

Ferraz do Amaral, Claudio A.; da Motta, Ronaldo Serôa

Working Paper

Automobile pollution control in Brazil

Discussion Paper, No. 86

Provided in Cooperation with:

Institute of Applied Economic Research (ipea), Brasília

Suggested Citation: Ferraz do Amaral, Claudio A.; da Motta, Ronaldo Serôa (2015) :
Automobile pollution control in Brazil, Discussion Paper, No. 86, Institute for Applied Economic
Research (ipea), Brasília

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/220175>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

86

DISCUSSION PAPER

Originally published by Ipea in September 1999 as number 670 of the series Texto para Discussão.

AUTOMOBILE POLLUTION CONTROL IN BRAZIL

**Claudio Ferraz
Ronaldo Seroa da Motta**



Originally published by Ipea in September 1999 as
number 670 of the series Texto para Discussão.

Brasília, January 2015

AUTOMOBILE POLLUTION CONTROL IN BRAZIL¹

Claudio Ferraz²

Ronaldo Seroa da Motta³

1. This paper is part of the project Effects of Vehicle Characteristic Taxes on Pollution Control in Brazil and Costa Rica. Financial support from the Dutch Foreign Ministry programme under the Collaborative Research on the Economics of Environment and Development (Creed) is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank Elcio Farah, Renato Linke and Homero de Carvalho at the Cetesb for making the emissions data available and Eduardo Fiuza for his help with the database organization. Additionally, Cicero Pimenteira, Alexia Rodrigues, Vinicius Bueno, Bruno Machado and Sabrina Azamor provided excellent research assistance. We also thank Nick Johnstone for helpful discussions and comments.

2. Diretoria de Pesquisa do Ipea e Universidade Santa Úrsula.

3. Diretoria de Pesquisa do Ipea e Universidade Santa Úrsula.

Federal Government of Brazil

**Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the
Presidency of the Republic**
Minister Roberto Mangabeira Unger



A public foundation affiliated to the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic, Ipea provides technical and institutional support to government actions – enabling the formulation of numerous public policies and programs for Brazilian development – and makes research and studies conducted by its staff available to society.

President

Sergei Suarez Dillon Soares

Director of Institutional Development

Luiz Cezar Loureiro de Azeredo

Director of Studies and Policies of the State, Institutions and Democracy

Daniel Ricardo de Castro Cerqueira

Director of Macroeconomic Studies and Policies

Cláudio Hamilton Matos dos Santos

Director of Regional, Urban and Environmental Studies and Policies

Rogério Boueri Miranda

Director of Sectoral Studies and Policies, Innovation, Regulation and Infrastructure

Fernanda De Negri

Director of Social Studies and Policies, Deputy

Carlos Henrique Leite Corseuil

Director of International Studies, Political and Economic Relations

Renato Coelho Baumann das Neves

Chief of Staff

Ruy Silva Pessoa

Chief Press and Communications Officer

João Cláudio Garcia Rodrigues Lima

URL: <http://www.ipea.gov.br>

Ombudsman: <http://www.ipea.gov.br/ouvidoria>

DISCUSSION PAPER

A publication to disseminate the findings of research directly or indirectly conducted by the Institute for Applied Economic Research (Ipea). Due to their relevance, they provide information to specialists and encourage contributions.

© Institute for Applied Economic Research – **ipea** 2015

Discussion paper / Institute for Applied Economic

Research.- Brasília : Rio de Janeiro : Ipea, 1990-

ISSN 1415-4765

1. Brazil. 2. Economic Aspects. 3. Social Aspects.
I. Institute for Applied Economic Research.

CDD 330.908

The authors are exclusively and entirely responsible for the opinions expressed in this volume. These do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Applied Economic Research or of the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic.

Reproduction of this text and the data it contains is allowed as long as the source is cited. Reproductions for commercial purposes are prohibited.

SUMÁRIO

RESUMO

ABSTRACT

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1 - INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| 2 - ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, FISCAL POLICIES AND THE BRAZILIAN CAR MARKET 5 | |
| 2.1 - The Vehicle Air Pollution Control Programme (Proconve) | 5 |
| 2.2 - Car Tax Structures | 6 |
| 3 - CAR EMISSIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS | 8 |
| 4 - ECONOMETRIC RESULTS | 10 |
| 4.1 - The Evolution of Emissions Compliance: 1992/97 | 10 |
| 4.2 - Emissions and Characteristics in the 1997 Models | 16 |
| 5 - CONCLUDING REMARKS | 17 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 20 |

RESUMO

A concentração da poluição do ar tem crescido rapidamente nas grandes regiões metropolitanas do Brasil devido, principalmente, ao crescente uso de veículos automotivos. Na presença desta externalidade negativa, a regulação ambiental faz-se necessária. A política de controle de emissões de poluentes automotivos no Brasil, implementada basicamente com uso de mecanismos de comando e controle e incentivo fiscal, resultou em redução significativa na emissão média de poluentes nos carros novos. Não obstante, o imposto (IPI) sobre a venda de automóveis, diferenciado por combustíveis e potência, também influenciou na evolução das emissões de poluentes. Este trabalho analisa a evolução do atendimento às metas de emissão de poluentes veiculares da legislação ambiental entre 1992 e 1997. Os resultados indicam que os carros grandes, que obtiveram incentivo fiscal, tiveram ajuste mais rápido enquanto os carros populares realizaram ajuste mais lento. Além disso, carros a gasolina ajustaram sua tecnologia mais rápido do que os carros a álcool. Adicionalmente, analisamos a relação entre emissões e características dos automóveis novos vendidos em 1997. Os resultados indicam a existência de uma relação positiva entre taxas de emissão e potência. Concluímos que, embora a atual estrutura do IPI não esteja em oposição aos carros mais limpos, a adoção de alíquotas diferenciadas dentro de cada categoria, menor para os mais limpos e maior para os mais sujos, criaria incentivos para que o controle das emissões de poluentes veiculares fosse realizado de forma mais custo-efetiva.

ABSTRACT

Air pollution concentrations have been rapidly increasing in the major urban areas of Brazil caused mainly by the increasing use of vehicles. In the presence of this negative externality, environmental regulation is required. Car emission control policies in Brazil have relied basically on mandatory emission standards and subsidies for specific cleaner technology resulting in substantial decrease of car emission rates. Nevertheless, car sale taxes, differentiated by vehicles' size and fuel, have also influenced car emission patterns. This paper analyzes the compliance trend of the Brazilian fleet with environmental standards between 1992 and 1997. We find that larger automobiles had the fastest compliance schedule while popular models adjusted very slowly. Also gasoline-fueled models had a faster adjustment pattern than ethanol cars. Additionally, we analyze the current relationship between pollution emissions and car characteristics in order to orient policy formulation. We find a positive relationship between emissions rates and horse power, concluding that although the current value added-sale car tax is not environmental harmful, a tax differentiating clean from dirty models, within each tax bracket, could create substantial incentives for emission control in the future.

