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## Overcoming History through Exit or Integration - Deep-Rooted Sources of Support for the European Union

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## Overcoming History through Exit or Integration – Deep- Rooted Sources of Support for the European Union

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# Overcoming History through Exit or Integration – Deep-Rooted Sources of Support for the European Union

## Abstract

Preferences about the vertical distribution of power in federal systems are not well understood. I argue that negative historical experiences with higher-level governments can plausibly raise demands for exit strategies and a devolution of power. But integration, for instance delegating power from the nation-state to a supra-national level or international organization, can also serve the purpose of overcoming history by constraining nation-state actions. I specify conditions for affecting current preferences, and apply this framework to the European Union. Empirically, the quasi-random division of the French regions Alsace and Lorraine allows estimating differences in support for integration in a spatial regression discontinuity design. More negative exposure to nation-state actions causes persistently higher support for European integration in three referenda and less euroscepticism in European elections. Survey evidence supports exit and integration as two complementary alternatives, revealing preferences to move power away from the nation-state, either to the regional or European level.

JEL-Codes: D700, F500, H700, N240.

Keywords: nation-states, federalism, supra-national integration, international organizations, secession, minority regions, persistence, European Union support, Euroscepticism, European identity.

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# 1 Introduction

Preferences about the vertical distribution of power are a key aspect for political science and related disciplines, but little attention has been paid to the factors shaping these preferences. Consider that we observe a backlash against globalization and supra-national integration in many countries, but certain regions within those countries resist the trend. Scotland is a region that experienced tensions with the central United Kingdom (UK) government throughout history. A plausible and widespread assumption is that such regions and groups support *exit* strategies; decentralization, more autonomy, or even outright secession. However, while electoral support for the main secessionist party was rising, Scottish public support for European integration also increased by 25 percent from 1979 to 1997 (Scottish Election Study). The region also clearly favored integration in the Brexit referendum, even though integration also means a centralization of power.

This might seem paradoxical at first, but I sketch a theoretical framework of *exit* vs. *integration* that can explain such preferences. It explains under what conditions negative historical experiences with higher-level governments cause lower-level entities to support integration – e.g., to a supra-national level or international organization (IO) – as a means to prevent history from repeating itself. After WWI highlighted the risk of conflict between nation-states and created new national minorities, this idea of integration emerged and culminated in the foundation of the League of Nations. I explain that integration is a relevant alternative or complementary strategy when exit strategies are costly, when integration credibly constrains higher-level government units and protects minority groups and regions, and when historical tensions and the role of integration are salient aspects to voters.

I apply this framework to the European Union (EU), one of the most advanced international organizations, as well as an ambitious attempt to develop a state-like federal governance system through supra-national integration. One reason to choose Europe is that “both nationalism and state formation, in their modern, territorial sense, originated in Europe” (Cederman 1997, p.8). Conflicts between nation-states were prevalent for centuries, and France and Prussia were the first states to implement systematic nation-building policies to assimilate minority groups, by force if necessary. European integration was always linked to peace and the idea to constrain powerful nation-state members, and this aspect became particularly salient for minority groups and regions since the 1990s.

Empirically, prior studies document a correlation between being a minority region and support for EU integration (e.g., Jolly 2015), but causally attributing this to specific historical experiences, like negative exposure to the higher-level nation-states, is inherently difficult. Causal analysis requires a coherent way to assess negative exposure, a suitable treatment and

control group, exogenous historical differences in negative exposure, and the possibility to observe treatment and control unit in the same institutional environment today. This is very hard to achieve in a large cross-sectional panel.

Examining specific cases solves some of the difficulties, but is still challenging. For instance, the southern part of the Austrian region Tyrol was occupied during WW1 and exposed to repressive nation-state policies by Italy afterwards. Today, this Italian part is described as a region strongly supporting EU integration.<sup>1</sup> However, as the counterfactual northern part remained in Austria, we cannot distinguish historical exposure from current political differences. In Spain, Catalonia was clearly exposed to nation-state repression during the Franco-era, and the electorate and regional parties today are supporters of EU integration. However, the empirical challenge is that Catalonia differs from other potential counter-factual Spanish regions in many other respects as well, with regard to current politics and all its unique history ranging back for centuries.

To solve this empirical challenge, I provide evidence from the initially homogeneous French-German border region Alsace and Lorraine, which were split in a quasi-random way after the Franco-Prussian war in 1871. As I will explain in more detail, the eastern “treated” part clearly made more negative experiences with nation-state actions over the next about 80 years. Both parts belong to the same French administrative region today, so that I can disentangle the effect of the historical treatment from contemporary differences. Using a municipal-level spatial regression discontinuity design at the former border, I find that the more negative exposure to nation-state actions caused higher agreement in three referenda about European integration and less Euroscepticism in European parliamentary elections.

These results are robust to different implementations of the RD estimation, and various robustness and placebo tests. Regarding mechanisms, I find no discontinuities in population changes, socioeconomic differences or public good provision, which could have been caused by the natural experiment and affect the outcome. Instead, I find that EU support is associated with a stronger European identity – in line with Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks (2019) – which is not related to higher perceived monetary benefits of EU membership. Finally, I present survey evidence showing that exit and integration – regionalization or delegation to the European level – are indeed complementary alternatives for respondents in the treated area.

A main contribution of my paper is to outline a theory of how past experiences with higher-level governments shape preferences about the vertical distribution of power. Studying nation-state actions, nation-building policies, and their effects, has been a core topic in several

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/south-tyrol-from-secessionist-to-european-dreams> , [http://www.provinz.bz.it/news/de/news.asp?news\\_action=4&news\\_article\\_id=590314#accept-cookies](http://www.provinz.bz.it/news/de/news.asp?news_action=4&news_article_id=590314#accept-cookies), and <https://kurier.at/politik/inland/suedtiroler-landesthauptmann-kompatscher-die-eu-als-groesseres-ganzes/306.514.568>. Accessed 23.08.2019.

seminal contributions, usually in a more qualitative way ([Anderson 2006](#); [Gellner and Breuilly 2008](#); [Hobsbawm 1990](#); [Weber 1979](#)). [Mylonas \(2013\)](#) began to link nation-building and international relations, by showing how external powers associated with domestic minority groups influence policies towards these groups. Similarly, my paper connects two lines of research that have so far been largely analyzed in isolation: the long-term effects of historical events on political preferences and outcomes, and support for supra-national integration and international organizations. My causal evidence augments studies like [Becker et al. \(2015\)](#), [Grosjean \(2014\)](#), and [Mazumder \(2018\)](#), by documenting persistent effects of differences in historical exposure on preferences regarding the vertical distribution of power.

I study negative experiences of a “group” in a case where the group is a minority compared to the nation as a whole, but a majority within their home region. In contrast, most existing papers consider the effect of nation-state repression on minority immigrant groups within a foreign host country ([Fouka 2020, 2019](#); [Komisarchik, Sen, and Velez 2019](#)). Such repressive policies against minorities can backfire, as already argued by [Cederman \(1997\)](#). Empirically, [Dehdari and Gehring \(2018\)](#) show the effect of repression on the formation of a stronger regional identity, and [Rozenas and Zhukov \(2019\)](#) provide a more nuanced argument when repression in an occupied area raises opposition towards the foreign occupier. My paper extends those analyses by highlighting how such negative experiences with higher-level governments can also foster support for delegating political power upwards through integration.

This allows a better understanding of preferences about the vertical distribution of power, which is crucial for the study of federalism (e.g., [Rodden 2006, 2004](#)). Understanding how the interests of different levels of government can strategically influence preferences about (de-)centralization has been a core question dating back to the federalist papers ([Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 2008](#)). It also relates to political economic theories about the optimal size of nations ([Alesina and Spolaore 1997](#)), but those focus more on economic arguments ([Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg 2000](#)). My theory highlights that decentralization and upward integration can be complementary strategies for lower-level entities concerned about political decisions of higher-level governments. This also connects my study to the literature on secessionist conflict, which has largely focused on *exit* strategies (e.g., [Cederman et al. 2015](#)) as the most plausible reaction to tensions between regions or groups and the central state.

Finally, by considering attitudes towards shifting decision-making to the international level, I relate to the international relations literature on regional integration ([Schneider 2017](#)), the political economy of international organizations (reviewed in [Dreher and Lang 2019](#)), the impact of IO conditionality (e.g., [Carnegie and Samii 2019](#); [Carnegie 2014](#); [Dreher 2009, 2004](#)), and on disintegration ([Walter et al. 2018](#)) and Brexit (e.g., [Becker, Fetzer, and Novy 2017](#)). My results complement the existing literature examining EU support (e.g., [Hooghe and Marks 2004](#);

Marks and Steenbergen 2004; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000) and Euroscepticism (e.g., De Vries 2018; Foos and Bischof 2019). To a large extent, the EU support literature is focused on correlational evidence regarding individual level attributes or current domestic aspects as explanatory factors. Hooghe and Marks (2004; 2005) highlight the role of identity as a potential source of support for the EU, but take identities as given and cannot exploit exogenous variation in their strength. My paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the first to provide causal evidence on deep-rooted structural reasons for existing differences in EU support, and suggests identity as one key channel.

## 2 Theory and application to EU and Alsace-Lorraine

### 2.1 Historical experiences and the exit vs. integration decision

Building on the emerging literature about the long-term consequences of history for current preferences and behavior (e.g., Becker et al. 2015; Grosjean 2014; Mazumder et al. 2018), I examine the effects of negative historical experiences of groups and regions with higher-level governments. In terms of experiences, I think of conflicts between those higher-level units that impose costs on lower-level units, and on repressive policies against lower-level units. To ease readability, I focus on the example of minority groups and specifically regions within nation-states, and on integration through supra-nationalism or international organizations (IOs). The arguments can, however, be applied to any multi-level governance structure.

I argue that negative historical experiences with nation-states can foster support for exit strategies – delegating power downwards through more autonomy – but also support for integration – delegating political power further upwards.<sup>2</sup> The intuitive prediction is indeed that such negative experiences foster demands for decentralizing power. Take Africa, a continent where the arbitrary colonial demarcation of states led to frequent tensions of minority ethnic groups with central governments. Most studies examining the effect of those tensions focus on secessionist conflict as an outcome (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Morelli and Rohner 2015). In Europe, Dehdari and Gehring (2018) show that repression by nation-states can lead to a stronger regional identity and support for regionalization. However, I explain why and when integration is an attractive alternative or complementary strategy.

The degree to which negative historical experiences with higher-level governments raise support for upward integration depends on three criteria. First, on how costly and politically

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<sup>2</sup> Drawing on the exit vs. voice distinction in Hirschman (1970).



feasible exit strategies are. Second, on the credibility with which supra-national integration or IOs constrain nation-states and lower the likelihood that negative historical experiences are repeated. Third, to influence political decisions and voting, in addition to the first two criteria, the historical experiences must be salient for voters. The following paragraphs explain the conditions in more detail.

The first criterion is the feasibility and costs of exit strategies. Outright secession, potentially by force, is risky and has a very low likelihood of success against higher-level governments that are usually militarily and politically much more powerful. [Rozenas and Zhukov \(2019\)](#) show that opposition to a central power only arises in situations when the power of the center is already weakened. Even milder forms of political decentralization and autonomy are often hard to achieve due to commitment problems, and might not be sufficient to satisfy demands for exit ([Cederman et al. 2015](#)). Moreover, remaining part of a larger state ensures economic benefits like a more efficient provision of public goods and better trade opportunities ([Alesina and Spolaore 1997](#)). Especially in developed countries these economic benefits are highly relevant, and support for separatist parties often requires economic gains associated with secession ([Gehring and Schneider 2018](#)). For those reasons, it is plausible to search for other means to achieve the goal of overcoming history.

For integration to be a relevant alternative, a second condition is that the supra-national level or international organization must be perceived as credibly limiting the likelihood of conflict and discriminatory actions against minority groups. Rational actors - here nation-states - agree to integration due to some of the same potential gains regions have from belonging to the nation-state: better trade opportunities or public good provision. That is why they are willing to engage in a governance contract that constrains their own choices in specific situations - e.g., how to handle tensions with other member-states or with regions within the country (cf., [Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019](#)). The literature argues that IOs can constrain the choice set of their member-states by setting conditions for access, conditions for specific programs ([Dreher 2009](#)), and enforcing rules and conditions among their members. To ensure that integration promotes peace, scholars emphasize the importance of democratic rules ([Pevehouse and Russett 2006](#)) and the existence of sophisticated institutional structures ([Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004](#)), including centralized courts and efficient enforcement mechanisms.

The idea that supra-national integration can avoid conflict and protect minority groups emerged in the 19th century and culminated in the foundation of the League of Nations after WW1. The League frequently discussed minority problems, and its World Court ruled repeatedly in defense of national minorities. However, it lacked the means to enforce those rulings ([Zahra 2008](#)). Similarly, after WW2, the United Nations (UN) as its successor ratified an "International Covenant" to protect national minorities against nation-states, but also struggles

to enforce these rulings. Accordingly, a decisive feature to make integration a desirable aim for regions with negative historical experiences is the ability to not only detect and judge potential misbehavior, but also enforce decisions to maintain peace and stop discrimination.

There are various attempts to use integration and IOs to facilitate peace and fight discrimination of minority groups today. The African Union has engaged and taken up mandates to prevent wars and act against mistreatment of minorities, albeit with limited success. [Mylonas \(2013\)](#) argues that ASEAN had some influence on reducing exclusionary policies, and making accommodation a more likely strategy in South-East Asia. The OSCE and the Council of Europe supposedly have been “a significant driving force” to achieve better treatment of minorities in post-Soviet countries (see also [Mylonas 2013](#), p. 185). Also in federal systems, minority protection is usually assigned to higher-level governments or defined as a constitutional right, which can be enforced by central courts. Hence, the concept of using integration this way is widespread, the challenge lies in the execution, in particular the ability to detect and act against misbehavior is crucial.

