification (3)
Immigration Enforcement	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.013** (0.006)
<i>County-level Controls</i>			
Female population (%)		1.374** (0.586)	1.165** (0.563)
Hispanic population (%)		1.188*** (0.326)	1.094*** (0.332)
Black population (%)		-1.090*** (0.275)	-1.011*** (0.252)
Population age 65+ (%)		-0.358 (0.254)	-0.349 (0.249)
Unemployment rate		-0.145 (0.178)	-0.129 (0.167)
Median household income		0.014 (0.039)	0.008 (0.039)
Poverty incidence		-0.217 (0.138)	-0.245* (0.137)
<i>State-level Controls</i>			
Swing state			-0.003 (0.004)
Democratic governor			0.005 (0.003)
High school civics standards			-0.005 (0.005)
Same-day voter registration allowed			0.000 (0.009)
Restrictive early voting laws			-0.010 (0.007)
Restrictive absentee voting laws			0.029** (0.011)
Strict voting ID laws			-0.018*** (0.006)
County & Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Dependent Variable Mean	0.042	0.042	0.042
Observations	18,642	18,642	18,642
R-squared	0.777	0.784	0.785

Notes: Specification (1) includes a constant term, and county and election year fixed effects. Specification (2) adds demographic and socioeconomic county-level controls, and specification (3) adds state-specific controls. Regressions are weighted by the county population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: The Impact of Immigration Enforcement on Black and Female Candidates' Participation as a Placebo Test

Model:	Specification (1)		Specification (2)		Specification (3)	
By Minority:	Female Candidates	Black Candidates	Female Candidates	Black Candidates	Female Candidates	Black Candidates
Immigration Enforcement	-0.000 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.009)	0.001 (0.005)
County-Level Controls	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
State-Level Controls	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
County & Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dependent Variable Mean	0.181	0.053	0.181	0.053	0.181	0.053
Observations	18,642	18,642	18,642	18,642	18,642	18,642
R-squared	0.455	0.691	0.457	0.695	0.460	0.696

Notes: Specification (1) includes a constant term, and county and election year fixed effects. Specification (2) adds demographic and socioeconomic county-level controls, *i.e.* sex, age and ethnic composition, unemployment rate, log median household income, and poverty incidence. Specification (3) adds state-specific controls, including whether the state has a Democratic governor, and regulations and restrictions likely affecting political participation, such as whether the state has civic standards for HS graduation, if it allows for same-day registration, if it has enacted early voting restrictions, and if it has restricted absentee voting or has voting ID laws in place. Regressions are weighted by the county population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table 3: Identification Checks: Assessing the Endogeneity of Immigration Enforcement

Column:	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Predicting the Activation of Tougher Interior Immigration Enforcement Policies		
Outcome:	First Election Cycle Immigration Enforcement > 0	First Level of Immigration Enforcement > 0
Hispanic Share in Candidate Pool	-0.296 (0.481)	-0.204 (0.167)
Constant	2,010.238*** (0.935)	-0.619* (0.336)
County-Level Controls	Y	Y
State-Level Controls	Y	Y
Sate Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Observations	2,728	2,728
R-squared	0.746	0.674
Panel B: Do Counties with Immigration Enforcement Vary in their Population Composition?		
Outcome:	Hispanic Share of the Population	Hispanic Population Growth Rate
Immigration Enforcement	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.003 (0.002)
County-Level Controls	Y	Y
State-Level Controls	Y	Y
County & Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y
Observations	18,642	15,533
R-squared	0.999	0.523

Notes: *Panel A:* The dependent variable in column (1) is the election year in which the first immigration enforcement measure was enacted in the county, and in column (2) it is the first non-zero value for immigration enforcement. Both specifications control for demographic and socioeconomic county-level characteristics, state-specific controls, and state fixed-effects. *Panel B:* Column (1) estimates the impact of immigration enforcement on the share of the population that is Hispanic. Colum (2) estimates the impact on the growth rate of the Hispanic population. All specifications include county and state-level controls, and county and election year fixed effects. All regressions weighted by the county population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: Robustness Checks

Column:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Outcome: Hispanic Share in Candidate Pool	Excluding Arizona Counties	Excluding Counties with IE \geq 3	Excluding Counties with IE = 4	Focus on Secure Communities	2000 Census Population Weights
Immigration Enforcement	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.007)	- -	-0.014** (0.006)
Secure Communities	- -	- -	- -	-0.021** (0.010)	- -
County-Level Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State-Level Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County & Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dependent Variable Mean	0.041	0.042	0.041	0.041	0.041
Observations	18,552	18,474	18,618	18,642	18,642
R-squared	0.795	0.795	0.793	0.785	0.786

Notes: All specifications include a constant term, demographic and socioeconomic county-level characteristics, state-specific controls, and county and election year fixed-effects. Specification (1) excludes 15 counties located in the state of Arizona. Specification (2) drops counties with an immigration enforcement score equal to or greater than three (about one percent of the sample), and specification (3) excludes counties with an immigration enforcement score of four (approximately 0.1 percent of the sample). Specification (4) replaces the overall immigration enforcement index with the activation of Secure Communities as the main independent variable, while controlling for the other interior immigration enforcement policies. Finally, specification (5) uses the 2000 county-level population as regression weights. All regressions are weighted by the county population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: Mechanisms
What Type of Immigration Enforcement Appears to Matter Most?