1 - INTRODUCTION

Urban air pollution is a serious environmental problem in developed as well as in most developing countries. In the case of Brazil, air pollution concentrations have been rapidly increasing in the major urban areas over the last decades. As elsewhere, this expansion has been caused mainly by the increasing use of vehicles. Today, emissions from vehicles are the major source of air pollution in Brazilian largest cities. In São Paulo, for example, private cars were responsible for approximately 75% of carbon monoxide (CO), 73% of hydrocarbons (HC), 23% of nitrogen oxides (NO_x) and 10% particulate matter (PM) emissions in 1997.¹

Costs associated with high air pollution concentrations in large cities are known to be important. Human health costs predominate, and range from eye irritations to respiratory problems and increasing cancer rates, all of which induce direct and indirect costs to society.² Seroa da Motta and Mendes (1995) estimate a reduction of 7% in the mortality rate from respiratory diseases in São Paulo, if particulate levels were reduced to minimum legal standards. They also estimate the health costs associated with concentration levels in excess of air pollution standards, finding a loss of approximately US\$ 700 million per year in the early 1990s.

Even when consumers can perceive individual emission damage, they are unable to reduce alone the aggregate social emission costs. Consequently, their preferences will usually not consider fuel and car cleanliness. In the presence of this negative externality, environmental regulation is required.

In these cases, economic literature is prone on identifying market-based instruments (MBIs), such as taxes and tradable permits, as more efficient ways to achieve environmental goals than emission and technological standards, commonly denominated as command-and-control mechanisms (C&C).

C&C instruments are based on standards which all users are forced to comply in order to lead into the desirable level of pollution. In the case of car emission, all automobiles and fuels are sold according to certain mandatory technological or emission standard target. If enforcement is strong, non-compliance would mean no sale and users either comply or leave the market. There is no trade-off schemes among producers or consumers to allow for cost minimization strategies. Such lack of flexibility impede cost-effectiveness gains.

Alternatively, by introducing an environmental tax equivalent to the social marginal cost of pollution emission (Pigovian tax), regulators force consumers to internalize their contribution to the aggregate social costs. In doing so, society reaches the optimal level of pollution when the marginal cost of pollution

¹ See Cetesb (1998). Also in São Paulo, according to Cetesb (1998), the air quality is considered to be below the human health minimum standard at least 25% of the days in a year.

² See Watkins (1991) and Maddison *et alii* (1996) for further analysis of health effects associated with vehicle source air pollution.

damages equals the marginal cost of pollution control. However, such optimal taxation requires the measurement of emissions from every single emission source and the determination of the marginal damage cost of one unit of emission.

If we were able to measure emissions by individual cars, the first best incentive option for car emission control would be the imposition of a Pigovian tax on each source according to its marginal contribution to air pollution damages. This would allow flexibility for car owners in the choice of emission reduction strategies. However, such first best approach usually has no trivial implementation and can be of high administrative cost. As put by Innes (1996), even if tamper-resistant emission-measurement from tailpipes were available at reasonable costs, such devices do not detect important non-tailpipe pollution and, therefore, high costly reliable periodic car monitoring would be required. Consequently, the application of car emission control policies would have to reckon on regimes which do not require direct emission monitoring.

When emission output measurements are difficult, economic literature on MBIs proposes instead that regulators may apply first best taxes on the use of inputs and products which are related to emissions. For car emissions, fuel and automobile taxes are good candidates for this option.

Fullerton and West (1999), hereafter FW, have derived a set of fuel and car optimal taxes which are able to mimic, at least in theory, the unavailable tax on emissions. In order to derive a closed form solution, FW consider emissions per gallon (EPG) and miles per gallon (MPG) only to depend on s_i , the size of the car. Under these specific technological conditions, FW propose a closed form solution for a fuel tax (t_g) differing according to characteristics of the vehicle at the pump. The owner of car model i , would pay a tax given by $t_{g,i} = \mu EPM(s_i)MPG(s_i)$. Where μ , represents the marginal social cost of a unit of emissions and EPG and MPG represent car features. More generally, we could specify such a tax to be a function of other car characteristics which are likely to affect EPG and MPG, as well as emission features of different fuel types.

Admitting regulators know the mileage consumption and useful life of each car model i owned by consumer j , an equivalent car sale tax would consist on the present value of the above fuel tax. This car tax could be, instead, applied periodically for licensing purposes, and its value would be set by monitored mileage at that period.

Both fuel and car taxes would make consumers perceive the emission-increasing cost of extra mileage consumption recognizing the emission-reducing benefits of fuel cleanness and economy as well as car pollution abatement devices.

Note that under this approach regulators must know the marginal social cost of a unit of emissions (μ). Moreover, this parameter will be location-specific since marginal damages are dependant on total pollution charges and the environment

assimilative capacity which, in turn, varies according to atmospheric variables (e.g., wind speed, temperature, humidity, etc).

Suppose, however, that regulators know μ and location-specific taxes can be applied. Although the fuel tax is simpler than the equivalent car tax, it would still require car features to be identifiable at the gas station. Again such approach is likely to generate high administrative costs in order to be feasible and reliable.

Therefore, if we cannot mimic the first best solution with alternative taxation schemes, we would have to rely on second best market instruments. The ideal second-best mechanism should create price incentives for consumers to drive fewer miles and, at the same time, buy cleaner cars. While the former decision is related to fuel use, the latter works through car price differentiation [see Johnstone and Karousakis (1998)].

A car tax based on the estimation of vehicle annual's emission is proposed by Eskeland (1994) and Sevigny (1998). Emission rates per mile would be estimated based on car characteristics and miles traveled could be measured by the change in the vehicle's odometer in a given year.³ What makes this proposal different from the first best alternative proposed by FW is the lack of knowledge on each specific car's EPM. While FW's model assumes that it is possible to estimate individual EPM for all car model in order to charge an emission gas tax at the fuel pump, Sevigny (1998) only expects to be able to derive average EPM figures. Once more implementation may prove to be costly for the case of odometer measurement procedures.

