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The Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Government- and Market-Attitudes

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DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

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AUGUST 2020



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ABSTRACT

The Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Government- and Market-Attitudes

We study the COVID-19 pandemic's effect on college students' government- and market-attitudes using within-subject comparisons of survey responses elicited before and after the onset of the pandemic. We find that support for markets significantly declines after the onset of the pandemic, with students less likely to think markets are efficient and more likely to think they can cause harm. Support significantly increases for bigger government though this does not translate to increased support for specific redistributive policies (i.e., the minimum wage, food stamps, and taxes on estates or extremely high income), nor to increased support for the government to play a role in the various specific capacities listed in the survey (e.g., ensuring access to healthcare, responding to natural disasters, and helping people get out of poverty). Both contentment with and trust in government significantly decrease after the onset of the pandemic. Subgroup analyses indicate these results are largely driven by more politically progressive students.

JEL Classification: H1, H5, P1

Keywords: COVID-19, pandemic, market attitudes, government attitudes,

political ideology, redistribution

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I. Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has thrown into stark relief the actual and possible roles of government and markets in relation to one another and in people's lives. In the U.S., the vast majority of residents have been subject to state stay-at-home orders, and many schools, businesses, and institutions have been subject to government-mandated shutdowns. To date, Congress has provided over \$2 trillion in emergency aid, including grants to local and state governments, direct stimulus checks to individuals, and expanded unemployment-insurance benefits. In addition to leveraging monetary policy to lower interest rates and promote market liquidity, the Federal Reserve has created emergency facilities broadening the scope of its role as lender-of-last-resort to include non-bank firms and non-bank financial markets. For many, the pandemic raises the question of what governments and businesses could or should have been doing in their usual operations to prevent such a crisis, and what their and the polity's priorities will be henceforth. These questions loom particularly large for young people, who are often the hardest hit in the long-run by economic downturns (Hoynes et al., 2012; Verick, 2010), whose confidence in political institutions is most diminished by exposure to epidemics (Aksoy et al., 2020), and who are most concerned about the health risks associated with COVID-19 (Bordalo et al., 2020).

In this paper, we study the COVID-19 pandemic's effect on young people's attitudes toward government and markets. Specifically, the attitudes of students at three different American colleges/universities were measured in online surveys conducted in three waves: September 2019, December 2019, and May 2020. Our within-subject comparisons reveal that government- and market-attitudes are stable between September and December 2019, the two survey-waves preceding the onset of the pandemic. In the May 2020 survey ("pandemic")—after the outbreak of COVID-19—support for markets significantly declines compared to the December 2019 survey ("pre-pandemic"), with students less likely to think markets are efficient and more likely to think they can cause harm. Support significantly increases for bigger government between the prepandemic and pandemic surveys. This does not, however, translate to increased support for specific redistributive policies (i.e., the minimum wage, food stamps, and taxes on estates or extremely high income), nor to increased support for the government to play a role in the various specific capacities listed in the survey (e.g., ensuring access to healthcare, responding to natural disasters, and helping people get out of poverty). Lastly, both contentment with and trust in government significantly decrease between the pre-pandemic and pandemic surveys. Subgroup analyses indicate that the pooled results are largely driven by more politically progressive students, with few significant changes in government- and market-attitudes between the pre-pandemic and pandemic surveys for less politically progressive students.

Our results are largely consistent with the rapidly forming literature on individuals' attitudes and perceptions toward the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, using a large-scale international survey, Fetzer et al. (2020) find that respondents think governments should be doing more in

response to the COVID-19 pandemic. More specifically, our results align with a host of papers that highlight the partisan nature of COVID-19 attitudes and perceptions in the U.S., with Democrats significantly more pessimistic than Republicans about their own chances of infection, the severity of the pandemic, and the severity of the ensuing economic downturn (Alcott et al., 2020; Barrios and Hochberg, 2020; Fan et al., 2020; Kushner et al., 2020); and Democratic governors significantly more likely than Republican governors to issue stay-at-home orders (Baccini and Brodeur, 2020; Murray and Murray, 2020).

We contribute to this literature in a number of ways. First, because we survey students both before and after the onset of the pandemic, we can measure how their attitudes *change*—not just their static attitudes after the onset of the pandemic; further, our survey and communications with students do not mention the pandemic in any manner, thereby eliciting general government- and market-attitudes rather than in reference to the pandemic. Second, our measurement of the attitudes of young people is important. Early adulthood (ages 18-25) is when individuals' political attitudes are most impressionable (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989). Exposure to a recession in early adulthood permanently increases support for redistribution (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014), and exposure to an epidemic erodes confidence in political leaders, governments, and national elections more for those in early adulthood than in any other age group, an effect that lasts at least two decades (Aksoy et al., 2020). For many Americans in early adulthood, November 2020 will be their first presidential election, making the immediate and long-run political stakes of how their attitudes are affected by the pandemic in the months preceding the election particularly high.

Lastly, our survey is, to our knowledge, the first in the COVID-19 literature to include items about specific policy preferences and attitudes toward markets. This has a disciplining effect on interpreting results: for example, our results indicate that we cannot assume increased support for a bigger government will translate into increased support for specific redistributive policies, nor can we assume that soured attitudes toward market efficiency increase trust in and contentment with government. Similarly, Kuziemko et al. (2015) show that while exposure to information about income inequality makes respondents significantly more likely to consider inequality a problem, it does not make them more supportive of specific redistributive policies. Our results echo this stubbornness of American preferences for redistribution, even in these extraordinary times.

II. Data and Methodology

The data collected for this paper are from three waves of an online survey of students at Barnard College, Santa Clara University, and Skidmore College. The original intent of the survey was to assess if economics instruction influences college students' government- and market-attitudes. The survey sample includes students enrolled in introductory economics courses and introductory natural/physical science courses in Fall 2019. Surveys were administered in both the first week ("pre-course") and last week ("pre-pandemic") of the course. Following the outbreak of COVID-

19, the same sample was surveyed a third time ("pandemic") to measure the impact of the pandemic on government- and market-attitudes. The focus of this paper is to compare pandemic to pre-pandemic survey-responses.¹

The pandemic survey was sent to all students who responded to the pre-course survey. Our sample consists of only those students who completed at least half of the pre-pandemic survey and at least half of the pandemic survey.² In total, 321 students meet this criterion: 199 from Santa Clara University, 79 from Skidmore College, and the remaining 43 from Barnard College. A summary of students' characteristics is found in Table 1.

The pre-course survey was administered from September 6-28, 2019, the pre-pandemic survey from December 2-11, 2019, and the pandemic survey from April 29-May 28, 2020. Appendix Figure A1 situates the latter two date ranges relative to the total number of U.S. COVID-19 cases. All three schools in the sample were in metropolitan areas (New York City, the Silicon Valley, and the New York Capital Region) that experienced early outbreaks, well in advance of the pandemic survey. It is also important to note that all but four of the pandemic survey responses were completed before the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020. This should allay concerns of any potential confounding effect on our results of the ensuing nationwide protests against police brutality. Further, when comparing the pre-course and pre-pandemic responses, there are no significant differences in government- and market-attitudes. While the pre-pandemic and pandemic surveys are five months apart, that there are no significant differences in the pre-course and pre-pandemic responses (timed three months apart) suggests that our results are likely to be driven by the onset of the pandemic as opposed to other events.

Informed consent was obtained for experimentation with human subjects; this research was approved by the Institutional Review Board from each school and was registered with the European Economic Association COVID-19 registry. Students were offered course credit for completing the pre-course and pre-pandemic surveys; it was at the instructors' discretion to determine the course credit offered. Students had the opportunity to opt out and still receive the course credit by emailing their instructor. To incentivize completion of the pandemic survey, students were entered into a lottery with a five-percent chance of earning a \$30 Amazon gift card.

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¹ The comparison of pre-course and pre-pandemic responses and the impact of economics instruction are the subject of a separate paper that we are drafting. Our main finding is that there is substantial selection into introductory economics courses based on government- and market-attitudes, but no evidence of training effects.

² To determine whether students in our sample are significantly different from non-respondents, we perform differences-in-means and -proportions tests on a set of demographic characteristics including gender identity, family income, political ideology, and race/ethnicity. We find that female gender identity and a progressive political ideology are associated with an increased likelihood of response. The results of these tests are presented in Appendix Table A1. It is important to note that because our analysis primarily relies upon within-subject methods, these differences do not pose a threat to the internal validity of our study, though they may partially limit the external validity of our findings.

The Survey

The survey consists of 31 items on market attitudes and 14 items on government attitudes. We apply exploratory factor analyses, as detailed below, to reduce dimensionality and, as appropriate, to cluster items together that address the same latent construct. In addition, the survey contains five items assessing support for redistributive policies. Lastly, two items assess whether, for thirteen specific capacities, students believe the government is doing a good job and how much of a role the government should play.³ The survey concludes with a set of more general attitudinal and sociodemographic items, including gender identity, race/ethnicity, age, college major, political ideology, religious affiliation, employment status and family income.⁴

Market-attitude items are derived from Goff and Noblet (2018), in which exploratory factor analysis identifies five distinct latent dimensions of market attitudes: *efficiency*, *harm*, *fairness*, *autonomy*, and *sanctity*. The latent factor *efficiency* corresponds to the belief that markets efficiently allocate resources. *Harm* corresponds to the belief that markets do not cause harm (e.g., that they do not give rise to greed, inequality, or environmental abuse). *Autonomy* corresponds to the belief that markets do not need government intervention to function well and in general should be subject to less government regulation and intervention. *Fairness* corresponds to the belief that markets provide equal opportunities and just outcomes. *Sanctity* corresponds to the belief that markets are a moral means to exchange goods and services (e.g., a market for human organs would not be immoral).

We supplement these items with additional ones designed to increase the robustness of the *sanctity* dimension and to elicit attitudes regarding government intervention in markets. We then conduct exploratory factor analysis following the methods described in Web Appendix B of Goff and Noblet (2018), resulting in a five-factor model that closely replicates the structure obtained in Goff and Noblet (2018); thus we are able to use the same factor titles. Response-scales of the market-attitude items are reverse coded as appropriate to make higher values indicative of more pro-market attitudes. Each student is assigned a value for each of the five factors that is equal to the mean of the student's responses to the items that make up the factor. We also calculate an overall index *overall* for each student, as the mean of the student's five factor values. Appendix B1 lists the market-attitude factors and their corresponding items.⁵

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³ These items are largely drawn from Goff and Noblet (2018), Jost et al. (2003), Kuziemko et al. (2015), Lephardt and Breeden (2005), Pew Research Center (2015), and Srinivasan (2013).

⁴ The pre-pandemic and pandemic surveys are nearly identical. A link to a preview version of the pandemic survey is available at https://skidmore.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV 7QXc7FIymxBf7DL

⁵ Three items do not load onto a factor and are excluded from subsequent analyses. See Appendix B2 for the factor loading matrix.

We use a similar approach to reduce the government-attitude items to a smaller set of factors. From the exploratory factor analysis we extract two latent factors—effective and extent—and two factors that each comprises a single item—content and trust. The latent factor extent corresponds to the belief that government should be bigger (e.g., should expand programs or do more than it currently does). The latent factor effective corresponds to the belief that the government functions well and effectively serves its people through existing programs. The factors content and trust correspond to contentment with and trust in the government, respectively. Response-scales of the government-attitude items are reverse coded as appropriate to make higher values indicative of more progovernment attitudes. Each student is assigned a value for each of the two latent factors that is equal to the mean of the student's responses to the items that make up the factor.

The five items measuring support for redistributive policies are analyzed separately. The first measures support for redistribution in general (*redistribute*), and the other four measure support for specific redistributive policies (*minimum wage*, *food stamps*, *tax on extreme income*, and *estate tax*). Also analyzed separately are the two items assessing whether students believe the government is doing a good job and how much of a role it should play in thirteen capacities. The thirteen capacities are listed in Table 3. The government-attitude factors and their corresponding items are listed in Appendix B3, and the factor loading matrix is presented in Appendix B4.

III. Results

To identify the impact of the pandemic on government- and market-attitudes, we conduct withinsubject comparisons of pandemic and pre-pandemic survey responses. The results unfold as follows. First, we explore the impact of the pandemic using paired sample difference-in-means tests. Then, we examine whether the impact varies by subgroup. Lastly, we confirm with regression analysis that the results persist when controlling for demographic characteristics.

Because we use multiple outcomes to identify the impact of the pandemic, we use Bonferroni adjustments—considered the most conservative approach (List, Shaikh, and Xu, 2016)—to control the familywise error rate. Specifically, we apply the Bonferroni adjustments to the alphas, not the *p*-values: throughout the paper we report raw *p*-values, but significance is not indicated by the raw *p*-value being less than the standard Type-I error rate alpha, e.g., 0.05. Instead, we derive the Bonferroni-adjusted alphas by dividing the standard alphas by the number of tests in a family. For market-attitudes, we measure the impact for six outcome variables (*overall*, *efficiency*, *harm*, *fairness*, *autonomy*, and *sanctity*); as such, we consider the impact to be significant if the unadjusted *p*-value is less than 0.0083 (=0.05/6). For government-attitudes, we measure the impact to be significant if the unadjusted *p*-value is less than 0.0125 (=0.05/4). For redistributive policies, we measure the impact for five outcome variables (*redistribute*, *minimum wage*, *food stamps*, *tax on extreme income*, and *estate tax*); as such, we consider the impact significant if the unadjusted *p*-value is less than 0.01 (=0.05/5). Lastly, for the two items assessing whether the government is

doing a good job and how much of a role it should play in thirteen specific capacities, we consider the impact significant if the unadjusted p-value is less than 0.0038 (=0.05/13).

A. Paired Sample Difference-in-Means Tests

Table 2 presents difference-in-means tests comparing students' pandemic responses to their prepandemic responses (= pandemic response – pre-pandemic response). We observe that *overall* support for markets significantly decreases from 2.920 to 2.849, or 0.204 standard deviations (effect size d = -0.204). Of the five market-attitude factors, two significantly decrease (*efficiency* d = -0.196; *harm* d = -0.187). The differences for the remaining factors are negative and insignificant. In sum, these results indicate that students' market-attitudes are negatively impacted by the pandemic.

The impact of the pandemic on students' government-attitudes is more nuanced. While support for bigger government significantly increases (extent d = 0.234), there is no evidence that support for redistribution or specific redistributive policies increases. Nor is there evidence of changed beliefs about the role that government should play for the thirteen specific capacities (see Panel B of Table 3). Further, contentment with and trust in government significantly decrease (content d = -0.168; trust d = -0.216). Beliefs that the government is doing a good job significantly decrease for four of the thirteen specific capacities: strengthening the economy, helping people get out of poverty, responding to natural disasters, and ensuring access to healthcare (d ranges from -0.357 to -0.207). Of the thirteen capacities, these appear to be the most closely related to pandemic-response (contrast these with, for example, keeping the country safe from terrorism and advancing space exploration). In sum, though students' general support for bigger government increases with the pandemic, more specific government-attitudes either do not change or become more negative.

B. Subgroup Analyses

Next, we consider whether the above results vary by subgroup along various dimensions. The only notable subgroup differences emerge by political ideology (progressive versus non-progressive)⁷ and are reported in Table 4.⁸ Subgroup analysis by political ideology reveals that our pooled results are largely driven by progressives. While the pandemic moves responses in the same

⁶ As a robustness check, we also conduct Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for outcome variables with categorical response scales. The results are largely the same, so we report the difference-in-means tests for ease of interpretation.