To influence current politics, these first two criteria must be fulfilled. But in addition a third criterion is that the salience of both historical negative experiences with higher-level governments and the role of integration as a potential remedy must be sufficiently high among citizens. Various papers highlight that history can shape current preferences (e.g., [Becker et al. 2015](#); [Dell 2010](#)). Historical memories can remain salient through vertical transmission from parents to children. An emerging literature documents that memories of historical experiences can be “reactivated” by current influential events or through party campaigns (e.g., [Fouka and Voth 2016](#); [Ochsner and Roesel 2017](#)) and then influence current behavior. Individual knowledge or investment is not necessarily required. It can be sufficient if organizations like regional associations, parties, or the media either invest in keeping these memories alive, or communicate this knowledge to voters and reactivate the memories and potential remedies.<sup>3</sup>

## 2.2 Application to the European Union

To demonstrate the empirical relevance of my framework, I apply it to the case of regions and nation-states that are members of the European Union (EU). The EU is an international organization, but also the most ambitious recent attempt to establish a federal governance system through supra-national integration. As ([Cederman 1997](#)) describes, Europe is the

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<sup>3</sup> These processes can be relevant in a variety of settings. Not all IOs are concerned with peace or minority protection, but some of the earliest and most important IOs are. Moreover, the such tensions can be equally relevant within nation-states with multi-layered federal systems, like the US. Tensions between lower and higher-level governments can often be traced back to historical events, so the more demanding condition is the credibility of integration to remedy existing tensions and constrain higher-level governments.

origin of modern nationalism. Nationalism in Europe is inseparably associated with aggressive nation-building policies against minority regions and reoccurring conflicts between nation-states that affected particularly border-regions. There are thus many tensions between regions and nation-states that are grounded in history, and the memory of conflicts between nation-states in a competition for power and space is still vivid. The next paragraphs apply my theory to the EU case, and examine to what degree the three criteria are satisfied.

First, what about the feasibility and costs of exit options? Decentralization is clearly not impossible in the EU, and there has been some successful devolution of power within member states, like the establishment of regional parliaments in the UK. Overall, however, a region's political power compared to national governments is limited. Many attempts to decentralize or attain more autonomy have fail, most recently visible in the failed Catalan attempts to achieve independence from Spain. The widespread existence of separatist parties underscores under-satisfied demands for exit strategies. At the same time, the economic costs of exit options are highlighted by the dependence of separatist party success on perceived economic benefits (Gehring and Schneider 2020). Hence, alternative or complementary strategies to exit are desirable.

Regarding the second criterion, credibility, the EU has certainly strengthened regions against the nation-states, in particular those representing a national linguistic or ethnic minority. Certain EU institutions, in particular the Committee of the Regions, allow regions to officially appeal decisions taken by nation-states. This allows "regions to identify and pursue interests divergent from those expressed [...] by the central institutions of their state" (Finck 2017, p.54) and "bypass national governments" (Jolly 2007) to ensure "the protection of regional cultures" (Panara 2019, p.13).

The aspect of constraining nation-states is also reflected in official EU rules and treaties. The Treaty of the EU (TEU) article 4(2) specifies respect for "regional and local self-government", and the EU's Copenhagen Criteria from 1993 demand "respect for and protection of minorities." The EU is also seen as having "the leverage to enforce commitments [...] for the protection of national minorities" (Galbreath and McEvoy 2012, p.279). The European Court of Justice plays a key role in that regard. After initial doubts about its legitimacy, scholars agree about its importance in restraining nation-states (Mattli and Slaughter 1995; Sweet and Brunell 2012). Garrett (1995, p.171) explains that "European law has supremacy over domestic laws and the court exercises judicial review [...] over the behavior of governments within their national boundaries". For instance, the court ruled to protect the fiscal autonomy of regions in the landmark "Portugal vs. Commission" case. In the "Izsák-Dabas vs. Commission" case, the court decided against the member states that an initiative aimed at improving the situation of national minority regions had to be allowed. Of course, EU institutions cannot fully control the

actions of member states. For integration to become a desirable strategy, it is sufficient that the EU is perceived as lowering the relative likelihood of nation-state conflicts and repressive policies against minority regions.

Regarding the third aspect, salience, peace and respect for cultural diversity have been crucial aspects since the early days of European cooperation. Take Robert Schuman, acknowledged as one of the founders of the EU. He himself experienced repression while living in the Lorrainian city of Metz, and as a parliamentarian for an Alsace-Lorrainian party advocated more autonomy from the central state – an exit option. However, later he began to recognize “international cooperation as a way to maintain peace” (Zanoun 2009, p. 268). In a famous 1949 speech in Strasbourg, Schuman – then French foreign minister – called all European countries to “attempt and succeed in reconciling nations in a supranational association. This would safeguard the diversities and aspirations of each nation[...].” These principles were formalized in the “Schuman Declaration” in 1950, and became the basis of the European Coal and Steel Community, the predecessor of the EU. Jean Monnet, another founding father, described EU integration as a process to “go beyond the concept of a nation,” and Konrad Adenauer, first German chancellor after WW2, called it an “antidote to nationalism.”

Actors representing regions ensure this aspect remains salient to voters in affected EU regions. Generally, regional governments and regional parties perceive the EU “as an ally against the central state” (Jolly 2007) and recognize the constraints the EU imposes on member states (Jolly 2015). The Council of European Municipalities and Regions recognizes how the EU has contributed to “respect for regional and local self-government as part of national identities.” The Federal Union of European Nationalities, an interest group representing minority regions, publicly praises the importance of the EU in protecting and promoting minority regions. Its “Minority SafePack” initiative to protect minority languages and cultures was widely featured in the media and, among others, was supported by South Tyrol and the Basque country.<sup>4</sup> In Alsace-Lorraine, the regionalist party *Unser Land* specifically campaigns for a strong region embedded in a supra-national EU framework.

Looking at data reveals a positive correlation between EU support and being in a border region (Gabel and Palmer 1995), and with perceiving one’s region in a struggle with the central nation-state (Jolly 2015). Prior studies also find a relationship between a region having a problematic history with nation-states and higher EU support (Jolly 2007) – all in line with my argumentation, but without being able to claim causality. Causally attributing EU support to negative historical experiences with nation-states requires selecting the relevant period in which nation-state actions are regarded as relevant, defining the relevant set of nation-state conflicts and repression across countries and time, and finding exogenous variation and suitable

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
<sup>4</sup> <http://www.minority-safepack.eu/#about>, accessed 10.03.2019.

counterfactuals for each region. I do not aim to estimate such a correlation in a large multi-region sample, but instead focus on the French-German border region Alsace and Lorraine as a specific historical natural experiment to solve these identification challenges.

## 2.3 The division of Alsace and Lorraine as a natural experiment

Figure 2 illustrates the relevant history of Alsace and Lorraine in a simplified way. Regarding the existence of a suitable counterfactual, it is most relevant that the whole region had been French for more than a century before it was divided. Both Alsace and Lorraine became autonomous political entities as far back as the 7th century, were united in the Duchy of Lotharingia, and became fully integrated into France in 1767. This means that, starting with Napoleon, the whole region experienced the same French nation-building policies. There are no reasons to expect systematic differences in attitudes towards the nation-state or the region. The left-hand side of Figure 1 shows a map of the region prior to 1870, with the six pre-1870 départements, and the four major cities in the region.

Figure 1: Alsace and Lorraine: départements before and after division in 1870/71



**Notes:** Author's depictions using ArcGIS and official administrative shapefiles. Linguistic border georeferenced from Harp (1998).

The division that I exploit for causal identification originates from the Peace Treaty that ended the Franco-Prussian War (July 19, 1870 to May 10, 1871). Otto von Bismarck, chancellor of Prussia, did not aim for territorial gains with this war, but wanted to unite all German

states against their arch-enemy France, to agree on founding a German nation-state (Wawro 2005). Still the successful German army occupied parts of France including all of Alsace and Lorraine, and then besieged Paris. The following peace negotiations with France were dominated by disagreement in the German leadership about its territorial expansion. The independent military leadership under the charismatic general Helmuth von Moltke (Förster 1990) wanted to keep the whole region Alsace and Lorraine. Bismarck thought of this as a “major folly” and source of future wars. If anything, he wanted to restrict expansion to the eastern German-dialect speaking areas (Lipgens 1964).

The negotiation process is described as dominated by pride and the clash between these two strong characters (Wawro 2005). For instance, Bismarck was willing to hand over Metz and the surrounding Lorrainian areas in the north (see map), but von Moltke refused as he considered taking the city one of his major achievements. The final border was a compromise decided upon centrally in Versailles, without taking account of local circumstances like existing identities, language or military-strategic considerations (Messerschmidt 1975). Bismarck, “quite uncharacteristically wilted under the pressure” (Wawro 2005, p.305) to annex larger parts – about half of the region. Figure 1 B. confirms that the resulting treatment border (i.) does not follow the historical linguistic border between French and German dialect speakers, (ii.) the existing pre-1870 département borders, (iii.) nor any older historical border.<sup>5</sup> Hence, for causal identification I treat it as-good-as-random, which I examine in more detail in Section 3.2.


Large parts, but not all of Alsace was transformed into the German districts of *Oberelsass* and *Unterelsass*, which are corresponding to today’s French départements *Haut-Rhin* and *Bas-Rhin*. In the northern Lorraine area, Germany created the district *Lothringen*, cutting right through the prior Lorrainian départements, corresponds to today’s département *Moselle*. In the remaining “control” area in the west, France created the départements *Meurthe-et-Moselle*, *Meuse* and *Vosges*, all still existing today. The eastern “treated” area in the region is often referred to as Alsace-Lorraine. It remained German until WW1; afterwards, the “lost provinces” (Harvey 1999) were re-integrated into France and since then again belong to the same region.

Figure 2 highlights how, after being initially comparable, the treated area clearly suffered more from the actions of nation-states for about 80 years from 1871 until the 1950s. This encompasses the consequences of war between nation-states – like occupation and having to change national affiliation – as well as repression by the states. As historians describe in great detail, the German period and the first decades back under French rule were accompanied by a wide range of discriminatory and repressive nation-state policies in the treated area (e.g., Callender 1927; Carrol and Zanoun 2011). Table 1 provides examples of these policies in five

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<sup>5</sup> This was verified using various maps from different medieval periods.

Figure 2: Simplified Timeline of Events in Alsace-Lorraine



categories, [Table B.1](#) gives a comprehensive list.<sup>6</sup>

Historians agree that the German nation-building policies backfired and did not create a German identity among regional citizens, but instead fostered regional identity and skepticism against nation-states. Towards the end of the German occupation, observers report that “the anti-German sentiment of the population is today stronger than ever” ([Carrol 2010](#), p.60). Henri-Dominique Collin, a leader of the regional party *Parti Lorrain Independant* declared: We assert ourselves as Lorrainers (...) and oppose Germany” ([Carrol and Zanoun 2011](#), p. 470). Even associating German dialect-speaking individuals with Germanophile sentiments is described as a “grossly inaccurate perception” ([Zanoun 2009](#), p. 71).

After initially welcoming the return to France after WW1, the repressive and discriminatory French central-state policies further increased the skepticism towards nation-states. “Mosellans began to feel anxious at the central state’s assimilation process” and wanted to “end what they saw as France’s methodical spoliation of local customs and traditions” ([Zanoun 2009](#), p. 62). They became “resentful of the central powers,” and developed a “strong resentment towards Germany and France” and towards “centralizing imperatives” ([Carrol and Zanoun 2011](#), p. 474) in general. Speaking about the Commission de Triage, one of the repressive French institutions, the regional politician Eugene Ricklin declared that ‘The Commission accused me of being a bad Alsatian ... [it] is the most shameful institution we have ever seen. Instead of making us love France, it did just the opposite’ ([Carrol and Zanoun 2011](#), p. 470).

The impression of being “a national minority suffering under the cultural domination of an imperialistic power” ([Carrol and Zanoun 2011](#), p. 477) developed, as citizens in the treated

<sup>6</sup> All Tables and Figures starting with a letter in front of the number can be found in the online appendix.



Table 1: Overview of policy categories and examples

Policy category	Example
Language policies	1920: Teaching in local dialect forbidden ( <a href="#">Grasser 1998</a> ).
Media	1927/ 28: Banning of three autonomist journals: the “Volksstimme,” the “Zukunft,” and the “Wahrheit” ( <a href="#">Goodfellow 1993</a> ).
Social, political, military freedom, equality	1927/28: Colmar trials: 15 prominent autonomists are arrested and tried for participation in a plot to separate Alsace from France ( <a href="#">Goodfellow 1993</a> ).
Separation and segregation	1918: Locals are classified according to an identity-card system. Lower classification leads to e.g., travel bans ( <a href="#">Harvey 1999</a> ).
Regional institutions and administrative personnel	1924: Ministerial Declaration by Premier Edouard Herriot imposes a centralized administration, French laws and intuitions ( <a href="#">Carrol and Zanoun 2011</a> ).

**Notes:** Sources and full list of policies in [Table B.1](#).

area were constantly reminded “of their minority status within France” ([Goodfellow 1993](#), p. 469). During repression, regionalist parties were established to act as “defenders of the region’s distinctive culture and traditions” ([Carrol and Zanoun 2011](#), p. 477). The exposure to conflict led people in the treated area to “reassert their pacifism” ([Carrol 2010](#), p. 63) and the idea of “a free Alsace-Lorraine belonging to the United States of Europe, that bridges France and Germany” ([Goodfellow 1993](#), p. 458) emerged.

During WW2, both the whole region was occupied by Germany, but again the treated area reportedly suffered more from the war. This “further alienated Alsatians from pro-German movements and concomitantly with German cultural identity” ([Goodfellow 1993](#), p. 469). Even under pressure, “no party, even among the autonomist groups, officially collaborated” ([Anderson 1972](#), p.23). A number of citizens from the treated area were forced to fight for the German army. After the war was over, these unfortunate soldiers – the so-called “malgré-nous” – were charged in the Bordeaux Trial for their “collaboration” with Germany. This caused massive protests against the French central state in the treated area, as the soldiers were perceived as being punished for something beyond their control. Finally, the French government realized the negative consequences of their approach. In 1953, it declared a far-reaching amnesty that settled this and other issues in 1953, marking the end of the treatment period. Since then, tensions began to calm down, and both parts were again subject to the same policies as part of the same French region.

