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The Spillover of Anti-Immigration Politics to the Schoolyard

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ABSTRACT

The Spillover of Anti-Immigration Politics to the Schoolyard*

There has been a resurgence in right wing and populist politics in recent years. A common element is a focus on immigration, an increase in anti-immigrant rhetoric, and the vilification of minorities. This in turn has the potential to lead to increases in societal hostility towards immigrants. Children are likely to find themselves at the frontline of this phenomenon. This paper uses census data on two cohorts of 5th grade Italian students to estimate the causal effect of anti-immigration politics on school bullying. We use variations in the timing of municipal elections in Italy and focus on the effect of Lega Nord, a far-right party, with a strong anti-immigration platform. We demonstrate that in municipalities where elections occur and Lega Nord is highly active, the victimisation of immigrant school children increases. These effects are large, while they are absent for municipalities in which Lega Nord has little support, where no elections occurred and for native children. These findings are robust to different definitions of bullying outcomes or different definitions of Lega Nord presence. Our results suggest important negative spillovers from the political sphere to the welfare of children that are likely to be consequential.

JEL Classification: J15, J13, D72, I24

Keywords: bullying, immigration, politics, elections, schooling

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1. INTRODUCTION

There has been a resurgence in right-wing and populist politics across the world. Across continental Europe, this includes the rise or resurgence of a range of political parties with disparate and multi-faceted political platforms, but where a common feature is a focus on immigration. While the recent refugee 'crisis' clearly brought this into sharper focus, much of the political traction that these parties have gained also relates to ongoing economic migration and the perception that this generates negative outcomes for the recipient population. This is reflected in the development of a now sizeable literature that seeks to estimate the effect of immigration flows on voting patterns and the political views of the native population (see, for instance, Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Barone *et al.*, 2016; Sekeris and Vasilakis, 2016; Dustmann *et al.*, 2019; Hangartner *et al.*, 2019) and on the effect of political preferences on immigration and immigration policy (Bracco *et al.*, 2018; Gamalerio, 2018).

While it is worth emphasizing that these parties differ markedly in overall platforms, they have converged towards an anti-immigration and anti-immigrant position (for an analysis on the evolution of Lega Nord policy platforms, see Albertazzi *et al.*, 2018). This has often manifested itself in extreme public statements. For instance, in 2003, Umberto Bossi, the *Lega Nord* founder and leader at the time, suggested that Italian authorities open fire on boats carrying migrants (interview with *Corriere della Sera*, 16th June 2003). This type of rhetoric was also a feature of the Brexit referendum of 2015 in the UK and the Trump presidential campaign. In the UK case, a substantial spike in reported hate crime occurred after the referendum (Meleady *et al.*, 2017) and recent research demonstrates the role of social media as a conduit between political rhetoric and hate crime in both the US and Germany (Müller and Schwarz, 2018 and 2019). Recently Romarri (2020) shows that hate crime occurrence is significantly higher in Italian municipalities where an extreme-right mayor is in power. Together this evidence leads to a broader concern that the language and actions of anti-immigration politicians lead to both an increase in hostility towards immigrants and non-natives, but also a more general break down in civic behaviour and the targeting of minority groups. An aspect of this is recent evidence of an increase in racially motivated bullying of children in the UK and US (Schilter, 2018; Huang and Cornell, 2019).

The focus of this paper is on the effect of anti-immigration politics on bullying in schools. School bullying is important for a range of related reasons. The small existing economic and psychological literature on the impact of bullying on child outcomes demonstrates large and long-lasting effects. For instance, Brown and Taylor (2008) use British Cohort Data and show that experiencing bullying at the ages of 7 or 11 has sizeable and long-lasting effects on later educational attainment and lifetime earnings. Erikksen *et al.* (2014) use Danish register data and demonstrate large effects of bullying on

educational attainment, and that these effects increase with the severity of bullying. Similarly, Gorman et al. (2020), using data from three cohorts of adolescents attending high school in UK, demonstrate that bullying victimisation has negative consequences on academic outcomes, mental health, unemployment and income.

School bullying is also highly prevalent. In a study by the World Health Organization 38% of children (11-years-olds) reported having been bullied at least once in the last two months (Craig et al., 2009). In the US between 2005 and 2013 about one third of the students aged between 12 and 18 suffered from some form of bullying at school (School Crime Supplement of the National Crime Victimization Survey). Ammermueller (2012) use data from TIMSS 2003 and show that between 24% and 47% of all students in grade four had been hit or hurt by other students during the last month. In Italy, about 50% of adolescents aged between 11 and 17 reported having been victim of some form of violent or non-violent bullying behaviour in 2014; 20% reported being victim at least once a month, and 10% every week (ISTAT, 2019). Finally, bullying cuts against a key aim of public-school provision: the development of civic attitudes and social integration (Dee, 2004). This latter issue can be viewed as particular critical in the case of immigrant or ethnic minority children.

Despite the prevalence of bullying and its high associated costs, little is known in practice about its determinants. The existing research demonstrates a range of robust associations with respect to immigrants and ethnic minorities. For example, holding socio-economic background constant, immigrant students (or with parents born abroad) are more likely to be victims of bullying than native students. More generally, exposure to various forms of school bullying victimisation is higher for racial and ethnic minority youths. For instance, Black/African-American and Latino-American youth are more likely to be victimized at school than White American youth (Graham et al. 2009; Hanish and Guerra 2000a; Hanish and Guerra 2000b; Peguero, 2012; DeVoe et al. 2005). There are a number of potential reasons why immigrant students are more exposed to school bullying. These students are more likely to attend schools in poorer neighbourhoods with higher underlying levels of disorder and violence (Gottfredson 2001; Kozol 1991, 2005; Welsh et al. 1999). More generally, being an immigrant may also correlate to other unobservable characteristics that may increase the chance of being bullied. Beyond these associations, there is a lack of evidence on the determinants of bullying and victimisation, and a lack of credible causal evidence on the role of wider societal factors. This paper aims to fill this gap.

Specifically, in this paper we examine whether the political climate affects school bullying, focusing on immigrants. A number of potential confounding factors make identification difficult. For example, a more (or less) welcoming political climate towards immigrants may be related to other

factors that may also affect the degree of violence observed in schools. Intolerance towards immigrants could be greater in places with more socioeconomically disadvantaged inhabitants and this disadvantage may also be linked to bullying causing bias in OLS regressions. At the same time, there may be an underlying relationship between the share of immigrants in a given geographical area and the climate toward immigrants. As above, this has been the focus of much attention in the economic literature which broadly demonstrates higher vote shares for conservative parties in areas with greater immigrant inflows (Barone et al., 2016). Again, this makes simple regressions of political climate and bullying likely biased, and it is unclear *a priori* in what direction this bias goes.