Outcome: Hispanic Share in Candidate Pool	Specification (1)	Specification (2)	Specification (3)
Panel A: Police-based vs. Employment-based Immigration Enforcement Policies			
Police-based Immigration Enforcement	-0.017** (0.008)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.014** (0.007)
Employment-based Immigration Enforcement	-0.006* (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
County-Level Controls	N	Y	Y
State-Level Controls	N	N	Y
County & Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Dependent Variable Mean	0.042	0.042	0.042
Observations	18,642	18,642	18,642
R-squared	0.777	0.784	0.785
Panel B: State vs. County-level Immigration Enforcement Policies			
County Immigration Enforcement Score	-0.028*** (0.011)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.022** (0.009)
State Immigration Enforcement Score	-0.003 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
County-Level Controls	N	Y	Y
State-Level Controls	N	N	Y
County & Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Dependent Variable Mean	0.042	0.042	0.042
Observations	18,642	18,642	18,642
R-squared	0.779	0.785	0.786

Notes: Specification (1) includes a constant term, and county and election year fixed effects. Specification (2) adds demographic and socioeconomic county-level controls, *i.e.* sex, age and ethnic composition, unemployment rate, median household income, and poverty incidence. Specification (3) adds state-specific controls, including whether the state has a Democratic governor, and regulations and restrictions likely affecting political participation, such as whether the state requires certain civic standards for HS graduation, if it allows for same-day registration, if it has enacted early voting restrictions, and if it has restricted absentee voting or voting ID laws in place. Regressions are weighted by the county population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: Heterogeneous Impacts of Immigration Enforcement on Hispanics' Willingness to Run for Office

Column:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Outcome:	Presidential	Midterm	Republican	Democratic	Sanctuary	Non-Sanctuary
Hispanic Share in Candidate Pool	Elections	Elections	Governor	Governor	Counties	Counties
Immigration Enforcement	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.012** (0.006)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.019)	-0.009** (0.004)
County-Level Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
State-Level Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County & Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dependent Variable Mean	0.037	0.047	0.041	0.044	0.070	0.034
Observations	9,321	9,321	11,456	7,106	792	17,850
R-squared	0.818	0.809	0.803	0.859	0.844	0.772

Notes: All specifications include a constant term, demographic and socioeconomic county-level characteristics, state-specific controls, and county and election year fixed-effects. Specification (1) restricts the sample to presidential election years, i.e., 2008, 2012, and 2016. Specification (2) restricts the sample to midterm election years, i.e., 2010, 2014, and 2018. Specification (3) focuses on jurisdictions with a Republican governor and specification (4) on those with a Democratic governor. Specification (5) restricts the sample to counties where a sanctuary law or measure was enacted at any point during the study period, while specification (6) includes counties that did not implement pro-sanctuary policies. All regressions are weighted by the county population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

FIGURES

Figure 1: Hispanic Candidates Share (2008)




Figure 2: Hispanic Candidates Share (2018)




Figure 3: Immigration Enforcement (2008)




Figure 4: Immigration Enforcement (2018)





Figure 5
Identification Check: Event-Study



Notes: Period t represents the election cycle the interior immigration enforcement index first turned positive in the county. It is dropped from the sample because a given enforcement initiative might have been passed before or after that year's election. Periods prior to $t-3$ are used as reference.

APPENDIX

Table A: Immigration Enforcement Programs

Nature of the Law	Law	Years	Where?	Objective	Who implements it?	Scope	Signed by	What it Consists of:
Police-Based Measures	287(g)	2002–	Street/Jail	Make communities safer by the identification and removal of serious criminals	State and local law enforcement entities	State and Local (County, City or Town)	State and local enforcement entities signed a contract (Memorandum of Agreement - MOA) with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	There are various functions: Task Force: allows local and state officers interrogate and arrest noncitizens during their regular duties on law enforcement operations. Jail enforcement permits local officers to question immigrants arrested on state and local charges about their immigration status. Hybrid model: which allow participate in both types of programs.
	Secure Communities (Priority Enforcement Program between 2015 and 2017)	2008–	Nation’s jail and prisons	Identify noncitizens who have committed serious crime using biometric information	Police	Local (County)	Jurisdictions	The program allows for the submission of biometric information on detainees checked against records in FBI and DHS databases.
	Omnibus Immigration Laws	2010–	Street/Jail	Identification noncitizen	State and local law enforcement entities	State	State governor	Comprehensive laws that may include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A “show me your papers” clause, enabling the police to request proper identification documentation during a lawful stop. • Require that schools report students’ legal status.
Employment Based Measures	E-Verify	2002–	Firms	Screen newly hired workers	Firms	State	State governor	Electronic program that allows employers to screen newly hired workers for work eligibility.