An alternative constrained optimal regulation is proposed by Innes (1996). A combination of taxes on gasoline and automobiles could be combined with a government fuel content standard. The fuel tax would be independent of individual automobiles, but the car tax would depend on auto characteristics (e.g., power, size, style), fuel economy and abatement features. Since mileage demand is highly correlated with automobile features, the automobile tax would also affect miles driven. Moreover, additional incentives could be created. In a dynamic setting, a car sale tax could be partially returned to consumers as incentive for scrapping older models according to the abbreviation of the car's useful life.⁴

For the previous mechanism, a subsidy for pollution control equipment is relatively simple to define since control equipment such as catalytic converters and filters are directly observable. The same applies for fuel, insofar as that emissions will rise more or less proportionately with fuel consumption for a given

³ This tax would take the form of Annual tax = $(aEPM_1 + bEPM_2 + cEPM_3) * VMT$. Where EPM is the emission per mile, VMT is the vehicle mile traveled and a, b, c are tax rates set to induce the desired level of abatement for each pollutant.

⁴ Road fees, varying with air pollution concentration levels and car's characteristics, are also regarded as possible second best options, although they may induce longer travel distances to avoid charges.

vehicle and given driving conditions.⁵ On the other hand, a tax on car characteristics requires a periodic identification of the relationship between car characteristics and emissions.

In general, market based instruments are of difficult implementation and regulators wishing to apply them would have to combine tax schemes with technological and emission standards. This approach does not maximize social welfare by setting optimal levels of pollution. Rather, the aim is to use pricing mechanisms to increase cost-effectiveness in achieving a certain standard compliance regarded as desirable.⁶

That is, once environmental goals are defined, economic instruments can reduce the social costs of achieving them. The rationale is rather simple. Since users face different marginal control cost schedules, pollution taxes varying direct with user's pollution levels will make users to adopt control levels up to the point where pollution control costs are equal, at the margin, to non-compliance tax costs. Taxes are set at certain level which will make the maximized individual decisions, in aggregate, to meet the desirable standards. Society will first start to control from the least-cost users which will reduce total control cost. In this case, individual emission standards are dropped out and regulators become only concerned with ambient standards which reflect total emissions.

Instead of setting prices, regulators may distribute pollution-permits to users, as a share of the desired total emission targets and allow these permits to be traded among users. This mechanism creates incentives for achieving the same marginal cost equalizing outcome given the competitive structure of the prices emerging from the permit market transactions.

Apart from cost-effectiveness benefits, such economic instruments, can generate revenue. In the case of pricing mechanisms, note that users with non-compliance will face the respective tax costs and thereby generate a tax revenue. In the case of tradable permits, they can be distributed through auctioning mechanisms.⁷

Car emission control policy in Brazil is basically defined on mandatory emission standards. Since 1988 the Brazilian governmental authorities have implemented a regulatory mechanism called The Vehicle Air Pollution Control Programme (Proconve), establishing maximum pollution emission standards (in grams per kilometer) for new vehicles entering the market. The program has been very successful in reducing emissions per kilometer for new car models. Nevertheless, as with any command and control approach, it is inflexible, increasing the costs of reducing pollution.

⁵ See Seroa da Motta and Mendes (1996) for an analysis of fuel taxation in Brazil.

⁶ Desirable here may mean either one standard politically acceptable or targeted at one specific damage. In the case of urban pollution, human health damages are usually targeted.

⁷ Cost-effectiveness of permits does not depend on permit auctioning. Freely distributed permits have different equity effects, although they are equally cost-effective if transactions costs are assumed not constrained.

This paper intends on analyzing the evolution of average emissions in the Brazilian fleet between 1992 and 1997 (the final compliance date). Together with environmental policy, car tax structures have been differentiated by car characteristics such as size and fuel use, in order to accommodate sectoral policy aims. Therefore, governmental initiatives have affected the car market and consequently the emission pattern of new automobiles. We try to relate these sectoral policies with the average emission compliance trends comparing the average emission changes across car sizes and fuel types. Additionally, we analyze the present relationship between pollution emissions and car characteristics in order to orient current policy formulation.

Our analysis is based on emission data recorded from laboratory tests undertaken by the São Paulo Environmental Agency's (Cetesb) which electronically measure emissions of HC, CO and NO_x for each car model along with the model's characteristics.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the Brazilian regulatory framework for car pollution control and the car tax structure. Section 3 describes our database and model characteristics. Section 4 presents the econometric results. Concluding remarks and policy recommendations are discussed in Section 5.

2 - ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, FISCAL POLICIES AND THE BRAZILIAN CAR MARKET

Recently, three different policies have shaped the size, the structure and the composition of the car fleet, namely: the ethanol program, the sale car tax changes, the environmental regulation. Moreover, all of them had substantially affected the pattern of pollution emissions from the Brazilian car fleet.⁸

2.1 - The Vehicle Air Pollution Control Programme (Proconve)

The introduction of emission control devices in the Brazilian vehicles was promoted by the 1986 protocol signed between the automotive industry and the government, the Vehicle Air Pollution Control Programme (Proconve), which was later turned into a law.

Proconve was, in fact, the first attempt to control directly pollution emissions from automobiles in Brazil. It defined targets for emission controls in new cars for the period 1988/97, according to the timetable presented in Table 1. It is important to note that these targets were as ambitious as those applied in some OECD countries.

⁸ Trade liberalization also had an important effect on the Brazilian car market. Nevertheless, due to the lack of data, it is not directly considered in our analysis [see De Negri (1998)].

Table 1

Emission Standards for New Cars in Brazil

(g/km)

| Year | Carbon Monoxide (CO) | Hydrocarbons (HC) | Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) |
|------|----------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| 1988 | 24.0 | 2.1 | 2.0 |
| 1992 | 12.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 |
| 1997 | 2.0 | 0.3 | 0.6 |

Source: *Brazilian National Environmental Code (Conama) resolution No. 18, 1986.*

The Protocol was successfully implemented and average emission levels of new cars decreased considerably. Hydrocarbon emissions, for example, decreased by approximately 92% for gasoline and 84% for ethanol cars, between 1988 and 1997. In sum, the Proconve mandatory emission standards was an effective command-and-control mechanism for reducing pollutant emission levels from vehicle sources. The adaptation was attained through the use of internationally available technology, mainly catalytic converters and the increased adoption of fuel injection.

2.2 - Car Tax Structures

Car taxation in Brazil is recognized as very high (varying from 23 to 33% of average price). Apart from two minor social contributions, it consists mainly on two parts, a state circulation value added tax (ICMS) and a federal industrial value added tax (IPI). The highest car tax level is from the industrial value added tax which is progressive with vehicle's power. The higher is the power measured in HP, the higher is the tax bracket. The differentials among tax classes have been changing in the last decade in order to accommodate sectoral policy objectives, such as, the promotion of ethanol fueled and popular cars (1,000 cc).

2.2.1 - Tax rate differential by fuel-type cars

The first major factor contributing to the reduction of vehicle emissions in Brazil occurred indirectly as a response to the first oil crisis in the seventies with the addition of ethanol to gasoline through the Brazilian National Alcohol Programme (Proalcool). Its main environmental benefit was the complete removal of lead from gasoline. After the second oil crisis, Brazil initiated a further phase of Proalcool, aimed at the sale of pure ethanol-fueled cars.