Our approach to overcoming these threats is to focus on changes in local political climate that occur due to campaigning periods of local elections and the presence of the anti-immigration party *Lega Nord* in Italy. We exploit two factors. The first relates to the timing of elections. In each municipality, a mayor is elected together with the city Council for a 5-year term (4-year until year 2000). All municipalities initially held elections in 1948 but the electoral schedule of a given municipality changes if at any time there was a resignation or death of the mayor, or through a (successful) no-confidence vote in the council. In these cases, elections are held before the natural schedule (i.e. out of this original 4 or 5 year cycle) and, as a consequence, all subsequent elections in that municipality will be held at different times with respect to other municipalities that remain on the standard cycle.¹ In practice, this leads to a staggered electoral schedule, with a considerable number of municipalities having elections in each year, and where critically this staggering reflects historical events unrelated to the current political climate in the municipality.

The second factor is the timing of our data. As discussed further below, we observe school bullying behaviour that occurs during the main campaigning period of these elections (but before the elections themselves) and are able to compare this with bullying behaviour in the same municipalities in non-electoral times. Hence, we can focus specifically on campaign periods without any additional effects from the election results themselves. In this way, we aim to provide the first causal estimates of the effect of anti-immigration campaigning on violence and bullying aimed at children.

As electoral campaigning with an anti-immigrant focus is specific to those political parties, such as *Lega Nord*, that have taken anti-immigration and anti-immigrant positions, we distinguish between municipalities in which *Lega Nord* has substantial support (and runs for elections) and municipalities where this is not the case. As these two groups of municipalities also differ in terms of a number of

¹ For example, the city of Rome held municipal elections in 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2016. This is because both in 2008 and in 2016 the mayors in office at the time resigned before the end of their term. At the same time the city of Turin elected its mayors in 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 as no resignation happened.

economic and social characteristics that might also affect our outcome of interest, we estimate our model including municipal fixed effects and then consider the change in school bullying experienced by children within the same municipality which has been induced by the quasi-random occurrence of elections.

Our main result is that active campaigning by Lega Nord leads to marked increases in school bullying. These effects are large and concentrated entirely among immigrant children. Lega Nord campaigning leads to an approximate 10% increase in the likelihood of immigrant children being bullied in school during the electoral campaign period. Additionally, we show that being a victim of bullying is associated with markedly lower test score performance. Our results are robust to alternative measures of bullying behaviour and to alternative methods of identifying Lega Nord presence in the municipality. Together, these results suggest that anti-immigration politics has real effects on the wellbeing of individuals, including those potentially most vulnerable.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data; in Section 3 we motivate our research; Section 4 presents the methodology and in Section 5 we report and discuss the results of our estimates, carry out a number of robustness checks and run a heterogeneity analysis. Section 6 concludes.

2. DATA

Our main data source is drawn from the National Program for the Assessment of Education run by INVALSI,² an Italian government agency, which carries out yearly testing of student attainment in literacy and numeracy. The evaluation covers the entire population of students attending 2nd and 5th grade (primary school), as well as 8th and 10th graders (lower and upper secondary schools, respectively). For each grade, approximately 400,000 students sit the assessment every year, over two different days (for the two subjects), during the first week starting in May. In primary school, these are low-stake tests, with no clear link to either student or school outcomes.³

Data provided by INVALSI contains information on test scores that are collected through standardized assessments, and individual/family background characteristics which come from school administrative records. In addition, it includes a range of individual-level information on family, school

² INVALSI is the Italian acronym for Istituto Nazionale per la Valutazione del Sistema dell'Istruzione

³ For instance, school-level results are communicated by INVALSI to each school, but they can decide whether to make these scores public or not.

and context characteristics collected through a Student Questionnaire, administrated on the same day as one of the two tests.

In this paper we focus on primary school children. We further restrict our analysis to students in the 5th grade as the questionnaire providing information on family background and school environment is not given to 2nd graders. Data are from the 2013/14 and 2014/15 waves for which the Student Questionnaire contains a range of questions on bullying and victimisation.⁴ This data covers the universe of public primary schools,⁵ with about 750,000 student-level observations located in 5,589 different municipalities (out of a total of 8,100 across Italy).

The Section on bullying covers four questions: two on verbal bullying, one on bullying with respect to isolating individuals, and one on physical bullying. These questions are asked from the perspective of whether the respondents had been victims of bullying, or whether they had themselves taken part in bullying behaviour. English translations of these questions are presented in Table 1 together with a link to the original version.

INSERT TABLE 1

For each of these questions students had to choose between the following answers: 1 (never), 2 (now and then), 3 (weekly), and 4 (daily). It is the latter two that fit with standard ideas of frequent bullying. At the same time, and as discussed in the following section, the timing of these fit with our campaign period of analysis. This leads us to create a dummy variable for each bullying outcome that takes value 1 if students declare that they have been bullied (Victim of: *Making Fun; Insult; Isolate; Beat*) or have bullied someone (Bullying: *Making Fun; Insult; Isolate; Beat*) either weekly or daily. We also create two dummy variables, *Victimisation* and *Bullying* – our main dependent variables – if a student has been bullied or has bullied others weekly or daily in at least one of the four ways. We adopt this approach as, in practice, the incidence of bullying and victimisation are highly correlated across the different categories. For instance, as shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, the correlation between the two different types of verbal victimisation (making fun and insulting) is equal to 0.608, p-value=0.000, while the correlation between these two variables in terms of bullying behaviour is also high (0.461, p-

⁴ In 2010/11 and 2011/12 waves the Student questionnaire included some questions asking whether (i) the student was beaten; (ii) the student was forced to do something against his/her will; (iii) the student was stolen things, which allow to build a measure of victimisation. However, no information is available on whether students have undertaken a bullying behaviour. In addition, students could only answer yes or no, which is a different scale compared to the one available for the waves used in this study. The more recent waves do not include questions that allow us to measure either bullying or victimisation.

⁵ In Italy about 94% of primary school students attend public schools.

value=0.000). Similar high correlations are found also for the other measures of victimisation and bullying.

For the purposes of robustness, we examine two alternative measures of bullying. First, we create two variables – named “*Bullying (PCA)*” and “*Victimisation (PCA)*” – through a Principal Component Analysis of each of the four bullying (victimisation) questions. As an additional alternative, we construct “count” measure of bullying (victimisation), summing up the values of the four bullying (victimisation) dummies, and obtaining two variables that range between 0 (when the four dummies all take the value of zero) and 4 (when the four dummies all take the value of 1). We call these variables *Bullying (intensity)* and *Victimisation (intensity)*, respectively.

To distinguish between Italian and non-Italian students we use information on student citizenship that comes from the school administrative records. It is important to note that children of immigrant parents may be granted Italian citizenship only if one of their parents becomes an Italian citizen first. A requirement for these (adult) immigrants to apply for citizenship is that they been continuously and legally resident in Italy for at least ten years. In addition, the application process may take up to four years. For these reasons and given that these tests are taken at age 10, we believe that relying on children’s citizenship is an almost-perfect proxy of being an immigrant, even more accurate than another common approach based on the student’s (or students’ parents) place of birth. We are also able to distinguish between first-generation students, that is, students born abroad to foreign-born parents, and second-generation students, that is, children born in Italy to foreign-born parents. 10.7% of students in our data set are immigrants, 7.2% are second generation immigrants while the remaining 3.5% are first generation immigrants.

