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## Protesting Parties in Europe: A comparative analysis

Party Politics

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## Online Appendix: Protesting Parties in Europe - A comparative analysis

Endre Borbáth, Swen Hutter

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## **Appendix A: Generation and Evaluation of our Protest Event Database**

The protest event database was jointly created by political scientists and computational linguists at the ERC project ‘Political Conflict in Europe in the Shadow of the Great Recession (POLCON)’ at the European University Institute, and the SNF project ‘Years of Turmoil’ at the University of Zurich. The database includes more than 30,000 protest events and covers 30 European countries over a sixteen year period. The countries covered by the dataset are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom. The protest events were retrieved from ten European news agencies that public English-speaking newswires and coded using semi-automated content analysis.<sup>1</sup>

We got access to the relevant newswires from the Lexis Nexis data service by using a list of more than 40 keywords that describe different protest actions in the search query. Still, we were left with an extremely large corpus of 5.2 million documents and, hence, we developed natural language processing (NLP) tools to identify newswires that report about protest events in the countries and during the time period that we are interested in. First, we removed documents that were exact or near duplicates and used a meta-data filter that discarded documents not reporting about any of our countries of interest. Afterward, we developed tools to attribute a probability score to each document, indicating whether this document actually reports about protest events. For this purpose, we combined two different classifiers (i.e. algorithms that identify documents or words as probable indicators of a protest event): a supervised document classifier that uses a

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<sup>1</sup> The following news agencies were included: AFP, AP, APA, BBC, BNS, CTK, DPA, MTI, PA, and PAP. The goal was to include not only the major news European agencies (AFP, DPA, PA) but also regional ones covering eastern and southern Europe in more depth.

bag-of-words approach and a supervised anchor classifier that uses event-mention detection tools.

A detailed evaluation of these classifiers by Wüest and Lorenzini (2019) shows that the classifiers are reliable and, thus, we used them to calculate a single probability score for each document. This score indicates the likelihood that both classifiers indicate that a document is relevant. Afterward, we manually coded a sample of documents to establish the optimal threshold for the probability score above which we are relatively confident that a document reports about protest without excluding too many relevant documents. In other words, we attempted to find the optimal level of the probability score, which would reduce the number of documents that are false positives and false negatives. In the end, we classified slightly more than 100,000 documents as relevant, thereby substantially reducing the number of documents that are relevant for our analysis.

Afterward, we employed manual coding to retrieve information on all protest events in our selected countries and time period. For this purpose, we used a simplified version of the protest event analysis (PEA) approach that was first established by Kriesi et al. (1995). An important advantage of the semi-automated process was that it significantly reduced the amount of time and resources required for coding protest events. By using the classifiers, we were able to provide coders with documents that were more likely to report about a protest event. In total only 22% of the documents that we submitted to coders were irrelevant (compared to 95% of documents from our entire corpus that are irrelevant). Tests to evaluate the content of the documents that we excluded from the analysis show that most of the documents that we excluded do not contain any protest events. Moreover, when documents report protest events, these events have the same attributes as the events included in the sample. Thus, we are confident that the articles, which we coded manually, are a good representation of all articles published by the ten newswires.

However, to implement PEA we still relied on an additional sampling strategy because the corpus of relevant documents remained too large to be coded manually. Therefore, we categorized countries into three groups: for countries with a large sample of documents, we coded 25% of the relevant documents; for countries with an average number of documents, we coded 50%; and for small countries with only a few hundred news reports, we coded all the documents identified as relevant by our classifiers. Afterward, coders were asked to identify all mentions of protest events in the documents. To this end, coders did not rely on a theoretical definition of relevant protest actions, which might be conceptually precise but practically very difficult to implement. Instead, coders identified relevant events based on a detailed list of unconventional or non-institutionalized action forms. In addition to demonstrative, confrontational, and violent actions, coders were asked to also identify strikes and other forms of industrial action as a protest.

A document may contain references to one or to more than one protest event and coders recorded the following variables for each event: date, location, action form, issue of the protest, the actors participating or organizing the protest, and the number of participants. To measure the level of inter-coder agreement, we presented fourteen coders with the same 65 documents at different times during their coding. For the identification of the events – assessing whether two coders agree on the date, country, and action form of all the events that they identify in the same document – the averaged F1-score was 0.60 with a standard deviation of 0.06. For the identification of event attributes, the average Cohen's Kappa varies by event attribute. It was 0.57 (with a standard deviation of 0.13) for actors, 0.53 (with a standard deviation of 0.45) for issues and 0.45 (with a standard deviation of 0.06) for the number of participants. These values show that our coders have a relatively high level of agreement given that values from 0.40 to 0.60 are commonly defined as fair to good.