Pure ethanol-fueled vehicles were, at that time, relatively cleaner in terms of certain pollutants than gasoline-fueled vehicles. Nevertheless, ethanol-fueled cars require a higher volumetric fuel consumption per mile traveled.⁹

To promote the sale of pure ethanol cars, the government relied on very aggressive fiscal and credit demand and supply-side incentives. Ethanol fuel prices were set

⁹ Approximately 15 to 20% depending on the model.

favorably relative to gasoline (reducing its relative price) and ethanol cars were also sold with lower sale tax rates and better financing schemes.

In the late 1980s, the continuous decline in international oil prices and the severe public deficits faced by the Brazilian economy, caused a cut in ethanol subsidy mechanisms. The fuel parity was substantially reduced and subsidies for producers were also dramatically cut. Ethanol car sales declined dramatically and almost disappeared in the beginning of the 1990s. This process suggests that the tax rate differential was not enough in order to avoid the dramatic drop in ethanol car sales. Relative fuel prices and availability, which directly affect car use levels, played a far more important role for consumer's choice.¹⁰

Finally in 1991, after some periods of fluctuation in the ethanol content of the gasohol mixture, a law was passed stating that the gasohol mixture had to be kept at the constant 22% level,¹¹ changed to 24% later on. Gasohol then became the main source of ethanol demand, particularly in recent years when fuel consumption peaked after the macroeconomic stabilization. The stability on the mixture used for automobile fuel, allowed the automotive industry to accelerate the introduction of technological innovations, particularly those for car emission control.

2.2.2 - Tax rate differential by engine size

Car taxation is also used in Brazil to achieve sectoral policy objectives. Value added taxes were reduced for cars with lower horsepower (cheaper automobiles) in order to promote production and employment. This differentiation has had significant environmental consequences.

Since 1986 the Brazilian government has differentiated the industrial value added tax (IPI) charged on automobiles by fuel and horsepower, imposing a higher tax for cars above 100 HP, as can be seen in Table 2. This differentiation was accentuated with the introduction of the "carro popular" (less or equal than 1000 cc) in 1990. The tax rate for the "carro popular" was reduced from 14% in 1992 to 0.1% in 1993 as an attempt to reverse the decline in the car market.¹² It was further increased to 8% in 1995 and to 13% in 1997. As can be seen, these tax reductions are more substantial than those offered for ethanol cars.

¹⁰ Note that these findings also corroborate the theoretical issues discussed on Section 1 which emphasizes the need to combine car and fuel price taxation.

¹¹ The law accepts a variance of 2%.

¹² In this case, the state value-added tax (ICMS) was also differentiated for "popular cars" for certain periods.

Table 2

Evolution of the Industrial Value Added Tax (IPI) for Automobiles in Brazil
(Em %)

| Year | Up to 1000cc Carro Popular | More than 1000cc, but up to 100 HP Gasoline | More than 1000cc, but up to 100HP Ethanol | More than 1000cc, over 100 HP Gasoline | More than 1000cc, over 100 Hp Ethanol |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| 1986 | - | 100 | 92 | 107 | 100 |
| 1987 | - | 45 | 40 | 50 | 45 |
| 1988 | - | 45 | 40 | 50 | 45 |
| 1989 | - | 33 | 28 | 38 | 33 |
| 1990 | 20 | 37 | 32 | 42 | 37 |
| 1991 | 20 | 37 | 32 | 42 | 37 |
| 1992 | 14 | 31 | 26 | 36 | 31 |
| 1993 | 0.1 | 25 | 20 | 30 | 25 |
| 1994 | 0.1 | 25 | 20 | 30 | 25 |
| 1995 | 8 | 25 | 20 | 30 | 25 |
| 1996 | 8 | 25 | 20 | 30 | 25 |
| 1997 ^a | 13 | 30 | 25 | 35 | 30 |

Source: Anfavea (1999).

^a Tax implemented in November, 1997.

In order to subsidize environmental compliance to the 1992 Proconve targets, government offered a reduction of 5% on the industrial value added tax levels for some large cars (between 100 and 127 HP) which adopted fuel injection devices from 1992 onwards. This incentive worked correctly and from 1992 onwards all models over 100 HP had already adopted fuel injection devices. It is important to note that the electronic injection subsidy worked equivalently to a sale tax on dirtiest large cars which would have not adopt this emission control device.

3 - CAR EMISSIONS AND CHARACTERISTICS

Emissions and characteristics data has been used to analyze pollution regulations and the possibility of implementing an environmental vehicle characteristic tax. White (1982) and Kahn (1996) used cross-section data to investigate the evolution of manufacturers compliance with pollution regulation in the United States. Under a different approach, Johnstone and Karousakis (1998) used emissions and characteristics to study the possibility of implementing a vehicle characteristic tax. We build upon these previous studies in order to analyze both the evolution of compliance to the new regulation and the current relationship between characteristics and emissions for the Brazilian fleet.

We assume that automobile i has a production function for pollution emissions represented by:

$$E_i = f(MY_i, C_i) \quad (1)$$

where MY_i is model year and C_i is a vector of characteristics which includes, among others, engine size, horse power, electronic injection, fuel type and catalytic converter.

Based on this model, our econometric exercise analyzes the evolution of the emission compliance pattern in the car industry in Brazil for the period 1992/97. The emission trend is analyzed across fuel types and engine size categories. Additionally, a specific cross-section regression is undertaken for 1997 in order to analyze the relationship between emissions and characteristics.

Our data was obtained from laboratory tests undertaken by the São Paulo Environmental Agency (Cetesb) which recorded electronically the emissions of HC, CO and NOx for each car model along with the model's characteristics.¹³ Since Cetesb only tests auto engine and emissions by family type, the same emission test is usually used for cars with the same engine, but with different weight, size and maximum speed. Consequently, we can only use one of the observations for statistical analysis purposes. Furthermore, since different weights are associated with the same emission rate, we cannot use such a variable for our analysis.

Other characteristics like cylinders and transmission are not used since they are almost uniform in Brazil (most cars have four cylinders and use manual transmission). Information on catalytic converters are also available, but only for part of the database and consequently could not be used. The variables left for inclusion in our analysis with enough precision are fuel type, engine size, horsepower, rpm, fuel injection type/carburetor and the year of the test. Nevertheless, due to the high correlation between engine size and horsepower, which caused significant multicollinearity in our model, we opted to include only horsepower in the estimation.¹⁴

Additionally, we merged the Cetesb database with our price and quantity database obtained from the Quatro Rodas magazine and Auto Part Manufacturer's National Syndicate (Sindipeças) in order to ensure that only car models with positive sales were included in the analysis. Since many different car models had the same emission test, we had to clean the database until there was only one observation from each family of cars. On this basis we ended up with 444 observations from 1992 to 1997.

