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The Seeds of Ideology: Historical Immigration and Political Preferences in the United States

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the United States**

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ABSTRACT

The Seeds of Ideology: Historical Immigration and Political Preferences in the United States*

We test the relationship between historical immigration to the United States and political ideology today. We hypothesize that European immigrants brought with them their preferences for the welfare state, and that this had a long-lasting effect on the political ideology of US born individuals. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we document that the historical presence of European immigrants is associated with a more liberal political ideology and with stronger preferences for redistribution among US born individuals today. Next, we show that this correlation is not driven by the characteristics of the counties where immigrants settled or other specific, socioeconomic immigrants' traits. Finally, we conjecture and provide evidence that immigrants brought with them their preferences for the welfare state from their countries of origin. Consistent with the hypothesis that immigration left its footprint on American ideology via cultural transmission from immigrants to natives, we show that our results are stronger when inter-group contact between natives and immigrants, measured with either intermarriage or residential integration, was higher. Our findings also indicate that immigrants influenced American political ideology during one of the largest episodes of redistribution in US history — the New Deal — and that such effects persisted after the initial shock.

JEL Classification: D64, D72, H2, J15, N32, Z1

Keywords: immigration, culture, political ideology, preferences for redistribution

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1 Introduction

The US is a nation of immigrants: since 1850, America has received more than 80 million foreign born individuals, and, as of 2018, 13.7 percent of its population was born abroad.¹ The recent rise in international migration has renewed interest in the longstanding debate on immigrants’ ability and willingness to assimilate economically and culturally. In fact, both today and in the past, advocates of immigration restrictions have argued that immigrants’ lack of assimilation is a threat to social cohesion and to American values.² However, defining national identity and ideology in a country where immigration played such a fundamental role is complicated by the fact that today’s culture is likely to be shaped precisely by past migration flows. Where does American ideology come from? How did historical immigration influence American political values in the long run?

In this paper, we address these questions, and study the long run effects of the 1910-1930 migration of millions of Europeans on political ideology of American born individuals today. Our empirical strategy exploits cross-county variation in exposure to historical (1910-1930) immigration, and correlates it with preferences for redistribution and political behavior of a large set of respondents in the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) today. To identify the causal effect of immigration, we follow the immigration literature and construct a version of the shift-share instrument (Card, 2001). This instrument rests on the empirical regularity that immigrants cluster geographically in receiving countries, and newcomers tend to settle where their ethnic community is larger, due to family ties and social networks.

Formally, the instrument interacts the share of individuals from each sending country living in a given US county in 1900 with the number of new immigrants moving to the US during a decade. Summing over all European groups in the county and averaging across the three decades (1910, 1920, and 1930), we recover the average predicted number of immigrants living in a county, which we then scale by baseline population to construct the average (predicted) immigrant share between 1910 and 1930. To limit concerns of endogeneity, we follow the suggestion in Adao et al. (2019) and, similar to Tabellini (2020), construct a “leave-out” version of the shift-share instrument, by apportioning national flows from each sending region to a county net of the individuals who eventually settled in that same county.

¹See statistics provided from the Migration Policy Institute at <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/us-immigration-trends>.

²Abramitzky and Boustan (2017) provide a comprehensive description of immigration in American history, including the recurrent concerns about immigrants’ assimilation. Higham (1955) is a classic reference for American nativism in the past, while Vigdor (2010) focuses on the more recent period. See also Abramitzky et al. (2019a) for a comparison of immigrants’ assimilation during the historical and the more recent immigration waves.

The Age of Mass Migration is not only the largest episode of immigration in American history (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017), but also offers an important advantage for the purposes of identification. Between 1910 and 1930, immigration flows from different European countries were differentially impacted by nation-wide shocks that were arguably exogenous to cultural, political, or economic conditions prevailing in individual US counties at the time. First, between 1915 and 1918, World War I (WWI) generated a significant break in European immigration, which was stronger for immigrants coming from countries that were directly involved in the War and were not part of the Allies (Greenwood and Ward, 2015; Tabellini, 2020). Second, and perhaps more importantly, in 1921 and 1924, US Congress passed the Immigration Act that drastically reduced immigration, especially for Southern and Eastern European countries, which had sent more migrants in the previous two decades (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017; Abramitzky et al., 2019d). These shocks induced a sharp change in the persistence of immigrant inflows from specific countries to specific US counties. As a result, they significantly reduce the concern raised by Jaeger et al. (2018) who note that, for the more recent period, the same local areas receive large flows of immigrants (often from the same sending region) for multiple decades. The exogenous nature of national shocks that differentially affected migration flows of different sending countries, coupled with immigrants’ tendency to cluster geographically along ethnic lines, also reduces concerns about the validity of shift-share designs, as discussed formally in Borusyak et al. (2018).

Even if the flows used to predict local immigrant arrivals were exogenous, one may still be concerned that the initial settlements of different European groups were correlated with factors that in turn influenced American ideology and preferences for redistribution in the long run. Note that, for this concern to have bite, it must be that immigration from specific countries was booming (at the national level) precisely when the specific characteristics that had attracted early settlers from those countries to a county became important for the evolution of long run culture. To overcome this concern, we perform a number of robustness checks.

First, we verify that our analysis is robust to including a host of baseline county characteristics, such as the urban and manufacturing share of the population, the fraction of blacks, the male labor force participation, and occupational income scores. Second, to deal with the possibility that our instrument were correlated with other factors that jointly determined long run ideology, we control for railroads connectivity and for a measure of (predicted) industrialization – two variables that were highly correlated with historical migration patterns (Sequeira et al., 2020). Geographical coordinates are also included in our analysis to proxy more broadly for any type of geographical location advantage. Third, we replicate our results by separately controlling for the 1900 shares of immigrants from each European country (i.e., the “Bartik shares” in Borusyak et al.,

2018, and Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018). This exercise tests whether the variation behind the instrument is disproportionately influenced by specific destination-origin combinations, which may also be spuriously correlated with the long run evolution of cultural values and political ideology across US counties (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018).

Using this instrument, we find that respondents who, today, live in counties with higher historical immigration are significantly more likely to oppose spending cuts, to prefer higher taxes to finance the fiscal deficit, and to support both welfare spending and a higher minimum wage. These effects are quantitatively large: according to our estimates, relative to respondents living in a county at the 25th percentile of the historical immigrant share, individuals in a county at the 75th percentile are 5.2% more likely to support welfare spending and 4.6% more likely to oppose spending cuts. Consistent with these patterns, immigration also has a strong, long run impact on liberal ideology and support for the Democratic Party. For instance, a 5 percentage point – or, 40% of the inter-quartile range – increase in the average immigrant share is associated with a 6.2% higher likelihood that a respondent in the CCES sample identifies with the Democratic Party.

In the second part of the paper, we seek to isolate the mechanisms through which historical immigration influenced natives’ preferences for redistribution and their political ideology. The first, perhaps most obvious explanation is that immigrants reduced natives’ employment and lowered wages, in turn increasing demand for government spending. However, contrary to this explanation, Sequeira et al. (2020) document that European immigration had a positive and quantitatively large impact on economic development and income per capita across US counties in the long run. Moreover, such positive effects appeared already in the short run, and were unlikely to be accompanied by increased inequality (Tabellini, 2020). Thus, if anything, the direct economic effects of immigration should lead to lower – rather than higher – preferences for redistribution (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981).

Next, we consider the possibility that the socioeconomic characteristics brought about by immigration caused the long run shift towards a left-leaning ideology among natives. In contrast with this idea, we show that results are unchanged when controlling for the (instrumented) 1910-1930 occupational income scores, manufacturing share, English proficiency, and literacy of immigrants.³ Also, and more importantly, none of these economic characteristics is correlated with respondents’ attitudes today.

A third possibility is that immigrants’ selection is responsible for the positive effect

³Before 1940, the US Census did not collect data on income or wages. Hence, following the literature (Abramitzky et al., 2014), we rely on the occupational income scores, which are constructed by assigning to an individual the median income of his job category in 1950, and are typically considered a proxy for lifetime earnings.

of immigration on desire for redistribution. However, this explanation seems unlikely given that existing evidence shows that, at least during the Age of Mass Migration, migrants tended to be more individualistic (Knudsen, 2019). Furthermore, those who chose to stay were typically positively selected (Abramitzky et al., 2019b), and thus more likely to believe in “effort” rather than “luck” (Piketty, 1995). As for the direct economic effects of immigration, these observations suggest that immigrants’ selection should have a negative, and not a positive, effect on left-leaning ideology of natives. Finally, using data from Abramitzky et al. (2019c), we document that the degree of intergenerational mobility of European immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration has no effect on either preferences for redistribution or ideology of natives today.

Having ruled out a number of economic mechanisms, we turn to our most preferred interpretation. We argue that immigration left its footprint on American ideology via cultural transmission from immigrants to natives. We corroborate this hypothesis by showing that immigrants brought with them their preferences for redistribution – proxied by the years of exposure to the generosity of the welfare state in their country of origin. To measure exposure to the welfare state, we use the year of introduction of education reforms in each European country in our sample prior to 1910 (when we start measuring immigration in US counties). We focus on education reforms because these represent the first systematic instance of public policies; other types of welfare reforms (such as health and pensions) were instead introduced much later in time, often after the immigrants’ period of arrival in the US that we consider in our paper. We then construct an index of exposure to the welfare state at the county level by: *i*) multiplying the country specific value of the index with the average share of immigrants from that country in a given US county between 1910 and 1930; and *ii*) summing over all immigrant groups in a county.

Defining the index so that higher values refer to stronger preferences for redistribution, we find that, even after controlling for the direct effect of immigration, higher exposure to social welfare reforms is strongly predictive of preferences for redistribution and liberal ideology today. Next, splitting the sample in counties with historical exposure to welfare reforms above and below the median, we show that the effects of immigration are significantly stronger in counties with higher values of the index.

These findings are consistent with the idea that immigrants brought their values with them and, in the long run, influenced natives’ preferences and ideology. While anecdotal and historical accounts suggest that immigrants influenced American culture in the domains of music, cinema, and cuisine (Hirschman, 2013), to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically document a similar impact on economic preferences and on political ideology. We provide suggestive evidence on the mechanisms of cultural transmission by exploring the heterogeneity of our results according to two measures

of inter-group contact: intermarriage and residential integration. Both measures can promote the diffusion of immigrants' ideology through vertical and horizontal cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). Intermarriage facilitates horizontal transmission between spouses, and subsequently vertical transmission from parents to children. Residential integration can foster horizontal socialization by increasing the frequency of inter-group contact with neighbors and friends. Consistent with our hypothesis, the effect of European immigration on American political ideology is larger in counties with higher historical immigrants' integration.

In all our specifications, we correlate the historical presence of immigrants with ideology today. In the last section of the paper, we follow the evolution of American ideology over time. Our results indicate that the presence of immigrants had a very strong effect on one of the largest instances of redistribution in US history – the New Deal – and that such effect persisted after this initial shock. Andersen (1979) notes that immigrants were fundamental in explaining the New Deal electoral alignment. She proposes a “mobilization” theory according to which support for Roosevelt had its roots in the 1928 elections, when Alfred Smith – the first Roman Catholic to run for presidency in American history, who also had an immigrant background – was able to attract a large segment of the immigrant urban electorate to the Democratic Party.

The realignment continued in subsequent years, partly helped by the fact that immigrants were among the groups hit hardest by the Great Depression (Andersen, 1979; Clubb and Allen, 1969; Degler, 1964; Lubell, 1952). We test this hypothesis by looking at the correlation between the historical presence of immigrants and the the Democratic vote share. While the presence of immigrants did not matter for political behavior prior to 1928, it had a large and significant effect, which persisted over time, starting with the 1928 elections, consistent with the “mobilization” hypothesis.

We examine the role of higher preferences for redistribution (brought about by European immigrants) further, by testing if counties with more European immigrants were more likely to receive more generous welfare spending during the New Deal. Consistent with our previous results, we find that, holding constant the severity of the Great Depression, counties with a higher fraction of immigrants received significantly larger relief expenditures during the New Deal. While one may be surprised that culture travels so quickly from immigrants to natives, two observations can help explain these findings. First, at the time of the New Deal, (naturalized) immigrants and their kids, who likely inherited values from their parents, represented a non-trivial share of the electorate (Keyssar, 2009). Second, the Great Depression was such a dramatic episode that might have induced a drastic change in culture, and this is precisely when one might expect the new values brought about by immigration to matter (Becker and Woessmann, 2008; Cantoni, 2012; Giuliano and Nunn, 2017).

Our paper speaks to different strands of the literature. First, a large set of papers have documented that ethnic diversity is negatively correlated with liberal ideology and, in particular, with preferences for redistribution (Alesina et al., 1999, 2018a,b; Dahlberg et al., 2012; Luttmer, 2001). We contribute to this literature by showing that the short and the long run effects of diversity might be different, if immigrants’ values can be transmitted to natives. From this perspective, our findings provide support for the “contact hypothesis” (Allport, 1954), according to which repeated interactions between different groups can, under certain circumstances, favor inter-group relations and the transmission of values from one group to the other.⁴ We speculate that, even if ethnic diversity brought about by European immigrants initially triggered natives’ backlash (Tabellini, 2020), it might have eventually led to stronger cohesion partly because it was “not too high”, and it was possible for European immigrants and natives to feel part of the same, racial group.⁵

Second, we complement the literature on immigrant assimilation. On the one hand, many papers have studied the pace at which immigrants assimilate economically and culturally (Abramitzky et al., 2012, 2019a,c; Borjas, 1985). On the other, several works have documented that immigrants’ culture persists across generations (Alesina et al., 2013; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Grosjean, 2014), and analyzed the effectiveness of different assimilation policies (Abdelgadir and Fouka, 2019; Fouka, 2019, 2020; Lleras-Muney and Shertzer, 2015). We take a different perspective, and show that immigrants’ culture can be transmitted to natives. While immigrants’ contribution to American economic development, trade, entrepreneurship, and innovation has been largely documented (Sequeira et al., 2020; Fulford et al., 2020; Burchardi et al., 2019; Kerr and Mandorff, 2015; Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; Moser et al., 2014), to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first systematic analysis on the long run effects of immigration on ideology and socio-economic preferences of Americans.

Third, our paper speaks to the vast literature on the determinants of preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). We highlight a novel channel – namely, the transmission of values from immigrants to natives – that can shape individuals’ views of the welfare state. Finally, we contribute to the growing literature on the Age of Mass Migration. Many papers have studied the short run effects of this migration episode on both economic and political outcomes (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017; Abramitzky et al., 2019d; Goldin, 1994; Tabellini, 2020). Recent work by Sequeira et al. (2020) investigates the long run economic effects

⁴See also Bazzi et al. (2019), Calderon et al. (2019), Lowe (2020), and Steinmayr (2018) among others for the positive effects of immigration and inter-group contact on inter-group relations.

⁵Findings in Fouka et al. (2018) suggest that the 1915-1930 Great Migration of African Americans from the South to the North of the United States reduced perceived differences between native whites and European immigrants, in turn favoring the Americanization of the latter.

of European immigration. We complement these papers by instead focusing on the long run effects of European immigration on American ideology.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the historical background, and discusses the mechanisms through which immigrants might have influenced natives' ideology in the long run. Section 3 presents our data, and Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy. Section 5 shows the main results, and summarizes the key robustness checks, which are described in more detail in the appendix. Section 6 explores the mechanisms behind our main findings, and Section 7 presents the relationship between the historical presence of immigrants and the evolution of political behavior in the US over the twentieth century. Section 8 concludes.

2 Historical Background

This section first describes the Age of Mass Migration (Section 2.1), and then discusses the possible mechanisms through which European immigrants might have influenced American ideology in the long run (Section 2.2).

2.1 The Age of Mass Migration

Between 1850 and 1920, almost 50 million Europeans moved to the New World, and around 30 millions of them chose to settle in the United States (Hatton and Williamson, 1998), at a time when no legal restrictions to European immigration existed.⁶ This unprecedented movement of people, typically referred to as the Age of Mass Migration, was influenced by the innovation in steam technology, which drastically reduced the cost of shipping, and made it easier for Europeans to move to the Americas (Keeling, 1999). At first, most immigrants came from Northern and Western European countries, but gradually, as both transportation costs fell and income rose, more and more migrants left poorer countries in Southern and Eastern Europe (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). This pattern is shown in Figure 1: in 1870, almost 90% of the foreign born stock in the US originated from Northern and Western Europe; by 1920, however, the share of Southern and Eastern European immigrants was almost as high as 45%.

Immigration skyrocketed after 1900 (Figure 2). This, together with the compositional shift towards new, culturally more distant sending countries, increased concerns about both immigrants' assimilation and the negative consequences on wages and employment of native workers. The political climate grew more and more hostile towards

⁶Immigration to the US was instead restricted for Chinese and Japanese immigrants, following the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and the 1908 Gentleman's Agreement respectively (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017).

European immigrants. After several attempts, in 1917, US Congress introduced a literacy test that required all immigrants arriving to the US to be able to read and write (Goldin, 1994). Interestingly, the literacy test was introduced when European immigration had already been drastically reduced by the onset of WWI (Figure 2). After the end of the war, between 1919 and 1921, immigration flows went back to their 1910 levels, fueling natives’ fears of a new “invasion”. Eventually, in 1921, the Quota Emergency Act introduced a temporary cap to immigration, which was made permanent and more stringent in 1924, with the passage of the National Origins Act (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017; Goldin, 1994). The quotas were explicitly designed with the goal of reducing inflows from Southern and Eastern Europe, whose immigrants were considered culturally far and unwilling and unable to assimilate (Higham, 1955).⁷

The combined effects of WWI and the quotas were dramatic: immigration to the US dropped and remained negligible until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Figure A.1 in the Appendix). A key feature of both shocks is that different nationalities were affected differentially. On the one hand, WWI had a larger impact on countries that were more directly involved in the War (with the German case being an emblematic one). On the other, the quotas reached their goal and disproportionately restricted the inflow of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. This is depicted in Figure A.2, which plots the share of European immigrants entering the US in each year from “high” and “low” restriction countries, as classified in Abramitzky et al. (2019d).⁸

The quotas – and to some extent WWI – restricted immigration especially from countries that had sent disproportionately more immigrants between 1900 and 1914, thereby creating a trend-break in the country-mix of immigrants moving to the US. Since immigrants cluster geographically in receiving countries (Card, 2001), such changes in turn led to substantial changes in both the number and the “mix” of immigrants received by different US counties between 1910 and 1930. Following the strategy implemented in a number of recent papers (Abramitzky et al., 2019d; Tabellini, 2020), we exploit such variation in our analysis, as described in detail below.

