

Endrich, Marek; Gutmann, Jerg

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Pacem in Terris: Are Papal Visits Good News for Human Rights?

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
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Marek Endrich
Jerg Gutmann

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Pacem in Terris: Are Papal Visits Good News for Human Rights?

Marek Endrich* and Jerg Gutmann†

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* Corresponding author, Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg, Johnsallee 35, D-20148 Hamburg, phone: +49-40-42838-9520, e-Mail: marek.endrich@uni-hamburg.de.

† Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg, Johnsallee 35, D-20148 Hamburg, and CESifo, Munich, phone: +49-40-42838-3040, e-Mail: jerg.gutmann@uni-hamburg.de.

Comments by Niclas Berggren, Christian Bjørnskov, Nehal Brain, Mario Ferrero, Jan Fidrmuc, Andreas Fuchs, Sugata Ghosh, Peter Jensen, Anna Koukal, Nada Maamoun, Stephan Michel, Konstantinos Pilpilidis, Stefan Voigt, participants of the Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture Annual Conference, the Danish Public Choice Workshop, the European Association of Law and Economics Annual meeting, the Insights into Political Economy Workshop, the Political Economy of International Organization Annual Conference, the Silvaplana Workshop on Political Economy, and economics research seminars at Brunel University and the University of Bayreuth.

Pacem in Terris: Are Papal Visits Good News for Human Rights?

Abstract

We analyze the effect of state visits by the Catholic pope on human rights in the host country to illustrate how a small theocracy like the Vatican can exert significant political influence in international politics. Our theoretical model of the strategic interaction between the Catholic Church and the government shows how the pope uses the threat of shaming to incentivize governments to refrain from violations of human rights. Drawing on a new dataset of papal state visits outside Italy and a novel identification strategy, we test the hypothesis that governments react in anticipation of a papal visit by improving human rights protection. The existence of such a causal effect is supported by the data.

Keywords: Catholic Church; human rights; political economy; pope; repression; shaming.

JEL-codes: D74; D78; F5; K38; P16; P26; P48; Z12.

1. Introduction

A popular assumption in international politics is that a country's political influence is roughly proportional to its size in terms of population, economy, and military. The Vatican has for a long time been a startling exception to this rule. Even though the Vatican lacks the economic and military means of other nation states, it enjoys a reputation as an influential player in the global political arena.¹ The reason for this exceptionalism is that the Vatican is home to the Roman Catholic Church, one of the oldest religious organizations and the largest Christian church with 1.3 billion members worldwide.

Among religious organizations, the Catholic Church is unmatched in its influence on global politics. It is credited as a catalyst for breakdowns of repressive regimes in the Eastern Bloc and Latin America and has served as a mediator in domestic conflicts as well as international disputes, such as that between Argentina and Chile in 1978 (Hanson 1987; Weigel 2003). Nevertheless, political economists and political scientists have paid little attention to the political agenda of the Vatican and its potential effects on the political and economic performance of countries around the globe. This is the first quantitative empirical study of the worldwide political influence of the Catholic Church. We focus on one policy instrument used by the Vatican, papal state visits. More precisely, we analyze whether and how official state visits by the pope influence governance quality in the form of human rights protection in the host countries.

Our study complements extant research on the persuasive power of the Catholic Church (Bassi and Rasul 2017; Farina and Pathania 2020; Deiana et al. 2018). However, unlike previous studies that are interested in attitudes of the general population, we argue that politicians react rationally and in anticipation of the pope's visit. We introduce a theoretical model of the interaction between the Catholic Church and the government of a host country. It predicts, firstly, that governments improve human rights protection before papal visits. Secondly, papal visits are more likely where governments are more responsive to the threat of being criticized by the pope, indicating that our estimated treatment effects should be considered an upper bound for the treatment effect on the untreated countries.

¹ Some have questioned this importance. Stalin, for example, famously asked tongue-in-cheek how many divisions the Vatican's military even had. Napoleon, in contrast, suggested one should deal with the pope as if he had 200,000 men at his command.

To test our hypotheses, we conduct the first empirical analysis of the political effects of official state visits by the pope on host countries. By addressing the endogeneity of the pope's travel itinerary, we also provide empirical evidence on the implicit decision criteria underlying the pope's choice of destination countries. For this purpose, we have collected a unique dataset of papal visits and various indicators suited to explaining the selection into treatment. We use characteristics of the pope, Catholic Church calendars, proxies for the strategic interests of the Vatican, and conditions in the host country as predictors of pope visits.

Our estimated causal treatment effect of papal visits indicates an increase in human rights protection. This effect sets in before the pope's visit, which can be explained by the pope's ability and frequently demonstrated willingness to voice politically costly criticism of politicians for their insufficient efforts to protect human rights. Consistent with this explanation, there are no further improvements in human rights protection after the visit of the pope. Yet, there is also no sign that human rights protection reverts to its original level. The salience of human rights in political discourse during pope visits is supported by an event study of the global media coverage of national human rights issues. During a papal visit, international media pay significantly more attention to the human rights record of the host country than before or after. This supports a key element of our assumed causal mechanism.

So far, there is only a small literature on the political role of religious leaders, among them the Catholic pope. Fuchs and Klann (2013) study the effect of visits by the Dalai Lama on countries' trade relations with China. They find that officially receiving the Dalai Lama at the highest political level implies a punishment via a reduction of exports to China.² Lin et al. (2019) show that this effect is driven by Chinese state-owned enterprises reducing their imports from the host countries. Bassi and Rasul (2017) study one specific papal visit to Brazil, which took place in 1991, regarding its effect on both the short-run intention to use contraception and long-run fertility outcomes in the affected population. Farina and Pathania (2020) find a sizable reduction in abortions after papal visits to Italian provinces. Deiana et al. (2018) argue that the pope's visit to Lesbos in early 2016 shifted attitudes in Catholic countries and put pressure on the European Union to deal more effectively with its refugee crisis.

² Another example for the importance of visits by an authority is the finding of Schuler et al. (2017) that Chinese government officials' visits to firms in China are associated with financial gains for these firms.

Our study also contributes to a broader literature that uses political economy models to explain the strategic behavior of religious organizations. Barro and McCleary (2016, 2017) analyze how the Catholic Church uses saint-making to inspire more intense religiosity in targeted countries and to discourage secularization and conversion to Protestantism (see also McCleary and Barro 2019, p. 136). Ferrero (2012) argues that the competition for sainthood within the Catholic Church serves as an incentive mechanism for different factions to pursue religious innovations. Padovano and Wintrobe (2013) ask, more generally, whether the economic model of dictatorship is descriptive of historical Vatican politics and find empirical support for this conjecture.

Finally, we add to a literature on how religious organizations can influence political outcomes. So far, this literature has focused on other channels of influence than pope visits, such as the Catholic Church's organization of opposition to the Nazi movement in Weimar Republic elections (Spenkuch and Tillmann 2018). Religious organizations are known to influence public policy (Grzymala-Busse 2015) and they can play an important role in political transitions, as the Catholic Church did in many democratization processes after the Second Vatican Council (Andersen and Jensen 2019).

In the next section, we outline the theoretical arguments for why and when papal visits should promote human rights protection in host countries. Section 3 introduces our data and presents the empirical analysis before Section 4 concludes.

2. Theory

2.1 The Catholic Church and human rights

We start this section by explaining the commitment of the Catholic Church to the protection of human rights. Then, we provide an overview of the organization of papal visits (Section 2.2) and introduce a theory on how papal visits affect human rights (Section 2.3).

The Catholic Church is known as a global advocate for human rights, but like most religious organizations, it also holds missionary aspirations. With the pope being the head of both a religious body and a sovereign state, the Church is highly centralized and hierarchically organized. Its commitment to the protection of human rights was stipulated only some decades ago during the Second Vatican Council in 1965, after

which human rights became part of the Church's social teaching (Troy 2009). Moreover, the Second Vatican Council led to a more interventionist approach of the Church in international affairs that not only made the Vatican endorse human rights, but also actively promote them across the globe (Huntington 1991; Shelledy 2004; Andersen and Jensen 2019).³

However, it was already in the papal encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, issued by Pope John XXIII in 1963, that the Vatican emphasized the importance of respecting human rights. Accordingly, "*man has the right to live. He has the right to bodily integrity and to the means necessary for the proper development of life (...). He has a right to freedom in investigating the truth, (...) to freedom of speech and publication, and (...) to be accurately informed about public events*" (par. 11). The encyclical further outlines man's political rights and rights of association, in all of which it was clearly influenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Most importantly, it argues that "*any government which refused to recognize human rights or acted in violation of them, would not only fail in its duty; its decrees would be wholly lacking in binding force*" (par. 61).⁴ Thus, the Church denied legitimacy to any government that does not respect human rights.

The commitment to human rights has given the Catholic Church an opportunity to develop an identity as a defender of societal interests. It can set standards of human rights, publicly call for their protection, and claim responsibility when improvements occur.⁵ This image helps to cultivate support from adherents. Promoting human rights on a grand scale has become an essential part of the brand of the Catholic Church that sets it apart from smaller religious organizations. Papal visits constitute one major instrument the Church can use to visibly address human rights issues (see, e.g., Crespo and Gregory 2020; Golan et al. 2019). Anecdotal evidence suggests a positive effect of numerous papal visits on human rights. For example, Pope Francis' visit to Myanmar in 2017 was preceded by an agreement on the repatriation of displaced members of the Rohingya ethnic group. Ahead of the visit of Pope John Paul II to the Philippines in 1981,

³ Andersen and Jensen (2019) argue that the involvement of the Catholic Church in democratization processes since the Second Vatican Council was a means to ensure the protection of human rights.