One limitation of this setting that originates in this history is that it is not possible to distinguish whether a potential effect is caused by suffering from conflicts between nation-states through conflict, occupation and switching nation-status, or from being exposed to



specific repressive nation-state policies. However, the examples of South Tyrol in Italy or Catalonia in Spain suggest that being exposed negatively to nation-state actions in either of these two ways is positively correlated with EU support.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, both these negative aspects associated with nation-states – conflict / occupation and repression – are *de facto* historically often linked when repression is enacted to integrate newly acquired regions. Relating back to my theory, the important feature is that historical accounts document that people in the treated area attributed the negative actions to nation-states.

## 3 Data and validation of identification strategy

### 3.1 Data

France is divided into 22 regions, which contain 96 départements. Those are further divided into 323 arrondissements and 1995 cantons; the latter however do not possess the status of a legal entity. I use data on EU support at the lowest administrative level, for a maximum of 3237 municipalities in the six départements in Alsace and Lorraine.

I use two main proxies for EU support – three referenda and electoral success of Eurosceptic parties – as well as different measures to capture mechanisms and preferences. All measures are at the municipal level, unless mentioned otherwise. Details on controls, pre-treatment variables, and socioeconomic mechanisms can be found in the respective sections and the online appendix. [Table A.1-A.5](#) provide all details and descriptive statistics.

#### **EU support – 1972 Referendum about the European Communities (EC) Enlargement:**

On 23 April 1972, voters were asked whether they approved of Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom joining the EC. The referendum was approved by 68.3% of voters in France. As for the following referenda, I compute agreement as the share of yes-votes of all valid votes. Data for 1972 are only available at the département level.

**EU support – 1992 Referendum about the Treaty of Maastricht:** The Maastricht Treaty, also known as Treaty of the European Union (TEU), introduced the three pillar structure of the EU. This augmented economic cooperation with a common foreign and security policy, and with the fields justice and home affairs. The TEU is seen as the until then furthest reaching integration step in EU history ([Moravcsik 1998](#)), as it greatly expanded EU competences outlined the creation of the Euro. Important for minorities, it resulted in the shifting of some nation-state powers either to the EU or to sub-national authorities ([Mandrino 2008](#)), and the importance of the European Court of Justice was explicitly recognized. Three countries held

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<sup>7</sup> [Rozenas and Zhukov \(2019\)](#) show that higher exposure to repression by the central Russian state leads to more political opposition, if the threat of retaliation is not too high.

a referendum to ratify the treaty, including France. In the end, a close majority of 50.8% of French voters approved it.

### **EU support – 2005 Referendum on Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe:**

This treaty intended to replace existing EU treaties with a single constitution. As the referenda before, it would have been a major step towards more integration, for instance by replacing unanimity with qualified majority voting in more policy areas. Moreover, it further strengthened the EU as an actor compared to the nation-states. It was rejected by 55% of French voters; later parts of it were integrated in the Lisbon Treaty.

**EU support – Eurosceptic parties:** The aim is to measure the success of Eurosceptic parties in the three European elections taking place between the referenda in 1992 and 2005: in 1994, 1999, and 2004. Besides the temporal fit with the two referenda, the notion of a “Europe of the regions” that protected and empowered minority regions against central states was politically salient during those years.<sup>8</sup> My first measure classifies a party as Eurosceptic if it has a net positive Eurosceptic score in the manifesto project database (Volkens et al. 2018), which contains time-varying assessments regarding the EU.<sup>9</sup>

One potential issue with the first measure is that the far-right party Front National (FN) is a large party within the Eurosceptic group, but also took on strong nationalistic positions. Regions with a history of tensions with the nation-state might for that reason reject to vote for the party, which could lead to a bias. Hence, I also create a second Eurosceptic measure without the FN. Finally, the previous two measures is the reliance on binary distinctions. For my last measure, I construct a continuous proxy for Euroscepticism by multiplying the vote share of each party running in the elections with the Euroscepticism score assigned to that party in the manifesto database. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the outcomes.

Table 2: Descriptive Table for Outcomes

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
EU Support (1992)	3230	53.59	11.78	0.00	100.00
EU Support (2005)	3235	45.65	10.28	0.00	100.00
Eurosceptic Parties (94-14)	16171	16.86	12.96	0.00	75.00
w/o Front National (94-14)	16171	3.93	7.55	0.00	66.67
Euroscepticism Index (94-14)	16171	61.29	65.19	0.00	367.14

<sup>8</sup> Later, integration was still seen as a net positive, but the hopes of regions were partly disappointed. In the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, the EU officially clearly supported the positions of the nation-states.

<sup>9</sup> <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu>, accessed 04.29.2019. I make one adjustment. In 1999, the “Union pour l'Europe des nations” ran as an independent joint list, representing the parties Rassemblement pour la République (RPF) and Mouvement pour la France (MPF). The list was clearly Eurosceptic, but not listed in the manifesto database as it was not related to one specific party. As it received about 13% of the votes in France in the 1999 election, I count it as a Eurosceptic party for the first two measures.

**Mechanisms and Preferences:** In addition to the detailed descriptions elsewhere, I want to shortly explain the availability and choice of survey data here. In terms of coverage and number of participants at the French département level, the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (OIP) – conducted between 1987 and 2003 – is by far the best source of survey questions in general. Questions vary between waves, and several waves captures preferences about exit or integration, as well as identity.

## 3.2 Identification

Which assumptions are required to estimate a causal effect in this natural experiment (cf., [Sekhon and Titiunik 2012](#))? First, for the control group to be a valid counterfactual for the treated group, there should be no differences between the two in absence of the treatment. As the whole region shares a joint history, we can at least test whether there were no pre-treatment differences between both parts. Shortly before the French revolution in 1789, Louis XVI's felt the need to send out his bureaucrats throughout the country to assess the loyalty of his citizens. The resulting data, known as the "Cahiers de doléances," specifically ask about the relative strength of regional identity compared to national identity. Figure 3 shows that the average response in the treated and control area is essentially identical.




Figure 3: Cahiers de doléances

**Notes:** Based on the Cahiers de doléances from 1789. [Hyslop \(1968\)](#) computed these values at the city level based on more disaggregate reports about the city and the surrounding area in verbal form. The value 3 corresponds to "National patriotism strongest," 2 to "Mixed loyalties: national patriotism combined with regionalism or other," and 1 to "Regional, or other, outweigh national patriotism." I use data on the "third estate," regular citizens, as well as the category "unified orders." If more than one estate is available, I take the arithmetic average.

Second, the assignment of units into in the treated and control area should be as good

as random. Technically, strict randomness is not required, but the assignment must have been orthogonal to the outcome. Third, more subtle, but important, historical designs such as mine make the assumption that after the treatment, no third factors that are unrelated to the treatment affect the outcomes differently. Compared to many studies examining long-term persistent effects, I am able to examine outcomes relatively shortly after the treatment (first referendum), as well as more in the mid term. Fourth, to ensure that municipalities are not differentially profiting from EU integration today, I focus on differences between municipalities that are geographically close at the treatment border. I estimate my spatial regression discontinuity design using a local linear regression:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \textit{Treatment}_i + \theta \textit{Distance border}_i \times \textit{Treatment}_i + z_i' \gamma + \delta_s + \epsilon_i.$$

$y_i$  is the outcome at the municipal level.  $\textit{Treatment}_i$  is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if the municipality is in the treated area and 0 otherwise. The linear term for the forcing variable,  $\textit{Distance border}_i$ , is allowed to vary in slope on both sides of the border. Conditional on this forcing variable,  $\beta$  captures the causal effect of the differences in negative exposure to nation-state actions.

My preferred specification uses fixed effects ( $\delta_s$ ) for five equally long border-segments, as well as controls for distance to the five largest cities in the area ( $z_i$ ). This ensures that municipalities on the other side of the border which are selected as counterfactuals are also geographically close.<sup>10</sup> I compute results for two bandwidths: ten kilometers and the efficient bandwidth (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2015). Ten kilometers is picked as the minimum bandwidth given the average diameter of a municipality; to a large extent this captures only municipalities directly at the border.<sup>11</sup> Standard errors are clustered at the canton level – the second-lowest administrative division in France – accounting for potential correlation across space within cantons.


I begin by using the formal RD specification to augment the historical narrative about the border being as-if random with more systematic evidence. If the border location was decided upon from far away in Paris, and driven by pride rather than strategic considerations, we would not expect differences at the border in geographic and pre-treatment socioeconomic measures. Figure 4 shows that for geographical factors that would suggest strategic considerations influenced the exact local position of the border there are no discontinuities. I also gathered data

<sup>10</sup> I will show later that alternative specifications like matching on coordinates yields very similar results (see e.g. Dell and Querubin 2017).

<sup>11</sup> Distance is computed based on the centroid of a municipality polygon. Once we move below ten kilometers, municipalities would start being dropped from the estimations if the centroid is further away than ten kilometers, even though their polygon directly touches the treatment border. Figure E.1 shows that all main results hold for varying bandwidths.

from various sources to show that there are no pre-treatment discontinuities in a large range of socioeconomic variables like population ([Motte et al. 2003](#)), the share of cropland and grazing land (from HYDE v.3.2), road length ([Perret, Gribaudo, and Barthelemy 2015](#)), and railroad connection and quality ([Mimeur et al. 2018](#)). Furthermore, [Table E.2](#) shows no discontinuities in ten years before the division in 1860 in measures like wages and revenues, which are available at the arrondissement level. The absence of significant discontinuities further supports that local geographic, political or economic conditions did not decide the precise border location.

Figure 4: Smoothness in Pre-Treatment Variables at the border



**Notes:** RD coefficients with 95% confidence interval. All variables were standardized with mean zero and variance one. Detailed regression results in [Table E.1](#).

## 4 Main results

### 4.1 European Union support - referenda

I begin by considering differences in EU support between the treatment and control area in the 1972 referendum about the European Communities enlargement. It is clearly visible in [Figure 5a](#) that the average agreement of about 85% in the treated area is considerably higher than the 72% in the control area. The map also shows that EU support is higher in each individual treated département than in any of the control départements. This comparison allows no causal interpretation. But the results less than two decades after the treatment ended allow us to track the persistence of differences over time, and rule out that events after 1972 are the-root-cause of potential differences in the 1990s.

The first set of causal results then considers the referenda in 1992 and 2005. Figure 5b shows a map with the average municipal-level share of yes-votes, and an RD plot to illustrate the approach and effect. The map shows that, as in 1972, agreement for further EU integration remains considerably higher in the treated area. The RD plot shows a clear jump upwards in agreement at the border, conditional on the running variable.<sup>12</sup>

Table 3 shows the results from the RD estimations, always using ten kilometers and the efficient bandwidth. In 1992, the treatment effect shows 5 and 6 percentage points higher agreement in the treated area. Relative to the mean outcome of about 53%, this is a meaningfully large difference, also statistically significant with p-values smaller than 0.01. The difference in 2005 is smaller at 2.8 percentage points, with p-values slightly above 0.1. The smaller size of the coefficient can partly be attributed to the fact that average agreement was also about ten percentage points lower than in 1992. When considering the two referenda jointly in a pooled cross-section in columns 5 and 6, the treatment effects of 4 and 4.7 percentage points are statistically significant at the 1%-level. Accordingly, negatively exposure to the actions of nation-states in the past led to a persistent and sizable positive effect on EU support in three referenda over a period of 37 years.

## 4.2 EU support - Euroscepticism


This section uses the three different definitions of political success of Eurosceptic parties outlined in the data section. In line with the referenda results on higher EU support, the map in Figure 5c indicates that Euroscepticism is lower in the treated area. The RD plot shows a negative jump at the border. Table 3, panel B, then also reveals a significant negative effect on Euroscepticism. The size of the effect differs between the estimations, and needs to be interpreted in relation to the mean of the outcome. In column two, the vote share is 1.7 percentage points lower relative to a mean of about 14%. Omitting the nationalist Front National leads to a relatively larger effect, corresponding to a 1.8 to 2.3 percentage points lower vote share, against a mean of about 7. Finally, columns 5 and 6 use the overall weighted Euroscepticism index score as the most comprehensive and my preferred measure of Euroscepticism. Again, Eurosceptic positions are significantly less successful in the treated area. For all measures, the effects are statistically significant with p-values below 0.05 when using the efficient bandwidth; the very conservative 10km bandwidth specifications are still at least close to the 0.1 threshold, but more importantly yield comparable point estimates.

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
<sup>12</sup> Table E.11 shows that higher EU support is not driven by differences in turnout for the referendum.

Figure 5: EU Support and Euroscepticism - Maps and RD Plots

a.) Average Agreement in EU Referendum 1972 in %



b.) Agreement in EU Referenda, average in 1992 & 2005 in %



c.) Average Vote Share Eurosceptic Parties in EU Parliamentary Elections 1994-2004 in %




Table 3: RD results - EU Support and Euroscepticism (1992 - 2005)

<b>Panel A</b>						
<b>EU Support (Share yes-votes 1992 and 2005)</b>						
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>1992</b>		<b>2005</b>		<b>1992 &amp; 2005</b>	
	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	5.242 (1.818) [0.004]	6.254 (1.812) [0.001]	2.787 (1.954) [0.154]	2.787 (1.954) [0.154]	4.012 (1.357) [0.003]	4.728 (1.330) [0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	13.419	10.000	10.000	10.000	12.530
Observations	619	813	618	618	1237	1517
Mean (Control)	48.72	49.09	40.61	40.61	44.67	44.77
<b>Panel B</b>						
<b>Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)</b>						
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties</b>		<b>w/o Front National</b>		<b>Euroscepticism Index</b>	
	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	-1.086 (0.707) [0.124]	-1.735 (0.617) [0.005]	-1.873 (0.675) [0.006]	-2.339 (0.619) [0.000]	-3.172 (2.028) [0.118]	-4.226 (1.930) [0.029]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	14.369	10.000	17.819	10.000	16.509
Observations	1855	2623	1855	3174	1855	2931
Mean (Control)	15.88	15.72	8.98	8.61	28.46	28.01

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, The outcomes are the share of people voting “Yes” in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcomes in Columns 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a net negative EU related score in their manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls are the distances to Germany (border), Metz, Strasbourg, Nancy, Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered on the cantonal level, are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, the left column uses a narrow bandwidth of 10km, the right column the efficient bandwidth (mean square error criterion, Calonico et al. 2017).