⁷ Political ideology is measured on a scale from 1 to 11, with 1 indicating "Very Progressive" and 11 indicating "Very Conservative." We define students as progressive if they responded from 1 to 5, moderate if they responded at 6, and conservative from 7 to 11.

⁸ The other dimensions analyzed are gender identity (male versus female), race/ethnicity (white-only versus all others), family income (high income versus low or middle income), and authoritarianism (more versus less authoritarian). Results are presented in Appendix Tables A2 through A5. All dimensions were selected either because the pandemic has had disparate impacts along them (gender identity, race, and family income) or because of different beliefs about and responses to the pandemic along them (political ideology and authoritarianism).

direction for progressives and non-progressives, the significant pooled results reported above are only significant for progressives and not for non-progressives. Further, belief that the government functions well and effectively significantly decreases for progressives (*effective* d = -0.217 for progressives).

Second, there are significant differences between progressives and non-progressives in both the pre-pandemic and pandemic surveys. These differences are largely in the direction one would expect. For example, in comparison to non-progressives, progressives have significantly more negative attitudes toward markets across all five factors and *overall* (the only exception is that progressives' *sanctity* factor is only marginally significantly lower than non-progressives' in the pre-pandemic survey); and significantly more positive attitudes toward redistributive policies (*redistribute* and the four specific redistributive policies) and bigger government (*extent*). Lastly, and perhaps less expectedly, in comparison to non-progressives, progressives express significantly more disaffection with government operations (*content*, *trust*, and *effective* (pre-pandemic effective only marginally significant)); this may reflect that students are more likely to think of these factors in the context of the current administration than they are for *extent*. We also calculate a difference-in-differences (DD) estimator to determine if gaps in government- and market-attitudes between progressives and non-progressives are significantly changed by the pandemic. None of the DD estimators is statistically significant.

C. Regression Analyses

In regression analyses, we test whether the observed impacts of the pandemic on government- and market-attitudes are explained by students' demographic characteristics. We regress the various outcome measures on a pandemic dummy, political ideology, school, college major, gender identity, race/ethnicity, family income, employment status, and religiosity. Results are estimated with OLS, and robust standard errors are clustered by student. Panel A of Table 5 presents select covariate-estimates for the pooled sample, and Panel B for progressives only.

The pooled regression results largely replicate those from the pooled difference-in-means tests, with the pandemic significantly decreasing support for markets (*overall* and *harm*), increasing support for bigger government (*extent*), and decreasing the degree to which students are *content* with and *trust* the government. The only difference comparing Panel A of Table 5 to Table 2 is that the negative effect of the pandemic on *efficiency* is only marginally significant in the regression analysis.

⁹ The choice of conducting subgroup analyses by progressive versus non-progressive (as opposed to progressive versus conservative) is due to the small proportion of conservative students (17.6%). To assess whether gaps between progressives and conservatives are significantly changed by the pandemic, we replicate the DD estimation for progressives and conservatives in Columns (11) and (12) of Table 4. The results indicate that the differences we observe between progressives and non-progressives increase in magnitude when comparing progressives to conservatives only. Lastly, the significant DD estimator for *content* indicates that the pandemic increases the gap between progressives' and conservatives' contentment with government.

Similarly, the progressives-only regression results largely replicate those from the progressives-only difference-in-means tests, with the pandemic significantly decreasing support for markets (*overall* and *efficiency*), increasing support for bigger government (*extent*), and decreasing the degree to which students are *content* with and *trust* the government. The only differences comparing Panel B of Table 5 to Table 4 are that, in the regression analyses, the negative effect of the pandemic on *harm* is only marginally significant, and the negative effect of the pandemic on *effective* is insignificant.

The coefficients on political ideology in the pooled sample are often as expected: more conservative students are significantly more supportive of markets (*overall* and all five factors) and less supportive of bigger government (*extent*) and redistributive policies in general (*redistribute*). As in the comparison of progressives to non-progressives in Section III.B, belief that the government is *effective*, along with *content*ment with and *trust* in the government, significantly increase with conservatism; again, this perhaps unexpected result may reflect that students think of these factors in the context of the current administration.

The coefficients on political ideology when restricting to progressives only are similar to those for the pooled sample; exceptions are that *sanctity*, *effective*, and *trust* do not vary significantly with political ideology for progressives. Lastly, in comparison to similar students at Barnard College, those at Santa Clara University and Skidmore College are significantly more supportive of markets (*overall*, *harm*, *fairness*, and *autonomy*) and less supportive of redistributive policies in general (*redistribute*).¹⁰

IV. Discussion

Comparing pre-pandemic and pandemic survey responses, we demonstrate that the pandemic decreases support for markets—with students less likely to think markets are efficient and more likely to think that markets cause harm—and increases support for bigger government. However, there is no evidence that this leads to increased support for specific redistributive policies, nor for the government to play a larger role in specific capacities; indeed the pandemic decreases trust in and contentment with government. Subgroup analyses indicate that the results are largely driven by more politically progressive students. These results are robust to various specification checks and obtain under the most conservative adjustments for multiple hypothesis-testing.

The results raise an interesting question: why does support for bigger government not translate into support for its expanded role in specific capacities? Or to greater support for specific

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¹⁰ Appendix Table A6 shows full regression results for the specifications in Table 5, along with an additional panel for non-progressives only. The results of Tables 5 and A6 are robust to using a linear mixed model with random effects for school and student (see Appendix Table A7).

redistributive policies? It is possible that these seeming discrepancies are due to scaling issues. For example, support for three of the four specific redistributive policies are quite high in the prepandemic survey (roughly 2.7 on scales with a maximum of 3), so there may be less scope for an increase than there is for support for bigger government (with a pre-pandemic mean of roughly 3.5 on a scale with a maximum of 5). An alternative explanation is that even though support for markets and bigger government is mutable, support for specific government capacities and policies may be largely fixed by early adulthood. Lastly, it may be that support for bigger government assumes an idealized government whereas support for specific capacities and policies are grounded in their existing forms.

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Table 1. Student Characteristics, Pandemic Sample

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	All Part	icipants	Progres	sive	Not Progressive	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	19.650	1.267	19.699	1.140	19.574	1.477
Gender						
Female	0.655		0.723		0.541	
Male	0.345		0.277		0.459	
Race						
White	0.674		0.644		0.729	
Black	0.088		0.105		0.047	
Hispanic/Latinx	0.117		0.120		0.121	
Asian	0.267		0.267		0.262	
American Indian	0.007		0.000		0.019	
Pacific Islander	0.010		0.005		0.019	
Other race/ethnicity	0.013		0.021		0.000	
Political ideology ($1 = very progressive$; $11 = very conservative$)	4.281	2.414	2.723	1.216	7.018	1.300
Progressive $(1-5)$	0.637		1.000		0.000	
Moderate (6)	0.186		0.000		0.514	
Conservative $(7-11)$	0.176		0.000		0.486	
Libertarian/authoritarian ($1 = libertarian$; $11 = authoritarian$)	5.315	1.920	5.456	2.005	5.065	1.747
Libertarian $(1-5)$	0.460		0.440		0.491	
Moderate (6)	0.315		0.290		0.361	
Authoritarian $(7-11)$	0.225		0.269		0.148	
Employed	0.376		0.390		0.365	
Part-time	0.340		0.357		0.323	
Full-time	0.035		0.033		0.042	
Not employed	0.625		0.610		0.635	
Family income						
Low income (less than \$25,000)	0.068		0.067		0.063	
Middle income (\$25,000 to less than \$200,000)	0.551		0.582		0.495	
High income (greater than or equal to \$200,000)	0.380		0.352		0.442	
Economics/business student	0.392		0.317		0.525	
Political science student	0.063		0.082		0.030	
Religiosity (any religious affiliation)	0.461		0.382		0.600	
Observations	321		195		111	

Notes: Progressive defined as a score of 1-5 on political ideology scale (1 = very progressive, 11 = very conservative); not progressive defined as a score of 6-11 on this same scale. Sum of proportions of participants by race/ethnicity exceeds one due to participants choosing multiple racial/ethnic categories.

Table 2. Summary of Results

	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Market Attitudes ($1 = strongly disagree with$		-		
Overall	2.920	2.849	-0.071***	-0.204
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.021)	p=0.001
Factors				
Efficiency	3.499	3.403	-0.096**	-0.196
	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.030)	p=0.002
Harm	2.520	2.415	-0.104**	-0.187
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.035)	p=0.003
Fairness	2.864	2.800	-0.064	-0.087
	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.046)	p=0.167
Autonomy	2.383	2.324	-0.060	-0.120
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.031)	p=0.053
Sanctity	3.263	3.234	-0.029	-0.046
•	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.039)	p=0.453
B. Government Attitudes				
Factors ($1 = strongly disagree with pro-govt statem$	ents; $5 = strongly ag$	ree with pro-govt .	statements)	
Effective	2.690	2.605	-0.085	-0.137
	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.038)	p=0.026
Extent	3.562	3.702	0.140 	0.234
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.037)	p = 0.000
Specific items	,	,	,	1
Content $(1 = angry with govt; 3 = content)$	2.124	2.023	-0.102 	-0.168
(85 8 7 7	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.037)	p=0.006
Trust $(1 = never trust govt to do what's right;$	2.207	2.075	-0.132+++	-0.216
4 = always trust	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.037)	p=0.001
,	(()	()	I
C. Redistributive Policies	2.620	2.755	0.44.6	0.420
Redistribute ($1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly$	3.639	3.755	0.116	0.139
agree)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.053)	p=0.030
Support for specific policies $(1 = decrease/do a)$	$not \ support; 3 = incr$	rease/support)		
Minimum wage	2.737	2.767	0.030	0.076
J	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.024)	p=0.218
Food stamps	2.707	2.756	0.049	0.099
r	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.030)	p=0.107
Tax on extreme income	2.605	2.635	0.030	0.063
	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.029)	p=0.303
Estate tax	1.771	1.786	0.015	0.023
Louic tax	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.039)	p=0.704
N-4C411	(0.043)	(0.074)	(0.032)	p=0.704

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p \le 0.00167$, ** $p \le 0.00833$, * $p \le 0.0167$; ## $p \le 0.0025$, ## $p \le 0.0125$; ## $p \le 0.0125$.

Table 3. Government Efficacy and Responsibility

	A. How good a		vernment doin	ıg?	B. What role should the government play?					
	(1 = very bad; 4 =	20 /			$(1 = no \ role, 3 = 1)$					
	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
More Pandemic-Relevant										
Ensuring a basic income for	2.542	2.439	-0.103	-0.126	2.612	2.684	0.072	0.144		
people 65 and older	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.050)	p=0.042	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	p=0.020		
Ensuring access to healthcare	2.046	1.825	-0.221***	-0.276	2.783	2.798	0.015	0.036		
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.049)	p=0.000	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	p=0.556		
Ensuring that food and medicine	2.741	2.597	-0.144	-0.143	2.875	2.890	0.015	0.041		
are safe	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.062)	p=0.021	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	p=0.506		
Helping people get out of	1.951	1.749	-0.202***	-0.308	2.684	2.703	0.019	0.039		
poverty	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.040)	p=0.000	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	p=0.530		
Responding to natural disasters	2.380	2.194	-0.186**	-0.207	2.852	2.871	0.019	0.045		
1	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.055)	p=0.001	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.026)	p=0.467		
Setting fair and safe standards	2.536	2.475	-0.061	-0.072	2.703	2.730	0.027	0.049		
for workplaces	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.053)	p=0.249	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)	p=0.432		
Strengthening the economy	2.782	2.500	-0.282***	-0.357	2.517	2.605	ò.087	0.144		
,	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.049)	p=0.000	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.038)	p=0.021		
Less Pandemic-Relevant										
Advancing space exploration	2.605	2.582	-0.023	-0.027	2.232	2.240	0.008	0.011		
8 1 1	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.052)	p=0.661	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.043)	p=0.860		
Ensuring access to high quality	2.175 ´	2.133	-0.042	-0.051	2.741	2.757	ò.015 ´	0.028		
education	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.051)	p=0.412	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.034)	p=0.651		
Keeping the country safe from	2.882	2.905	0.023	0.026	2.844	2.867	0.023	0.051		
terrorism	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.055)	p=0.680	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.027)	p=0.406		
Maintaining infrastructure	2.771	2.721	-0.050	-0.060	2.760	2.688	-0.072	-0.128		
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.051)	p=0.335	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.035)	p=0.039		
Managing the nation's	1.814	1.821	0.008	0.010	2.734	2.741	0.008	0.013		
immigration system	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.046)	p=0.870	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.035)	p=0.830		
Protecting the environment	1.669	1.597	-0.072	-0.104	2.848	2.848	0.000	0.000		
6	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.043)	p=0.094	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)	p=1.000		

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p \le 0.000769$, *** $p \le 0.00385$, * $p \le 0.00769$.