⁷The 1921 Emergency Quota Act mandated that the number of European immigrants from each country entering the US in a given year could not exceed 3% of the stock from that country living in the US in 1910. With the 1924 National Origins Act, the limit was lowered to 2%, and the base year was moved to 1890, so as to further restrict immigration from “new sending countries”. Furthermore, the total number of immigrants that could be admitted in a given year was capped at 150,000 (Goldin, 1994).

⁸The list of countries with high and low restrictions can be found in Abramitzky et al. (2019d), Appendix Table A1.

2.2 European Immigrants and American Ideology

Abundant evidence exists on the contribution of European immigrants to the US economy and to the American society more broadly. As noted by historian Maldwyn Jones, American economic development was “...due in significant measure to the efforts of immigrants...[who] supplied much of the labor and technical skill needed to tap the underdeveloped resources of a virgin continent” (Jones, 1992, pp. 309–310). Echoing Jones, John F. Kennedy wrote that immigrants contributed to “every aspect of the American economy” (Kennedy, 1964, p. 88). Sequeira et al. (2020) discuss extensively the various channels through which European immigrants might have fostered economic development – from their contribution to science and innovation to the provision of agricultural know-how, to the supply of cheap labor for an expanding manufacturing sector.⁹ In their analysis, the authors show that, not only European immigrants brought short-run economic prosperity, but also, that such effects persisted and are still evident today.

Given the contribution of European immigrants to a wide range of domains, there are reasons to expect that immigration had a long-lasting impact on American ideology and on social and economic preferences of natives as well. The most obvious channel through which immigration could have affected ideology is income. Given the long run impact of immigration on income per capita documented in Sequeira et al. (2020), one would expect less support for left-leaning ideology, possibly driven by a reduced demand for government spending and lower desire to redistribute (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).

Another factor is immigrants’ selection. If, as shown in Knudsen (2019), more individualistic individuals were more likely to migrate, they might have transmitted such ideology to natives, reinforcing beliefs in effort rather than luck, and reducing preferences for redistribution (Piketty, 1995). This mechanism might have been reinforced by the fact that more successful immigrants were more likely to stay in the US (Abramitzky et al., 2019b). Moreover, immigrants’ social mobility in the United States might have influenced American ideology. If immigrants experienced a high degree of social mobility in the past, this could have determined their lower preferences for redistribution in the past and today, and therefore their left-leaning ideology (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Piketty, 1995; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000).

Finally, immigrants might have shaped American ideology and preferences for redistribution by increasing ethnic and racial diversity. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that one of the main reasons why the welfare state is smaller in the US than in Europe is that the US is a more racially and ethnically diverse country. Consistent with this

⁹See also Akcigit et al. (2017) and Moser and San (2019) among others for studies on the effects of European immigrants on science and innovation in the United States.

idea, Tabellini (2020) finds that European immigration led to a reduction in redistribution across American cities between 1910 and 1930. One might thus conjecture that such effects persisted and perhaps became stronger over time. A related argument, discussed in Lipset and Marks (2000), is that socialism never succeeded in the United States partly because of the (ethnically) heterogeneous background of the American working class.

For different reasons, all the channels discussed above suggest that historical immigration may have lowered preferences for redistribution of Americans in the long run. However, it is *a priori* possible that the opposite happened, and that, despite the short run effects documented in Tabellini (2020), European immigrants led to a more liberal ideology and to stronger preferences for redistribution over time. At the time of arrival, many Europeans had been exposed to social welfare programs in their countries of origin. For example, already at the end of the nineteenth century, Germany provided to its citizens both public education and retirement income (Flora, 1983). Similarly, as of 1890, public education was offered in France, Italy, Sweden, and in many other European countries (Bandiera et al., 2018). In addition, pensions and social welfare reforms were introduced across Europe in the first two decades of the twentieth century (Galasso and Profeta, 2018).

Exposure to social welfare programs in their home country might have increased immigrants' expectations about and demand for similar policies in the US as well. Adding to the direct effects of immigrants' demand, over time, preferences of Europeans might have gradually "spilled over" into local American culture and preferences. While the literature typically views assimilation as driven by immigrants converging towards natives' culture (Abramitzky et al., 2019a; Advani and Reich, 2015; Eriksson, 2019), in principle, it is possible for the opposite to happen. In the US context, Hirschman (2013) describes several examples where immigrants' preferences and culture spilled over onto those of natives – from Jazz music to the film industry, to sports and cuisine. In many cases, immigrants were (cultural) "innovators", who set standards that persisted throughout the decades, eventually becoming integral parts of the American culture. Beyond culture, there is evidence of immigrants' contribution also in a number of specific institutions. For instance, the kindergarten was imported to the US by the German immigrant Friederich Fröbel (Ager and Cinnirella, 2016). Similarly, the university system adopted by US states built extensively on the Prussian model (Faust, 1916).

This discussion suggests that the long run effects of immigration on American ideology are *ex-ante* ambiguous. On the one hand, a number of factors – income effects, immigrants' selection, ethnic heterogeneity, and natives' reactions – are consistent with a negative relationship between immigration and preferences for redistribution. On

the other, if immigrants arrived with a more liberal ideology and with stronger preferences for redistribution (relative to natives), and if such preferences were transmitted to natives, counties that received more European immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration might be expected to house individuals with higher demand for social welfare and with more liberal attitudes today.

3 Data

To study the long run effects of European immigration on American ideology, we combine a variety of datasets. Section 3.1 describes the data assembled to construct exposure to historical immigration at the county level and all the other historical characteristics. Then, Section 3.2 presents the variables used to measure different aspect of current ideology obtained from the CCES.

3.1 Historical Data

Immigrant share and immigrants’ characteristics. We collect data on the number of European immigrants at the county level in each decade from 1910 to 1930 from the full count US Censuses made available by Ruggles et al. (2020). Using the same source we also construct several variables on immigrants’ characteristics for the period between 1910-1930, such as occupational income score and the share of immigrants who are: English speakers; literate; working in manufacturing; in the labor force; and, employed.¹⁰

Historical county characteristics. Relying on the full count data from Ruggles et al. (2020), we also construct several 1900 county characteristics. These are: the share of population living in urban areas; the fraction of blacks living in the county; the male labor force participation; the employment share in manufacturing; average occupational scores; and geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude). We also include a measure of railroad connectivity for 1850-1900 (from Sequeira et al., 2020), and a measure of industry growth for the period between 1900-1930 as in Tabellini (2020).

Exposure to the welfare state in the countries of origin. To measure exposure to the welfare state in the countries of origin, we use the year of introduction of education

¹⁰When constructing the economic characteristics of immigrants, we restrict the sample to men in the age range 15-64, who were not in school. Since prior to 1940 no data on wages or income was reported in the US Census, we follow Abramitzky et al. (2014) and subsequent work, and rely on occupational income scores, which are constructed by assigning to an individual the median income of his job category in 1950.

reforms in each European country in our sample (see Table A.1). The data come from Bandiera et al. (2018), except for Germany and Austria for which we instead rely on the original data in Flora (1983).¹¹ We consider education reforms because other types of welfare reforms (such as health and pensions) were introduced much later in time, often after 1910 – the first year considered in our analysis to measure the historical presence of immigrants across US counties.

We count the number of years between 1910 and the year in which a country introduced education reforms.¹² We then interact this variable with the 1910-1930 county average share of immigrants from each country, and sum over all European countries to obtain a weighted average of exposure to education reforms inherited by European immigrants, with weights equal to the share of immigrants (relative to the foreign born population) from each origin in each US county.¹³ In formulas, denoting the index of exposure to education reforms for immigrant group j with pr_j , and the 1910-1930 average immigrant share of that group (relative to all immigrants in the county) with γ_{jc} , the county-specific index of exposure can be written as:¹⁴

$$PR_c = \sum_j \gamma_{jc} * pr_j \quad (1)$$

To ease the interpretation of coefficients, in our analysis we standardize this index by subtracting its mean and dividing it through its standard deviation. In this way, results can be interpreted as the effects of one standard deviation increase in the index of (historical) exposure to social welfare reforms on education.

We use exposure to education reform in the country of origin as a proxy for historical preferences for redistribution, as surveys are not available for that period of time. Luttmer and Singhal (2011) show that preferences for redistribution are highly persistent. In Appendix Figure A.3, we report the correlation (after controlling for

¹¹Bandiera et al. (2018) also build their dataset from Flora (1983), but attribute to Germany and Austria education reforms carried out in the eighteenth century. We instead prefer to consider the reforms of the late nineteenth century, since these in our view capture more centralized (and thus, for our purposes meaningful) reforms. One country that is hard to code is Russia. According to Willcox (1929), for the period 1889-1924 around 40% of Russian immigrants were classified in the immigration national statistics as being of Hebrew race. These numbers are similar to those estimated in Spitzer (2015). Since Jewish immigrants had historically higher preferences for redistribution, we classify as Jewish (immigrant) any individual born in Russia with at least one member of the household reporting either Hebrew or Yiddish as mother tongue, and then assign to them the highest preference for welfare state by using the first education reform in our sample (1814 for Denmark). Reassuringly, all our results are robust to either excluding Jewish immigrants or considering Russia as a single ethnic group.

¹²If a country did not introduce any education reform prior to 1910, we set this variable to zero.

¹³Results remain unchanged when constructing this variable allowing immigrants arriving in different decades (e.g. 1910 vs 1920) to be exposed for a different number of years to education reforms.

¹⁴Specifically, for each decade t , we first compute the share of immigrants from each country j in county c , relative to all immigrants in the county: $\gamma_{jct} = Imm_{jct} / \sum_j Imm_{jct}$. Then, we take the average across years (for 1910, 1920, and 1930).

GDP) weighted by the number of respondents between preferences for redistribution of immigrants coming from the European countries in our sample and the year of introduction of education reforms.¹⁵ Reassuringly, there is a statistically significant and negative relationship between the year of introduction of the reform and current immigrants’ preferences for redistribution, implying that immigrants from countries that introduced welfare reforms earlier display stronger support for generous welfare policies. We replicate these results by estimating individual level regressions and controlling for a large number of individual controls. Results, reported in Appendix Table A.3, confirm the correlation presented in Figure A.3.¹⁶

Summary statistics Detailed information about each variable and its sources is provided in Appendix Table A.2. For all our variables, since county boundaries change over time, we apply the harmonization procedure in Perlman (2016), fixing them to 1930.

Panel A of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our main historical variables. The 1910-1930 immigrant share for the average county in our sample is 5.5%, but this masks substantial heterogeneity across space, as depicted in Figure 3. Consistent with the description in Abramitzky and Boustan (2017), immigrants were concentrated in the North-East and in the Mid-West as well as in California. Much fewer European immigrants were instead living in the US South at the time. Importantly for our analysis, which only exploits within-state variation, the historical presence of European immigrants varied substantially also across counties within the same state, as documented in Figure A.4.

On average, the urban share of the population in 1910-1930 was around 14%, but, again, this variable displays significant variation, ranging from 0 for some of the entirely rural counties in the Mid-West to 1 for urban counties like Cook County (IL) or the boroughs of New York City. Table 1, Panel B, also documents that around 85% and 92% of immigrants in 1910-1930 were, respectively, able to speak English and literate. However, these average values mask substantial heterogeneity, with immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe being significantly less skilled and less proficient in English than those from “old” sending countries like Germany, the UK, or Scandinavia (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017).

¹⁵As in Luttmer and Singhal (2011), we use data from the European Social Survey. Consistent with the literature, preferences for redistribution are calculated using the following question: “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. Respondents are asked if they agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or disagree strongly. See Appendix C for more details.

¹⁶Details about the empirical analysis and variable definitions can be found in Appendix C.

3.2 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES)

To measure political ideology and preferences for redistribution, we rely on nationally representative survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Specifically, for ideology and political behavior we use the Cumulative CCES Common Content dataset (Kuriwaki, 2018), which combines all surveys between 2006 and 2018, for a total of more than 450,000 respondents. For all other questions, we instead combine surveys for each individual year.¹⁷

The CCES is an online survey conducted in November of every year since 2005 that asks a wide range of questions – from political ideology and voting behavior to preferences for redistribution and views on the role of government, to attitudes towards minorities and several socioeconomic issues such as gun control, gay rights, and abortion – and has been used extensively in political science and political economy (Ansolabehere and Kuriwaki, 2019; Hopkins et al., 2019; Acharya et al., 2016). The CCES also asks a large number of demographic and socioeconomic questions such as nativity, age, gender, marital status, income, and education. Moreover, and crucially for our purposes, the CCES reports the county of residence of respondents and, due to its vast sample size, allows us to exploit cross-county variation in attitudes.¹⁸

We restrict attention to American born individuals living in counties for which European immigration and the other historical variables described in Section 3.1 are available. We measure political ideology and preferences for redistribution using a total of eight questions – four for the former, and four for the latter. All questions are coded so that higher values refer to more liberal (i.e. closer to the Democratic Party) ideology and stronger preferences for redistribution, respectively. The exact wording of each question, the range of the corresponding answer, and the years in which each question is available are reported in Appendix Table A.4.

In Table 1, Panels C and D, we report the summary statistics for each of the eight outcomes, while Appendix Table A.5 presents the individual level characteristics of respondents in our sample. The number of respondents varies, since not all questions were asked in all years and because not all individuals answered all questions, ranging from a minimum of around 186,000 (support for an increase in the minimum wage) to a maximum of more than 422,000 (party affiliation). As it appears from Table 1, the average ideology score is 2.88, while 38% and 51% of respondents identify with the Democratic Party and voted for a Democratic candidate in the last Presidential

¹⁷See <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910/DVN/II2DB6> for more details and to access the dataset. The Cumulative dataset includes a sub-set of questions that are common to all survey waves, and whose answers can be more easily interpreted.

¹⁸Differently from most other surveys, such as the American National Election Studies (ANES) or the General Social Survey (GSS), the CCES offers a key advantage: its sample size is very large and nationally representative even at the county level.

elections respectively. Around 40% of respondents in our sample oppose spending cuts and are in favour of financing the deficit with taxes, while more than 70% of them are in favor of increasing the minimum wage.

4 Empirical Strategy

This section describes our empirical strategy. We first introduce our baseline estimating equation (Section 4.1), and we then construct the instrument for historical European immigration at the county level (Section 4.2).

4.1 Baseline Estimating Equation

To study the long run effects of European immigration on American ideology, we estimate a specification of the form:

$$y_{icst} = \alpha_s + \gamma_t + \beta imm_{cs} + X_{cs} + W_{icst} + u_{icst} \quad (2)$$

where y_{icst} refers to ideology or preferences for redistribution of respondent i living in county c at time t . The key regressor of interest is the average European immigrant share of the county population between 1910 and 1930, imm_{cs} . We always control for state and survey wave fixed effects, α_s and γ_t , for individual characteristics of respondents, W_{icst} , as well as for a set of historical county variables, included in X_{cs} . Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Individual characteristics, W_{icst} , include a quadratic in age, gender, race dummies (white, black, and other), marital (single, married, separated, and widowed) and employment (employed, unemployed, and out of the labor force) status, educational attainment (less than high school, high school, and more than high school) and income dummies.¹⁹ The set of historical county controls, X_{cs} , is described in Section 3.1, and discussed in detail again when presenting our results below.²⁰

4.2 Instrument for Historical Immigration

To attach a causal interpretation to the relationship between the historical immigrant share and American ideology today, the location of European immigrants in the first three decades of the twentieth century should be orthogonal to factors that might have

¹⁹There are 12 income categories – from less than 10,000 to more than 150,000 US dollars. We include dummies for each of them. Details for each category are provided in Table A.5.

²⁰We never include contemporaneous county controls, since any variable for the current period might be directly or indirectly affected by historical immigration (see, for instance, Sequeira et al., 2020). As such, these would be “bad controls” that could bias our estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).

independently contributed to shape long run preferences and values of natives. One specific concern is that immigrants might have settled in counties that were booming at the time of their arrival, and that such thriving economic conditions persisted over time, directly influencing Americans’ preferences for redistribution and ideology.²¹ Similarly, immigrants might have been attracted to areas with more liberal views towards immigration, which may in turn be correlated with socioeconomic preferences and ideology today.

To overcome these and similar concerns, in addition to controlling for historical economic and political county characteristics and for state fixed effects, we follow the immigration literature, and construct a version of the shift-share instrument originally introduced by Altonji and Card (1991) and subsequently refined by Card (2001). The instrument predicts the number of immigrants received by US counties in each decade from 1910 to 1930 by interacting 1900 settlements of different ethnic groups with subsequent migration flows from each sending (European) country. Similarly to Burchardi et al. (2019) and Tabellini (2020), as suggested in Adao et al. (2019), we construct a “leave-out” version of the shift-share instrument, by excluding immigrants from each country who eventually settled in a given county.