### 4.3 Potential effect of historical linguistic differences

To some extent, in particular in the most southern areas, the treatment border coincides with the historical linguistic border dividing German and French dialect speakers. This could bias the results on EU support if, for instance, German dialect speakers would generally be more favorable towards the EU. To address this potential issue, I exclude these parts of the border, and rely only on a comparison between treated and control area within the French dialect area. The right-hand side of Figure 6 illustrates this border modification. The coefficient plot on the left-hand side of the figure shows that even when considering only the discontinuities within also



linguistically homogeneous regions, the treatment effects for the referenda and Euroscepticism remain stable with regard to size and statistical significance.

Figure 6: Robustness: Modified border excluding overlaps with linguistic border



**Notes:** The coefficient plot displays the main and alternative treatment coefficients, with standard errors clustered on the cantonal level. EU support is average of the share of people voting “Yes” in Maastricht referendum 1992 and in European Constitution referendum in 2005. Euroscepticism is the weighted eurosceptic party share in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. Baseline is the complete border, modified only the part not overlapping with language border (see figure on the right). Optimal bandwidth is selected following mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017). Included controls are distances to Germany (border), Metz, Strasbourg, Nancy, Mulhouse, and 5 segment-fixed effects. Corresponding regression results in [Table E.13](#). Source linguistic border: Harp (1998).


## 5 Preferences and mechanisms

### 5.1 Mechanisms: Socioeconomics, policy, or identity

This section briefly examines evidence for potential mechanisms that could explain the persistent differences. [Appendix C](#) discusses those aspects in more detail.

To sum up, I find no significant changes in population - potentially be caused by the treatment - at the border, suggesting this does not explain the differences in EU support ([Figure 7](#), panel A). Taken together, neither population changes nor other policies associated with the more negative historical exposure to nation-states led to significant differences in socioeconomic aspects, which could directly explain support for supra-national integration (panel B). Finally, although treated and control area correspond to different départements – within the same administrative region – there is no evidence of significant discontinuities in public good provision, which could have influenced preferences (panel C).

Figure 7: Mechanisms: population changes, socioeconomic factors, and public goods



**Notes:** Panel A-C show RD, Panel D OLS coefficients, with 95% confidence interval. Public good provision is measured per capita. All variables were standardized with mean zero and variance one. Detailed results in [Table E.3](#).

Alternatively, I test the idea that a joint European identity positively influences support for European Integration, as proposed by Hooghe and Marks (2004; 2005) and highlighted in constructivist theories (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks 2019). A sense of the common suffering of Europeans from repeated wars and repression by nation-states during prior centuries, and the hope that EU integration can be a remedy, could lead to such a stronger sense of community. I can use three survey measures for European identity, again from various waves of the OIP surveys. I estimate an effect using OLS with individual controls at the département level, essentially comparing the conditional means between treated and control area. Panel D shows that indeed there seems to be a significantly stronger EU identity in the treated area. Depending on the proxy, European identity is a quarter to a third of a standard deviation stronger.

## 5.2 Preferences for exit and integration

One cornerstone of my theory is that exit vs. integration options both can be means to constrain the higher-level government-unit made responsible for negative historical experiences. This should be reflected in preferences to move decision-making power away from the nation-state level – upwards or downwards. The results in [Table 4](#), based again on the OIP surveys, provide convincing evidence in line with my theory.

I begin by examining differences in regional, national French, and European identity. Indeed, I find no effect on national identity, but a significantly stronger regional AND European identity (on regional identity [Dehdari and Gehring 2018](#), provide more evidence). This is evidence that people in the treated area did not simply become more cosmopolitan or overcame existing lower level identities per se, but is in line with my theory that devolution (exit) and upward (European) integration are in line with preferences for lower or higher levels. The fact that French identity is only insignificantly weaker indicates that the motivation of people after so many decades is not mere grievances against fellow Frenchmen, but rather the fear to suffer again from actions by nation-state governments.

Table 4: Nested Identities: EU, National, and Regional (Alsace & Lorraine) Level

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>			
<b>Treatment Effect on Strength of Identities</b>			
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.179 (0.029) [0.000]	-0.016 (0.029) [0.582]	0.277 (0.030) [0.000]
Observations	5620	5619	5553
<b>Panel B</b>			
<b>Preferred Level of Decision-Making</b>			
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Level</b>	<b>National Level</b>	<b>European Level</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.157 (0.060) [0.009]	-0.071 (0.062) [0.255]	0.197 (0.053) [0.000]
Observations	1322	1322	1322
<b>Panel C</b>			
<b>Preferred Level Compared to Alternative</b>			
<b>Prefer decision-making at ... compared to ...</b>	<b>Regional Level National Level</b>	<b>National Level European Level</b>	<b>European Level Regional Level</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.152 (0.076) [0.047]	-0.333 (0.099) [0.001]	0.185 (0.080) [0.020]
Observations	902	427	725

**Sources:** Individual-level survey data from the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). “X” Identity: “Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?” The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case), and the region, asked in separate questions. These questions were available for the years 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001. Main question panel B and C: “In your opinion, should the development of your region occur according to a plan decided by the region, the state or the European Union?,” only available in 1991. In panel B, “X” Level is a dummy variable indicating the choice of “X” (Region, State or EU). In panel C, for each column the sample is reduced only the respondents choosing either Option 1 or 2 (Option 1 = 1; Option 2 = 0). Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

However, the decisive metric for preferences about the vertical distribution of power is the preferred level of decision-making in the treated versus control area. In line with the identity differences, panel B shows a stronger preference for decision-making at either the regional OR the European level – in line with regional and European identity being stronger relative to national identity. Panel C considers the possible levels as alternatives to each other. The results are again clear. Respondents in the treated area prefer both the regional and the European level compared to the national level (columns 1 and 2).<sup>13</sup>

## 6 Placebo tests and sensitivity

I conduct three placebo tests to verify the validity of the main result. The first two examine to what degree the prior results could be driven by general differences between border départements and the rest of the country. For the first test, I create a placebo border between all border départements and the next adjacent départements further towards the center – excluding the départements in my main analysis. The second test also moves the treatment border one département further towards the center, but now focuses on the border of Alsace and Lorraine with the adjacent region Champagne-Ardenne.<sup>14</sup> The third test uses the old département border within Lorraine prior to 1870, which has no meaning anymore today. Differences within the region before the actual treatment period could signal a potentially problematic heterogeneity already existed before the division. Figure 8 (a) to (c) visualize the respective placebo borders in yellow.


Figure 8 (d) shows the effects at all three borders, focusing on the average of the 1992 and 2005 referenda and the Euroscepticism score as my preferred outcomes. None of the placebo effects turns out to be significant, and they are also all considerably smaller than the actual treatment effects. The largest estimates occur for comparing the Alsace-Lorraine region to the rest of the country, but even those are far from being statistically significant. Hence, there is no evidence that the effect is driven by pre-existing differences or border départements generally being different.

The results are also robust to a large variety of sensitivity tests, discussed in more detail in the online appendix. For instance, they remain very similar with regard to sign and magnitude without controls (Table E.4), when clustering on a different level (Table E.5), controlling for latitude and longitude (Table E.7), and controlling for pre-treatment variables (Table E.6).

<sup>13</sup> Relative to the regional level, respondents in the treated area would prefer the European level, which could indicate high costs or inefficiencies of decentralization in the French context.

<sup>14</sup> Note that in 2014, after our outcomes are measured, both regions were merged as part of a reform which cut the number of regions in France from 22 to 13 - despite protests in particular in Alsace.

Figure 8: Placebo Borders



**Notes:** Map A shows the départements at the French border (black) and their adjacent départements (grey). This excludes the départements that constitute Alsace and Lorraine and the second-row département Haute Marne. Haute Marne has no counterfactual on the first-row side due to this exclusion of the Alsace and Lorraine regions. The border separating first and second row départements is used as a placebo border (bold orange line). Map B displays the border between the former départements Meurthe and Moselle before 1871 (bold orange line). Map C shows the border between the control départements in the main regression and their adjacent départements inland (bold orange line). The coefficient plot displays the placebo treatment coefficients. *EU Support* is the average share of people voting “Yes” in the 1992 and 2005 referenda. *Euroscepticism* is the Euroscepticism score EU parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. The optimal bandwidth is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse. Detailed results in [Table E.14](#).

## 7 Conclusion

This paper provides a new framework to consider how negative historical experiences with higher-level governments affect preferences about the vertical distribution of power. It is often implicitly assumed that such events lead to preferences for exit strategies – decentralization, autonomy, secession. I explain why and under what conditions integration – centralization, supra-nationalism, delegation to international organizations (IOs) -- can be a feasible alternative for affected groups and regions. This fosters our understanding of federalism (e.g., [Rodden 2006, 2002](#)) in general, and secessionism (e.g., [Cederman et al. 2015](#); [Gehring and Schneider 2020](#)) and international integration more specifically.

By highlighting that deep-rooted historical differences can explain considerable differences in EU support, the paper contributes to a growing literature about the importance of history in influencing current preferences and behavior ([Fouka and Voth 2016](#); [Mazumder et al. 2018](#); [Rozenas and Zhukov 2019](#)). I connect those historical influences theoretically to preferences in a setting where such influences have been largely disregarded. The empirical results document a source of persistently stronger support for European Union (EU) integration. This highlights the role of the EU as an IO that contributes to maintaining peace between its members, and help preventing member-states from discriminatory policies against minority regions. In times where international cooperation and multilateralism are under attack, this is an important and novel insight for our understanding of support for supra-national integration and IOs.

The paper also provides a more comprehensive picture of the origins of current political preferences. It augments an existing EU support literature that largely focused on the role of personality traits, individual socioeconomic features and domestic politics (see review by [Hobolt and de Vries 2016](#)). My framework explains why many minority regions and those experiencing tensions with their nation-states exhibit strong regionalist parties, but at the same time also support supra-national integration ([Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2004](#)). I augment existing correlational evidence by showing that historical tensions with nation-states causally influences preferences and voting behavior today.

The theoretical framework provides insights beyond this application by highlighting the importance of historical tensions between different levels in multi-level governance systems for preferences about the vertical distribution of power. By explicitly outlining the conditions under which those events can influence preferences and actions towards supporting integration strategies, the framework can be adapted to other circumstances in future research. One insight from the EU application is the importance of being able to actually enforce constraints for the credibility of integration to overcome history.

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# Appendix (for online publication)

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# A Descriptive Table

Table A.1: Variable Description and Sources 1

Variable	Definition	Source
<b><i>Dependent Variables</i></b>		
Vote Share 'Yes' 1992	Share of Yes votes in the 1992 referendum (Maastricht Treaty)	Centre de données socio-politiques (CDSP)
Vote Share 'Yes' 2005	Share of Yes votes in the 2005 referendum (European Constitution)	Centre de données socio-politiques (CDSP)
Eurosceptic Parties	Vote Share of Parties in Euro. Parl. Elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) with a larger EU-Negativity than Positivity Score	CDSP & Manifesto Project Database
w/o Front National	Vote Share of Eurosceptic Parties in Euro. Parl. Elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) excluding Front National. In 2004, FN is the only eurosceptic party.	CDSP & Manifesto Project Database
Euroscepticism Index	Vote Share of Parties in Euro. Parl. Elections (1994, 1999 and 2004) weighted by their EU-Negativity Score	CDSP & Manifesto Project Database
<b><i>Control Variables</i></b>		
Distance to German Border	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the German-French border	Author computations using ArcGIS
Distance to Metz	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the municipal centroid of Metz	Author computations using ArcGIS
Distance to Nancy	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the municipal centroid of Nancy	Author computations using ArcGIS
Distance to Strasbourg	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the municipal centroid of Strasbourg	Author computations using ArcGIS
Distance to Mulhouse	Nearest distance of municipal centroid to the municipal centroid of Mulhouse	Author computations using ArcGIS
X-Coordinate	Position of municipal centroid on X-axis of the coordinate system (measured in meters)	Author computations using ArcGIS
Y-Coordinate	Position of municipal centroid on Y-axis of the coordinate system (measured in meters)	Author computations using ArcGIS

**Notes:** Variable description and source for all variables used in the paper and the online appendix.

Table A.2: Variable Description and Sources 2

Variable	Definition	Source
<b>Pre-Treatment Variables</b>		
Ruggedness	Index of variance in elevation in each municipality	Global elevation data set
Elevation	Meter over sea level	NASA SRTM data set
Std. Dev. Elevation	Variation in elevation in standard deviations	NASA SRTM data set
Suitability (Potato)	Soil suitability for production of potatoes (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Wheat)	Soil suitability for production of wheat (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Barley)	Soil suitability for production of barley (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Sunflower)	Soil suitability for production of sunflower (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
Suitability (Onion)	Soil suitability for production of onion (medium input intensity and irrigation)	IIASA/FAO, 2012
River Length	Total length of all rivers (in meters)	Andreadis et al., 2013
Population	Population in 1866	French Census 1866
Population Density	Population in 1866 divided by area (in square km)	French Census 1866
Cropland	Total area of arable land and permanent crops in the municipality in 1860	HYDE 3.2
Grazing Land	Total land area used for mowing or grazing livestock in the municipality in 1860	HYDE 3.2
Road Length	Total length of road network in the municipality in 1860	Perret et al., 2015
Railway Station	Presence of railway station in municipality in 1860	Mimeur et al., 2018
Railway Quality	Linear hierarchy about the infrastructure in the municipality in 1860 (0 : no / 1 : fast)	Mimeur et al., 2018
Share Children	Share of children in the workforce on the arrondissement-level in Lorraine	Chanut et al., 2001
Income PC	Average income of industrial worker on the arrondissement-level in Lorraine	Chanut et al., 2001
Worker Productivity	Total industrial production divided by total number of workers on the arrondissement-level in Lorraine	Chanut et al., 2001
Firm Productivity	Total industrial production divided by total number of firms on the arrondissement-level in Lorraine	Chanut et al., 2001
<b>Post-Treatment Variables</b>		
Income	Median income in municipality in 2008	INSEE
Age	Mean age in municipality in 2008	INSEE
Education	Share of people over 15 years old with a high school degree in 1999	INSEE
Employment	Share of blue-collar workers in 2006	INSEE
Health Care	Number of health care establishments (medium-term stay) per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
High School	Number of high schools with general and/or technological education per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
Vocational School	Number of secondary schools with vocational training per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
Post Office	Number of post offices per 1000 inhabitants in 2013	INSEE
Change Population 1866-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1866 and 1946	
Change Population 1916-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1916 and 1946	
Change Population 1926-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1926 and 1946	
Change Population 1936-1946	Difference in population in a municipality between 1936 and 1946	

**Notes:** Variable description and source for all variables used in the paper and the online appendix.



Table A.3: Survey Questions (i.)

