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A Literature Review of the Economics of COVID-19

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A Literature Review of the Economics of COVID-19

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Abstract

The goal of this piece is to survey the emerging and rapidly growing literature on the economic consequences of COVID-19 and governmental responses, and to synthetize the insights emerging from a very large number of studies. This survey (i) provides an overview of the data sets used to measure social distancing and COVID-19 cases and deaths; (ii) reviews the literature on the determinants of compliance and effectiveness of social distancing; (iii) summarizes the literature on the socio-economic consequences of COVID-19 and governmental interventions, focusing on labor, health, gender, discrimination and environmental aspects; and (iv) discusses policy proposals.

Keywords: COVID-19 coronavirus employment lockdowns

JEL Codes: E00 I15 I18 J20

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1 Introduction

The World has been gripped by a pandemic over the first half of 2020. It was identified as a new coronavirus (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, or SARS-CoV-2), and later renamed as Coronavirus Disease-19 or COVID-19 (Qiu et al., 2020). While COVID-19 originated in the city of Wuhan in the Hubei province of China, it has spread rapidly across the World, resulting in a human tragedy and tremendous economic damage. By end of June, there had been over 10 million reported cases of COVID-19 globally, with over 512,000 reported deaths.

Given the rapid spread of COVID-19, countries across the World have adopted several public health measures intended to prevent its spread, including social distancing (Fong et al. (2020)). As part of social distancing, businesses, schools, community centers, and non-governmental organization (NGOs) have been required to close down, mass gatherings have been prohibited, and lockdown measures have been imposed in many countries, allowing travel only for essential needs. The goal is that through social distancing, countries will be able to “flatten the curve”, i.e., reduce the number of new cases related to COVID-19 from one day to the next in order to halt its exponential growth and hence reduce pressure on medical services (John Hopkins University, 2020a).

The spread of COVID-19 has resulted in a considerable slowdown of economic activities. According to an early forecast of the International Monetary Fund (2020a), the global economy would contract by about 3 percent in 2020. That contraction is expected to be of far greater magnitude than that of the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis. However, in its latest update (June 2020), the International Monetary Fund (2020b) revised the forecast to a 4.9 percent contraction in 2020. The report cites the following reasons for the deteriorated updated forecast: i) longer persistence in social distancing activities; ii) lower activity during lockdowns; iii) steeper decline in productivity amongst firms which have opened up for

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1 According to Mandavilli (2020), this strategy saved thousands of lives both during other pandemics such as the Spanish flu of 1918 and more recently in Mexico City during their 2009 flu outbreak.

2 According to CDC (2020), social distancing (or physical distancing) means keeping physical space between yourself and other people residing outside one’s home. To practice social/physical distancing: i) stay at least 6 feet (about 2 arms’ length) from other people: ii) do not gather in groups; and iii) avoid crowded places and mass gatherings.
business; and iv) greater uncertainty. The economic implications will be wide-ranging and uncertain, having different effects on labor markets, production supply chains, financial markets, and the World economy. The negative economic effects may vary by the stringency of the social distancing measures (e.g., lockdowns and related policies), their length of implementation, and the degree of compliance. In addition, the pandemic and the government intervention may lead to greater mental health distress, increased economic inequality, and particularly harsh effects on certain socio-demographic groups.

The goal of this piece is to survey the emerging literature on the economic consequences of COVID-19 and governmental response, and to synthesize the insights emerging from a growing number of studies. Figure 1 illustrates the number of National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) working papers that have been released related to the pandemic between March 2020 and June 2020. By the end of June, there had been over 160 papers related to COVID-19. Similarly, close to 100 discussion papers on the pandemic were released by the IZA Institute of Labor Economics from March to June of 2020.

Figure 1: COVID-19 Publications in NBER

Source: Author’s Research drawn from the NBER website

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3 The World Bank (2020) forecasts a 5.2 percent contraction in global GDP for 2020 relative to 2019. Similarly, the OECD (2020) forecasts a fall in global GDP by 6 percent to 7.6 percent, depending on the emergence of a second wave of COVID-19.

4 The list of NBER working papers is available at this URL: https://www.nber.org/wp_covid19.html.

5 The list of IZA discussion papers is available at this URL: https://covid-19.iza.org/publications.
Our objective is to better inform academic and policy debate. We list throughout our paper governmental responses and how they vary across local, provincial (or state), and federal governments. We investigate policies implemented not only aimed at mitigating the deaths and the morbidities related to COVID-19, i.e., the direct health and public health-related issues, but also those measures providing a cushion in the form of short-run income maintenance and subsidies to business. We also cover interventions aimed at addressing the more persistent scarring economic effects that are expected to manifest themselves in the longer run.

This paper will focus on five broad areas: i) the measurement of the spread of COVID-19 and social distancing, ii) the degrees of disease transmission, plus the effectiveness and compliance with social distancing, iii) the economic impacts of COVID-19, iv) the socioeconomic consequences of lockdowns, and v) the governmental response to the pandemic. One topic that we do not cover is the interface between COVID 19 and financial markets. This omission is due to the fact that the outcomes in financial markets that might be related to COVID 19 are extremely variable, and therefore any analysis contained in our survey would be ephemeral.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on the background of COVID-19 itself, including a historical context of pandemics and the evolution of COVID-19. Section 3 provides an outline on the measurement of COVID-19 spread and of social distancing by documenting and describing the most popular data sources. Section 4 discusses the socioeconomic determinants and the effectiveness of social distancing. Section 5 focuses on the economic and financial impacts, including the plausible mechanisms and economic modelling of infections. Section 6 reviews the literature on the socioeconomic consequences of social distancing measures, focusing on the labor-related, health-related, gender-related, discriminatory, and environmental aspects. Section 7 touches upon the policy measures. Section 8 provides the conclusion.
2 Background

2.1 History of Pandemics and Economic Impact

Pandemics are not new and have occurred at different stages in human history (Ferguson et al., 2020). Table 1 below provides a historical timeline of major pandemics across the World. While there have been many outbreaks and human catastrophes, there has been a notable rise in the frequency of pandemics from the year 2000 and thereafter. This is particularly due to increased emergence of viral disease amongst animals (Madhav et al., 2017). Given the rise in the frequency of pandemics, many researchers including Garrett (2007), Keogh-Brown et al. (2008), and most recently Madhav et al. (2017) and Fan et al. (2018) argue that a large-scale global pandemic was inevitable. Ferguson et al. (2020) from the Imperial College of London COVID-19 Response Team claim that COVID-19 is the most serious episode since the 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic. Despite the comparisons, Barro (2020) concludes that the non-pharmaceutical interventions implemented during 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic were not successful in reducing the overall incidence of death. This was because the interventions were not maintained for a sufficiently long period of time. He estimates that the mean duration of school closings and prohibitions of public gatherings was only 36 days, whereas the mean duration of quarantine/isolation was 18 days. These numbers were quite small compared to the number of days that the 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic was active.

Table 1: Major Pandemics: Historical Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Type/Pre-human host</th>
<th>Estimated Death Toll</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antonine Plague</td>
<td>165-180</td>
<td>Believed to be either smallpox or measles</td>
<td>5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese smallpox epidemic</td>
<td>735-737</td>
<td>Variola major virus</td>
<td>1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plague of Justinian</td>
<td>541-542</td>
<td>Yersinia pestis bacteria/rats, fleas</td>
<td>30 to 50 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Death</td>
<td>1347-1351</td>
<td>Yersinia pestis bacteria/rats, fleas</td>
<td>200 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disease/Outbreak</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Multicausal Agent</td>
<td>Deaths/Infections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New World Smallpox Outbreak</td>
<td>1520-onwards</td>
<td>Variola major virus</td>
<td>56 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Plague of London</td>
<td>1665</td>
<td>Yersinia pestis bacteria/rats, fleas</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Plague</td>
<td>1629-1631</td>
<td>Yersinia pestis bacteria/rats, fleas</td>
<td>1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cholera Pandemics 1-6</td>
<td>1817-1923</td>
<td>V. cholerae bacteria</td>
<td>1 million+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Plague</td>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Yersinia pestis bacteria/rats, fleas</td>
<td>12 million (China &amp; India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow Fever</td>
<td>Late 1800s</td>
<td>Virus/Mosquitoes</td>
<td>100,000-150,000 (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Flu</td>
<td>1889-1890</td>
<td>H2N2 (avian origin)</td>
<td>1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Flu</td>
<td>1918-1919</td>
<td>H1N1 virus/pigs</td>
<td>40 to 50 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Flu</td>
<td>1957-1958</td>
<td>H2N2 virus</td>
<td>1.1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong Flu</td>
<td>1968-1970</td>
<td>H3N2 virus</td>
<td>1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>1981-present</td>
<td>Virus/chimpanzees</td>
<td>25 to 35 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swine Flu</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>H1N1 virus/pigs</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>Coronavirus/bats, civets</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebola</td>
<td>2014-2016</td>
<td>Ebolavirus/ wild animals</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERS</td>
<td>2015-present</td>
<td>Coronavirus/bats, camels</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Pandemics are expected to have a severe negative impact on economic activities, at least in the short run. According to Jonas (2013), the impact ranges from: i) avoidance reaction due to social distancing measures (e.g., individuals might forgo consumption and purchases of certain goods and services), ii) small direct costs (e.g., hospitalization and medical costs), iii) larger indirect costs (loss of labor input, production), and iv) offsetting and cascading
effects (disruption of services and travel). A number of studies tried to anticipate the economic loss from a pandemic. For example, Jonung and Roeger (2006) forecasted that a hypothetical global pandemic would lead to a 1.6 percent drop in GDP for the European Union (EU) due to both demand and supply side factors. Other studies analyze the impact with a historical comparison. For example, ‘how would the casualty numbers during the 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic transpire today?’ Barro et al. (2020) estimate that, holding everything else constant, the 2.1 percent death rate during the Spanish Influenza pandemic in 1918-1920 would translate to roughly 150 million deaths worldwide (based on the World’s population of 7.5 billion in 2020) during COVID-19 pandemic. The authors also find that, on average, the 2.1 percent death rate corresponds to a 6 percent decline in GDP and an 8 percent fall in private consumption.

2.2 Evolution of COVID-19

According to Zhu et al. (2020), the first pneumonia case was discovered on December 8, 2019 in a wet market in Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei Province of China. Afterwards, several clusters of patients with such pneumonia-like symptoms were reported throughout late December 2019. Table 2 below provides a timeline of key events, starting from January 2020.