⁴ Decisive in the approach of the Catholic Church to politics was the Declaration of Religious Liberty (*Dignitatis Humanae*) in the Second Vatican Council in 1965. It demands that all states protect the rights of Catholics as well as of other minorities regardless of their religious observance. It was therefore interpreted as a religious call for promoting human rights (Weigel 1992).

⁵ Many of the public speeches of the popes to foreign audiences address the topic of human rights (Golan et al. 2019). The human rights discourse is consistent across all popes since the Second Vatican Council (Troy 2019).

President Marcos lifted the repressive martial law. Cuban authorities have released prisoners before each of the papal visits in 1998, 2012, and 2015.

2.2 The organization of Papal Visits

As the pope represents both a religious organization and a sovereign state, an official visit by the pope must be initiated by formal invitations from both the national conference of Catholic bishops and the national government of the host country (t_1 in Figure 1). The government and the Vatican then set the basic terms of the visit. After a general agreement has been reached (t_2), the planning of the travel itinerary begins, which has to be concluded before the visit (t_4). After the parties have agreed on a date and the negotiations are closed, the Vatican at some point publishes an official announcement (t_3). There tends to be a considerable period of time between the invitation and the formal announcement of a visit, which can easily span several years. The pilgrimage of John Paul II to Cuba in 1998, for example, was preceded by a long-standing invitation by the Cuban bishops. After intense negotiations, a formal invitation was issued by Cuban President Castro in 1996 and the planning period for the visit could officially start (Weigel 2003, p. 806).

Figure 1: Timeline of a papal visit



The travel itinerary reflects both the political and pastoral nature of pope visits and entails consultations with the government, public sermons to local Catholics, and the serving of ecclesiastical matters. The sermons are given to promulgate Catholic Church values and they often draw large crowds. Human rights are one main topic of the pope's speeches, but the pope can express criticism about human rights conditions also in a more diplomatic way, for example, when he meets with political opposition groups or nongovernmental organizations critical of the government.

During the pope's trip to South America in 1987, the full range of his diplomatic toolkit was observable. In Chile, the dismal human rights performance of the government led the pope to label the government dictatorial. He called for democracy

and human rights and met with opposition groups. Argentina showed a far better development at the time and the pope praised the government for the “full re-establishment of democratic institutions”.⁶ Comparable positive or negative remarks on the government’s human rights record are part of many papal visits.

The public appearances of the pope during these visits are aimed at local audiences, but the Church also tries to transmit the Catholic moral teachings to an international audience. Public relations instruments, such as press corps, press conferences, and the dissemination of news via the Vatican’s own media outlets, accompany pope visits and add to the comprehensive coverage in international media (Hanson 1987, p. 5; Weigel 2003, p. 491; see Section 3.6).

2.3 Mechanisms linking papal visits to human rights

Researchers, so far, have attributed the influence of papal visits primarily to the use of persuasive messages (see, e.g., Bassi and Rasul 2017 or Farina and Pathania 2020) and political mediation by the pope. Of course, interaction with the pope during his visit can have an effect on religiosity and values, and the pope can act as a mediator in conflict-prone societies. Such arguments require assumptions about information provision or changes in preferences caused by the pope. We focus here on a more parsimonious explanation that does not necessitate assumptions about the pope having a unique ability to change peoples’ minds or deescalate conflict in society.

Our argument is based on the ability of religion to serve as a legitimizing force for governments. A religious authority can endorse a political entity or actor and in exchange, it is rewarded with economic and political benefits. Historically, secular leaders relied frequently and systematically on religious authorities as a source of political legitimacy (Cantoni et al. 2018; Fox and Sandler 2004, p. 35; Rubin 2017).

The Catholic Church has been a major player in the market for political legitimacy and was often rewarded generously, for example by being declared the official state religion (Coşgel et al. 2018). In past centuries, the Church’s side of the bargain was to declare the rule of political leaders divine. Since then, legitimation practices have taken a different

⁶ New York Times, April 12th 1987, p. 3.

form, such as appearing publicly with or praising a government and publicly supporting its policies.

In the following, we model the strategic interaction between the pope and the government of a potential destination country. We set up a game with two players, called the government and the church, and four decision stages.

The players

The church competes on a market for followers against other religious denominations. Its utility function (U) can be described as

$$U = U(X) \quad (1)$$

where X is the number of adherents and $\frac{\delta U}{\delta X} > 0$. Religions offer credence goods of salvation and consumers decide to follow a religion depending on the expected quality of these goods. The church can offer other goods as well, such as social services, but for our argument here, we focus on the role of credence goods.

As the utility impact of credence goods is unknown, consumers evaluate their quality based on the reputation of the supplier. Thus, we can write the (indirect) utility function of the church with respect to its reputation as follows:

$$V = V(Repu) \quad (2)$$

where higher values of $Repu$ indicate a better reputation and $\frac{\delta V}{\delta Repu} > 0$.

A good reputation does not come for free. Advertising religious goods requires extensive and continued brand-building efforts. Even more so in recent decades, if one considers the recurring scandals the Catholic Church has been facing. Since the Second Vatican Council, the reputation of the Catholic Church is closely linked to its public image as a promoter of human rights. The Church uses brand-building strategies to nurture that image. A better reputation raises the expectation among consumers regarding the quality of the offered religious goods and hence leads to more followers and more utility for the Catholic Church.

The brand-building effort of the Catholic Church has two additional reinforcing effects on the attractiveness of the religious good. First, the prestige of a firm can have a direct effect on the utility of the consumer (Becker and Murphy 1993). If the reputation as a

human rights promoter translates into more prestige, consuming the religious good offered by this producer becomes more attractive. Secondly, advertising campaigns can serve as a signaling device for the quality of other (nonreligious) experience goods offered by the Catholic Church (Nelson 1974). If the Church uses the effort reflected in its human rights reputation to signal its commitment to protecting the safety of its followers, consumers will value membership in the Catholic Church higher.


The second player, the government, has the objective to remain in office while maximizing its own consumption of public resources. To maximize the resources available for its own consumption, the government only spends a budget (B) that allows it to produce a minimum level of power (π_{min}), as required for staying in office:

$$\pi = \pi_{min} \quad (3)$$

The game

The timing of the game portrayed in Figure 2 is as follows: In the first stage (t1), the government decides if it invites the pope or not. In the second stage (t2), the church can either accept or reject the invitation, given that there was one. In stage 3, given that the church has accepted the invitation, the government sets a level of repression for the period between agreement (t2) and visit (t4). In stage 4 (t4), the pope is visiting the country and decides on the sentiment he expresses during the visit.

Figure 2: The Game tree



The Actions

In *stage 1*, the government decides to invite the pope or not.⁷ If it invites the pope, the game proceeds to *stage 2*, otherwise it ends with the payoffs of the outside option. In *stage 2*, the church can either accept the invitation to proceed to *stage 3* or decline the invitation and the game ends with the payoffs of the outside option.

Stage 3 covers the period between the acceptance of an invitation and the visit. The government uses two inputs to build and maintain the required political power to stay in office. Loyalty (L) is bought from citizens. Repression (R) requires investment in repressive resources. It is aimed against political opponents and in more extreme cases even against the general population. L and R are continuous variables, where higher values indicate more resources spent. Politicians face a trade-off between channeling resources into loyalty or repression. The relationship between the input factors repression and loyalty and political power can be described by a production function

$$\pi = \pi(R, L) \quad (4)$$

⁷ Pope visits come with publicity for the visited government. This can have a direct positive effect on the political power π of the government, by increasing its international standing and its domestic legitimacy. Our parsimonious model does not account for this effect.

which is well-behaved with $\frac{\delta\pi}{\delta R} > 0$, $\frac{\delta\pi}{\delta L} > 0$, $\frac{\delta^2\pi}{\delta R^2} < 0$, and $\frac{\delta^2\pi}{\delta L^2} < 0$. Thus, an increased use of each production factor results in increasing political power, but with marginally diminishing effectiveness.

The government's budget constraint

$$B = P_R R + P_L L \quad (5)$$

encompasses the two input factors, repression and loyalty, and the respective per unit costs of repression (P_R) and loyalty (P_L).

In *stage 4*, the pope is visiting the country and expresses a sentiment (ρ) towards the government, for example in the wording of his speeches. The sentiment is a latent continuous variable that the pope chooses depending on how the government changes its use of repression between the agreement to a visit and the visit itself

$$\rho(\Delta R) = f(R_{t4} - R_{t2}). \quad (6)$$

Higher levels of ρ represent a more critical sentiment towards the hosting government, and the level of sentiment is increasing (/decreasing) in the government's increasing (/decreasing) use of repression, $\frac{\delta\rho}{\delta\Delta R} > 0$. This is because the sentiment of the pope is judged by potential followers in relation to the human rights performance of the government. We assume that the reputation, and thus the utility of the church, increases if the pope either expresses positive sentiment to governments with an improving human rights record or negative sentiment to governments with a deteriorating human rights record. If there is a mismatch between the actions of the government and the sentiment of the pope, the reputation of the church suffers and it will fail to attract new (or even keep its current) followers.