Table 4. Summary of Results, by Political Ideology

	Progressive (N=195)			NI . D	. 01-111)			Progressive – Not Progressive		Progressive – Conservative Only		
		(N=195)		T. CC C.		sive (N=111)		E.CC . C.		ive		e Only
	Pre- Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size	Pre- Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size	Pre-	D	Pre- Pandemic	Pandemic
				(d)				(d)	Pandemic	Pandemic		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. Market Attitudes (1 = strongly a			ts; 5 = strongly a	igree with pro-mark								
Overall	2.741	2.659	-0.083**	-0.237	3.218	3.187	-0.031	-0.106	-0.476***	-0.528***	-0.643***	-0.687***
_	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.027)	p=0.002	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.030)	p=0.306	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.092)
Factors												
Efficiency	3.386	3.249	-0.137***	-0.274	3.697	3.673	-0.025	-0.053	-0.311***	-0.424***	-0.518***	-0.616***
	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.039)	p=0.001	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.048)	p=0.607	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.093)
Harm	2.296	2.174	-0.122**	-0.215	2.904	2.832	-0.071	-0.131	-0.607***	-0.658***	-0.732***	-0.729***
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.044)	p=0.007	(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.056)	p=0.210	(0.082)	(0.092)	(0.114)	(0.130)
Fairness	2.588	2.512	-0.076	-0.097	3.352	3.305	-0.047	-0.072	-0.763***	-0.793***	-0.989***	-1.008***
	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.062)	p=0.221	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.068)	p=0.496	(0.092)	(0.105)	(0.120)	(0.136)
Autonomy	2.183	2.134	-0.048	-0.099	2.731	2.650	-0.080	-0.152	-0.548***	-0.516***	-0.633***	-0.682***
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.038)	p=0.202	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.055)	p=0.146	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.116)	(0.113)
Sanctity	3.182	3.104	-0.078	-0.124	3.389	3.466	0.078	0.125	-0.206*	-0.362***	-0.360**	-0.536***
	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.048)	p=0.107	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.065)	p=0.235	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.114)	(0.120)
B. Government Attitudes												
Factors $(1 = strongly disagree with pro$	-govt statement;	5 = strongly agree	e with pro-govt sta	atement)								
Effective	2.621	2.487	-0.134	-0.217	2.806	2.807	0.001	0.002	-0.185†	-0.320+++	-0.319++	-0.424
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.047)	p = 0.005	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.066)	p=0.983	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.113)	(0.119)
Extent	3.889	4.041	0.151+++	-0.275	2.993	3.106	0.112	-0.164	0.896†††	0.935	1.133	1.256
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.042)	p = 0.000	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.071)	p=0.117	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Specific items	, ,	, ,	, ,	1	, ,	, ,	, ,	1	, ,	, ,	, ,	, ,
Content $(1 = angry with govt; 3 =$	1.976	1.822	-0.154	-0.253	2.376	2.376	0.000	0.000	-0.400+++	-0.554+++	-0.424+++	-0.689
content)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.047)	p = 0.001	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.059)	p=1.000	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.103)
Trust $(1 = never trust govt to do$	2.142	1.988	-0.154	-0.271	2.323	2.237	-0.086	-0.125	-0.181††	-0.248+++	-0.214†	-0.345†††
what's right; $4 = always trust$)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.044)	p=0.001	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.071)	p=0.230	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.094)
C. Redistributive Policies	,	()		1	()	(/	\/	1	\/	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	\/	/
Redistribute ($1 = strongly disagree;$	4.153	4.194	0.041	0.054	2.752	2.992	0.240	0.249	1.400###	1.202##	1.557##	1.258‡‡‡
$5 = strongly \ agree$	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.061)	p=0.500	(0.106)	(0.117)	(0.104)	p=0.023	(0.126)	(0.138)	(0.168)	(0.200)
	` ,	,	,	1	(/	(~/	(~~-)	1	(~~)	(0.200)	(~~)	(/
Support for specific policies ($1 = a$				0.077	2.520	2.559	0.022	0.052	0.214444	0.202144	0.205444	0.450444
Minimum wage	2.852	2.882	0.030	0.077	2.538				0.314##	0.323‡‡‡	0.385##	0.459‡‡‡
Г. 1.	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.030)	p=0.319	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.043)	p=0.620	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.098)	(0.085)
Food stamps	2.852	2.882	0.030	0.077	2.452	2.527	0.075	0.116	0.400‡‡‡	0.355‡‡‡	0.452##	0.504‡‡‡
TT.	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.030)	p=0.319	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.067)	p=0.265	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.107)	(0.110)
Tax on extreme income	2.846	2.846	0.000	0.000	2.183	2.258	0.075	0.113	0.663##	0.588##	0.846##	0.713‡‡‡
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.025)	p=1.000	(0.075)	(0.066)	(0.069)	p=0.277	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.123)	(0.112)
Estate tax	1.905	1.905	0.000	0.000	1.548	1.591	0.043	0.071	0.357‡‡‡	0.314‡‡‡	0.350##	0.328‡‡
Notes: Standard errors are in parent	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)	p=1.000	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.063)	p=0.496	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.107)	(0.107)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

**** $p \le 0.00167$, *** $p \le 0.00833$, * $p \le 0.0167$; ††† $p \le 0.0025$, †† $p \le 0.0125$; † $p \le 0.025$; ‡‡ $p \le 0.002$; † $p \le 0.01$, † $p \le 0.02$; § DD statistically significant at $\alpha \le 0.05$.

Progressive defined as a score of 1 - 5 on political ideology scale (1 = very progressive, 11 = very conservative); not progressive defined as a score of 6 - 11 on this same scale.

Table 5. OLS Regressions, by Political Ideology

	A. All											
	Overall (1)	Efficiency (2)	Harm (3)	Fairness (4)	Autonomy (5)	Sanctity (6)	Effective (7)	Extent (8)	Content (9)	Trust (10)	Redistribute (11)	
Pandemic	-0.073** (0.025)	-0.089* (0.036)	-0.116** (0.040)	-0.073 (0.051)	-0.075 (0.036)	-0.010 (0.049)	-0.071 (0.041)	0.140+++ (0.043)	-0.118 (0.042)	-0.153 (0.041)	0.091 (0.063)	
Political ideology	<i>p</i> =0.004 0.115*** (0.014)	<i>p</i> =0.013 0.083*** (0.017)	p=0.004 0.134*** (0.018)	<i>p</i> =0.151 0.167*** (0.019)	<i>p</i> =0.036 0.120*** (0.020)	p=0.831 0.068*** (0.020)	p=0.087 0.047 (0.018)	p=0.001 -0.185 ††† (0.021)	p=0.006 0.105 (0.016)	p=0.000 0.043 (0.014)	<i>p=0.147</i> -0.244 ‡‡‡ (0.029)	
	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	p = 0.001	p = 0.010	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	p = 0.002	p = 0.000	
School												
SCU	0.251** (0.084)	-0.083 (0.107)	0.297** (0.096)	0.354** (0.122)	0.493*** (0.122)	0.268 (0.147)	-0.126 (0.115)	-0.297† (0.121)	0.192 (0.094)	0.050 (0.083)	-0.722 ‡‡‡ (0.161)	
Skidmore	0.262**	-0.104	0.360**	0.362**	0.453***	0.300	-0.261	-0.241	0.022	-0.013	-0.557###	
Constant	(0.093) 2.161***	(0.116) 3.130***	(0.115) 1.450***	(0.135) 1.951***	(0.129) 1.351***	(0.165) 2.824***	(0.125) 2.694 	(0.131) 4.398 	(0.103) 1.715 	(0.082) 2.010 	(0.164) 5.422 ‡‡‡	
Observations	(0.156) 441	(0.182) 436	(0.205) 434	(0.245) 428	(0.202) 436	(0.258) 439	(0.212) 440	(0.210) 440	(0.189) 440	(0.150) 440	(0.309) 423	
Observations R-squared	0.380	0.199	0.303	0.339	0.318	0.107	0.100	0.441	0.238	0.116	0.437	
IX-squared	8. Progressive											
	Overall (12)	Efficiency (13)	Harm (14)	Fairness (15)	Autonomy (16)	Sanctity (17)	Effective (18)	Extent (19)	Content (20)	Trust (21)	Redistribute (22)	
Pandemic	-0.090**	-0.124**	-0.133*	-0.091	-0.080	-0.046	-0.106	0.155+++	-0.160	-0.179	-0.003	
	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.070)	
Political ideology	<i>p</i> =0.006 0.139***	<i>p</i> =0.008 0.132***	<i>p</i> =0.009 0.137**	<i>p</i> =0.183 0.225***	<i>p</i> =0.068 0.144***	<i>p</i> =0.469 0.100	<i>p</i> =0.037 0.083	<i>p</i> =0.002 -0.187 	<i>p</i> =0.004 0.147 †††	<i>p</i> =0.000 0.051	<i>p</i> =0.961 -0.306 ± ±±	
r ondear ideology	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.056)	
	$\hat{p} = 0.000$	$\hat{p} = 0.002$	$\hat{p} = 0.003$	$\hat{p} = 0.000$	p = 0.000	p = 0.026	$\hat{p} = 0.047$	p = 0.000	p = 0.000	$\hat{p} = 0.081$	$\hat{p} = 0.000$	
School												
SCU	0.317***	-0.001	0.291*	0.463***	0.479***	0.339	-0.130	-0.288††	0.203	0.076	-0.434‡‡	
Skidmore	(0.082) 0.246*	(0.108)	(0.110) 0.191	(0.131) 0.341	(0.130) 0.384*	(0.181) 0.393	(0.141) -0.290*	(0.104) -0.265	(0.112) 0.074	(0.095) -0.009	(0.157) -0.275	
Skidinore	(0.095)	-0.092 (0.119)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.197)	(0.152)	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.093)	(0.161)	
Constant	2.080***	3.038***	1.533***	1.844***	1.398***	2.459***	2.660+++	4.280	1.582	1.864 	5.358‡‡‡	
	(0.188)	(0.225)	(0.271)	(0.302)	(0.244)	(0.316)	(0.293)	(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.195)	(0.330)	
Observations	283	278	279	274	281	283	282	282	282	282	270	
R-squared	0.267	0.174	0.180	0.223	0.212	0.096	0.121	0.257	0.170	0.122	0.302	

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at participant level.

Additional control variables: gender identity (indicator variable for female), race/ethnicity (indicator variables for Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Pacific Islander, and other), college major (indicator variables for business/economics and political science), family income (indicator variables for middle income (\$25,000 to less than \$200,000) and high income (greater than or equal to \$200,000), employment status (indicator variable for part- or full-time work), and religiosity (indicator variable for reporting any religious affiliation).

Political ideology is measured on a scale from 1 = very progressive to 11 = very conservative; Panel B restricts the sample to political ideology scores of 1 – 5.

^{***} $p \le 0.00167$, ** $p \le 0.0083$, * $p \le 0.0167$; ## $p \le 0.0025$, ## $p \le 0.0125$; # $p \le 0.025$; ## $p \le 0.002$; ## $p \le 0.01$, # $p \le 0.01$.

Tables

Table 1. Student Characteristics, Pandemic Sample

	All Part	icipants	Progres	Progressive		ogressive
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	19.650	1.267	19.699	1.140	19.574	1.477
Gender						
Female	0.655		0.723		0.541	
Male	0.345		0.277		0.459	
Race						
White	0.674		0.644		0.729	
Black	0.088		0.105		0.047	
Hispanic/Latinx	0.117		0.120		0.121	
Asian	0.267		0.267		0.262	
American Indian	0.007		0.000		0.019	
Pacific Islander	0.010		0.005		0.019	
Other race/ethnicity	0.013		0.021		0.000	
Political ideology (1 = very progressive; $11 = very$ conservative)	4.281	2.414	2.723	1.216	7.018	1.300
Progressive $(1-5)$	0.637		1.000		0.000	
Moderate (6)	0.186		0.000		0.514	
Conservative $(7-11)$	0.176		0.000		0.486	
Libertarian/authoritarian ($1 = libertarian$; $11 = authoritarian$)	5.315	1.920	5.456	2.005	5.065	1.747
Libertarian $(1-5)$	0.460		0.440		0.491	
Moderate (6)	0.315		0.290		0.361	
Authoritarian $(7 - 11)$	0.225		0.269		0.148	
Employed	0.376		0.390		0.365	
Part-time	0.340		0.357		0.323	
Full-time	0.035		0.033		0.042	
Not employed	0.625		0.610		0.635	
Family income						
Low income (less than \$25,000)	0.068		0.067		0.063	
Middle income (\$25,000 to less than \$200,000)	0.551		0.582		0.495	
High income (greater than or equal to \$200,000)	0.380		0.352		0.442	
Economics/business student	0.392		0.317		0.525	
Political science student	0.063		0.082		0.030	
Religiosity (any religious affiliation)	0.461		0.382		0.600	
Observations	321		195		111	

Notes: Progressive defined as a score of 1-5 on political ideology scale (1 = very progressive, 11 = very conservative); not progressive defined as a score of 6-11 on this same scale. Sum of proportions of participants by race/ethnicity exceeds one due to participants choosing multiple racial/ethnic categories.

Table 2. Summary of Results

•	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Market Attitudes $(1 = strongly disagree with$	h pro-market stateme	nts; 5 = strongly	agree with pro-mar	ket statements)
Overall	2.920	2.849	-0.071***	-0.204
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.021)	p=0.001
Factors	, ,	, ,	, ,	1
Efficiency	3.499	3.403	-0.096**	-0.196
,	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.030)	p=0.002
Harm	2.520	2.415	-0.104**	-0.187
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.035)	p=0.003
Fairness	2.864	2.800	-0.064	-0.087
	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.046)	p=0.167
Autonomy	2.383	2.324	-0.060	-0.120
,	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.031)	p=0.053
Sanctity	3.263	3.234	-0.029	-0.046
,	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.039)	p=0.453
	()	()	()	1
Factors (1 = strongly disagree with pro-govt statem Effective	2.690 (0.038)	2.605 (0.041)	-0.085 (0.038)	-0.137 p=0.026
Extent	3.562	3.702	0.140 	0.234
Extent	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.037)	p=0.000
Specific items	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.037)	p=0.000
Content $(1 = angry \ with \ govt; 3 = content)$	2.124	2.023	-0.102 	-0.168
Content (1 ungry with good, 5 content)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.037)	p=0.006
Trust $(1 = never trust govt to do what's right;$	2.207	2.075	-0.132	-0.216
$4 = always \ trust)$	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.037)	p=0.001
T – uwuys irusi)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.037)	p=0.001
C. D. P. et al. D. P. et				
C. Redistributive Policies	2 (20	2 755	0.117	0.120
Redistribute (1 = strongly disagree; $5 = strongly$	3.639	3.755	0.116	0.139
agree)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.053)	p=0.030
Support for specific policies ($1 = decrease/do$	$not \ support; 3 = incr$	rease/support)		
Minimum wage	2.737	2.767	0.030	0.076
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.024)	p=0.218
Food stamps	2.707	2.756	0.049	0.099
-	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.030)	p=0.107
Tax on extreme income	2.605	2.635	0.030	0.063
	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.029)	p=0.303
Estate tax	1.771	1.786	0.015	0.023
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.039)	p=0.704

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p≤0.00167, *** p≤0.00833, * p≤0.0167; p ≤ 0.0025, p ≤ 0.0125; p ≤ 0.025.

Table 3. Government Efficacy and Responsibility

Tuble of Government Emou	A. How good a (1 = very bad; 4 =	job is the go	vernment doin	ıg?	B. What role should the government play? (1 = no role, β = major role)					
	Pre-Pandemic (1)	Pandemic (2)	Difference (3)	Effect Size (d) (4)	Pre-Pandemic (5)	Pandemic (6)	Difference (7)	Effect Size (d) (8)		
More Pandemic-Relevant										
Ensuring a basic income for	2.542	2.439	-0.103	-0.126	2.612	2.684	0.072	0.144		
people 65 and older	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.050)	p=0.042	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.031)	p=0.020		
Ensuring access to healthcare	2.046	1.825	-0.221***	-0.276	2.783	2.798	0.015	0.036		
F : 1 : 6 1 1 1:	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.049)	p=0.000	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.026)	p=0.556		
Ensuring that food and medicine	2.741	2.597	-0.144	-0.143	2.875	2.890	0.015	0.041		
are safe	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.062)	p=0.021	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	p=0.506		
Helping people get out of	1.951	1.749	-0.202***	-0.308	2.684	2.703	0.019	0.039		
poverty	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.040)	p=0.000	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	p=0.530		
Responding to natural disasters	2.380	2.194	-0.186**	-0.207	2.852	2.871	0.019	0.045		
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.055)	p=0.001	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.026)	p=0.467		
Setting fair and safe standards	2.536	2.475	-0.061	-0.072	2.703	2.730	0.027	0.049		
for workplaces	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.053)	p=0.249	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)	p=0.432		
Strengthening the economy	2.782	2.500	-0.282***	-0.357	2.517	2.605	0.087	0.144		
,	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.049)	p=0.000	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.038)	p=0.021		
Less Pandemic-Relevant										
Advancing space exploration	2.605	2.582	-0.023	-0.027	2.232	2.240	0.008	0.011		
8 1 1	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.052)	p=0.661	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.043)	p=0.860		
Ensuring access to high quality	2.175	2.133	-0.042	-0.051	2.741	2.757	0.015	0.028		
education	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.051)	p=0.412	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.034)	p=0.651		
Keeping the country safe from	2.882	2.905	0.023	0.026	2.844	2.867	0.023	0.051		
terrorism	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.055)	p=0.680	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.027)	p=0.406		
Maintaining infrastructure	2.771	2.721	-0.050	-0.060	2.760	2.688	-0.072	-0.128		
manual minastructure	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.051)	p=0.335	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.035)	p=0.039		
Managing the nation's	1.814	1.821	0.008	0.010	2.734	2.741	0.008	0.013		
immigration system	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.046)	p=0.870	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.035)	p=0.830		
Protecting the environment	1.669	1.597	-0.072	-0.104	2.848	2.848	0.000	0.000		
riotecting the environment										
	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.043)	p=0.094	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)	p=1.000		

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p \le 0.000769$, *** $p \le 0.00385$, * $p \le 0.00769$.