Table 2: COVID-19 - Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 January 2020</td>
<td>WHO reports cluster of pneumonia cases in Wuhan, Hubei, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 January 2020</td>
<td>WHO identifies COVID-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 January 2020</td>
<td>China announces 1st death from COVID-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 January 2020</td>
<td>1st official case of COVID-19 reported outside China in Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 January 2020</td>
<td>Authorities in the Nepal, France, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Vietnam and Taiwan confirm cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 January 2020</td>
<td>1st case of COVID-19 reported in the United States of America (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January 2020</td>
<td>WHO finds evidence of human-to-human transmission from China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See Boissay and Rungcharoenkitkul (2020, p. 2) for a list of studies estimating the economic loss from past or hypothetical pandemics.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 January 2020</td>
<td>China imposes lockdown in the cities of Wuhan, Xiantao and Chibi of the Hubei province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 January 2020</td>
<td>WHO declares COVID-19 to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 2020</td>
<td>US declares COVID-19 a domestic public health emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 February 2020</td>
<td>1st death due to COVID-19 outside of China in Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 February 2020</td>
<td>The death toll in China surpasses that of 2002-03 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 February 2020</td>
<td>Egypt reports 1st case of COVID-19, the 1st case in the African continent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 February 2020</td>
<td>France reports 1st death from COVID-19 outside of Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 February 2020</td>
<td>COVID-19 cases rise in Italy in what becomes the largest outbreak outside of Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 February 2020</td>
<td>Brazil confirms 1st case of COVID-19, the 1st case in South America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 February 2020</td>
<td>1st case of community transmission reported in the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 February 2020</td>
<td>1st death due to COVID-19 in the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 March 2020</td>
<td>Over 100 countries report COVID-19 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy imposes quarantine in Lombardy region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 March 2020</td>
<td>WHO declares COVID-19 a pandemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 March 2020</td>
<td>Donald Trump declares national emergency in the US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 March 2020</td>
<td>All 50 states in US have at least one confirmed case of COVID-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>California first state to implement ‘stay-at-home’ order in US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March 2020</td>
<td>Italy’s death toll surpasses that of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 March 2020</td>
<td>EU suspends public deficit rules to inject fiscal stimulus across countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 March 2020</td>
<td>The White House and Senate leaders of both the Democratic and Republican parties in the US come to an agreement on a US$2 trillion stimulus to aid workers, businesses, and the health-care system in response to the pandemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March 2020</td>
<td>US leads the world in COVID-19 cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2 shows the cumulative cases and deaths from the COVID-19 pandemic. Note that both cases and deaths started rising from March 2020. As of 30 June, total, cumulative cases numbered over 10 million, while there were over 512,000 deaths across the World. Table 3 lists the top 10 countries in terms of COVID-19 cases and deaths. The table shows that...
the US, UK, Brazil, and some countries in the European Union (Italy, France, Spain and Germany) are in the top 10 in terms of COVID-19 cases and deaths.

Figure 2: Cumulative COVID-19 Cases and Deaths – Global Pandemic (as on 30 June)

Table 3: Cumulative Cases: Top 10 Countries (as of 30 June)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Confirmed Cases (Cumulative)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Confirmed Deaths (Cumulative)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>2,367,380</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>127,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1,402,041</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>59,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>653,479</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>43,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>585,481</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>34,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>314,162</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>29,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>285,213</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>28,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>279,393</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>27,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>249,271</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>17,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>240,578</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>10,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>230,211</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9,754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from the Coronavirus Resource Center, Johns Hopkins University.
Compared to previous pandemics, COVID-19 has a disproportionate impact on the elderly from a health perspective. The resulting lockdown measures, however, are more global in scope and scale than their predecessors, and they have disrupted international supply chains as well as aggregate demand and consumption patterns. This in turn has led to heightened financial market turbulence and amplified the economic shock. Moreover, greater borrowing and higher debt levels among firms and households during this time make the short-term shocks more potent compared to previous pandemics (Boissay and Rungcharoenkitkul, 2020).

3 Measurement of COVID-19 and Social Distancing

3.1 Measurement of COVID-19

Before reviewing the potential economic impact, socioeconomic consequences, and governmental response, it is important to contextualize the data related to COVID-19. Without such data, it will not be possible to assess the scope of the pandemic. Timely and reliable data inform the World of how the disease is spreading, what impact the pandemic has on the lives of people around the World, and whether or not the counter measures taken are successful (Roser et al., 2020).

The three key indicators are: i) the total number of tests carried out, ii) the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases, and iii) the number of COVID-19 deaths. These numbers are provided by different local, regional and national health agencies/ministries across countries. However, for research and educational purposes, the data are accumulated by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University. The database provides the figures as well as visual maps of COVID-19 cases across the World. The cases are reported at the provincial level for China, at the city level for the US, Australia and Canada, and at the country level for all other countries (Dong et al., 2020). The data are corroborated with the WHO, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in the US, and the European Center for Disease Control (ECDC).

7 See the link for the numbers and visual representation. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu.
Based on these figures, the Case Fatality Rate (CFR) is calculated as the number of confirmed deaths divided by the number of confirmed cases and is used to assess the mortality rate of COVID-19. However, Roser et al. (2020) caution against taking the CFR numbers at face value to understand mortality risks, because the CFR is based on the number of confirmed cases. Due to limited testing capacities, not all COVID-19 cases can be confirmed. Moreover, the CFR reflects the severity of the disease in a particular context at a particular point in time. Therefore, CFR changes over time and is sensitive to the location and population characteristics.

Recent studies show that there are large measurement errors associated with COVID-19 case numbers. Using data on influence-like illnesses (ILI) from the CDC, Silverman et al. (2020) show that ILIs can be a useful predictor of COVID-19 cases. The authors find that there was an escalation of ILI patients during March 2020. These cases could not be properly identified as COVID-19 cases due to the lack of testing capabilities during the early stages. The authors suggest that the surge in ILIs may have corresponded to 8.7 million new COVID-19 cases between March 8 and March 28. Based on imputation, the number suggests that almost 80 percent cases of COVID-19 in US were never diagnosed.

While the above dataset focuses on counts and tests, the COVID Tracking Project in the US provides additional data on patients who have been hospitalized, are in intensive care units (ICU), and are on ventilator support for each of the 50 states. It also grades each state on data quality. Recently, it has included the COVID Racial Data Tracker, which shows the race and ethnicity of individuals affected by COVID-19. All of these combined measures and statistics provide a more comprehensive perspective of the spread of the pandemic in the US.

### 3.2 Measurement of Social Distancing

In comparison to measuring the spread of the virus, social distancing is not easy to quantify. We determined from the literature that there are three main techniques that are employed:

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9 Refer to Johns Hopkins University (2020b) for CFR data across countries.
11 See the link for further details. [https://covidtracking.com/data](https://covidtracking.com/data).
12 See the link for further details. [https://covidtracking.com/race](https://covidtracking.com/race).
i) measures of the mobility of the population, ii) modelling proxies, and iii) the formation of indices. Proxies and indices are based on data related to the observed spread of infection and to the implementation of policies, respectively. On the other hand, the movements of people are based on their observed travelling patterns. Mobility measures have been used extensively in the last two months to understand mobility patterns during the COVID-19 pandemic (Nguyen et al., 2020). However, mobility data providers have slight differences in their methodologies. Table 4 provides a summary of how different mobility data providers compile their data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility Measures</th>
<th>How Do They Work?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Google LLC Community Mobility Reports</td>
<td>Google Mobility(^\text{13}) aggregates anonymous data from users’ mobile-device-location histories. It shows how visits to, or length of stay at, different types of locations change over time compared to a baseline period. The reports have six locational categories: i) retail and recreation, ii) grocery and pharmacy, iii) parks (parks, beaches, etc.), iv) transit stations (subways, bus, train stations), v) workplaces, and vi) residential areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Unacast’</td>
<td>‘Unacast’(^\text{14}) has a Social Distancing Scoreboard. It uses location data from cellphones to compare the number of average visitations for each day to its ‘normal’ levels prior to the pandemic. The ‘Scorecard’ assigns a letter grade of A through F based on peoples’ social distancing behavior. The assigned score is based on three different metrics: i) percent change in the average distance travelled; ii) percent change in “non-essential visitation”; and iii) change in “human encounters”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{13}\) See the link for further details. [https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility](https://www.google.com/covid19/mobility).

\(^\text{14}\) See the link for further details. [https://www.unacast.com/covid19](https://www.unacast.com/covid19).
| ‘Safegraph’ | ‘Safegraph’\(^\text{15}\) data track the GPS locations from millions of US cellphones to construct a daily panel of census-block-level aggregate movements measures. |
| ‘Baidu’ Maps | ‘Baidu’ Maps\(^\text{16}\) track the population flow of more than 300 cities in China every day. This includes the flow of passengers and urban travel intensity as well as city migration trends. This platform was used to track the early spread of COVID-19 from Wuhan. |

Mobility data\(^\text{17}\) are more dynamic, available at a daily rate, and they can be used to measure the effect of social distancing on other variables, such as adherence to shelter-in place policies or labor employment (Gupta \textit{et al}., 2020). They also offer key insights into human behavior. For example, ‘Safegraph’ data suggest that social activity in the US started declining substantially and rapidly well before lockdown measures were imposed (Farboodi \textit{et al}., 2020).

Nevertheless, mobility data do have their own limitations. Mobility data are a proxy for time spent in different locations. They do not allow one to determine the situational context of the contacts (needed to understand the spread of COVID-19), i.e., whether they occur in the workplace or in the general community (Martín-Calvo \textit{et al}., 2020). Those situations involve different levels of the risk of transmission. In regards to the productive activities of the individuals that are tracked, information on the context is also indeterminate. For those who are working virtually from their homes, for instance, these measures do not capture the value added from the time that they allocate to their outside jobs. It is also likely that the quality of these measures can deteriorate when overall unemployment rates and job disruptions are high (Gupta \textit{et al}., 2020).\(^\text{18}\) Telecom operator data are deemed to be more

\(^{15}\) See the link for further details. [https://www.safegraph.com/dashboard/covid19-commerce-patterns](https://www.safegraph.com/dashboard/covid19-commerce-patterns).

\(^{16}\) See the link for further details. [http://research.baidu.com/Blog/index-view?id=133](http://research.baidu.com/Blog/index-view?id=133).

\(^{17}\) See Oliver \textit{et al}. (2020) for a detailed analysis of why mobility data are not frequently used in case of epidemics, even though they might be useful.

\(^{18}\) Mobility measures track work locations based on movements to a workplace from a reference point i.e. their home. However, if a person works from home or becomes unemployed, there will not be a distinct workplace reference point. Hence, the quality of mobility measures is expected to deteriorate.
representative compared to location data, as telecom data are not limited to people with smartphones, GPS locator, and history of travel using GPS location (Lomas, 2020).

4 Social Distancing: Determinants, Effectiveness and Compliance

A large range of social distancing policies have been implemented, ranging from full-scale lockdowns to voluntary self-compliance measures. For example, Sweden imposed relatively light restrictions (Juranek and Zoutman, 2020). Large-scale events were prohibited, and restaurants and bars were restricted to table service only; however, private businesses were generally allowed to operate freely. The populations were encouraged to stay home if they were feeling unwell and to limit social interaction if possible (M. Andersen et al., 2020).

Stringent social distancing measures tend to be implemented in countries with a greater proportion of the elderly population, a higher population density, a greater proportion of employees in vulnerable occupations, higher degrees of democratic freedom, a higher incidence of international travel, and further distance from the equator (e.g., Jinjarak et al., 2020a). Appealing to a game theory approach, Cui et al. (2020) argue that states linked by economic activities will be “tipped” to reach a Nash equilibrium, whereby all other states comply with shelter-in-place policies.

Social distancing policy determinants have been linked to party leader characteristics, political beliefs, and partisan differences (Baccini and Brodeur, 2020; Barrios and Hochberg, 19

The WHO Health System Response Monitor provides a cross country analysis and other details: https://analysis.covid19healthsystem.org/.