Given we sampled the events in some countries and not in others (see above), and starting from the assumption that events in bigger countries are more likely to be covered, we constructed weights for event features and participant numbers based on the press agency and the log population number of the country where the event took place (for details see: Kriesi et al., forthcoming). All the empirical analysis included in the paper and in the appendix is weighted by this weight.

### **Literature:**

Kriesi H, Koopmans R, Dyvendak JW, et al. (1995) *New Social Movements in Western Europe : A Comparative Analysis*. University of Minnesota Press.

Kriesi, H., Lorenzini, J., Wüest, B. & Häusermann, S. (eds.). (forthcoming). *Contention in times of crises: Comparing political protest in 30 European countries, 2000-2015*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## Appendix B: Regression Tables of Figures Included in the Paper

Table 1: Regression table: event and context characteristic on party sponsorship (figure 4)

	High Diff.	Low Diff.	Full Sample
Intercept	1.54 (0.56)**	1.01 (0.40)*	1.51 (0.56)**
Economic	-0.53 (0.17)**	-0.45 (0.23)	-0.53 (0.17)**
Cultural lib.	0.86 (0.17)***	0.25 (0.20)	0.86 (0.17)***
Cultural cons.	0.58 (0.20)**	0.49 (0.22)*	0.58 (0.20)**
Political	0.91 (0.15)***	1.04 (0.18)***	0.91 (0.15)***
Participants	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Unions	-5.06 (0.31)***	-5.77 (0.31)***	-5.06 (0.31)***
Other org.	-5.39 (0.28)***	-6.34 (0.27)***	-5.39 (0.28)***
Petition	0.05 (0.30)	1.33 (0.30)***	0.05 (0.30)
Strike	-1.06 (0.30)***	-0.43 (0.36)	-1.06 (0.30)***
Confrontation	-1.46 (0.29)***	0.98 (0.33)**	-1.46 (0.29)***
Violence	-0.39 (0.28)	0.50 (0.30)	-0.39 (0.28)
Demonstration	0.78 (0.25)**	1.76 (0.25)***	0.78 (0.25)**
After election	0.56 (0.16)***	-0.08 (0.19)	0.56 (0.16)***
Before election	0.34 (0.17)*	0.13 (0.16)	0.34 (0.17)*
Overall protest	10.32 (7.95)	15.29 (12.37)	15.09 (10.37)
Overall protest (sq)	-9.35 (7.90)	17.47 (6.44)**	-10.97 (9.27)
Differentiation			0.58 (0.73)
Economic*Diff			0.08 (0.29)
Cult. lib.*Diff			-0.62 (0.27)*
Cult. cons.*Diff			-0.09 (0.30)
Political*Diff			0.13 (0.24)
Participants*Diff			0.00 (0.00)
Unions*Diff			-0.71 (0.44)
Other org.*Diff			-0.94 (0.39)*
Petition*Diff			1.27 (0.43)**
Strike*Diff			0.62 (0.47)
Confrontation*Diff			2.44 (0.44)***
Violence*Diff			0.89 (0.41)*
Demonstration*Diff			0.98 (0.35)**
After elec.*Diff			-0.64 (0.24)**
Before elec.*Diff			-0.21 (0.23)
Overall protest * Diff.			45.07 (24.07)
Overall protest (sq) * Diff.			39.39 (14.52)**
AIC	1726.34	1784.92	3511.26
BIC	1948.22	1999.72	3991.32
Log Likelihood	-832.17	-861.46	-1693.63
Deviance	1389.97	1490.13	2880.10
Num. obs.	9486	7546	17032

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05

All models include country fixed effects and standard errors clustered by countries.