The dataset also provides information on a number of pupil and parental characteristics (gender, attendance of pre-primary school, parental working status and education). Information on the family background of the student are used by INVALSI to build an indicator of socio-economic status (called ESCS: Economic and Social Cultural Status)⁶ through a principal component analysis, obtaining a variable with zero mean and unitary standard deviation. We also have information on month of birth, and whether each student is either younger (*Early enrolled*) or older (*Late enrolled*) than a regular student. These are important for immigrant children in Italy who often have different school-age enrolment patterns to native Italian students.⁷ We also have information on the number of students enrolled in

⁶ This ESCS indicator is built in accordance to the one proposed in the OECD-PISA framework and considers parents’ occupation, educational attainment and possession of educational resources at home (for instance, the number of books). For a detailed description, see Volume II of the OECD-PISA 2015 Result or the [INVALSI description](#).

⁷ In Italy a student starts primary school in September of the calendar year (Jan-Dec), in which he or she turns six, e.g children born in 2014 start primary school in September 2020. Parents of children who are just too young for the cut-off (i.e. children

each class at the beginning of the school year (*Class Size*) and we also calculate the share of females (*Share Females*) and immigrants in each class (*Share Immigrants*).

Table 2 reports the summary statistics. About 21% of the students report that they were victims of bullying weekly or daily in one way or another (making fun, insult, isolate, beat). On the other hand, 7.7% declare that they have bullied others. About 50% of students in the sample are enrolled in schools located in the Northern part of the country, 50% are females and about 10.7% are immigrants. The average class size is 20 pupils.

INSERT TABLE 2

Using information on the municipality where the school is located, we merge the INVALSI data with data from the Italian Interior Ministry on elections; we then build a dummy variable (*Elections*) taking the value of one for municipality m and year t (2014 or 2015) in which an election takes place, and zero otherwise. The municipal elections in our years of analysis occurred on the 25th May 2014 and the 31st May 2015.

Approximately 23% of the students in our sample are interviewed during electoral campaigns since in the two years about 24% of municipalities elected their mayors (the percentage is 38.6% in 2014 and 8.5% in 2015). As municipal electoral data are not available for “Special Autonomy Regions”,⁸ we discard these students from our analysis; they account for 15% of the population. Some of these regions are also bilingual (French or German), which may make their test scores less comparable.

The INVALSI tests were administered at the height of the electoral campaign, between the 5th and the 8th of May. Municipal elections typically experience a very high turnout as they are perceived as highly salient by voters. Over 71% of eligible voters turned out in 2014 and 64% in 2015. These are a little below the turnout for the most proximate general election (75% in 2013).

Data from the 2011 national census are used to gather information on some municipal characteristics: population size, the number of employed individuals and the educational attainment of the population, municipality area and altitude.

In the municipal electoral system each mayoral candidate is supported by one or more list of candidates for the municipal council. The lists linked to the elected mayor are automatically awarded a

born in January-April 2015 in our example) can freely choose to let their children start primary school a year earlier; this is typically correlated with a higher socio-economic background. It is not uncommon that recently arrived immigrants, who are strongly lagging in language skills or have a weaker academic background, are put in classes with students younger than them: in our data 65% of students attending a lower grade than their age are immigrants.

⁸ Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Sicilia and Sardegna.

clear majority in the council. The balance of power between the mayor and the council is strongly tipped in favour of the mayor: her resignation triggers new elections and she has the power to nominate or dismiss members of the executive committee (*Giunta*), to whom she may delegate specific tasks.

This electoral system allows us to pinpoint which mayoral candidates are supported by (also or exclusively) a Lega Nord list and calculate the share of votes Lega Nord obtained in each municipal election. A complicating factor is that national political parties do not always participate in mayoral elections: especially in smaller municipalities where local politics is dominated by local voters' associations (*Lista Civica*), which cannot be linked directly to major parties.⁹

With this in mind, a challenge is how to identify the municipalities where Lega Nord is active in a way that it potentially affects the social climate. We adopt a number of approaches to do this.

In our preferred definition we calculate the maximum vote share for Lega Nord in municipal elections for the period 1995-2015. We then define a "*Lega*" dummy, which takes value 1 in those municipalities where this vote share is higher than the average (12.5%). This definition is therefore time-invariant and aims at pinpointing those localities (37% of municipalities in our sample) where support for Lega Nord can be considered as entrenched. The main advantage of this approach is that, over longer periods of time (20 years), the probability of observing candidates running under the national-party label of Lega Nord increases, allowing us to overcome problems related to when these candidates run under a "*Lista Civica*".

An alternative approach that we undertake is to calculate Lega Nord strength in the municipality using municipal level results at the 2013 election for the Italian Parliament where local voters' associations ("*Liste Civiche*") do not run. As shown in Table 2, using this definition (*Lega1*) in about 35% of Italian municipalities Lega Nord has obtained a vote share higher than 4.4% which is the average national value.

In order to have measures of Lega Nord support more strictly linked to results obtained in recent elections, we also focus on the maximum vote share for Lega Nord in municipal elections held in the period 2010-2015 and define the dummy variable *Lega2* for those municipalities (18%) where this vote share is higher than the average (7%).

Finally, we develop a measure that considers whether a Lega Nord member was running for the mayor position during the municipal elections occurring in the period covered by our dataset (2014-

⁹ In very small villages, the presence of Lega Nord or any other established political party in municipal elections is, in practice, difficult to ascertain as mayoral candidates run under a generic "*Lista Civica*" party labels (such as Lega Nord, Partito Democratico, etc.). In many cases these mayoral candidates are indeed non-partisan figures, not belonging to any national political party. However, this may also hide situations in which local politicians with locally known partisan allegiance decide – for whatever reason – to run under a non-partisan local label.

2015). This measure, *Lega3*, while is the most affected by problems deriving from the presence of *Liste Civiche*, has the advantage of being related to the elections taking place in the period in which students answered to the survey collecting data on bullying. Using this measure, there were about 27% of municipalities in our sample where a Lega Nord candidate was running for a mayor position.

It is worth noting that in practice all of these measures are strongly correlated to each other (see Table A2 in the Appendix of the paper). We are aware that the measures relying on municipal elections are at risk of miscoding: a “Lista Civica” locally known to be linked to Lega Nord would not be detected and would be coded as zero. As this would bias downward our estimates of the effects of Lega Nord on the outcomes of interest, we believe it does not impinge on the credibility of our results.

More importantly, we also use alternative measures of Lega Nord – for example, the percentage of votes obtained in each municipality by Lega Nord at the Parliamentary elections – that are not affected at all by the problem of Lista Civica, and we obtain very similar results.