Variable	Question	Categories/Scale	Source
French Identity	"Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to France?"	4 = very attached; 3 = rather attached; 2 = not very attached; 1 = not attached at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
European Identity	"Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to Europe?"	4 = very attached; 3 = rather attached; 2 = not very attached; 1 = not attached at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
European relative to National Identity		Relation of the two identities; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
Regional Identity	"Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to [Insert Region]?"	4 = very attached; 3 = rather attached; 2 = not very attached; 1 = not attached at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 1995/95/99 & 2001
European Citizen	"I see myself as a European citizen."	The higher the value, the more favorable are respondents to the claim.	OIP 1987/89/93/96/97 & 2001/03
European Pride	"How proud of being European are you?"	The higher the value, the prouder the respondent.	OIP 1998
Interregional Cooperation in EU	"Concerning development strategies, should the regional council seek cooperation with other European regions?"	The higher the value, the more respondents want regions to cooperate with other European regions.	OIP 1998
EU (generally)	Opinion of respondents towards the impact of the European project on their region.	The higher the value, the more positive the respondent's opinion	OIP 1995/97
Common Market	"Is the creation of an European common market going to worsen or improve the economic difficulties of your region?"	The higher the value, the more beneficial the common market is perceived by respondents.	OIP 1989/93
Evaluation of European Union	"Generally, do you think the fact that France is part of the EU is a good or a bad thing?"	1 = good thing; 0 = bad thing; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	PEF2002 V2
Evaluation of Democracy in EU	"And in the European Union, do you believe that democracy is working very well, rather well, not very well or not well at all?"	4 = very well; 3 = rather well; 2 = not very well; 1 = not well at all; standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1	OIP 2000 Q10

**Notes:** Description of survey questions from the Observatoire Interrégional du Politique (OIP), as well as the panel électoral français. The values of the categories are reversed compared to the original question categories. Questions were originally in French and have been translated.

Table A.4: Descriptive Table 1

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<b>Treatment &amp; Distance Variable</b>	35				
Treatment (Dummy)	3237	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Distance to Border (in km)	3237	31.33	21.43	0.26	92.82
<b>Dependent Variables</b>					
Vote Share 'Yes' 1992	3230	53.59	11.78	0.00	100.00
Vote Share 'Yes' 2005	3235	45.65	10.28	0.00	100.00
Eurosceptic Parties 1994	3230	2.61	3.77	0.00	57.33
Eurosceptic Parties 1999	3233	25.38	7.94	0.00	75.00
Eurosceptic Parties 2004	3235	13.97	6.40	0.00	50.00
w/o Front National 1994	3230	2.61	3.77	0.00	57.33
w/o Front National 1999	3233	17.03	7.17	0.00	66.67
w/o Front National 2004	3235	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Euroscepticism Index 1994	3230	17.33	7.87	0.00	82.25
Euroscepticism Index 1999	3233	24.10	16.44	0.00	210.94
Euroscepticism Index 2004	3235	2875.34	995.79	0.00	8589.00
Turnout 1992	3230	74.57	6.28	33.33	100.00
Turnout 2005	3235	73.48	6.68	50.79	100.00
<b>Control Variables</b>					
Distance to German Border (in km)	3237	51.76	35.66	0.33	141.55
Distance to Metz (in km)	3237	83.12	44.02	1.60	203.16
Distance to Strasbourg (in km)	3237	108.62	50.57	0.02	223.02
Distance to Nancy (in km)	3237	73.61	34.71	0.06	164.98
Distance to Mulhouse (in km)	3237	125.88	58.08	0.00	258.53
Treatment Border Segment 1 (Dummy)	3237	0.24	0.42	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 2 (Dummy)	3237	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 3 (Dummy)	3237	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 4 (Dummy)	3237	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Treatment Border Segment 5 (Dummy)	3237	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00

**Notes:** This table presents the following statistics for the components of the running variable, as well as the dependent and control variables: Number of Observations, Average Value, Standard Deviation, Maximum and Minimum Value. The description of the variables can be found in the Table [A.1](#).

Table A.5: Descriptive Table 2

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<b>Pre-Treatment Variables</b>					
Elevation	3237	300.79	118.86	110.80	1039.54
Ruggedness	3237	68.28	62.80	2.29	549.24
St. Dev. Elevation	3237	32.06	35.49	0.00	301.98
River Length (in km)	3237	75.10	112.81	0.00	2507.36
Road Length (in km)	3237	4.42	5.83	0.00	74.39
Railway Station	3229	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00
Railway Quality	3229	0.11	0.37	0.00	2.00
Cropland	3237	20.45	11.40	0.00	51.89
Grazing Land	3237	23.37	13.10	0.00	45.43
Population Density 1866	3229.00	84.64	117.67	0.00	3234.54
Population 1866	3229	823.00	2526.00	0.00	84167.00
Suitability (Barley)	3206	5585.00	1771.00	794.00	10000.00
Suitability (Maize)	3206	3118.00	1783.00	0.00	7776.00
Suitability (Onion)	3206	5091.00	1584.00	0.00	8988.00
Suitability (Wheat)	3206	5801.00	1788.00	798.00	10000.00
Suitability (Potato)	3206	3713.00	1047.00	730.00	5882.00
Suitability (Sunflower)	3206	5105.00	1721.00	0.00	8887.00
<b>Post-Treatment Variables</b>					
Change Population 1866-1946	3226	52.00	2305.00	-4495.00	91348.00
Change Population 1916-1946	3222	-88.00	642.00	-13928.00	8814.00
Change Population 1926-1946	3228	-38.00	336.00	-8332.00	4429.00
Change Population 1936-1946	3232	-80.00	545.00	-17604.00	1111.00
Age	3237	39.71	3.21	28.26	69.38
Income	2647	31559.20	5998.64	17691.00	53547.00
Education	3234	0.10	0.03	0.00	0.50
Employment	3236	0.19	0.08	0.00	1.00
Health Care	3143	0.01	0.11	0.00	3.33
High School	3143	0.01	0.09	0.00	2.50
Vocational School	3143	0.01	0.06	0.00	2.50
Post Office	3143	0.08	0.32	0.00	10.00

**Notes:** This table presents the following statistics for the Pre- and Post-treatment variables: Number of Observations, Average Value, Standard Deviation, Maximum and Minimum Value. The description of the variables can be found in the Table A.2.

## B Overview of repressive policies

Table B.1: Detailed Overview of Repressive Policies in Alsace and Lorraine

Time Period	Ruled By	Policy	Policy Category	Source
1871-1902	Germany	Reactivation of the 1849 "dictatorship paragraph": permitted house searches, the expulsion of agitators and prohibiting political organizations.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Carrol (2010)</a> ; <a href="#">Grasser (1998)</a>
Beginning 1871/72	Germany	Bismarcks <i>Kulturkampf</i> : government seriously restricted Catholic education as well as the Catholic press. Moreover, some religious orders were expelled from the Reichsland.	Regional institutions and administrative personnel	<a href="#">Silverman (1966)</a>
May 1872	Germany	Strasbourg University is reopened as "Kaiser-Willhelm-Universitaet."	Language	<a href="#">Höpel (2012)</a>
Oct. 1872	Germany	Introduction of obligatory military service.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Grasser (1998)</a>
1873	Germany	French is prohibited to be taught in schools.	Language	<a href="#">Grasser (1998)</a>
1878	Germany	Legislation to restrict the political participation of the people.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Carrol (2010)</a>
1882	Germany	The use of French is prohibited in the Delegation.	Language	<a href="#">Grasser (1998)</a>

1887	Germany	Choral and gymnastic societies are banned as they are seen as opportunities for the coming-together of pro-French minded people.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Carrol (2010)</a>
1890 onward	Germany	Unwelcome legislation (e.g. German trade regulations) is introduced in Alsace-Lorraine.	Regional institutions and Administrative Personnel	<a href="#">Höpel (2012)</a>
1890 onward	Germany	German becomes the only official language and district and county councils become obliged to embrace German as their only language.	Language	<a href="#">Grasser (1998)</a>
Until 1898	Germany	Restrictions are imposed on the press.	Media	<a href="#">Silverman (1966)</a>
1914	Germany	Citizens sympathizing with the French are taken in "protective detention" without trial.	Separation and segregation; Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Harvey (1999)</a>
1917/18	France	Approximately 100 000 Germans are deported.	Separation and segregation	<a href="#">Carrol and Zanoun (2011)</a> , <a href="#">Callender (1927)</a>
1918	France	Establishment of French Currency.	Regional institutions and administrative personnel	<a href="#">Callender (1927)</a>

Dec. 1918	France	An identity-card system is implemented: Locals are classified and receive a specific civil status according to the origin of their parents. Lower classification is often associated with discrimination.	Separation and segregation	<a href="#">Harvey (1999)</a>
Dec. 1918 to Oct. 1919	France	"Commissions de Triage" are established: Designed to assert the Frenchness of the population in re-annexed areas, individuals suspected of faulty loyalties are investigated and either exonerated, placed under surveillance, taken into custody or expelled from France. In this context, some pro-German Alsatiens are forcefully emigrated.	Separation and segregation; Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Carrol and Zanoun (2011)</a> ; <a href="#">Harvey (1999)</a>
1920	France	French becomes the only language to be taught in schools. The so-called "direct method," where students are immersed in the French language with no reference to German, leads to considerable difficulties for a majority of French-speaking Alsatiens.	Language	<a href="#">Grasser (1998)</a> ; <a href="#">Goodfellow (1993)</a>
1920s	France	French becomes the official legal language. Due to this, many bureaucrats, who had previously built their career under the German system, are in danger of losing their jobs or being denied promotions as the French government now regards them as incompetent or politically problematic.	Language	<a href="#">Goodfellow (1993)</a>

June 1924	France	The Ministerial Declaration by Premier Edouard Herriot introduces a centralised French administration as well as all French laws and institutions into the recovered territories. The Declaration also introduces the separation of church, secular education and a number of anti-clerical laws.	Regional institutions and administrative personnel	<a href="#">Carrol and Zanoun (2011); Goodfellow (1993)</a>
1925	France	The post of Commissioner General is abolished and the regional government returned to the Government of Paris	Regional institutions and administrative personnel	<a href="#">Callender (1927)</a>
1927/28	France	Three autonomist journals become banned as they are seen to have had a central role in a campaign against the French: The "Volksstimme" ("voice of the people"), the "Wahrheit" ("truth") and the "Zukunft" ("future").	Media	<a href="#">Goodfellow (1993)</a>
1927/28	France	Colmar trials: 15 prominent autonomists are arrested and tried with the reason given that they had participated in a plot to separate Alsace from France. 4 of the 15 are sentenced to 1 year in prison, while 5 are sentenced to be exiled.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Goodfellow (1993)</a>
1939	France	15 autonomists are arrested for relations with the enemy. One autonomist leader is later executed by a fire squad in 1940 in Champigneulle.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Goodfellow (1993)</a>

1940	Germany	The French language is prohibited from use and street signs must be renamed in German. French names must be replaced by German equivalents.	Language	<a href="http://www.nithart.com">www.nithart.com</a> ; <a href="#">Encyclopédie</a>
1940	Germany	Germans prohibit the Alsatian dialect as it is regarded as a means of protest against the Nazi-government.	Language	<a href="#">Encyclopédie</a>
1940	Germany	Germans prohibit typically Alsatian gatherings and celebrations as they are seen as expressions of specifically regional culture and therefore against the Germanisation efforts of the Nazi regime.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Encyclopédie</a>
1940	Germany	German is made the official language of the administration.	Language	<a href="#">Grasser (1998)</a>
1945-1952	France	Teaching of German is de jure prohibited in schools, de facto this is applied in about half of the schools.	Language	<a href="http://www.alsace-lorraine.org">www.alsace-lorraine.org</a> ; <a href="#">Anderson (1972)</a>
1953	France	Bordeaux trials: 13 Alsatian <i>malgré-nous</i> are sentenced to death due to their involvement in the massacre of Oradour-sur-Glane.	Social, political, military freedom, equality	<a href="#">Boswell (2008)</a> <a href="#">Collins (2007)</a>

Notes: [Encyclopédie](#) refers to [www.encyclopedia.bsditions.fr](http://www.encyclopedia.bsditions.fr).

## C Mechanisms and background on nested identities

### C.1 Mechanisms: migration, socioeconomics, public goods, identity

This section describes the tests related to potential mechanisms in more detail. This part discusses population changes, socio-economic and public good provision in detail, the next part European identity.



Population in- or outflows might have contributed to explaining the observed differences in EU support. Historians document at least two big migration waves in and out of the treatment area as a whole, one when becoming German after 1871 and one after WWI when returning to France. The overall numbers at the département level added up to several 10,000, but historians disagree about the exact numbers ([Harvey 1999](#)). To work as a mechanism in the RD specifications, migration must be related to changes for municipalities at the border. For the years between 1866 and 1956, I managed to gather municipal level historical census data. Migration can affect EU support directly by changing the norms and identities in an area, or by changing the composition of the population with regard to socioeconomic factors.