Table 4. Summary of Results, by Political Ideology

·	Progressive	(N=195)			Not Progres	ssive (N=111)			Progressive – Not Progressive		Progressive – Conservative Only	
	Pre- Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size	Pre- Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size	Pre- Pandemic	Pandemic	Pre- Pandemic	Pandemic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(d) (4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(d) (8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. Market Attitudes (1 = strongly a						(0)	(1)	(0)	()	(10)	(11)	(12)
Overall	2.741	2.659	-0.083**	-0.237	3.218	3.187	-0.031	-0.106	-0.476***	-0.528***	-0.643***	-0.687***
Overan	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.027)	p=0.002	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.030)	p=0.306	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.077)	(0.092)
Factors	(0.000)	(0.037)	(0.027)	P 0.002	(0.0.0)	(0.000)	(0.050)	P 0.500	(0.050)	(0.001)	(0.077)	(0.072)
Efficiency	3.386	3.249	-0.137***	-0.274	3.697	3.673	-0.025	-0.053	-0.311***	-0.424***	-0.518***	-0.616***
Efficiency	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.039)	p=0.001	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.048)	p=0.607	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.093)
Harm	2.296	2.174	-0.122**	-0.215	2.904	2.832	-0.071	-0.131	-0.607***	-0.658***	-0.732***	-0.729***
Taiti	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.044)	p=0.007	(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.056)	p=0.210	(0.082)	(0.092)	(0.114)	(0.130)
Fairness	2.588	2.512	-0.076	-0.097	3.352	3.305	-0.047	-0.072	-0.763***	-0.793***	-0.989***	-1.008***
1 anness	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.062)	p=0.221	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.068)	p=0.496	(0.092)	(0.105)	(0.120)	(0.136)
Autonomy	2.183	2.134	-0.048	-0.099	2.731	2.650	-0.080	-0.152	-0.548***	-0.516***	-0.633***	-0.682***
rutonomy	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.038)	p=0.202	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.055)	p=0.146	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.116)	(0.113)
Sanctity	3.182	3.104	-0.078	-0.124	3.389	3.466	0.078	0.125	-0.206*	-0.362***	-0.360**	-0.536***
Sanctity	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.048)	p=0.107	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.065)	p=0.235	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.114)	(0.120)
B. Government Attitudes Factors (1 = strongly disagree with pro Effective	2.621	2.487	-0.134	-0.217	2.806	2.807	0.001	0.002	-0.185†	-0.320	-0.319††	-0.424
Extent	(0.047) 3.889 (0.048)	(0.048) 4.041 (0.045)	(0.047) 0.151 (0.042)	p=0.005 -0.275 p=0.000	(0.063) 2.993 (0.076)	(0.070) 3.106 (0.083)	(0.066) 0.112 (0.071)	p=0.983 -0.164 $p=0.117$	(0.079) 0.896 (0.090)	(0.085) 0.935 (0.094)	(0.113) 1.133 (0.126)	(0.119) 1.256 ††† (0.127)
Specific items	(0.0.0)	(0.0.0)	(0.0.2)	P 0.000	(0.070)	(0.000)	(0.071)	<i>P</i> •••••	(0.0,0)	(0.02.1)	(0.120)	(0.127)
Content $(1 = angry with govt; 3 =$	1.976	1.822	-0.154 †††	-0.253	2.376	2.376	0.000	0.000	-0.400†††	-0.554 †† †	-0.424 	-0.689 §
content)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.047)	p=0.001	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.059)	p=1.000	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.103)
Trust $(1 = never trust govt to do$	2.142	1.988	-0.154	-0.271	2.323	2.237	-0.086	-0.125	-0.181††	-0.248	-0.214†	-0.345
what's right; $4 = always trust$)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.044)	p=0.001	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.071)	p=0.230	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.088)	(0.094)
C. Redistributive Policies	(0.037)	(0.0.2)	(0.01.1)	p 0.007	(0.055)	(0.000)	(0.071)	p 0.2>0	(0.000)	(0.073)	(0.000)	(0.05.1)
Redistribute ($1 = strongly disagree;$	4.153	4.194	0.041	0.054	2.752	2.992	0.240	0.249	1.400###	1.202###	1.557##	1.258###
5 = strongly agree	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.061)	p=0.500	(0.106)	(0.117)	(0.104)	p=0.023	(0.126)	(0.138)	(0.168)	(0.200)
	,	` ,	,	P 0.500	(0.100)	(0.117)	(0.101)	P 0.023	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.100)	(0.200)
Support for specific policies ($1 = a$ Minimum wage	ecrease/ ao noi s 2.852	uppori; 5 — incre 2.882	0.030	0.077	2.538	2.559	0.022	0.052	0.214	0.323±±±	0.385##	0.459±±
Millimum wage									0.314‡‡‡			
Food stamps	(0.030) 2.852	(0.026) 2.882	(0.030) 0.030	<i>p</i> =0.319 0.077	(0.060)	(0.054) 2.527	(0.043) 0.075	p=0.620 0.116	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.098)	(0.085)
Food stamps					2.452				0.400‡‡‡	0.355##	0.452##	0.504‡‡‡
T	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.030)	p=0.319	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.067)	p=0.265	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.107)	(0.110)
Tax on extreme income	2.846	2.846	0.000	0.000	2.183	2.258	0.075	0.113	0.663###	0.588‡‡‡	0.846##	0.713‡‡‡
P	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.025)	p=1.000	(0.075)	(0.066)	(0.069)	p=0.277	(0.081)	(0.073)	(0.123)	(0.112)
Estate tax	1.905	1.905	0.000	0.000	1.548	1.591	0.043	0.071	0.357‡‡‡	0.314‡‡‡	0.350‡‡	0.328‡
	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.052)	p=1.000	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.063)	p=0.496	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.107)	(0.107)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

^{***} $p \le 0.00167$, ** $p \le 0.00833$, * $p \le 0.0167$; ## $p \le 0.0025$, # $p \le 0.0125$; # $p \le 0.025$; ## $p \le 0.0025$; ## $p \le 0.0025$; # $p \le 0$

Table 5. OLS Regressions, by Political Ideology

						A. All					
	Overall (1)	Efficiency (2)	Harm (3)	Fairness (4)	Autonomy (5)	Sanctity (6)	Effective (7)	Extent (8)	Content (9)	Trust (10)	Redistribute (11)
Pandemic	-0.073** (0.025)	-0.089* (0.036)	-0.116** (0.040)	-0.073 (0.051)	-0.075 (0.036)	-0.010 (0.049)	-0.071 (0.041)	0.140 (0.043)	-0.118 †† (0.042)	-0.153 ††† (0.041)	0.091 (0.063)
Political ideology	<i>p</i> =0.004 0.115***	<i>p</i> =0.013 0.083***	<i>p</i> =0.004 0.134***	<i>p</i> =0.151 0.167***	<i>p</i> =0.036 0.120***	<i>p</i> =0.831 0.068***	<i>p=0.087</i> 0.047 ††	<i>p=0.001</i> -0.185 	<i>p</i> =0.006 0.105 †††	<i>p</i> =0.000 0.043 † †	<i>p=0.147</i> -0.244‡‡‡
	(0.014) $p=0.000$	(0.017) $p=0.000$	(0.018) p=0.000	(0.019) $p=0.000$	(0.020) p=0.000	(0.020) p=0.001	(0.018) $p=0.010$	p=0.000	(0.016) p=0.000	(0.014) p=0.002	(0.029) $p=0.000$
School											
SCU	0.251**	-0.083	0.297**	0.354**	0.493***	0.268	-0.126	-0.297†	0.192	0.050	-0.722+++
	(0.084)	(0.107)	(0.096)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.147)	(0.115)	(0.121)	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.161)
Skidmore	0.262**	-0.104	0.360**	0.362**	0.453***	0.300	-0.261	-0.241	0.022	-0.013	-0.557‡‡‡
	(0.093)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.165)	(0.125)	(0.131)	(0.103)	(0.082)	(0.164)
Constant	2.161***	3.130***	1.450***	ì.951***	ì.351***	2.824***	2.694 † 	4.398+++	1.715 † 	2.010 [5.422
	(0.156)	(0.182)	(0.205)	(0.245)	(0.202)	(0.258)	(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.189)	(0.150)	(0.309)
Observations	441	436	434	428	436	439	440	440	440	440	423
R-squared	0.380	0.199	0.303	0.339	0.318	0.107	0.100	0.441	0.238	0.116	0.437
	B. Progressive										
	Overall (12)	Efficiency (13)	Harm (14)	Fairness (15)	Autonomy (16)	Sanctity (17)	Effective (18)	Extent (19)	Content (20)	Trust (21)	Redistribute (22)
Pandemic	-0.090**	-0.124**	-0.133*	-0.091	-0.080	-0.046	-0.106	0.155+++	-0.160++	-0.179+++	-0.003
	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.070)
	p=0.006	p=0.008	p=0.009	p=0.183	p = 0.068	p=0.469	p=0.037	p=0.002	p=0.004	p=0.000	p=0.961
Political ideology	0.139***	0.132***	0.137**	0.225***	0.144***	0.100	0.083	-0.187	0.147†††	0.051	-0.306‡‡‡
	(0.030) p=0.000	(0.041) $p=0.002$	(0.045) p=0.003	(0.052) p=0.000	(0.036) $p=0.000$	(0.044) p=0.026	(0.041) $p=0.047$	(0.039) p=0.000	(0.030) p=0.000	(0.029) $p=0.081$	(0.056) $p=0.000$
School	•	•	•	•	1	•	•	•	•	•	•
SCU	0.317***	-0.001	0.291*	0.463***	0.479***	0.339	-0.130	-0.288++	0.203	0.076	-0.434±±
	(0.082)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.181)	(0.141)	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.095)	(0.157)
Skidmore	0.246*	-0.092	0.191	0.341	0.384*	0.393	-0.290*	-0.265	0.074	-0.009	-0.275
	(0.095)	(0.119)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.197)	(0.152)	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.093)	(0.161)
Constant	2.080***	3.038***	1.533***	1.844***	1.398***	2.459***	2.660+++	4.280	1.582	1.864	5.358‡‡‡
	(0.188)	(0.225)	(0.271)	(0.302)	(0.244)	(0.316)	(0.293)	(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.195)	(0.330)
Observations	283	278	279	274	281	283	282	282	282	282	270
R-squared	0.267	0.174	0.180	0.223	0.212	0.096	0.121	0.257	0.170	0.122	0.302

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at participant level.

Additional control variables: gender identity (indicator variable for female), race/ethnicity (indicator variables for Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Pacific Islander, and other), college major (indicator variables for business/economics and political science), family income (indicator variables for middle income (\$25,000 to less than \$200,000) and high income (greater than or equal to \$200,000), employment status (indicator variable for part- or full-time work), and religiosity (indicator variable for reporting any religious affiliation).

Political ideology is measured on a scale from 1 = very progressive to 11 = very conservative; Panel B restricts the sample to political ideology scores of 1 – 5.

^{***} $p \le 0.00167$, ** $p \le 0.00833$, * $p \le 0.0167$; †† $p \le 0.0025$, †† $p \le 0.0125$; † $p \le 0.025$; ‡‡ $p \le 0.002$; ‡‡ $p \le 0.01$, ‡ $p \le 0.01$.

	A. All											
	Overall	Efficiency	Harm	Fairness	Autonomy	Sanctity	Effective	Extent	Content	Trust	Redistribute	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	
Pandemic	-0.073**	-0.089*	-0.116**	-0.073	-0.075	-0.010	-0.071	0.140†††	-0.118††	-0.153	0.091	
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.063)	
	p=0.004	p=0.013	p=0.004	p=0.151	p=0.036	p=0.831	p=0.087	p=0.001	p=0.006	p=0.000	p=0.147	
Political ideology	0.115***	0.083***	0.134***	0.167***	0.120***	0.068***	0.047††	-0.185	0.105	0.043	-0.244	
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.029)	
	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.001	p=0.010	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.002	p=0.000	
School												
SCU	0.251**	-0.083	0.297**	0.354**	0.493***	0.268	-0.126	-0.297†	0.192	0.050	-0.722	
	(0.084)	(0.107)	(0.096)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.147)	(0.115)	(0.121)	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.161)	
Skidmore	0.262**	-0.104	0.360**	0.362**	0.453***	0.300	-0.261	-0.241	0.022	-0.013	-0.557###	
	(0.093)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.165)	(0.125)	(0.131)	(0.103)	(0.082)	(0.164)	
Constant	2.161***	3.130***	1.450***	1.951***	1.351***	2.824***	2.694	4.398	1.715	2.010	5.422##	
	(0.156)	(0.182)	(0.205)	(0.245)	(0.202)	(0.258)	(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.189)	(0.150)	(0.309)	
Observations	441	436	434	428	436	439	440	440	440	440	423	
R-squared	0.380	0.199	0.303	0.339	0.318	0.107	0.100	0.441	0.238	0.116	0.437	
						B. Progress	sive					
	Overall	Efficiency	Harm	Fairness	Autonomy	Sanctity	Effective	Extent	Content	Trust	Redistribute	
	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	
Pandemic	-0.090**	-0.124**	-0.133*	-0.091	-0.080	-0.046	-0.106	0.155	-0.160††	-0.179	-0.003	
	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.070)	
	p=0.006	p=0.008	p=0.009	p=0.183	p=0.068	p=0.469	p=0.037	p=0.002	p=0.004	p=0.000	p=0.961	
Political ideology	0.139***	0.132***	0.137**	0.225***	0.144***	0.100	0.083	-0.187	0.147	0.051	-0.306###	

	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.070)
	p=0.006	p=0.008	p=0.009	p=0.183	p=0.068	p=0.469	p=0.037	p=0.002	p=0.004	p=0.000	p=0.961
Political ideology	0.139***	0.132***	0.137**	0.225***	0.144***	0.100	0.083	-0.187	0.147	0.051	-0.306###
	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.056)
	p=0.000	p=0.002	p=0.003	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.026	p=0.047	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.081	p=0.000
School	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	•	*	*
SCU	0.317***	-0.001	0.291*	0.463***	0.479***	0.339	-0.130	-0.288††	0.203	0.076	-0.434##
	(0.082)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.181)	(0.141)	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.095)	(0.157)
Skidmore	0.246*	-0.092	0.191	0.341	0.384*	0.393	-0.290*	-0.265	0.074	-0.009	-0.275
	(0.095)	(0.119)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.197)	(0.152)	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.093)	(0.161)
Constant	2.080***	3.038***	1.533***	1.844***	1.398***	2.459***	2.660	4.280	1.582	1.864	5.358
	(0.188)	(0.225)	(0.271)	(0.302)	(0.244)	(0.316)	(0.293)	(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.195)	(0.330)
Observations	283	278	279	274	281	283	282	282	282	282	270
R-squared	0.267	0.174	0.180	0.223	0.212	0.096	0.121	0.257	0.170	0.122	0.302

R-squared 0.267 0.174 0.180 0.223 0.212 0.096 0.121 0.25/ 0.1/0 0.122 0.302

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at participant level.