People tend to adopt social distancing practices when there is a specific incentive to do so in terms of risk of health and financial cost (Makris, 2020). Maloney and Taskin (2020) also attribute voluntary actions to either fear or a sense of social responsibility.

To understand the negative effects of undermining social distancing measures, see Lyu and Wehby (2020) who examine the cumulative COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents in borders counties in Iowa and Illinois, where the former did not issue stay-at-home orders while the later did. Similarly, Bertoli et al. (2020) who show the effect of municipal election participation in France amidst COVID-19 on subsequent mortality rates.

“ A tipping set is a set of players with the following property: if all members of this set choose to implement shelter-in-place policies, then the best response of every other agent will be to follow suit. So the member of the tipping set can drive all others to the adoption of shelter-in-place policies, even in the absence of a federal mandate for such policies.” (Cui et al., 2020, p. 4).
Barrios and Hochberg (2020) correlate the risk perception for contracting COVID-19 with partisan differences. They find that, in the absence of social distancing imposition, counties in the US which had higher vote shares for Donald Trump are less likely to engage in social distancing. This persists even when mandatory stay-at-home measures are implemented across states. Allcott et al. (2020) find a similar pattern. In addition, the authors show through surveys that Democrats and Republican supporters have different risk perceptions about contracting COVID-19 and hence regarding the importance of social distancing measures.

Researchers are trying to establish the effectiveness of social distancing policies in reducing social interaction and ultimately COVID-19 infections and deaths. Abouk and Heydari (2020) show that reductions in outside-the-home social interactions in the US are driven by a combination of governmental regulation and voluntary measures, with a strong causal impact for the implementation of state-wide stay-at-home orders, and more moderate impacts for non-essential business closures and limitations placed on bars/restaurants. Ferguson et al. (2020) argue that multiple interventions are required to have a substantial desired impact on transmission. The optimal mitigation strategy, which is a combination of case isolation, home quarantine, and social distancing of high-risk groups (aged over 70), would reduce the number of deaths by half, and the demand of beds in intensive care units (ICUs) by two-thirds in the UK and US. Note that this set of interventions falls well short of an economic shutdown.

Similarly, Dave et al. (2020b) find that counties in Texas that adopted shelter-in-place orders earlier than the statewide shelter-in-place order experienced a 19 to 26 percent fall in the rates of COVID-19 case growth two weeks after implementation of such orders. Andersen and Brodeur (2020) find that US states with Democratic governors are 50 percent more likely to implement lockdown/stay-at-home orders. Moreover, governors without term limits were 40 percent more likely to implement stay-at-home orders.

Fang et al. (2020) argue that if lockdown policies were not imposed in Wuhan, then the infection rates would have been 65% higher in cities outside Wuhan. Hartl et al. (2020) show that growth rate of COVID-19 cases in Germany dropped from 26.7 percent to 13.8 percent after implementation of lockdown in the country. Greenstone and Nigam (2020) project that 3 to 4 months of social distancing would reduce the number of cases in the US by 1.7 million by October 2021, 630,000 of which would be due to avoided overcrowding of ICUs in hospitals. Friedson et al. (2020) argue that early intervention in California helped reduce significantly COVID-19 cases and deaths during the first three weeks following its enactment.

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et al. (2020) find that temporary paid sick leave, a federal mandate enacted in the US, which allowed private and public employees two weeks of paid leave, led to increased compliance with stay-at-home orders. On a more global scale, Hsiang et al. (2020) show that social distancing interventions prevented or delayed around 62 million confirmed cases, corresponding to averting roughly 530 million total infections in China, South Korea, Italy, Iran, France, and the US.

Testing is another facet of COVID-19 which has been widely investigated (Baunez et al., 2020; Gollier and Gossner, 2020). This process is crucial in informing about the number of people who have fallen ill with COVID-19 and in understanding in real-time whether the dynamics of the pandemic are accelerating or decelerating (Baunez et al., 2020). Moreover, it allows for tested non-infected individuals to rejoin the workforce without posing a risk to others. However, according to Gollier and Gossner (2020), there is an insufficient production level of tests in order to conduct mass-testing across all affected countries. These authors call for “group-testing” as a way to get around the problem, but there might be practical problems related to such measures e.g., the maximum number of people present in a group and the acceptable error band for tests in groups. Baunez et al. (2020) suggest a process of “test allocation” across regions in a specific country based on the marginal benefit of testing. Using data for Italy, the authors find that the allocation of tests was not efficient in relation to the criteria provided by the authors.

Another important related issue is the determinants of compliance behavior (e.g., Fan et al., 2020). The documented socioeconomic determinants of the degree of compliance with social distancing (lockdowns or safer-at-home orders) include, among others, income, trust and social capital, public discourse, and to some extent, news channel viewership. Chiou and Tucker (2020) show that Americans living in higher-income regions with access to high-

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25 Using data for testing numbers and socioeconomic characteristics at the zip-code level in New York City, Borjas (2020) finds that there is a significant correlation between tests conducted, positive test results, and income level. This suggests that people residing in poorer neighborhoods are less likely to be tested. However, if they are tested, they have a higher chance of obtaining a positive test result.

26 Group testing involves testing a group of people or more aptly ‘a pooled sample of individuals’ for COVID-19. This would reduce the number of tests required individually. The intuition is that if the result for the group is negative, then all the individuals are virus free. The result would enable them to return their work positions and mitigate the economic consequences of social distancing or lockdown measures.

27 Ethnic diversity is another documented determinant of social distancing (e.g., Egorov et al., 2020).
speed internet are more likely to comply with social distancing directives. Coven and Gupta (2020) find that residents of low-income neighborhoods in New York City comply less with shelter-in-place activities during non-work hours. According to the authors, this pattern is consistent with the fact that low-income populations are more likely to be front-line workers and are also more likely to make frequent retail shopping visits for essentials, making for two compounded effects. People with lower income levels, less flexible work arrangements (e.g., inability to tele-work), and a lack of outside space at home are less likely to engage social distancing (Papageorge et al., 2020).

Individual beliefs and social preferences should also be taken into consideration, as they affect behavior and compliance. Based on an experimental setup with participants in the US and the UK, Akesson et al. (2020) conclude that individuals over-estimated the infectiousness of COVID-19 relative to expert suggestions. If they were exposed to expert opinion, individuals were prone to correct their beliefs. However, the more infectious COVID-19 was deemed to be, the less likely they were to undertake social-distancing measures. This was perhaps due to beliefs that the individual will contract COVID-19 regardless of his/her social distancing practices. Briscese et al. (2020) model the impact of “lockdown extension” on compliance using a representative sample of residents from Italy. The authors find that, if a given hypothetical extension is shorter than expected (i.e., a positive surprise), the residents are more willing to engage in self-isolation. Therefore, to ensure compliance, these authors suggest that it is imperative for the government/local authorities to work on communication and to manage peoples’ expectations. Campos-Mercade et al. (2020) examine the relationship between social preferences and social distancing compliance. The authors find that people who exhibit pro-social behavior (in this instance individuals do not want to expose others to risks) are more likely to follow social distancing measures and other health-related guidelines.

Bargain and Aminjonov (2020) show that residents in European regions with high levels of trust decrease their mobility related to non-necessary activities compared to regions with lower levels of trust.\(^{28}\) Similarly, Brodeur et al. (2020c) find that counties in the US with

\(^{28}\) Brück et al. (2020) document a negative relationship between being in contact with sick people trust in people and institutions.
relatively more trust in others decrease their mobility significantly more once a lockdown policy is implemented. They also provide evidence that the estimated effect on compliance post-lockdown is especially large if people tend to place trust in the media, and relatively smaller if they tend to trust in science, medicine or government. Barrios et al. (2020) and Durante et al. (2020) also provide evidence that regions with stronger civic culture engaged in more voluntary social distancing. Barrios et al. (2020) and Durante et al. (2020) also provide evidence that regions with stronger civic culture engaged in more voluntary social distancing.30 Aksoy et al. (2020b) find that a high level of public attention (measured through the share of Google shares on COVID-19) has a significant correlation with the timing of implementation of social distancing measures. This relationship is mostly applicable for countries with high quality of institutions.

Simonov et al. (2020) analyze the causal effect of cable news on social distancing compliance. The authors examine the average partial effect of Fox News viewership, a news channel that mostly defied expert recommendations from leaders of the US and global health communities on the severity of COVID-19 and on compliance and find that a 1 percentage point increase in Fox News viewership reduced the propensity to stay at home by 8.9 percentage points. Bursztyn et al. (2020) show that greater exposure to Hannity compared to exposure to Tucker Carlson Tonight in Fox News is associated with larger COVID-19 case numbers and deaths. This is because the former TV host downplayed the importance of COVID-19, while the latter provided a serious warning on the same topic during early February. The variation between the messages in the two shows led to changes in behavior in response to COVID-19.

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29 Researchers also think about this causality in reverse. Aksoy et al. (2020a) find that individuals’ exposure to epidemics (especially during the ages 18 to 25) has a negative effect on their confidence in political institutions. These individuals are also less likely to have confidence in healthcare systems during the times of pandemics. 30 See Ding et al. (2020) for an analysis of the role of community engagement in explaining social distancing behavior in the US. Moreover, Bartscher et al. (2020) show that higher social capital (proxied through voter turnout in parliamentary elections) leads to fewer COVID-19 cases per capita accumulated from Mid-March to mid-May in selected European countries and UK.
5 COVID-19: Potential Economic and Financial Impacts

5.1 Plausible Mechanisms for Macroeconomic Impact

To understand the potential negative economic impact of COVID-19, it is important to understand the economic transmission channels through which the shocks will adversely affect the economy. According to Carlsson-Szlezak et al. (2020a) and Carlsson-Szlezak et al. (2020b), there are three main transmission channels. The first is the direct impact, which is related to the reduced consumption of goods and services. Prolonged lengths of the pandemic and the social distancing measures might reduce consumer confidence by keeping consumers at home, wary of discretionary spending, and pessimistic about the long-term economic prospects. The second one is the indirect impact working through financial market shocks and their effects on the real economy. Household wealth will likely fall, savings will increase, and consumption spending will decrease further. The third consists of supply-side disruptions; as COVID-19 keeps production halted, it will negatively impact supply chains, labor demand, and employment, leading to prolonged periods of lay-offs and rising unemployment. In particular, Baldwin (2020) discusses the expectation shock by which a “wait-and-see” attitude is adopted by economic agents. The author argues that this is common during economic climates characterized by uncertainties, as there is less confidence in markets and engaging in economic transactions. Ultimately, the intensity of the shock is determined by the underlying epidemiological properties of COVID-19, consumer and firm behavior in the face of adversity and uncertainty, and public policy responses.

