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KIEL WORKING PAPER

**IPR Policies and
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Analysis**



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ABSTRACT

IPR POLICIES AND MEMBERSHIP IN STANDARD SETTING ORGANIZATIONS: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

Jiaming Jiang, Rajeev K. Goel and Xingyuan Zhang

Whereas technical standards and Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) are omnipresent and essential to mass production and mass communications, relatively little is formally known about the propensity of firms to belong to certain SSOs. This paper uses a social network analysis technique to empirically analyze the behavior of market participants and their propensities to belong to SSOs. We concentrate our study on standard setting organizations features and their intellectual property rights (IPR) policies such as licensing rules, disclosure requirements, as well as the features of the decision process of standards. Using data on more than 1060 member firms as participants in 28 SSOs, we are able to uniquely graph the membership of firms in SSOs by highlighting some important characteristics. Finally, a multinomial logit regression analysis studies the propensities of firms to belong to four SSOs and member firms' network communities.

Keywords: standard setting organizations, network analysis; intellectual property rights policies; patents; market concentration

JEL classification: L14, O3

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1 Introduction

Industry institutions play important roles in ensuring the protection of intellectual property protection and maintaining a level competitive field for their members. Certifications or validations by industry organizations can also impact firms' conduct (Goel and Nelson, 2019), whereas standards lower transactions costs by improving coordination and eliminating unnecessary duplication (Kindleberger, 1983). Among the numerous different industry institutions, Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) or Standard Developing Organizations (SDOs) are responsible for international technology standards (<https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/standard-setting-organization-ssol/>). There are two broad classes of SSOs – those dealing with quality standards (e.g., ISO 9000), and those dealing with interoperability (e.g., MP3 format or USB). Examples of SSOs include The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), etc. (<https://www.electronicdesign.com/communications/10-standards-organizations-affect-you-whether-you-know-it-or-not>). Without standards, it would be nearly impossible for firms to exploit economies of scale, as there would be barriers to mass production and mass communication.

While there are multiple ways to categorize these institutions, three categories are often utilized, i.e., (1) formally recognized standards bodies; (2) quasi-formal standards bodies and (3) standardization consortia. Whatever the category, it is usually stakeholders that work together on a voluntary basis to produce standards (Contreras, 2019). Thus, SSO incorporate all variants of groups that develop standards, including Special Interest Groups (SIGs), standards-development organizations, consortia, and other entities.

Every SSO needs a set of rules that address the intellectual property rights (IPR) in order to ensure that the SSO owns its work product upon completion, and to decrease the risk, or mitigate the hold-up problem that its completed standards will encounter IPR-based impediments to broad implementation (Farrell et al., 2007, Bekkers and Updegrove, 2012). As indicated by many, SSOs have rules or policies relevant to the patent hold-up problem (Scotchmer, 2004).

Membership in SSOs is voluntary and a firm can potentially belong to several SSOs (Baron and Pohlmann, 2013)). This affects how the firm/industry grows and technological change takes place. However, little is formally known about the drivers of membership in SSOs and this paper attempts to contribute in that regard. What induces firms to join particular SSOs? Is it the market power or IPR rules? To motivate this thought, one could think of the electric vehicle industry as an example. Given the newness of the technology with firms at different stages of development, widely accepted technical standards do not seem to have developed. A firm might decide between joining future SSOs dealing with battery life, battery size or standardization of charging outlets (or might join them all). Any decision will have implications for firm/industry growth. However, will early entrants (e.g., Tesla in the United States) have an interest in joining SSOs when they have market power not only with regard to market share but also with regard to the network of charging stations?

These rules that are also called as bylaws or constitutions etc. are often related to the procedures for setting standards and related to the policies applicable to standard essential patents (SEPs) (Barron and Spulber, 2018). The latter mandates some form of disclosure and the licensing of these SEPs. The most common IPR policy was a requirement to grant licenses on "Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory" terms, often called a FRAND policy (see Epstein and Kappos, 2013). Some standards

organizations require royalty-free licenses. Other organizations offer a list of options, which may also include voluntary disclosure of the most restrictive licensing terms (Bekker et al., 2011). All these have implications for competitiveness and profitability that would affect incentives of firms to join SSOs.

Although SSOs developed many rules regarding procedures for setting standards or the IPR policies for the SEPs, as indicated by Chiao et al. (2007), few statistical studies have examined the relationship between the rules and operations of different SSOs. The focus on SSO membership and networks is important as these private institutions can somewhat substitute for or complement government institutions. What drives firms to participate in SSOs?