Formally, the predicted number of immigrants received by county c in decade τ is given by

$$\tilde{Z}_{cs\tau} = \sum_j sh_{jc} Imm_{j\tau} \quad (3)$$

where sh_{jc} is the share of immigrants from country j living in county c as of 1900 (relative to all immigrants from country j in the US) and $Imm_{j\tau}$ is the number of immigrants arrived from country j in the US between decade $\tau - 1$ and decade τ , net of those that eventually settled in county c . Since we are interested in predicting the total number of immigrants in the county, we add the 1900 immigrant stock to the predicted flows for 1910, and then recursively sum the flows for subsequent decades predicted by $\tilde{Z}_{cs\tau}$. Finally, we compute the average number of predicted immigrants in the county for the three decades 1910, 1920, and 1930, and scale it by 1900 county population.²² We denote the predicted average immigrant share in county c with Z_{cs} , and we use it to instrument for the average immigrant share, imm_{cs} , in equation (2).

²¹In fact, results in Sequeira et al. (2020) suggest that immigrants were more likely to endogenously select in otherwise declining counties, possibly due to congestion costs and discrimination.

²²So as not to contaminate the instrument with endogeneity, we follow the suggestion in Card and Peri (2016), and use baseline – rather than contemporaneous – population to construct the fraction of immigrants. Results are unchanged when scaling the instrument by 1910 (rather than 1900) population.

4.2.1 Sources of Variation

The shift-share instrument exploits two complementary sources of variation. First, cross-sectional variation in the distribution of 1900 immigrants' enclaves of different countries across US counties. Second, time-series variation in the number of immigrants from different European countries moving to the United States across decades. Figure 4 plots the share of immigrants from different European countries living in across US counties in 1900, and confirms the substantial degree of clustering across places for different immigrant groups already documented in the literature (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017; Card, 2001).

For instance, while Italians were highly concentrated in large cities such as Chicago and New York, they were significantly less likely to settle in mid-western states like Minnesota. Even stronger geographic concentration is observed for Portuguese immigrants, who had a large community in the Boston area (Middlesex County), but were practically absent from most other regions. Clustering was not specific to “new” European sending countries. In fact, similar patterns can be found for Swedish and German settlements, which were concentrated in northwestern and mid-western states, and especially for Germans, in New York City. Focusing on Massachusetts, Figure A.5 in the Appendix verifies that a similar degree of variation exists also for counties within the same state. Since our empirical analysis always conditions on state fixed effects, within state variation in ethnic enclaves is a necessary condition for the instrument to have predictive power.

The shift-share instrument combines this geographic variation with changes in nationwide immigration across sending regions. As already discussed in Section 2.1, the decades between 1900 and 1930 were characterized by nation-wide shocks – WWI and the Immigration Acts – exogenous to county-specific economic or political conditions, that dramatically changed both the level and the composition of immigrants moving to the United States over time (Figures 1 and 2).

4.2.2 Instrument Validity and Identifying Assumptions

As noted in other work (Abramitzky et al., 2019d; Tabellini, 2020), WWI and the Immigration Acts make this setting particularly suitable for the use of the shift-share instrument, since these shocks induced a sharp change in the immigration patterns prevailing until 1915, which had also contributed to the formation of the 1900 immigrant settlements (Figure A.2). This is important because it significantly reduces the serial correlation in migration flows from the same country of origin to the same local destination – a feature that might invalidate the shift-share design by conflating the short

and the long run effects of immigration (Jaeger et al., 2018).²³ The differential impact of such exogenous, nation-wide shocks across European countries is also key to reduce more general concerns about the validity of shift-share designs, as discussed formally in Borusyak et al. (2018).

Even if the WWI and quota shocks introduced an exogenous trend-break in immigration flows, one may still be worried that (conditional on state fixed effects) the county characteristics that attracted more immigrants from selected European countries before 1900 might be correlated both with trends in country-specific immigration between 1910 and 1930 and with long run ideology and preferences of native-born Americans. For instance, before 1900, early settlers from Scandinavia or Germany may have selected counties where natives' preferences for redistribution became stronger (for reasons other than immigration) during the 1920s, when migration from these countries grew, relative to that from other sending areas. A related concern is that, prior to 1900, specific immigrant groups (e.g. Italians) settled in counties that experienced a stronger change in economic fundamentals when immigration from that specific origin was booming (e.g. in the 1910s).

While we cannot observe the ideology of native-born individuals at the county level at the beginning of the twentieth century, we proxy for political preferences with the vote share of the Democratic Party in Presidential elections at baseline.²⁴ We document that our results are unchanged when controlling for these political variables. Moreover, all our specifications include county latitude and longitude as well as a large set of 1900 county-specific controls, such as the urban and the black share of the population, average occupational scores, employment to population ratio, and the share of employment in manufacturing. In addition, we seek to isolate even more directly the variation in immigrants' composition exploited by the shift-share instrument, by separately controlling for the initial shares of immigrants from each European country. This exercise tests whether the variation behind the instrument is disproportionately influenced by specific destination-origin combinations, which may also be spuriously correlated with the long run evolution of preferences across US counties (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018).

Yet another concern is that the instrument could be spuriously correlated with shocks (e.g. the arrival of railroads or the expansion of specific industries) hitting US counties that both affected long run local economic and political conditions and

²³For instance, while the correlation in predicted immigration within the same destination over time is around .95 for the period between 1980 and 2010 (Jaeger et al., 2018), it is lower than .3 in our context. Using a somewhat different empirical strategy, but focusing on the same period, Abramitzky et al. (2019d) find that such correlation is as low as -.16.

²⁴We define the "baseline" election years in different ways (e.g. 1900; 1904; combining 1900 and 1904 together), and results always remain unchanged.

influenced emigration patterns across European countries. To assuage this concern, all our specifications include a measure of predicted labor demand, constructed by interacting the 1900 industrial composition of US counties with the national growth rate of different industries between 1910 and 1930 (Tabellini, 2020). We also control for the measure of railroad connectivity constructed in Sequeira et al. (2020).

5 Main Results

This section presents our main results. Section 5.1 shows that American born respondents who today live in counties that received more immigrants between 1910 and 1930 have a more liberal political ideology and hold stronger preferences for redistribution. Section 5.2 summarizes the robustness checks we conducted, which are then described in detail in Appendix B.

5.1 Historical presence of immigrants and American Ideology

We begin our analysis by investigating the long run effects of European immigration on political ideology and preferences for redistribution of American born individuals today. Before presenting our formal regression results, we show the variation in the raw data in Figure A.6. Here, we plot the quintiles of the distribution of the voting-Democrat dummy in presidential elections (Panel A) and of support for welfare spending (Panel B), after partialling out state fixed effects. Two patterns emerge. First, for both outcomes, we observe a strong variability throughout the country. Second, the distribution of both support for the Democratic Party and preferences for redistribution seems to positively correlate with the historical presence of European immigrants (partialled out from state fixed effects), which is reported in Figure A.4.

We now focus on the regression analysis. In Table 2, we estimate a parsimonious version of equation (2), which includes only individual respondents' characteristics and state and survey-year fixed effects. Panel A presents OLS results, whereas Panels B and C report 2SLS and first stage coefficients respectively. OLS estimates for both ideology and preferences for redistribution reveal that there is a strong, positive relationship between the 1910-1930 share of European immigrants in a county and the probability that, today, an individual identifies as liberal, Democrat or voted for a Democratic candidate in the last presidential election (columns 1-4). A very similar pattern emerges when focusing on support for welfare spending, opposition to spending cuts, support for minimum wage increases, and preferences to fund state deficit using taxes instead of reducing expenditures (columns 5-8). In all cases, individuals living in counties with a larger historical presence of immigrants are more likely to view redistribution more

favorably.

We then turn to instrumental variable estimation, presenting 2SLS and first stage results in Panels B and C respectively. Starting from the first stage, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between predicted and actual immigration, and the KP F-stat for weak instruments is well above conventional levels (Panel C). First stage coefficients imply that a 10 percentage point increase in the predicted 1910-1930 average immigrant share is associated with a 14.2 percentage point increase in the actual immigrant share.²⁵

2SLS estimates (Panel B) confirm OLS results – both quantitatively and qualitatively – and indicate the existence of a strong link between historical immigration and left-leaning, liberal ideology among native born individuals today. In Table 3, we present results for a more stringent specification, which, in addition to state and survey wave fixed effects and the individual characteristics of Table 2, also includes a large number of historical controls. In particular, we add the 1900: urban and black share, male labor force participation, employment share in manufacturing, and average occupational income scores. We also add geographical coordinates, an index of industry growth between 1910 and 1930 as in Tabellini (2020), and railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020).²⁶

The size of coefficients, for both the 2SLS and OLS estimates, is smaller than in Table 2, but remains always significant and of sizeable magnitudes. Similarly, the point estimate for the first stage, reported in Panel C, becomes slightly lower, but remains highly statically significant. Appendix Figure A.7 presents the residualized (bin) scatterplot for first stage regressions aggregated at the county level across survey waves and weighted by the average number of respondents, after partialling out state fixed effects and all county controls included in Table 3. The graph confirms the strong relationship between actual and predicted immigration already documented in Panel C of Table 3.

Focusing on 2SLS estimates for political ideology, a 5 percentage point increase in the average immigrant share – equivalent to roughly 40% of the inter-quartile range – is associated with a 1.2% higher probability of reporting a liberal ideology (column 1) and with a 6.2% higher likelihood of identifying with the Democratic Party (column 3), relative to the sample mean. Results are similar for preferences for redistribution: relative to respondents living in a county at the 25th percentile of the historical immigrant share, individuals in a county at the 75th percentile are 4.6% more likely to oppose

²⁵The exact point estimate varies slightly across columns because the number of respondents is different for each question, and this implicitly changes the weighting scheme behind each regression. Reassuringly, results are always very stable. In unreported regressions, we also verified that the first stage remains strong when estimating county-level, unweighted regressions.

²⁶Results appear robust to also including each of these controls individually.

spending cuts and 5.2% more likely to support welfare spending, relative to the sample mean (columns 5 and 6).²⁷ The effects of immigration on support for an increase in the minimum wage and for funding state deficit through taxes (rather than via spending cuts) are quantitatively very similar.

OLS and 2SLS coefficients are very close, and never statistically different from each other – a pattern similar to that documented in Tabellini (2020) for the short run effects of European immigration across US cities. One possible explanation for this is that the pull factors that might have attracted immigrants to a specific county (e.g. strong labor demand) were offset by congestion costs that induced immigrants to select otherwise declining places. Alternatively, it is possible that immigrants chose their location based on local economic conditions prevailing at the time, and that these were not correlated with cultural preferences of natives (either in the past or today).

Coefficients on the individual controls (reported in Appendix Table A.6) are in line with those estimated in the literature (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Race is probably the single most important variable to explain individual preferences for redistribution and political behavior in the US. For our measures of political ideology, the historical fraction of immigrants has a beta coefficient that is roughly 40% relative to the effect of being black. For preferences for redistribution, the coefficient on historical immigration is the same order of magnitude of being black for all questions, except for support for the minimum wage increase, for which the size is twice as large. In our sample, higher income is associated with lower desire for redistribution (in line with Meltzer and Richard, 1981), and the size of the beta coefficient of historical immigration is approximately equal to the effect of having an income in the range of \$80,000-\$100,000 relative to having an income of less than \$10,000 for all questions.²⁸

Summing up, this section has documented a strong effect of historical European immigration on today’s preferences for redistribution and liberal ideology of American born individuals. Moreover, our estimates are quantitatively large, and comparable in size to other, more standard determinants of preferences for redistribution and political behavior in the United States, such as race and income. In Section 6, we explore the mechanisms behind these results. Before doing so, in the next paragraph, we briefly summarize the robustness checks conducted in our analysis, which are then reported and discussed in detail in Appendix B.

²⁷These numbers are obtained by multiplying the coefficients in columns 5 and 6 of Panel B by the inter-quartile range of the average fraction of immigrants in our sample (0.125), and dividing it by the mean of the dependent variable, reported at the bottom of each column in Table 3.

²⁸Only for support for welfare spending the beta coefficient of historical immigration is smaller (approximately half the size) when we compare the income bracket of \$80,000-\$100,000 relative to having an income of less than \$10,000.

5.2 Summary of Robustness Checks

As noted above, our most stringent specification already includes a large number of county-specific variables as well as individual respondents' characteristics, and state and survey wave fixed effects. In this section, we summarize additional exercises performed to probe the robustness of our findings, which are described in more detail and presented extensively in Appendix B. First, we verify that our main results, reported in Table 3, are robust to the inclusion of baseline controls for the Democratic vote share in Presidential elections (Table B.1). Second, we replicate our results using the average immigrant share for the full 1850-1930 period (Table B.2). Third, we show that results are unchanged when dropping the US South, when aggregating the data to the commuting zone (CZ) level, and when separately controlling for the (instrumented) ethnic diversity resulting from European immigrants (Tables B.3, B.4, and B.5). In addition, we verify that results are unchanged when dropping counties above (resp. below) the 99th and 95th (resp. 1st and 5th) percentile of the 1910-1930 average immigrant share (Tables B.6 and B.7). Finally, and most importantly, we replicate the analysis by including – one by one – the initial shares of each immigrant group in the county, i.e. sh_{jc} in equation (3). This exercise, reported in Figures B.1 and B.2, reduces concerns raised by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018) that specific combinations of US counties and European countries of origin might be absorbing most of the variation in our data. It also deals with the possibility that the initial immigrant shares were not independent of cross-county pull factors systematically related to settlers' state of origin.

6 Mechanisms

This section explores the mechanisms for the positive effect of historical immigration on preferences for redistribution and liberal ideology of American voters today. To our knowledge, there is no systematic evidence on the long-run effects of historical immigration on political behavior in the US. The existing literature has studied the effect of contemporaneous immigration or ethnic diversity on political behavior and preferences for redistribution. Specifically for the US, Mayda et al. (2018) study the impact of immigration on the Republican vote share using county level data from 1990 to 2010, finding that immigrants' level of skills is an important determinant of natives' voting behavior. In particular, while high-skilled immigrants decrease the Republican vote share, the presence of low-skilled immigrants has the opposite effect – especially in low-skilled and rural counties.

In the context of the Age of Mass Migration, Tabellini (2020) finds that European immigration to US cities led to lower support for the Democratic Party, to the election

of more anti-immigrant legislators, and to the reduction in both public spending and tax rates. Tabellini (2020) provides evidence that natives' backlash was likely influenced more by cultural differences between immigrants and natives than by concerns over labor market competition.²⁹ More generally, starting with Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina et al. (1999), many studies have documented, both across and within countries, that higher ethnic diversity is negatively associated with preferences for redistribution. More directly related to our work, the inflow of immigrants has been shown to reduce natives' desire for government spending (Alesina et al., 2018a; Dahlberg et al., 2012) and to increase support for right-wing parties (Dustmann et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017).

A key distinction between the existing literature and our work, is that the effect in the long run can be quite different. Even though in the short run ethnic and cultural diversity might increase the support for right wing parties and lower natives' preferences for redistribution, it is possible for these effects to gradually dissipate and even flip sign over time. In the next two sections, we explore potential mechanisms that could help understand the long run, positive effect of European immigration on liberal ideology and preferences for redistribution of American voters today.

We first consider several economic channels, such as direct labor market effects of immigrants on natives, immigrants' selection, and the type of economic characteristics that immigrants brought with them to the US. However, in analyzing these economic mechanisms, we conclude that none of them can explain our main findings. We then turn to a "social transmission" mechanism. We conjecture that immigrants exposed to more generous welfare programs in Europe, who likely held stronger preferences for redistribution, transmitted their values to natives.

The literature tends to think about immigrants' assimilation as a one-sided process in which minority groups converge to the habits of the majority (Abramitzky et al., 2019a; Fouka, 2020). While this is certainly the case in many instances, the melting pot society that characterizes the United States – indeed defined "a nation of immigrants" in Kennedy (1964) – might have induced native-born individuals to, perhaps unconsciously, absorb some aspects of immigrants' culture and values. Immigrants bring their own values with them (Giuliano, 2007; Fernández and Fogli, 2009; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), and these may be transmitted to natives. Since culture is, typically, quite sticky, studies focusing on the short run effects of immigration are unlikely to capture this process of cultural transmission.

Focusing on a time horizon that spans more than one hundred years makes it possible to detect such cultural spillovers, if any. To the extent that immigrants had

²⁹A different interpretation is instead proposed in Goldin (1994), who argues that the main reason behind the Immigration Acts of the 1920s was labor market competition.

relatively stronger preferences for redistribution and a more liberal ideology than their American born counterparts, the local presence of Europeans might have, gradually, shifted natives' preferences towards that of a more generous welfare state and consequently a more left-leaning ideology.³⁰ We provide empirical evidence consistent with this interpretation.

6.1 Economic Mechanisms

Direct economic effects. The first, perhaps most obvious, mechanism for the positive effects of immigration on preferences for redistribution and ideology is through the impact of immigrants on the US economy. If immigrants had a negative effect on natives' employment and wages, it is possible that counties with more immigrants historically demanded more redistribution. However, existing evidence suggests that this mechanism is unlikely. In fact, Sequeira et al. (2020) find a strong, positive relationship between European immigration and long run economic development across US counties. Moreover, consistent with Ager and Hansen (2017), the authors show that immigrants' benefits emerged almost immediately, indicating that even in the short run demand for economic protection among natives should not have increased.

Despite the positive average effects of immigration documented in Sequeira et al. (2020), it is possible that some groups of natives were made worse off, and that such groups demanded more economic protection and redistribution. While possible, this idea is somewhat inconsistent with findings in Tabellini (2020). Exploring the short-run effects of European immigration on the 180 largest US cities, he shows that, not only immigration had a strong and positive effect on both natives' employment and economic activity, but also that even natives working in highly exposed sectors (e.g. manufacturing) and occupations (e.g. laborers) did not experience significant wage or employment losses.³¹ Thus, if anything, the effects of European immigrants on natives' economic outcomes should have led to weaker – rather than stronger – preferences for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).