Gourinchas (2020, p. 33) summarizes the effect on the economy by stating: “A modern economy is a complex web of interconnected parties: employees, firms, suppliers, consumers, and financial intermediaries. Everyone is someone else’s employee, customer, lender, etc.” Due to the very high degrees of inter-connectiveness and specialization of productive activities, a breakdown in the supply chains and the circular flows will have a cascading effect.31

31 See Baldwin (2020) describes the impact of COVID-19 and subsequent social distancing measures on the macroeconomy within a circular flow framework.
It is also important to understand the processes that generate recoveries from economic crises. Carlsson-Szlezak et al. (2020a) explain different types of recovery in the aftermath of negative shocks through the concept of “shock geometry”. There are three broad scenarios of economic recoveries, which we mention in ascending order of their severity. First, there is the most optimistic one labelled ‘V-shaped’, whereby aggregate output is displaced and quickly recovers to its pre-crisis path. Second, there is the ‘U-shaped’ path, whereby output drops swiftly but does not return to its pre-crisis path. The gap between the former trajectory of output and the actual one remains large. Third, in the case of the very grim ‘L-shaped’ path, output drops, a trough is reached, but subsequent growth rates remain very low. The gap between the former and the new output paths continues to widen. Notably, Carlsson-Szlezak et al. (2020b) state that after previous pandemics, such as the 1918 Spanish Influenza, the 1958 Asian Influenza, the 1968 Hong Kong influenza, and the 2002 SARS outbreak, economies have tended to experience ‘V-shaped’ recoveries. However, the pattern for the COVID-19 economic recovery is not expected to be straightforward. This is because the effects on employment due to social distancing measures and lockdowns are expected to be much larger. According to Gourinchas (2020), during a short period, as much as 50 percent of the working population might not be able to find work. Moreover, even if no containment measures are implemented, a recession would occur anyway, fueled by the precautionary and/or panic behavior of households and firms faced with the uncertainty of dealing with a pandemic as well as with an inadequate public health response (Gourinchas, 2020).

5.2 Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) Epidemiological Models

In this sub-section we discuss the integration of the macroeconomic models with the epidemiological models. A key tool used by epidemiologists is the seminal SIR model developed by Kermack et al. (1927). In these models there are three states of health: i) susceptible (S) (at risk of getting infected), ii) infected (I) (and contagious), and iii) recovered/resistant (R) (previously infected). Those who have died from the disease are no longer contagious.

The entire population is divided between these three states of health, and the transitions between them (i.e., from S to I and eventually to R) depend on two key
parameters. One parameter is the rate at which susceptible people interact with infected people and transmit the virus, i.e., the transmission rate. The other parameter is the rate at which infected people recover over time, i.e., the recovery rate. The number of new infections will depend on number of people in the susceptible population, the transmission rate, and the number of people currently infected. The new infection numbers are added to the infectious population and subtracted from the susceptible population. As people recover, their numbers are subtracted from the infectious population and added to the recovered population. The model assumes that the susceptible population eventually declines over time, and the people who have recovered gain 'herd immunity' from COVID-19.

A variant of the SIR is the Susceptible-Infected-Exposed-Recovered (SEIR) model. These models assume that individuals first need to be exposed to the virus before they can be infected. This step adds another parameter, which is the rate at which exposed individuals become infected, i.e., infection rate. As in the case of SIR models, the number of new exposure cases depends on the number of people in the susceptible population, the transmission rate, and the number of people currently infected. Intuitively, the number of infected cases rises with the transmission and exposure rates and falls with increasing recovery rates.

One of the most important parameters in the SIR or SEIR models is the basic reproduction, or $R_0$, number. This gives the expected number of cases that can be generated from one new case in the population in the absence of interventions (Fraser et al., 2009). The $R_0$ number is the ratio of the transmission rate to the recovery rate. Most estimates for COVID-19 range between 2.2 and 3.1, meaning that each infected person infects an average of between 2.2 and 3.1 new people before recovering (Hur and Jenuwine, 2020).

A large number of studies have estimated and forecasted disease scenarios for COVID-19 using SIR or SEIR models without the implementation of social distancing measures. Atkeson et al. (2020) use SEIR models to simulate the effect of social distancing measures on

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32 The simplest versions of these models abstract from the fact that there is a chance of re-infection. In such a case, the infected people would rejoin the pool of agents in the S group.
33 See D'souza and Dowdy (2020) for details on gaining herding immunity for COVID-19.
34 See Ellison (2020) for a brief survey of results.
the spread of the infection. The authors account for the social distancing measures by incorporating a time-varying transmission rate, which ultimately changes $R_0$. The authors find that without mitigation measures (by simulating for $R_0$ between 3.0 to 1.8), the infection rate rises over 1 percent within 150 to 200 days. If mild social distancing measures are implemented (by simulating a reduction of $R_0$ from 3.0 to 1.6), the infection rates still rise. If strict but short social distancing measures are implemented (by simulating a reduction from 3.0 to 1.0), there is a chance of re-emergence of the infection. These outcomes give a sense of the role of social distancing on COVID-19 transmission (Anderson et al., 2020).

An underlying assumption in these epidemiology models by Atkeson et al. (2020) and other researchers is that the transitions between the states of health are exogenous with respect to economic outcomes. This means that the expected decreases in consumption activities or hours worked due to COVID-19 are not accounted for in either SIR or SEIR models. This condition cannot be ignored because of the “lives vs. livelihood” tradeoff that weighs heavily in any general analysis of pandemics that incorporates the public health outcomes and the economic outcomes. Therefore, a central focus of this strand of the literature is the efficiency of that tradeoff, i.e., how to reduce the rate of infections at the lowest possible costs to economic welfare.

Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) address that question by integrating a macroeconomic general equilibrium model with the standard SIR model. In their SIR-Macro model, the prevalence of infection depends not only on transmission rates between susceptible and infected individuals, but also on the degree of interaction between agents when undertaking consumption and work activities. In the ‘Macro’ side of the model, the choices of consumption and labor supply determine their utility levels, and the choices are determined by their state of health i.e., whether the person is susceptible, infected or recovered. Therefore, the susceptible individual can lower his/her chances of infection by reducing his/her consumption activities and labor supply patterns (outside of their residences). Based on their assumptions and calibration techniques, Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) find that, without any mitigation measures, aggregate consumption falls by 9.3 percent over a 32-week period. On the other hand, labor supply or hours worked followed a U-shaped pattern, with a peak decline of 8.25 percent in the 32$^{nd}$ week from the start of the pandemic. These decisions cause changes in
the SIR side of the model, with peak infection rates and death tolls decreasing from 7 percent and 0.30 percent to 5 and 0.26 percent respectively.

While the SIR-Macro model abstracts from real-world problems such as bankruptcy costs, mass hysteria on the part of households and firms, or loss of effective labor supply. They also do not consider dynamics that are present in other models, such as consumption uncertainty and price stickiness (which if present would make consumption and hours worked fall further). Furthermore, there are certain caveats that have been accounted for in the literature, namely infection externalities, incomplete information, and risks across sub-populations. We explain some of these factors below.

Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) focus on the infection externality problem. They mention that the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Infected agents do not consider that their actions impact the infection and death rates of other economic agents and continue to consume and work above the socially optimal levels. To properly internalize the externality, the authors model the optimal containment measure as a consumption tax and lump-sum rebate. The consumption tax reduces consumption activities and makes leisure more attractive compared to work, which in turn reduces spread of infection. The tax is rebated to households so that disposable income is held constant. The optimal containment measure reduces peak infection rate to 3 percent and the death toll to 0.21 percent. The authors also suggest that the containment measures are optimal if they are tightened over time in proportion to the spread of infection. If a strict containment policy is enforced from the beginning, it will have a much more severe impact on the economy.

Bethune and Korinek (2020) focus on the infection externality in a more formal manner. The authors develop Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) and SIR models to quantify the infection externalities using an individualized, decentralized and then the social planners’ approach. The authors find that in the former approach, infected individuals continue to engage in economic activities in order to maximize their utility. On the other hand, susceptible agents do reduce their activities in efforts to reduce the risk of infection. The resulting behavioral outcome is that infected individuals do not engage in adequate social

35 Eichenbaum et al. (2020c) compare three canonical macroeconomic models and show that New Keynesian models with sticky prices lead to larger recessions.
distancing, as they do not internalize the effects of their activities on the overall infection risk. Based on the model assumptions and calibration for the US economy, the results suggest that the pandemic persists for more than two years. In contrast, with the social planner approach, the planner forcibly reduces the activity of infected agents to mitigate the risks to susceptible agents and eventually to reduce new infections to zero. In addition, the authors calculate the marginal cost of additional infection to be $80,000 in the decentralized approach and $286,000 with the social planner’s approach (nominal 2020 dollars). This shows that private agents underestimate the cost of the externality that they risk imposing on others, and the social planner’s approach of containment of the infected population is Pareto efficient compared to a uniform containment policy.

Infected populations might be asymptomatic and might unknowingly increase infection. Berger et al. (2020) develop a SEIR model based on Kermack et al. (1927) to account for this type of incomplete information. They suggest the intervention of randomized testing of susceptible populations in order to identify infected yet asymptomatic patients and subsequently quarantining this segment of the population. The authors find that the targeted quarantine policy with testing would have a 5-percentage-point lower negative impact on the economy compared with the standard uniform quarantine policy without testing, as per the standard lockdown measures. Piguillem and Shi (2020) and Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) conclude that ‘smart containment’ policies, which involve a combination of testing, identification and quarantining of infected people, would render the economic activity vs. public health tradeoff more favorable. Similarly, Aum et al. (2020a) show that the progression of the virus in South Korea and UK can be effectively managed with aggressive testing and contact tracing, which can in turn reduce both the economic and health costs.

Acemoglu et al. (2020) introduce the feature of heterogeneity of risks across sub-populations. The different sub-populations (young, middle-aged, and old) have different infection, morbidity, and fatality rates, as well as different levels of interaction with others. These conditions give rise to targeted quarantine measures. This is because a differential lockdown between different risk groups (aggressive lockdown of older groups compared to younger ones) can reduce the number of lives lost and negative economic outcomes to a greater extent compared to uniform lockdown measures for all age groups. The authors find that with a uniform lockdown lasting 434 days, the total number of fatalities reaches 1.8
percent of the population, with economic costs of about 24.3 percent of annual GDP. On the other hand, a targeted lockdown policy lasting 230 days reduces fatalities to 1 percent of the population and the economic cost to 10 percent of annual GDP. Glover et al. (2020) also incorporate differences in age and sector of work for individuals in their variant of the SEIR-Macro model. The authors show that optimal mitigation policy is dependent on how much weight a social planner places on the well-being of different agents. If the planner puts a higher weight on the welfare of older economic agents, the mitigation measures will be more extensive and long-lasting and vice-versa.

An interesting question is whether differentiating containment/social distancing measures across sectors and occupations can help to reduce the extent of lives lost and lower the severity of the economic downturn. Bodenstein et al. (2020) and Krueger et al. (2020) focus on this aspect through their variants of the SIR-Macro model. Bodenstein et al. (2020) rely on a supply-side perspective that is centered on the effects of the pandemic on the sectors of the economy that provide essential inputs. The authors develop an integrated framework by combining a standard SIR model containing two groups of a heterogeneous population with a macroeconomic model. The transmission mechanism between the epidemiological and the economic variables involves the change in labor supply, i.e., infected people cannot participate in the workforce, which is a direct cost of the disease. The productive activities are divided between two groups: “core” and “non-core” sectors characterized by a low degree of substitutability in production between them. The former produce raw and intermediate inputs, while the latter produces final-stage outputs. The indirect cost stems from the fact that the slowdown/closure of core industries will affect non-core industries through input-output linkages – what are typically called the ‘supply chains’ in the media. The social distancing measures help to attenuate deaths and morbidities, hence to curb the decrease in labor supply. The model shows that the absence of social distancing leads to a negative 40 percent deviation from steady state in output in this two-sector model. This contraction shrinks to a negative 20 percent deviation from the steady state with the enforcement of social distancing. Intuitively, “All else equal, a lower infection peak shields better the core sector, resulting in economic gains (while reducing the strain on the national health care systems). However, these gains now imply some economic losses from reducing

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the labor supply and some economic gains from smoothing out the infection peak.” (Bodenstein et al., 2020, p. 23).