Table 2: Regression table: party characteristics on sponsorship of protest events – sample split by the level of differentiation (figure 6)

	<b>M1 (High Diff.)</b>	<b>M1 (Low Diff.)</b>	<b>M2 (High Diff.)</b>	<b>M2 (Low Diff.)</b>	<b>M3 (High Diff.)</b>	<b>M3 (Low Diff.)</b>
Mainstream	-0.22 (0.16)	-0.58 (0.13)***	-0.09 (0.20)	-0.38 (0.13)**	-0.32 (0.19)	-0.42 (0.19)*
Past PM party	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.00 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.13)	0.08 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.15)	0.10 (0.20)
Opp. party	0.17 (0.11)	0.79 (0.19)***	0.16 (0.11)	0.69 (0.18)***	0.30 (0.12)*	0.79 (0.23)***
Vote share	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)*	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)*	-0.00 (0.01)	0.04 (0.01)*
Ch. in vote share	-0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Left-right	-0.11 (0.03)***	0.07 (0.03)*				
State-market			-0.13 (0.04)**	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.09 (0.04)*	-0.05 (0.04)
Liberty-authority			-0.01 (0.03)	0.10 (0.03)**	0.00 (0.03)	0.08 (0.04)
Mass party org.					0.42 (0.11)***	0.01 (0.17)
Length of Gov.	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
R <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.15	0.20	0.16	0.26	0.15
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.12	0.16	0.12	0.22	0.10
Num. obs.	440	626	440	626	373	405
RMSE	1.17	1.64	1.17	1.64	1.20	1.63

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05

All models include country fixed effects.

Standard errors clustered by countries.



Table 3 Regression table: party characteristics on sponsorship of protest events – Interaction with the level of differentiation (figure 6)

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
Mainstream	-0.22 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.20)	-0.32 (0.19)
Past PM party	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.16)
Opp. party	0.17 (0.11)	0.16 (0.11)	0.30 (0.12)*
Vote share	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Ch. in vote share	-0.00 (0.00)*	-0.00 (0.00)*	-0.00 (0.00)
Left-right	-0.11 (0.03)***		
State-market		-0.13 (0.04)**	-0.09 (0.04)*
Liberty-authority		-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)
Mass party org.			0.42 (0.11)***
Length of Gov.	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Differentiation	-1.63 (0.49)***	-1.50 (0.48)**	-0.96 (0.70)
Mainstream*Diff	-0.36 (0.21)	-0.29 (0.24)	-0.10 (0.27)
Past PM party*Diff	0.12 (0.18)	0.19 (0.19)	0.25 (0.25)
Opp. party*Diff	0.61 (0.22)**	0.53 (0.21)*	0.48 (0.26)
Vote share*Diff	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.02)*
Ch. vote share*Diff	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Left-right*Diff	0.17 (0.04)***		
State-market*Diff		0.08 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)
Liberty-authority*Diff		0.11 (0.04)**	0.08 (0.06)
Mass party org.*Diff			-0.41 (0.20)*
R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.17	0.19
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.14	0.15
Num. obs.	1066	1066	778
RMSE	1.47	1.46	1.44

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05


All models include country fixed effects.

Standard errors clustered by countries.

## Appendix C: Differentiation Threshold


In the analysis presented in the paper we rely on the median (11 percent) level of party sponsored protest, to have an equal number of countries in a context of low and high differentiation. Figure 1 shows the distribution of countries and the threshold of differentiation:

Figure 1: Party sponsored protest using the median value as a threshold of differentiation



In this appendix we replicate the analysis included in the paper using the average value of party sponsored protest as a threshold of differentiation (13 percent). Figure 2 shows the distribution of the countries.

Figure 2: Party sponsored protest using the average value as a threshold of differentiation



While some of the estimates diverge, our substantive interpretations are robust to these differences.

Figure 3: Replicating figure 3 using the average level of differentiation - characteristics of party sponsored protest events





Figure 4: Replicating figure 4 using the average level of differentiation - impact of event and context characteristic on party sponsorship, logistic regression, odds ratios



Note: see appendix C, table 1 for the corresponding regression table.

Table 1: Logistic regression of the type of event sponsored by parties using the average level of differentiation