Immigrants' economic characteristics. It is possible that immigrants from different regions brought with them specific skills and economic characteristics. These, in turn, might have contributed to the evolution of natives' preferences for redistribution and American ideology in the long-run. Relative to natives, immigrants – especially

³⁰For example, European immigrants arriving after 1910 had not been exposed to the “frontier culture” that instead influenced ideology and preferences of many early settlers (Bazzi et al., 2017; Turner, 1893).

³¹Tabellini (2020) also shows that immigration did not cause any significant increase in house prices or in the rents paid by natives.

from Southern and Eastern Europe – were significantly more likely to work in the manufacturing sector, to hold unskilled jobs, and to be illiterate (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). Similarly, there was substantial variation in the income level of immigrants from different groups. While Abramitzky et al. (2014) show that not all European immigrants faced an earnings penalty relative to natives upon arrival, for many of them such gap actually existed, and it typically took more than one generation to close it (Abramitzky et al., 2019c). As a result, it is possible that counties receiving more immigrants, in particular from poorer European countries, developed a set of institutions and norms that were conducive to more generous welfare programs. Once these institutions were in place, preference of both natives and immigrants might have adapted to them (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).

To test whether immigrants’ economic characteristics can explain results presented in Table 3 above, we construct a set of indexes that account for the economic characteristics brought about by immigration. Specifically, for each decade and for each county, we compute *i*) the immigrants’ average occupational income score as well as the share of immigrants who were: *ii*) able to speak English; *iii*) literate; and *iv*) employed in manufacturing.³²

To measure the average value of each characteristic brought about by immigrants in a given county during 1910-1930, we take the mean of each variable during this period. We construct a corresponding instrument for this index as follows. We first compute the average value of the variables described above for each immigrant group between 1910 and 1930 at the national level.³³ Next, we interact this country-specific value with the predicted share of immigrants in a given county in each decade (relative to all other immigrant groups), sum across groups in that county (in each decade), and finally take the average over the three decades.³⁴

We then augment our baseline specification by separately controlling for (the instrumented version of) each of these indexes. To ease the interpretation of results, each index is standardized by subtracting its mean and dividing it through its standard deviation. 2SLS results are reported in Table 4. In Panel A, we start by controlling for the share of immigrants who were able to speak English; then, in Panels B, C, and D we consider, respectively, log occupational income scores, the employment share in manufacturing, and literacy. Two results stand out.

First, the main effect of immigration is barely affected: throughout, the coefficient on immigration remains positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively close to

³²When constructing these indexes, we restrict attention to immigrant men of age 15-64 (see Table A.2), but our results are robust to dropping this restriction.

³³Results are unchanged when using either 1910 or 1900 values for each immigrants’ characteristic.

³⁴The predicted share of immigrants in each county and decade is constructed using the country-specific values used to build our main instrument (see equation (3) in Section 4.2).

that reported in our baseline specification. Second, and perhaps more importantly, no systematic pattern for the effects of each economic characteristic of immigrants emerges. In Panel E, we present a specification where all immigrants’ characteristics are simultaneously included. Also in this case, the average immigrant share in the county remains strongly positive and highly significant. Moreover, these results are in line with those from the baseline specification (Panel B of Table 3).

As before, in Table 4 we also present the KP F-stat for the joint significance of all instruments. With the exception of the specification in which we include the occupational income score (Panel B), the F-stat is above conventional levels. While some caution is needed in interpreting the results with the lower F-stat, we nonetheless find it reassuring that, even for this specification, the first stage for the fraction of immigrants remains strong. In addition, when evaluating the partial AP F-stats for each individual first stage (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), which we do not report to save space, we note that they are always well above conventional levels.³⁵ Finally, when we include all controls simultaneously, in the most demanding specification of Panel E, the KP F-stat continues to be above conventional levels and the 2SLS coefficient on the average fraction of immigrants remains positive, quantitatively large, and precisely estimated.

Overall, the evidence presented in this paragraph indicates that the positive relationship between historical immigration and both preferences for redistribution and political ideology is unlikely to be explained by the economic characteristics that European immigrants brought with them at the turn of the twentieth century.

Immigrants’ selection. Another mechanism through which immigrants might have influenced preferences for redistribution of natives is that of selection (Borjas, 1987). However, if this mechanism were at play, one would probably expect it to lower natives’ preferences for redistribution. First, Knudsen (2019) shows that immigrants from Scandinavia during the Age of Mass Migration were significantly more likely to be individualistic, to travel on their own, and to settle in areas where their ethnic community was smaller.³⁶ These patterns suggest that immigrants were less likely to demand redistribution (at least, relative to stayers), and so, if anything, more immigration should be associated with lower preferences for redistribution.

Second, return migration during this historical period was extremely high – often above 30% (Bandiera et al., 2013). It seems natural to expect that migrants who chose to stay were those who succeeded, and were able to realize the “American dream”.

³⁵For instance, in the specific case of Panel B, the AP F-stat for the immigrant share and for the average occupational scores is, respectively, 155 and 66.

³⁶These findings are in line with the “voluntary settlement hypothesis” formulated in Kitayama et al. (2006), according to which migration typically involves the voluntary movement of highly independent individuals.

Consistent with this idea, Abramitzky et al. (2019b) document that, among Norwegian immigrants in the US, those who chose to go back home were negatively selected in terms of economic characteristics and skills. Hence, European immigrants who permanently settled in the US likely put more weight on effort instead of luck, in turn preferring a smaller welfare state (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).

Immigrants’ intergenerational mobility. Finally, the experience of European immigrants in the US might have influenced their own preferences for redistribution, and in turn spilled over into those of natives. In particular, if immigrants did not experience significant occupational upgrading, or if the degree of intergenerational mobility for their kids was lower than for kids of natives, counties that received more immigrants historically might have developed over time stronger preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).

We directly address this possibility using data from Abramitzky et al. (2019c), and construct the county-average rate of immigrants’ intergenerational mobility, weighted by the share of immigrants from each group in each county in each decade between 1910 and 1930. We adopt a strategy similar to that used for the immigrants’ economic characteristics described above. Specifically, for each immigrant group, we interact its 1910-1930 average share in a county (relative to all other foreign born) with the group-specific rate of intergenerational mobility computed by Abramitzky et al. (2019c). When constructing the corresponding instrument, we use the predicted rather than the actual immigrant share in the county, but the logic remains exactly the same. Then, we obtain an index at the county level by summing these county-group specific values across all European groups.³⁷ As before, to ease the interpretation of results, we standardize the index by subtracting its mean and dividing it by its standard deviation.

Next, we augment our baseline specification (Panel B of Table 3) by controlling for the instrumented index of intergenerational mobility of immigrants in the county. 2SLS results are reported in Table A.7. In line with our previous results, also in this case the coefficient on the average immigrant share remains positive, statistically significant, and quantitatively close to that reported in our baseline specification. Moreover, the point estimate on the index of intergenerational mobility is quantitatively small and never statistically significant.

³⁷We can construct this index only for the subset of immigrant groups for which data in Abramitzky et al. (2019c) are available. Reassuringly, the groups for which data are not available represent less than 10% of all European immigrants moving to the US in this period.

6.2 Immigrants' Preferences and Cultural Transmission

The evidence presented above suggests that neither direct economic effects nor the economic characteristics brought about by European immigrants can explain the impact of immigration on natives' preferences for redistribution and ideology. We now explore an alternative possibility, namely that European immigrants transmitted their social and cultural preferences to natives. In particular, we test whether, today, American born respondents hold stronger preferences for redistribution and a more liberal ideology in counties with a higher historical presence of immigrants who had been more exposed to welfare programs in Europe.

As described in Section 3.1, we construct an index that measures the average exposure to education reforms that European immigrants had in their countries of origin until 1910 (see equation (1)). Figure A.8 plots the distribution of such index across counties, after partialling out state fixed effects. As expected, the index takes on higher values, on average, in counties in the Mid-West, where many immigrants from Scandinavia and Germany – areas with a relatively high number of years of exposure to welfare reforms (see Table A.1) – had settled (Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). However, the index varies substantially across the entire country, suggesting that our test is unlikely to capture regional patterns (which would be anyway absorbed by the state fixed effects).

We then augment our most demanding specification, where we also control for all instrumented immigrants' economic characteristics (Panel E of Table 4), by including the index of education reforms, standardized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1. We report 2SLS results in Table 5. As for the various economic characteristics, the main effect of immigration is unchanged. However, differently from results in Table 4, the index of education reforms enters positively and significantly. Moreover, the magnitude of coefficients is quantitatively relevant: for instance, one standard deviation increase in exposure to education reforms is associated with a 2.1% and 5.4% higher probability of voting for the Democratic Party (column 4) and support for welfare spending (column 6), respectively.

These magnitudes are similar to that implied by a 5 percentage point (equivalent to the sample mean, or 40% of the inter-quartile range) increase in the average fraction of immigrants. To more concretely interpret them, consider that one standard deviation in the years of exposure to education reforms across European countries in our sample is 33 years. This gap is close to the difference between the Italian (33 years of exposure) and the Swedish (68 years of exposure) experience (see Table A.1). Our estimates suggest that, holding the number of immigrants in two counties constant, changing their immigrant population from entirely Italian to entirely Swede would increase support

for the Democratic Party and preferences for redistribution by, respectively, 2% and 5%.

Next, we split the sample for counties above and below the median of immigrants' exposure to education reforms, and separately estimate the effects of immigration in each sub-sample (again controlling for all the variables included in Panel E of Table 4). This test complements the previous one, and asks whether immigration had a stronger impact on preferences for redistribution of natives in counties where immigrants had themselves been exposed to more generous welfare programs in their countries of origin. We report 2SLS estimates in Figure 5, with orange (resp. blue) bars referring to coefficients for the sample of counties above (resp. below) the median.³⁸

Consistent with our conjecture, the effects of immigration on preferences for redistribution and liberal ideology are substantially larger in counties with exposure above the sample median – and this difference is almost always statistically significant at the 5% level. Specifically, when focusing on counties with exposure to education reforms above the median, 2SLS coefficients on the average immigrant share are always statistically significant and larger than in the baseline specification reported above. Conversely, when considering counties with immigrants' exposure to education reforms below the median, the coefficient on immigration becomes unstable and smaller in magnitude.³⁹

Taken together, these findings support the hypothesis that the effects of immigration on preferences for redistribution and ideology of American-born respondents (today) are at least partly driven by a process of cultural transmission, through which immigrants' values influenced natives' attitudes. On the one hand, exposure to education reforms “imported” by immigrants in the early twentieth century is strongly and positively associated with both preferences for redistribution and support for the Democratic Party among American born individuals today, even after accounting for the direct effect of immigration. On the other hand, the impact of immigration is larger in counties where immigrants had been more exposed to welfare programs in Europe prior to their arrival.

It is important to note that the analysis in this section always conditioned on immigrants' economic characteristics. This implies that our findings are unlikely to be driven by the correlation between economic and cultural factors. Specifically, one may be worried that exposure to education reforms in the country of origin influences political preferences directly (Glaeser et al., 2007), and not through attitudes towards public spending. The introduction of education reforms could more simply capture the effect of differences in human capital on political ideology. The inclusion of controls for

³⁸The corresponding, formal estimates (including the F-stat for weak instruments) are reported in Appendix Table A.8.

³⁹This pattern is not due to a weak instrument problem. In fact, if anything, the KP F-stat is higher in the sample below median (see Table A.8).

immigrants’ ability to speak English, literacy, and occupational scores – the three best proxies for education prior to 1940 in the US Census – weighs against this alternative interpretation. In addition, to the extent that education is correlated with income, education should reduce the desire for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).⁴⁰

Overall, our evidence suggests that exposure to the welfare state in the immigrants’ countries of origin, which likely affected immigrants’ preferences and ideology, spilled over to natives, through a process of cultural transmission. While the literature has studied how inter-group contact helped promoting the Americanization of immigrants (Abramitzky et al., 2019a), we argue that it may have also facilitated the transmission of immigrants’ cultural values and beliefs to natives. We now explore this channel.

6.3 Inter-group Contact and Political Ideology

To investigate the possibility that immigrants could have transmitted their ideology to natives, we explore the heterogeneity of our results according to two measures of inter-group contact: intermarriage and residential segregation. Both measures could explain the diffusion of European ideology through vertical and horizontal cultural transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). Intermarriage should be associated with cultural transmission inside the family, whereas residential integration should foster horizontal transmission by increasing contacts with neighbors and friends.

As in Fouka et al. (2018), we define intermarriage as the share of immigrants who are married with individuals of native parentage during the 1910-1930 period. We construct residential segregation, using the very same procedure adopted in Logan and Parman (2017).⁴¹ In order to interpret coefficients in the same direction, we present results for residential integration, i.e. the opposite of segregation in Logan and Parman (2017). Figures A.9 and A.10 plot the distribution of both intermarriage and residential integration, after partialling out state fixed effects. Importantly, not only there is substantial variation in the two measures across counties, but also their geographic distribution does not seem to overlap, and is rather different from that of the index of education reforms reported in Figure A.8. This suggests that the three measures are unlikely to merely capture the same underlying, latent variable.

As we did for education reforms, we split the sample for counties above and below the median rate of intermarriage and residential integration during the 1910-1930 period. Then, we separately estimate the effects of immigration in each sub-sample

⁴⁰Piketty (2018) documents a higher propensity for educated people to vote for the left in France, Britain and the United States, although only for the most recent period.

⁴¹The only difference relative to Logan and Parman (2017) is that, in our case, we focus on natives-immigrants as the two groups, rather than on whites and blacks. Results are unchanged – in fact stronger – if we define residential segregation by including native born Americans with foreign born parents (i.e. second generation immigrants) in the “immigrant” group.

using 2SLS, to test if immigrants had a stronger effect on natives’ ideology in counties where, historically, inter-group contact was higher. 2SLS estimates are consistent with our hypothesis: the impact of immigration is significantly stronger in counties with higher intermarriage (Figure 6) and where immigrants were residentially more integrated (Figure 7). For most outcomes, 2SLS coefficients for counties with values of inter-group contact above the median (orange bars) are twice as large as those for counties below the median (blue bars).⁴² These patterns also indicate that our findings are not merely driven by the persistence of immigrants’ culture within ancestry. In fact, if this were to be the case, one would expect a smaller effect of immigration in areas where immigrants and natives interacted more often. Instead, they indicate that natives’ culture was “horizontally” influenced through socialization with individuals of other groups (i.e., immigrants).

7 From the Past to the Present

Sections 6.2 and 6.3 provide suggestive evidence that immigrants brought with them higher preferences for the welfare state, and transmitted them to natives. In this section, we examine the historical process that led to such diffusion. Andersen (1979) argues that immigrants were fundamental in explaining the New Deal electoral realignment. Instead of a “conversion” story in which American voters switched from the Republican to the Democratic Party, she proposes a “mobilization” theory. According to this view, support for Roosevelt (in the 1932 elections) had its origins in 1928, when Alfred Smith, an urban Catholic of immigrant background, was able to mobilize the immigrant urban vote to the Democratic Party.⁴³ In subsequent years, the process of realignment continued, reinforced by the fact that immigrants were hit hard during the Great Depression (Andersen, 1979; Clubb and Allen, 1969; Degler, 1964; Lubell, 1952).

We formally test the descriptive evidence associated with the view that “Al Smith, the rags-to-riches scion of the Fulton Fishmarket, was responsible for bringing the children of “new immigration” into an increasingly welfare-oriented Democratic party” (Clubb and Allen, 1969) by examining two sets of historical data. First, we look at the correlation between the Democratic vote share in presidential elections and immigration at the county level, from 1900 until today. This exercise allows us to inspect when

⁴²Coefficients and F-stats corresponding to Figures 6 and 7 are reported in Tables A.9 and A.10. For robustness, in Tables A.11 and A.12 we replicate this exercise considering 1900, i.e. prior to the period we consider to define the share of immigrants.

⁴³Al Smith was the first Roman Catholic to ever run for presidency for the Democratic Party. Historical accounts (Slayton, 2001) and results in Tabellini (2020) suggest that his religious affiliation was among the causes of his defeat, as anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiments among natives favored his opponent, Herbert Hoover.

the “shift” discussed in Clubb and Allen (1969) took place. Second, we study the relationship between New Deal expenditures and the 1910-1930 immigrant share, to test if higher immigration was associated with more generous welfare programs at the local level.

Figure 8 plots 2SLS coefficients on the 1910-1930 fraction of immigrants in yearly regressions, where the dependent variable is the Democratic vote share in presidential elections.⁴⁴ All regressions include the most stringent set of controls (i.e. the specification of Table 4, Panel E), are weighted by 1900 county population, and are estimated every 4 years, from 1900 until 2016.⁴⁵ While there is no statistically significant relationship between the 1910-1930 fraction of immigrants and the Democratic vote share until 1924 (included), the coefficient abruptly spikes in 1928, when it becomes strongly positive and highly statistically significant. The lack of a statistically significant relationship between 1910-1930 immigration and the Democratic vote share before 1928 is also reassuring as it indicates the lack of “pre-trends” in our sample about the historical presence of immigrants and political behavior. Although data on voting behavior broken down by ethnicity (or, nativity) do not exist, we view results displayed in Figure 8 as consistent with the “mobilization” hypothesis proposed by Andersen (1979).

Next, we study the effects of 1910-1930 European immigration on the generosity of New Deal spending at the county level. The New Deal represents one of the largest instances of social reforms in American history. We conjecture that the presence of European immigrants, with their strong support for government spending and redistribution, influenced the local allocation of relief programs. Data come from Fishback et al. (2003), who group New Deal expenditures in the following (per-capita) categories: relief expenditures, public work programs, farm programs, and housing loans and insurance.⁴⁶ The relief expenditure program – mostly directed to areas with high unemployment and with a large decline in economic activity in the early 1930s – was by far the most redistributive one. The redistributive content of the other programs was instead significantly lower. In particular, the farm program allocated more money to areas with larger farms, higher average incomes, and higher share of wealthier citizens. Similarly, public work programs tended to target areas with higher average retail sales per person. Finally, the loan programs distributed more funds in areas with higher levels of per capita retail sales, and with a higher percentage of households rich enough to pay income taxes. A priori, we thus expect the effect of immigration – if any – to be

⁴⁴Electoral returns at the county level come from Clubb et al. (1990) for 1900-1968, and from Leip’s Atlas (Leip, 2018) for 1972 to 2016.