Krueger et al. (2020) also focus on the heterogeneity across sectors by introducing a multi-sector economy with varying degrees of elasticity of substitution of consumption across goods. Note the contrast of his approach with respect to Bodenstein et al. (2020), who focus on the production side. In this case sectors differ according to the riskiness of consuming the respective services that they provide. Susceptible households substitute consumption from the high-infection sector with those from the low-infection sector in the event of an outbreak. This re-allocation of spending patterns helps to maintain a relatively stable consumption path and lowers the risk of being infected from participating – as either a provider or a consumer - in high-infection activities. According to the authors, with all other things equal, this “reallocation” of economic activity may help to reduce the number of infections.

Other researchers try to model the endogenous responses of economic agents and the time-varying nature of infection risks. Quaas (2020) and Dasaratha (2020) provide theoretical propositions regarding behavioral responses to various changes in policies or to infection levels. Alfaro et al. (2020) modify the existing SIR models to account for optimizing decisions on social interaction based on the infection risks. Typically, infection rates are taken as exogenous in SIR models. However, after accounting for heterogeneity in preferences, they find that preference traits, such as patience, altruism, and reciprocity, play important roles in reducing the infection externalities. An approach that balances strict social distancing restrictions with social preferences is expected to help mitigate the economic and public health costs. To provide an example, Argente et al. (2020) find that public disclosure of the precise location of COVID-19 cases in Seoul, South Korea led to a decrease in foot traffic in neighborhoods/areas with more cases. These data were calibrated into an SIR model with a heterogeneous population to account for infection transmission and economic outcomes. The authors find that, compared to a scenario with no disclosure, public disclosure led to a decrease in infection by 400,000 cases and deaths by 13,000 over a period of 2 years. The same policy is also expected to lower economic costs by 50%.

Akbarpour et al. (2020) develop a theoretical heterogeneous-agents, network-based model to account for the factors of heterogeneity in the population, social interaction
amongst networks, health differences, and employment variation within the population. Using data for metropolitan statistical areas in the US, they conclude that alternating schedules in schools and firms for different groups of students and employees is effective in mitigating the health risks and healthcare costs associated with the pandemic, while also reducing employment losses.

Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) extend the endogenous behavioral response by accounting for time-variation in the infection rate or in the $R_0$ parameter contained in SIR models. Using a Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered-Died (SIRD) model and different values of $R_0$ across countries, they find that forecasts prior to the peak death rates are ‘noisy’. After the peak has occurred, however, these forecasts converged well towards the actual data. Liu et al. (2020) find that COVID-19 growth rates can be forecasted by autoregressive fluctuations and also suggested that the forecasts contain a lot of uncertainties due to parameter uncertainties and realization of future shocks. Pindyck (2020) estimates how different values of the $R_0$ parameter affect death rates, durations of pandemics, and the possibility of a ‘second wave’ of infection. The author also analyzes the benefits of social distancing measures in terms of the value of statistical life (VSL) measure and its implications in terms of realism.

5.3 Macroeconomic Impacts

As COVID-19 unfolds, many researchers have been thinking about the economic impact from a historical perspective. Ludvigson et al. (2020) find that, in a fairly conservative scenario without non-linearities, pandemics such as COVID-19 are tantamount to large, multiple-period exogenous shocks. Using a ‘costly disaster’ index, the authors find that multi-period shocks in US (assumed to be a magnitude of 60 standard deviations from the mean of the costly disaster index for a period of 3 months) can lead to a 12.75 percent drop in industrial production, a 17 percent loss in service employment, sustained reductions in air travel, and macroeconomic uncertainties which linger for up to five months. Jordà et al. (2020) analyze

36 See Hong et al. (2020) for an intuitive explanation behind the uncertainties and the caveats related to the $R_0$ number in managing COVID-19 risks.
the rate of return on the real natural interest rate (the level of real returns on safe assets resulting from the demand and supply of investment capital in a non-inflationary environment) from the 14th century to 2018. Theoretically, a pandemic is supposed to induce a downward negative shock on the real natural interest rate. This is because investment demand decreases due to excess capital per labor unit (i.e., a scarcity of labor being utilized), while savings flows increase due to either precautionary reasons or to replace lost wealth.

However, analysis using historical data might not be relevant in this case. According to Baker et al. (2020b), COVID-19 has led to massive spikes in uncertainty, and there are no close historical parallels. Because of the speed of evolution and timely requirements of data, the authors suggest that one should utilize forward-looking uncertainty measures to ascertain its impact on the economy.37 Using a real business cycle (RBC) model, the authors find that a COVID-19 shock38 leads to year-over-year contraction of GDP by 11 percent in 4th quarter of 2020. According to the authors, more than half of the contraction is caused by COVID-19-induced uncertainty. Coibion et al. (2020b) use surveys to assess the macroeconomic expectations of households in the US. They find that it is primarily lockdowns, rather than the COVID-19 infections themselves, that lead to drops in consumption, employment, lower inflationary expectations, increased uncertainty, and lower mortgage payments.39

Mulligan (2020) assesses the opportunity cost of “shutdowns” in order to document the macroeconomic impact of COVID-19. Within the National Accounting Framework for the US, the author extrapolates the welfare loss stemming from “non-working days”, the fall in the labor-capital ratio resulting from the absence/layoff of workers, and the resulting idle capacity of workplaces. After accounting for dead-weight losses stemming from fiscal stimulus, the replacement of normal import and export flows with black market activities, and the effect on non-market activities (lost productivity, missed schooling for children and young adults), the author finds the welfare loss to be approximately $7 trillion per year of shutdown.

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37 See Atlig et al. (2020) for an analysis of different forward-looking uncertainty measures during the pandemic.
38 This shock is formulated from the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 Volatility Index (VIX) and the news-based economic policy uncertainty (EPU) developed by Baker et al. (2016). Refer to Baker et al. (2020b) for details.
39 According to Coibion et al. (2020b), these findings have implications for monetary and fiscal policies and their respective transmission mechanisms.
Medical innovations such as vaccine development, contact tracing, and workplace risk mitigation can help to offset the welfare loss by around $2 trillion per year of shutdown.

Other researchers have examined the supply side. Bonadio et al. (2020) use a quantitative framework to simulate a global lockdown as a contraction in labor supply for 64 countries. The authors find that the average decline in real GDP constitutes a major contraction in economic activity, with a large share attributed to disruptions in global supply chains. Elenev et al. (2020) model the impact of COVID-19 as a fall in worker productivity and a decline in labor supply which adversely affect firm revenue. The fall in revenue and the subsequent non-repayment of debt-servicing obligations spur a wave of corporate defaults, which might bring down financial intermediaries. Céspedes et al. (2020) formulate a minimalist economic model in which COVID-19 also leads to loss of productivity. The authors predict a vicious cycle triggered by the loss of productivity causing lower collateral values, in turn limiting the amount of borrowing activity, subsequently leading to decreased employment, followed by a further decline in productivity. The COVID-19 shock is thus magnified through an ‘unemployment and asset price deflation doom loop’.40

Consumption patterns and debt responses from pandemic shocks had not been analyzed prior to COVID-19 (Baker et al., 2020a). Using transaction-level household data, Baker et al. (2020a) find that households sharply increased their spending during the initial period in specific sectors such as retail and food spending.41 These increases, however, were followed by a decrease in overall spending. Binder (2020) conducted an online survey of 500 US consumers to understand their concerns and responses related to COVID-19, which indicated those items of consumption on which they were spending either more or less. They find that 28 percent of the respondents in that survey delayed/postponed future travel plans, and that 40 percent forewent food purchases. Interestingly, Binder (2020) finds from the surveys that consumers tend to associate higher concerns about COVID-19 with higher inflationary expectations, a sentiment which serves as a proxy for “pessimism” or “bad times”.

40 See Fornaro and Wolf (2020) for a broader explanation of the mechanism.
41 Globally, after the onset of COVID-19, households have increased purchases from online platforms. See Chang and Meyerhoefer (2020) on how the pandemic affected food purchases in Taiwan.
Clemens and Veuger (2020) focus on the declines in government sales and income tax collections across US states. According to the authors, COVID-19 has led to a substantial decline in consumption compared to income. This is unlike the case in previous recessions, whereby income decreased more than consumption. The authors find that the COVID-19 pandemic will reduce the states’ tax collection by $42 billion in the 2nd quarter of 2020. For fiscal year 2021, the authors anticipate a decline in sales and income tax revenues of $106 billion with heterogeneity across US states.

McKibbin and Fernando (2020) estimate the economic cost of COVID-19. Using a Hybrid DSGE/CGE global model, the authors model COVID-19 as a negative shock to labor supply, consumption, financial markets, and as a positive shock to government expenditure, particularly stemming from health-related expenditures. The authors outline seven different scenarios and provide a range of estimates on the increase in mortality and the fall in GDP for a number of countries across the world. In the case of the most contained outbreak, the number of deaths reach around 15 million, while the reduction in global GDP is around $2.4 trillion in 2020.

The economic impact of shocks such as pandemics is usually measured with aggregate time series data, such as industrial production, GDP growth, unemployment rate, and others. However, these datasets are available only after a certain lag - usually months or until the end of the current quarter. On the other hand, economic shocks resulting from COVID-19 are occurring in real time. In order to analyze the economic impact at a higher frequency, Lewis et al. (2020) developed a weekly economic index (WEI) using ten different economic variables to track the economic impact of COVID-19 in the US. According to the study, between March 21 and March 28, the WEI declined by 6.19 percent. This was driven by a decline in consumer confidence, a fall in fuel sales, a rise in unemployment insurance (UI) claims, and other variables. Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2020) estimate the economic impact of social distancing measures via three high-frequency proxies (electricity consumption, nitrogen dioxide emissions, and mobility records). The authors find that social distancing measures led to a 10 percent decline in economic activity (as measured by electricity usage and emissions) across European and Central Asian countries between January and April. Chetty et al. (2020) develop a real time economic tracker using daily statistics on consumption, employment, business revenue, job posting and other variables. The authors show that the initial slowdown
in economic activity was partly driven by reductions in consumption by high-income individuals. These spending shocks negatively affected business revenues catering to high-income individuals. Subsequently, low-income individuals working for these businesses lose out on income and reduce their consumption.