Table B: Descriptive Statistics for Immigration Enforcement

	Pooled	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018	Min/Max
Overall immigration enforcement	0.976 (0.688)	0.202 (0.450)	0.695 (0.797)	1.198 (0.572)	1.222 (0.497)	1.234 (0.499)	1.253 (0.519)	0/4
Police-based measures	0.970 (0.670)	0.198 (0.433)	0.675 (0.727)	1.197 (0.567)	1.220 (0.488)	1.232 (0.490)	1.248 (0.502)	0/3
Employment-based measures	0.132 (0.339)	0.048 (0.214)	0.057 (0.232)	0.169 (0.375)	0.169 (0.375)	0.170 (0.376)	0.172 (0.377)	0/1
State-level measures	0.315 (0.671)	0.177 (0.469)	0.266 (0.654)	0.367 (0.708)	0.347 (0.706)	0.349 (0.708)	0.373 (0.716)	0/3
County-level measures	0.794 (0.507)	0.073 (0.252)	0.485 (0.609)	1.000 (0.368)	1.045 (0.208)	1.055 (0.229)	1.052 (0.222)	0/2
Secure Communities (1=active)	0.725 (0.427)	0.006 (0.035)	0.377 (0.419)	0.913 (0.203)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	0/1
287(g) agreement (1=active)	0.127 (0.333)	0.175 (0.380)	0.235 (0.424)	0.129 (0.335)	0.064 (0.246)	0.075 (0.263)	0.090 (0.286)	0/1
E-Verify mandates (1=active)	0.322 (0.467)	0.107 (0.309)	0.147 (0.354)	0.318 (0.466)	0.386 (0.487)	0.474 (0.499)	0.477 (0.500)	0/1
Omnibus legislation (1=enacted)	0.119 (0.324)	0.016 (0.126)	0.063 (0.243)	0.156 (0.363)	0.156 (0.363)	0.157 (0.364)	0.158 (0.365)	0/1
Observations	18,642	3,107	3,107	3,107	3,107	3,107	3,107	

Notes: All means weighted by county populations. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table C: Event Study Estimates (Depicted in Figure 5)

Key Regressors	Coefficient (S.E.)
<i>Pre-IE >0</i>	
Three Election Cycles Prior IE >0	-0.003 (0.010)
Two Election Cycles Prior IE >0	0.004 (0.007)
One Election Cycle Prior IE >0	0.004 (0.004)
<i>Post-IE >0</i>	
(One Election Cycle After IE >0) * IE	-0.010*** (0.004)
(Two Election Cycles After IE >0) * IE	-0.009*** (0.002)
(Three Election Cycles After IE >0) * IE	-0.008** (0.004)
County-Level Controls	Y
State-Level Controls	Y
County & Year Fixed Effects	Y
Dependent Variable Mean	0.042
Observations	18,642
R-squared	0.786


Notes: The table presents the event-study estimates on the election cycles relative to when IE first turned positive ($IE > 0$). The model includes a constant term, demographic and socioeconomic county-level controls, state-specific controls, and county and year fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by the county population. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table D
Differentiated Impact of Interior Immigration Enforcement Measures on Hispanic Candidates' Participation

Outcome: Hispanic Share in Candidate Pool	Specification (1)	Specification (2)	Specification (3)
Secure Communities	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.023** (0.011)	-0.021** (0.010)
287(g) Agreement (any variation)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.010 (0.009)
E-Verify Mandate	0.000 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)
Omnibus Immigration Legislation	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.007)
County-Level Controls	N	Y	Y
State-Level Controls	N	N	Y
County & Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y
Dependent Variable Mean	0.042	0.042	0.042
Observations	18,642	18,642	18,642
R-squared	0.777	0.784	0.785

Notes: Specification (1) includes a constant term, and county and election year fixed effects. Specification (2) adds demographic and socioeconomic county-level controls, and specification (3) adds state-specific controls. Regressions are weighted by the county population. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A
Identification Check: Event-Study for Secure Communities



Notes: Period t represents the election cycle the interior immigration enforcement index first turned positive in the county. It is dropped from the sample because a given enforcement initiative might have been passed before or after that year's election. Periods prior to $t-3$ are used as reference.