**** p ≤0.00167, **** p ≤0.00833, * p ≤0.0167; ††† p ≤ 0.0025, †† p ≤ 0.0125; †† p ≤ 0.0025; †† p ≤ 0.002; †† p ≤ 0.01, †† p ≤ 0.02.

Additional control variables gender identity (indicator variable for female), nec/ethnicity (indicator variables for Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Pacific Islander, and other), college major (indicator variables for business/economics and political science), family income (indicator variables for middle income (\$25,000 to less than \$200,000) and high income (greater than or equal to \$200,000), employment status (indicator variable for part- or full-time work), and religiosity (indicator variable for reporting any religious affiliation).

Political ideology is measured on a scale from 1 = very progressive to 11 = very conservative; Panel B restricts the sample to political ideology scores of 1 – 5.

Appendix A Supplemental Tables and Figures


Table A1. Assessment of Response Bias

	Pre-Pandem:	ic Only	7	Pandemic			
	Mean/ Proportion	N	SE	Mean/ Proportion	N	SE	Difference (Pandemic – Pre-Pandemic)
Female	0.50	125	0.04	0.66	354	0.03	0.16***
Family Income							
High Income	0.40	96	0.05	0.41	291	0.03	0.01
Middle Income	0.57	96	0.05	0.54	291	0.03	-0.04
Low Income	0.03	96	0.02	0.05	291	0.01	0.02
Political Ideology							
Progressive-Conservative	4.89	112	0.20	4.37	344	0.13	-0.52**
Libertarian-Authoritarian	5.28	106	0.17	5.31	340	0.10	0.03
Race/ethnicity							
White - Not Hispanic/Latino	0.80	100	0.04	0.73	273	0.03	-0.07
Black - Not Hispanic/Latino	0.07	107	0.02	0.10	304	0.02	0.04
Hispanic/Latino	0.12	121	0.03	0.12	345	0.02	0.00
Asian	0.21	121	0.04	0.27	345	0.02	0.06
American Indian	0.00	121	0.00	0.01	345	0.01	0.01
Pacific Islander	0.02	121	0.01	0.01	345	0.00	-0.02*
Other	0.02	121	0.01	0.02	345	0.01	0.01

Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01.

"Pre-Pandemic Only" consists of students who completed at least half of the pre-pandemic survey, but who did not complete at least half of the pandemic survey.

Figure A1. Total U.S. COVID-19 Cases During Each Survey



Note: COVID-19 Data is from the New York Times

Table A2. Summary of Results, by Race/Ethnicity

	White Only (N=	:163)			Non-White (N=	144)			White Only – N	on-White
	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Market Attitudes (1 = strongly disa	agree with pro-market	statements; 5 =		pro-market statements)						
Overall	2.960	2.862	-0.097**	-0.263	2.870	2.828	-0.042	-0.131	0.090	0.035
	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.031)	p=0.002	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.029)	p=0.151	(0.062)	(0.068)
Factors				•				•		
Efficiency	3.508	3.397	-0.112*	-0.221	3.473	3.400	-0.073	-0.151	0.035	-0.003
·	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.043)	p=0.011	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.045)	p=0.104	(0.070)	(0.077)
Harm	2.553	2.419	-0.134*	-0.227	2.483	2.401	-0.082	-0.156	0.070	0.018
	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.051)	p=0.009	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.049)	p=0.095	(0.085)	(0.094)
Fairness	2.909	2.836	-0.073	-0.105	2.810	2.733	-0.077	-0.098	0.099	0.103
	(0.071)	(0.081)	(0.061)	p=0.233	(0.074)	(0.081)	(0.073)	p=0.292	(0.103)	(0.115)
Government Intervention	2.425	2.271	-0.154***	-0.307	2.330	2.372	0.042	0.090	0.095	-0.100
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.043)	p=0.000	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.042)	p=0.327	(0.079)	(0.078)
Sanctity	3.287	3.274	-0.013	-0.021	3.235	3.210	-0.025	-0.038	0.052	0.064
,	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.053)	p=0.808	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.059)	p=0.673	(0.085)	(0.091)
Government Attitudes										
Factors $(1 = strongly disagree with pro$	o-govt statements; 5 =	strongly agree wi	th pro-govt statem	ents)						
Effective	2.729	2.647	-0.082	-0.127	2.668	2.541	-0.127†	-0.222	0.061	0.106
	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.055)	p=0.140	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.052)	0.016	(0.077)	(0.083)
Extent	3.498	3.698	0.200	-0.298	3.639	3.719	0.080	-0.161	-0.141	-0.021
	(0.070)	(0.075)	(0.057)	p=0.001	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.045)	0.080	(0.097)	(0.097)
Specific items	,	` /	,	1	, ,	,	,		,	, ,
Content $(1 = angry with govt; 3)$	2.102	1.993	-0.109	-0.172	2.149	2.066	-0.083	-0.145	-0.047	-0.073
= content)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.055)	p=0.047	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.052)	p=0.114	(0.077)	(0.081)
Trust $(1 = never trust govt to do$	2.182	2.058	-0.124†	-0.203	2.240	2.058	-0.182+++	-0.342	-0.057	0.001
what's right; $4 = always trust$)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.052)	p=0.019	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.048)	p=0.000	(0.064)	(0.067)
Redistributive Policies										
Redistribute ($1 = strongly disagree;$	3.587	3.698	0.111	0.141	3.731	3.838	0.107	0.121	-0.143	-0.139
5 = strongly agree)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.069)	p=0.113	(0.098)	(0.102)	(0.084)	p=0.206	(0.143)	(0.145)
Support for specific policies ($1 = a$				*	. ,	` /	, ,	*	` '	` /
Minimum wage	2.723	2.745	0.022	0.053	2.752	2.793	0.041	0.110	-0.029	-0.049
3-	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.035)	p=0.534	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.034)	p=0.227	(0.061)	(0.055)
Food stamps	2.693	2.752	0.058	0.111	2.736	2.769	0.033	-0.026	-0.042	-0.017
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.045)	p=0.195	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.042)	p=0.435	(0.067)	(0.060)
Tax on extreme income	2.569	2.562	-0.007	-0.015	2.661	2.727	0.066	0.144	-0.092	-0.165*
on externe meome	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.041)	<i>p</i> =0.858	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.042)	<i>p</i> =0.117	(0.077)	(0.070)
Estate tax	1.766	1.803	0.036	0.056	1.752	1.744	-0.008	-0.013	0.014	0.059
Locate tax	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.055)	<i>p</i> =0.510	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.058)	<i>p</i> =0.887	(0.088)	(0.083)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** p≤0.00167, *** p≤0.00833, * p≤0.0167; \ddagger p≤ 0.0025, \ddagger p≤ 0.0125; \ddagger p≤0.0025; \ddagger p≤0.002; \ddagger p≤0.002; \ddagger DD statistically significant at α ≤ 0.05.

Table A3. Summary of Results, by Gender

	Female (N=207))			Male (N=109)				Female - Male	
	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Market Attitudes (1 = strongly di	sagree with pro-market	statements; 5 =	strongly agree with	pro-market statements)						
Overall	2.856	2.785	-0.071**	-0.211	3.053	2.984	-0.069	-0.189	-0.197**	-0.199**
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.025)	p=0.005	(0.055)	(0.060)	(0.039)	p=0.080	(0.066)	(0.072)
Factors	,	,	,	1	,	,	,	1	,	,
Efficiency	3.457	3.358	-0.099*	-0.197	3.588	3.498	-0.089	-0.193	-0.131	-0.141
,	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.038)	p=0.009	(0.063)	(0.071)	(0.050)	p=0.079	(0.075)	(0.084)
Harm	2.488	2.392	-0.096	-0.173	2.587	2.464	-0.123	-0.215	-0.099	-0.072
	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.042)	p=0.022	(0.073)	(0.082)	(0.063)	p=0.053	(0.090)	(0.100)
Fairness	2.771	2.651	-0.120	-0.159	3.058	3.112	0.053	0.077	-0.287**	-0.460***
	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.057)	p=0.038	(0.086)	(0.099)	(0.076)	p=0.486	(0.106)	(0.120)
Government Intervention	2.334	2.255	-0.078	-0.152	2.487	2.466	-0.021	-0.045	-0.153	-0.210*
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.039)	p=0.043	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.051)	p=0.675	(0.080)	(0.083)
Sanctity	3.194	3.165	-0.029	-0.045	3.411	3.381	-0.030	-0.048	-0.217	-0.216
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.048)	p=0.546	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.067)	p=0.657	(0.090)	(0.096)
	()	()	()	<i>I</i>	()	(* * * * *)	()	<i>I</i>	(* * * *)	()
Government Attitudes										
Factors (1 = strongly disagree with p	ro-oovt statements: 5 =	stronoh aoree wi	th pro-govt statem	ents)						
Effective	2.648	2.561	-0.087	-0.137	2.776	2.694	-0.083	-0.137	-0.128	-0.132
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.048)	p=0.069	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.065)	p=0.205	(0.083)	(0.092)
Extent	3.667	3.825	0.158	-0.264	3.348	3.449	0.101	-0.170	0.318+++	0.376
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.045)	p=0.001	(0.083)	(0.090)	(0.064)	p=0.116	(0.102)	(0.106)
Specific items	(01007)	(01000)	(0.0.0)	P	(0.000)	(01070)	(0.00.)	r	(******)	(0.200)
Content $(1 = angry with govt; 3)$	2.028	1.955	-0.073	-0.123	2.322	2.161	-0.161†	-0.257	-0.294†††	-0.206†
= content)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.044)	p=0.102	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.067)	p=0.019	(0.084)	(0.090)
Trust $(1 = never trust govt to do$	2.145	2.022	-0.123	-0.197	2.333	2.184	-0.149†	-0.257	-0.188††	-0.162
what's right; $4 = always trust$	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.047)	p=0.009	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.062)	p=0.019	(0.069)	(0.072)
	(0.050)	(0.0.0)	(0.017)	P 0.005	(0.030)	(0.000)	(0.002)	P Olors	(0.005)	(0.072)
Redistributive Policies										
Redistribute ($1 = strongly disagree$;	3.816	3.877	0.061	0.074	3.277	3.506	0.230	0.263	0.540‡‡‡	0.371±
5 = strongly agree)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.063)	p=0.340	(0.120)	(0.129)	(0.097)	p=0.020	(0.148)	(0.155)
Support for specific policies (1 =				p 0.570	(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.057)	p 0.020	(0.1 10)	(0.155)
Minimum wage	2.793	2.827	0.034	0.082	2.621	2.644	0.023	0.062	0.173‡	0.183##
	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.031)	p=0.275	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.040)	p=0.567	(0.068)	(0.062)
Food stamps	2.788	2.860	0.073	0.157	2.540	2.540	0.000	0.000	0.247±±±	0.320###
1 ood stamps	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.035)	p=0.037	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.059)	p=1.000	(0.076)	(0.070)
Tax on extreme income	2.637	2.693	0.056	0.125	2.540	2.517	-0.023	-0.044	0.097	0.175
1 ax on extreme meonie	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.033)	p=0.096	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.057)	p=0.686	(0.079)	(0.076)
Estate tax	1.754	1.793	0.039	0.059	1.805	1.770	-0.034	-0.058	-0.050	0.023
Estate tax	(0.052)	(0.051)			(0.078)	(0.074)				(0.023
	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.050)	p=0.432	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.064)	p=0.593	(0.094)	(0.090)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p \le 0.00167$, *** $p \le 0.00833$, * $p \le 0.0167$; ## $p \le 0.0025$, ## $p \le 0.0125$; ## $p \le 0.0025$; ## $p \le 0.002$; \$ DD statistically significant at $\alpha \le 0.05$.

Table A4. Summary of Results, by Family Income

	High Income (N	I=100)			Low/Middle Inc	come (N=163)			High – Low/Mi	ddle Income
	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Market Attitudes (1 = strongly dis	agree with pro-market	statements; 5 = .	strongly agree with	pro-market statements)						
Overall	2.968	2.939	-0.029	-0.083	2.873	2.767	-0.106***	-0.300	0.095	0.172
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.039)	p=0.454	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.029)	p=0.000	(0.069)	(0.072)
Factors	,	, ,	,	1	,	,	,	1	,	,
Efficiency	3.537	3.524	-0.013	-0.026	3.455	3.300	-0.155***	-0.324	0.082	0.224**
•	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.056)	p=0.814	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.040)	p=0.000	(0.079)	(0.083)
Harm	2.576	2.500	-0.076	-0.122	2.462	2.323	-0.139***	-0.271	0.114	0.177
	(0.076)	(0.088)	(0.071)	p=0.286	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.043)	p=0.001	(0.096)	(0.107)
Fairness	2.925	3.044	0.118	0.144	2.817	2.675	-0.142	-0.205	0.108	0.369**
	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.094)	p=0.213	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.059)	p=0.017	(0.112)	(0.124)
Government Intervention	2.434	2.311	-0.123	-0.240	2.333	2.311	-0.022	-0.043	0.101	0.000
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.056)	p=0.033	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.043)	p=0.611	(0.090)	(0.089)
Sanctity	3.312	3.296	-0.016	-0.023	3.228	3.179	-0.049	-0.077	0.084	0.117
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.075)	p=0.836	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.053)	p=0.357	(0.096)	(0.102)
	,	, ,	,	1	,	,	,	1	,	,
Government Attitudes										
Factors $(1 = strongly disagree with pro-$	o-govt statements: 5 =	strongly agree wi	th pro-govt statem	ents)						
Effective	2.620	2.716	0.096	0.149	2.689	2.571	-0.118†	-0.208	-0.069	0.145
	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.071)	p=0.183	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.047)	p=0.013	(0.081)	(0.095)
Extent	3.449	3.587	0.138†	-0.256	3.623	3.796	0.174	-0.276	-0.174	-0.209
	(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.060)	p=0.024	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.052)	p=0.001	(0.111)	(0.114)
Specific items	()	(* * * * *)	()	<i>I</i>	()	()	()	1	(- /	()
Content $(1 = angry with govt; 3)$	2.062	2.012	-0.049	-0.081	2.145	2.021	-0.124†	-0.207	-0.083	-0.008
= content)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.068)	p=0.469	(0.052)	(0.057)	(0.050)	p=0.014	(0.082)	(0.086)
Trust $(1 = never trust govt to do$	2.235	2.099	-0.136	-0.224	2.221	2.069	-0.152††	-0.238	0.014	0.030
what's right; $4 = always trust$	(0.059)	(0.065)	(0.067)	p=0.048	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.053)	p=0.005	(0.072)	(0.080)
	()	(* * * * *)	()	<i>I</i>	()	()	()	1	()	()
Redistributive Policies										
Redistribute ($1 = strongly disagree;$	3.457	3.621	0.164	0.167	3.779	3.874	0.096	0.129	-0.321	-0.253
5 = strongly agree)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.113)	p=0.151	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.064)	p=0.136	(0.164)	(0.164)
Support for specific policies $(1 =$				I	(~~~~)	(~-~-,)	(2.22.)	1	(~~-)	(~~-)
Minimum wage	2.704	2.716	0.012	0.023	2.745	2.793	0.048	0.142	-0.041	-0.077
	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.060)	p=0.836	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.028)	p=0.090	(0.075)	(0.066)
Food stamps	2.654	2.765	0.111	0.222	2.752	2.772	0.021	0.045	-0.097	-0.007
	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.056)	p=0.049	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.038)	p=0.592	(0.076)	(0.069)
Tax on extreme income	2.506	2.543	0.037	0.066	2.648	2.690	0.041	0.088	-0.142	-0.146
- si chiteme meome	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.062)	p=0.552	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.039)	p=0.290	(0.091)	(0.077)
Estate tax	1.827	1.691	-0.136	-0.216	1.779	1.862	0.083	0.129	0.048	-0.171
Donne tax	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.070)	p=0.055	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.053)	p=0.122	(0.099)	(0.091)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** $p \le 0.00167$, ** $p \le 0.00833$, * $p \le 0.0167$; †† $p \le 0.0025$, †† $p \le 0.0125$; † $p \le 0.025$; ‡‡ $p \le 0.002$; ‡ $p \le 0.01$, † $p \le 0.02$; § DD statistically significant at $\alpha \le 0.05$ High family income indicates a self-reported family income of at least \$200,000 in the senior year of high school.