To tie this research to the related body of knowledge, Lerner and Tirole (2006) discussed theoretically forum shopping on SSOs activities and suggest that the sponsors of an attractive technology can afford to make few concessions such as royalty-free licensing to prospective users and to choose an SSO that is relatively friendly to its cause. To test their theoretical work, Chiao et al. (2007) empirically explored SSOs' policy choices. They found a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors. On the other hand, relationships with the IPR rules and firms with SEPs may be investigated by the social networks where firms choose different SSOs and identify which SSOs may be friendly to them.¹

Recent developments in the field of social network analysis could provide a possibility for visualization, facilitated analysis and interpretation of the behavior of "forum shopping" on the SSOs with necessary software tools. Such techniques have been applied in research related to patent statistics, i.e., patent applications, patent citations or joint patent applications (Clarkson, 2004, Leydesdorff and Vaughan, 2006, Bartkowski and Schramm, 2008 and Jiang et al., 2017).

In social network analysis, two-mode data refers to data recording ties between two sets of entities. In this context, the term "mode" refers to a class of entities – typically called actors, nodes or vertices – whose members have social ties with other members (in the one- mode case) or with members of another class (in the two-mode case).²

Most social network analysis is concerned with the one-mode case, as the patent-citations network or joint-patent- applications network which are just mentioned. The two-mode case arises when we collect relations between the participants (firms with SEPs) and SSOs. Although it would be a mistake to think of two-mode data as an advance over one-mode data, it is important to note that there are many cases where extending network analysis methodology to more than two modes are desirable (Borgatti, 2009), like the case in our paper. Through the two-mode network, we can easily figure out how many SSOs a company is involved in, which firms are alliance members because they participate in the same SSO, which firms play a leader role as they are active in many SSOs.

Our paper tries to fill this gap. Our main findings revealed that, the member firms' IPR policy orientation or features of the SSOs' policy-making processes vary across different social network communities. Overall, most of the member companies favor FRAND terms, whereas, of four network communities (or clusters) for member firms, member firms in Community 2 have a strong tendency to pursue early disclosure and discourage blanket disclosure. The empirical analysis results also show that, most member firms, especially in Community 1, seem to be with low openness level and reluctant to provide information and opportunities to the general public, even those firms in Community 1 are involved in most SSOs activities.

¹ IPR protection is a problem, even in developed nations (see Goel, 2019).

² See the details for the discussion of the two-mode network in Borgatti and Everett (1997).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides literature and definition of standard and SSOs, and discuss SSOs' policies on IPR. Section 3 introduces the database we utilize in our analysis. Section 4 gives the image of the two-mode network of the participants (firms) and SSOs by using social network analysis software Pajek.³ Section 5 reports the formal empirical analysis, and section 6 concludes.

2 Literature on Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) and their IPR Policies

To provide a better context for this work and highlight the contribution, we review the literatures on SSOs/SEPs and their IPR policies.

2.1 Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) and Standard Essential Patents (SEPs)

Generally, formal international technology standards are developed and undated within Standard-Setting Organizations (Barron et al., 2014). SSOs affect efficiency throughout the economy, with more than one thousand organizations developing hundreds of thousands of technology standards.⁴ SSOs involve many standards and participating members all over the world, for example, the ISO/IEC JTC 1 (an acronym for "Joint Technical Committee 1"), which has 3160 published standards, 510 standards under development, and 32 participating country members, such as United States, Japan, Korea, Germany, France, etc.⁵ It was formed by global standards organizations ISO and IEC to develop worldwide Information and Communication Technology (ICT) standards for business and consumer applications. Additionally, JTC 1 provides the standards approval environment for integrating diverse and complex ICT technologies. These standards rely upon the core infrastructure technologies developed by JTC 1 centers of expertise complemented by specifications developed in other organization.⁶

Different from JTC 1, in which membership is mainly open to national organizations, there are many other types of the SSOs, in which most of the members are private firms, universities, public research institutions and other industry organizations. For example, The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) that develops standards used in connection with the Web, among other technologies, has more than 450 members⁷. Most members in W3C are private firms that include Adobe, Apple, Cisco, Facebook, Huawei, etc..

These SSOs often have tiered membership, where higher tiers are associated with more rights to sit on the board of the SSO, or chair working groups. The higher rights are usually associated with higher

³ Pajek is a network analysis software developed by de Nooy et al. (2005). There are a variety of software tools that have been developed for social network analysis. The most popular software packages include Pajek, UCINET 6, NetDraw, Gephi, E-Net, KeyPlayer 1, StOCNET and Automap. We employ Pajek in this study because it has efficient algorithms for analyzing large networks in addition to its powerful visualization function(s). See Apostolato (2013) for an overview of software applications for social network analysis.