⁴⁵We weigh regressions by 1900 population in order to recover the effects of immigration on the average US county, and to make our county-level analysis comparable to that conducted above when using individual level survey data. Results are unchanged when estimating unweighted regressions.

⁴⁶For more details on each specific program, see Fishback et al. (2003).

largest for the relief expenditure programs.

We estimate 2SLS regressions in Table 6. In all regressions, in addition to state fixed effects, we always include both the historical (1900) county controls and the instrumented immigrants' characteristics also included in Table 4.⁴⁷ To assess the implied magnitude of coefficients and to ease comparisons across outcomes, we also report beta coefficients in square brackets. Consistent with our hypothesis, the 1910-1930 fraction of immigrants is strongly associated with relief expenditure per capita (column 1) – the program with the highest degree of redistribution. For other programs, coefficients always have a small beta coefficient, which in some cases is even negative (column 2, for public work programs) or not statistically significant (column 4, for housing loans). Crucially, as shown in Panel B of Table 6, results are robust to controlling for the severity of the Great Depression, which we proxy for by using the sales growth rate from 1929-1933 (Feigenbaum, 2015; Fishback et al., 2003). Also in this case, our findings indicate that redistributive expenditures at the county level were stronger in counties with a larger presence of European immigrants.

8 Conclusions

Abundant evidence on the contribution of European immigrants to the American economy exists (Kennedy, 1964; Sequeira et al., 2020). However, much less is known about the impact that immigrants had on American ideology and political preferences in the long run. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap by studying the long-term consequences of historical immigration to the United States during the Age of Mass Migration on political ideology and preferences for redistribution of American born individuals today. We exploit variation in the presence of European immigrants across US counties between 1910 and 1930, combining 1900 settlements with the differential rates of immigration from different countries in the three subsequent decades, which were influenced by plausibly exogenous events such as WWI and the Immigration Acts.

We find that historical immigration had a strong effect on political ideology and preferences for redistribution. In particular, US born individuals living in counties with a higher historical immigrant share are, today, more left-leaning, more likely to vote for a Democratic candidate, and more supportive of government spending and redistribution. These results run counter to the large literature on the short-run effects of ethnic diversity and immigration (Alesina et al., 1999; Dustmann et al., 2019; Halla et al., 2017). They suggest that, over longer periods of time, immigrants might not only assimilate, converging to the culture of the new, host country (Abramitzky et al.,

⁴⁷As for Figure 8, regressions are weighed by 1900 county population, but results are unchanged when estimating unweighted regressions.

2014, 2019a), but also, that they might themselves influence the values and the norms prevailing receiving country.

In the second part of the paper, we explore the mechanisms responsible for our main findings. We first consider the possibility that European immigrants influenced American ideology in the long run through economic channels. However, in analyzing these mechanisms – the direct economic effects of immigrants, their economic characteristics, and their selection – we conclude that none of them is able to explain the positive effects of immigration on preferences for redistribution and on liberal, left-leaning ideology of American born individuals today. Instead, we advance the hypothesis that immigrants brought with them their preferences for the welfare state, which were then transmitted to US born individuals through a process of vertical and horizontal cultural transmission.

We provide evidence consistent with this idea in different ways. First, we measure preferences for the welfare state by using the number of years of education reform experienced by immigrants in their country of origin prior to the arrival in the United States. With this proxy at hand, we document that, conditioning on the immigrant share in a county, places where the “immigrant mix” originated from European countries with a longer history of education reforms display, today, stronger preferences for redistribution and higher support for the Democratic Party. We also show that immigration had a stronger effect in counties whose immigrants had been more exposed to welfare state policies prior to their arrival in the United States. Second, and consistent with a process of horizontal transmission, we find that the footprint left by immigrants more than one hundred years ago is stronger (today) in counties with a historically higher frequency of inter-group contact, measured as intermarriage between immigrants and natives and as residential integration of immigrants. We conclude by tracing out the relationship between European immigration and the Democratic vote share for the entire twentieth century. Consistent with Andersen (1979), we find that the 1928 elections, when Roman Catholic with immigrant background Alfred Smith ran for presidency for the Democratic Party, were key in the process of political realignment and in the corresponding incorporation of immigrants in the Democratic Party.

Findings in this paper highlight the importance of distinguishing between the short and the long run effects of diversity and immigration on political preferences and ideology in receiving countries. Although immigrants might be opposed, generate backlash, and reduce natives’ preferences for redistribution in the near term, they might eventually lead to higher social cohesion and stronger desire for generous government spending over a longer horizon of time. Moreover, our results indicate that immigrants’ assimilation is not a one-sided process, and that, instead, immigrants’ preferences might spill-over and be transmitted to natives, thereby contributing to a diverse and complex

culture, and to the development of a “melting-pot” society.

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
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
Figures and Tables

Figure 1. Immigrants by Region




Notes: Share of immigrant stock living in the United States, by sending region and by decade. Source: Authors' calculations from IPUMS sample of US Census (Ruggles et al. (2020)).

Figure 2. Total Number of Immigrants (in Thousands)




Notes: Annual inflow of immigrants to the United States (1850-1930). Source: Migration Policy Institute.

Figure 3. Fraction of European Immigrants over County Population (1910-1930)




Notes: the map plots the average share of European Immigrants (over county population) in the period 1910-1930 in our sample. Source: Authors' calculations from IPUMS sample of US Census (Ruggles et al. (2020)).

Figure 4. Share of Immigrants from Selected Countries in Different Counties




Notes: share of individuals of European ancestry living in US counties in 1900, for selected ethnic groups. Source: Authors' calculations using IPUMS data.

Figure 5. Heterogeneous Effects: Exposure to Education Reforms




Notes: the bars report the marginal effect of historical immigration (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the main outcomes of the analysis for counties with exposure to education reforms above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). Dependent variables are from CCES surveys: see Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The measure of exposure to education reforms is built from Bandiera et al. (2018) and Flora (1983); the variable is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020).

Figure 6. Heterogeneous Effects: Intermarriage (1910-1930)




Notes: the bars report the marginal effect of historical immigration (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the main outcomes of the analysis for counties with intermarriage rate above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). Dependent variables are from CCES surveys: see Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: share of urban population and share of black population in 1900, labor force, log of occupational score and manufacturing share in 1900, geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity, index of industry growth (1910-1930).

Figure 7. Heterogeneous Effects: Residential Integration (1910-1930)



Notes: the bars report the marginal effect of historical immigration (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) on the main outcomes of the analysis for counties with the index of residential integration – defined as the opposite of residential segregation in Logan and Parman (2017) – above (resp. below) the sample median in orange (resp. blue). Dependent variables are from CCES surveys: see Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. Individual controls include the following respondents’ characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020).

Figure 8. Effect of Historical Immigration on Democratic Vote Share



Notes: the figure plots 2SLS point estimates for the effects of the 1910-1930 average fraction of immigrants on the Democratic vote share in presidential elections. Regressions are estimated at the county-level and weighed by 1900 county population. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Regressions include the instrumented immigrants' characteristics. Dashed line represents 95% confidence interval.

Table 1. Summary Statistics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Panel A: Historical County Variables					
Fraction of Immigrants (1910-1930)	0.055	0.067	0	0.39	2,898
Predicted Fraction of Immigrants (1910-1930)	0.022	0.041	0	0.57	2,898
Urban Share (1900)	0.136	0.219	0	1	2,898
Black Share (1900)	0.134	0.213	0	0.94	2,898
Employment Share in Manufacturing Sector (1900)	0.060	0.065	0	0.44	2,898
Labor Force Share (1900)	0.832	0.058	0.39	1	2,898
Occupational Score (1900)	2.838	0.151	2.36	3.30	2,898
Industry Growth Index (1910-1930)	0.069	0.055	-0.04	0.24	2,898
Railroad Connectivity (1850-1900)	24.193	17.255	0	50	2,898
Panel B: County Immigrants' Characteristics (1910-1930)					
Exposure to Education Reforms	0	1	-3,54	4.3	2,898
Share of English-speaking Immigrants	0.848	0.079	0	0.98	2,898
Immigrants' Occupational Score	2.522	0.184	0	2.63	2,898
Immigrants working in Manufacturing	0.282	0.032	0	0.41	2,898
Share of Literate Immigrants	0.917	0.075	0	1	2,898
Share of Intermarried Immigrants	0.112	0.036	0	0.22	2,898
Index of Residential Integration	0.929	0.089	0.30	1.01	2,876
Panel C: CCES Ideology					
Ideology	2.883	1.145	1	5	405,197
Party Affiliation Scale (R to D)	4.271	2.198	1	7	422,101
Democratic Party Indicator	0.380	0.485	0	1	410,015
Voted Democratic Candidate	0.509	0.500	0	1	319,134
Panel D: CCES Preferences for Redistribution					
Oppose Spending Cuts	0.589	0.492	0	1	379,541
Support Welfare Spending	2.818	1.199	1	5	148,194
Support Minimum Wage Increase	0.720	0.449	0	1	185,846
Finance Deficit with Taxes	0.402	0.265	0	1	288,796

Table 2. Political Ideology, Preferences for Redistribution and Historical Presence of Immigrants

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: OLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.196*** (0.123)	2.893*** (0.226)	0.635*** (0.0427)	0.614*** (0.0529)	0.376*** (0.0462)	1.471*** (0.213)	0.424*** (0.0439)	0.189*** (0.0264)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.084*** (0.147)	2.715*** (0.288)	0.598*** (0.0569)	0.585*** (0.0684)	0.340*** (0.0597)	1.491*** (0.323)	0.405*** (0.0543)	0.182*** (0.0272)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.418*** (0.112)	1.420*** (0.111)	1.420*** (0.112)	1.417*** (0.114)	1.420*** (0.111)	1.430*** (0.114)	1.417*** (0.108)	1.424*** (0.113)
KP F-stat	160	162.3	161	154.5	163.2	157.1	171	159.4
Observations	360,545	374,603	363,926	284,642	336,932	132,609	165,454	256,774
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90 (1.14)	4.31 (2.20)	0.39 (0.49)	0.52 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	2.84 (1.20)	0.73 (0.45)	0.41 (0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.055 and its standard deviation is 0.067. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 3. Redistribution, Ideology and Immigration - Second Stage with Historical Controls

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: OLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.706*** (0.133)	2.062*** (0.250)	0.507*** (0.0455)	0.384*** (0.0625)	0.223*** (0.0515)	1.031*** (0.244)	0.294*** (0.0507)	0.0950*** (0.0285)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.684*** (0.174)	2.018*** (0.346)	0.486*** (0.0635)	0.399*** (0.0850)	0.220*** (0.0726)	1.185*** (0.391)	0.298*** (0.0679)	0.103*** (0.0359)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.241*** (0.0854)	1.243*** (0.0853)	1.243*** (0.0856)	1.238*** (0.0867)	1.243*** (0.0854)	1.252*** (0.0873)	1.239*** (0.0830)	1.242*** (0.0871)
KP F-stat	211.2	212	210.5	204	211.8	205.7	223	203.1
Observations	360,545	374,603	363,926	284,642	336,932	132,609	165,454	256,774
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90 (1.14)	4.31 (2.20)	0.39 (0.49)	0.52 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	2.84 (1.20)	0.73 (0.45)	0.41 (0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.055 and its S.D. is 0.067. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table 4. Redistribution, Ideology and Immigration - Second Stage with Instrumented Immigrants' Characteristics

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: English Speaking Ability</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.749*** (0.207)	2.097*** (0.403)	0.533*** (0.0712)	0.438*** (0.0976)	0.234*** (0.0840)	1.371*** (0.428)	0.356*** (0.0751)	0.106*** (0.0404)
English-Speaking Immigrants	0.124 (0.189)	0.152 (0.354)	0.091 (0.067)	0.075 (0.088)	0.027 (0.072)	0.355* (0.197)	0.111* (0.063)	0.007 (0.03)
KP F-stat	17.52	17.97	17.91	17.58	17.81	19.53	18.27	18.85
<i>Panel B: Occupational Income Score</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.676*** (0.174)	1.997*** (0.347)	0.481*** (0.0636)	0.397*** (0.0849)	0.220*** (0.0724)	1.179*** (0.391)	0.290*** (0.0683)	0.104*** (0.0358)
Immigrants' Income Score	0.044 (0.072)	0.113 (0.14)	0.024 (0.028)	0.006 (0.034)	-0.002 (0.031)	0.031 (0.076)	0.040 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.016)
KP F-stat	5.114	5.282	5.230	5.189	5.261	5.787	5.162	5.376
<i>Panel C: Employment in Manufacturing</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.757*** (0.183)	2.118*** (0.366)	0.509*** (0.0668)	0.439*** (0.0883)	0.244*** (0.0758)	1.303*** (0.401)	0.321*** (0.0694)	0.124*** (0.0364)
Immigrants working in Manufacturing	-0.619 (0.389)	-0.840 (0.700)	-0.192 (0.132)	-0.334** (0.166)	-0.197 (0.134)	-0.969** (0.439)	-0.200 (0.125)	-0.181** (0.079)
KP F-stat	58.03	59.47	59.15	58.38	59.23	62.58	60.07	62.58

Table 4, Continued

<i>Panel D: Literacy</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.739*** (0.187)	2.118*** (0.369)	0.523*** (0.0656)	0.433*** (0.0901)	0.230*** (0.0780)	1.280*** (0.410)	0.330*** (0.0709)	0.100*** (0.0377)
Share of Literate	0.183 (0.195)	0.330 (0.376)	0.121* (0.073)	0.113 (0.093)	0.033 (0.077)	0.317 (0.209)	0.109 (0.038)	-0.008 (0.0384)
KP F-stat	8.557	8.776	8.724	8.564	8.667	9.619	8.956	9.281
<i>Panel E: All Immigrants' Characteristics</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.687*** (0.235)	1.912*** (0.448)	0.512*** (0.0799)	0.418*** (0.107)	0.232** (0.0914)	1.431*** (0.442)	0.346*** (0.0814)	0.117*** (0.0437)
KP F-stat	13	13.08	13.39	15.41	12.74	13.15	13.68	14.18
Observations	360,545	374,603	363,926	284,642	336,932	132,609	165,454	256,774
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90 (1.14)	4.31 (2.20)	0.39 (0.49)	0.52 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	2.84 (1.20)	0.73 (0.45)	0.41 (0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.055 and its S.D. is 0.067. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). The definition and construction of the variables related to immigrants' characteristics can be found in Table A.2. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table 5. Mechanisms: Exposure to Education Reforms

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.600*** (0.219)	1.774*** (0.424)	0.491*** (0.0775)	0.384*** (0.0997)	0.210** (0.0880)	1.332*** (0.417)	0.333*** (0.0791)	0.102** (0.0412)
Exposure to Education Reforms	0.0521*** (0.0173)	0.0822*** (0.0308)	0.0128** (0.0055)	0.0212*** (0.0075)	0.0131** (0.006)	0.0549*** (0.0172)	0.00813 (0.0052)	0.00944*** (0.0032)
KP F-stat	11.75	11.89	12.10	13.73	11.51	11.93	12.57	12.54
Observations	360,545	374,603	363,926	284,642	336,932	132,609	165,454	256,774
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90 (1.14)	4.31 (2.20)	0.39 (0.49)	0.52 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	2.84 (1.20)	0.73 (0.45)	0.41 (0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Instrumented Immigrants' Characteristics	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.055 and its S.D. is 0.067. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. The measure of exposure to education reforms is built from Bandiera et al (2018) and Flora (1987); the variable is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.


Table 6. Immigration and New Deal Expenditures

Dep. Variables	Relief Expenditure per capita	Public Work Program per capita	Farm Program per capita	Housing Loans and Insurance per capita
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Baseline Specification</i>				
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	183.0*** (27.92) [0.267***]	-43.72* (22.45) [-0.0277*]	133.9*** (20.23) [0.0826***]	-4.673 (56.48) [-0.0064]
KP F-stat	103	103	103	103
<i>Panel B: Controlling for Sales Growth Rate</i>				
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	183.2*** (27.99) [0.267***]	-39.93* (22.24) [-0.0253*]	130.7*** (20.25) [0.0806***]	-6.208 (56.9) [-0.0085]
Sales Growth Rate	1.47 (4.317)	21.20*** (5.008)	-17.31*** (4.174)	-8.441 (8.208)
KP F-stat	72.29	72.29	72.29	72.29
Observations	2972	2972	2972	2972
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	76.71 (46.99)	31.92 (44.24)	37.61 (53.64)	68.49 (71.25)
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Instrumented Immigrants' Characteristics	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables and the sales growth rate are taken from Fishback et al. (2003). Relief Expenditure (column 1) and Public Work Program (column 2) per capita refer to the total amount of Relief grants and public works grants, respectively; Farm Program per capita (column 3) aggregates loans and grants provided by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, the Farm Security Administration, and the Rural Electrification Administration; Housing Loans and Insurance per capita (column 4) refers to the total amount of grants and loans provided by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, the Farm Housing Administration (insured loans), and the US Housing Administration. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. All regressions include state fixed effects and are weighed by 1900 county population. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Immigrants' characteristics are: English-speaking ability, literacy, occupational income score, and the employment share in manufacturing. Square brackets report beta coefficients. Robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

A Appendix – Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A.1. Immigrants as Percent of US Population




Notes: the solid line shows the number of legal immigrants as a percent of US population. The dashed line includes also the estimated number of illegal immigrants, available from 2000 onwards. Source: the number of legal immigrants comes from the Migration Policy Institute, while the number of illegal immigrants was taken from the Pew Research Center tabulations.