Table A5. Summary of Results, by Authoritarianism-Libertarianism

	Authoritarian (N	1=68)			Libertarian (N=	139)			Authoritarian - l	Libertarian
	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Market Attitudes (1 = strongly disa	agree with pro-market	statements; 5 =	strongly agree with	pro-market statements)	. ,	` '	. ,	•	•	, ,
Overall	2.629	2.528	-0.101*	-0.342	3.069	3.040	-0.029	-0.082	-0.439***	-0.512***
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.039)	p=0.011	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.032)	p=0.374	(0.079)	(0.084)
Factors	()	()	()	<i>I</i>	()	()	()	T	(()
Efficiency	3.387	3.210	-0.177**	-0.392	3.598	3.590	-0.008	-0.016	-0.210	-0.380***
,	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.059)	p=0.004	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.045)	p=0.863	(0.087)	(0.095)
Harm	2.353	2.064	-0.290***	-0.474	2.638	2.588	-0.050	-0.090	-0.285*	-0.525***
	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.082)	p=0.001	(0.066)	(0.073)	(0.052)	p=0.339	(0.111)	(0.113)
Fairness	2.436	2.415	-0.021	-0.029	3.066	3.028	-0.038	-0.047	-0.630***	-0.613***
	(0.101)	(0.113)	(0.097)	p=0.826	(0.072)	(0.086)	(0.077)	p=0.619	(0.125)	(0.142)
Government Intervention	1.975	1.904	-0.071	-0.134	2.593	2.546	-0.047	-0.101	-0.618***	-0.642***
	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.070)	p=0.309	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.043)	p=0.279	(0.094)	(0.095)
Sanctity	2.976	3.026	0.051	0.090	3.382	3.391	0.009	0.014	-0.406***	-0.364**
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.073)	p=0.492	(0.058)	(0.065)	(0.059)	p=0.879	(0.119)	(0.123)
	, ,	, ,	, ,	*	, ,		. ,	•	, ,	` ′
Government Attitudes										
Factors ($1 = strongly disagree with pro-$	o-govt statements; 5 =	strongly agree wi	th pro-govt statem	ents)						
Effective	2.806	2.659	-0.146	-0.240	2.699	2.558	-0.141†	-0.221	0.106	0.101
	(0.079)	(0.095)	(0.081)	p=0.076	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.059)	p=0.019	(0.099)	(0.113)
Extent	3.851	4.172	0.321	-0.502	3.354	3.411	0.057	-0.096	0.497 †††	0.761
	(0.097)	(0.078)	(0.085)	p=0.000	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.055)	p=0.301	(0.123)	(0.109)
Specific items	, ,	, ,	, ,	*	, ,		` ,	•	, ,	` ′
Content $(1 = angry with govt; 3)$	1.930	1.772	-0.158	-0.254	2.216	2.129	-0.086	-0.135	-0.286	-0.357
= content)	(0.075)	(0.090)	(0.082)	p=0.060	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.059)	p=0.150	(0.096)	(0.107)
Trust $(1 = never trust govt to do$	2.193	1.982	-0.211††	-0.357	2.224	2.069	-0.155++	-0.266	-0.031	-0.087
what's right; $4 = always trust$)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.078)	p=0.009	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.054)	p=0.005	(0.084)	(0.094)
,	, ,	, ,	, ,	*	, ,	, ,	. ,	•	, ,	` ′
Redistributive Policies										
Redistribute ($1 = strongly disagree;$	4.230	4.368	0.138	0.186	3.310	3.406	0.096	0.103	0.920‡‡‡	0.961##
5 = strongly agree)	(0.110)	(0.090)	(0.099)	p=0.170	(0.115)	(0.123)	(0.089)	p=0.284	(0.159)	(0.152)
Support for specific policies ($1 = 1$)	decrease/do not suppo	$rt; \hat{\beta} = increase/.$	support)	1	,	,	, ,	1	,	, ,
Minimum wage	2.825	2.842	0.018	0.040	2.672	2.707	0.034	0.083	0.152	0.135
Ü	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.059)	p=0.766	(0.050)	(0.046)	(0.039)	p=0.373	(0.076)	(0.067)
Food stamps	2.772	2.860	0.088	0.185	2.655	2.698	0.043	0.081	0.117	0.161
1	(0.071)	(0.053)	(0.063)	p=0.168	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.050)	p=0.386	(0.088)	(0.073)
Tax on extreme income	2.737	2.789	0.053	0.132	2.474	2.552	0.078	0.156	0.263±±	0.238##
	(0.077)	(0.070)	(0.053)	p=0.322	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.046)	p=0.095	(0.100)	(0.089)
Estate tax	1.947	2.070	0.123	0.157	1.698	1.621	-0.078	-0.125	0.249	0.449±±
	(0.095)	(0.082)	(0.103)	p=0.240	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.058)	p=0.181	(0.116)	(0.102)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

*** $p \le 0.00167$, *** $p \le 0.00833$, * $p \le 0.0167$; †† $p \le 0.0025$, †† $p \le 0.0125$; † $p \le 0.0025$; †† $p \le 0.0$ from this analysis.

Table A6. Summary of Results, by Field of Study

	Economics/Bus	iness Students	(N=113)		Other Students	(N=175)			Econ/Business	Other
	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic	Difference	Effect Size (d)	Pre-Pandemic	Pandemic
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Market Attitudes (1 = strongly dis	sagree with pro-market	statements; 5 = .	strongly agree with	b pro-market statements)						
Overall	3.106	3.009	-0.097**	-0.325	2.820	2.750	-0.069	-0.188	0.286***	0.259***
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.030)	p=0.002	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.029)	p=0.018	(0.061)	(0.066)
Factors	,	, ,	,	1	,	,	,	1	,	,
Efficiency	3.643	3.590	-0.053	-0.123	3.429	3.287	-0.142***	-0.280	0.213**	0.303***
,	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.044)	p=0.232	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.041)	p=0.001	(0.073)	(0.073)
Harm	2.731	2.660	-0.071	-0.124	2.390	2.255	-0.135**	-0.244	0.341***	0.405***
	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.059)	p=0.233	(0.054)	(0.060)	(0.045)	p=0.003	(0.087)	(0.096)
Fairness	3.145	3.015	-0.130	-0.181	2.712	2.661	-0.051	-0.071	0.432***	0.354**
	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.074)	p=0.083	(0.065)	(0.076)	(0.059)	p=0.388	(0.100)	(0.113)
Government Intervention	2.568	2.443	-0.125	-0.244	2.268	2.240	-0.028	-0.061	0.299***	0.203*
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.053)	p=0.020	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.037)	p=0.445	(0.079)	(0.079)
Sanctity	3.402	3.333	-0.069	-0.107	3.181	3.176	-0.004	-0.007	0.222**	0.157
	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.066)	p=0.298	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.049)	p=0.928	(0.083)	(0.089)
	, ,	, ,	, ,	*	, ,	, ,	, ,	*	, ,	, ,
Government Attitudes										
Factors ($1 = strongly disagree with pr$	ro-govt statements; 5 =	strongly agree wil	th pro-govt statem	ents)						
Effective	2.762	2.687	-0.074	-0.119	2.651	2.543	-0.108†	-0.183	0.111	0.144
	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.064)	p=0.246	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.046)	p=0.021	(0.083)	(0.088)
Extent	3.314	3.385	0.071	-0.109	3.713	3.873	0.160 	-0.286	-0.399+++	-0.488†††
	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.067)	p=0.290	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.044)	p=0.000	(0.100)	(0.101)
Specific items	, ,	, ,	, ,	•	` ,	. ,	, ,	1	, ,	, ,
Content $(1 = angry with govt; 3)$	2.260	2.167	-0.094	-0.152	2.043	1.951	-0.093	-0.158	0.217	0.216
= content)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.063)	p=0.140	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.046)	p=0.047	(0.081)	(0.083)
Trust $(1 = never trust govt to do$	2.250	2.104	-0.146	-0.210	2.185	2.043	-0.142+++	-0.266	0.065	0.061
what's right; $4 = always trust$)	(0.057)	(0.064)	(0.071)	p=0.043	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.042)	p=0.001	(0.069)	(0.075)
				*				*		
Redistributive Policies										
Redistribute ($1 = strongly disagree;$	3.252	3.405	0.153	0.164	3.871	3.959	0.089	0.118	-0.619##	-0.555###
5 = strongly agree	(0.127)	(0.135)	(0.100)	p=0.129	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.061)	p=0.148	(0.151)	(0.157)
Support for specific policies ($1 =$	decrease/ do not suppor	rt; 3 = increase/s	support)					_		
Minimum wage	2.583	2.656	0.073	0.150	2.827	2.840	0.012	0.039	-0.244‡‡‡	-0.183‡‡
~	(0.060)	(0.051)	(0.050)	p=0.145	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.025)	p=0.619	(0.068)	(0.059)
Food stamps	2.583	2.729	0.146‡	0.244	2.784	2.790	0.006	0.015	-0.201##	-0.061
*	(0.062)	(0.052)	(0.061)	p=0.019	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.032)	p=0.848	(0.072)	(0.063)
Tax on extreme income	2.406	2.448	0.042	0.077	2.716	2.759	0.043	0.102	-0.310‡‡‡	-0.311‡‡‡
	(0.072)	(0.064)	(0.055)	p=0.453	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.033)	p=0.195	(0.084)	(0.076)
Estate tax	1.802	1.781	-0.021	-0.034	1.753	1.790	0.037	0.056	0.049	-0.009
	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.063)	p=0.741	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.052)	p=0.475	(0.092)	(0.089)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** $p \le 0.00167$, *** $p \le 0.00833$, * $p \le 0.0167$; ## $p \le 0.0025$, ## $p \le 0.0125$; ## $p \le 0.0025$; ## $p \le 0.002$; ## $p \le 0$