The emission compliance process is analyzed by fuel type (gasoline and ethanol) and car size (small, medium and large). Controlling for horsepower and rpm (since Cetesb tests are undertaken in different *rpm*), we include dummies for test years and obtain the percentage change in emissions through time.

¹³ Since we are interested in local pollution, we chosen not to use data on CO₂ emissions which are very controversial.

¹⁴ The results do not change substantially when we include engine size instead of horse power. Nevertheless, due to its greater variability, the model has a better fit with horse power.

The analysis is undertaken for the three pollutants, CO, HC and NOx, using a simplified version of equation (1) given by:

$$\log e_i = \alpha + \beta_1 hp_i + \beta_2 rpm_i + \sum_{j=1}^4 \gamma_j dyear_{ij} + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where *hp* is horse power, *rpm* is rotations per minute and *dyear* are dummies taking the value 1 if the car was tested in that year and zero otherwise and ε is the error term. The dummy year for the test is used as proxy for the model year.

Based on this semi-logarithmic specification, the coefficient estimate gives us the percentage change in average emissions due to a unit change in the independent variable. Note that for the dummy variables, the correct expression for this percentage change is given by $e^\gamma - 1$. The results are discussed based on the transformed coefficients. It is also important to point out that, since model year dummies have 1992 as the base year, all year dummy coefficients represent variations against 1992.

The second regression equation aims at analyzing the current relationship between emissions and characteristics in the Brazilian fleet. We use 1997 test data and a model similar to Johnstone and Kourasakis (1998). Regressing emissions on vehicle characteristics and controlling for *rpm*, we are able to distinguish the different effects of horse power, single-point or multi-point fuel injection and fuel type on emissions of CO, HC and NOx. The econometric model estimated is given by:

$$\log e_i = \alpha + \beta_1 hp_i + \beta_2 rpm_i + \beta_3 singlefuel_i + \beta_4 gas_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where *hp* is horse power, *rpm* is rotations per minute, *singlefuel* is a dummy variable taking the value of zero if the car has multi-point and 1 if it has single-point fuel injection and *gas* is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the car is gas-fueled and 0 if it is ethanol-fueled. Due to the presence of heteroscedasticity in some regressions, White-consistent standard errors are used.

4 - ECONOMETRIC RESULTS

4.1 - The Evolution of Emissions Compliance: 1992/97

Due to the small number and unequal distribution of observations across time, it is not possible to undertake a cross-section analysis for each pollutant by each model year. Moreover, car models vary across years, hence it is also not possible to use panel-data estimation techniques. We opted for pooling all observations controlling for variables that influence emissions such as the horse power, rotations per minute and the presence of fuel injection and adding dummy variables for each test year. Following Kahn (1996) we use a cross-section

regression to analyze the effects of pollution regulation in Brazil through the period 1992/97.

4.1.1 - Compliance schedules and emission trends by fuel type

Divergence in emission levels among fuel-type cars can be observed in Table 3. Gasoline cars adapted to the regulation first while ethanol cars had a significant adaptation lag. As said before, this divergence pattern could be explained by the lost of market share of ethanol cars and consequently, the decrease in the R&D invested in cleaner technologies.

As shown in Table 3, by 1992 the HC emission levels from ethanol cars exceeded those from gasohol cars. This trend may be explained by the fact that there were no longer any special sale opportunities for ethanol cars and, consequently, technological efforts were concentrated on gasohol models.

Table 3

Evolution of Average Emission Levels of New Passengers Vehicles in Brazil by Fuel Type

(g/km)

| Year | Gasohol | | | | | | Ethanol | | | | | |
|------|---------|------|------|--------------------|------|------|---------|------|------|--------------------|------|------|
| | Mean | | | Standard Deviation | | | Mean | | | Standard Deviation | | |
| | CO | HC | NOX | CO | HC | NOX | CO | HC | NOX | CO | HC | NOX |
| 1992 | 5,88 | 0,49 | 0,75 | 1,82 | 0,19 | 0,30 | 4,04 | 0,61 | 0,61 | 1,34 | 0,15 | 0,27 |
| 1993 | 5,57 | 0,47 | 0,68 | 2,17 | 0,21 | 0,32 | 4,34 | 0,62 | 0,62 | 1,64 | 0,16 | 0,30 |
| 1994 | 5,02 | 0,45 | 0,65 | 2,43 | 0,24 | 0,32 | 4,02 | 0,63 | 0,63 | 1,48 | 0,15 | 0,27 |
| 1995 | 4,74 | 0,41 | 0,64 | 2,50 | 0,25 | 0,27 | 3,82 | 0,57 | 0,57 | 1,68 | 0,16 | 0,22 |
| 1996 | 3,80 | 0,35 | 0,55 | 2,59 | 0,24 | 0,28 | 3,59 | 0,55 | 0,56 | 1,79 | 0,19 | 0,25 |
| 1997 | 1,06 | 0,13 | 0,32 | 0,84 | 0,05 | 0,14 | 0,66 | 0,19 | 0,19 | 1,18 | 0,03 | 0,06 |

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: Simple average excluding station wagons, pick ups and sport utility vehicles. CO=Carbon Monoxide; HC = Hydrocarbons; NOx = Nitrogen Oxide.

In order to analyze these compliance schedules, we estimate separate regressions for each fuel type and for the three pollutants. Controlling for horsepower and *rpm*, we analyze the evolution of average emissions after 1992. The regression results are presented in Table 4.