Figure A.2. Share of European Immigrants: “High” and “Low” Restrictions




Notes: Share of European immigrants entering the US in each year between 1900 and 1930, classified as coming from countries exposed to “high” and “low” restrictions to immigration according to Abramitzky et al. (2019d). Source: Authors’ calculations from IPUMS sample of US Census (Ruggles et al. (2020))

Figure A.3. Preferences for Redistribution and Exposure to Education Reform




Notes: : The figure plots the preferences for redistribution for the first-generation immigrants by country of origin, over the logarithm of the year of the Education Reform. Both y-axis and x-axis report the residuals of the specific variable obtained after partialling out the logarithm of the GDP for each country. The observations are weighted according to the number of observations for each country of origin. The blue solid line shows the relationship between the two variables when we do not include Denmark in the sample. The dashed red line shows the relationship including Denmark. The coefficient for the regression including Denmark is -3.450 with robust standard errors equal to 2.315.

Figure A.4. Fraction of European Immigrants: Partialling Out State fixed effects



Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the average share of European Immigrants (over county population) in the period 1910-1930 in our sample after partialling out State fixed effect. Source: Authors' calculations from IPUMS sample of US Census (Ruggles et al. (2020)).


Figure A.5. Share of Immigrants from Selected Countries in Massachusetts, 1900




Notes: share of individuals of European ancestry living in Massachusetts counties in 1900, for selected ethnic groups. Source: Authors' calculations using IPUMS data

Figure A.6. Ideology and Preferences for Redistribution: Partialling Out State fixed effects

Panel A: Voted Democratic Candidate




Panel B: Support Welfare Spending




Notes: the map plots the quintiles of two outcomes: voted for Democratic candidate at Presidential Elections and support State welfare spending after partialling out State fixed effect.

Figure A.7. First Stage (Residual Bin-Scatterplot)




Notes: The y-axis (resp. x-axis) reports the actual (resp. predicted) average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The scatterplot pools observations into 50 bins. Each point in the scatter diagram represents the residuals of the two variables, after partialling out State fixed effects, and 1900 historical controls. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). The red, solid line refers to the slope of the first stage coefficient, which is also reported in the main diagram (with associated clustered standard errors at the county level).

Figure A.8. Exposure to Education Reforms: Partialling Out State fixed effects




Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the exposure to education reforms after partialling out State fixed effect.

Figure A.9. Intermarriage (1910-1930): Partialling Out State fixed effects



Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the average intermarriage rate between 1910 and 1930 after partialling out State fixed effect.

Figure A.10. Residential Integration (1910-1930): Partialling Out State fixed effects



Notes: the map plots the quintiles of the index of residential segregation computed in the period 1910-1930 after partialling out State fixed effect.

Table A.1. Immigrants and Exposure to Education Reform

Countries	Education Reform (Year of Introduction)
Albania	1928
Austria	1869
Belgium	1914
Bulgaria	n/a
Czechoslovakia	n/a
Denmark	1814
Estonia	n/a
Finland	1921
France	1882
Germany	1871
Greece	1834
Hungary	n/a
Ireland	1892
Italy	1877
Latvia	n/a
Lithuania	n/a
Netherlands	1900
Norway	1827
Poland	1918
Portugal	1835
Romania	n/a
Russia (Jewish)	n/a
Russia (No Jewish)	1918
Spain	1857
Sweden	1842
Switzerland	1874
United Kingdom	1880
Yugoslavia	n/a

Notes: the table presents the list of European countries included in our analysis, together with the year in which education reforms were introduced (column 2). The date reported for Education Reform is based on Bandiera et al. (2018), except for Austria and Germany. In the latter case, we follow the definition in Flora (1983).

Table A.2. Independent Variables: Definition and Construction

Variable	Description	Source
Fraction of immigrants (1910-1930)	Average across decades of European Immigrant share over decade county population	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Predicted fraction of immigrants (1910-1930)	Average across decades of predicted European Immigrant share over 1900 county population (Leave-out instrument adapted from Tabellini, 2020)	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Urban share (1900)	People in places with +2,500 inhabitants over county population	ICPSR Study 2896, Haines et al. (2010)
Black share (1900)	Black share over county population	ICPSR Study 2896, Haines et al. (2010)
Labore Force Share (1900)	Men in labor force over men aged 15-64	Ruggles et al. (2020)
Employment share in manufacturing share (1900)	Share of men employed in manufacturing, relative to men in the labor force	Ruggles et al. (2020)
Occupational score (1900)	Average of $\log(1+\text{occupational score})$ for men in the labor force	Ruggles et al. (2020)
Connectivity to the Railroad (1850-1900)	Years of connection to the Railroad in the period 1850-1900	Sequeira, Nunn, and Qian (2020)
Industry Growth Index	Share of employment in different industries in each county in 1900 interacted with the national growth rate of each industry for each decade between 1900 and 1930.	Data from Ruggles et al. (2020), adapted from Tabellini (2020)
County Geographic Coordinates	Latitude and longitude of the county centroid.	Manson et al. (2017)
Exposure to education reforms	Weighted average of the number of years between 1910 and the year of introduction of education reform for each immigrant group, weighted by the relative share of immigrants from each country in the county between 1910 and 1930. If no reform was introduced in the country of origin prior to 1910, we assign a value of 0 to the immigrant-specific exposure to education reform.	Bandiera et al (2018); for Germany and Austria-Hungary, Flora (1987)
Intermarriage (1910-1930)	Average across decades of the share of immigrants being married with native (with native parents) over all married immigrants. Sample is both men and women	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Share of English-speaking immigrants (1910-1930)	Average across decades of the share of English-speaker immigrants over all immigrants. Sample restricted to men aged 15-64	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Immigrants' income score (1910-1930)	Average across decades of the average on labor force of $\log(1+\text{occupational score})$. Labor force restricted to immigrant men aged 15-64	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Immigrants working in manufacturing (1910-1930)	Average across decades of the share of immigrants (men aged 15-64) employed in manufacture over immigrants in labor force	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)
Share of literate immigrants (1910-1930)	Average across decades of the share of literate immigrants over all immigrants. Sample restricted to men aged 15-64	Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. (2020)

Table A.3. Immigrants' Preferences for Redistribution and Year of Introduction of Education Reforms in the Countries of Origin, European Social Survey

Dep. Variable	Preferences for Redistribution	
	<i>Denmark Included</i>	<i>Denmark NOT Included</i>
	(1)	(2)
Log Year of Introduction of Education Reforms	-3.534*	-4.574***
	(1.730)	(1.559)
Observations	11,489	11,305
Cluster	Y	Y
N. Clusters	19	18
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	3.835 (1.048)	3.839 (1.048)
Individual Controls	Y	Y

Notes: Each regression controls for gender, a quadratic in age, logarithm of years of education, employment and marital status, income and logarithm of GDP from the immigrants' countries of origin. Regressions also include round fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. Regressions use data from the European Social Survey, including rounds from 1 to 8. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.4. Dependent Variables: Definition and Construction

Variable	Question	Answers coded as	Years
Panel A. CCES Ideology			
Ideology	In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint?	From 1=very conservative to 5=very liberal	2006-2018
Party Affiliation Scale (R to D)	Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as: Strong democrat, not very strong democrat, lean democrat, independent, lean republican, not very strong republican, strong republican.	From 1=strong republican to 7=strong democrat	2006-2018
Democratic Party Indicator	Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a: democrat, republican, independent.	Indicator equal 1 for Democrat, 0 for Republican or Independent	2006-2018
Voted Democratic Candidate	For whom did you vote for President of the United States?	Indicator equal 1 if voted Democrat and 0 for Independent or Republican	2006-2018
Panel B. CCES Preferences for Redistribution			
Oppose spending cuts	The federal budget deficit is approximately XXX trillion this year. If the Congress were to balance the budget it would have to consider cutting defense spending, cutting domestic spending (such as Medicare and Social Security), or raising taxes to cover the deficit. What would you most prefer that Congress do - cut domestic spending, cut defense spending, or raise taxes?	Indicator equal 1 if preferred option is not to cut spending	2006, 2008, 2010-2018
Support welfare spending	State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase or decrease spending on the five areas below? Welfare spending.	From 1=most decrease to 5=most increase	2014, 2016, 2018
Support minimum wage increase	Do you favor or oppose raising the minimum wage to \$X an hour over the next two years, or not? OR If your state put the following questions for a vote on the ballot, would you vote FOR or AGAINST? Raise the minimum wage to \$X/hour?	Indicator equal 1 if in favor	2006-2008, 2016, 2018
Finance deficit with taxes	If your state were to have a budget deficit this year it would have to raise taxes on income and sales or cut spending, such as on education, health care, welfare, and road construction. What would you prefer more, raising taxes or cutting spending? Choose a point along the scale from 0 to 100	Normalize range to 0-1, where 1=100% taxes and 0% cuts	2006-2017

Table A.5. Summary Statistics, CCES - Individual Characteristics

Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs
Age	49.51	16.14	18	99	374,603
Female	0.53	0.50	0	1	374,603
Male	0.47	0.50	0	1	374,603
Black	0.11	0.31	0	1	374,603
White	0.75	0.43	0	1	374,603
Other	0.14	0.34	0	1	374,603
Single	0.27	0.44	0	1	374,603
Married	0.56	0.50	0	1	374,603
Widowed	0.05	0.21	0	1	374,603
Separated	0.13	0.34	0	1	374,603
No High School	0.03	0.17	0	1	374,603
High School	0.27	0.45	0	1	374,603
More than High School	0.70	0.46	0	1	374,603
Employed	0.54	0.50	0	1	374,603
Unemployed	0.06	0.24	0	1	374,603
Out of Labor Force	0.41	0.49	0	1	374,603
Income < 10K	0.04	0.20	0	1	374,603
10K < Income < 20K	0.08	0.27	0	1	374,603
20K < Income < 30K	0.11	0.32	0	1	374,603
30K < Income < 40K	0.12	0.32	0	1	374,603
40K < Income < 50K	0.10	0.31	0	1	374,603
50K < Income < 60K	0.10	0.30	0	1	374,603
60K < Income < 70K	0.08	0.26	0	1	374,603
70K < Income < 80K	0.08	0.27	0	1	374,603
80K < Income < 100K	0.10	0.29	0	1	374,603
100K < Income < 120K	0.07	0.25	0	1	374,603
120K < Income < 150K	0.05	0.23	0	1	374,603
Income > 150K	0.06	0.24	0	1	374,603

Table A.6. Baseline Specification with Individual Controls Coefficients

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.706*** (0.133) [0.0512]	2.062*** (0.250) [0.0787]	0.507*** (0.0455) [0.0854]	0.384*** (0.0625) [0.0683]	0.223*** (0.0515) [0.0386]	1.031*** (0.244) [0.0857]	0.294*** (0.0507) [0.057]	0.0950*** (0.0285) [0.0329]
Age	-0.0052*** (0.0007) [-0.074]	0.0203*** (0.0013) [0.148]	0.0023*** (0.0003) [0.0758]	-0.0007* (0.0004) [-0.0216]	0.0043*** (0.0003) [0.142]	-0.0059*** (0.0012) [-0.080]	0.0024*** (0.0004) [0.085]	-0.0016*** (0.0002) [-0.0960]
Age squared	-7.01e-06 (7.28e-06) [-0.0098]	-0.0002*** (1.35e-05) [-0.1627]	-2.05e-05*** (3.06e-06) [-0.067]	-7.09e-06** (3.54e-06) [-0.0227]	-5.35e-05*** (3.30e-06) [-0.174]	-1.45e-05 (1.24e-05) [-0.0199]	-3.18e-05*** (4.21e-06) [-0.114]	1.31e-05*** (2.12e-06) [0.077]
Female	0.207*** (0.004) [0.0895]	0.394*** (0.007) [0.1186]	0.116*** (0.0016) [0.0922]	0.0922*** (0.0018) [0.0789]	0.0775*** (0.0017) [0.030]	0.0731*** (0.0066) [0.1185]	0.106*** (0.0022) [0.0792]	0.0417*** (0.001)
Black	0.239*** (0.0063) [0.0649]	1.686*** (0.0115) [0.241]	0.367*** (0.0026) [0.236]	0.409*** (0.003) [0.257]	0.126*** (0.0028) [0.081]	0.421*** (0.0113) [0.1046]	0.189*** (0.0038) [0.1262]	0.0548*** (0.0019) [0.0585]
Other Race	0.0661*** (0.006) [0.0199]	0.458*** (0.0104) [0.0717]	0.0823*** (0.002) [0.0579]	0.0925*** (0.0028) [0.061]	0.0266*** (0.0025) [0.0188]	0.0621*** (0.0098) [0.0178]	0.0559*** (0.003) [0.0433]	-0.00616*** (0.0016) [-0.0078]
Married	-0.381*** (0.005) [-0.165]	-0.595*** (0.009) [-0.134]	-0.0981*** (0.002) [-0.0999]	-0.139*** (0.0024) [-0.138]	-0.114*** (0.0023) [-0.115]	-0.153*** (0.0085) [-0.0636]	-0.0661*** (0.0029) [-0.0735]	-0.0604*** (0.0014) [-0.113]
Widowed	-0.278*** (0.010) [-0.051]	-0.417*** (0.0186) [-0.0395]	-0.0727*** (0.0042) [-0.031]	-0.115*** (0.0047) [-0.0496]	-0.0647*** (0.0046) [-0.027]	-0.0869*** (0.0168) [-0.016]	-0.0349*** (0.006) [-0.016]	-0.0455*** (0.0029) [-0.0356]

Table A.6, Continued

Divorced	-0.179*** (0.0067) [-0.052]	-0.308*** (0.012) [-0.0469]	-0.0611*** (0.0028) [-0.042]	-0.0696*** (0.0032) [-0.047]	-0.0402*** (0.00301) [-0.0276]	-0.0459*** (0.0114) [-0.013]	-0.0200*** (0.00395) [-0.0147]	-0.0300*** (0.0019) [-0.036]
Unemployed	0.0068 (0.0083) [0.0014]	-0.0233 (0.015) [-0.003]	-0.0229*** (0.0035) [-0.011]	-0.0158*** (0.0041) [-0.007]	0.0103*** (0.0036) [0.005]	0.145*** (0.0152) [0.0265]	0.0408*** (0.0054) [0.0187]	-0.00152 (0.0024) [-0.001]
Out Labor Force	0.0213*** (0.0044) [0.0091]	0.0575*** (0.0081) [0.0128]	0.0035* (0.0019) [0.0035]	0.0144*** (0.0021) [0.014]	0.0436*** (0.00198) [0.0436]	0.132*** (0.0077) [0.0545]	0.0203*** (0.0026) [0.022]	0.0249*** (0.0012) [0.046]
High School	-0.0238** (0.0119) [-0.009]	-0.120*** (0.0210) [-0.024]	-0.0081* (0.0048) [-0.007]	-0.0243*** (0.006) [-0.021]	-0.0123** (0.0051) [-0.011]	-0.181*** (0.0213) [-0.066]	-0.0274*** (0.0065) [-0.0275]	-0.0200*** (0.0036) [-0.033]
More than	0.175*** (0.0117) [0.069]	0.0965*** (0.0207) [0.0202]	0.0099** (0.00476) [0.009]	0.0388*** (0.0063) [0.034]	0.0337*** (0.005) [0.031]	-0.0508** (0.021) [-0.019]	-0.0630*** (0.0064) [-0.065]	0.0158*** (0.0035) [0.0269]
Income 10-20K	0.0644*** (0.011) [0.0149]	0.107*** (0.02) [0.013]	0.0306*** (0.0046) [0.0169]	0.0172*** (0.0057) [0.009]	0.0424*** (0.0048) [0.236]	-0.0997*** (0.0189) [-0.022]	0.0102 (0.0066) [0.005]	0.00693** (0.0033) [0.007]
Income 20-30K	0.0344*** (0.0109) [0.009]	0.0487** (0.019) [0.007]	0.0235*** (0.0044) [0.015]	0.0019 (0.0055) [0.001]	0.0115** (0.0046) [0.007]	-0.314*** (0.0181) [-0.082]	0.00113 (0.0063) [0.0008]	-0.013*** (0.0032) [-0.016]
Income 30-40K	0.0160 (0.0109) [0.004]	-0.0011 (0.0194) [-0.0002]	0.0205*** (0.0045) [0.013]	-0.0014 (0.006) [-0.001]	-0.0031 (0.005) [-0.002]	-0.459*** (0.018) [-0.123]	-0.0227*** (0.0064) [-0.016]	-0.0218*** (0.003) [-0.026]
Income 40-50K	0.0129 (0.011) [0.003]	-0.0604*** (0.0198) [-0.008]	0.0119*** (0.0046) [0.007]	-0.00768 (0.0056) [-0.005]	-0.0197*** (0.0048) [-0.012]	-0.542*** (0.0186) [-0.136]	-0.0421*** (0.0065) [-0.0285]	-0.0309*** (0.0033) [-0.036]