The sentiment ρ of the pope has consequences for the government's budget constraint $B(R, L)$ by affecting the prices P_R and P_L . The costs of repression P_R include costs such as wages, equipment, and weapons for the police and military. The (perceived) costs are also increasing in the expected sentiment of the pope, $E(\rho)$. The pope's criticism is covered by the international media and has negative effects on trade, foreign direct investment, and foreign aid.⁸ Thus, any expected criticism by the pope has

⁸ Human rights violations have been shown to be detrimental to foreign direct investment and tourism (see Blanton and Blanton 2007 for empirical evidence). On the political side, information about human rights violations can hamper the inflow of foreign aid (Lebkovic and Voeten 2009).

to be priced into the government's decision how much repression to employ. We define the (perceived) cost per unit of repression as

$$P_R = P_R(E(\rho)) \quad (7)$$

with $\frac{\delta P_R}{\delta E(\rho)} > 0$.

The (perceived) cost per unit of loyalty is defined as

$$P_L = P_L(E(\rho)) \quad (8)$$

with $\frac{\delta P_L}{\delta E(\rho)} > 0$.

A more critical sentiment decreases the legitimacy of the government vis-à-vis the population (Rubin 2017) and, therefore, increases the cost of buying loyalty. The reverse of that medal is that a government that is commended by the pope for improving its human rights performance will gain in legitimacy, which will lower the cost of buying the loyalty of the population. To sum up, a government that needs to fear criticism by the pope for its dismal human rights record will expect having to spend more resources to buy the loyalty of citizens that are not repressed. In contrast, a government that can expect to be praised by the pope for its recent human rights performance can safely spend fewer resources to buy the loyalty of the citizens.

There are other factors modeled in Wintrobe (2000) that affect P_L and P_R , but we abstract from them as they do not change the workings of our model. In summary, we have endogenized the costs P_R and P_L in the budget constraint of the government. The costs react to the expected sentiment of the pope, and we get

$$B = P_R(E(\rho))R + P_L(E(\rho))L \quad (9)$$

The decisions

To deduct the optimal decision of the government and the Catholic Church, we solve the game by backward induction. In *stage 4*, the pope visits the host country and chooses his sentiment. His choice depends on the change in the level of repression by the visited government after the agreement on a visit. The utility of the church is maximized by matching the pope's sentiment to the actions of the government. The worse a government has performed in its human rights record, the more critical the pope will be


in his remarks. This allows him to preserve and enhance the reputation of the Catholic Church as a human rights promoter.

In *stage 3*, the government has to choose the level of repression for the time until the papal visit. The government takes into account that the level of repression affects the expected sentiment $E(\rho)$ of the pope. The government maximizes the resources available for its own consumption by minimizing the budget spent on loyalty and repression in order to stay in power, or

$$\text{Min}\mathcal{L}(R, L, \lambda) = P_R(E(\rho))R + P_L(E(\rho))L + \lambda[\pi_{min} - \pi(R, L)] \quad (10)$$

At the optimum, the marginal costs of acquiring power through more loyalty equal the marginal costs of increasing power via the use of repression. The expected sentiment of the pope increases the costs of using repression and lowers the costs of using loyalty. Both effects favor a substitution of repression with loyalty. In comparison with the level of repression before the agreement (or a situation without an agreement), the government will, thus, choose a lower level of repression and invest more resources into loyalty. The change in the government's budget constraint and the resulting equilibrium is also graphically illustrated in Figure 3. Note that Figure 3 leaves open the question whether the government budget increases or decreases with the change in prices. This will, however, be relevant for the government's decision to invite the pope.

Figure 3: The government's cost minimization with and without a papal visit



In *stage 2*, the decision of the Catholic Church to agree to a visit depends on the expected behavior of the government in *stage 3*. The pope's willingness to agree to a visit is higher, if he expects the government to be responsive and improve human rights protection before his visit. This argument rests on the assumption that showing a negative sentiment is somewhat costly for the pope, for example in terms of political capital. Once there is an agreement to a visit, the pope will have to incur these costs, if the government shows a bad human rights record. However, if this outcome is to be expected, the pope will not agree to a visit in the first place. This has an important implication for the interpretation of our empirical results. When we are estimating an average treatment effect on the human rights performance of treated countries, the estimated effect should be considered an upper bound for the potential treatment effect on the non-treated countries. In other words, if the pope would choose to travel to more countries, one would expect a marginally decreasing effect of papal visits on these countries' human rights performances, as their governments are less responsive.

In *stage 1*, the government compares the budget expenses needed for producing π_{min} in a scenario with a pope visit to the outside option of no pope visit. The budget expenses increase with the sentiment of the pope. Thus, the willingness of the government to invite the pope is decreasing in its expectation of the pope's level of critical sentiment. As the sentiment itself depends on the human rights record of the government, governments who are more willing to make concessions are also more

likely to invite the pope, which reaffirms our argumentation above regarding the external validity of an estimated average treatment effect on the treated.

To sum up the insights derived from our theoretical model: Firstly, governments are expected to improve human rights protection before papal visits. Secondly, papal visits are more likely where governments are more responsive to the threat of being criticized by the pope.

The development of human rights after a papal visit is unclear. If the gain in legitimacy of the government prevails, the cost of buying loyalty remains lower. Improvements in human rights protection could also have lasting consequences, if, for example, investments are made in permanent infrastructure, institutions are reformed to change incentives in the public sector or government officers are retrained. However, as criticism from the pope is less effective from afar, the costs of using repression may also revert to its original level.

3. Empirical Analysis

3.1 Where does the pope travel?

One contribution of our research is to introduce the first global dataset on papal travels outside of Italy. Our dataset covers over 9,000 country-year observations since 1964, when the Pope resumed the practice of Papal state visits. Indeed, no pope before Paul VI had ever left Europe. As we account only for papal travels for which also human rights data is available, our dataset ends in 2017 and covers in total 275 state visits. Figure OA1 in the Online Appendix shows the global distribution of the pope's state visits. The majority of those visits were during the papacy of John Paul II who held office for 25 years – almost as long as the other three popes combined. The probability for a pope visit in a random country-year is around 3%, but there are notable differences in countries' likelihood of being visited by the pope.

Most pope visits outside of Italy have been to other countries in Europe (5% is the probability of a visit for a country-year in Europe). The second most likely continent to be visited were the Americas (4%). Visits to Africa, Asia or Oceania have been far less common (2%). Given that popes are rather old, their health status is an important constraint on their traveling schedule. In years in which the pope was hospitalized, state visits were significantly less likely (2%). On the other hand, personal ties and

preferences of the pope also affect his destination choice. The pope's country of birth has a substantially higher probability of being visited in any given year (28%).


The existence of formal diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the destination country favor a visit by the pope (4%). The pope is even more likely to visit countries at the time formal diplomatic relations are (re-)established or when there is an anniversary for the establishment of diplomatic relations (5%). Jubilees celebrating the anniversary of the evangelization of a country are also frequently visited by the pope with increasing probability for 50- (9%), 100- (10%), or 500-year jubilees (22%).

The pope is also likely to visit the major events and meetings of the Catholic Church around the world. Particularly the International Eucharistic Congress (46%), the World Youth Days (92%), the World Meeting of Families (60%), and the Episcopal Conference of Latin America (100%). In contrast, the pope does not travel to countries where coups have taken place (0%) and even if a coup attempt was unsuccessful, a papal visit in the same year is unlikely (1%). The pope is said not to visit countries in years of elections, but our data does not support that. In general, the pope is more likely to visit democracies (4%) than nondemocracies (2%).

3.2 Timing the effect of papal visits on human rights

In a first step, we demonstrate the evolution of human rights around a typical visit by the pope. For this purpose, we estimate a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the first difference of a continuous latent human rights indicator by Fariss (2014, 2019). We include as independent variables the level of human rights protection in the previous year, country and year fixed effects, and 21 dummy variables identifying the year of a visit as well as the fifteen years before and the five years after. Figure 4 illustrates the point estimates of these 21 dummy variables as well as the 95% confidence interval based on panel robust standard errors.

Figure 4: Changes in Human Rights Before, During, and After Papal Visits



Note: Estimated lags and leads with 95% confidence intervals around a papal visit. The dependent variable is the first difference of a continuous indicator for the level of human rights protection by Fariss (2019). The model includes country and year fixed effects.

Although the coefficients displayed in Figure 4 only describe the evolution of human rights before and after a papal visit and not a causal effect of that visit, we gain information on the potential timing of the effect on human rights. Accordingly, human rights start improving significantly three years before the pope's visit and there is no more improvement (but also no reversal) in the years after the pope's visit. Most of the improvement occurs two to three years before the visit, which roughly coincides with our assumed time period for the planning of papal visits. One possible concern with this observation is that the pope may simply visit countries that are already on an upward trajectory regarding their protection of human rights. However, Figure 4 does not indicate that there are significant improvements in human rights in the time period that is clearly before the planning horizon of a papal visit.