	<b>High Diff.</b>	<b>Low Diff.</b>	<b>Full Sample</b>
Intercept	1.30 (0.54)*	2.16 (0.50)***	1.30 (0.53)*
Economic	-0.73 (0.16)***	-0.19 (0.28)	-0.73 (0.16)***
Cultural lib.	0.77 (0.15)***	0.03 (0.23)	0.77 (0.15)***
Cultural cons.	0.42 (0.17)*	0.52 (0.27)*	0.42 (0.17)*
Political	0.94 (0.14)***	0.99 (0.22)***	0.94 (0.14)***
Participants	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)**	0.00 (0.00)***
Unions	-4.99 (0.26)***	-6.34 (0.40)***	-4.99 (0.26)***
Other org.	-5.60 (0.24)***	-6.37 (0.34)***	-5.60 (0.24)***
Petition	0.18 (0.23)	1.43 (0.46)**	0.18 (0.23)
Strike	-0.92 (0.25)***	-0.35 (0.54)	-0.92 (0.25)***
Confrontation	-0.35 (0.25)	0.27 (0.50)	-0.35 (0.25)
Violence	-0.16 (0.24)	0.72 (0.47)	-0.16 (0.24)
Demonstration	1.06 (0.19)***	1.58 (0.41)***	1.06 (0.19)***
After election	0.23 (0.13)	0.37 (0.24)	0.23 (0.13)
Before election	0.19 (0.14)	0.36 (0.21)	0.19 (0.14)
Overall protest	0.92 (8.54)	26.17 (8.05)**	0.19 (9.67)
Overall protest (sq)	7.17 (7.27)	-13.91 (5.63)*	7.91 (8.01)
Differentiation			0.67 (0.87)
Economic*Diff			0.54 (0.32)
Cult. lib.*Diff			-0.73 (0.27)**
Cult. cons.*Diff			0.11 (0.32)
Political*Diff			0.04 (0.26)
Participants*Diff			0.00 (0.00)
Unions*Diff			-1.35 (0.48)**
Other org.*Diff			-0.77 (0.41)
Petition*Diff			1.25 (0.51)*
Strike*Diff			0.57 (0.59)
Confrontation*Diff			0.62 (0.56)
Violence*Diff			0.88 (0.52)
Demonstation*Diff			0.52 (0.45)
After elec.*Diff			0.14 (0.27)
Before elec.*Diff			0.17 (0.25)
Overall protest * Diff.			-130.42 (92.95)
Overall protest (sq) * Diff.			-144.06 (58.21)*
AIC	2301.39	1217.55	3518.95
BIC	2560.77	1392.48	3999.01
Log Likelihood	-1115.70	-581.78	-1697.47
Deviance	1910.42	976.54	2886.96
Num. obs.	12220	4812	17032

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05

All models include country fixed effects.

Standard errors clustered by countries.

Figure 5: Replicating figure 5 using the average level of differentiation - type of parties sponsoring protests





Figure 6: Replicating figure 6 using the average level of differentiation - impact of party characteristics on sponsorship of protest events - OLS regression



Note: See appendix C, table 2 and table 3 for the corresponding regression table.



Table 2: OLS regression of the level of protest sponsorship by party – Sample split by the average level of differentiation

	<b>M1 (High Diff.)</b>	<b>M1 (Low Diff.)</b>	<b>M2 (High Diff.)</b>	<b>M2 (Low Diff.)</b>	<b>M3 (High Diff.)</b>	<b>M3 (Low Diff.)</b>
Mainstream	-0.25 (0.13)	-0.66 (0.15)***	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.45 (0.15)**	-0.21 (0.16)	-0.52 (0.23)*
Past PM party	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.12)	0.08 (0.15)	-0.22 (0.16)	0.15 (0.22)
Opp. party	0.27 (0.11)*	0.80 (0.23)***	0.26 (0.11)*	0.65 (0.21)**	0.36 (0.13)**	0.72 (0.24)**
Vote share	0.01 (0.01)*	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)
Ch. in vote share	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Left-right	-0.07 (0.03)**	0.07 (0.04)				
State-market			-0.10 (0.03)**	-0.06 (0.03)	-0.08 (0.03)*	-0.09 (0.05)
Liberty-authority			0.01 (0.02)	0.11 (0.05)*	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.06)
Mass party org.					0.35 (0.11)**	0.14 (0.18)
Length of Gov.	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)**	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
R <sup>2</sup>	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.17	0.17	0.17
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.12
Num. obs.	595	471	595	471	485	293
RMSE	1.29	1.68	1.29	1.68	1.36	1.60

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05

All models include country fixed effects.

Standard errors clustered by countries.

Table 3: OLS regression of the level of protest sponsorship by party – Interaction with the average level of differentiation

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
Mainstream	-0.25 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.21 (0.16)
Past PM party	-0.08 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.12)	-0.21 (0.16)
Opp. party	0.27 (0.11)*	0.26 (0.11)*	0.37 (0.13)**
Vote share	0.01 (0.01)*	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Ch. in vote share	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Left-right	-0.07 (0.03)**		
State-market		-0.10 (0.03)**	-0.08 (0.03)*
Liberty-authority		0.01 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Mass party org.			0.35 (0.11)**
Length of Gov.	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Differentiation	-1.26 (0.51)*	-1.20 (0.52)*	0.47 (0.85)
Mainstream*Diff	-0.40 (0.20)*	-0.34 (0.21)	-0.29 (0.28)
Past PM party*Diff	0.01 (0.20)	0.13 (0.20)	0.33 (0.27)
Opp. party*Diff	0.54 (0.26)*	0.39 (0.24)	0.34 (0.27)
Vote share*Diff	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Ch. vote share*Diff	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Left-right*Diff	0.13 (0.05)**		
State-market*Diff		0.04 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)
Liberty-authority*Diff		0.10 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)
Mass party org.*Diff			-0.19 (0.21)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.16	0.17
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.13	0.12
Num. obs.	1066	1066	778
RMSE	1.48	1.47	1.46

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05


All models include country fixed effects.

