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Transnational terrorism and restrictive immigration policies

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Appendix

| <i>Labor migration</i> | <i>Family reunification</i> | <i>Asylum and refugees</i> | <i>Control mechanisms</i> |
|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| Targeting | Residence requirements | Existence of | Illegal residence |
| Quotas labor | Family members | subsidiary/humanitarian | Carriers sanction |
| Age limits | Age limits | protection | Alien's register |
| Young age beneficial | Quotas family | Nationality | Information sharing/international cooperation |
| Specific income per month | reunification | Quotas asylum | Biometric information |
| Specific financial funds | Financial requirements | Safe third country | Forged/expired documents |
| Language skills | Accommodation | Safe countries of origin | Aiding irregular immigrants |
| Application fee | requirements | Resettlement agreements | Identification documents |
| Job offer | Language skills | Place of application | Amnesty/Regularization programs |
| Equal work conditions | Application fees | Permit validity | Public schooling |
| List of occupations | Residence permit validity | Permit renewal | Employer sanctions |
| Labor market tests | Autonomous residence | Permanent permit | Marriage of convenience |
| Work permit validity | permit | Right to appeal | Detention |
| Renewal of permit | (Self)employment | Status when crisis resolved | |
| Transition temporary permanent | | Free movement | |
| Loss of employment | | (Self)employment | |
| Flexibility of permit | | Form of benefits | |
| <i>Notes:</i> Changes in items referring to labor migration, family reunification and asylum/refugees are combined into the first dependent variable “change in migration regulation”. Changes in control mechanisms constitute the second dependent variable “change in migration controls”. See Bjerre et al. (2016) for more details regarding the IMPIC dataset and the codebook. | | | |

Supplementary Table 1: Items of the IMPIC Immigration Policy Dataset

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| Dependent Variable → | Migration Regulation | Migration Regulation | Migration Regulation | Migration Controls | Migration Controls | Migration Controls |
| Transnational Terrorism Index | -0.319 (0.353) | 0.045 (0.080) | -0.131 (0.119) | -0.841 (1.125) | 0.158** (0.036) | 0.141** (0.051) |
| Policy Diffusion | 2.768** (0.868) | 2.765** (0.874) | 2.779** (0.872) | 2.064* (1.004) | 2.035* (1.010) | 2.067* (1.006) |
| Left-Wing Government | 0.567* (0.275) | 0.558* (0.275) | 0.569* (0.276) | -0.044 (0.337) | -0.068 (0.341) | -0.054 (0.339) |
| Right-Wing Government | 0.354 (0.251) | 0.333 (0.255) | 0.358 (0.255) | -0.454 (0.239) | -0.514* (0.246) | -0.480* (0.241) |
| Government Size | 0.029 (0.035) | 0.030 (0.035) | 0.029 (0.035) | 0.019 (0.020) | 0.022 (0.021) | 0.020 (0.020) |
| Unemployment | 0.052 (0.027) | 0.052 (0.027) | 0.052 (0.027) | 0.082** (0.030) | 0.080** (0.029) | 0.081** (0.029) |
| Per Capita Income | 0.941** (0.207) | 0.938** (0.202) | 0.942** (0.206) | 0.480** (0.163) | 0.462** (0.161) | 0.469** (0.161) |
| Democratic Participation | 0.896 (1.509) | 0.962 (1.452) | 0.897 (1.500) | -0.038 (1.106) | 0.085 (1.093) | 0.045 (1.091) |
| Index Weighting | 1*I+1*W1 1*K | 1*I+1*W1 1*K | 1*I+1*W1 1*K | 1*I+1*W1 1*K | 1*I+1*W1 1*K | 1*I+1*W1 1*K |
| Index Decay | No Memory | 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6 ... | 1/2, 1/4, 1/16 ... | No Memory | 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6 ... | 1/2, 1/4, 1/16 ... |
| Time Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Pseudo-R ² | 0.074 | 0.074 | 0.07 | 0.040 | 0.041 | 0.040 |
| No. of Observations | 827 | 827 | 827 | 827 | 827 | 827 |

Notes: Logit-model estimates reported. Constant not reported. I=Number of transnational terrorist incidents. W=Number of individuals wounded in incidents. K=Number of individuals killed in incidents. All explanatory variables lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01