⁴ For a list of standards, see <https://www.consortiuminfo.org/links/#.WxXiUYjFKUk>. The list includes categorized links and overviews of 1068 organizations, and more are added as they are announced.

⁵ See <https://www.iso.org/committee/45020.html>.

⁶ See <https://www.iso.org/isoiec-jtc-1.html>.

⁷ See <http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List>.

membership fee (Barron and Spulber, 2018). At the same time, it can be seen that SSOs provide vertical coordination among suppliers, producers and distributors, and SSOs are important for coordination of R&D, entrepreneurship, and product innovation in many industries (Spulber, 2018).

An SSO incorporates all variants of groups that develop standards, including Special Interest Groups (SIGs), standards-development organizations (SDOs), consortia, and other entities. The acronym SSO is often used interchangeably with SDO but, in principle, the former term covers the activities of both setting and managing standards, including associated intellectual property issues (Maskus, 2013).

SSO members participate in the institution voluntarily and their compliance with technology standards is also voluntary (Barron and Spulber, 2018). Given that participation in SSO can be expensive and time-consuming, why so many firms choose to participate actively in voluntary, consensus-based standard setting activities?

According to Braveman (2013), SSOs have many potential benefits, whose collaborative work can advance technology, promote health and safety, and enhance quality and efficiency. From an antitrust perspective, by facilitating comparability and interoperability, SSOs can lessen barriers to entry, increase competition, reduce costs, and thus serve consumer welfare. The literature in economics focused on the institution of SSOs has largely considered one role: that of a forum where competitors can resolve conflicts. According to Farrell and Saloner (1988), the SSOs are also a place where the two parties can negotiate, but has no institutional features (e.g., rules governing decision-making or requiring concessions from sponsors).

The core function of SSOs is to facilitate decisions by their members on the adoption of a standard. That is, who is eligible to vote, how voting power is allocated, and what approval thresholds are required are important issues to analyze for the adoption of a standard (Barron and Spulber, 2018). At the same time, these decision rules vary significantly across SSOs ranging from majority rule to full consensus (Spulber, 2018).

Most SSOs have adopted policies requiring that participants either disclose and/or license patents that are essential to the implementation of the standards (Contreras, 2017). These standard essential patents are indispensable in order to manufacture a product or offer a service based on the standards (Bekkers et al., 2011). Accordingly, a key element for standard development organizations' disclosure and licensing policies is how patents (or patent claims) are classified as "essential" to a standard, and what essentiality entails in practice.

Essential patents may strengthen the patentee's case for infringement by accused products that comply with the standard. For instance, in 2014, Unwired Planet, that acquired a portfolio of more than 2,800 patents from Ericsson in 2013, asserted six of these patents in the UK against a group of defendants including Huawei, Samsung and Google. Unwired Planet claimed that five of the six patents were essential to a portion of ETSI's 4G LTE standard. Then by April 2016, three of these technical trials had been completed with findings that two of Unwired Planet's asserted patents were valid and essential and two were not. In the cases Unwired Planet was successful, the court's decision regarding essentiality of the asserted patents hinged on the question of claim construction. A UK High Court, after a detailed claim construction exercise, agreed with Unwired Planet's construction and concluded that the patent was essential to the standard and thereby infringed (Contreras, 2017).

Patents often contain a number of different claims, some of which may cover technology included in a standard, and others of which may not. In essential claim infringement cases, the litigants will often argue whether a given claim is, or is not, essential. In the latter case, the non-essential claims should not be licensed on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) conditions (discussed

below). According to Bekkers and Updegrove (2012), nine of the ten standard development organizations' policies have IPR policies that refer to essential claims, as compared to "essential patents".

Next, we discuss IPR policies in SSOs.

2.2 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policies in SSOs.

Intellectual property rights, and particularly patent claims, provide special challenges to standards developers. According to Bekkers and Updegrove (2012), SSO IPR policies regarding SEPs may cover two important aspects: rules on the disclosure of SEPs, and member obligations to make a licensing commitment. Besides these two important types of SSO roles, Farrell et al. (2007) also discussed negotiation rules that could help make negotiations better on royalty negotiation practices.

The most common rules related to IPR policies are traditionally referred to as "fair", and "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (or FRAND) terms. The FRAND commitment is a voluntary agreement between the SSOs and their members, i.e., the holders of essential patents (Barron and Spulber, 2018).