3.3 Estimating the effect of papal visits on human rights – OLS

For all models estimated in this subsection, we modify our dataset such that the dependent variable (Δy) and the covariates (x) are collapsed for the year of a papal visit and the three years before the visit by taking the mean value. This leaves us with one observation per visit by the pope and the estimated coefficient on our treatment dummy δ measures the mean annual effect of a papal visit over a four-year period. All country-years without a visit by the pope and outside the three-year window before a papal visit remain annual observations. This manipulation of the data accounts for the fact that the collapsed years are not treated independently from each other. Simple panel data estimation with standard errors clustered on the country level would underestimate the standard errors.

Our goal is to estimate the following equation (the *outcome model*):

$$\Delta y_{it} = x'_{it}\beta + \delta d_{it} + u_{it} \quad (11)$$

where Δy is the outcome of interest (i.e., the first difference of the level of human rights protection), x is a vector of exogenous covariates that potentially explain the outcome, and d is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if a country is treated (i.e., it is visited by the pope). δ denotes our parameter of interest (i.e., the ATT). The vector x in the outcome model comprises the lagged level of human rights protection and six standard explanatory variables for changes in human rights (see, e.g., Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999). From the Penn World Table 9.1, we include as socio-economic characteristics the growth rates of a country's population and of its income per capita (Feenstra et al. 2015). We further include magnitude scores for both civil and international warfare from the Polity IV project (Marshall 2019) and another conflict indicator constructed from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset (V-DEM V10). Finally, we include a dummy variable for successful coups d'état based on Bjørnskov and Rode (2020). Note that in line with the choice of our dependent variable, we consider as covariates only factors that could explain changes in the level of human rights protection within a country and not differences in the level of human rights protection across countries. Thus, we do not control for indicators such as income per capita or the absolute size of the population, but rather for their respective growth rates. For the same reason we do not include country fixed effects.

The results in Table 1 show that papal visits are associated with a significant improvement in human rights protection. Our baseline model includes 145 countries observed between 1964 and 2017 in 6,403 observations. We include our vector of control variables x in model specifications (2) to (4). Model specifications (3) and (4) include a linear time trend and year fixed effects, respectively. The OLS estimated effect of a papal visit remains very stable and statistically significant over these model specifications. Substantively, our estimates indicate that a papal visit increases the trend in human rights protection (because our dependent variable is first differenced) by half a standard deviation. The estimated effects for our control variables are also highly plausible and consistent with the literature. Economic growth is linked to improvements in human rights. Population growth, conflict, and coups deteriorate human rights. The significant negative coefficient on the lagged level of human rights protection in models (2) to (4) indicates conditional beta convergence in the level of human rights protection.

<< Table 1 about here >>

In a first attempt to challenge the causal interpretation of our estimated ATT, we run several placebo tests (see Neumayer and Plümper 2017, p. 62). Their results are shown in Tables OA1 to OA6 in the Online Appendix. In our first placebo test, we vary the treatment assignment by replacing the year in which the pope visits a country by either a four-year-lag or a four-year-lead. This test is to ensure that it is really the timing of the visit that matters and moving the time window forward or backward should lead to an estimate of the ATT that is close to zero and not statistically significant. Indeed, we find that our estimated effect of pope visits does not capture any broader country-specific time trends. None of the estimated treatment effects is significant at the 5% level.

In a next step, we do not vary the treatment, but the outcome of the treatment. Specifically, we study the effect of a pope visit not on basic human rights, but on women's rights. Given that the Catholic Church can hardly be called a role model in the promotion of gender equality, we would not expect that women's rights improve before a visit by the pope in the same way as basic human rights do. We use three indicators for women's rights from V-DEM (civil liberties, civil society participation, and political participation) as well as a composite index of these three dimensions (political empowerment). We estimate exactly the same models as in Table 1, only the dependent variable is replaced by the first difference of a women's rights indicator and the lagged

level of human rights protection is replaced by the lagged level of that women's rights indicator. Again, our placebo tests do not produce a statistically significant ATT. The coefficient estimates for the control variables are plausible, but their explanatory power is clearly lower than in the case of basic human rights. All dimensions of women's rights exhibit (conditional and unconditional) beta convergence. As in the case of basic human rights, population growth is associated with declining women's rights in all dimensions. Moreover, conflict and coups are linked to reductions in civil liberties for and political participation of women. Overall, our placebo tests are consistent with a causal interpretation of the estimated treatment effects.

3.4 Estimating the effect of papal visits on human rights – ETM

In this subsection we take another approach to account explicitly for the endogeneity of the treatment in evaluating the causal influence of papal visits on the target states' respect for human rights. We employ an endogenous treatment model (ETM). ETMs allow for the identification of causal effects, even if the selection into treatment is based on unobservable factors that also affect the outcome of interest. Identification presupposes the availability of one or more variables that affect treatment assignment without being directly related to the outcome of interest.⁹

To account for the endogeneity of treatment assignment, the outcome model (11) estimated above using OLS is now complemented by a binary choice model that explains selection into treatment (the *selection model*):

$$d_{it}^* = z_{it}'\gamma + v_{it} \quad (12)$$

where d_{it}^* is a latent variable, which is assumed to be standard normally distributed and if this latent variable is above a threshold, the respective country-year is treated. z is, thus, a vector of exogenous covariates that affect the likelihood of being selected into treatment. The vector z in the selection model does not have to overlap with the vector of covariates x employed in the outcome model. However, estimating the ATT requires at least one variable in vector z that is not also included in vector x . This variable (or variables) need(s) to be (jointly) significantly correlated with the likelihood of being

⁹ The ETM employed here was first introduced by Heckman (1976; 1978) and is closely related to the Heckman selection model. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a thorough discussion and Gutmann et al. (2020) for an application to the human rights consequences of US sanctions.

treated, but uncorrelated with the error term of the outcome model. We refer to such a variable as a *treatment instrument*. All parameters that have to be identified to compute the ATT can be estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood. In contrast to the OLS estimator used above, these ETM estimates are not based on the assumption that the treatment assignment can be considered random.

In our vector z , we include all control variables from vector x in the outcome model plus additional variables that are supposed to predict the probability of a country-year being treated. In other words, these indicate the probability that a country is visited by the pope in a particular year. We argue that these variables are not directly related to changes in the level of human rights protection in a country. The following variables are our treatment instruments and unlike the variables in x they are measured in the year of the papal visit (i.e., without taking the mean value).

The first group of variables describes *characteristics of the pope* in office. As our sample covers the tenure of the last four popes, we include three “pope dummies” for John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis. These are intended to capture differences in their general propensity to travel due to unobserved and time-invariant characteristics of the popes. To account for the possibly changing propensity of popes to travel during the time of their tenure, we also control for the age of the pope currently in office and we include a dummy variable that indicates whether the pope was hospitalized in a given year. Finally, we control for a dummy variable that indicates the birth country of the pope, as the pope might be more likely to visit his home country.

The second group of indicators describes *country characteristics* that might favor a visit by the pope. We use binary indicators for whether there is a 10-, 50- or 100-year anniversary of diplomatic relations with the Vatican in a country-year. We do not use an indicator for the year in which diplomatic relations are (re)established, as this is not necessarily exogenous to the country’s human rights performance. Another group of country characteristics includes the spatial, genetic, and religious distance between a country and Italy (which we use to proxy distance to the Vatican). We measure this, first, in terms of the log-geographic distance of a country’s capital from Rome. Since travel expenses are not an important constraint for the Catholic Church, it can be argued that the pope is more likely to visit distant countries to support the global diffusion of Catholicism in areas far away from the Vatican. At the same time, the pope might be less

likely to visit countries with a larger genetic or religious distance from Italy, which reflects relatively larger differences in preferences and higher barriers to interaction and communication between these populations and traditional members of the Catholic Church. How relevant these barriers still are is reflected in the frequently voiced criticism that the Vatican's leadership structure is Eurocentric and underrepresents developing nations in the Southern Hemisphere relative to their share of church members. Pope Francis, for example, was the first non-European pope since the eighth century.

The third group of indicators describes country characteristics that might be relevant for or descriptive of the *strategic interests of the Catholic Church*. These include the population shares of Catholics, other Christians, and Muslims (as the major competing monotheistic religion). We also control for the degree of religious pluralism (or competition) in a country, as measured by a Herfindahl index of adherence shares. These factors might be important for the decision of the Catholic Church to invest resources into competing for members in the respective country.

We also rely on a set of indicators derived from data on saint-making by the Catholic Church, which was collected by Barro and McCleary (2016). As their dataset ends in 2009, we have coded all canonizations and beatifications between 2010 and 2017 ourselves. Two of the indicators we construct count the (log) number of individuals from a country that have become saints during the history of this country, as well as the corresponding number for the last ten years. These indicators are supposed to capture an expressed interest of the Catholic Church to compete for members in these countries. We control for the number of new saints made on a continent over the last ten years to measure the shifting strategic regional interests of the Church.

Finally, we include binary indicators to control for whether a pope has visited the respective country during the last five years or during the five years before that, as well as two indicators for how often a pope has visited the respective region during these time intervals. We expect that previous visits to the country itself lower the probability that a pope visits the same country only shortly after. In contrast, previous visits to the geographic region might be reflective of the Church's strategic interest in terms of competition for adherents. They should, thus, be linked to a higher probability of visiting further countries in that region.