As shown in Table 3, in which we report summary statistics for a number of demographic characteristics (from 2011 Census), municipalities in which Lega Nord (*Lega*) has support differ from other municipalities as they are more populated, with a larger fraction of employed individuals, slightly higher average education levels, and with larger flows of immigrants.¹⁰

INSERT TABLE 3

INSERT FIGURES 1-3

To clarify these issues Figures 1 to 3 provide maps of the relevant jurisdictions. In Figure 1 one can see in the darker colour the “special autonomy” regions, which are excluded from our sample, and in the intermediate colour the Northern regions in which Lega Nord was present at the time of our analysis (Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Liguria). We also show (Figure 2) municipalities where Lega Nord has never contested municipal elections (paler colour), where it has contested municipal elections, and where its electoral success is above average (darker colour). Finally, in Figure 3 we show municipalities who elected their mayors in 2014, 2015 or in another year. The maps in Figures 2-3 focus on the Northern ordinary (non-special autonomy) regions. One can see how support for Lega Nord is widespread, especially in the North East, but with substantial territorial variation. Delving more into the data, we categorize as “Lega” municipality approximately 10% of municipalities in Piemonte (most Western large region of Northern Italy), about half of municipalities in Lombardia (at the centre of Northern Italy) and 70% of municipalities in Veneto (most Eastern large region).

¹⁰ Notice also that smaller municipalities are more likely to be dominated by non-partisan mayoral candidates and in these Lega Nord is typically allied with other conservative parties.

3. MOTIVATING EVIDENCE

Before moving to our main estimates, we first seek to motivate our research in two ways. First, we examine the incidence of bullying and its association with immigrant status and one important outcome for which we have data, educational attainment. This is important as this data on bullying has not previously been used and we seek to (a) demonstrate the underlying patterns of bullying incidence in our data and (b) understand whether there are, at least, robust associations between bullying and educational outcomes.

Table 4 reports mean and mean differences in bullying and victimisation between native and immigrant students. We use our variable *Victimisation* (equal to one if a student has been bullied weekly or daily in at least one way). This makes presentation clearer but also fits with the time frame of our identification approach that we outline later. Immigrant students are at a higher risk of being victimised by their peers. 25% of 5th grade immigrant students suffer some victimisation at least every week compared to 20% for native students. At the same time, immigrant students are more likely to report having bullied others compared to native students: about 10% of immigrant students report having conducted some form of bullying behaviour (every week or every day) compared to 7.5% of natives. Behaviourally, the two phenomena may be intertwined in non-obvious ways. Individuals react to psychological or physical violence differently, it may be that in this case violence begets violence which would fit with evidence from other fields demonstrating that victims and bullies may often switch position (see for instance Zych et al., 2018 and Zych et al., 2019).¹¹

INSERT TABLE 4

We expand on this to examine whether bullying is particularly prominent for immigrant children once observable characteristics and sorting across municipalities is taken into account. To do so, we estimate regressions of the following form:

$$Y_{imt} = \alpha + \beta Immigrant_{imt} + \gamma' X_{imt} + \delta Z_{mt} + \mu_m + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{imt} \quad (1)$$

¹¹ In our data 27% of immigrant students who have suffered some kind of bullying on a weekly or daily basis also report that they have carried out such behaviour towards other students in the same time period. This percentage is smaller (about 22%), but still substantial for native students.

where the subscript i indicates student, m indicates municipality and t indicates time. Y is, alternatively, the *Victimisation* or *Bullying* outcome, taking a value of one if it occurred weekly or daily, and zero otherwise. *Immigrant* is the dummy for students with foreign citizenship, X is a battery of individual level controls including gender, socio-economic status, quarter of birth and whether a student is in the regular school year, Z are municipality-level controls such as population, average education, area and altitude (in alternative specifications, we include municipal fixed effects μ) and τ are time dummies.

Table 5 reports linear probability models of each of the eight victimisation and bullying outcomes available in the data. These results demonstrate a number of consistent patterns. Immigrants are more likely to be a victim of all forms of bullying even after controlling for a range of characteristics and municipal fixed effects.¹² For the aid of interpretation, we report the overall sample means for each of the outcomes. This reveals that immigrants are approximately 10% more likely to be a victim of being made fun of, 15% more likely to have been insulted, and 24% more likely to either have been a victim of isolation or physical violence.

These differences, we argue, are large, even if they are clearly smaller than the ones reported in Table 4. This points to the fact that some of the differences in bullying behaviour can be accounted by the characteristics of immigrants and/or their location. In unreported estimates, we found that it is the inclusion of municipal fixed effects that has the most dramatic effect on reducing observed differences in bullying victimisation between immigrants and native students. Together, these results are consistent with existing evidence from other contexts. Immigrants suffer more bullying victimisation, some part of these differences reflects non-random sorting into locations associated with higher levels of bullying victimisation, but sizeable statistically significant differences remain.

Table 5 also reports equivalent conditional differences in the likelihood of immigrant students bullying others. Again, these differences are smaller than unconditional mean differences, but remain statistically significant and are in the range of 10% to 18% higher among immigrant children dependent on the particular form of behaviour.

INSERT TABLES 5

Next, we show in Table 6 conditional associations between bullying and academic achievement that result from estimates of models of the form:

¹² The results are unchanged if instead we use school fixed effects.

$$TestScore_{imt} = \alpha + \beta Immigrant_{imt} + \gamma Victimization_{imt} + \delta Immigrant_{imt} * Victimization_{imt} + \pi' X_{imt} + v_{imt} \quad (2)$$

where the outcome variables are the standardized (0-100) test scores in Italian (columns 1-2) and Maths (columns 3-4). Along with a dummy variable for immigrant students we include an interaction between being bullied and an immigrant. This may pick up either differences in severity of bullying for immigrants, differences in the effect of bullying on immigrant educational performance, or some combination of both. In practice, it is challenging to establish a causal link between being victimised and having lower academic achievement. There are likely important omitted variables that may cause both victimisation and academic achievement or simultaneity bias. For instance, children with difficult home lives may be more easily singled out by bullies and perform poorly on academic tests.

INSERT TABLE 6

We report results with and without controls. Unconditional effects suggest that being the victim of bullying is associated with a 4.1% reduction in Italian test scores and a 3.8% reduction in math scores. There are large differences in average performance between native and immigrant students, 9.1% in Italian and 7.5% in mathematics. There is also some suggestive evidence that victimisation has additional negative effects on immigrant students. Including municipal fixed effects and our usual battery of individual controls, including socio-economic background, markedly reduces the immigrant penalty on test scores but does not substantively influence the relationship between being bullied and test scores, nor the additional negative effect for immigrants.

While we stress again that these are not interpretable causally, these results are informative insofar as our self-reported bullying information is correlated with deleterious educational outcomes. In combination with the results in Table 5, this shows that immigrants are more likely to be victims of bullying and that this, in turn, is likely to have important negative impacts on academic achievement.