Panel A in [Figure C.1](#) begins by testing for discontinuities in population changes at the treatment border. The coefficient plots indicate no such discontinuities, suggesting that migration was not a direct mechanism. Prior research shows that socioeconomic factors like education, age, employment or income are related to political choices. Even though panel A did not indicate net population changes at the border, the composition could still have been altered. The treatment period could also have influenced these factors also by changing incentives, norms or institutions. For instance, the remaining legal differences, the so-called “local laws,” could affect these aspects, as well as differences in religiosity (the treated area is more catholic and still features obligatory religious lessons at school) or the political influence of 50 years of German rule. Nonetheless, [Figure C.1](#) provides no evidence that these factors are the decisive mechanisms.

Finally, the third plausible socioeconomic channel are changes in public good provision by the respective départements. For instance, the German occupation period might not solely have been an exposure to negative policies by a nation-state, but to some degree citizens in the treated area might also have adapted to the more decentralized German system. A better functioning département could also plausibly explain higher support for policies that weaken the national level compared to other levels. Panel C, however, provides no empirical evidence in favor of this mechanism as well.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Moreover, [Appendix D](#) shows that religiousness and religious denomination are not significantly related to EU support in France during the sample period.

Figure C.1: Mechanisms: population changes, socioeconomic factors, and public goods



**Notes:** Panel A-C show RD, panel D OLS coefficients, with 95% confidence interval. Public good provision is measured per capita. All variables were standardized with mean zero and variance one. Detailed results in [Table E.3](#).

## C.2 European Identity

We can define identity formally by adapting [Shayo \(2009\)](#). An individual  $i$  can identify with multiple groups  $j$  that are potentially nested in each other. People in the control and treated area have at least three identities that can differ in strength regional Alsatian or Lorrainian, national French identity, and European identity. Group identity depends on the *perceived* distance to the “prototypical” member of group  $j$ , so that

$$h^{i,j} = 1 - \left( \sum_{k \in K} \omega_k (p_k^i - p_k^j)^2 \right)^{1/2}$$

$j \in \{R, N, EU\}$ , with  $R, N$  and  $EU$  corresponding to region, nation and Europe. This section will focus on whether the treated area on average has a stronger European identity, and whether this comes at the cost of national identity. [Appendix C](#) considers the relationship between all three nested identities in more detail.

How strong an individual  $i$  identifies with a group  $j$  depends on the weight  $\omega_k$  she puts on individual attributes  $p_k$  that she shares with the other group members, compared to those that

distinguish her from the group. Individual attributes are predetermined, so that the weights determine the identity strength. If, for instance, historical events cause individuals to emphasize the common suffering by all Europeans during the complicated and conflict-prone history of the continent more, their European identity becomes stronger.

Table C.2: Mechanisms: Stronger European Identity

	<b>A. European and National Identity</b>	
	<b>European Identity</b>	<b>French National Identity</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.277 (0.030) [0.000]	-0.016 (0.029) [0.582]
Observations	5553	5619
	<b>B. European Identity (alternative)</b>	
	<b>European Citizen</b>	<b>European Pride</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.201 (0.022) [0.000]	0.258 (0.063) [0.000]
Observations	10023	1347

**Sources:** Individual-level survey from the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). “X” Identity: “Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?” X refers to Europe and the nation (France in this case), asked in separate questions (95, 97, 99 and 01). *European Citizen*: “I see myself as a European citizen.” (87, 89, 93, 96, 97, 01 and 03). *European Pride*: “How proud of being European are you?” (98). The higher the value, the higher the agreement of the respondents. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero and variance one. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values below.

Table C.2, panel A begins by showing that attachment to Europe, a common proxy for identity, is clearly stronger in the treated area. This holds when setting European relative to national French identity. European identity remains between a quarter and a third of a standard deviation stronger in the treated area. Both differences are statistically significant at the 1%-level. panel B uses whether respondents perceive themselves as European citizens and whether they are proud of being European as alternatives. Again, there is a consistently stronger European identity in the treated area. The differences are meaningfully large in size, and statistically highly significant. To sum up, the higher EU support and lower share of Eurosceptic parties is also reflected in a stronger European identity in the part of the region historically more negatively affected by the actions of nation-states.<sup>16</sup>

In Table C.3, I test whether the stronger European identity in the treated area is driven by higher perceived economic benefits for the region. A significant difference would suggest

<sup>16</sup> Remember that the survey data are available at the département instead of municipal level, i.e., we are essentially comparing conditional means in the three treated and three control départements.

that people who expect higher economic gains are also the ones driving the differences in European identity. This does not seem to be the case. Interacting the treatment variable with three different indicators of perceived economic benefits always yields a positive and significant treatment effect, but this effect is not moderated by economic perceptions.

Table C.3: Differences in European identity and perceived economic benefits

	<b>Europ. Citizen</b>	<b>Europ. Identity</b>	<b>Europ. Pride</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.286 (0.042) [0.000]	0.121 (0.039) [0.002]	0.217 (0.062) [0.000]
- Common Market Beneficial	0.153 (0.035) [0.000]		
- EU Economic Impact Beneficial		0.504 (0.032) [0.000]	
- EU Interregional Cooperation Beneficial			0.189 (0.060) [0.002]
Interaction	0.059 (0.043) [0.172]	0.001 (0.037) [0.976]	0.000 (0.075) [0.996]
Observations	2399	2536	1294

Notes: Individual-level survey data from the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). *European Citizen*: "I see myself as a European citizen." (89 and 93). *European Pride*: "How proud of being European are you?" (98). *Cooperation Regions*: "Concerning development strategies, should the regional council seek cooperation with other European regions" (98). *European Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to Europe?" *Common Market*: "Is the creation of an European common market going to worsen or improve the economic difficulties of your region?" (89 and 93). *EU Impact*: Opinion of respondents towards the economic impact of the European project on their region (95 and 97). Main variables are standardized with mean zero and variance one. The higher the value, the higher the agreement of the respondent. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values below.

### C.3 Relation between Multiple Identities

One crucial question when discussing about contributing to a stronger identity of a supra-national identity like the European Union is whether this has necessarily to come at the cost of weaker lower-level identities. Although there is a literature about the possibility of dual identities, in particular in border regions, it seems that this is often implicitly assumed. To

examine this, I also evaluate the effect of the treatment on regional and national identity. Such an approach is not entirely new and relates to existing studies. [Hooghe and Marks \(2004\)](#), for instance, find that individuals stating a stronger national identity correlates with a stronger European identity using Eurobarometer data.

It is not straightforward to evaluate the relationship between identities at different levels using survey measures as proxies for the real identity. Using the OIP surveys, for instance, there is a positive correlation between identities at all levels. However, this is hard to interpret as it could be related to an individual-specific error term, like a general tendency to answer more positively or negatively. In addition to studying correlations at the individual level, we can also examine the correlations between département level regional, national and European identities. This way, the individual-specific error terms are canceled out. The result still suggests a positive correlation between the identities at different levels. Nonetheless, a causal interpretation could still be problematic as the differences cannot be distinguished from département-specific error terms.

Ideally, we would want to use real panel data, to examine how the European identity of the same individual changes as her national or regional identity changes. Instead of such a panel, examining the effect of the treatment on the identities at all three levels is of equal interest. Given that we can interpret the treatment effect as the change within formerly homogeneous regions, we can also examine whether the observed increase in European identity comes at the cost of a lower national or regional identity.

[Table C.1](#) shows the results. First, even though the treated areas were historically more negatively affected by the French nation state, the stronger European identity does not come at the expense of a strongly weaker national identity. French identity is only minimally weaker, and the difference is clearly statistically insignificant. My findings hence suggest that national identities are not an obstacle to European integration, contrasting prior correlational work ([Carey 2002](#); [Fligstein, Polyakova, and Sandholtz 2012](#)). When examining regional identity, there is even a positive effect. That means, both European identity and regional identity are strengthened. This is explained by [Dehdari and Gehring \(2018\)](#). Due to the European Union being perceived as fostering the cause of regions in the 1990s and early 2000s, regional and European identity are perceived as aligned; in economic terms they could be described as substitute. Using the terminology in [Hooghe and Marks \(2004\)](#), individuals defined their regional identity as inclusive with regard to European identity.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Also note that the positive correlation between regional and European identity is much stronger in the treated area than in the rest of France.

Table C.1: Nested Identities: EU, National, and Regional Level (Alsace &amp; Lorraine)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>			
	<b>Strength of Identities</b>		
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.179 (0.029) [0.000]	-0.016 (0.029) [0.582]	0.277 (0.030) [0.000]
Observations	5620	5619	5553
<b>Panel B</b>			
	<b>Relationship between Nested Identities</b>		
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
<b>Variable of Interest</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>
V.o.I. X Treatment vs. Control	0.002 (0.030) [0.941]	0.009 (0.033) [0.776]	0.064 (0.031) [0.038]
Observations	5611	5547	5545
<b>Panel C</b>			
	<b>Preference: Level of Decision-Making</b>		
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Level</b>	<b>National Level</b>	<b>European Level</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.157 (0.060) [0.009]	-0.071 (0.062) [0.255]	0.197 (0.053) [0.000]
Observations	1322	1322	1322
<b>Panel D</b>			
	<b>Preference: Level of Decision-Making (relative to alternative)</b>		
<b>Baseline rather than</b>	<b>Regional Level National Level</b>	<b>National Level European Level</b>	<b>European Level Regional Level</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.152 (0.076) [0.047]	-0.333 (0.099) [0.001]	0.185 (0.080) [0.020]
Observations	902	427	725

**Sources:** Individual-level survey data from the Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). “X” *Identity*: “Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?” The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case), and the region, asked in separate questions. These questions were available for the years 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001. Main question panel C and D: “In your opinion, should the development of your region occur according to a plan decided by the region, the state or the European Union?,” only available in 1991. In panel C, “X” *Level* is a dummy variable indicating the choice of “X” (Region, State or EU). In panel D, for each column the sample is reduced only the respondents choosing either Option 1 or 2 (Option 1 = 1; Option 2 = 0). Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Panel B of Table C.1 explores for each possible identity pair, whether the relationship between two identities is stronger or weaker in the treated compared to the control area. To do so, I regress one identity on another, also include the treatment dummy variable, as well as the interaction between the two. Note that in this regression only the interaction between the treatment dummy and the other identity can be causally interpreted.

The results show that the differences between treatment and control area are not explained by a stronger relationship between regional and French, as well as French and European identity. The interaction term becomes significant only when considering the relationship between European and regional identity. The correlation between the two is significantly stronger in the treated area than in the control area. Hence, the joint increase in both identities in panel a can be explained by the fact that both identities seem to be stronger substitutes in the treated area.

## C.4 Further details

Table C.2 explores the relationship between different identities in more detail, now using the same survey data for all of France, only excluding the area examined so far. Panel A explores whether each pair of identity variables is correlated positively at the individual level. This is clearly the case, there is a positive relationship for all three pairs, which is stronger for identity pairs that are conceptually closer to each other. That means, regional and French identity, as well as French and European identity are closer related with each other than European and regional identity. All individual level results are robust to including département- and year-fixed effects.

Of course, these individual level results might be driven by any omitted variable at the individual level; or framed differently an individual specific error term. To overcome this concern as well as possible with the data at hand, I average the identity variables at the département level for panel C and D. With a sufficiently high a number of observations per département, in this case about 100, the individual specific error terms should cancel each other out when averaging. Using a pooled cross section in panel C yields rather different results. The relationship between regional and French identity is not statistically insignificant, and the relationship between European and regional identity becomes negative. When including département and year fixed effects in panel D, and thus estimating off of only changes in the explanatory variables by département, the results change again. Regional and French identity are again positively correlated, and European and regional identity positive but statistically insignificant.

The most robust positive relationship might come as a surprise for many politicians and scientific observers. National French identity and European identity are positively correlated in each specification. This holds even when identifying the effect only with changes over time in panel D. Hence, when thinking achieving a stronger European identity in the future, at least the evidence from France suggests that a stronger national identity seems helpful rather than an obstacle to achieving this.

Table C.3 shows that the stronger European identity in the treated area does not seem to be driven by the perception of stronger economic benefits. Thus, it appears to be driven by a psychological change relating to the value of the EU in other non-economic dimensions; potentially its role in maintaining peace.

Table C.2: Identities as Substitutes (All of France w/o Alsace & Lorraine)

Dependent Variable Variable of Interest	Regional Identity French Identity	French Identity European Identity	European Identity Regional Identity
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>			
<b>Individual level</b>			
Variable of Interest	0.362 (0.005) [0.000]	0.177 (0.005) [0.000]	0.061 (0.005) [0.000]
Observations	44325	43658	43616
<b>Panel B</b>			
<b>Individual level (Département- and year-fixed effects)</b>			
Variable of Interest	0.371 (0.005) [0.000]	0.177 (0.005) [0.000]	0.074 (0.005) [0.000]
Observations	44325	43658	43616
<b>Panel C</b>			
<b>Départemental level</b>			
Variable of Interest	0.078 (0.095) [0.416]	0.181 (0.050) [0.000]	-0.100 (0.042) [0.018]
Observations	300	300	300
<b>Panel D</b>			
<b>Départemental level (Département- and year-fixed effects)</b>			
Variable of Interest	0.444 (0.058) [0.000]	0.157 (0.091) [0.089]	0.122 (0.100) [0.227]
Observations	300	300	300

Notes: Individual-level survey data from Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP) from the years 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001. "X" Identity: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.



## D Further Regressions

**Religiosity and EU support, relevant for 1992 and 2005 referenda** One distinct feature in which the local laws strongly differ from the rest of France is with regard to religion. Historically, the church played a larger role in the average citizens life in the treated area until after WWI, and still does to some degree until today. In contrast to the rest of France, pupils in the area are still subjected to compulsory religious classes at school (usually two hours per week). This is not uncommon in other European countries, for instance, many of the southern German states feature a similar policy. Usually these classes are not dogmatic, but transmit information about religions in general, of course still with an emphasis on Christianity. If religion or religious denomination is related to a more favorable attitude towards the EU, part of the effect we measure and attribute to differences in exposure to intrusive policies might be driven by differences in religious identity.