Table A6. OLS Regressions, by Political Ideology

						A. All											B. Progress					
	Markets	Efficiency	Harm	Fairness	Autonomy	Sanctity	Effective	Extent	Content	Trust	Redistribute	Markets	Efficiency	Harm	Fairness	Autonomy	Sanctity	Effective	Extent	Content	Trust	Redistribute
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
Pandemic	-0.073**	-0.089*	-0.116**	-0.073	-0.075	-0.010	-0.071	0.140	-0.118	-0.153	0.091	-0.090**	-0.124**	-0.133*	-0.091	-0.080	-0.046	-0.106	0.155	-0.160	-0.179	-0.003
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.063)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.068)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.070)
	p=0.004	p=0.013	p=0.004	p=0.151	p=0.036	p=0.831	p=0.087	p=0.001	p=0.006	p=0.000	p=0.147	p=0.006	p=0.008	p=0.009	p=0.183	p=0.068	p=0.469	p=0.037	p=0.002	p=0.004	p=0.000	p=0.961
Political ideology	0.115***	0.083***	0.134***	0.167***	0.120***	0.068***	0.047	-0.185	0.105	0.043	-0.244###	0.139***	0.132***	0.137**	0.225***	0.144***	0.100	0.083	-0.187	0.147	0.051	-0.306###
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.056)
	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.001	p=0.010	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.002	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.002	p=0.003	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.026	p=0.047	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.081	p=0.000
School																						
SCU	0.251**	-0.083	0.297**	0.354**	0.493***	0.268	-0.126	-0.297†	0.192	0.050	-0.722	0.317***	-0.001	0.291*	0.463***	0.479***	0.339	-0.130	-0.288	0.203	0.076	-0.434##
	(0.084)	(0.107)	(0.096)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.147)	(0.115)	(0.121)	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.161)	(0.082)	(0.108)	(0.110)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.181)	(0.141)	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.095)	(0.157)
Skidmore	0.262**	-0.104	0.360**	0.362**	0.453***	0.300	-0.261	-0.241	0.022	-0.013	-0.557###	0.246*	-0.092	0.191	0.341	0.384*	0.393	-0.290	-0.265	0.074	-0.009	-0.275
	(0.093)	(0.116)	(0.115)	(0.135)	(0.129)	(0.165)	(0.125)	(0.131)	(0.103)	(0.082)	(0.164)	(0.095)	(0.119)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.197)	(0.152)	(0.126)	(0.117)	(0.093)	(0.161)
Female	-0.028	-0.063	0.058	-0.147	0.044	-0.042	-0.121	0.091	-0.072	-0.145	-0.011	0.070	0.045	0.090	-0.015	0.111	0.129	-0.033	0.012	-0.035	-0.130	0.040
	(0.064)	(0.083)	(0.089)	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.082)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.127)	(0.081)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.135)	(0.093)	(0.123)	(0.109)	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.087)	(0.161)
Race/Ethnicity																						
Black:	0.055	0.079	0.215	-0.048	0.081	-0.100	-0.226	0.109	0.101	-0.099	0.311	0.098	0.130	0.245	-0.080	0.186	-0.043	-0.203	0.095	0.126	-0.031	0.147
	(0.106)	(0.143)	(0.166)	(0.155)	(0.126)	(0.160)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.124)	(0.111)	(0.171)	(0.120)	(0.151)	(0.202)	(0.175)	(0.147)	(0.177)	(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.136)	(0.127)	(0.188)
Hispanic/Latino	-0.042	0.002	0.121	-0.124	-0.100	-0.105	0.032	0.060	-0.058	0.041	0.110	-0.084	-0.113	0.120	-0.290	-0.080	-0.060	-0.075	0.035	-0.078	0.031	0.067
	(0.087)	(0.098)	(0.118)	(0.131)	(0.105)	(0.144)	(0.113)	(0.101)	(0.115)	(0.094)	(0.155)	(0.110)	(0.133)	(0.145)	(0.167)	(0.146)	(0.170)	(0.141)	(0.148)	(0.131)	(0.119)	(0.199)
Asian	-0.006	0.046	-0.015	-0.023	0.044	-0.019	-0.128	0.066	0.041	0.048	-0.028	0.047	0.057	0.062	0.072	0.149	-0.055	-0.163	-0.057	0.007	0.037	0.078
	(0.064)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.099)	(0.083)	(0.096)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.065)	(0.119)	(0.073)	(0.102)	(0.097)	(0.116)	(0.104)	(0.120)	(0.108)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.081)	(0.142)
American Indian	-0.139	-0.069	-0.535	-0.020	-0.292**	0.236	0.019	0.470	0.123	-0.116	0.936±±±	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	, ,	` ′		` ′	` ′	, ,	` ′
	(0.096)	(0.125)	(0.235)	(0.185)	(0.104)	(0.110)	(0.099)	(0.328)	(0.388)	(0.158)	(0.262)											
Other	-0.140	-0.215	-0.167	-0.043	-0.327	0.105	-0.571	0.099	-0.286	-0.383	-0.291	-0.124	-0.206	-0.178	-0.008	-0.290	0.115	-0.544	0.121	-0.222	-0.376	-0.377
	(0.294)	(0.404)	(0.288)	(0.415)	(0.196)	(0.477)	(0.360)	(0.209)	(0.225)	(0.286)	(0.490)	(0.301)	(0.387)	(0.302)	(0.394)	(0.184)	(0.479)	(0.321)	(0.212)	(0.194)	(0.284)	(0.397)
Major	, ,	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	, ,	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	, ,	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	, ,	` ′
Écon/Business	0.131	0.193*	0.133	0.163	0.028	0.124	0.055	-0.197†	0.055	-0.017	-0.298±	0.127	0.133	0.156	0.148	-0.014	0.240	-0.005	-0.159	0.073	-0.076	-0.261
	(0.059)	(0.074)	(0.084)	(0.092)	(0.074)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.072)	(0.064)	(0.126)	(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.104)	(0.121)	(0.088)	(0.109)	(0.116)	(0.095)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.158)
Political Science	-0.004	-0.235	0.191	0.040	0.187	-0.139	0.044	0.066	-0.096	-0.000	0.069	-0.031	-0.228	0.112	0.004	0.088	-0.118	0.131	0.095	0.021	0.102	0.166
	(0.149)	(0.178)	(0.135)	(0.177)	(0.192)	(0.213)	(0.187)	(0.122)	(0.136)	(0.087)	(0.165)	(0.161)	(0.177)	(0.153)	(0.194)	(0.202)	(0.262)	(0.190)	(0.137)	(0.149)	(0.093)	(0.156)
Family income	, ,		` ′	` ′	` ′			` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	` ′	, ,	` ′		` ′	` ′	, ,	` ′
Middle income	0.007	0.104	0.016	-0.090	0.063	-0.083	0.032	0.240	-0.065	0.126	0.050	-0.059	0.031	-0.048	-0.206	-0.074	-0.001	-0.070	0.379	-0.119	0.218	0.066
	(0.105)	(0.135)	(0.147)	(0.171)	(0.128)	(0.180)	(0.120)	(0.178)	(0.159)	(0.124)	(0.235)	(0.125)	(0.179)	(0.197)	(0.212)	(0.164)	(0.210)	(0.169)	(0.233)	(0.226)	(0.142)	(0.260)
High income	0.082	0.173	0.146	0.000	0.043	-0.005	0.055	0.198	-0.168	0.136	-0.080	0.045	0.109	0.058	-0.098	-0.033	0.102	0.082	0.348	-0.116	0.322	-0.176
~	(0.110)	(0.142)	(0.157)	(0.179)	(0.138)	(0.187)	(0.127)	(0.189)	(0.162)	(0.130)	(0.255)	(0.133)	(0.188)	(0.204)	(0.223)	(0.172)	(0.221)	(0.173)	(0.239)	(0.233)	(0.150)	(0.278)
Employed	-0.029	-0.062	-0.049	0.008	-0.081	0.060	0.025	-0.057	0.041	0.054	-0.062	-0.093	-0.169	-0.066	-0.104	-0.126	0.049	-0.008	0.013	0.032	-0.002	0.009
F - 2 - 4	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0,082)	(0.093)	(0.073)	(0.091)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0,063)	(0.058)	(0.103)	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.108)	(0.119)	(0.099)	(0.128)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0,083)	(0.069)	(0.121)
Religious	0.020	-0.041	0.146	0.068	0.119	-0.131	-0.065	-0.068	-0.120	-0.099	-0.129	0.038	-0.006	0.164	0.067	0.085	-0.102	-0.048	0.014	-0.090	-0.030	-0.186
	(0.058)	(0.075)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.073)	(0.087)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0,074)	(0.062)	(0.112)	(0.068)	(0.094)	(0.101)	(0.108)	(0.091)	(0.105)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0,084)	(0.072)	(0.129)
Constant	2.161***	3.130***	1.450***	1.951***	1.351***	2.824***	2.694	4.398	1.715	2.010	5.422111	2.080***	3.038***	1.533***	1.844***	1.398***	2.459***	2.660	4.280	1.582	1.864	5.358##
	(0.156)	(0.182)	(0.205)	(0.245)	(0.202)	(0.258)	(0.212)	(0.210)	(0.189)	(0.150)	(0,309)	(0.188)	(0.225)	(0.271)	(0.302)	(0.244)	(0.316)	(0.293)	(0.253)	(0.254)	(0.195)	(0.330)
Observations																						270
																						0.302
Observations R-squared	441 0.380	436 0.199	434 0.303	428 0.339	436 0.318	439 0.107	440 0.100	440 0.441	440 0.238	440 0.116	423 0.437	283 0.267	278 0.174	279 0.180	274 0.223	281 0.212	283 0.096	282 0.121	282 0.257		282	282 282

Table A6 (continued)

						C. Not Progressive						
	Markets	Efficiency	Harm	Fairness	Autonomy	Sanctity	Effective	Extent	Content	Trust	Redistribute	
	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(31)	(32)	(33)	
Pandemic	-0.050	-0.027	-0.093	-0.058	-0.073	0.050	-0.010	0.124	-0.034	-0.096	0.229	
	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.083)	(0.065)	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.069)	(0.082)	(0.123)	
	p=0.217	p=0.641	p=0.175	p=0.486	p=0.265	p=0.538	p=0.892	p=0.152	p=0.622	p=0.247	p=0.067	
Political ideology	0.118	0.130	0.156**	0.177	0.064	0.111	0.055	-0.193†	0.085	0.089	-0.205	
r ontient lacology	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.065)	(0.087)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.055)	(0.116)	
	p=0.062	p=0.050	p=0.006	p=0.023	p=0.327	p=0.202	p=0.441	p=0.015	p=0.224	p=0.108	p=0.082	
School	p=0.002	p-0.050	p=0.000	p-0.023	p=0.527	p=0.202	p-0.441	p=0.015	p=0.224	p=0.100	p=0.002	
SCU	0.156	-0.139	0.501	0.246	0.462	0.233	0.025	-0.468	0.228	0.087	-1.526###	
300	(0.276)	(0.328)	(0.209)	(0.344)	(0.287)	(0.343)	(0.184)	(0.382)	(0.206)	(0.213)	(0.376)	
Skidmore	0.356	-0.004	0.936***		0.611	0.203			-0.014			
3 Kuamore				0.556			0.010	-0.315		0.066	-1.435###	
	(0.310)	(0.359)	(0.259)	(0.382)	(0.292)	(0.384)	(0.207)	(0.388)	(0.243)	(0.204)	(0.409)	
Female	-0.238	-0.192	-0.059	-0.400*	-0.197	-0.319	-0.174	0.298	-0.056	-0.136	-0.205	
	(0.113)	(0.134)	(0.159)	(0.156)	(0.135)	(0.150)	(0.181)	(0.161)	(0.138)	(0.122)	(0.257)	
Race/Ethnicity												
Black:	-0.270	-0.218	-0.078	-0.064	-0.555*	-0.430	-0.186	-0.005	0.118	-0.276	0.907廿	
	(0.155)	(0.314)	(0.213)	(0.232)	(0.215)	(0.293)	(0.285)	(0.237)	(0.250)	(0.199)	(0.328)	
Hispanic/Latino	-0.126	0.093	0.015	-0.003	-0.311	-0.372	0.139	0.323	-0.137	0.014	0.256	
- mymm,	(0.183)	(0.168)	(0.227)	(0.254)	(0.168)	(0.301)	(0.223)	(0.193)	(0.245)	(0.167)	(0.270)	
Asian	-0.203	0.037	-0.223	-0.280	-0.252	-0.174	-0.098	0.326	0.030	0.046	-0.233	
Z13tun												
	(0.133)	(0.151)	(0.190)	(0.164)	(0.175)	(0.170)	(0.162)	(0.192)	(0.161)	(0.138)	(0.279)	
American Indian	-0.181	0.030	-0.583	0.028	-0.432	0.073	0.065	0.567†	0.092	0.009	0.929##	
	(0.212)	(0.156)	(0.364)	(0.361)	(0.278)	(0.152)	(0.176)	(0.229)	(0.470)	(0.209)	(0.278)	
Other												
Mc-												
Major	0.040		0.010	0.040		0.045		0.445		0.084		
Econ/Business	0.038	0.222	-0.040	0.049	-0.086	-0.045	0.116	-0.125	0.006	0.076	-0.237	
	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.149)	(0.150)	(0.141)	(0.149)	(0.135)	(0.159)	(0.139)	(0.104)	(0.216)	
Political Science	0.320	-0.091	0.398	0.323	0.965	-0.134	-0.469	0.444	-0.482	-0.448	-0.524	
	(0.366)	(0.474)	(0.368)	(0.540)	(0.511)	(0.422)	(0.639)	(0.508)	(0.325)	(0.325)	(0.565)	
Family income												
Middle income	-0.042	-0.038	0.074	-0.147	0.197	-0.337	0.090	0.032	0.047	-0.202	-0.032	
	(0.146)	(0.228)	(0.216)	(0.193)	(0.201)	(0.355)	(0.191)	(0.248)	(0.193)	(0.178)	(0.427)	
High income	-0.015	0.047	0.206	-0.080	0.064	-0.292	-0.075	0.007	-0.213	-0.330	-0.044	
	(0.146)	(0.223)	(0.239)	(0.203)	(0.206)	(0.352)	(0.211)	(0.281)	(0.196)	(0.179)	(0.439)	
E J	0.014	0.057	-0.056	0.203)	-0.124	0.332)	0.049	-0.218	0.073	0.130	-0.201	
Employed												
	(0.093)	(0.116)	(0.126)	(0.137)	(0.116)	(0.124)	(0.160)	(0.159)	(0.125)	(0.119)	(0.233)	
Religious	0.082	-0.007	0.203	0.214	0.289	-0.136	0.010	-0.226	-0.130	-0.187	-0.095	
	(0.102)	(0.114)	(0.133)	(0.128)	(0.140)	(0.149)	(0.166)	(0.153)	(0.151)	(0.118)	(0.228)	
Constant	2.406***	2.867***	1.158	2.059*	1.869**	3.058***	2.398	4.685	1.776	1.960	6.018	
	(0.657)	(0.718)	(0.585)	(0.819)	(0.598)	(0.922)	(0.634)	(0.748)	(0.602)	(0.537)	(1.212)	
Observations	158	158	155	154	155	156	158	158	158	158	153	
R-squared	0.263	0.177	0.272	0.265	0.274	0.143	0.073	0.249	0.097	0.130	0.253	

R-squared 0.263 0.17// 0.272 0.265 0.2/4 0.143 0.0/3 0.249 0.097 0.130 0.253

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and are dustered at participant level.

**** p≤0.00167, *** p≤0.00833, * p≤0.0167; †† p≤ 0.0025, †† p≤ 0.0125; † p≤ 0.0025; †† p≤ 0.0025; †† p≤ 0.0025; †† p≤ 0.0025; †† p≤ 0.004, † p≤ 0.002.

Additional control variables gender identity (indicator variable for female), race/ethnicity (indicator variables for Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Pacific Islander, and other), college major (indicator variables for black) and political science), family income (indicator variables for middle income (\$25,000 to less than \$200,000) and high income (greater than or equal to \$200,000), employment status (indicator variable for part- or full-time work), and religiosity (indicator variable for reporting any religious affiliation).

Political ideology is measured on a scale from 1 = very progressive to 11 = very conservative; Panel B restricts the sample to political ideology scores of 1 – 5.