4. METHODOLOGY

As discussed earlier, there are a range of confounding factors that make it difficult to assess the effect of a hostile social climate toward immigrants on student bullying. For example, anti-immigrant sentiments are typically correlated with other social aspects that may also affect the degree of violence observed in schools. A source of exogenous variation is required to disentangle the impact of social and political climate on bullying and victimisation.

Our identification strategy exploits the change in social climate and political debate on immigration induced by the occurrence of local elections in municipalities where Lega Nord, a party with a core anti-immigration political platform, had substantial support. Our approach relies on the fact that in Italy municipalities are subject to independent terms of office for their mayors. Even if elections are scheduled far in advance, and are therefore predictable, the occurrence of an electoral campaign can be considered as exogenous to determinants of bullying behaviour, due to the different timing of terms across municipalities. Using municipality fixed effects and elections dummy we can analyse the effect of the electoral campaign on the bullying behaviour of students living in that locality. Moreover, through our Lega Nord dummy we can identify if the electoral campaign affects particularly bullying in localities in which Lega Nord has more traction and popular support.

Therefore, we aim to compare bullying behaviours towards immigrants in municipalities where an election is held *and* Lega is an active political actor with respect to municipalities in which no elections are held or Lega Nord is not active. Practically speaking, our regressor of interest will be the triple interaction between the *Elections* dummy, the *Lega Nord* dummy and the *Immigrant* dummy. We exploit the occurrence of the electoral campaign in Lega-supporting localities as an exogenous variation in the salience of immigration issue and anti-immigrant sentiment.

Our main estimating equation takes the form:

$$Y_{imt} = \alpha Elections_{mt} + \gamma Immigrant_{im} + \delta Lega_m + \phi Lega_m * Elections_{mt} + \theta Lega_m * Immigrant_{im} + \rho Elections_{mt} * Immigrant_{im} + \beta Immigrant_{im} * Lega_m * Elections_{mt} + \pi' X_{imt} + \mu_m + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{imt}$$

where Y is a bullying outcome of student i in municipality m in year t . *Elections* indicates that an election takes place in municipality m at time t , *Immigrant* if student is an immigrant, *Lega* is a dummy for *Lega Nord* municipality, μ are municipality fixed effects, τ is a time dummy, and β is the main parameter of interest. X is a vector of individual controls. We estimate linear probability models of several variants of Equation 3, and as our main explanatory variable is defined at the municipal level we allow for clustering of errors at the municipality level.

5. RESULTS

Table 7 reports our main results. The dependent variable is *Victimisation*, that is, if a student has been bullied in any way weekly or daily. We build up the specification gradually. In column (1) we include as controls only *Female*, *Socio-Economic Status*, quarter of birth dummies and a year dummy. In column (2) we additionally include *Class Size*, *Share Females* and *Share Immigrants*. Column (3) includes municipal characteristics (population size, average education, employment rate, elderly population (%),

area, altitude) while in column (4) we include municipal fixed effects (which remove any time-invariant municipality variation).

Consistent with the earlier estimates, immigrants have in general a higher incidence of victimisation (3 or 4 percentage points more) than native students. Election campaigns where Lega Nord is not active leaves this unchanged. However, in municipalities with a high level of Lega Nord support, electoral campaigns lead to a higher incidence of victimisation (about 2 p.p. more) for immigrant students, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This effect is not apparent for native students: i.e. the coefficient of the interaction between *Lega Nord* and *Elections* is near zero and not statistically significant. This pattern holds throughout all of our specifications.

While not our focus, we also find that females, children born earlier in the year or enrolled at regular time, of richer families, students in smaller classes and in classes with fewer immigrants are less likely to be victims of bullying.

INSERT TABLE 7

Table 8 reports analogous results, where the dependent variable is whether the student has bullied others weekly or daily. The results follow a similar pattern to those for victimisation, but are generally smaller and statistically weaker. Electoral campaigns in areas where *Lega Nord* is very active increases the likelihood of an immigrant child engaging in bullying by around 1%, but this is statistically significant only at the 10% level.

INSERT TABLE 8

We next examine whether these effects are heterogeneous according to students' demographic characteristics and to the socio-economic environment in which they live.

First, we are able to distinguish between first generation immigrants (foreign-born students with foreign citizenship) and second-generation immigrants (students born in Italy to at least one immigrant parent). As shown in a large literature (see, for example, De Paola and Brunello, 2016; Dustmann et al. 2012), second generation students, who face lower language and cultural barriers, tend to display better academic outcomes compared to their first-generation counterparts. For similar reasons, we would expect that, being more integrated, they are less affected by a worsening of the social climate towards immigrants compared to foreign-born students. To investigate this issue, we re-estimate our main models including separate dummy variables for First and Second generation immigrants and interaction

terms between these dummies and the dummy variables Lega Nord and Elections. These results are reported in Table 9. We estimate including alternatively municipal characteristics (odds columns) and municipal fixed effects (even columns).

On average, first generation immigrants are more likely to be victims of bullying than second generation immigrants (4.2 percentage points compared to 2.7 percentage points higher than native students). Moreover, the effect of Lega Nord electoral campaigns on bullying is largely concentrated on this group of recently arrived children. These campaigns lead to increases in the likelihood of victimisation of just over 3 percentage points. This effect is halved for 2nd generation immigration children and is not statistically significant at standard levels. For bullying, there is no such difference and the disaggregated effects are not statistically significant. Results from herein follow this pattern and as result we focus solely on victimisation.¹³

INSERT TABLE 9

Here we explore both variations in municipal settings potentially associated with greater underlying hostility towards immigrants, and immigrant characteristics that may potentially influence likelihood of being bullied. Specifically, we consider the potential for gender, socio-economic background, average education at the municipal level, share of immigrant in the local population, size of the school's municipality. As many of these variables are unequally distributed between Northern and Southern Italy, we focus our attention on the Northern students, with the exception of the case of gender.

Table 10 reports these split sample estimates for gender and socio-economic background (below and above the median). They demonstrate that the effects are concentrated among girls; even if immigrant female students are less involved in bullying and victimisation, they are particularly affected by the worsening of the social climate. In addition, that effects of Lega Nord campaigning on bullying and victimisation concern almost exclusively immigrants from low SES backgrounds. Again, this fits with a view of more vulnerable students being affected most by these campaign events.

INSERT TABLE 10

In Table 11 we turn our attention to a number of municipal features. We find that our results are driven by municipalities characterised by low educational levels – below the median value – (see columns 1-4) and with a share of immigrants in the local population above the median (see columns 5-

¹³ As shown in Table A3, these results hold true also when we restrict our sample to municipalities located in the northern part of Italy.

8). On the other hand, there is little evidence that the share of immigrants in the classroom or the size of the school's municipality is a relevant mediating factor (results available upon request).

INSERT TABLE 11

Together, these results fit with a view that a hostile social and political climate toward immigrants is particularly detrimental for first generation immigrants, for students with lower socio-economic background, in less educated places and more so for girls than for boys. These students may be more likely to be perceived as threats to the national identity of the host country, and more easily victimized.