Supplementary Table 2: Further Operationalizations of Terrorism Index

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Dependent Variable → | Migration Regulation | Migration Regulation | Migration Controls | Migration Controls |
| Transnational Terrorism Index | 0.083 (0.045) | -0.002 (0.014) | -0.008 (0.054) | 0.014* (0.006) |
| Policy Diffusion | 1.530** (0.486) | 1.640** (0.504) | 1.210* (0.572) | 1.193* (0.561) |
| Left-Wing Government | 0.272 (0.151) | 0.317* (0.157) | -0.023 (0.196) | -0.028 (0.194) |
| Right-Wing Government | 0.111 (0.133) | 0.188 (0.145) | -0.260* (0.147) | -0.273* (0.137) |
| Government Size | 0.019 (0.016) | 0.015 (0.019) | 0.010 (0.011) | 0.011 (0.012) |
| Unemployment | 0.026 (0.015) | 0.027 (0.016) | 0.046** (0.017) | 0.045** (0.017) |
| Per Capita Income | 0.492** (0.107) | 0.520** (0.119) | 0.267** (0.093) | 0.262** (0.090) |
| Democratic Participation | 0.535 (0.743) | 0.472 (0.804) | -0.009 (0.618) | 0.011 (0.607) |
| <i>Reduced-Form Results</i> | | | | |
| Military Capacity | 0.661** (0.062) | | 0.651** (0.061) | |
| F-Test Statistic (Prob.>F) | 112.98** (0.00) | | 115.55** (0.00) | |
| Wald Exogeneity Test (Prob.> χ^2) | 8.49** (0.00) | | 0.12 (0.72) | |
| Time Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| No. of Observations | 827 | 827 | 827 | 827 |
| <i>Notes:</i> Constant not reported. Reduced-form results for other covariates not reported. Null hypothesis of Wald exogeneity test: no endogeneity. Military capacity=First principal component from military spending and military spending as a share of GDP as well as military personnel and military personnel per capita. Data on military spending from WDI and National Material Capabilities Dataset (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities). All explanatory variables lagged by one year. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01. | | | | |

Supplementary Table 3: Additional Instrumental-Variable Estimates


Remarks on IV-Approach and Results. As in Hendrix and Young (2014), we expect military capacity to positively predict transnational terrorism because terrorism is the reasonable (cost-efficient) tactical choice when challenging a powerful enemy (consistent with the dictum that “terrorism is the weapon of the weak”).

By contrast, there is no argument in the literature that military capacity ought to affect the likelihood of implementing stricter migration policies. First, the various policy measures captured by the IMPIC dataset (cf. Supplementary Table 1) are not related to any military activity; for instance, even if a country's military were to patrol a country's borders, this would not affect the IMPIC measures. Second, in many countries (e.g., the U.S., Germany) there are legal/constitutional limits to the use of military for domestic purposes (such as border protection). This further minimizes the relationship between military capacity and migration policy-making. Third, for many parts of the (developed) world, especially for OECD and EU countries considered in our analysis, border protection is conducted by specialized police forces (e.g., FRONTEX, United States Border Patrol, Israel Border Police etc.) rather than the military (for a more detailed discussion, see Andreas, 2003). If any, the military plays only a minor (auxiliary) role in today's border protection, supporting the actual border protection agencies (Andreas, 2003); again, such an auxiliary role would not affect the data reported in the IMPIC dataset. In sum, we therefore expect military capacity to affect changes in migration policy only through its effect on the terrorism index.


Our results show that military capacity is indeed a positive predictor of terrorist activity, as hypothesized. The instrument is also sufficiently strong (as indicated by the *F*-tests). The exogeneity test suggests that an IV-approach is meaningful when analyzing the effect of transnational terrorism on migration regulation restrictiveness. However, our findings from the IV-approach (cf. model (1)) still indicate that there is no statistically significant effect of transnational terrorism on migration regulation restrictiveness, in line with the corresponding ordinary probit model findings (cf. model (2)). With respect to migration control restrictiveness, our findings (cf. model (3)) suggest that an IV-approach is not warranted (non-significant exogeneity test). An ordinary probit approach (cf. model (4)) is instead more meaningful. The ordinary probit results suggest that more transnational terrorism translates into higher migration control restrictiveness. In sum, the IV-results therefore very closely mirror those reported in Section 4.3 and Table 5.

References

- Andreas, P. 2003. Redrawing the line: Borders and security in the twenty-first century. *International Security* 28: 78-111.
- Hendrix, Cullen S. and Joseph K. Young. 2014. State capacity and terrorism: A two-dimensional approach. *Security Studies* 23: 329-363.



Supplementary Figure 1: Effect of Time on Policy Change [Migration Regulation]



Supplementary Figure 2: Effect of Time on Policy Change [Migration Controls]