Table 4
OLS Estimates of CO, HC and NOx Emissions by Fuel Type Automobiles

| | Log CO | | Log HC | | Log Nox | |
|-------------------------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| | Gasoline | Ethanol | Gasoline | Ethanol | Gasoline | Ethanol |
| Constant | 2.973* | -1.087 | -0.665* | -2.367* | -0.891* | -3.943* |
| | (0.355) | (0.657) | (0.316) | (0.690) | (0.369) | (0.710) |
| Horse Power | -0.012* | -0.004 | -0.009* | -0.009* | -0.003* | 0.007** |
| | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.002) |
| RPM | -0.00005 | 0.0005* | 0.0001** | 0.0005* | 0.0001** | 0.0004* |
| | (0.00007) | (0.0001) | (0.00006) | (0.0001) | (0.00007) | (0.0001) |
| 1993 test | -0.055 | 0.047 | -0.026 | -0.0007 | -0.074 | -0.034 |
| | (0.105) | (0.123) | (0.087) | (0.084) | (0.122) | (0.133) |
| 1994 test | -0.168 | 0.004 | -0.080 | 0.011 | -0.099 | -0.046 |
| | (0.115) | (0.127) | (0.099) | (0.086) | (0.123) | (0.136) |
| 1995 test | -0.312* | -0.107 | -0.240* | -0.062 | -0.115 | -0.083 |
| | (0.109) | (0.117) | (0.094) | (0.080) | (0.116) | (0.123) |
| 1996 test | -0.633* | -0.248** | -0.431* | -0.133 | -0.324* | -0.146 |
| | (0.121) | (0.138) | (0.097) | (0.094) | (0.113) | (0.125) |
| 1997 test | -1.623* | -1.686* | -1.194* | -1.123* | -0.773* | -1.002* |
| | (0.132) | (0.162) | (0.107) | (0.105) | (0.126) | (0.210) |
| Number of Observations | 298 | 146 | 298 | 146 | 298 | 146 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.47 | 0.35 | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.17 | 0.24 |

Notes: White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance. Standard errors on parentheses. Small cars correspond to 1,000cc. Medium cars are higher than 1,000cc, but lower than 100hp. Large cars are higher than 100hp.

* Statistically significant at the 5% level.

** Statistically significant at the 10% level.

Except for NOx, the characteristics and test year dummies perform quite well in explaining the variance of pollutant emissions. Moreover, the results are consistent with our hypothesis. For gasoline cars, dummy variables for 1995, 1996 and 1997 are statistically significant for almost all pollutants. This implies that since 1995 gasoline cars adopted cleaner technologies which decreased average emissions in a statistically significant manner. On the other hand, ethanol cars only adopted significant reductions much later in order to comply with the 1997 standards. This can be observed by the fact that, except for CO in 1996, the only statistical significant dummy for ethanol is for 1997. We can conclude that for all other previous years, average emissions were not statistically reduced with respect to 1992 emissions.


Gasoline cars started their technological adjustment in 1993, while there was only a slight decrease in emissions (or increase depending on the pollutant analyzed) from ethanol cars. Although in 1993 and 1994 adjustments in the emission rates of gasoline cars were not significant, in 1995 the decrease in average emissions reached 26.8% for CO, 21.3% for HC and 10.9% for NOx, whereas the highest reduction for ethanol cars only represented 10.2% for CO in the same year.

Although total emission reductions for gasoline and ethanol vehicles for 1992 to 1997 are quite comparable, reductions from 1996 to 1997 were much higher for ethanol while gasoline cars undertook the adjustment in a more gradual fashion. This slower adjustment evolution of ethanol vehicles can be explained by their decreasing market share during the period which reduced incentives for innovations. Due to the decline in the market share of ethanol-fueled vehicles, we could expect ethanol cars to have adopted pollution control strategies at the very end of the compliance period, while gasoline cars, which were gaining market share, probably adopted cleaner technologies earlier.

4.1.2 - Compliance schedules and emission trends by car sizes

The evolution of compliance by car size can be observed in Graphs 1 and 2 where we present emission rates, by horsepower, for automobiles tested in 1992 and 1997. As can be seen, in 1992, most “popular cars” (up to 1000 cc) in the Brazilian market showed much higher emission levels than other car categories (up to 100 hp and above). This tendency was only reversed as the compliance time limit approached, in 1997.

In order to better describe the compliance trends, we undertake regression estimates of emissions of the three pollutants broken down by tax category, i.e. small, medium and large. Controlling for *rpm* and horse power, it is possible to observe the evolution in the compliance trend by car category. Regression results are presented in Table 5.






Table 5

OLS Estimates of CO, HC and NO_x Emissions by Automobile Categories

| | Log CO | | | Log HC | | | Log Nox | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | Small | Medium | Large | Small | Medium | Large | Small | Medium | Large |
| Constant | 2.497* (1.218) | 0.841 (0.634) | 4.461* (0.876) | -2.014** (1.171) | -1.244* (0.629) | 0.263 (0.633) | -1.628* (0.793) | -3.464* (0.610) | 1.103** (0.606) |
| Horse Power | 0.0002 (0.024) | 0.005 (0.004) | -0.024* (0.003) | 0.043 (0.025) | 0.008* (0.004) | -0.014* (0.002) | -0.002 (0.015) | 0.00004 (0.004) | -0.003 (0.002) |
| Rotations per Minute | -0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.00005 (0.0001) | -0.00008 (0.0001) | -0.00008 (0.00009) | -0.00002 (0.0001) | 0.00009 (0.0001) | 0.0003** (0.0001) | 0.0005* (0.0001) | -0.0002* (0.0001) |
| 1993 test | -0.211 (0.384) | 0.050 (0.080) | -0.083 (0.220) | -0.271 (0.258) | 0.049 (0.064) | -0.147 (0.157) | -0.217 (0.248) | -0.003 (0.116) | -0.123 (0.186) |
| 1994 test | -0.302 (0.427) | 0.034 (0.085) | -0.259 (0.220) | -0.420 (0.368) | 0.069 (0.069) | -0.248 (0.169) | -0.190 (0.322) | -0.033 (0.117) | -0.103 (0.180) |
| 1995 test | -0.175 (0.376) | -0.161** (0.088) | -0.361** (0.199) | -0.167 (0.248) | -0.075 (0.075) | -0.350* (0.150) | -0.286 (0.209) | -0.118 (0.112) | -0.114 (0.160) |
| 1996 test | -0.793* (0.375) | -0.350* (0.118) | -0.595* (0.192) | -0.708* (0.300) | -0.179** (0.097) | -0.494* (0.146) | -0.558* (0.200) | -0.271* (0.115) | -0.251 (0.162) |
| 1997 test | -2.066* (0.392) | -1.784* (0.171) | -1.193* (0.217) | -1.945* (0.273) | -1.425* (0.139) | -0.965* (0.139) | -1.221* (0.284) | -0.989* (0.161) | -0.585* (0.179) |
| Number of Observations | 37 | 241 | 166 | 37 | 241 | 166 | 37 | 241 | 166 |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.61 | 0.43 | 0.37 | 0.50 | 0.41 | 0.30 | 0.51 | 0.20 | 0.09 |

Notes: White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance. Standard errors on parentheses. Small cars correspond to 1,000cc. Medium cars are higher than 1,000cc, but lower than 100hp. Large cars are higher than 1,000cc and 100hp.

* Statistically significant at the 5% level.