Table A.6, Continued

Income 50-60K	0.0013 (0.011) [0.0003]	-0.108*** (0.020) [-0.015]	0.0061 (0.0046) [0.0038]	-0.0121** (0.0056) [-0.007]	-0.0337*** (0.0048) [-0.021]	-0.579*** (0.0188) [-0.145]	-0.0620*** (0.0065) [-0.0418]	-0.0353*** (0.0033) [-0.041]
Income 60-70K	0.0065 (0.012) [0.0015]	-0.0907*** (0.0211) [-0.011]	0.0075 (0.0048) [0.004]	-0.004 (0.0059) [-0.002]	-0.0295*** (0.0051) [-0.016]	-0.606*** (0.0196) [-0.136]	-0.0623*** (0.007) [-0.0378]	-0.0339*** (0.0034) [-0.0343]
Income 70-80K	0.0230** (0.012) [0.006]	-0.0946*** (0.021) [-0.012]	0.0103** (0.048) [0.0058]	-0.005 (0.0058) [-0.003]	-0.0389*** (0.005) [-0.0216]	-0.581*** (0.0196) [-0.132]	-0.0681*** (0.007) [-0.042]	-0.0333*** (0.003) [-0.035]
Income 80-100K	0.0437*** (0.0115) [0.011]	-0.0870*** (0.021) [-0.012]	0.0125*** (0.0047) [0.0075]	0.00422 (0.0057) [0.003]	-0.0393*** (0.005) [-0.023]	-0.631*** (0.0193) [-0.156]	-0.0728*** (0.007) [-0.049]	-0.0314*** (0.0034) [-0.036]
Income 100-120K	0.0477*** (0.012) [0.0108]	-0.0760*** (0.0218) [-0.009]	0.0187*** (0.005) [0.0098]	0.0133** (0.006) [0.007]	-0.0420*** (0.0053) [-0.022]	-0.603*** (0.0205) [-0.128]	-0.0889*** (0.0070) [-0.057]	-0.0262*** (0.0035) [-0.026]
Income 120-150K	0.0540*** (0.0126) [0.011]	-0.0955*** (0.0228) [-0.0100]	0.0106** (0.0052) [0.005]	0.0160*** (0.0062) [0.008]	-0.0423*** (0.0055) [-0.0198]	-0.619*** (0.0211) [-0.123]	-0.0849*** (0.0073) [-0.045]	-0.0221*** (0.0036) [-0.0199]
Income > 150K	0.0903*** (0.012) [0.0196]	-0.0743*** (0.022) [-0.008]	0.0159*** (0.0051) [0.008]	0.0323*** (0.0061) [0.016]	-0.0393*** (0.0054) [-0.019]	-0.608*** (0.021) [-0.128]	-0.0812*** (0.0072) [-0.046]	-0.0213*** (0.0036) [-0.0203]
Observations	360,545	374,603	363,926	284,642	336,932	132,609	165,454	256,774
KP F-Stat	211.2	212	210.5	204	211.8	205.7	223	203.1

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. This table reports all individual controls associated with the regressions reported in Table 3, Panel B. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.058 and its standard deviation is 0.068. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in Section 4.2 of the paper. Square brackets report beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table A.7. Baseline Specification: Controlling for Intergenerational Mobility

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.673*** (0.174)	1.982*** (0.341)	0.483*** (0.0619)	0.401*** (0.0830)	0.213*** (0.0714)	1.137*** (0.393)	0.279*** (0.0679)	0.101*** (0.0355)
Immigrants' Intergenerational Mobility Index	0.0037 (0.0117)	0.0119 (0.0226)	0.0009 (0.0045)	-0.0007 (0.0055)	0.0023 (0.0046)	0.0161 (0.0122)	0.0062 (0.0041)	0.0008 (0.0023)
Observations	360,545	374,603	363,926	284,642	336,932	132,609	165,454	256,774
KP F-stat	11.04	11.25	11.20	10.96	11.16	12.15	11.44	11.63
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90 (1.14)	4.31 (2.20)	0.39 (0.49)	0.52 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	2.84 (1.20)	0.73 (0.45)	0.41 (0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.058 and its standard deviation is 0.068. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. The measure of social mobility is built from Abramitzky et al (2019) and reflects, by nationality, the predict income rank of son whose immigrant father was in 25th income percentile; its mean and standard deviation are 0.411 and 0.028. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: share of urban population and share of black population in 1900, labor force, log of occupational score manufacturing share, geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity, index of industry growth, average immigrant share in 1900 in each county. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Immigrants' characteristics are: English-speaking ability, literacy, income score and employment in manufacturing. Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.8. Sample Split around Exposure to Education Reforms Median

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Education Reform Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.406*** (0.389)	3.267*** (0.702)	0.619*** (0.130)	0.724*** (0.174)	0.492*** (0.146)	1.413*** (0.539)	0.639*** (0.122)	0.224*** (0.0710)
Observations	172,736	178,786	173,738	136,669	160,738	62,596	78,684	124,327
KP F-stat	96.85	97.49	97.39	96.99	96.85	95.68	97.45	96.89
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.21(2.20)	0.37(0.48)	0.50(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.84(1.21)	0.71(0.45)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.10(0.08)	0.10(0.08)	0.10(0.08)	0.10(0.08)	0.10(0.08)	0.10(0.08)	0.10(0.08)	0.10(0.08)
<i>Panel B: Education Reform Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.110 (0.154)	1.029*** (0.344)	0.330*** (0.0719)	0.0628 (0.0742)	0.0254 (0.0586)	0.350** (0.178)	0.0568 (0.0682)	-0.0467 (0.0335)
Observations	187,808	195,816	190,187	147,972	176,193	70,013	86,768	132,446
KP F-stat	264.7	262.9	263.6	262.4	262.5	262.6	264.6	267.2
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.93(1.13)	4.40(2.20)	0.41(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.60(0.49)	2.84(1.19)	0.74(0.44)	0.41(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)	0.09(0.09)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Immigrants' Characteristics	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
T-test [p-value]	[0.007]***	[0.009]***	[0.075]*	[0.001]***	[0.009]***	[0.078]*	[0.000]***	[0.005]***

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. The measure of exposure to education reforms is built from Bandiera et al (2018) and Flora (1987); the variable is standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Here the sample is split around the median of this index in the estimation sample (-0.188). The last row reports the p-value of the t-test for equality between coefficients above and below the median. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.9. Sample Split around Intermarriage (1910-1930)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Intermarriage Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	2.072*** (0.517) [0.155]***	4.406*** (0.931) [0.172]***	0.881*** (0.166) [0.156]***	1.045*** (0.225) [0.180]***	0.540*** (0.181) [0.0943]***	1.704*** (0.452) [0.122]***	0.687*** (0.168) [0.131]***	0.233** (0.0997) [0.0758]**
Observations	180,352	187,154	181,837	142,110	168,006	65,751	82,630	129,465
KP F-stat	312.1	313.8	313.7	298.7	323.8	327.56	353	311.2
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.84(1.14)	4.15(2.20)	0.36(0.48)	0.49(0.50)	0.58(0.49)	2.81(1.19)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)
<i>Panel B: Intermarriage Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.383* (0.218) [0.0287]*	1.537*** (0.441) [0.0601]***	0.420*** (0.0742) [0.0743]***	0.288*** (0.0975) [0.0495]***	0.134 (0.0880) [0.0234]	1.158** (0.497) [0.0829]**	0.198** (0.0797) [0.0378]**	0.0461 (0.0417) [0.0150]
Observations	180,193	187,449	182,089	142,532	168,926	66,858	82,824	127,309
KP F-stat	440.3	449.8	447.9	441.6	443.4	427.4	439	454.8
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.96(1.14)	4.46(2.19)	0.42(0.49)	0.55(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.86(1.20)	0.75(0.43)	0.41(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)	0.13(0.09)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Immigrants' Characteristics	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
T-test [p-value]	[0.009]***	[0.078]*	[0.000]***	[0.005]***	[0.007]***	[0.009]***	[0.075]*	[0.001]***

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. The measure of intermarriage is the average share of intermarried over married immigrants in 1910-1930 period: we consider an immigrants to be intermarried if married with a native with both parents being native. Here the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (0.1023). The last row reports the p-value of the t-test for equality between the coefficients above and below median. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Significance levels: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.

Table A.10. Sample Split around Residential Integration (1910-1930)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential Integration Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	2.781*** (0.707) [0.209]***	5.622*** (1.222) [0.220]***	1.060*** (0.224) [0.188]***	1.277*** (0.309) [0.219]***	0.795*** (0.247) [0.139]***	2.191*** (0.731) [0.157]***	1.060*** (0.233) [0.203]***	0.288** (0.130) [0.0936]**
Observations	178,719	185,934	180,398	140,234	166,480	65,113	82,092	126,784
KP F-stat	100.7	101.6	101.9	100.3	99.43	93.13	98.15	97.98
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.80(1.14)	4.12(2.22)	0.36(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.57(0.50)	2.81(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.40(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.03(0.03)	0.03(0.03)	0.03(0.03)	0.03(0.03)	0.03(0.03)	0.03(0.03)	0.03(0.03)	0.03(0.03)
<i>Panel B: Residential Integration Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.409* (0.210) [0.0307]*	1.584*** (0.415) [0.0619]***	0.438*** (0.0697) [0.0774]***	0.324*** (0.0946) [0.0557]***	0.128 (0.0803) [0.0224]	1.158** (0.479) [0.0830]**	0.221*** (0.0775) [0.0423]***	0.0526 (0.0428) [0.0171]
Observations	180,894	187,692	182,573	143,659	169,581	67,130	82,927	129,330
KP F-stat	485.3	488.4	487.2	476.8	483.6	469.6	488.9	482.3
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	3.01(1.14)	4.50(2.17)	0.42(0.50)	0.56(0.50)	0.63(0.48)	2.87(1.20)	0.75(0.43)	0.41(0.27)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Immigrants' Characteristics	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
T-test [p-value]	[0.002]***	[0.003]***	[0.011]**	[0.004]***	[0.012]**	[0.245]	[0.001]***	[0.090]*

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. Residential integration (1910-1930) is defined as the opposite of residential segregation in Logan and Parman (2017): the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (0.9266). The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.11. Sample Split around Intermarriage (1900)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Intermarriage (1900) Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.756*** (0.588) [0.131]***	3.308*** (0.940) [0.129]***	0.597*** (0.170) [0.105]***	0.677*** (0.233) [0.116]***	0.420** (0.197) [0.0730]**	1.149** (0.502) 0.0819]**	0.686*** (0.155) [0.131]***	0.269** (0.115) [0.0868]**
Observations	170,146	176,442	171,295	133,639	158,291	61,552	77,356	121,193
KP F-stat	183.8	179.7	182.6	202.1	177.6	186.1	174.7	179.6
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.88(1.15)	4.25(2.21)	0.38(0.49)	0.51(0.50)	0.59(0.49)	2.85(1.20)	0.72(0.45)	0.41(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)	0.05(0.05)
<i>Panel B: Intermarriage (1900) Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.582*** (0.215) [0.0434]***	1.896*** (0.445) [0.0737]***	0.489*** (0.0752) [0.0858]***	0.392*** (0.0963) [0.0670]***	0.146 (0.0914) [0.0254]	1.315*** (0.504) [0.0937]***	0.276*** (0.0834) [0.0527]***	0.0532 (0.0445) [0.0171]
Observations	169,630	176,325	171,461	134,975	159,121	63,327	78,176	121,164
KP F-stat	313.1	314.8	314	309.4	313.1	311.9	321.8	306.2
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.96(1.14)	4.42(2.18)	0.41(0.49)	0.54(0.50)	0.61(0.49)	2.85(1.20)	0.74(0.44)	0.41(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.14(0.09)	0.14(0.09)	0.14(0.09)	0.14(0.09)	0.14(0.09)	0.14(0.09)	0.14(0.09)	0.14(0.09)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Immigrants' Characteristics	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
T-test [p-value]	[0.064]*	[0.179]	[0.577]	[0.263]	[0.204]	[0.818]	[0.015]**	[0.079]*

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. The measure of intermarriage is the share of intermarried over married immigrants in 1900: we consider an immigrants to be intermarried if married with a native with both parents being native. Here the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (0.0526). The last row reports the p-value of the t-test for equality between the coefficients above and below median. The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table A.12. Sample Split around Residential Integration (1900)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Residential Integration (1900) Above Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.154* (0.619) [0.0865]*	3.211*** (1.081) [0.125]***	0.621*** (0.219) [0.110]***	0.558** (0.269) [0.0958]**	0.290 (0.182) [0.0506]	1.089* (0.607) [0.0780]*	0.573*** (0.180) [0.110]***	0.0985 (0.115) [0.0319]
Observations	179,250	186,386	180,866	140,292	166,851	65,279	82,014	126,751
KP F-stat	270.5	272.3	272.2	259.8	269.3	266	278.6	267.9
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.82(1.14)	4.16(2.22)	0.36(0.48)	0.48(0.50)	0.57(0.50)	2.81(1.20)	0.70(0.46)	0.340(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.04(0.04)	0.04(0.04)	0.04(0.04)	0.04(0.04)	0.04(0.04)	0.04(0.04)	0.04(0.04)	0.04(0.04)
<i>Panel B: Residential Integration (1900) Below Median</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.189 (0.237) [0.0141]	1.231*** (0.455) [0.0481]***	0.376*** (0.0762) [0.0665]***	0.224** (0.107) [0.0385]**	0.0386 (0.0881) [0.00673]	1.020** (0.515) [0.0731]**	0.136 (0.0850) [0.0259]	-0.00396 (0.0431) [-0.0012]
Observations	179,226	186,047	180,949	142,753	168,140	66,562	82,487	128,548
KP F-stat	286.8	288.2	286.3	282.6	287.2	267	288.9	284.8
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.99(1.14)	4.46(2.17)	0.42(0.50)	0.56(0.50)	0.62(0.49)	2.87(0.19)	0.75(0.43)	0.42(0.26)
Mean (s.d.) fraction of imm.	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)	0.15(0.08)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Immigrants' Characteristics	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
T-test [p-value]	[0.166]	[0.116]	[0.327]	[0.275]	[0.233]	[0.935]	[0.033]**	[0.413]

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.44 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. Residential integration (1900) is defined as the opposite of residential segregation in Logan and Parman (2017): the sample is split around the median of this measure in the estimation sample (0.9066). The coefficients in square brackets refer to beta coefficients. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

B Appendix – Robustness Checks

In this section we present a variety of robustness checks. First, we start by addressing the possibility that immigrants settled in counties that, historically, were already more liberal and where support for the Democratic Party was stronger. If this were to be the case, and if such political preferences (of natives) persisted over time, our estimates may be biased by the spurious correlation between past ideology and European historical immigration. While our instrument should deal with this concern, one may be worried that the 1900 settlements of European immigrants were themselves correlated with political ideology of the native born.

In Table B.1, we augment our baseline specification (reported in Panel B of Table 3) by controlling for the county level Democratic vote share in presidential elections of 1900 and 1904. Reassuringly, results, reported in Panel B of Table B.1, show that all coefficients remain precisely estimated and quantitatively very close to those reported in the baseline specification of Table 3 and displayed in Panel A of Table B.1 to ease comparisons. Moreover, in unreported results, we replicated Table B.1 by varying the definition of “baseline” years (1900 or 1904 alone; including elections of 1908 and/or 1912; combining elections until 1912), and our estimates remained virtually unchanged.

Second, in Table B.2 we verify that our results are robust to extending the sample period used to define the average European immigrant share to 1850-1930. Since our instrument is constructed using the 1900 settlements of European immigrants, we cannot conduct this exercise with 2SLS. However, the similarity of OLS and 2SLS estimates in our main results (see Tables 2 and 3) bolsters our confidence in the OLS analysis for the 1850 to 1930 period.

Panel A of Table B.2 reports the baseline OLS results obtained for the 1910 to 1930 period (also shown in Panel A of Table 3), while Panel B replicates them for the 1850-1930 decades. As noted in Sequeira et al. (2020), when going back to pre-1900 decades, some counties are not available. For this reason, in Panel C, we repeat this exercise including only counties for which we have observations in all decades. Reassuringly, results are always quantitatively and qualitatively close to those reported in Panel A: in all cases, historical immigration is strongly and positively associated with liberal ideology and higher preferences for redistribution among American voters today.⁴⁸

Third, in Table B.3, we verify that our results are robust to excluding the US South, where identification with the Democratic Party and, more broadly, political preferences may have been greatly influenced by the history of race relations (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Schickler, 2016). Moreover, we show that our estimates are unchanged

⁴⁸Results (unreported) remain unchanged also when defining the period of interest from 1850 to 1920, as done for instance in Sequeira et al. (2020).

when defining the European immigrant share at the Community Zone (CZ) – rather than at the county – level (Table B.4). This exercise deals with the possibility that European immigration triggered selective “white flight”, inducing more conservative natives to emigrate in response to the arrival of European immigrants. If this were to be the case, our findings may be unduly affected by sample selection. However, Table B.4 documents that, even when aggregating the unit of analysis to CZs, all our results remain unchanged.⁴⁹

Fourth, we explore the relationship between political ideology, European immigration, and ethnic diversity. As noted in Section 6 in the main text of the paper, a large literature has documented a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). As shown in Tabellini (2020), such relationship was evident also during the Age of Mass Migration: in US cities where (immigrant induced) ethnic diversity was higher, public spending and tax rates were lower. In light of these results, one may wonder if our positive estimates for the effects of immigration on preferences for redistribution are, at least partly, due to the fact that we are not accounting for ethnic diversity explicitly.

To examine this possibility, we augment our baseline specification by separately controlling for the (instrumented) ethnic diversity brought about by European immigrants. 2SLS results for this exercise are reported in Table B.5, which shows not only that the coefficient on the historical fraction of immigrants is unchanged, but also that ethnic diversity has a *positive* effect on both liberal ideology and preferences for redistribution, although its precision varies across outcomes.⁵⁰ We speculate that this, somewhat surprising, result is due to the fact that the diversity brought about European immigrants was relatively contained in size. On the one hand, when levels of diversity are not “too high”, at least in the medium to long run, social cohesion can be enhanced, consistent with recent work by Bazzi et al. (2019). On the other, although slowly and at varying rates, European immigrants eventually became fully integrated into the American society (Abramitzky et al., 2019a), in part helped by the arrival of new outsiders like African Americans from the US South, who looked even more different from white natives than European immigrants (Fouka et al., 2018).