Our fourth and last category is concerned with major *events* of the Catholic Church. It comprises indicators for congresses, synods, and jubilees of the Catholic Church that increase the likelihood that the pope will visit a specific country or a specific region of the world for these events. International congresses, such as the International Eucharistic Congress, serve as a meeting point for the Catholic Church and bishops from a region regularly assemble at Episcopal Conferences.¹⁰ These dates in the Church's calendar offer the pope an opportunity to coordinate and redirect the Catholic Church and to address a large crowd of followers. Similarly, the Holy Sea itself periodically hosts synods of bishops within its vicinity. These, however, run over months and often require the presence of the pope in the Vatican, which can limit his available time for travelling in that year.

If synods at the Holy Sea are dedicated to a country or a region, they can increase the probability of papal travels to that country or region in the same year. Such a theme indicates how important the Vatican considers a country or region to be at that time. Visits of the pope can be used to present the Synod's resolutions on site. Jubilees of Christianity are a reason for celebration in the Church and provide opportunities to amass its followers. National churches use the occasion of jubilees of the evangelization of a country to celebrate their existence, which provides an opportunity for the pope to visit the country. Based on the year of evangelization of a country, we control for 50-year, 100-year and 500-year anniversaries of national churches. We have collected information on all these church events from various sources. Appendix A describes all the variables we use in our empirical analysis and their data sources. Appendix B provides descriptive statistics.

3.5 Endogenous treatment model results

Tables 2 and 3 shows the results for the selection model and the outcome model, which are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood estimation. Analogous to the outcome models estimated above using OLS, we gradually add the control variables

¹⁰ We include the most important assemblies: World Meeting of Families, World Youth Days, International Eucharistic Congresses, and Regional Episcopal Conferences (Episcopal Conference of Latin America – CELAM, Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar – SECAM, Federation of Asian Bishops' Conference – FABC, Federation of Catholic Bishops' Conferences of Oceania – FCBCO).

(model 2), then a linear time trend (model 3) and finally year fixed effects instead of the time trend (model 4). In the selection model, we find that, *ceteris paribus*, Paul VI who was in office from 1963 to 1978 had a lighter travel itinerary than the popes that followed him, at least in terms of the number of countries visited. Not surprisingly, we find that increasing age significantly lowers the probability of the pope visiting a country, whereas the pope's home country has an increased likelihood of being the destination of an official state visit. An anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Vatican favors a papal visit.

Regarding the different measures of distance from the Vatican, we find only one statistically significant effect. The pope is less likely to travel to countries if they are genetically more dissimilar from Italy. Major Church events are important predictors of pope visits, except for Synods.¹¹ Among the indicators of saint-making as proxies for the strategic interests of the Catholic Church, only the number of new saints in a country over the last ten years is associated with an increased likelihood of a papal visit and this correlation is only significant at the 10% level.

Finally, we can confirm our expectation that recent visits by the pope to a country lower the probability of that country being visited over the next five years dramatically, whereas visits to the same continent over the last five years predict a higher likelihood for the pope to visit a country. The shares of Muslims, Catholics, and other Christians in the population are not related to papal visits and the association between more religious competition and an increased likelihood of a visit by the pope is only significant at the 10% level. Finally, we find that the pope is more likely to visit a country if human rights are not well protected and the country is not involved in an international war.

<< Tables 2 and 3 about here >>

When we study the results of the outcome model taking into account the endogeneity of the treatment, we still find a positive and significant effect of pope visits. This effect is twice as large as in the OLS models, suggesting that simple regression analysis underestimates the positive effect of papal visits on human rights, because the pope chooses travel destinations where human rights are not doing well. This is consistent with our significantly negative estimate of ρ , which suggests that unobservables that

¹¹ Although these church events are planned many years in advance and their timing and location are, therefore, plausibly exogenous, we provide in Tables OA7 and OA8 in the Online Appendix estimation results excluding all church events except Jubilees. Our results do not change.

adversely affect a country's human rights situation follow a pattern similar to unobservables that increase the likelihood of a visit by the pope. Substantively, our estimates imply an increase in the dependent variable by more than one standard deviation. Again, we find conditional beta convergence in the level of human rights protection and a positive effect of economic growth. Population growth, coups, and conflict are associated with declining human rights protection.

Having established a robust and plausibly causal relationship between pope visits and improvements in human rights protection, we next turn to the question of effect heterogeneity where we test three conjectures. The effect of a pope visit could depend on the share of Catholics in the population, the income level of the host country, and the political institutions of the host country. A higher share of Catholics may make criticism voiced by the pope during his visit politically more costly, which adds to the incentives for the host country government to improve the human rights situation in advance. The level of income per capita of the country may determine the resources at the disposal of the government, which can be used to protect human rights and substitute repressive policies with redistribution. Governments of high-income countries might therefore be more responsive. Finally, being criticized by the pope may be more costly to democratic governments, which are facing competitive elections. Therefore, we would expect a larger effect of pope visits on human rights protection in democracies. To test these three conjectures, we interact the treatment indicator (1) with the share of Catholics in the population, (2) with a dummy variable for income per capita above 6,000\$ according to Feenstra et al. (2015), and (3) with a dummy variable for democratic regimes as coded by Bjørnskov and Rode (2020). The results are shown in Tables C1 to C3 in Appendix C. The effect of pope visits on human rights does not depend on the share of Catholics or the income of the host country's population. However, we do find our third conjecture confirmed. The effect of pope visits on human rights appears to be largely driven by democratic regimes. The measured improvements in human rights protection in nondemocracies are not statistically significant.

3.6 Media coverage of national human rights

Media attention is a necessary precondition for criticism by the pope to be harmful to the government (see, e.g., Eisensee and Strömberg 2007). On his travels abroad, the

topic of human rights is a constant companion of the pope. The Catholic Church actively promotes media coverage of the pope's travels by offering regular press talks, for example during flights, and by using their own numerous media channels.

Here, we demonstrate that papal visits are not only associated with increased media attention to the host country, but that international media specifically increase coverage of the human rights situation in that country. We analyze data provided by the GDELT database, an open-source repository for print and web news articles in over 100 languages. We create an indicator for the frequency of reports mentioning "human rights" in combination with the name of the host country. The indicator is standardized by dividing it by the total number of international news articles on the same day that address human rights. This serves to make our indicator comparable over time. The available data for the timespan from August 2013 to August 2017 allows us to measure media coverage concerning human rights in the host country during 23 papal visits.

Appendix D shows the mean value of our indicator over the 23 countries visited by the pope in the 60 days before and after the pope's visit. The visit itself is described by only one data point (at $t=0$), which takes the maximum value of our media indicator during the time of the visit. This allows us to compare papal visits of different length. As one can see, the global share of human rights related media reports that mention the host country is about five to six times higher during a visit by the pope than during normal times. This lends support to our assumed causal mechanism that the pope can harm governments by drawing attention to their human rights performance. In a complementary analysis, we have coded the speeches of the pope for the number of times the term "human rights" is used. The increase in media attention to human rights during the visit is even more pronounced in countries where the pope mentions human rights at least twice in a speech (results available on request).

4. Conclusion

We have shown that papal visits have a significant effect on human rights protection in the years before the visit. These results are robust to the use of endogenous treatment models and their interpretation is supported by several placebo tests. The effect appears to be due to democratic governments anticipating increased media attention to human

rights issues and the threat of being criticized by the pope for insufficient efforts to guarantee the protection of human rights for the country's citizens. Papal visits are only one channel through which the Catholic Church exerts influence on other countries. Followers of the Catholic belief can react directly to messages by the Holy See (Koukal 2017) and also national churches can lobby for the preferred policy of the Catholic Church (Andersen and Jensen 2019). In order to better understand the political importance of the Catholic Church, it is thus essential that more research deals with these channels. Moreover, our study is focused on one effect of pope visits, i.e., changes in human rights protection. Undoubtedly, the consequences of papal visits on the economy and other political outcomes also deserve more attention.