** Statistically significant at the 10% level.

A relatively well-fitted regression is obtained, especially for small and medium cars, even though the number of observations for small cars is quite low. For most pollutants and car categories, we could not reject the null hypothesis of no significant statistical difference in average emissions between 1992 and the 1993/95 period. For 1996 and 1997 most pollutants and car categories showed significant reductions in average emissions. This result was expected, implying that most car manufacturers waited, on average, until the last year to adopt pollution control technologies. This result is similar to the one obtained by Kahn (1996) for the United States, where he finds that significant reductions in emissions were closely related to more stringent regulation periods.

Although in 1992 small cars (1000 cc) had the highest emission levels, they showed the fastest adjustment in emission reductions during the 1992/93 period, once controlling for different *rpm*. In 1993, average CO emissions decreased by 19%, HC by 23.7%, and NO_x by 19.5%. These were much higher than reductions undertaken by medium and large cars. Nevertheless, this adjustment process was not continuous and by 1995 average emissions increased by 10% for CO and 19% for HC. Adjustment towards the 1997 Proconve standards was mostly taken in 1996. Small cars reduced average emissions of CO and HC by approximately 35% from 1995 to 1996 and 30% to 35% from 1996 to 1997. NO_x reductions were more stable, but the greatest reduction also occurred from 1996 to 1997.

As previously stated, small cars were, on average, the dirtiest models in 1992. Since then, they presented the greatest reductions in overall emissions, with a 87% reduction in CO, 85% in HC and 70% in NO_x emissions, once controlling for different *rpm*.

Manufacturers started the technology adjustment in medium cars later, although their final reductions were slightly lower than in the case of small cars. By 1994, average emissions increased by 3.5% for CO and 7.2% for HC emissions, although NO_x emissions were, on average, reduced by 3.25%. Nonetheless, after 1995, average emissions decreased substantially, particularly from 1996 to 1997 when CO and HC average emissions decreased, respectively, by 53% and 60%.

In contrast with other countries, large cars in Brazil were among the cleanest models in 1992. This was probably due to the subsidy offered for electronic fuel injection adoption. Since then, average emissions reductions were much lower than small and medium cars. Some intensification occurred as the Proconve 1997 deadline approached with further average reductions of 70% for CO, 62% for HC and 44% for NO_x emissions.

These differences in compliance schedules may be explained by the fact that, in order to attract consumers to low power models, the industry tried to keep prices down by not incorporating expensive technologies, such as electronic fuel injection which would have made “popular” and medium cars cleaner, but also more expensive. Thus the market strategy for manufacturers, was to pursue slower compliance schedules for such models in order to increase market share.

These adjustment patterns are expected since the automobile industry faces increasing marginal production costs of emission control technologies. Berry, Kortum and Pakes (1996) used a hedonic cost function approach to show that production costs in the US car industry moved upwards in the period 1972/82 due to tightened emission standards. The authors indicate that catalytic converters, usually the first control device introduced in the US as well as in Brazil, did not have significant impacts on costs, but more advanced technologies such as electronic fuel injection affected costs significantly. Moreover, these additional costs of introducing fuel injection were passed to consumers.

Using a hedonic price analysis, Fonseca (1997) estimate quality index for the Brazilian automobile industry finding that the trend of price increases from 1980 to 1994 was highly associated to increases in car quality, including emission control devices during the later years. That is, the costs of technological improvements in cars were passed through to consumer prices, as one would expect in an oligopolistic market.

4.2 - Emissions and Characteristics in the 1997 Models

The pattern of emissions across models and engine sizes changed considerably from 1992 to 1997. After the adjustment to the 1997 Proconve standards, this relationship changed when 1997 car models incorporated the existent technological devices.

Our results in Table 6 show that after controlling for *rpm*, fuel type and single-point fuel injection, emissions tend to increase with horsepower. Moreover a unit increase in horsepower increases emissions by 0.002% to 0.004% depending on the pollutant analyzed.

Nevertheless, this linear increasing relationship between emission and horse power is not generic. We also estimated a quadratic model which was found significant for CO emissions which seem to follow an inverted-U shaped curve first increasing and then decreasing with horse power. This finding differs from the ones obtained by Fullerton and West (1999) showing an opposite relationship.

Although for the linear model horsepower is not a significant determinant of CO emissions, it is statistically significant for HC and NO_x. On the other hand, single-point and gasoline dummies are statistically significant for almost all pollutants. We find that, on average, single-point fuel injection cars emit 73% more CO than multi-point fuel injection cars and 58% more NO_x, after controlling for *rpm*, horsepower and fuel type. For HC, the difference between multi-point and single-point fuel injection does not seem to be significant in explaining average emissions.

Another interesting result is related to the difference between gas-fueled and ethanol-fueled vehicles. Although ethanol-fueled vehicles make up an increasingly small part of the market, they still have lower CO and NO_x average emissions

than gasoline-fueled cars. On the other hand, we find that, after controlling for *rpm* and horse power, ethanol-fueled vehicles emit, on average, 36% more HC than gasoline-fueled vehicles with multi-point fuel injection (the most advanced technology for reducing emissions currently adopted in Brazil).

Table 6
OLS Estimates of Emissions by Automobile Characteristics

| <i>Independent variables</i> | <i>Dependent variables</i> | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | <i>Log CO</i> | <i>Log HC</i> | <i>Log Nox</i> |
| Constant | -1.38 (7.84) | -4.34* (5.86) | -2.03* (7.72) |
| Horse Power | 0.002 (0.20) | 0.003** (0.17) | 0.004* (0.19) |
| RPM | 0.0001 (0.87) | 0.0004* (0.63) | -0.0002 (0.83) |
| Single-point | 0.547* (0.30) | 0.187 (0.20) | 0.46** (0.31) |
| Gas | 0.293* (0.09) | -0.454* (0.06) | 0.43* (0.11) |
| Number of Observations | 67 | 67 | 67 |
| Adjusted R^2 | 0.14 | 0.37 | 0.23 |

Notes: Standard errors on parentheses.

* *Statistically significant at the 5% level.*

** *Statistically significant at the 10% level.*

Although our analysis is limited due to the lack of a complete database on car characteristics, we find that multi-injection devices may be an important technology to be adopted in order to impose further pollution control levels for Brazilian new car models.

5 - CONCLUDING REMARKS

Average emissions from cars produced in Brazil decreased substantially with the imposition of mandatory car emission standards. The compliance trend shows interesting adaptation schedules among car sizes and fuel types. Nevertheless, the gradual compliance approach of Proconve, based on the 1992 and 1997 deadlines, avoided a rapid introduction of already existing emission control technologies. During the middle years of the period 1992/97, models differed substantially in emission levels.

Ethanol cars lost significant market share and are currently hardly sold. This was reflected in their compliance schedule which did not incorporate new technology as fast as gasoline cars. Compared to gasoline models, they still have lower average emissions for CO and NOx, but higher levels for HC.