Fifth, we verify that our results are robust to omitting counties with very large and

⁴⁹CZs are defined as clusters of counties that feature strong commuting ties within, and weak commuting ties across CZs. Importantly, the boundaries of CZs are time-invariant, and are defined on the basis of post 1960s migration patterns (Tolbert and Sizer, 1996). This implies that, for the early twentieth century, they represent a very large definition of “local” labor market, not to mention political jurisdiction. In unreported results, we also verified that our estimates are unchanged when aggregating counties to State Economic Areas (SEAs), as in Abramitzky et al. (2019d). SEAs are county aggregates that should correspond (roughly) to CZs for the early twentieth century.


⁵⁰Results reported in Table B.5 do not control for the (instrumented) economic characteristics of immigrants (e.g. Table 4). However, in unreported results, we verified that including these additional controls leaves results unchanged.

very low immigration, and that could be potential outliers. In Tables B.6 and B.7, we replicate our baseline results trimming observations in counties with average 1910-1930 European immigration below (resp. above) the 1st and the 5th (resp. the 99th and 95th) percentiles respectively. Reassuringly, in all cases coefficients are in line with those reported in Table 3 (Panel B).

Finally, we examine the possibility that the 1900 settlements of specific European groups across US counties might be correlated with both the long-run political ideology of Americans (or, with factors that determined them) and the migration patterns of that specific immigrant group in each decade between 1900 and 1930. As shown formally in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018), if this were to be the case, the validity of the instrument would be threatened. Following an approach similar to that used in Tabellini (2020), we replicate the analysis for each of our eight outcomes by adding – one by one – the share of each European group in the county in 1900 (relative to all immigrants from that group in the United States).

We plot 2SLS coefficients (with corresponding 95% intervals) for each of these separate regressions in Figures B.1 and B.2, reporting the point estimate associated with the baseline specification as the first dot from the left to ease comparisons. In all cases, coefficients remain quantitatively close to, and never statistically different from, our baseline estimates. Only for the 9th dot from the left, which plots results for the regressions that include the 1900 share of French immigrants, we note a slight drop in the magnitude of the coefficient. But, even in this case, results remain close to our baseline ones.

Figure B.1. 2SLS Coefficients, Controlling for Initial Shares: Political Ideology



Notes: The Figure plots the 2SLS point estimate (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effect of the historical fraction of immigrants augmenting the specification reported in Table 3 with the 1900 immigrant share from each sending country, separately. The first coefficient plotted in the figure corresponds to the baseline specification. The ninth coefficient refers to the specification that includes the 1900 share of French immigrants in the county (relative to all immigrants from France in the US as of 1900).

Figure B.2. 2SLS Coefficients, Controlling for Initial Shares: Preferences for Redistribution



Notes: The Figure plots the 2SLS point estimate (with corresponding 95% confidence intervals) for the effect of the historical fraction of immigrants augmenting the specification reported in Table 3 with the 1900 immigrant share from each sending country, separately. The first coefficient plotted in the figure corresponds to the baseline specification. The ninth coefficient refers to the specification that includes the 1900 share of French immigrants in the county (relative to all immigrants from France in the US as of 1900).

Table B.1. Baseline Specification Controlling for Democratic Share in Presidential Elections

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS Baseline</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.684*** (0.174)	2.018*** (0.346)	0.486*** (0.0635)	0.399*** (0.0850)	0.220*** (0.0726)	1.185*** (0.391)	0.298*** (0.0679)	0.103*** (0.0359)
KP F-stat	211.2	212	210.5	204	211.8	205.7	223	203.1
Observations	360,545	374,603	363,926	284,642	336,932	132,609	165,454	256,774
<i>Panel B: 2SLS Controlling for Democratic Share (1900-1904)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.701*** (0.176)	2.054*** (0.347)	0.490*** (0.0628)	0.406*** (0.0852)	0.230*** (0.0724)	1.205*** (0.388)	0.305*** (0.0679)	0.106*** (0.0367)
KP F-stat	214.2	215	213.5	207.3	214.7	208.4	225.9	205.4
Observations	344,492	358,057	347,810	271,822	322,115	126,864	158,360	245,230
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90(1.14)	4.31(2.20)	0.39(0.49)	0.52(0.50)	0.60(0.49)	2.84(1.20)	0.73(0.45)	0.41(0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.055 and its S.D. is 0.067. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. In Panel B, we control for the (county-level) average Democratic vote share in Presidential Elections for 1900 and 1904. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B.2. Ideology, Preferences for Redistribution and Immigration (1850-1930) – OLS estimates

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Baseline Specification</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.706*** (0.133)	2.062*** (0.250)	0.507*** (0.0455)	0.384*** (0.0625)	0.223*** (0.0515)	1.031*** (0.244)	0.294*** (0.0507)	0.0950*** (0.0285)
<i>Panel B: All Counties (1850-1930) Baseline Specification</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.614*** (0.118)	1.630*** (0.239)	0.391*** (0.0467)	0.327*** (0.0563)	0.192*** (0.0450)	0.830*** (0.205)	0.252*** (0.0453)	0.0804*** (0.0255)
Observations	178,719	185,934	180,398	140,234	166,480	65,113	82,092	126,784
KP F-stat	100.7	101.6	101.9	100.3	99.43	93.13	98.15	97.98
Observations	360,545	374,603	363,926	284,642	336,932	132,609	165,454	256,774
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90(1.14)	4.31(2.20)	0.39(0.49)	0.52(0.50)	0.60(0.49)	2.84(1.20)	0.73(0.45)	0.41(0.26)
<i>Panel C: Counties with all decades (1850-1930)</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.657*** (0.128)	1.694*** (0.270)	0.403*** (0.0535)	0.338*** (0.0639)	0.178*** (0.0515)	0.854*** (0.230)	0.269*** (0.0506)	0.0726*** (0.0279)
Observations	288,463	300,146	291,487	227,177	269,957	107,037	132,876	203,906
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.91(1.14)	4.35(2.20)	0.40(0.49)	0.53(0.50)	0.60(0.49)	2.83(2.20)	0.73(0.44)	0.40(0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. Data are based on Authors' calculations from Ruggles et al. 2020. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.055 and its standard deviation is 0.067. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B.3. Baseline Specification Excluding US South

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: OLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.621*** (0.129)	1.918*** (0.246)	0.502*** (0.0480)	0.375*** (0.0715)	0.180*** (0.0497)	0.990*** (0.268)	0.249*** (0.0561)	0.0781*** (0.0360)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.616*** (0.176)	1.923*** (0.340)	0.500*** (0.0586)	0.383*** (0.0841)	0.181*** (0.0699)	1.241*** (0.432)	0.266*** (0.0680)	0.091*** (0.0359)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.357*** (0.0637)	1.358*** (0.0632)	1.359*** (0.0636)	1.359*** (0.0639)	1.358*** (0.0640)	1.372*** (0.0677)	1.348*** (0.0643)	1.363*** (0.0618)
KP F-stat	453.3	461.4	457.4	452.5	450	410.2	439	486.9
Observations	244,636	253,712	246,682	194,570	229,120	90,011	111,939	176,590
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.963 (1.143)	4.384 (2.181)	0.401 (0.498)	0.539 (0.487)	0.614 (1.191)	2.847 (0.442)	0.733	0.410 (0.265)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 3 excluding US South States (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia). The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.129 and its standard deviation is 0.082. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the commuting zone level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.4. Baseline Specification Aggregating at the Commuting Zone Level

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: OLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.825*** (0.191)	2.288*** (0.367)	0.531*** (0.0632)	0.419*** (0.0890)	0.298*** (0.0704)	1.137*** (0.232)	0.354*** (0.0828)	0.124*** (0.0395)
<i>Panel B: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.682*** (0.211)	1.788*** (0.421)	0.415*** (0.0789)	0.337*** (0.105)	0.296*** (0.0811)	1.267*** (0.289)	0.321*** (0.104)	0.144*** (0.0450)
<i>Panel C: First Stage</i>								
Predicted Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.337*** (0.146)	1.338*** (0.146)	1.338*** (0.146)	1.337*** (0.149)	1.345*** (0.148)	1.345*** (0.151)	1.324*** (0.143)	1.337*** (0.145)
KP F-stat	83.29	83.46	83.48	80.66	83.03	79.84	85.62	84.55
Observations	366,845	381,147	370,285	289,680	342,801	134,927	168,308	261,278
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.9 (1.144)	4.301 (2.201)	0.388 (0.487)	0.518 (0.500)	0.596 (0.491)	2.838 (1.197)	0.725 (0.446)	0.406 (0.264)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 3 aggregating the geography used to define the fraction of immigrants from the county to the Commuting Zone level. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.101 and its standard deviation is 0.088. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the commuting zone level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.5. Baseline Specification: Controlling for Ethnic Diversity

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale	Democratic	Voted Democratic	Oppose	Support State	Support Minimum	Taxes to Pay
	(1)	(R to D)	Party	Candidate	Spending Cuts	Welfare Spending	Wage Increase	State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.697*** (0.170)	2.051*** (0.336)	0.493*** (0.0610)	0.409*** (0.0822)	0.224*** (0.0715)	1.198*** (0.388)	0.300*** (0.0673)	0.105*** (0.0356)
Ethnic Diversity	0.215 (0.140)	0.447* (0.259)	0.0833* (0.0506)	0.134** (0.0620)	0.0547 (0.0526)	0.222 (0.144)	0.0395 (0.0501)	0.0279 (0.0259)
Observations	359,776	373,811	363,159	284,041	336,220	132,308	165,098	256,228
KP F-stat	47.17	47.69	48.34	51.61	47.06	50.06	50.60	46.99
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90 (1.14)	4.31 (2.20)	0.39 (0.49)	0.52 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	2.84 (1.20)	0.73 (0.45)	0.41 (0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The Table replicates Table 3 augmenting the specification by controlling for Ethnic Diversity. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. Its mean is 0.058 and its standard deviation is 0.068. The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. Ethnic diversity is reconstructed using national group shares. Its mean is 0.764 and its S.D. is 0.119. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020), average immigrant share in 1900 in each county. Immigrants' characteristics are: English-speaking ability, literacy, income score and employment in manufacturing. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B.6. Baseline Specification, Trimming Outliers (1st-99th Percentiles of Immigration)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.617*** (0.176)	1.889*** (0.356)	0.443*** (0.0698)	0.329*** (0.0895)	0.219*** (0.0697)	0.752*** (0.183)	0.267*** (0.0675)	0.0940** (0.0395)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.258*** (0.119)	1.258*** (0.119)	1.259*** (0.120)	1.254*** (0.120)	1.260*** (0.120)	1.276*** (0.124)	1.256*** (0.118)	1.252*** (0.119)
KP F-stat	110.9	111	110.5	109.2	110.2	106.3	113.8	111.7
Observations	353,714	367,435	356,966	279,347	330,454	129,967	162,123	252,240
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90 (1.14)	4.31 (2.20)	0.39 (0.49)	0.52 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	2.84 (1.20)	0.73 (0.45)	0.41 (0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The Table replicates Table 3 but restricting the sample to counties with average fraction of immigrants above the 99th percentile (0.338) and below the 1st percentile (0.0004). The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Table B.7. Baseline Specification, Trimming Outliers (5th-95th Percentiles of Immigration)

Dep. Variables	Ideology	Party Scale (R to D)	Democratic Party	Voted Democratic Candidate	Oppose Spending Cuts	Support State Welfare Spending	Support Minimum Wage Increase	Taxes to Pay State Deficit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: 2SLS estimates</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	0.751*** (0.224)	2.142*** (0.461)	0.466*** (0.0910)	0.409*** (0.114)	0.252*** (0.0914)	0.641*** (0.219)	0.324*** (0.0835)	0.131*** (0.050)
<i>Panel B: First Stage</i>								
Historical Fraction of Immigrants	1.131*** (0.115)	1.130*** (0.114)	1.131*** (0.115)	1.123*** (0.115)	1.133*** (0.115)	1.145*** (0.119)	1.139*** (0.114)	1.127*** (0.114)
KP F-stat	97.42	97.58	97.04	95.86	96.31	92.60	100.1	97.62
Observations	325,461	337,891	328,298	257,217	303,847	119,412	149,144	232,934
Mean (s.d.) dep.var.	2.90 (1.14)	4.29 (2.20)	0.39 (0.49)	0.52 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	2.83 (1.20)	0.72 (0.45)	0.41 (0.26)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Historical Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Notes: Dependent variables are taken from CCES surveys. See Table A.4 for the exact wording of the survey questions. The regressor of interest is the average fraction of European immigrants over county population between 1910 and 1930. The Table replicates Table 3 but restricting the sample to counties with average fraction of immigrants above the 95th percentile (0.26) and below the 5th percentile (0.001). The predicted fraction of immigrants is described in the main body of the paper. KP F-Stat refers to the F-stat for weak instruments. Individual controls include the following respondents' characteristics: age, age squared, gender, race, marital status, educational attainment, employment status, income. Historical controls include: 1900 black and urban share of the county population, 1900 share of men 15-64 in the labor force, 1900 log occupational score, 1900 employment share in manufacturing (men 15-64), county geographic coordinates, railroad connectivity from Sequeira et al. (2020), and an index of predicted industry growth (1910-1930) as in Tabellini (2020). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the county level. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

C Appendix – European Social Survey

The European Social Survey (ESS) is a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted in around 38 countries in Europe since 2002, every two year.⁵¹ Our analysis includes survey rounds from 1 to 8, i.e. until 2016, and all the countries that are available therein. The number of respondents in each wave varies from 40,000 to 56,000 for a total of 326,678 respondents overall. The ESS collects demographic and socio-economic characteristic of respondents, and elicits political ideology as well as attitudes towards social exclusion and preferences for redistribution.

We use the ESS to validate the proxy for historical preferences for redistribution constructed in the main text, which is based on exposure to education reforms across European countries (see Section 3.1 in the main text). To do so, we focus on first generation immigrants, i.e. individuals who are residing in a country different from their country of birth, and estimate the following specification:

$$y_{ijt} = \gamma_t + \beta \log(\text{EduReform}_j) + X_{ijt} + \log(\text{GDP}_{2000,j}) + u_{ijt} \quad (\text{C.4})$$

Where y_{ijt} is the stated preference for redistribution of respondent i from country j in survey wave t . Consistent with the literature (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), we measure preferences for redistribution using individuals’ response to the following statement in the ESS: “Government should reduce differences in income levels”. The possible answers range from 1 (for *Strongly Agree*) to 5 (for *Strongly Disagree*). We recode the variable so that higher values correspond to stronger preferences for redistribution. We also control for wave fixed effects γ_t , a set of individual characteristics X_{ijt} , and the logarithm country j ’s GDP in 2000.⁵²

The key regressor of interest is the log of the year in which the first education reform was introduced in country j .⁵³ The vector of individual characteristics, X_{ijt} , includes: gender, a quadratic in age, level of income, logarithm of years of education, employment, marital status. We create ten different income dummies: the first nine exactly correspond to the first nine possible categories that are reported in the ESS question; the last dummy encompasses all higher levels of income. Employment status reports three different categories: employed, unemployed, and out of the labor force. Finally, marital status includes the following four categories: single, married, divorced or separated, and widowed.

⁵¹The exact number of countries varies across survey waves. Data can be downloaded at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>.

⁵²Results are unchanged when using GDP measured in other years. Data can be downloaded at <http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-7.0>.

⁵³See Section 3.1 for the sources of this variable and Table A.1 for the years of introduction for each country in our sample.

Results, reported in Figure A.3 and Table A.3 in Appendix A, and are based on 11,489 observations – the number of respondents we are left with after restricting the sample to first generation immigrants and to individuals from countries for which we have data on education reforms (see Table A.1). In Figure A.3, we plot the relationship between the average preferences for redistribution of respondents (on the y-axis) and the logarithm of the year in which the reform was introduced in their country of origin (on the x-axis), after partialling out GDP of the country in 2000, and weighing observations by the number of respondents in the ESS.⁵⁴ We report results obtained both including (dashed line) and excluding (solid line) Denmark, which might be a potential outlier.

Table A.3 reports similar results for a more formal regression analysis, where we estimate equation (Equation C.4) with OLS. To save space, Table A.3 only reports the coefficient associated with the log of the year of introduction of education reforms, but we also include all controls described above. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level. As for Figure A.3, we report results obtained including (column 1) and excluding (column 2) Denmark.

⁵⁴Equivalent results are obtained when estimating unweighted regressions.

Table C.1. Variable Description

Variable	Question	Answers coded as	Source
Panel A. Preferences for Redistribution			
Preferences for Redistribution	Government should reduce differences in income levels. 1= Strongly Agree to 5 Disagree Strongly. 7=Refusal, 8=Don't know. 9=No answer	Scale from 1=Disagree Strongly to 5=Strongly Agree	European Social Survey
Panel B. Main Regressor and Individual Controls			
Log Year of Education Reform	Year in which the education reform was implemented	Logarithm(Year of reform)	Bandiera et al (2018); for Germany and Austria-Hungary, Flora (1987)
Country of Residence			European Social Survey
Country of Birth			European Social Survey
Age			European Social Survey
Gender	Gender of the respondent	Coded as 1=male, 2=female	European Social Survey
Years of Education	Years of education	Logarithm(1+years of education)	European Social Survey
Marital Status	Legal marital status: single, married or in a civil union, separated, divorced, widowed.	Coded as 1=single, 2=married or in a civil union, 3=divorced or separated, 4=widowed	European Social Survey
Employment Status	Main activity, last 7 days.	Coded as 1=out of the labor force, 2=unemployed, 3=employed	European Social Survey
Income	Household's total net income, all sources	Coded as 1 to 9 for the first nine deciles and 10 for higher levels	European Social Survey
GDP	Log per capita GDP (PPP converted relative to the United States, G-K method, at current prices) for the year.	Logarithm(1+ GDP_{2000})	Groningen Growth and Development Centre