Table A7. Linear Mixed Model Regressions, by Political Ideology

						A. All											B. Progressi	ve				
	Overall	Efficiency	Harm	Fairness	Autonomy	Sanctity	Effective	Extent	Content	Trust	Redistribute	Markets	Efficiency	Harm	Fairness	Autonomy	Sanctity	Effective	Extent	Content	Trust	Redistribute
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)			(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)			(18)
Pandemic	-0.075**	-0.100**	-0.109**	-0.070	-0.077	-0.016	-0.065	0.147†††	-0.115	-0.154	0.097	-0.087**	-0.137***	-0.122*	-0.086	-0.078	-0.049	-0.105	0.164	-0.162	-0.181	0.017
	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.059)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.041)	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.063)
	p=0.002	p=0.003	p=0.006	p=0.160	p=0.022	p=0.737	p=0.102	p=0.000	p=0.005	p=0.000	p=0.097	p=0.006	p=0.002	p=0.013	p=0.186	p=0.056	p=0.415	p=0.026	p=0.000	p=0.002	p=0.000	p=0.791
Political ideology	0.116***	0.080***	0.133***	0.167***	0.122***	0.069***	0.049	-0.187	0.106	0.044	-0.242	0.137***	0.128***	0.130***	0.215***	0.141***	0.091	0.094†	-0.182	0.149†††	0.056	-0.290
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.052)
	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.003	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.001	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.001	p=0.001	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.052	p=0.015	p=0.000	p=0.000	p=0.064	p=0.000
Female	-0.054	-0.055	0.019	-0.198	0.025	-0.085	-0.068	0.145	-0.080	-0.150†	0.030	0.042	0.052	0.027	-0.087	0.084	0.059	0.025	0.091	-0.064	-0.136	0.149
	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.081)	(0.090)	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.115)	(0.073)	(0.094)	(0.101)	(0.120)	(0.094)	(0.120)	(0.098)	(0.088)	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.134)
Race/Ethnicity																						
Black	0.027	0.067	0.194	-0.035	0.070	-0.126	-0.247	0.072	0.097	-0.106	0.296	0.089	0.153	0.257	-0.039	0.195	-0.056	-0.222	0.036	0.146	-0.042	0.108
	(0.098)	(0.123)	(0.136)	(0.153)	(0.124)	(0.154)	(0.136)	(0.131)	(0.117)	(0.104)	(0.194)	(0.105)	(0.137)	(0.148)	(0.173)	(0.135)	(0.175)	(0.143)	(0.129)	(0.122)	(0.113)	(0.196)
Hispanic/Latino	-0.030	0.008	0.115	-0.104	-0.104	-0.083	0.064	0.038	-0.039	0.062	0.098	-0.060	-0.076	0.150	-0.243	-0.088	-0.019	-0.063	-0.004	-0.038	0.053	-0.023
	(0.080)	(0.099)	(0.110)	(0.123)	(0.101)	(0.123)	(0.109)	(0.105)	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.155)	(0.098)	(0.126)	(0.135)	(0.160)	(0.125)	(0.160)	(0.131)	(0.118)	(0.111)	(0.103)	(0.178)
Asian	0.003	0.059	-0.024	-0.032	0.056	-0.011	-0.093	0.072	0.054	0.052	-0.034	0.051	0.067	0.056	0.059	0.156	-0.045	-0.136	-0.051	0.024	0.041	0.072
	(0.063)	(0.078)	(0.086)	(0.097)	(0.079)	(0.098)	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.122)	(0.076)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.124)	(0.097)	(0.127)	(0.103)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.082)	(0.140)
American Indian	-0.156	-0.076	-0.558	-0.037	-0.312	0.220	0.078	0.480	0.145	-0.098	0.944											
	(0.285)	(0.356)	(0.388)	(0.434)	(0.356)	(0.443)	(0.393)	(0.375)	(0.333)	(0.297)	(0.543)											
Other	-0.125	-0.199	-0.161	-0.042	-0.312	0.100	-0.533	0.094	-0.261	-0.363	-0.273	-0.112	-0.181	-0.152	-0.008	-0.280	0.105	-0.476	0.131	-0.185	-0.340	-0.382
	(0.235)	(0.294)	(0.321)	(0.359)	(0.294)	(0.366)	(0.324)	(0.310)	(0.275)	(0.245)	(0.449)	(0.227)	(0.296)	(0.317)	(0.368)	(0.291)	(0.377)	(0.308)	(0.277)	(0.260)	(0.243)	(0.412)
Major																						
Econ/Business	0.135	0.200**	0.131	0.162	0.020	0.135	0.072	-0.184†	0.062	-0.006	-0.291‡	0.135	0.159	0.155	0.142	-0.030	0.254	0.021	-0.135	0.080	-0.055	-0.294
	(0.058)	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.089)	(0.073)	(0.091)	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.113)	(0.075)	(0.099)	(0.106)	(0.123)	(0.096)	(0.126)	(0.103)	(0.092)	(0.087)	(0.081)	(0.139)
Political Science	-0.086	-0.219	0.099	-0.057	0.094	-0.292	0.135	0.180	-0.155	-0.020	0.133	-0.109	-0.211	-0.023	-0.088	-0.010	-0.348	0.222	0.223	-0.066	0.061	0.315
	(0.122)	(0.149)	(0.167)	(0.187)	(0.155)	(0.187)	(0.165)	(0.159)	(0.144)	(0.127)	(0.237)	(0.131)	(0.165)	(0.178)	(0.213)	(0.169)	(0.211)	(0.172)	(0.155)	(0.148)	(0.137)	(0.233)
Family income																						
Middle income	0.013	0.094	0.013	-0.056	0.085	-0.070	0.046	0.188	-0.040	0.142	0.011	-0.043	0.057	-0.008	-0.139	-0.052	0.024	-0.062	0.306	-0.065	0.238	-0.040
	(0.113)	(0.139)	(0.154)	(0.172)	(0.141)	(0.173)	(0.154)	(0.147)	(0.132)	(0.116)	(0.224)	(0.135)	(0.174)	(0.188)	(0.220)	(0.173)	(0.223)	(0.182)	(0.164)	(0.154)	(0.144)	(0.259)
High income	0.089	0.187	0.137	0.026	0.055	0.001	0.098	0.155	-0.134	0.161	-0.127	0.065	0.175	0.101	-0.031	-0.019	0.119	0.146	0.293	-0.048	0.359†	-0.295
	(0.117)	(0.143)	(0.160)	(0.179)	(0.147)	(0.179)	(0.158)	(0.152)	(0.137)	(0.120)	(0.232)	(0.139)	(0.177)	(0.192)	(0.227)	(0.179)	(0.227)	(0.185)	(0.167)	(0.158)	(0.147)	(0.264)
Employed	-0.040	-0.066	-0.067	-0.013	-0.087	0.044	0.039	-0.037	0.044	0.048	-0.078	-0.092	-0.167	-0.084	-0.111	-0.129	0.046	0.006	0.026	0.039	-0.003	-0.042
	(0.056)	(0.070)	(0.077)	(0.086)	(0.070)	(0.087)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.108)	(0.069)	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.113)	(0.089)	(0.115)	(0.094)	(0.085)	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.127)
Religious	0.027	-0.037	0.161	0.082	0.129	-0.129	-0.074	-0.081	-0.119	-0.098	-0.115	0.038	-0.010	0.173	0.074	0.095	-0.121	-0.051	0.006	-0.094	-0.037	-0.165
	(0.056)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.086)	(0.070)	(0.087)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.108)	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.095)	(0.111)	(0.086)	(0.113)	(0.092)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.073)	(0.126)
Constant	2.362***	3.065***	1.736***	2.233***	1.682***	3.087***	2.453	4.170	1.777	2.010	4.955##	2.291***	2.974***	1.763***	2.157***	1.718***	2.821***	2.382	4.026	1.660	1.864	5.059##
	(0.145)	(0.170)	(0.199)	(0.218)	(0.204)	(0.212)	(0.188)	(0.181)	(0.166)	(0.143)	(0.312)	(0.177)	(0.216)	(0.234)	(0.284)	(0.235)	(0.275)	(0.225)	(0.203)	(0.192)	(0.178)	(0.321)
Observations	441	436	434	428	436	439	440	440	440	440	423	283	278	279	274	281	283	282	282	282	282	270

Table A7 (continued)

						C. Not Progressi	ve				
	Overall	Efficiency	Harm	Fairness	Autonomy	Sanctity	Effective	Extent	Content	Trust	Redistribute
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(9)
Pandemic	-0.058	-0.036	-0.092	-0.049	-0.081	0.042	0.006	0.123	-0.025	-0.098	0.226
	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.076)	(0.060)	(0.076)	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.115)
	p=0.119	p=0.493	p=0.166	p=0.517	p=0.177	p=0.581	p=0.931	p=0.123	p=0.697	p=0.200	p=0.049
Political ideology	0.116**	0.145**	0.148*	0.170**	0.033	0.103	0.040	-0.173	0.074	0.079	-0.206
	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.053)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.096)
	p=0.008	p=0.005	p=0.014	p=0.005	p=0.536	p=0.096	p=0.534	p=0.008	p=0.187	p=0.078	p=0.032
Female	-0.284**	-0.199	-0.090	-0.437**	-0.291*	-0.360*	-0.145	0.367†	-0.067	-0.153	-0.178
	(0.103)	(0.122)	(0.142)	(0.143)	(0.125)	(0.146)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.132)	(0.105)	(0.224)
Race/Ethnicity											
Black	-0.323	-0.188	-0.116	-0.111	-0.606	-0.514	-0.192	0.104	0.043	-0.279	0.907
	(0.242)	(0.289)	(0.325)	(0.335)	(0.297)	(0.347)	(0.358)	(0.367)	(0.316)	(0.257)	(0.513)
Hispanic/Latino	-0.149	0.032	0.016	-0.018	-0.325	-0.338	0.182	0.258	-0.053	0.033	0.271
	(0.145)	(0.169)	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.173)	(0.202)	(0.209)	(0.213)	(0.184)	(0.145)	(0.307)
Asian	-0.219	0.025	-0.233	-0.295	-0.303	-0.169	-0.088	0.333	0.050	0.037	-0.235
	(0.120)	(0.142)	(0.162)	(0.165)	(0.145)	(0.170)	(0.175)	(0.178)	(0.154)	(0.122)	(0.254)
American Indian	-0.229	-0.008	-0.602	-0.001	-0.498	0.052	0.100	0.570	0.136	0.006	0.950
	(0.292)	(0.346)	(0.387)	(0.395)	(0.353)	(0.412)	(0.427)	(0.434)	(0.376)	(0.295)	(0.606)
Other											
Major											
Econ/Business	0.041	0.217	-0.030	0.074	-0.060	-0.046	0.126	-0.134	0.006	0.081	-0.214
	(0.095)	(0.113)	(0.127)	(0.130)	(0.116)	(0.135)	(0.140)	(0.142)	(0.123)	(0.097)	(0.200)
Political Science	0.236	-0.327	0.376	0.250	0.958	0.005	-0.241	0.342	-0.364	-0.378	-0.564
	(0.361)	(0.428)	(0.491)	(0.500)	(0.440)	(0.515)	(0.531)	(0.544)	(0.469)	(0.381)	(0.778)
Family income											
Middle income	-0.050	-0.078	0.081	-0.169	0.201	-0.300	0.096	-0.035	0.117	-0.193	-0.084
	(0.209)	(0.246)	(0.278)	(0.284)	(0.252)	(0.293)	(0.304)	(0.309)	(0.267)	(0.210)	(0.436)
High income	-0.042	0.006	0.198	-0.128	0.035	-0.278	-0.081	-0.054	-0.136	-0.319	-0.087
	(0.210)	(0.248)	(0.280)	(0.285)	(0.253)	(0.295)	(0.306)	(0.311)	(0.269)	(0.211)	(0.439)
Employed	-0.007	0.091	-0.085	0.083	-0.177	0.097	0.047	-0.128	0.016	0.111	-0.159
. ,	(0.096)	(0.112)	(0.132)	(0.132)	(0.115)	(0.134)	(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.122)	(0.096)	(0.209)
Religious	0.090	-0.016	0.208	0.204	0.293*	-0.099	-0.008	-0.271	-0.093	-0.178	-0.080
~	(0.096)	(0.113)	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.116)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.142)	(0.123)	(0.097)	(0.203)
Constant	2.681***	2.727***	1.762**	2.480***	2.644***	3.327***	2.487	4.166	1.928	2.105	4.948
	(0.406)	(0.472)	(0.597)	(0.565)	(0.484)	(0.565)	(0.584)	(0.596)	(0.514)	(0.411)	(0.964)
Observations	158	158	155	154	155	156	158	158	158	158	153

Appendix B Factor Analysis Details

B1. Variables Comprising Factors Used in Analysis - Market-Attitudes

Efficiency ($\alpha = 0.86$)

- 1. In my opinion, market systems lead to quality-improvements and technical advances in products and services.
- 2. In my opinion, market systems provide opportunities and incentives for success.
- 3. In my opinion, market systems raise the standard of living for most people.
- 4. In my opinion, market systems provide consumers the goods and services they want.
- 5. In my opinion, market systems encourage innovation and entrepreneurship.
- 6. In my opinion, market systems lead to efficient use of resources.
- 7. In my opinion, market systems provide goods and services at an affordable price.
- 8. In my opinion, acting in response to market forces is an ethical way to conduct business.
- 9. In my opinion, the fairest economic system is a market system in which everyone is allowed to independently pursue their own economic interests.

$Harm (\alpha = 0.85)$

- 1. In my opinion, market systems lead to an unfair distribution of income.
- 2. In my opinion, market systems encourage unethical business behavior.
- 3. In my opinion, market systems encourage greed and excessive materialism.
- 4. In my opinion, market systems encourage abuse of the environment.
- 5. In my opinion, market systems lead to unemployment and worker insecurity.
- 6. In my opinion, market systems lead to inadequate provision of important public goods and services (for example, public schools, roads, public parks, and national defense).

Autonomy ($\alpha = 0.80$)

- 1. In my opinion, it is never acceptable for the government to intervene in markets.
- 2. In my opinion, the market rules and regulations the government sets are necessary to protect citizens and the environment.
- 3. In my opinion, government regulation of business usually does more harm than good.
- 4. In my opinion, markets dominated by only one or a few businesses should be regulated by the government.
- 5. In my opinion, market systems require a lot of government control to be efficient.
- 6. In my opinion, there are some goods and services which should not be exchanged through a free market system.

Fairness ($\alpha = 0.80$)

- 1. In my opinion, market systems reward people fairly for their productivity and hard work.
- 2. In my opinion, market systems allow equal access to work opportunities.
- 3. In my opinion, market systems provide employment opportunities for all who desire to work.

Sanctity ($\alpha = 0.52$)

- 1. In my opinion, any voluntary exchange between two people is morally permissible.
- 2. In my opinion, whatever price a buyer and seller agree to trade at is a fair price.
- 3. In my opinion, legal markets for human organs would be immoral regardless of the lives they save.
- 4. In my opinion, paying people to donate blood is an acceptable way to increase the available blood supply.

B2. Variables Comprising Factors Used in Analysis – Government-Attitudes

Extent ($\alpha = 0.75$)


- 1. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?
- 2. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest.
- 3. The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going deeper into debt.
- 4. The government today can't afford to do much more to help the needy.
- 5. Government should do more to solve problems.
- 6. Government is doing too many things better left to businesses and individuals.

Effectiveness ($\alpha = 0.62$)

- 1. All in all, how good a job does the federal government do running its programs? An excellent job, a good job, only a fair job, or a poor job?
- 2. Some people think of the federal government as a friend or protector. Others see it as a bother, or even an enemy. On a scale of 1 to 10 where a 1 means you think the federal government is your enemy and a 10 means you think the federal government is your friend where on this scale would you place yourself? Keep in mind you can indicate ANY number between 1 and 10. The government is my ...
- 3. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for.
- 4. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is generally run for the benefit of all the people?
- 5. Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient.

B3. Factor Loadings & Scree Plot – Market-Attitudes

Scree Plot - Using Averages for NA Values




Factor Loadings

Loadings:						
	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Factor4	Factor5	
advances_4	0.68					
success_5	0.68					
standard 8	0.53		0.37			
goods_13	0.59					
innovation_15	0.71					
income_1	0	0.56	-0.30			
business_1		0.61	0.50			
greed_6		0.63				
environment_10		0.58				
hardwork_1	0.35	-0.30	0.51			
access_7	0.55	0.50	0.65			
opportunity_14			0.60			
intervene_1			0.00	-0.63		
protect_1				0.56		
regulation_1				-0.63		
monopoly_1				0.51		
gov_shoulddo_13				0.51		
resources_9	0.32		0.35			
	0.32	0.46	0.55			
insecurity_11 control_12		0.46		0.38		
_	0.25		0.20	0.56		
afford_16	0.35	0.42	0.39			
public_17		0.43			0.46	
voluntary_2					0.46	
agree_2	0.20				0.37	
forces_3	0.38					
independent_4	0.39			0.21		
exchange_5				0.31		
marketprice_6					0.30	
organs_7					-0.30	
life_7						
blood_1					0.33	
intimacy_1						
		r				
		Factor2 F				
SS loadings	3.18	2.65	2.18	2.12	0.97	
Proportion Var	0.10	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.03	
Cumulative Var	0.10	0.18	0.25	0.32	0.35	
Test of the hype	othesis	that 5 fa	actors an	re suffic	ient.	

Test of the hypothesis that 5 factors are sufficient. The chi square statistic is 695.19 on 346 degrees of freedom. The p-value is 1.18e-25

B4. Factor Loadings & Scree Plot – Government-Attitudes

Scree Plot – Using Averages for NA Values



Factor Loadings

Loadings:		
	Factor1	Factor2
gov_size	0.58	
gov_pubint_1	0.55	
gov_needy_1	0.60	
gov_canthelp_1	-0.61	
gov_solve_1	0.65	
gov_toomuch_1	-0.63	
gov_job		0.55
gov_friend_1		0.64
gov_better_1		0.66
gov_content		
gov_trust		
gov_bigint		0.34
gov_waste_1		-0.43
		_
		Factor2
SS loadings	2.25	
Proportion Var	0.17	
Cumulative Var	0.17	0.29

Test of the hypothesis that 2 factors are sufficient. The chi square statistic is 199.63 on 53 degrees of freedom. The p-value is 7.25e-19

Note that a three-factor model was suggested by parallel analysis. However, when using averages for missing data, the three-factor model produced one factor consisting entirely of the variable *content*. When ignoring missing data, the three-factor model produced one factor consisting entirely of *trust*. Therefore, we keep two latent factors (*effective* and *extent*) and then include *content* and *trust* separately in our analysis.