As most formal standards bodies have adopted a FRAND policy, the members are obliged to notify any essential patent they hold and are requested to issue a public statement that they are willing to license for royalty-free or royalty-bearing under the FRAND conditions. However, this procedure may create some degree of uncertainty about using the lists of essential patents as an indicator of knowledge position. First, firms are allowed to submit "blanket claims", stating that they will license essential patents on FRAND conditions. Such blanket claims do not reveal individual patents, but help their owners possess large portfolios of essential patents even if the owners don't own any essential patents. Inversely, there is some degree of "over-claiming", where firms declaring patents to be essential while they are not in fact, for the purpose of licensing their patents (Bekkers and Martinelli, 2012). And this may arise from few legal or regulatory penalties associated with declaring too many patents as essential versus severe penalties for under-declaring (Contreras, 2017).

Some literature pays attention to the relationship between the SSO IPR policies and operations of different SSOs. Many studies seek to explain it in terms of a policy tradeoff for an SSO: stronger rules mitigate the hold-up problem, but could cause some patent holders not to join the SSO (Farrell et al., 2007).

Lerner and Tirole (2006) discussed theoretically forum shopping on SSOs activities. Their model predicts that the sponsor of an attractive technology (such as SEPs) can afford to make few concessions (such as royalty-free licensing or FRAND) to prospective users and to choose an SSO that is relatively friendly to the sponsor. Chiao et al. (2007) empirically explored SSOs' policy choices. They proposed some proxies to measure the orientation of the SSO to sponsors, which include the nature of the SSOs' organization, membership and the voting rules, and found a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level related to royalty-free licensing or FRAND required of sponsors.

Overall, we see that in recent years, the behavior of SSOs has drawn researchers' interest, although a number of issues remain unresolved. This paper aims to contribute some new insights to this emerging body of research.

3 Data

Despite the SSOs' economic importance and dynamism, they have received surprisingly little empirical scrutiny (Chiao et al., 2007). One reason for that is that, as indicated by Baron and Spulber (2018), data on SSO membership has so far only been available and used for single SSOs or small groups of related SSOs and consortia.

The Searle Center Database (SCDB) on technology standards and SSOs has been recently developed by Baron and Spulber in 2015.⁸ This database combines comprehensive information on technology standards, SSO membership and SSO characteristics in a format designed for economic research. In particular, the database includes data on quantifiable characteristics of 797,711 standard documents issued by 615 SSOs, institutional membership in a sample of 191 Standards Organizations, and the rules of 36 SSOs on standard adoption procedures, standard-essential patents (SEPs), participation and openness. Baron and Spulber (2018) track both institutional membership and the SSO rules and procedures over time since the inception of the Archives in 1996, and identify 67,417 entities participating in at least one standards organization. Additionally, the database includes information on various document characteristics, such as the publication date, the issuing SSO, the technological classification, the number of pages, references between documents, equivalence between documents issued by different SSOs, and withdrawal dates (if the document is inactive).

In this paper, in order to analyze the relationship between the SSOs' IPR policies and membership of the SSOs, especially for multinational private firms, we employ the Searle Center Database. We merge the database's SCDB *sso policies file* with the SCDB members file, to obtain the information of IPR policies and membership for SSOs which are most engaged in the ICT field.⁹

We clean/sanitize the private firms' name, and identify 1066 observations that are active in the 28 SSOs during the period 1995 to 2015. We also use PATSTAT ver. Oct. 2016, a patent data set, to collect the information for the firms' patent applications and patent classifications in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Then we utilize the sample to show the two-mode social network relations that will be discussed in the next section, between the SSOs and their memberships, and investigate empirically the relationship between the SSOs' IPR policies and their membership in section 5.

4 Networks analysis of membership in SSOs

4.1 Two-mode network

Once transformed into a bilateral data set, i.e., the SSOs and member of the SSOs, the network structure of the SSOs' memberships can be studied. In such a two-mode network, there are two kinds of vertices, one representing firms that engage in different SSOs, and the other representing the SSOs which these firms belong. The affiliations connect between the SSOs and firms, and a firm does not connect with any other firm directly.

⁸ See <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/data/technologystandards/>.

⁹ We also reference Bekkers and Updegrave (2012) to obtain additional information for the IPR policies that are necessary in our empirical analysis.

We can create two one-mode networks from the two-mode network: a network of interlocking SSOs and a network of firms that are members of the same SSO. Especially for the latter, the firms can be connected by multiple lines (routes), indicating that two firms affiliate in more than one SSO. We can measure centrality by using Betweenness centrality proposed by Freeman (1979).