6 Socio-economic Consequences

We now review studies documenting the socio-economic consequences of COVID-19 and the ensuing lockdowns. Social distancing and lockdown measures have been shown to adversely affect labor markets, mental health and well-being, racial inequality and gender roles. The environmental implications, while likely to be positive, also need to receive careful analysis.42

6.1 Labor Market Outcomes

A large number of studies document the effect of COVID-19 on the variables of hours of work and job losses (e.g., Adams-Prasll et al., 2020a; Béland et al. 2020c; Coibion et al., 2020a; Kahn et al., 2020).43 The unemployment increases observed in the US are partly driven by lockdowns and social distancing policies (Rojas et al., 2020). Accounting for cross-state variation in the timing of business closures and stay-at-home mandates in US, Gupta et al. (2020) find that the employment rate in the US falls by about 1.7 percentage points for every extra 10 days that a state experienced a stay-at-home mandate during the period of March 12th to April 12th.

Coibion et al. (2020a) find that the unemployment/job loss in the US is more severe than one might judge based on the rise in unemployment insurance (UI) claims, which is to be expected given the low coverage rate for UI regimes in the US. They also calculate a severe fall in the labor participation rate in the long run accompanied by an increase in the number of “discouraged workers” (unemployed workers who have actively stopped searching for work).

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42 A number of studies also investigate the effect of income and occupations on COVID-19 transmission (e.g., Baum and Henry (2020), Lewandowski (2020)). Using an instrumental variable approach, Qiu et al. (2020) find that the spread of COVID-19 cases “between cities” in China is much lower compared to “within city” spread. Cities with higher income levels (measured by GDP per capita at the city level) are more likely to have higher transmission rates owing to more social interactions and higher levels of economic activity.

43 Aucejo et al. (2020) examine the impact of COVID-19 on higher education in terms of changes in study time, delayed graduation and job/internship loss, based on surveys from Arizona State University.
work, effectively withdrawing from the labor force). This might be due to the disproportionate impact of COVID-19 on the older population. Aum et al. (2020b) find that an increase in infections leads to a drop in local employment in the absence of lockdowns in South Korea, where there were no government mandated lockdowns. This number increased for countries such as the US and the UK where mandatory lockdown measures were imposed.

Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a) analyze the inequality in job and income losses based on the type of job and individual characteristics for the US and the UK. The authors find that workers who can perform none of their tasks from home are more likely to lose their job. The study also finds that younger individuals and people without a university education were significantly more likely to experience drops in their income. Yasenov (2020) finds that workers with lower levels of education, younger adults, and immigrants are concentrated in occupations that are less likely to be performed from home. Similarly, Alstadsæter et al. (2020) find that the pandemic shock in Norway has a strong socio-economic gradient, as it has disproportionately affected the financially vulnerable population, including parents with younger children.

Béland et al. (2020c) discuss heterogeneous effects across occupations and workers in the US. They show that occupations that have a higher share of workers working remotely were less affected by COVID-19. On the other hand, occupations with relatively more workers working in proximity to others were more affected. They also find that occupations classified as ‘more exposed to disease’ are less affected. This finding is possibly due to the number of essential workers in these occupations. Based on these results, it can be reasonably expected that workers might change (or students might select different) occupations in the short or medium-term. Bui et al. (2020) focus on the impact of COVID-19 on older workers in US. Using CPS data, they show that older workers over the age of 65 years and over, especially older women, are facing higher unemployment in this COVID-19 recession compared to previous ones.

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44 Baert et. al (2020a) investigate the impact of COVID-19 on career prospects through surveys conducted in Belgium. They document concerns about job losses and missing out on promotions, especially amongst migrant workers.
Kahn et al. (2020) show that firms in the US have dramatically reduced job vacancies from the 2nd week of March 2020. The authors find that the job vacancy declines occurred simultaneously with increasing UI claims. Notably, the labor market declines (proxied through reductions in job vacancies and increases in UI claims) were uniform across states, with no notable differences across states which experienced the spread of the pandemic earlier than others or implemented stay-at-home orders earlier than others. The study also finds that the reduction in job vacancies was uniform across industries and occupations, except for those in front line jobs, e.g., nursing, essential retail, and others.

With the enforcement of social distancing measures, work from home has become increasingly prevalent. The degree to which economic activity is impaired by such social distancing measures depends largely on the capacity of firms to maintain business processes from the homes of workers (Alipour et al. (2020), Papanikolaou and Schmidt (2020)). Additionally, work from home or remote work is much more common and is thought to cause lower productivity loss in industries with better educated and better paid workers (Bartik et al., 2020a). Brynjolfsson et al. (2020) find that the increase in COVID-19 cases per 100k individuals is associated with a significant rise in the fraction of workers switching to remote work and the fall in the fraction of workers commuting to work in the US. Interestingly, the authors find that people working from home are more likely to claim UI compared to people who are still commuting to work and are likely working in industries providing essential services.

Dingel and Neiman (2020) analyze the feasibility of jobs that can be done from home. They find that 37 percent of jobs can be feasibly performed from home. A different but related context on the feasibility of work from home is the extent to which the job involves face-to-face interaction. According to Avdiu and Nayyar (2020), the job-characteristic variables of home-based work (HBW) and face-to-face (F2F) interaction differ along three main dimensions, namely: i) temporal (short run vs. medium run); ii) the primary channel of effects (supply and demand of labor); and iii) the relevant margins of adjustment (intensive vs. extensive). They argue that the supply of labor in industries with HBW capabilities and low F2F interactions (e.g., professional, scientific and technical services) might be the least affected. Nevertheless, those industries and occupations with HBW capabilities and high F2F interactions are likely to experience negative productivity shocks. For example, teachers in
high schools and universities might provide lectures online through web-based applications during lockdown restrictions. This mode of teaching, however, is not as interactive as standard classroom sessions. As lockdown restrictions are lifted, industries with low HBW capabilities and low F2F interactions (e.g., manufacturing, transportation and warehousing) might be able to recover relatively quickly. The risk of infection through physical proximity can be mitigated by wearing personal protective equipment (PPE) and by taking other relevant precautionary measures. However, those industries with low HBW capabilities and high F2F interactions (e.g., accommodation and food services, arts entertainment and recreation) are likely to experience slower recoveries, as consumers might be apprehensive about patronizing them, e.g., going to cinemas and restaurants. Using a web survey in Belgium, Baert et al. (2020b) find that a majority of respondents thought teleworking and digital conferencing are here to stay and will become more common post COVID-19.

From the firm’s perspective, there are large short-term effects of temporary closures, the (perhaps permanent) loss of productive workers, and declines in job postings - all characterized by strong heterogeneity across industries. Bartik et al. (2020b) survey a small number of firms in the US and document that several of them have temporarily closed shop and reduced their number of employees compared to January 2020. The surveyed firms were not optimistic about the efficacy of the fiscal stimulus (CARES Act loan program) implemented by the federal government of the US. Campello et al. (2020) find that job losses have been more severe for industries with highly concentrated labor markets (i.e., where hiring is concentrated within few employers), non-tradable sectors (e.g., construction, health services), and credit-constrained firms. Hassan et al. (2020) discern a pattern of heterogeneity with respect to firm resilience across industries in the US and around the World. Based on earnings call reports, they provide evidence that some firms are expecting increased business opportunities in the midst of the global disruption (e.g., firms which make medical supplies or others whose competitors are facing negative impressions after the outbreak of COVID-19). Barrero et al. (2020) measure the reallocation of labor in response to the pandemic-induced demand response (e.g., increased hiring in delivery companies, delivery-oriented restaurant/fast food chains, technology companies).
6.2 Health Outcomes

The impact of the pandemic on physical health and mortality has been documented in many studies (e.g., Goldstein and Lee, 2020; Lin and Meissner, 2020). Knittel and Ozaltun (2020) document a positive correlation between the share of elderly population, the incidence of commuting using public transportation, and the number of COVID-19 deaths in the US. In contrast, the authors provide evidence that obesity rates, ICU beds per capita, and poverty rates are not related to the death rate. Chatterji and Li (2020) document the effect of the pandemic on the US health care sector. The authors find that COVID-19 is associated with a 67 percent decline in the total number of outpatient visits per provider by the week of April 12th - 18th 2020 relative to the same week in prior years. This might have negative health consequences, especially amongst individuals with chronic health conditions. Others such as Alé-Chilet et al. (2020) explore the drop in emergency cases in hospitals around the world.

Nevertheless, during a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, it is common for everyone to experience increased levels of distress and anxiety, particularly the sentiment of social isolation (American Medical Association, 2020). A growing number of studies document worsening mental health status and well-being, e.g., Adams-Prassl et al. (2020b), Brodeur et al. (2020c); Davillas and Jones (2020); de Pedraza et al. (2020); and Tubadji et al. (2020). According to Lu et al. (2020), social distancing or lockdown measures are likely to affect psychological well-being through a lack of access to essential supplies, discrimination or exclusion by neighbors or other groups, financial loss, boredom, and frustration due to a lack of information. They determine that maintaining a positive attitude (in terms of severity perception, the credibility of real-time updates, and confidence in social distancing measures) can help reduce depression. Public mental health is also affected by the cognitive bias related to the diffusion of public death toll statistics (Tubadji et al., 2020). These needs are all the less

45 Lin and Meissner (2020) show that places that performed poorly in terms of mortality rates in 1918 were more likely to have higher mortality rates during COVID-19. They also find that countries more strongly affected by SARS are likely to have lower mortality rates from COVID-19.

46 Using an experimental setup, Bogliacino et al. (2020) find that a negative shock induced by the COVID-19 lowers cognitive function and increases risk aversion and propensity to punish others i.e. negative reciprocity.

47 Using pre-COVID-19 data, Hamermesh (2020) provide evidence that, adjusted for numerous demographic and economic variables, happiness is affected by how people spend time and with whom.
likely to be addressed given the lower levels of provision of health care and social work services.

Using the Canadian Perspective Survey Series, Béland et al. (2020b) find that older individuals and employed individuals who have less than a high school education reported lower mental health status. Their assessment also reveals that those who missed work not due to COVID-19, and those who were already unemployed, showed declines in mental health. Using panel data in the UK, Etheridge and Spantig (2020) report a large deterioration in the state of mental health, with much larger effects for women.48

The implementation of lockdown policy also adversely affected public mental health. Armbruster and Klotzbücher (2020) demonstrate that there were increases in the demand for psychological assistance (through helpline calls) due to lockdown measures imposed in Germany. The authors find that these calls were mainly driven by mental health issues such as loneliness and depression. Brodeur et al. (2020a) show that there has been a substantial increase in the search intensity on ‘boredom’ and ‘loneliness’ during the post-lockdown period in nine Western European countries and the US during the first few weeks of lockdowns. Using experimental surveys, Codagnone et al. (2020a) find that about 43 percent of the population in Italy, Spain and UK are at high risk of mental health problems not only because of the negative economic shock but also due to conditions of economic vulnerability in the countries.

Fetzer et al. (2020) find that there has been broad public support for COVID-19 containment measures. However, some of the respondents believe that the general public fails to adhere to health measures, and that the governmental response has been insufficient. These respondents have a tendency to exhibit a poorer state of mental health. If governments are seen to take decisive actions, then the respondents altered their perception about governments and other citizens, which in turn improved mental health.