Standard errors clustered by countries.

## **Appendix D: Estimating the Profile of the Typical Protesting Party on Different Samples**


In this part of the appendix, we replicate the analysis of the profile of the typical protesting party using two different samples. Firstly, we include parties that were not included in the expert survey on party organization and therefore were dropped in the analysis presented in the paper. Secondly, we replicate the analysis without dropping parties which never sponsored a protest event and governments under which no protest event has happened. The conclusions presented in the paper are robust to these variations in the sample.

Figure 1: Replicating figure 6 across all parties which have sponsored protest (without mass party organization)




Note: see appendix B, table 2 and table 3 for the corresponding regression table

Figure 2: Replicating figure 6 across all parties regardless whether they have sponsored protest (including missings and including mass party organizations)



Note: see appendix D, table 1 and table 2 for the corresponding regression table

Figure 3: Replicating figure 6 across all parties regardless whether they have sponsored protest (including missings, but not including mass party organizations)



Note: see appendix D, table 1 and table 2 for the corresponding regression table

Table 1: OLS regression of the level of protest sponsorship by party – across all parties regardless whether they have sponsored protest (including missings)

	<b>M1 (High Diff.)</b>	<b>M1 (Low Diff.)</b>	<b>M2 (High Diff.)</b>	<b>M2 (Low Diff.)</b>	<b>M3 (High Diff.)</b>	<b>M3 (Low Diff.)</b>
Mainstream	-0.24 (0.05)***	-0.39 (0.08)***	-0.21 (0.05)***	-0.24 (0.08)**	-0.22 (0.07)**	-0.34 (0.13)*
Past PM party	0.03 (0.04)	0.06 (0.08)	0.04 (0.04)	0.11 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.07)	0.09 (0.14)
Opp. party	0.05 (0.04)	0.44 (0.11)***	0.04 (0.04)	0.41 (0.11)***	0.13 (0.05)*	0.58 (0.16)***
Vote share	0.01 (0.00)**	0.02 (0.01)**	0.01 (0.00)**	0.02 (0.01)*	-0.00 (0.00)	0.03 (0.01)*
Ch. in vote share	-0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)*	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Left-right	-0.03 (0.01)**	0.03 (0.02)				
State-market			-0.03 (0.02)*	-0.04 (0.02)*	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)
Liberty-authority			-0.00 (0.01)	0.08 (0.02)***	-0.01 (0.01)	0.06 (0.03)*
Mass party org.					0.29 (0.06)***	0.06 (0.10)
Length of Gov.	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.15	0.26	0.14
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.13	0.15	0.14	0.24	0.11
Num. obs.	1301	1196	1301	1196	854	612
RMSE	0.75	1.25	0.75	1.24	0.84	1.38

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05

All models include country fixed effects.

Standard errors clustered by countries.

Table 2: OLS regression of the level of protest sponsorship by party – across all parties regardless whether they have sponsored protest (including missings)

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
Mainstream	-0.24 (0.05)***	-0.22 (0.05)***	-0.21 (0.07)**
Past PM party	0.03 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.12 (0.07)
Opp. party	0.05 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.13 (0.05)*
Vote share	0.01 (0.00)**	0.01 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)
Ch. in vote share	-0.00 (0.00)*	-0.00 (0.00)*	-0.00 (0.00)
Left-right	-0.03 (0.01)**		
State-market		-0.03 (0.02)*	-0.02 (0.02)
Liberty-authority		-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Mass party org.			0.29 (0.07)***
Length of Gov.	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***
Differentiation	-0.74 (0.25)**	-0.78 (0.26)**	-0.61 (0.48)
Mainstream*Diff	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.09)	-0.12 (0.15)
Past PM party*Diff	0.03 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)	0.20 (0.15)
Opp. party*Diff	0.39 (0.12)***	0.36 (0.11)**	0.44 (0.17)**
Vote share*Diff	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)**
Ch. vote share*Diff	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Left-right*Diff	0.06 (0.02)**		
State-market*Diff		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)
Liberty-authority*Diff		0.08 (0.02)***	0.07 (0.03)*
Mass party org.*Diff			-0.23 (0.12)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.17	0.19
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.14	0.15	0.17
Num. obs.	2497	2497	1466
RMSE	1.02	1.02	1.10

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05

All models include country fixed effects.