Robustness Checks

Having established an effect of Lega Nord electoral campaigning on bullying victimisation of immigrants, we now seek to examine the robustness of these estimates to a range of potential issues.

First, we examine whether our results are sensitive to alternative treatments of our dependent variable. First, we use principal components analysis to construct measures of victimisation and bullying, *Victimisation (PCA)* and *Bullying (PCA)*, from the 4 different questions for each (using the 4 dummy variables we have built) and using the first principal component. We then estimate our preferred models using these alternative dependent variables, and these are reported in column (1) and (4) of Table 12. The results for victimisation demonstrate a larger effect (6 percentage point increase) on immigrant victimisation, although this estimate is less precise and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The estimate for bullying is also larger, but not statistically significant (p -values of 0.131).

As another alternative outcome variable, in columns (2) and (5), we consider two categorical variables, taking values from 0 to 4, measuring victimisation intensity (*Victimisation (Intensity)*), and bullying intensity, (*Bullying (Intensity)*). The value 0 occurs for students who have never been bullying/victimized in any way (on weekly or daily basis), while the value 4 is observed for students who have been bullying/victimized weekly or daily in all four ways.¹⁴ These estimates demonstrate again a statistically significant increase in victimisation, and a statistically insignificant increase on bullying behaviour.¹⁵

¹⁴ Alternatively, we have also used as outcome variable a categorical variable (taking values from 0 to 12) obtained by summing values taken by the four different indicators of bullying/victimisation – each taking values from 0 (never) to 3 (every day). Again, we find results qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7. However, it is worthwhile to notice that this outcome variable represents a measure that is not able to distinguish between cases in which only a certain type of bullying/victimisation occurs very frequently and cases in which different types of bullying/victimisation occur occasionally (for instance we will observe a value of 4 for a student who now and then has experiences all the different types of bullying considered in the questionnaire and a student who has been beaten every day).

¹⁵ Since our intensity measures take 5 discrete values, for these measures we use also Ordered Probit models (including provincial fixed effects) and we obtain very similar results (estimates not reported).

Finally, in columns (3) and (6) we focus only on two types of bullying, Isolate and Beat, that may be less subject to individual perceptions of events, and build two dummy variables taking the value of one for students who declare that they have been Isolated or Beaten (or have isolated and beat someone either weekly or daily. We find results that are qualitatively similar to those discussed above.

INSERT TABLE 12

The same results hold true also when we restrict our analysis only to municipalities located in the North of Italy (see Figure 1), where Lega Nord has an established presence in terms of votes at municipal level (see Table A4 in the appendix of the paper).

We next examine alternative approaches to defining a municipality as having an active Lega Nord presence. To this point, our measure of Lega Nord was based on the maximum vote share for Lega Nord in municipal elections in the period 1995-2015. We seek to examine the robustness of our results to three alternative measures of Lega Nord which we denote *Lega1* through to *Lega3*. First, we examine results at the 2013 election for the Italian Parliament (at the municipal level), and classify as Lega municipalities those with a percentage of Lega votes above the national average (*Lega1*). Second, we use the maximum vote share for Lega Nord in the municipal elections taking place in the period 2010-2015 (*Lega2*), the ones in which the incumbent mayor at the time of the exams we focus on was elected. Finally, we focus on whether a Lega Nord member was running for the mayor position for the municipal elections in the period that we examine (2014-2015) (we exclude candidates that obtained less than 5% of votes) (*Lega3*). Results using these alternative definitions are reported in Table 13. For victimisation, these results are essentially unaffected by these alternative measures of Lega Nord electoral involvement. Again bullying is more sensitive.

INSERT TABLE 13

Finally, as an additional robustness check, in Table 14 we carry out a falsification test where we randomly generate a dummy variable for election occurrence at municipal/year level (with mean 0.24, as per our real sample) and interact it with all the relevant variables. As shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 14, there is no evidence of a relationship between victimisation/bullying and the interaction term of our interest. Along similar lines in columns (3) and (4) we report results obtained from randomly defining the dummy variable Lega Nord (with mean of 0.36 as in our sample) and consider the interaction terms obtained by using this fake variable. Again, we find no effect neither on victimisation nor on bullying.

INSERT TABLE 14

6. CONCLUSIONS

The increase in divisive, anti-immigration, rhetoric has the potential to have a range of negative social consequences. This paper focused on one particular important social outcome, the bullying victimisation of children from immigrant backgrounds in schools.

We do so in the context of Italy and analysing the influence of Lega Nord, a party that has become increasingly anti-immigrant and inflammatory in their campaigning and policies. To identify our effect of interest, we have exploited the occurrence of municipal elections that have the characteristics of heating up the political and social climate towards immigrants where Lega Nord is entrenched. Crucially, municipal elections are arguably exogenous to other determinants of bullying behaviour.

Our main result is that during electoral campaigns in places where Lega Nord is active there are large increases in bullying victimisation within schools that is concentrated solely on children from immigrant backgrounds. These effects are absent for municipalities in which Lega Nord has little support, where no elections occurred and for native children.

Further analysis shows that it is first generation immigrant children (born overseas) that experience the largest increases in victimisation by some margin. These increases are apparent across both verbal and physical forms of bullying. We show that our findings are robust to different definitions of bullying outcomes or different definitions of Lega Nord presence.

More generally, these results suggest that anti-immigration campaigning serves to undercut one of the main aims of public school provision, promotion of social integration across different groups.

These increases in victimisation are likely to have a range of social and economic consequences. Previous research suggests marked and long-lasting negative effects of bullying victimisation. We provide some suggestive evidence that our measures of bullying victimisation are associated with lower educational achievements. Hence, our main take away point is that anti-immigration politics is likely to harm immigrant children in ways that hinder their assimilation into the host country, and potentially generate long term economic disadvantages.

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Figure 1. Italian regions. Special autonomy (darkest), Lega Nord core constituency (intermediate), others (palest)



Figure 2. Municipalities in Northern Italy (non-special-autonomy regions). Lega Nord never contested municipal elections (paler), contested elections (darker) and had above-average support in municipal election (darkest)




Figure 3. Municipalities in Northern Italy (non-special autonomy regions). No municipal elections in sample period (paler), municipal elections in 2014 (darker) and municipal elections in 2015 (darkest)




Table 1. Questions on Bullying and Victimisation in the INVALSI Student Questionnaire

This school year how often have you:

Victimisation	<i>Bullying</i>
Bullied/hassled by other students at school making fun of you?	Bullied/hassled other students at school by making fun of them?
Bullied/hassled by other students at school by insulting you?	Bullied/hassled other students at school by insulting them?
Bullied/hassled by other students at school by isolating you?	Bullied/hassled other students at school by isolating them?
Bullied/hassled by other students at school by beating you?	Bullied/hassled other students at school by beating them?