Car tax structure subsidizing large cars with fuel injection devices allowed this segment to speed up compliance. Oppositely, small cars, due to their low price characteristic, had the slowest compliance schedule across all categories. However, after the adjustment to full compliance, they became the least polluting category in terms of average emissions. Therefore, we conclude that the current value added tax structure is not running against the emission pattern of manufactured Brazilian cars.

Can this tax structure be modified to create additional incentives for lower emission levels in the current models?

With the full enforcement of Proconve in 1997, vehicle manufacturers do not have any further incentives to reduce emissions. Moreover, demand for new automobiles is still very high, increasing aggregate emissions with substantial pressures on air quality in major urban areas.

In order to mitigate this problem, additional policy actions are required to create incentives for a cleaner profile of the Brazilian vehicle fleet. The idea of combining fuel taxes to decrease miles driven with a vehicle characteristics tax in order to encourage the purchase of cleaner automobiles was discussed and it is recognized as a cost-effective solution.

Since the current automobile policy regime is already offering wide tax incentives, a possible alternative is a tax discrimination between clean and dirty car tax within each tax bracket based on clean-car characteristics, such as the multi-injection devices as pointed out in our econometric analysis. The application of this scheme for all categories would change the relative price of clean and dirty cars throughout all market sector and will create incentives for the purchase of cleaner vehicles. Additionally, incentives for R&D in cleaner technologies would be induced. Note that this differentiation could be used alongside the already adopted tax differentiation across small, medium and large cars.

An important question relates to the neutrality of such a tax differential. Although in theory we could design a fiscal-neutral policy, the final result would depend fundamentally on relative elasticities across sizes and models, as well as the supply response to such a tax policy.

In spite of the fact that a subsidy on cleaner automobiles was given to fuel injection in the past, the choice among a tax on dirty cars or a subsidy on cleaner models does not depend solely on fiscal constraints. Subsidies for environmental purposes create substantial negative dynamic supply side responses.

The proposed characteristic tax can also be applied to annual licensing taxes (IPVA) creating an additional incentive for the substitution of dirty for cleaner used cars. There are some distributive concerns with that tax scheme since older and more polluting cars are usually owned by lower income households which

would pay higher taxes.¹⁵ Nonetheless, in a dynamic perspective, the lower tax on newer cars could create an additional incentive for richer households to buy new automobiles more frequently generating a reduction on used cars average prices. In that case, net welfare gains may arise for lower income households.

Another policy aiming at avoiding equity problems on the pursue of the fleet modernization is a car sale tax rebate offered to new buys and linked to the selling of an old car varying according to car's age.

Regardless of the option, any taxation scheme based on clean car characteristic has to be reviewed periodically following the adaptations and innovations of these characteristics in the car market. Moreover, the dirty surtax levels must be somehow related to the marginal production costs of introducing these characteristics and also to the expected additional costs born by owners due to car maintenance and performance affected by these clean characteristics. In sum, although these cost-effective instruments are simple in theory, they are not easily implemented and should deserve further research efforts.

¹⁵ See Harrington *et alii* (1994) for the analysis of the case of United States.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANFAVEA. *Brazilian automotive industry statistical yearbook*. São Paulo: Anfavea, 1999.
- BERRY, S., KORTUM, S., PAKES, A. *Environmental change and hedonic cost functions for automobiles*. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, v. 93, p. 12.731-12.738, 1996.
- CETESB. *Relatório de qualidade do ar no estado de São Paulo: 1997*. São Paulo: Cetesb, 1998 (Série Relatórios).
- DE NEGRI, J. A. *Avaliação do regime automotivo brasileiro*. Brasília: IPEA, 1998, mimeo.
- ESKELAND, G. S. A presumptive Pigovian tax: complementing regulation to mimic an emission fee. *The World Bank Economic Review*, v. 8, n. 3, 1994.
- FONSECA, R. Mensuração da mudança qualitativa dos automóveis brasileiros: 1960/94. *Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico*, Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, v. 27, n. 1, p. 71-112, abr. 1997.
- FULLERTON, D., WEST, S. *Can taxes on cars and on gasoline mimic an unavailable tax on emissions?* 1999 (NBER Working Paper Series, 7059).
- HARRINGTON, *et alii*. Shifting gears: new directions for cars and clean air. *Resources for the Future*. 1994 (Discussion Paper, 94-26).
- INNES, R. Regulating automobile pollution under certainty, competition and imperfect information. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, v. 31, n. 2, 1996.
- JOHNSTONE, N., KAROUSAKIS, K. *Economic incentive policies to reduce pollution emissions from transport: the case for vehicle characteristics taxes*. London: IIED, 1998, mimeo.
- KAHN, M. New evidence on trends in vehicle emissions. *Rand Journal of Economics*, v. 27, n. 1, p. 183-196, 1996.
- MADDISON, D., *et alii*. *The true costs of road transport*. London: Earthscan, 1996.
- SEROA DA MOTTA, R., MENDES, A. P. F. Custos de saúde associados à poluição do ar no Brasil. *Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico*, v. 25, n. 1, p. 165-198, abr. 1995.

SEROA DA MOTTA, R., MENDES, F. E. Proposta de um imposto ambiental sobre os combustíveis líquidos no Brasil. In: *A Economia Brasileira em Perspectiva*, Rio de Janeiro: IPEA, v. 2, p. 671-690, 1996.

SEVIGNY, M. *Taxing automobile emissions for pollution control*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998.

WATKINS, L. H. *Air pollution from road vehicles*. London: HMSO, 1991.

WHITE, L. J. U.S. *Automotive emissions control: how well are they working?* AER, v. 72, n. 2, 1982.

PUBLISHING DEPARTMENT

Coordination

Cláudio Passos de Oliveira

Supervision

Everson da Silva Moura

Reginaldo da Silva Domingos

Typesetting

Bernar José Vieira

Cristiano Ferreira de Araújo

Daniella Silva Nogueira

Danilo Leite de Macedo Tavares

Diego André Souza Santos

Jeovah Herculano Szervinsk Junior

Leonardo Hideki Higa

Cover design

Luís Cláudio Cardoso da Silva

Graphic design

Renato Rodrigues Buenos

*The manuscripts in languages other than Portuguese
published herein have not been proofread.*

Ipea Bookstore

SBS – Quadra 1 – Bloco J – Ed. BNDES, Térreo

70076-900 – Brasília – DF

Brazil

Tel.: + 55 (61) 3315 5336

E-mail: livraria@ipea.gov.br

Ipea's mission

Enhance public policies that are essential to Brazilian development by producing and disseminating knowledge and by advising the state in its strategic decisions.

Secretariat of

Secretariat of



ipea Institute for Applied
Economic Research

Secretariat of
Strategic Affairs