Standard errors clustered by countries.



## Appendix E: Additional Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Context level interaction of the timing of democratization and the strength of civil society




Figure 2: Party protests and overall protest mobilization - number of participants




Table 1: Protest events sponsored by different types of parties

## a) Context of low differentiation

<i>Status</i>	Big Event	Demo	Conf./ Violent	Co-org.	Econ.	Cult.	Before Elec.	After Elec.
Mainstream	<b>5,2</b>	2,8	<b>-8,9</b>	-2,3	2,8	<b>-20,6</b>	1,6	0,0
Mass Party	<b>8,3</b>	-1,2	<b>-4,5</b>	<b>5,7</b>	-2,4	<b>-10,1</b>	<b>5,7</b>	0,1
Opposition	<b>-18,9</b>	<b>5,0</b>	2,0	-3,4	<b>6,1</b>	<b>10,8</b>	<b>-30,1</b>	-3,1
Past PM	4,7	-0,5	-3,6	3,4	-4,3	<b>-19,9</b>	5,4	<b>9,5</b>
<i>Ideology</i>								
Left Party	-1,7	1,6	-1,7	<b>6,4</b>	<b>18,7</b>	<b>-13,3</b>	0,7	-0,4
Economic Left	-1,1	0,9	1,5	<b>7,2</b>	<b>16,6</b>	-2,3	-1,6	0,4
Cultural Libertarian	2,3	-1,0	<b>-5,6</b>	4,9	4,9	-5,8	<b>6,9</b>	1,2
<i>Share of seats</i>								
0	<b>-14,7</b>	-3,6	<b>3,8</b>	<b>-5,5</b>	<b>-11,0</b>	<b>16,9</b>	-1,7	-1,6
0-10	0,2	-0,5	-0,8	-2,2	6,3	3,6	-1,0	-1,5
>10&<25	-1,2	<b>10,0</b>	-0,7	<b>17,2</b>	<b>12,6</b>	-1,5	-2,5	-0,6
>25	<b>20,2</b>	-1,3	-3,8	-1,9	0,4	<b>-25,0</b>	4,9	3,9

## b) Context of high differentiation

<i>Status</i>	Big Event	Demo	Conf./ Violent	Co-org.	Econ.	Cult.	Before Elec.	After Elec.
Mainstream	-7,6	<b>11,4</b>	-7,3	1,0	4,1	-7,4	4,3	1,9
Mass Party	5,4	-1,5	-5,8	<b>13,8</b>	<b>20,8</b>	-0,1	4,7	-0,4
Opposition	-1,7	<b>-11,2</b>	<b>9,7</b>	<b>8,6</b>	<b>5,2</b>	-0,5	<b>-12,3</b>	<b>-12,8</b>
Past PM	2,5	3,9	-6,6	6,1	<b>14,8</b>	-5,4	4,3	6,5
<i>Ideology</i>								
Left Party	<b>11,0</b>	<b>-7,2</b>	-3,3	<b>15,6</b>	<b>17,6</b>	<b>-6,8</b>	1,0	<b>-6,8</b>
Economic Left	<b>12,9</b>	<b>-9,0</b>	-2,6	<b>17,4</b>	<b>18,4</b>	-6,1	-0,8	<b>-5,5</b>
Cultural Libertarian	5,0	-1,2	-4,2	<b>8,2</b>	4,9	-3,3	-0,1	-5,4
<i>Share of seats</i>								
0	<b>-18,4</b>	1,6	<b>13,4</b>	5,7	-3,0	4,6	2,1	-3,0
0-10	2,6	<b>-8,3</b>	3,1	<b>-8,7</b>	<b>-7,3</b>	2,5	1,5	-1,7
>10&<25	0,4	<b>10,1</b>	-8,9	2,2	11,6	-3,4	<b>-13,5</b>	7,2
>25	11,1	4,9	-9,7	8,5	6,0	-5,5	6,7	-0,3

Note: Shares calculated from type of events sponsored by the different parties within a given context. The table shows deviation from the baseline level. Bold shows differences significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level, calculated using two proportions Z-test.