However, the available literature indicates no direct relationship between religious attachments and European integration and “even indirect effects of religion on Euroscepticism are small or appear to cancel each other out”(Boomgaarden and Freire, 2009, p.1). To the opposite, albeit minimally, it is argued that “actors such as religious parties and the churches have strayed from the integrationist path and contributed to Euroscepticism” (Minkenberg 2009, p.1190).

To make sure this is really no concern, we examine the purported relationship in a more systematic way as well. In the specific French context, there are no municipal level measures on religious affiliation and the share of people who consider themselves secular, due to the specific secular constitution and approach in France. Nonetheless, we can use outcomes aggregated at the département level for all of France to assess the relationship between religion and voting in the EU referendum. Table D.1 shows results for two variables that measure the intensity of religiousness and religious denomination. *Attendance* measures how often subjects attend religious services, both as a continuous variable and coded as a set of dummies with *never attending* as the reference category. Denomination relates to the share of people who perceive themselves as *Roman Catholic*, *Protestant*, *Christian Orthodox*, *Jewish*, *Muslim* or *other faiths*, with *no religious affiliation* as the reference category.

The results show no difference for *Attendance* in both 1992 and 2005. With *Attendance* coded as individual dummies, there is also no stable relationship. Only very enthusiastic churchgoers have a marginally significant positive correlation compared to those who never attend in 2005, but not in 1992. The pattern is similar for denomination. The only positive correlation which is significant at the 10 percent level is with *Protestant* in 1992, but it also disappears in 2005. Overall, this supports the existing literature that religion does not play

a major role for attitudes towards the EU. Thus, the concern that religious differences would contaminate the results appears unfounded.

Table D.1: Share of Yes Votes and Religion, all of France.

	Share Yes 1992			Share Yes 2005		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Attendance [mean]	-1.839			-1.774		
	[0.167]			[0.113]		
Attendance: Weekly		0.114			0.099	
		[0.167]			[0.135]	
Attendance: 2-3 times a month		0.002			0.025	
		[0.983]			[0.788]	
Attendance: Once a month		-0.052			-0.097	
		[0.625]			[0.164]	
Attendance: Sev. times a year		0.057			0.054	
		[0.114]			[0.144]	
Attendance: Less freq.		0.036			-0.001	
		[0.391]			[0.988]	
Roman Catholic			0.029			0.004
			[0.291]			[0.902]
Protestant			0.353			0.146
			[0.054]			[0.321]
Christian Ortodox			0.115			0.267
			[0.846]			[0.585]
Jewish			0.847			1.095
			[0.116]			[0.278]
Moslem			-0.092			0.008
			[0.437]			[0.955]
Other Religions			-0.155			0.010
			[0.495]			[0.971]
Obs.	94	94	94	94	94	94

**Notes:** This table tests whether there is a clear relationship between religious affiliation and voting in the two referenda 1992 and 2005. The OLS estimates use aggregate survey results at the département-level. *Attendance* refers to how often the respondents attend religious services. *Never attending* is the omitted reference category for attendance, *no religious denomination* is the omitted reference category for religion. Controls: Sex, Age, Years of schooling, Urban vs Rural, Union membership, Degree, Income, and Household size. *p*-values in brackets. There is no systematic effect of religion, which is reassuring as the areas in former Alsace-Lorraine has a slightly different history with regard to schooling. Accordingly, these differences and schooling should not explain our results. *Short Interpretation:* Religious beliefs and denomination could affect voting in the referenda. We show for all of France that such a relationship never shows up significantly at any level, both for intensity of belief measured by church attendance, as well as when using denomination as the variable of interest. We conclude that there are some differences with regard to the treatment of religion between the départements, but none that closely influences or could explain our result.

## E Robustness

Table E.1: RD Smoothness Test: Pre-Treatment Variables

	Barley	Wheat	Potato	Onion	Sunflower
Treatment vs. Control	49.089 (445.953) [0.912]	145.863 (443.440) [0.742]	-69.233 (242.320) [0.775]	10.633 (364.771) [0.977]	59.347 (441.175) [0.893]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	10.000	11.537	10.000	10.000
Observations	614	614	706	614	614
	Elevation	Std. Dev. Elev.	Ruggedness	Pop. Density	Population
Treatment vs. Control	5.367 (33.568) [0.873]	5.496 (11.621) [0.636]	17.329 (20.605) [0.400]	382.246 (234.538) [0.103]	9.646 (10.370) [0.352]
Bandwidth (km)	13.146	11.085	12.479	18.554	10.863
Observations	795	681	757	1098	670
	River Length	Road Length	Grazing Land	Cropland	
Treatment vs. Control	3404.949 (14492.769) [0.814]	954.125 (858.652) [0.266]	0.844 (3.135) [0.788]	-0.973 (1.380) [0.481]	
Bandwidth (km)	12.619	13.394	10.000	10.000	
Observations	764	811	619	619	
	Railway Station	Railway Quality			
Treatment vs. Control	-0.000 (0.026) [0.987]	-0.073 (0.056) [0.194]			
Bandwidth (km)	13.944	11.089			
Observations	846	681			

**Notes:** Tests for discontinuities in pre-treatment variables for the whole border. *Ruggedness* is the mean index of the variation in elevation, while *Elevation* is the mean elevation. *Std. Dev. Elev.* is the standard deviation of *Elevation*. *Potato*, *Wheat*, *Maize*, *Sunflower* and *Barley* refer to the soil suitability for potato, wheat, maize, sunflower and barley production, respectively. *Population* is the municipality's population 1866. *Pop. Density* is *Population* divided by its area (in square km). *River Length* is the total length of all rivers in a municipality. *Road Length* is the total length of all historical roads in a municipality. *Grazing Land* is the size of the area in a municipality that is used for grazing. *Cropland* is the size of the area in a municipality that is used for crop production. *Railway Station* is a dummy variable whether a municipality has a railway station. *Railway Quality* is a 4-stage variable measuring the quality of the railway infrastructure. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered on the cantonal level. The bandwidth is optimally selected in regards to the Mean Square Error (Calonico et al. 2017). Only if the bandwidth falls below 10km, we set 10km as the bandwidth. Standard errors are in brackets and p-values are positioned below them.

Table E.2: RD Smoothness Test: 1860 Economic Indicators (Level of Arrondissement)

	Mean (Treatment)	Mean (Control)	T-test
Share Children	0.052	0.050	0.875
Income PC	178.353	187.329	0.387
Worker Productivity	6625.835	6968.153	0.728
Firm Productivity	1.30e+05	98487.290	0.418

**Sources:** This table shows the t-test for four variables measuring economic conditions on the arrondissement-level in the region of Lorraine. The data set comprises of seven arrondissements in the control and five arrondissements in the treatment group. *Share Children* measures the share of children in the workforce. *Income PC* is the average income of a worker in the arrondissement. *Worker Productivity* measures the average production output per worker. *Firm Productivity* shows the average production output per firm.

Table E.3: Smoothness: Post-Treatment Variables

	Educ. 99	Age 06	Occup. 06	Income 08
Treatment vs. Control	0.003 (0.004) [0.411]	-0.547 (0.484) [0.259]	0.016 (0.015) [0.283]	1063.636 (858.687) [0.215]
Bandwidth (km)	10.473	18.132	10.663	14.355
Observations	646	1078	658	723
	Health Care	High School	Voc. School	Post Office
Treatment vs. Control	0.011 (0.013) [0.403]	-0.003 (0.005) [0.598]	0.001 (0.005) [0.903]	-0.020 (0.043) [0.637]
Bandwidth (km)	22.388	10.445	14.179	10.000
Observations	1270	627	848	604
Population Change	1866-1946	1916-1946	1926-1946	1936-1946
Coefficient	-192.756 [190.986] 0.313	-57.978 [99.369] 0.560	46.097 [53.388] 0.388	71.715 [50.219] 0.153
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	10.354	14.332	22.078
Observations	618	633	871	1275

**Notes:** This table shows tests for discontinuities in covariates using all départements in Alsace and Lorraine. *Age 06* is the average (self-reported) age in 2006 and *Income 08* is the median income in 2008. *Educ. 99* refers to the share of people above 15 with a high school degree in 1999 and *Occup. 06* is the share of blue-collar workers in the total population in 2006. *High School*, *Voc. School*, *Post Office*, and *Health Care* measure the relative number of high schools with general and/or technological education, secondary schools with vocational training, post offices and health care establishments for medium-term stays per 1,000 inhabitants in 2013. *Population Change* measures the change in municipal population over four periods with different start years (1866, 1916, 1926, 1936) and one end year (1946). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and five segment-fixed effects (one of those as reference category). The bandwidth is optimally selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017). Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level.

Table E.4: RD Specification - No Controls

<b>Panel A</b>		<b>EU Support (1992 and 2005)</b>				
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Yes Share 1992</b>	<b>Yes Share 1992</b>	<b>Yes Share 2005</b>	<b>Yes Share 2005</b>	<b>Yes Share 92 &amp; 05</b>	<b>Yes Share 92 &amp; 05</b>
	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	5.029 (2.132) [0.018]	5.990 (1.996) [0.003]	2.255 (2.820) [0.424]	1.893 (2.413) [0.433]	3.641 (1.499) [0.015]	4.182 (1.357) [0.002]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	19.866	10.000	14.548	10.000	17.347
Observations	619	1162	618	878	1237	2055
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.47	43.51	44.26	48.07	48.91
<b>Panel B</b>		<b>Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)</b>				
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties</b>	<b>w/o Front National</b>	<b>w/o Front National</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index</b>
	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>	<b>(6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	-1.442 (0.966) [0.135]	-2.186 (0.704) [0.002]	-2.290 (1.140) [0.045]	-2.612 (0.856) [0.002]	-3.307 (3.470) [0.341]	-5.206 (2.720) [0.056]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	22.659	10.000	23.517	10.000	20.550
Observations	1855	3930	1855	4080	1855	3621
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.31	7.51	7.05	25.41	24.56

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcome is the share of people voting “Yes” in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. A eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

Table E.5: RD Specification - No Clusters

**Panel A****EU Support (1992 and 2005)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Yes Share 1992 (1)</b>	<b>Yes Share 1992 (2)</b>	<b>Yes Share 2005 (3)</b>	<b>Yes Share 2005 (4)</b>	<b>Yes Share 92 &amp; 05 (5)</b>	<b>Yes Share 92 &amp; 05 (6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	5.242 (1.544) [0.001]	6.969 (1.262) [0.000]	2.787 (1.606) [0.083]	2.787 (1.606) [0.083]	4.012 (1.275) [0.002]	4.447 (1.104) [0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	15.369	10.000	10.000	10.000	13.369
Observations	619	924	618	618	1237	1611
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.13	43.51	43.51	48.07	48.58

**Panel B****Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties (1)</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties (2)</b>	<b>w/o Front National (3)</b>	<b>w/o Front National (4)</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index (5)</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index (6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	-1.086 (1.184) [0.359]	-1.915 (0.813) [0.018]	-1.873 (1.008) [0.063]	-2.387 (0.631) [0.000]	-3.172 (1.646) [0.054]	-4.980 (1.147) [0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	21.121	10.000	25.135	10.000	19.441
Observations	1855	3726	1855	4344	1855	3426
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.31	7.51	7.00	25.41	24.31

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcome is the share of people voting 'Yes' in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

Table E.6: RD Specification - Baseline Plus Pre-Treatment Controls

**Panel A****EU Support (1992 and 2005)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Yes Share 1992 (1)</b>	<b>Yes Share 1992 (2)</b>	<b>Yes Share 2005 (3)</b>	<b>Yes Share 2005 (4)</b>	<b>Yes Share 92 &amp; 05 (5)</b>	<b>Yes Share 92 &amp; 05 (6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	5.858 (1.489) [0.000]	5.948 (1.485) [0.000]	3.219 (1.876) [0.086]	3.219 (1.876) [0.086]	4.534 (1.211) [0.000]	4.620 (1.187) [0.000]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	10.188	10.000	10.000	10.000	12.362
Observations	614	621	613	613	1227	1487
Mean of Outcome	52.62	52.65	43.51	43.51	48.07	48.35

**Panel B****Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties (1)</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties (2)</b>	<b>w/o Front National (3)</b>	<b>w/o Front National (4)</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index (5)</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index (6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	-1.201 (0.715) [0.093]	-1.667 (0.505) [0.001]	-2.022 (0.673) [0.003]	-2.347 (0.564) [0.000]	-3.363 (2.043) [0.100]	-4.245 (1.823) [0.020]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	19.995	10.000	18.893	10.000	14.057
Observations	1840	3486	1840	3321	1840	2551
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.35	7.51	7.17	25.41	25.20

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcome is the share of people voting “Yes” in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects, as well as all variables used in the pre-treatment balance test. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

Table E.7: RD Specification - Coordinate Controls

**Panel A****EU Support (1992 and 2005)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Yes Share 1992 (1)</b>	<b>Yes Share 1992 (2)</b>	<b>Yes Share 2005 (3)</b>	<b>Yes Share 2005 (4)</b>	<b>Yes Share 92 &amp; 05 (5)</b>	<b>Yes Share 92 &amp; 05 (6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	5.071 (1.749) [0.004]	6.552 (1.678) [0.000]	2.251 (2.109) [0.286]	2.049 (1.936) [0.290]	3.661 (1.365) [0.007]	3.809 (1.278) [0.003]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	15.247	10.000	12.282	10.000	13.961
Observations	619	920	618	743	1237	1695
Mean of Outcome	52.62	53.09	43.51	43.78	48.07	48.61


**Panel B****Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)**

<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties (1)</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties (2)</b>	<b>w/o Front National (3)</b>	<b>w/o Front National (4)</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index (5)</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index (6)</b>
Treatment vs. Control	-1.025 (0.705) [0.146]	-1.578 (0.587) [0.007]	-1.725 (0.669) [0.010]	-2.174 (0.629) [0.001]	-2.656 (2.086) [0.203]	-3.730 (1.962) [0.057]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	15.238	10.000	18.464	10.000	16.300
Observations	1855	2754	1855	3276	1855	2904
Mean of Outcome	14.62	14.43	7.51	7.18	25.41	24.95

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcomes is the share of people voting “Yes” in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: the coordinates on the x- and y-axis and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).