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Appendix A: Description of Variables

Variable	Description and source
Human Rights	Latent human rights protection score. Source: Fariss (2019), v3.01.
Pope Visit	Binary indicator for official visits by the pope. Source: www.vatican.va .
Population Growth	Growth rate of the population size. Source: Feenstra et al. (2015), v9.1.
Economic Growth	Growth rate of expenditure-side real GDP per capita at chained PPPs per capita. Source: Feenstra et al. (2015), v9.1.
Conflict (V-DEM)	Binary indicator coded 1 if e_civil_war, e_miinteco or e_miinterc are coded 1 in V-DEM, v10.
Int. War (Polity)	Magnitude score of episodes of international warfare. Source: Marshall (2019).
Civil War (Polity)	Magnitude score of episodes of civil warfare. Source: Marshall (2019).
Successful Coup	Binary indicator for whether there was at least one successful coup. Source: Bjørnskov and Rode (2020), v2.2.
Past Visits (t-1/t-5)	Binary indicator for whether the pope has visited this country over the last 5 years. Source: www.vatican.va .
Past Visits (t-6/t-10)	Binary indicator for whether the pope has visited this country between 6 and 10 years ago. Source: www.vatican.va .
Past Visits (t-1/t-5), regional	Number of countries on the same continent that the pope has visited over the last 5 years. Source: www.vatican.va .
Past Visits (t-6/t-10), regional	Number of countries on the same continent that the pope has visited between 6 and 10 years ago. Source: www.vatican.va .
Log-Total Past Saints	Log-number of all past Beatifications and Canonizations of nationals of this country. Sources: Barro and McCleary (2016), updated with manually collected data for 2010 to 2017.
Past Saints (t-1/t-10)	Number of Beatifications and Canonizations of nationals of this country over the last 10 years. Source: Barro and McCleary (2016) and manually collected data for 2010 to 2017.
Past Saints (t-1/t-10), regional	Number of Beatifications and Canonizations of nationals of countries on this continent over the last 10 years. Source: Barro and McCleary (2016) and manually collected data for 2010 to 2017.
Share Catholic	Share of Catholics in the population. Source: Brown and James (2018).
Share Other Christian	Share of other Christians in the population. Source: Brown and James (2018).
Share Muslim	Share of Muslims in the population. Source: Brown and James (2018).
Religious Competition	One minus the Herfindahl index (sum of squares of adherence shares) among persons who adhere to some or no religion. Own calculation, following McCleary and Barro (2006). Source: Brown and James (2018).
Church Jubilee (500 years)	Binary indicator for whether a country is in a 500-year jubilee of evangelization. Sources: Barrett et al. (2001) and www.vatican.va .
Church Jubilee (100 years)	Binary indicator for whether a country is in a 100-year jubilee of evangelization. Sources: Barrett et al. (2001) and www.vatican.va .
Church Jubilee (50 years)	Binary indicator for whether a country is in a 50-year jubilee of evangelization. Sources: Barrett et al. (2001) and www.vatican.va .
Int. Eucharistic Congress	Binary indicator for whether the International Eucharistic Congress took place in that country. Source: Kasper (2006) and www.vatican.va .
World Youth Day	Binary indicator for whether the World Youth Day took place in that country. Source: Kasper (2006) and www.vatican.va .

W. Meeting of Families	Binary indicator for whether the World Meeting of Families took place in that country. Source: Kasper (2006) and www.vatican.va .
CELAM	Binary indicator for whether the Episcopal Conference of Latin America took place in that country. Source: Kasper (2006) and www.vatican.va .
SECAM	Binary indicator for whether the Symposium of Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar took place in that country. Source: Kasper (2006) and www.vatican.va .
FABC	Binary indicator for whether the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conference took place in that country. Source: Kasper (2006) and www.vatican.va .
FCBCO	Binary indicator for whether the Federation of Catholic Bishops' Conferences of Oceania took place in that country. Source: Kasper (2006) and www.vatican.va .
Year of Synod	Binary indicator for whether the Holy Sea hosted a Synod of Bishops in that year. Source: www.vatican.va .
Synod Theme	Binary indicator for whether a Special Synod of Bishops on the country or the region where the country is located took place in that year.
Pope: Birth Country	Binary indicator for the birth country of the pope.
Pope: Age	Age of the pope in years.
Pope: Year Hospitalized	Binary indicator for whether the pope was hospitalized or died in that year. Source: www.vatican.va .
Pope: John Paul II	Binary indicator for whether John Paul II was the pope.
Pope: Benedict XVI	Binary indicator for whether Benedict XVI was the pope.
Pope: Francis	Binary indicator for whether Francis was the pope.
10 Years Dipl. Ties	Binary indicator for whether diplomatic relations with the Vatican have a (multiple of) 10-year anniversary. Source: www.vatican.va .
50 Years Dipl. Ties	Binary indicator for whether diplomatic relations with the Vatican have a (multiple of) 50-year anniversary. Source: www.vatican.va .
100 Years Dipl. Ties	Binary indicator for whether diplomatic relations with the Vatican have a (multiple of) 100-year anniversary. Source: www.vatican.va .
Distance: Geographic	Log-Distance of a country's capital from the Vatican. Source: Mayer and Zignago (2011).
Distance: Religious	Religious distance of a country's population from that of Italy. Source: Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016).
Distance: Genetic	Genetic distance (FST) of a country's population from that of Italy. Source: Spolaore and Wacziarg (2018).
Women Political Empowerment	Women political empowerment index (v2x_gender). Source: V-DEM, v10.
Women Civil Liberties	Women civil liberties index (v2x_gencl). Source: V-DEM, v10.
Women Civil Society Participation	Women civil society participation index (v2x_gencs). Source: V-DEM, v10.
Women Political Participation	Women political participation index (v2x_genpp). Source: V-DEM, v10.
High income	Binary indicator for whether expenditure-side real GDP per capita at chained PPPs per capita is above 6,000US\$. Own calculation based on Feenstra et al. (2015).
Democracy	Binary indicator for whether a country is democratic. Source: Bjørnskov and Rode (2020), v2.2.

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

	Full				Treated			
	mean	sd	min	max	mean	sd	min	max
Δ Human Rights	0.01	0.18	-3.25	3.07	0.02	0.22	-2.49	1.26
Human Rights (t-1)	0.04	1.58	-3.77	5.14	0.06	1.48	-3.09	4.69
Pope Visit	0.03	0.17	0	1	1.00	0.00	1	1
Population Growth	0.02	0.02	-0.18	0.19	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.08
Economic Growth	0.03	0.09	-0.70	1.43	0.02	0.06	-0.25	0.39
Conflict (V-DEM)	0.14	0.35	0	1	0.13	0.33	0	1
Int. War (Polity)	0.07	0.59	0	9	0.02	0.15	0	2
Civil War (Polity)	0.24	1.01	0	7	0.16	0.85	0	6
Successful Coup	0.02	0.15	0	1	0.00	0.00	0	0
Past Visits (t-1/t-5)	0.13	0.34	0	1	0.20	0.40	0	1
Past Visits (t-6/t-10)	0.10	0.30	0	1	0.14	0.34	0	1
Past Visits (t-1/t-5), regional	5.15	5.07	0	23	7.77	5.56	0	23
Past Visits (t-6/t-10), regional	3.83	4.57	0	23	4.15	4.43	0	23
Log-Total Past Saints	0.33	0.79	0.00	4.96	0.93	1.35	0	4.83
Past Saints (t-1/t-10)	0.43	1.90	0	31	1.84	4.31	0	29
Past Saints (t-1/t-10), regional	23.11	43.70	0	175	40.92	54.09	0	175
Share Catholic	26.87	31.62	0.00	98.01	43.46	34.00	0.00	95.31
Share Other Christian	23.27	26.65	0.00	98.61	21.02	23.62	0.01	95.75
Share Muslim	24.50	35.96	0.00	99.77	14.85	28.34	0.00	99.39
Religious Competition	0.41	0.21	0.00	0.82	0.42	0.20	0.01	0.79
Church Jubilee (500 years)	0.00	0.06	0	1	0.02	0.15	0	1
Church Jubilee (100 years)	0.01	0.08	0	1	0.02	0.14	0	1
Church Jubilee (50 years)	0.01	0.10	0	1	0.03	0.17	0	1
Int. Eucharistic Congress	0.00	0.04	0	1	0.02	0.15	0	1
World Youth Day	0.00	0.04	0	1	0.04	0.20	0	1
W. Meeting of Families	0.00	0.02	0	1	0.01	0.11	0	1
CELAM	0.00	0.02	0	1	0.02	0.12	0	1
SECAM	0.00	0.04	0	1	0.00	0.06	0	1
FABC	0.00	0.04	0	1	0.01	0.09	0	1
FCBCO	0.00	0.04	0	1	0.00	0.06	0	1
Year of Synod	0.45	0.50	0	1	0.47	0.50	0	1
Synod Theme	0.03	0.17	0	1	0.04	0.19	0	1
Pope: Birth Country	0.00	0.07	0	1	0.04	0.20	0	1
Pope: Age	74.72	6.82	59	85	72.10	7.41	59	85
Pope: Year Hospitalized	0.15	0.36	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1
Pope: John Paul II	0.50	0.50	0	1	0.72	0.45	0	1
Pope: Benedict XVI	0.16	0.37	0	1	0.10	0.30	0	1
Pope: Francis	0.10	0.30	0	1	0.11	0.32	0	1
10 Years Dipl. Ties	0.06	0.24	0	1	0.11	0.31	0	1
50 Years Dipl. Ties	0.00	0.07	0	1	0.01	0.11	0	1
100 Years Dipl. Ties	0.00	0.05	0	1	0.00	0.06	0	1
Distance: Geographic	8.41	0.84	5.44	9.83	8.16	0.97	5.44	9.83
Distance: Religious	0.71	0.17	0.40	1.00	0.63	0.17	0.40	0.98
Distance: Genetic	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.07
<i>N</i>	8,478				265			

Appendix C: Effect Heterogeneity

Table C1: Endogenous Treatment Model, Conditional on Share of Catholics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Visit * Share Catholics	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Pope Visit	0.059**	0.065**	0.064**	0.062**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: Results analogous to Table 2, but with an added interaction term between the share of Catholics and the treatment indicator for a pope visit.

Table C2: Endogenous Treatment Model, Conditional on Income


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Visit * High Income	0.034+	0.019	0.018	0.021
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pope Visit	0.038	0.052*	0.052*	0.051*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: Results analogous to Table 2, but with an added interaction term between a dummy variable for high income countries and the treatment indicator for a pope visit.