Notes: See INVALSI “Questionario Studenti”

https://invalsireaprove.cineca.it/docs/attach/05_Questionario_STAMPA.pdf

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs
Victimisation, dummy	0.211	0.408	741,175
Victim of making fun, dummy	0.158	0.365	741,175
Victim of insult, dummy	0.112	0.315	741,175
Victim of isolate, dummy	0.085	0.279	741,175
Victim of beat, dummy	0.035	0.183	774,495
Victimisation (intensity)(D:1-4)	0.390	0.862	774,495
Victimisation (PCA)	-0.001	1.474	741,175
Bullying, dummy	0.077	0.266	734,372
Bully making_fun, dummy	0.034	0.181	739,636
Bully insult, dummy	0.030	0.171	739,631
Bully isolate, dummy	0.035	0.184	739,233
Bully beat, dummy	0.026	0.161	738,744
Bullying (intensity) (D: 1-4)	0.124	0.495	734,372
Bullying (PCA)	-0.008	1.416	734,372
Maths Score	63.803	19.176	739,895
Italian Score	63.562	17.568	708,443
Elections	0.243	0.429	741,175
Lega	0.368	0.482	741,175
Legal	0.353	0.478	741,175
Lega2	0.182	0.385	741,175
Lega3	0.284	0.451	741,175
Immigrant	0.107	0.309	741,175
Immigrant I g.	0.034	0.182	741,175
Immigrant II g.	0.072	0.259	741,175
Year:2015	0.477	0.499	741,175
North	0.503	0.500	741,175
Female	0.496	0.500	741,175
Socio-economic status	0.078	0.966	741,175
Born II Quarter	0.246	0.431	741,175
Born III Quarter	0.270	0.444	741,175
Born IV Quarter	0.250	0.433	741,175
Early Enrol.	0.012	0.107	741,175
Post Enrol.	0.025	0.155	741,175
Class Size	20.755	3.867	741,175
Share Females	0.494	0.085	741,175
Share Immigrants	0.108	0.131	741,175

Notes: Data at student-level. Source: Invalsi, waves: 2013-2014 and 2014-2015. Data on Elections: Interior Ministry

Table 3. Summary Statistics of Municipalities where Lega Nord has High/Low Electoral Support

Variable	Lega Nord Municipalities			Non Lega Nord Municipalities		
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Population	12223	45790	1440	9060	50750	3,438
Employment	0.455	0.191	1,440	0.390	0.144	3,438
Education	8.974	0.516	1,440	8.730	0.623	3,438
Perc. Imm.	0.095	0.041	1,386	0.063	0.043	3,403
Elderly	0.198	0.038	1,440	0.217	0.045	3,438
Altitude	188	186	1,442	312	243	3,442
Area, sq. km	27.6	38.9	1,442	42.5	56.4	3,442

Table 4. Bullying and Victimisation on native and immigrant students

	Natives	Immigrants	First Generation Immigrants	Second Generation Immigrants
Victimisation	20,59%	25,47%	27.01%	24.74%
Bullying	7.52%	10.07%	11.64%	9.32%

Table 5. Immigrants and Incidence of Victimisation and Bullying

	(1) Victim of making fun	(2) Victim of insult	(3) Victim of isolate	(4) Victim of beat	(5) Bully making fun	(6) Bully insult	(7) Bully isolate	(8) Bully beat
Immigrant	0.016*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.001)
Obs.	748374	747282	748398	749543	749932	749616	749027	748379
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.015	0.007	0.015	0.016	0.017	0.014	0.017
Mean	0.159	0.113	0.086	0.027	0.034	0.031	0.036	0.027

Notes: OLS estimates with individual characteristics and municipal fixed effects. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table 6. Test Scores, Immigrants and Victimisation

	(1) Italian Score	(2) Italian Score	(3) Maths Score	(4) Maths Score
Immigrant	-9.150*** (0.076)	-5.246*** (0.081)	-7.563*** (0.081)	-3.456*** (0.086)
Victimisation	-4.120*** (0.052)	-3.243*** (0.050)	-3.781*** (0.056)	-3.358*** (0.054)
Immigrant* Victimisation	-0.985*** (0.152)	-1.049*** (0.145)	-0.756*** (0.162)	-0.887*** (0.154)
Observations	738066	717968	770987	750116
Adjusted R^2	0.037	0.156	0.023	0.143

Notes: OLS estimates. Odd cols: just what is shown. Even cols: individual controls and municipal FE. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table 7. The Impact of Lega Nord Campaigning on Victimization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Immigrant*Lega*Elections	0.019** (0.009)	0.025** (0.011)	0.024** (0.011)	0.021** (0.010)
Elections	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Lega	0.005* (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	
Immigrant	0.040*** (0.003)	0.034*** (0.004)	0.032*** (0.004)	0.032*** (0.004)
Immigrant*Elections	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.008)
Elections*Lega	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)
Immigrant*Lega	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.009* (0.005)
Female	-0.071*** (0.001)	-0.071*** (0.001)	-0.070*** (0.001)	-0.071*** (0.001)
Socio-economic status	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.001)
Class Size		-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Share Females		-0.007 (0.007)	-0.055*** (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)
Share Immigrants		0.039*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.033*** (0.008)
Municipal Characteristics	NO	NO	YES	NO
Year dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Quarter of birth dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Fixed Effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	741175	741175	740219	741175
Mean of Victimization	0.211	0.211	0.211	0.211

Notes: OLS Estimates. The dependent variable is *Victimization*. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table 8. The impact of Lega Nord Campaigning on Bullying Behaviour

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Immigrant*Lega*Elections	0.008 (0.005)	0.011* (0.006)	0.012* (0.006)	0.013* (0.007)
Elections	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Lega	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.001)	
Immigrant	0.010*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)	0.007** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
Immigrant*Elections	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)
Elections*Lega	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Immigrant*Lega	0.005* (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Female	-0.071*** (0.001)	-0.071*** (0.001)	-0.070*** (0.001)	-0.071*** (0.001)
Socio-economic status	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.001)
Class Size		-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Share Females		0.024*** (0.005)	-0.021*** (0.005)	0.020*** (0.005)
Share Immigrants		0.023*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.043*** (0.006)
Municipal Characteristics	NO	NO	YES	NO
Year dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Quarter of birth dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Fixed Effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Observations	743254	743254	743202	743254
Mean of Bullying	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077

Notes: OLS Estimates. The dependent variable is *Bullying*. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table 9. The impact of Social Climate on Victimization and Bullying of First and Second Generation Immigrants

	(1) Victimisation	(2) Victimisation	(3) Bullying	(4) Bullying
Imm.I*Lega*Elections	0.031** (0.014)	0.030** (0.014)	0.007 (0.009)	0.009 (0.009)
Imm.II*Lega*Elections	0.021 (0.014)	0.017 (0.013)	0.013* (0.008)	0.014 (0.009)
Immigrant I g.	0.042*** (0.005)	0.042*** (0.005)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)
Immigrant II g.	0.027*** (0.004)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)
Immigrant_I*Lega	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
Immigrant_II*Lega	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.006 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)
Individual Characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Characteristics	YES	NO	YES	NO
Year dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Fixed Effects	NO	YES	NO	YES
Observations	740219	741175	742302	743254
Adjusted R^2	0.012	0.018	0.024	0.031