Figure E.1: Robustness Check: Bandwidth Choice



**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using all Municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The treatment effect for the main variables capturing EU support and Euroscepticism using a range of bandwidths smaller and larger than the MSE-optimal bandwidth (Calonica et al., 2018). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level.

Table E.8: Nested Identities: EU, National and Regional Level (all of France; Extensive Table)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>			
	<b>Strength of Identities</b>		
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.192 (0.015) [0.000]	-0.028 (0.016) [0.085]	0.319 (0.016) [0.000]
Observations	49999	50027	49249
<b>Panel B</b>			
	<b>Relationship between Nested Identities</b>		
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
<b>Variable of Interest</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.723 (0.076) [0.000]	-0.324 (0.061) [0.000]	-0.008 (0.067) [0.907]
Variable of Interest	0.368 (0.005) [0.000]	0.181 (0.005) [0.000]	0.072 (0.005) [0.000]
Interaction	0.038 (0.016) [0.020]	0.073 (0.019) [0.000]	0.117 (0.018) [0.000]
Observations	49936	49205	49161

**Sources:** Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). “X” Identity: “Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?” The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Table E.9: Nested Identities: EU, National, and Regional Level (Alsace & Lorraine; Extensive Table)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
<b>Panel A</b>			
	<b>Strength of Identities</b>		
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
Treatment vs. Control	0.179 (0.029) [0.000]	-0.016 (0.029) [0.582]	0.277 (0.030) [0.000]
Observations	5620	5619	5553
<b>Panel B</b>			
	<b>Relationship between Nested Identities</b>		
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>
<b>Variable of Interest</b>	<b>French Identity</b>	<b>European Identity</b>	<b>Regional Identity</b>
Variable of Interest	0.426 (0.025) [0.000]	0.231 (0.027) [0.000]	0.114 (0.026) [0.000]
Treatment vs. Control	0.122 (0.049) [0.013]	0.126 (0.052) [0.015]	0.307 (0.072) [0.000]
Interaction	0.002 (0.030) [0.941]	0.009 (0.033) [0.776]	0.064 (0.031) [0.038]
Observations	5611	5547	5545

**Sources:** Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP). “X” *Identity*: “Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to X?” The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to X. X refers to Europe, the nation (France in this case) and the region, asked in separate questions. Regressions control for age, employment status, education and sex. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Table E.10: Demographic Interactions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent Variable	European Identity			
Variable of Interest	Age	Experience	Sex	Education
Treatment vs. Control	0.169 (0.084) [0.043]	0.253 (0.036) [0.000]	0.281 (0.040) [0.000]	0.298 (0.033) [0.000]
Variable of Interest	0.008 (0.002) [0.000]	0.099 (0.055) [0.070]	0.064 (0.051) [0.207]	0.395 (0.068) [0.000]
Treatment X V.o.I.	0.002 (0.002) [0.164]	0.059 (0.064) [0.354]	-0.006 (0.059) [0.926]	-0.106 (0.076) [0.164]
Observations	5553	5553	5553	5553

**Notes:** Individual-level survey data. Observatoire Interregional du Politique (OIP) in 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001. *European Identity*: "Could you tell me whether you feel very attached, rather attached, not very attached or not attached at all to Europe?" The higher the value the more attached the respondent is to Europe. *Age* measures your age in years. *Experience* is a binary variable indicating whether the respondent was at least 10 years old in 1945. *Sex* captures the respondent's sex (0 = male; 1 = female). *Education* measures whether someone finished an education higher than high school. Controls included: age, experience, education, sex and employment status. Standard errors in brackets and p-values right below. All outcome variables are standardized with mean zero.

Table E.11: RD Specification - Turnout Referendum 1992 &amp; 2005

	Turnout 1992		Turnout 2005	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.270 (1.038) [0.221]	-1.073 (1.015) [0.291]	-0.483 (1.142) [0.672]	-1.577 (1.109) [0.155]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	12.234	10.000	15.616
Observations	619	742	618	939
Mean of Outcome	73.76	73.80	73.04	73.04

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The outcome is the turnout in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and segment-fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

Table E.12: OLS Results - EU Support and Euroscepticism (1992 - 2005)

<b>Panel A</b>			
<b>EU Support (Share Yes-Votes 1992 and 2005)</b>			
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>1992 &amp; 2005</b>
Treatment vs. Control	6.665 (1.401) [0.000]	6.617 (1.421) [0.000]	6.626 (1.077) [0.000]
Observations	3230	3235	6465
Mean of Outcome	53.59	45.65	49.62
<b>Panel B</b>			
<b>Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)</b>			
<b>Dependent Variable</b>	<b>Eurosceptic Parties</b>	<b>w/o Front National</b>	<b>Euroscepticism Index</b>
Treatment vs. Control	-2.226 (0.514) [0.000]	-2.588 (0.555) [0.000]	-6.155 (1.542) [0.000]
Observations	9698	9698	9698
Mean of Outcome	13.99	6.55	23.40

**Notes:** Comparison of treated and untreated municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. In panel A, the outcome is the share of people voting “Yes” in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. In panel B, the outcome in Columns 1 and 2 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects (one of those as reference category). Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them.

Table E.13: RD Specification - Robustness to Linguistic Border

	<b>EU Support</b>		<b>Euroscepticism</b>	
	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Modified</b>	<b>Baseline</b>	<b>Modified</b>
Treatment vs. Control	3.586 (1.329) [0.007]	3.422 (1.446) [0.018]	-1.489 (0.604) [0.014]	-1.573 (0.668) [0.019]
Bandwidth (km)	14.529	22.997	16.179	22.430
Observations	1755	1709	2898	2496
Mean of Outcome	48.69	48.66	14.43	14.49

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the baseline and modified treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The outcome “EU Support” is the share of people voting “Yes” in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. The outcome “Euroscepticism” the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. For each outcome, the regression is run once with the complete border (left) and once with a shorter border, having removed the sections overlapping with the language border and those border sections with no counterfactuals on the other side. The optimal bandwidth is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonic et al. 2017). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse.

Table E.14: RD Specification - Placebo Borders

	Placebo Border (a)		Placebo Border (b)		Placebo Border (c)	
	EU Support	Euroscepticism	EU Support	Euroscepticism	EU Support	Euroscepticism
Treatment vs. Control	0.056 (0.678) [0.934]	-0.386 (0.330) [0.243]	-0.114 (1.692) [0.946]	-0.386 (0.762) [0.613]	1.636 (1.357) [0.228]	-1.073 (0.768) [0.162]
Bandwidth (km)	14.673	16.719	10.000	10.000	24.840	26.194
Observations	14386	24169	511	768	1799	2827
Mean of Outcome	42.68	14.10	48.17	14.71	43.25	14.66

**Notes:** Map (a) in [Figure 8](#) shows the départements at the French border (black) and their adjacent départements (grey). This excludes the départements that constitute Alsace and Lorraine and the second-row département Haute Marne. Haute Marne has no counterfactual on the first-row side due to this exclusion of the Alsace and Lorraine regions. The border separating first and second row départements is used as a placebo border (bold orange line). Map (b) in [Figure 8](#) displays the border between the former départements Meurthe and Moselle before 1871 (bold orange line). Map (c) in [Figure 8](#) shows the border between the départements composing the control area in the main regression and their adjacent départements inland (bold orange line). This table displays the local treatment effect at these borders for the two main outcomes *EU Support* is the share of people voting “Yes” in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. *Euroscepticism* is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. The optimal bandwidth is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017). Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy and distance to Mulhouse.

Table E.15: RD Results - EU Support (1992 - 2005) - Full Specification

Dependent Variable	EU Support (Share Yes-Votes 1992 and 2005)					
	1992 (1)	1992 (2)	2005 (3)	2005 (4)	1992 & 2005 (5)	1992 & 2005 (6)
Treatment vs. Control	5.242 (1.853) [0.006]	6.254 (1.901) [0.001]	2.787 (2.029) [0.174]	2.787 (2.029) [0.174]	4.012 (1.441) [0.007]	4.728 (1.455) [0.002]
Distance to Germany	0.000 (0.000) [0.063]	0.000 (0.000) [0.037]	0.000 (0.000) [0.022]	0.000 (0.000) [0.022]	0.000 (0.000) [0.011]	0.000 (0.000) [0.009]
Distance to Metz	0.000 (0.000) [0.876]	0.000 (0.000) [0.491]	0.000 (0.000) [0.406]	0.000 (0.000) [0.406]	0.000 (0.000) [0.570]	0.000 (0.000) [0.279]
Distance to Strasbourg	-0.000 (0.000) [0.970]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.904]	0.000 (0.000) [0.007]	0.000 (0.000) [0.007]	0.000 (0.000) [0.069]	0.000 (0.000) [0.104]
Distance to Nancy	0.000 (0.000) [0.799]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.880]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.118]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.118]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.460]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.265]
Distance to Mulhouse	0.000 (0.000) [0.484]	0.000 (0.000) [0.193]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.039]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.039]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.457]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.992]
Border Segment 1	-4.136 (8.514) [0.629]	-4.414 (7.456) [0.555]	12.561 (6.874) [0.072]	12.561 (6.874) [0.072]	4.296 (5.431) [0.432]	2.795 (5.182) [0.591]
Border Segment 2	-4.681 (7.840) [0.552]	-5.711 (6.720) [0.398]	9.666 (6.280) [0.128]	9.666 (6.280) [0.128]	2.580 (5.094) [0.614]	1.039 (4.617) [0.822]
Border Segment 3	-8.411 (6.805) [0.221]	-8.475 (5.841) [0.150]	11.953 (4.809) [0.015]	11.953 (4.809) [0.015]	1.866 (3.992) [0.642]	0.565 (3.867) [0.884]
Border Segment 4	3.991 (4.616) [0.390]	4.778 (3.827) [0.215]	10.650 (3.651) [0.005]	10.650 (3.651) [0.005]	7.399 (2.419) [0.003]	7.445 (2.374) [0.002]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	13.419	10.000	10.000	10.000	12.530
Observations	619	813	618	618	1237	1517

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The outcome is the share of people voting “Yes” in the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the French European Constitution Referendum in 2005. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects (one of those as reference category). Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).

Table E.16: RD Results - Euroscepticism (1992 - 2005) - Full Specification

Dependent Variable	Euroscepticism (1994, 1999 and 2004)					
	Eurosceptic Parties (1)	(2)	w/o Front National (3)	(4)	Eurosceptism Index (5)	(6)
Treatment vs. Control	-1.086 (0.727) [0.140]	-1.735 (0.644) [0.008]	-1.873 (0.680) [0.008]	-2.339 (0.620) [0.000]	-3.172 (2.080) [0.132]	-4.283 (1.971) [0.032]
Distance to Germany	-0.000 (0.000) [0.460]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.089]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.085]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.001]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.049]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.004]
Distance to Metz	0.000 (0.000) [0.155]	0.000 (0.000) [0.557]	0.000 (0.000) [0.089]	0.000 (0.000) [0.456]	0.000 (0.000) [0.658]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.886]
Distance to Strasbourg	-0.000 (0.000) [0.026]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.022]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.376]	0.000 (0.000) [0.913]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.035]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.026]
Distance to Nancy	-0.000 (0.000) [0.914]	0.000 (0.000) [0.935]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.635]	-0.000 (0.000) [0.800]	0.000 (0.000) [0.226]	0.000 (0.000) [0.307]
Distance to Mulhouse	0.000 (0.000) [0.011]	0.000 (0.000) [0.068]	0.000 (0.000) [0.007]	0.000 (0.000) [0.319]	0.000 (0.000) [0.010]	0.000 (0.000) [0.090]
Border Segment 1	0.677 (2.388) [0.778]	-0.371 (2.033) [0.856]	1.332 (1.911) [0.488]	2.389 (1.299) [0.069]	-5.294 (6.388) [0.410]	-2.817 (5.378) [0.602]
Border Segment 2	-0.801 (2.334) [0.732]	-1.510 (1.970) [0.445]	-0.039 (1.772) [0.982]	1.611 (1.201) [0.183]	-7.872 (6.069) [0.199]	-4.929 (4.989) [0.326]
Border Segment 3	0.284 (2.076) [0.891]	0.005 (1.687) [0.998]	2.004 (1.556) [0.202]	3.246 (0.976) [0.001]	-7.894 (5.710) [0.171]	-4.388 (4.210) [0.300]
Border Segment 4	-1.190 (1.613) [0.463]	-1.769 (1.104) [0.112]	0.116 (1.176) [0.922]	0.525 (0.601) [0.384]	-5.586 (4.730) [0.242]	-5.150 (3.121) [0.102]
Bandwidth (km)	10.000	14.369	10.000	17.819	10.000	16.675
Observations	1855	2623	1855	3174	1855	2967

**Notes:** Discontinuity at the treatment border using municipalities in Alsace and Lorraine. The outcomes in Columns 1 is the share of people voting for eurosceptic parties in European parliamentary elections between 1994 and 2004. An eurosceptic party is defined by having a higher negativity than positivity score in regards to the European Union in their published manifestos between 1992 and 2003. The outcome in Column 3 and 4 is adapted to exclude the vote share for the party Front National. In Column 5 and 6 an index capturing Euroscepticism is used, which is a weighted vote share of eurosceptic parties. Weighting occurs by multiplying the vote share with the euro-negativity score. Included controls: distance to Germany (border), distance to Metz, distance to Strasbourg, distance to Nancy, distance to Mulhouse and 5 segment-fixed effects (one of those as reference category). Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal level. Standard errors are displayed in brackets and p-values are right below them. For each outcome, in left column the regression is run using a narrow bandwidth of 10km, while the optimal bandwidth in the right column is selected with regards to the mean square error criterion (Calonico et al. 2017).