Table C3: Endogenous Treatment Model, Conditional on Democracy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Visit * Democracy	0.058**	0.048*	0.048*	0.046*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Pope Visit	0.019	0.030	0.030	0.032
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: Results analogous to Table 2, but with an added interaction term between a dummy variable for democratic countries and the treatment indicator for a pope visit.

Appendix D: Media Coverage of Human Rights during Papal Visits

Note: Mean level of human rights reporting related to 23 countries, 60 days before and after a papal visit to that country.

Table 1: OLS estimates– outcome model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Human Rights (t-1)	-0.003+ (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)
Pope Visit	0.027** (0.01)	0.024* (0.01)	0.024* (0.01)	0.023* (0.01)
Population Growth		-0.610** (0.21)	-0.554** (0.21)	-0.507* (0.21)
Economic Growth		0.134*** (0.03)	0.133*** (0.03)	0.145*** (0.03)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.066*** (0.01)	-0.062*** (0.01)	-0.064*** (0.01)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.007+ (0.00)	-0.007+ (0.00)
Successful Coup		-0.107** (0.03)	-0.104** (0.03)	-0.104** (0.03)
Constant	0.010*** (0.00)	0.030*** (0.01)	-0.797* (0.36)	0.002 (0.01)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: The dependent variable is the first difference of a continuous indicator for the level of human rights protection by Fariss (2019). OLS coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses clustered on the country level. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 2: ETM estimates – outcome model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Human Rights (t-1)	-0.003+ (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)
Pope Visit	0.062*** (0.02)	0.065*** (0.02)	0.065*** (0.02)	0.066*** (0.01)
Population Growth		-0.585** (0.21)	-0.529* (0.21)	-0.478* (0.20)
Economic Growth		0.136*** (0.03)	0.134*** (0.03)	0.145*** (0.03)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.066*** (0.01)	-0.062*** (0.01)	-0.064*** (0.01)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.006+ (0.00)
Successful Coup		-0.106** (0.03)	-0.103** (0.03)	-0.103** (0.03)
Constant	0.009*** (0.00)	0.028*** (0.01)	-0.796* (0.36)	0.001 (0.01)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: The dependent variable in the second stage is the first difference of a continuous indicator for the level of human rights protection by Fariss (2019). ETM coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses clustered on the country level. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 3: ETM estimates – selection model

Human Rights (t-1)	-0.085** (0.03)	-0.120*** (0.03)	-0.120*** (0.03)	-0.120*** (0.03)
Past Visits (t-1/t-5)	-0.570*** (0.13)	-0.592*** (0.13)	-0.592*** (0.13)	-0.590*** (0.13)
Past Visits (t-6/t-10)	-0.172 (0.13)	-0.188 (0.13)	-0.188 (0.13)	-0.188 (0.13)
Past Visits (t-1/t-5), regional	0.036*** (0.01)	0.035*** (0.01)	0.035*** (0.01)	0.035*** (0.01)
Past Visits (t-6/t-10), regional	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
Log-Total Past Saints	0.137 (0.09)	0.137 (0.09)	0.137 (0.09)	0.137 (0.09)
Past Saints (t-1/t-10)	0.035+ (0.02)	0.035+ (0.02)	0.035+ (0.02)	0.035+ (0.02)
Past Saints (t-1/t-10), regional	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Share Catholic	0.008 (0.00)	0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)
Share Other Christian	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)
Share Muslim	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Religious Competition	0.324 (0.23)	0.382+ (0.23)	0.382+ (0.23)	0.380+ (0.23)
Church Jubilee (500 years)	0.960** (0.32)	0.986** (0.32)	0.986** (0.32)	0.987** (0.32)
Church Jubilee (100 years)	0.363 (0.30)	0.336 (0.30)	0.336 (0.30)	0.336 (0.30)
Church Jubilee (50 years)	0.522* (0.23)	0.508* (0.23)	0.508* (0.23)	0.508* (0.23)
Int. Eucharistic Congress	1.764*** (0.48)	1.749*** (0.48)	1.749*** (0.48)	1.747*** (0.48)
World Youth Day	2.575*** (0.50)	2.587*** (0.49)	2.587*** (0.49)	2.585*** (0.49)
W. Meeting of Families	2.030*** (0.61)	1.963** (0.61)	1.964** (0.61)	1.965** (0.61)
CELAM	6.415*** (0.25)	6.837*** (0.28)	6.640*** (0.28)	6.265*** (0.28)
SECAM	0.873 (0.68)	0.889 (0.69)	0.889 (0.69)	0.894 (0.69)
FABC	1.124* (0.47)	1.157* (0.45)	1.157* (0.45)	1.155* (0.45)
FCBCO	0.965** (0.29)	0.980*** (0.29)	0.980*** (0.29)	0.980*** (0.29)
Year of Synod	0.024 (0.06)	0.022 (0.06)	0.022 (0.06)	0.026 (0.06)
Synod Theme	0.016 (0.19)	0.018 (0.19)	0.017 (0.19)	0.017 (0.19)
Pope: Birth Country	1.372* (0.63)	1.363* (0.63)	1.363* (0.63)	1.364* (0.63)

Pope: Age	-0.030*** (0.01)	-0.034*** (0.01)	-0.034*** (0.01)	-0.035*** (0.01)
Pope: Year Hospitalized	-0.139 (0.09)	-0.147 (0.09)	-0.147 (0.09)	-0.153+ (0.09)
Pope: John Paul II	0.703*** (0.15)	0.714*** (0.15)	0.707*** (0.15)	0.698*** (0.15)
Pope: Benedict XVI	0.531** (0.17)	0.528** (0.17)	0.518** (0.17)	0.530** (0.17)
Pope: Francis	0.728*** (0.15)	0.712*** (0.15)	0.701*** (0.15)	0.708*** (0.15)
10 Years Dipl. Ties	0.321** (0.12)	0.327** (0.12)	0.327** (0.12)	0.328** (0.12)
50 Years Dipl. Ties	0.546+ (0.32)	0.519+ (0.31)	0.519+ (0.31)	0.517+ (0.31)
100 Years Dipl. Ties	0.169 (0.47)	0.171 (0.47)	0.172 (0.47)	0.166 (0.47)
Distance: Geographic	-0.105 (0.09)	-0.095 (0.09)	-0.095 (0.09)	-0.094 (0.09)
Distance: Religious	0.382 (0.76)	0.460 (0.78)	0.460 (0.78)	0.461 (0.79)
Distance: Genetic	-9.288** (3.38)	-9.903** (3.56)	-9.899** (3.56)	-9.895** (3.57)
Population Growth		-0.720 (3.32)	-0.765 (3.31)	-0.752 (3.30)
Economic Growth		0.022 (0.27)	0.023 (0.27)	0.022 (0.27)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.143 (0.11)	-0.146 (0.11)	-0.146 (0.10)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.249** (0.09)	-0.249** (0.09)	-0.249** (0.09)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.038 (0.03)	-0.038 (0.03)	-0.037 (0.03)
Successful Coup		-0.137 (0.15)	-0.139 (0.15)	-0.142 (0.16)
Constant	0.037 (1.05)	0.166 (1.12)	0.196 (1.12)	0.252 (1.12)
Rho	-0.108** (0.03)	-0.131*** (0.04)	-0.130*** (0.04)	-0.133*** (0.03)
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: The dependent variable in the first stage is a binary indicator reflecting an official visit by the current pope. Coefficient estimates are shown with standard errors in parentheses clustered on the country level. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

ONLINE APPENDIX FOR

**Pacem in Terris: Are Papal Visits Good News for
Human Rights?**

Marek Endrich and Jerg Gutmann

Figure OA1: Global Distribution of Papal Visits




Table OA1: OLS estimates– outcome model, placebo treatment (lag)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Human Rights (t-1)	-0.004* (0.00)	-0.015*** (0.00)	-0.015*** (0.00)	-0.014*** (0.00)
Pope Visit	-0.002 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)
Population Growth		-0.788*** (0.22)	-0.763*** (0.22)	-0.712** (0.22)
Economic Growth		0.110** (0.04)	0.109** (0.04)	0.120** (0.04)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.066*** (0.01)	-0.064*** (0.01)	-0.067*** (0.01)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.006 (0.00)
Successful Coup		-0.093* (0.04)	-0.092* (0.04)	-0.092* (0.04)
Constant	0.015*** (0.00)	0.038*** (0.01)	-0.361 (0.43)	0.017+ (0.01)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,036	6,036	6,036	6,036

Note: Results analogous to Table 1, but the treatment variable (Pope Visit) has been constructed based on a four-year-lag of the visit.

Table OA2: OLS estimates– outcome model, placebo treatment (lead)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Human Rights (t-1)	-0.004* (0.00)	-0.017*** (0.00)	-0.017*** (0.00)	-0.017*** (0.00)
Pope Visit	0.015+ (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	0.013 (0.01)	0.011 (0.01)
Population Growth		-0.653** (0.24)	-0.593* (0.23)	-0.533* (0.23)
Economic Growth		0.120*** (0.03)	0.116** (0.04)	0.133*** (0.04)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.085*** (0.02)	-0.081*** (0.02)	-0.084*** (0.02)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.007* (0.00)
Successful Coup		-0.094** (0.04)	-0.091* (0.04)	-0.090* (0.04)
Constant	0.011*** (0.00)	0.036*** (0.01)	-1.041** (0.39)	0.008 (0.01)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	5,857	5,857	5,857	5,857

Note: Results analogous to Table 1, but the treatment variable (Pope Visit) has been constructed based on a four-year-lead of the visit.