48 Galasso et al. (2020) rely on survey data from eight OECD countries and provide evidence that women are more likely to agree with restraining public policy measures and to comply with them.
6.3 Gender and Racial Inequality

A growing literature points out that COVID-19 has had an unequal impact between genders and across races in OECD countries; specifically, women and racial minorities, such as African-Americans and Latinos, have been unduly and adversely affected. While recessions typically affect men more than women, many studies provide evidence that COVID-19 has large negative effects on women’s labor market outcomes (Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a), Forsythe (2020), Yassenov (2020)). Alon et al. (2020) argue that women’s employment is concentrated in sectors such as health care and education. Moreover, the closure of schools and daycare centers led to increased childcare needs, which would have a negative impact on working mothers and/or single mothers.

Béland et al. (2020a) analyze the domestic violence aspect of COVID-19 in Canada. The authors find that work arrangements such as remote work are not increasing women’s perceived impacts of COVID-19 on the levels of family stress and domestic violence. Instead, women’s concerns regarding their inability to meet financial obligations due to COVID-19 contributed to a significant increase in reported family stress and domestic violence. They also suggest that women’s concerns about maintaining social ties is positively associated with concerns regarding domestic violence and family stress from confinement.

Fairlie et al. (2020) examine the variation in unemployment shocks amongst minority groups in the US. The authors find that Latino groups were disproportionately affected by the pandemic. The authors attribute the difference to an unfavorable occupational distribution (e.g., more Latino workers work in non-essential services) and to lower skill levels amongst them. Borjas and Cassidy (2020) determine that the COVID-19 shock led to a fall in employment rates of immigrant men compared to native men in US, which was in contrast to the historical pattern observed during previous recessions. The immigrants’ relatively high rate of job loss was attributed to the fact that immigrants were less likely to hold jobs that could be performed remotely from home. The likelihood of being unemployed during March 2020 was significantly higher for racial and ethnic minorities in the US (Montenovo et al., 2020). On the other hand, McLaren (2020) finds that minority’s population share in a county strongly correlates with COVID-19 related deaths in US. After controlling for education, jobs and travel patterns, the correlation holds for mainly for African Americans and First Nations.
populations. The author shows that this racial disparity between African-American, First Nations and others can be attributed to public transit usage.

Schild et al. (2020) find that COVID-19 occasioned a rise of Sinophobia across the internet, particularly when western countries started showing signs of infection. Bartos et al. (2020) document the causal effect of economic hardships on hostility against certain ethnic groups in the context of COVID-19 using an experimental approach. The authors find that the COVID-19 pandemic magnifies hostility and discrimination against foreigners, especially from Asia.

6.4 Environmental Outcomes

The global lockdown and the considerable slowdown of economic activities is expected to have a positive effect on the environment (He et al., 2020; Almond et al., 2020; Cicala et al., 2020). He et al. (2020) show that lockdown measures in China led to a remarkable improvement in air quality. The Air Quality Index and the fine particulate matter (PM$_{2.5}$) concentrations were brought down by 25 percent within weeks of the lockdown, with larger effects in colder, richer, and more industrialized cities. Similarly, Almond et al. (2020) focused on air pollution and the release of greenhouse gases in China during the post COVID-19. The authors determined that, while nitrogen dioxide (NO$_2$) emissions fell precipitously, sulphur dioxide emissions (SO$_2$) did not fall. For China as whole, PM$_{2.5}$ emissions fell by 22 percent; however, ozone concentrations increased by 40 percent. These variations show that there is not an unambiguous decrease in air pollution due to the economic slowdown. The reduction can be attributed to less personal vehicle travel in turn causing lower nitrous oxide (NO$_2$) emissions. Brodeur et al. (2020b) examine the causal effect of ‘safer-at-home’ policies on air pollution across US counties. They find that ‘safer-at-home’ policies decreased air pollution (measured as PM$_{2.5}$ emissions) by almost 25% on average, with a larger effect for populous counties.49 Cicala et al. (2020) focus on the health and mortality benefits of reduced vehicle travel and electricity consumption in the US due to the stay-at-home policies. The authors

49 Andree (2020) focuses on the effect of pollution on COVID-19 cases, finding that PM$_{2.5}$ levels are a highly significant predictor of COVID-19 incidence using data from 355 municipalities in Netherlands. In terms of COVID-19 related deaths, Knittel and Ozaltun (2020) find no evidence that pollution levels are related to death rates in the US.
suggest that reductions in emissions from less travel and from lower electricity usage reduced deaths by over 360 per month.

Based on the research discussed above, Table 5 provides a summary of the literature focusing on the socioeconomic outcomes of social distancing, stay-at-home orders, and/or lockdowns, including measures and methodologies.

Table 5: Socioeconomic Outcome of COVID-19 Lockdowns: Summary of Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Socio-economic domain</th>
<th>Socio-economic Outcome Measure</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Mental Health &amp; Wellbeing</td>
<td>Impact of Quarantine and Attitudes Towards COVID-19 on Depressive</td>
<td>Quantile Regression</td>
<td>Lu et al. (2020)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Sector/Issue</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Mental Health &amp; Wellbeing</td>
<td>Symptoms and Happiness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Impacts of Spending Time “With Whom” and “How”</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Hamermesh (2020)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>during Lockdowns on Happiness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Mental Health &amp; Wellbeing</td>
<td>Effects of COVID-19 and lockdown on Individuals’ Mental Health and Financial</td>
<td>Probit Regression</td>
<td>Béland et al. (2020b)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and Work Concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK, Italy</td>
<td>Mental Health &amp; Wellbeing</td>
<td>Causal Effect of Lockdown on Mental Health</td>
<td>Difference-in-</td>
<td>Tubadji et al. (2020)</td>
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<tr>
<td>and Sweden</td>
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<td>Differences</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Mental Health &amp; Wellbeing</td>
<td>Effect of Lockdown on Mental Health</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Fetzer et al. (2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Gender Inequality</td>
<td>Disproportionate Effect of COVID-19 on Gender Equality (in terms of labor</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Alon et al. (2020)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>force participation, childcare needs, workplace flexibility)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Gender Inequality/Domestic Violence</td>
<td>Effect of COVID-19 and subsequent confinement on family stress and domestic</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Béland et al. (2020a)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Effect of COVID-19 Lockdown on Air Quality/Exposure/Externalities</td>
<td>Method/Approach</td>
<td>Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Effect of COVID-19 Lockdown on Air Quality</td>
<td>Difference-in-Differences</td>
<td>Almond et al. (2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Impact of Social Distancing on Emissions and Expected Health Effects Through Reduced Personal Vehicle Travel and Electricity Consumption.</td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>Cicala et al. (2020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Causal Effect of Safer-At-Home Orders on Pollution and Collision Externalities</td>
<td>Difference-in-Differences/Synthetic Control Method</td>
<td>Brodeur et al. (2020b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7 Policy Measures

The economic literature deals with many different policy measures. In the interests of bringing coherence to our discussion of them, we organize it according to five broad topics: i)
the types of policy measures, ii) the determinants of government policy, iii) the lockdown measures and their associated factors, iv) the lifting of lockdowns, and v) the economic stimulus measures.

To mitigate the negative effects of public health controls on the economy and to sustain and promote public welfare, governments all around the World have implemented a variety of policies within a very short time frame. These include fiscal, monetary, and financial policy measures (Gourinchas, 2020). The economic measures vary across counties in breadth and scope, and they target households, firms, health systems and/or banks (Weder di Mauro, 2020).

Using a database of economic policies implemented by 166 countries, Elgin et al. (2020) employ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to develop their COVID-19 Economic Stimulus Index. The authors correlate the standardized index with predictors of government response, such as population characteristics (e.g., median age), public-health-related measures (e.g., number of hospital beds per capita), and economic variables (e.g., GDP per capita). They find that the economic stimulus is larger for countries with higher COVID-19 infections, older median age, and higher GPD-per-capita. In addition, the authors develop a ‘Stringency Index’, which includes the measures such as school closures and travel restrictions. The authors find that the ‘Stringency Index’ is not a significant predictor of their economic stimulus index, which suggests that public health measures do not drive economic stimulus measures (Weder di Mauro, 2020).

On a similar note, Porcher (2020) has created an index of public health measures using the PCA technique. The index is based on 10 common public health policies implemented across 180 countries to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. The index is designed to measure the stringency of the public health response across countries. The author finds that, abstracting from the COVID-19 case numbers and deaths, countries which have better public-health systems and effective governance tend to have less stringent public health measures.

C. Cheng et al. (2020) develop the ‘CoronaNet – COVID-19 Government Response Database’, which accounts for policy announcements made by countries globally since 31 December 2019. The information that is contained in the data base is categorized according to: i) type of policy, ii) national vs. sub-national enforcement, iii) people and geographic region
targeted by the policy, and iv) the time frame within which the policy is implemented. Table 6 provides a description of the government response database for 125 countries.

The dataset shows variations across policy measures. The policy most governments have implemented in response to COVID-19 is “external border restriction”, i.e., the one which seeks to restrict access to entry through ports. The authors find that external border restrictions have been imposed by 186 countries. Similarly, the second most common policy measure, implemented by 153 countries, is “school closures”. However, in terms of policies which have implemented the greatest number of times, “obtaining or securing health resources” come first. This includes materials (e.g., face masks), personnel (e.g., doctors, nurses), and infrastructure (e.g., hospitals). The second most implemented policy is “restriction on non-essential businesses”. In terms of stringency of policy enforcement, “emergency declaration” and the formation of a “new task force” or a “administrative reconfiguration to tackle pandemic” are implemented with 100 percent stringency.

Due to these idiosyncratic differences between policy responses across countries over time, the authors use a Bayesian dynamic item-response approach to measure the implied economic, social and political cost of implementing a particular policy over time. They also develop a supplementary measure labelled the ‘Policy Activity Index’, which assigns a higher rank for policy measures to countries that are more willing to implement a ‘costly’ policy. Based on the ‘Policy Activity Index’, the authors determine that school closure is the costliest to implement across the 125 countries. Mandatory business closure and social distancing policies rank second. Moreover, internal border restrictions are viewed as more costly compared to external border restriction.

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50 Harris (2020a) maps the incidence of COVID-19 in New York City with subway usage. The author finds that the shutoff of subway ridership in Manhattan correlates strongly with the substantial increase (doubling of new cases) in this borough. This is arguably due to alternative modes of transport (e.g., local train lines, bus lines) leading to “closer interaction” amongst riders.