Notes: OLS estimates. We estimate specifications (3) and (4) of Table 7. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table 10. Heterogeneous effects on Victimization: Gender and Socio Economic Background

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Victimisation		Bullying		Victimisation		Bullying	
	Whole Sample				North Only			
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls	Low ESE	High SES	Low ESE	High SES
Immigr.*Lega*Elections	0.0127 (0.0143)	0.0288** (0.0113)	0.0089 (0.0102)	0.0142** (0.0062)	0.0209* (0.0126)	0.0040 (0.0191)	0.0038 (0.0085)	0.0141 (0.0113)
Individual Characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Characteristics	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Year dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	373456	367719	374306	368948	169683	202951	170206	203393
Adjusted R ²	0.012	0.011	0.018	0.009	0.020	0.015	0.029	0.021

Notes: OLS Estimates. We estimate specification (4) of Table 7. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table 11. Heterogeneous effects on Victimization: Municipal Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Victimisation		Bullying		Victimisation		Bullying	
	North Only				North Only			
	Low Education	High Education	Low Education	High Education	Low share immigrants	High share immigrants	Low share immigrants	High share immigrants
Immigr.*Lega*Elections	0.0282** (0.0131)	-0.0016 (0.0201)	0.0060 (0.0108)	0.0164 (0.0069)	0.0152* (0.0161)	0.0242 (0.0150)	-0.0015 (0.0100)	0.0177* (0.0091)
Individual Characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Characteristics	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Year dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	186,588	186,046	374306	368948	182782	189852	183288	190311
Adjusted R ²	0.0206	0.0156	0.018	0.009	0.017	0.019	0.025	0.026

Notes: OLS Estimates. We estimate specification (4) of Table 7. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table 12. The impact of Lega Nord Campaigning on alternative measures of Victimization and Bullying

	(1) Victimization (PCA)	(2) Victimization (int.)	(3) Victimization (Only Isolate/Beat)	(4) Bullying (PCA)	(5) Bullying (int)	(6) Bullying (Only Isolate/Beat)
Immigrant*Lega*Elections	0.060* (0.037)	0.035* (0.021)	0.011 (0.007)	0.059 (0.039)	0.020 (0.014)	0.013* (0.006)
Individual Characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	741175	741175	750926	743254	743254	751269
Adjusted R2	0.020	0.020	0.012	0.030	0.030	0.022

Notes: OLS Estimates. We estimate specification (4) of Table 7. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table 13. The impact of Lega Nord Campaigning on Victimisation and Bullying with alternative measures of Lega Nord.

	% Lega 2013 Parliament Elections		% Lega Recent Mun. Elections		Lega contesting Mun Elections in 2014 or 2015	
	(1) Victimisation	(2) Bullying	(3) Victimisation	(4) Bullying	(5) Victimisation	(6) Bullying
Immigrant*Lega*Elections	0.019*	0.011	0.023**	0.014*	0.024**	0.015**
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Individual Characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year Dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	741175	743254	741175	743254	741175	743254
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.031	0.018	0.031	0.018	0.031

Notes: OLS Estimates. We estimate specification (4) of Table 7. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table 14. The impact of Lega Nord Campaigning on Victimization and Bullying. Placebo

	Fake Elections		Fake Lega	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Victimization	Bullying	Victimization	Bullying
Immigrant*Lega*PlaceboElections	-0.001 (0.009)	0.005 (0.006)		
Immigrant*PlaceboLega*Elections			-0.038 (0.032)	0.002 (0.021)
Individual Characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year Dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES
Quarter of birth dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	741175	743254	741175	743254
Adjusted R-squared	0.018	0.031	0.018	0.031

Notes: OLS Estimates. We estimate specification (4) of Table 7. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

APPENDIX

Table A1. Correlation matrix for different measures of Victimisation and Bullying

	VIC: making fun	VIC: insult	VIC: isolate	VIC: beat	BUL: making fun	BUL: insult	BUL: isolate	BUL: beat
VIC: making fun	1.000							
VIC: insult	0.608	1.000						
VIC: isolate	0.411	0.424	1.000					
VIC: beat	0.264	0.323	0.273	1.000				
BUL: making fun	0.148	0.157	0.125	0.167	1.000			
BUL: insult	0.152	0.201	0.159	0.228	0.461	1.000		
BUL: isolate	0.157	0.171	0.172	0.211	0.322	0.341	1.000	
BUL: beat	0.150	0.193	0.170	0.294	0.282	0.379	0.300	1.000

Notes: All the reported correlation rates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table A2. Correlation matrix different measures of Lega Nord

	Lega	Lega1	Lega2	Lega3
Lega	1.0000			
Lega1	0.614	1.0000		
Lega2	0.539	0.495	1.0000	
Lega3	0.587	0.406	0.748	1.0000

Notes: All the reported correlation rates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table A3. The impact of Social Climate on Victimisation and Bullying of First and Second Generation Immigrants. North of Italy only

	(1) Victimisation	(2) Victimisation (PCA)	(3) Victimisation (Int)	(4) Bullying	(5) Bullying (PCA)	(6) Bullying (Int)
Immigrant_I_Lega_Elections	0.0318* (0.0169)	0.0882 (0.0578)	0.0639* (0.0381)	0.0063 (0.0114)	0.0133 (0.0628)	-0.0331 (0.0469)
Immigrant_I_Lega_Elections	0.0166 (0.0117)	0.0578 (0.0429)	0.0252 (0.0272)	0.0033 (0.0073)	0.0180 (0.0427)	-0.0289 (0.0431)
Individual Characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Characteristics	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Year dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	372634	372634	372634	373599	373599	373599
Adjusted R ²	0.018	0.021		0.025	0.024	

Notes: OLS Estimates in col. 1-2-4-5. Ordered Probit estimates in col. 3 and 6. We estimate specification (4) of Table 7. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table A4. The impact of Lega Nord Campaigning on alternative measures of Victimization and Bullying North of Italy

	(1) Victimization (PCA)	(2) Victimization (int.)	(3) Victimization (Only Isolate/Beat)	(3) Bullying (PCA)	(4) Bullying (int)	(3) Bullying (Only Isolate/Beat)
Immigrant*Lega*Elections	0.056 (0.038)	0.032 (0.022)	0.006 (0.008)	0.115*** (0.042)	0.040*** (0.015)	0.013** (0.006)
Individual Characteristics	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year dummy	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipal Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	372634	372634	377375	373599	373599	377474
Adjusted R2	0.021	0.020	0.011	0.024	0.024	0.018

Notes: OLS Estimates. We estimate specification (4) of Table 7. Standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and allowed for clustering at the municipal level) are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.