Table OA3: OLS estimates– outcome model, DV: women political empowerment

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women Empowerment (t-1)	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.019*** (0.00)	-0.023*** (0.00)	-0.023*** (0.00)
Pope Visit	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Population Growth		-0.076** (0.03)	-0.085** (0.03)	-0.081** (0.03)
Economic Growth		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.003 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)	-0.003+ (0.00)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Successful Coup		-0.009 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)
Constant	0.015*** (0.00)	0.020*** (0.00)	-0.177** (0.06)	0.016*** (0.00)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,296	6,296	6,296	6,296

Note: Results analogous to Table 1, but the dependent variable has been replaced with the first difference of a continuous indicator for the level of women's rights protection by V-DEM and the lagged level of rights protection is based on the same indicator from V-DEM.

Table OA4: OLS estimates– outcome model, DV: women civil liberties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women CivLib (t-1)	-0.014*** (0.00)	-0.019*** (0.00)	-0.019*** (0.00)	-0.019*** (0.00)
Pope Visit	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Population Growth		-0.102** (0.03)	-0.104** (0.04)	-0.102** (0.03)
Economic Growth		0.007 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	0.010+ (0.01)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.003 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.005* (0.00)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.002* (0.00)	-0.002* (0.00)	-0.002* (0.00)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Successful Coup		-0.008 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)
Constant	0.012*** (0.00)	0.018*** (0.00)	0.087 (0.06)	0.016* (0.01)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: Results analogous to Table 1, but the dependent variable has been replaced with the first difference of a continuous indicator for the level of women's rights protection by V-DEM and the lagged level of rights protection is based on the same indicator from V-DEM.

Table OA5: OLS estimates– outcome model, DV: women civil society participation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Women CivSoc (t-1)	-0.017*** (0.00)	-0.020*** (0.00)	-0.022*** (0.00)	-0.022*** (0.00)
Pope Visit	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Population Growth		-0.089** (0.03)	-0.093** (0.03)	-0.090*** (0.03)
Economic Growth		-0.002 (0.00)	-0.003 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.01)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Successful Coup		-0.008 (0.00)	-0.007 (0.00)	-0.008+ (0.00)
Constant	0.015*** (0.00)	0.020*** (0.00)	-0.103 (0.07)	0.016*** (0.00)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: Results analogous to Table 1, but the dependent variable has been replaced with the first difference of a continuous indicator for the level of women's rights protection by V-DEM and the lagged level of rights protection is based on the same indicator from V-DEM.

Table OA6: OLS estimates– outcome model, DV: women political participation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Women PolPart (t-1)	-0.023*** (0.00)	-0.029*** (0.00)	-0.039*** (0.00)	-0.038*** (0.00)
Pope Visit	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Population Growth		-0.103* (0.05)	-0.126* (0.05)	-0.121* (0.05)
Economic Growth		0.002 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	-0.000 (0.01)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.006** (0.00)	-0.004+ (0.00)	-0.005+ (0.00)
Int. War (Polity)		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Civil War (Polity)		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Successful Coup		-0.021* (0.01)	-0.020* (0.01)	-0.020* (0.01)
Constant	0.023*** (0.00)	0.030*** (0.00)	-0.622*** (0.10)	0.026*** (0.01)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,296	6,296	6,296	6,296

Note: Results analogous to Table 1, but the dependent variable has been replaced with the first difference of a continuous indicator for the level of women's rights protection by V-DEM and the lagged level of rights protection is based on the same indicator from V-DEM.

Table OA7: ETM estimates – outcome model, no church events

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Human Rights (t-1)	-0.003+ (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)	-0.013*** (0.00)
Pope Visit	0.075*** (0.01)	0.079*** (0.01)	0.078*** (0.01)	0.080*** (0.01)
Population Growth		-0.576** (0.21)	-0.521* (0.21)	-0.468* (0.20)
Economic Growth		0.136*** (0.03)	0.135*** (0.03)	0.146*** (0.03)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.066*** (0.01)	-0.062*** (0.01)	-0.064*** (0.01)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.006+ (0.00)	-0.006+ (0.00)
Successful Coup		-0.106** (0.03)	-0.103** (0.03)	-0.103** (0.03)
Constant	0.008** (0.00)	0.027*** (0.01)	-0.796* (0.36)	0.000 (0.01)
Control variables	NO	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	NO	NO	YES	NO
Time fixed effects	NO	NO	NO	YES
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: Results analogous to Table 2, but based on a reduced set of covariates in the selection model (Table OA8), as Church events other than jubilees are omitted.

Table OA8: ETM estimates – selection model

Human Rights (t-1)	-0.089** (0.03)	-0.123*** (0.03)	-0.122*** (0.03)	-0.123*** (0.03)
Past Visits (t-1/t-5)	-0.546*** (0.13)	-0.553*** (0.13)	-0.553*** (0.13)	-0.551*** (0.13)
Past Visits (t-6/t-10)	-0.099 (0.13)	-0.106 (0.13)	-0.106 (0.13)	-0.106 (0.13)
Past Visits (t-1/t-5), regional	0.034*** (0.01)	0.032*** (0.01)	0.032*** (0.01)	0.033*** (0.01)
Past Visits (t-6/t-10), regional	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Log-Total Past Saints	0.128 (0.08)	0.134 (0.09)	0.134 (0.09)	0.134 (0.09)
Past Saints (t-1/t-10)	0.051** (0.02)	0.048** (0.02)	0.048** (0.02)	0.048** (0.02)
Past Saints (t-1/t-10), regional	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Share Catholic	0.008 (0.00)	0.008+ (0.01)	0.008+ (0.01)	0.008+ (0.01)
Share Other Christian	0.002 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)	0.003 (0.00)
Share Muslim	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Religious Competition	0.347 (0.23)	0.403+ (0.23)	0.403+ (0.23)	0.402+ (0.23)
Pope: Year Hospitalized	-0.156+ (0.09)	-0.164+ (0.09)	-0.164+ (0.09)	-0.173+ (0.09)
Pope: Birth Country	1.422* (0.63)	1.436* (0.63)	1.436* (0.63)	1.436* (0.63)
Pope: Age	-0.029*** (0.01)	-0.033*** (0.01)	-0.033*** (0.01)	-0.034*** (0.01)
Pope: John Paul II	0.687*** (0.15)	0.680*** (0.14)	0.671*** (0.14)	0.660*** (0.14)
Pope: Benedict XVI	0.530** (0.17)	0.509** (0.18)	0.497** (0.18)	0.514** (0.18)
Pope: Francis	0.704*** (0.14)	0.665*** (0.14)	0.650*** (0.14)	0.661*** (0.14)
10 Years Dipl. Ties	0.300** (0.11)	0.307** (0.11)	0.307** (0.11)	0.308** (0.11)
50 Years Dipl. Ties	0.486 (0.31)	0.481 (0.31)	0.481 (0.31)	0.477 (0.31)
100 Years Dipl. Ties	0.185 (0.52)	0.066 (0.48)	0.066 (0.48)	0.058 (0.48)
Distance: Geographic	-0.058 (0.09)	-0.046 (0.09)	-0.046 (0.09)	-0.046 (0.09)
Distance: Religious	0.290 (0.73)	0.413 (0.75)	0.413 (0.75)	0.413 (0.75)
Distance: Genetic	-11.183*** (3.40)	-11.670*** (3.53)	-11.667*** (3.53)	-11.668*** (3.53)
Church Jubilee (500 years)		1.093*** (0.29)	1.093*** (0.29)	1.092*** (0.29)

Church Jubilee (100 years)		0.328 (0.30)	0.328 (0.30)	0.331 (0.30)
Church Jubilee (50 years)		0.503* (0.23)	0.503* (0.23)	0.503* (0.23)
Population Growth		-0.064 (3.25)	-0.119 (3.24)	-0.102 (3.23)
Economic Growth		0.073 (0.27)	0.074 (0.27)	0.073 (0.27)
Conflict (V-DEM)		-0.119 (0.10)	-0.123 (0.10)	-0.123 (0.10)
Int. War (Polity)		-0.268** (0.08)	-0.268** (0.08)	-0.268** (0.08)
Civil War (Polity)		-0.034 (0.03)	-0.034 (0.03)	-0.033 (0.03)
Successful Coup		-0.208 (0.17)	-0.209 (0.17)	-0.217 (0.18)
Constant	-0.223 (1.02)	-0.144 (1.10)	-0.106 (1.10)	-0.027 (1.10)
Rho	-0.142*** (0.03)	-0.166*** (0.04)	-0.165*** (0.03)	-0.170*** (0.03)
Countries	145	145	145	145
Observations	6,403	6,403	6,403	6,403

Note: Results analogous to Table 3, but based on a reduced set of covariates, as Church events other than jubilees are omitted.