51 Valsecchi (2020) show that regions in Italy which saw an increase in internal migration experienced more COVID-19 deaths. This outcome suggests the importance of internal border restriction.
Table 6: Summary Statistics of COVID-19 Government Response Dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Policies</th>
<th>Cumulative Total Number of Implemented Policies</th>
<th>Number of Countries which have Implemented Policies</th>
<th>Stringency of Policy Enforcement (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obtaining or Securing Health Resources</td>
<td>2342</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction of Non-Essential Businesses</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Closures</td>
<td>1583</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarantine/Lockdown/Stay-at-Home Measures</td>
<td>1102</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Border Restrictions</td>
<td>1064</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Awareness Campaigns</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Mass Gathering</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Distancing (Voluntary)</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Non-Essential Government Services</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Task Force/Configuration of Administration to Tackle Pandemic</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Declaration</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Monitoring</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Border Restrictions</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Testing</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: C. Cheng et al. (2020)
Optimal lockdown policies have been investigated mostly by using epidemiology-macroeconomic models, some of which are oriented around the dichotomy between the case in which the choices (and responses) are all made by private agents and the case in which the choices are made by a social planner (Acemoglu et al. (2020), Alvarez et al. (2020), Berger et al. (2020), Bethune and Korinek (2020), Eichenbaum et al. (2020a). Jones et al. (2020) argue that in contrast to private agents, the social planner will seek to front-load mitigation strategies, i.e., impose strict lockdowns from the beginning to reduce the spread of infection and let the economy fall into a recession or a depression. This is because their model setup not only considers the healthcare costs and congestion in hospitals, but also rightly considers the fact that workers need time to become productive for a work-from-home situation. The outcomes are dependent on the assumed values of the parameters of these models. The optimal policy choice reflects the rate of time preference, epidemiological factors, the value of statistical life, the rate at which death rate increases in the infected population, the hazard rate for a vaccine discovery, the learning effects in the health care sector, and the severity of output losses due to a lockdown (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2020). The intensity of the lockdown depends on the gradient of the fatality rate as a function of the number of infected individuals and on the assumed value of a statistical life (VSL). The absence of testing increases the economic costs of the lockdown and shortens the duration of the optimal lockdown (Alvarez et al., 2020). Chang and Velasco (2020) argue that the optimality of policies depends on peoples’ expectations. For instance, fiscal transfers must be large enough to induce people to stay at home to reduce the degree of contagion; otherwise they might not change their behavior, which will increase the risk of infection. Their analysis also contains a critique of the use of SIR models, as the parameters used in these models (which remain fixed in value) would shift as individuals change their behavior in response to policy. Kozlowski et al. (2020) investigate the scarring effect (i.e., the change in belief about the probability of an

52 The earlier lockdown measures are imposed, the more time workers have to become productive with the work from home setup.
53 Coibion et al. (2020c) show that providing households with monetary and fiscal policy information details does not have large effect on expectations of economic agents for income, mortgage rates, inflation or unemployment rates.
54 Chang and Velasco (2020) compare their critique of SIR models with that of the Lucas (1976) critique of macro-econometric models, namely that macroeconomic predictions of the impacts of stabilization policies derived from the dominant models were misleading because economic agents would respond in kind.
extreme but negative or tail-risk event) of COVID-19 in SIR-Macro model and find that revision in belief about tail-risk events amongst economic agents will lead to a larger and more persistent negative impact on the economy in the long run.

When the daily death rates and case numbers decline, policies regarding re-opening the economy are of primary importance. Gregory et al. (2020) describe the lockdown measure as a “loss of productivity”, whereby relationships between employers and laborers are suspended, terminated, or continued. They further explain that post COVID-19, the speed and the type (V-shaped or L-shaped) of recovery depend on at least three factors: i) the fraction of workers who, at the beginning of the lockdown, enter unemployment while maintaining a relationship with their employer, ii) the rate at which inactive relationships between employers and employees dissolve during the lockdown, and iii) the rate at which workers who, at the end of the lockdown, are not recalled by their previous employer can find new, stable jobs elsewhere (Gregory et al., 2020).

Harris (2020b) points out the importance of utilizing several status indicators (e.g., results of partial voluntary testing, guidelines for eligibility of testing, daily hospitalization rates) in order to decide upon the course of action on re-opening the economy. Kopecky and Zha (2020) state that decreases in deaths are either due to implementation of social distancing measures or to herd immunity; it is hard to identify and disentangle those factors using standard SIR models. They argue that with the ‘identification problem’, there will be considerable uncertainty about restarting the economy. Only comprehensive testing can help resolve this ambiguity by quickly and accurately identifying new cases so that future outbreaks could be contained by isolation and contact-tracing measures (Kopecky and Zha, 2020).

Agarwal et al. (2020) rely on synthetic control methods to investigate the effect of counterfactual mobility restriction interventions in US. Using the daily death data from different countries, the authors create different “synthetic mobility US” variables. These are applied to predict a counterfactual scenario and to understand the trade-off between different levels of mobility interventions on death levels in US. They find that a small decrease

55 See, for example, T. M. Andersen et al. (2020), Glover et al. (2020) and Zhao et al. (2020) for how to relax restrictions and whether the lockdowns should remain in place.
in mobility reduces the number of deaths; however, after registering a 40 percent drop in mobility, the benefits derived from mobility restrictions (in terms of the number of deaths) diminish. Using a counterfactual scenario, the authors find that lifting severe mobility restrictions but retaining moderate mobility restrictions (e.g., by imposing limitations in retail and transport locations) might effectively reduce the number of deaths in US. Others such as Rampini (2020) make the case for the sequential lifting of lockdown measures for the younger population at the initial stages followed by the older population at later stages. The authors state that the lower effect on the younger population group is a fortunate coincidence, and thus the economic consequences of interventions can be greatly reduced by adopting a sequential approach. Oswald and Powdthavee (2020) make a similar case for releasing the younger population from mobility restrictions first on the grounds of higher economic efficiency (as they are more likely to be in the labor force) and their greater resilience against infections.

As some US states reopened, researchers now focus on the immediate consequences. Nguyen et al. (2020) find that four days after reopening, mobility has increased by 6 to 8 percent, with greater increases across states which were late adopters of lockdown measures. These findings have important implications for the resurgence of cases, hospital capacity utilization, and further deaths. Dave et al. (2020a) analyze the effect of lifting the shelter-in-place order in Wisconsin, after the Wisconsin Supreme Court abolished it, on social distancing and COVID-19 cases and find no statistically significant impact. W. Cheng et al. (2020) find that employment activity in US increased in May due to reopening in some states, mainly based on people who resumed working at their previous job. However, they find that the longer employees are away, their reemployment probabilities decline dramatically. The authors also find that UI claims increased in May, suggesting that workers were unemployed or became unemployed in May.

In regards to the aggregate macroeconomy, Gourinchas (2020) states that without substantial, timely, and stimulative macroeconomic intervention, the output lost from the economic downturn will be greatly amplified, especially as economic agents try to protect

56 See Balla-Elliott et al. (2020) for a survey of small American businesses’ expectations about re-opening.
themselves from COVID-19 by reducing consumption spending, investment spending, and engaging in lower credit transactions. Gourinchas (2020) suggests that there should be cross-regional variation in government responses based on country characteristics. Therefore, the type and level of fiscal and monetary stimulus designed to buffer the economic downturn will vary significantly across countries. With high amounts of government debt and historically low interest levels existing in most developed countries, Bianchi et al. (2020) recommends a coordinated monetary and fiscal policy to address the COVID-19 economic fallout. They recommend that fiscal policy should be used to enact an emergency budget with a ceiling placed on the debt-to-GDP ratio. This measure would increase aggregate spending, raise the inflation rate, and reduce real interest rates. The monetary authorities would coordinate with fiscal policy authorities by adopting an above-normal inflation target. In the long run, governments would try to balance the budget, and future monetary policy would aim to bring inflation back to normal levels.

Bigio et al. (2020) focus on the cases for government transfers vs. credit subsidy policies. They determine that the optimal mix between them depends on the level of financial development in the economy. According to these authors, economies with a developed financial system should utilize stimulative credit policies. On the other hand, developing economies should engage in more transfer spending. Guerrieri et al. (2020) explore whether a supply shock such as COVID-19 leads to a fall in excess demand in a multi-sector economy with incomplete markets. They find that a negative supply shock can lead to an overreaction in terms of falling demand, especially in cases where there is a low degree of substitutability across goods, incomplete markets, and liquidity constraints amongst consumers. They argue that the optimal policy response is to combine loosening of monetary policy with enhanced social insurance spending. In contrast, unconventional policies such as wage subsidies,

57 Collard et al. (2020) explain that efficient allocation is determined by the marginal rate of substitution between consumer utility and infection risks. For dynamic models, the resource allocation is determined by the interplay between immunization and infection externalities. Hall et al. (2020) analyze the maximum amount of consumption people would be willing to forgo to avoid death from COVID-19. The authors find that the decrease in consumption ranges from 41 percent to 28 percent, depending on the average mortality rate for a group.

58 See Jinjarak et al. (2020b) for an account of how monetary and fiscal policies in response to COVID-19 have affected Eurozone countries.

59 See Auerbach et al. (2020) for the effectiveness of fiscal policy in a situation of economic slack i.e. where workers and capital resources experience periods of idleness.
helicopter drops of liquid assets, equity injections, and loan guarantees can keep the economy in a full-employment, high-productivity equilibrium (Céspedes et al., 2020). These policies can stop the cycle of negative feedback loops between corporate default and financial intermediary weakness, which can create a macro-economic disaster (Elenev et al., 2020). Didier et al. (2020) discuss the policy menu, priorities and trade-offs of providing direct financing to firms.

Chetty et al. (2020) analyze the causal effect of policies implemented in the US on households and business. They find that stimulus payments through the CARES Act increased spending. However, this spending was directed toward durable goods (which require low physical interaction). As a result, this spending is not directed towards businesses – mainly small and medium size businesses - which lost out on revenues e.g., bars and restaurants. On the other hand, loans to small businesses from the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) did little to restore employment amongst businesses. Based on the data, the authors suggest the economic recovery depends on restoring consumer confidence and targeted assistance programs rather than uniform stimulus payments might be more effective in the short run.

Codagnone et al. (2020b) focus on the expectations of stakeholders with regard to the post-lockdown period. Using an experimental survey in Spain, Italy and UK, the authors find that exposure to the COVID-19 shock and subsequent lockdown had led to negative expectation about job opportunities, higher drawdowns of savings than before, and a deterioration in social relations which might be fundamental in finding job opportunities in the long run. The authors conclude the fiscal policy measures might be insufficient in managing these expectations amidst uncertainties and called on policy makers to present contingent plans for exiting the lockdown not only in terms of public budget earmarked for post-lockdown operations but also in terms of strategies in place to tackle a second wave of COVID-19.

8 Conclusion

This study delved into the research related to the economics of COVID-19 that has been released over a relatively short time period. The aim is to bring coherence to the scientific and policy debate and to aid further research.
Before covering the impacts of COVID-19 and the ensuing government response on the economy, we documented the most popular data sources to measure COVID-19 known cases/deaths and social distancing activities. We first pointed out that COVID-19 cases and deaths are subjected to measurement error due to many factors including testing capacity constraints. Mobility measures using GPS coordinates from cell phones have been used extensively to measure social distancing. However, there are certain caveats that apply, particularly in terms of privacy concerns and the representativeness of data. The paper also reviewed different research related to social distancing itself, particularly in regards to its determinants, its effectiveness in mitigating the spread of COVID-19, and compliance with the orders. Going forward, social distancing and its measurements will continue to play a key role in academic research and policy development.

Going forward, the policy measures related to COVID-19 will continue to be an important area of research. These interventions, which have varied both in terms of scope and implementation, are expected to yield a profound economic and social impact. This study tried to bring coherence to these issues by covering different public health and economic stimulus measures as well as providing a review of the literature on policy determinants, optimal lockdown measures, factors affecting the lifting of a lockdown, and combinations of fiscal and monetary policy measures aimed at ‘flattening the recession curve’.
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When Face-to-Face Interactions Become an Occupational Hazard Jobs in the Time of COVID-19


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