The Betweenness centrality calculates the extent to which a company is located on the shortest path between any two nodes in the one-mode network. For company i , its value of Betweenness centrality can be measured by,

$$\text{Betweenness centrality}_i = \sum_{j \neq k \neq i} \frac{g_{jk}(i)}{g_{jk}} \quad (1)$$

where $g_{jk}(i)$ denotes the number of shortest paths linking firms j and k that contain focal company i , and g_{jk} is the total number of shortest paths from company j to company k . The *Betweenness centrality* captures both the centrality and the spanning of structural holes in the network, and reflects the extent to which the company plays an important role in SSOs activities.

{Insert Figure1 here}

Figure 1 depicts Betweenness centrality for our sample firms. The vertex (of the firms) sizes show values of Betweenness centrality, and the positions of the vertices (of the firms) in the networks are determined with the Kamada–Kawai energy command of Pajek, which makes the vertices with high values of Betweenness centrality occupy the central position, (inversely, vertexes with low values of the Betweenness centrality situate peripherally).

As shown in this figure, INTEL, IBM, MICROSOFT, HITACHI, TOSHIBA and HEWLETT-PACKARD locate in the center of the network with the biggest size of the vertex, and there are some firms with relatively high values of Betweenness centrality around the central firms, such as HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES and SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS, the firms from emerging economies. In contrast to those firms, the figure also shows that FACEBOOK and AMAZON, two firms of the Big Four tech firms (GAFA) are located peripherally because they only associated with fewer SSOs activities.¹⁰ It may be that the market power, partly associated with scale economies and network externalities, that FACEBOOK and AMAZON possess, induce them to locate in the periphery. This can have implications for antitrust enforcement.

4.2 Communities in the two-mode network

Our two-mode network comprises more than a thousand nodes that are related to 28 SSOs and 1066 firms. One of the ways to analyze the properties of these nodes is by understanding their group behavior, i.e., community properties. In this paper, we employ the Louvain method for community detection in our two-mode network.¹¹

¹⁰ Due to space limitations, we only note the names for selected members in the figure. The full names for the sample companies for the figure are available on request.

¹¹ Our placement of firms in communities may be seen as an empirical complement to the vertically differentiated groups noted by Spulber (2018).

The Louvain method searches for the partition of vertices into clusters with the highest value of modularity.¹² Modularity was introduced by Newman and Girvan (2004) for undirected graphs as a formalization of the common requirement that the connections within graph clusters should be dense, and the connections between different graph clusters that should be sparse (Rotta and Noack, 2011). Details about how firms are placed in communities can be visualized in the Appendix.

{Insert Figure 2 here}

Figure 2 represents an image of four communities/clusters measured by the software Pajek, in which the resolution parameter is set to 1.0 and the communities are obtained with the modularity 0.47. The four communities are marked with four different forms, in which small diamond refers to Community 1, small black diamond is Community 2, a circle is Community 3, and a large black circle is Community 4. We can see these vertices separated in terms of communities, but the borders of communities are ambiguous, even joined with each other to some extent. However, lines connected with firms within a community are supposed to have larger values, i.e., involvement in more same SSOs than those between the communities. Then we list the names of firms in each cluster.

{Insert Table 1 here}

The number of firms in communities 1-4 are 376, 368, 228, and 94, respectively. We notice that, in Community 1, there are some leading telecommunications companies that are active in the SSOs such as Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) and European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) on developing standards of internet technologies, especially on the 5G network, internet of things and so on.

On the other hand, Community 2 includes leading global companies that share more SSOs such as PCI-SIG and JEDEC Solid State Technology Association on developing standards for the semiconductor and microelectronics industry.

The SSOs that firms are involved in Community 3 quite overlap with those in Community 2. However, the firms in Community 3 pay more attention to consumer technologies. These firms' standardization activities are associated with the design and manufacture of consumer electronics products and related services, and so on.

Although the number of firms in Community 4 is the least among the four communities, this community includes some important companies that are technology and innovation leaders in defense, civil government, business applications and cybersecurity solutions.

In the next section, we will check the IPR policies of the SSOs, to find out if there is relationship between the SSOs' IPR policies and the SSOs membership, say, the communities of the SSOs member companies in our case.

¹² The method is a greedy optimization method that attempts to optimize the "modularity" of the network (modularity is defined here). The optimization is performed in two steps. First, the method looks for "small" communities by optimizing modularity locally. Second, it aggregates nodes belonging to the same community and builds a new network whose nodes are the communities. These steps are repeated iteratively until a maximum of modularity is attained and a hierarchy of communities is produced (Blondel et al, 2008).

5 Empirical analysis of effects of IPR policies on SSOs membership

Although many studies have focused on the SSO IPR policies, few studies have examined the relation between SSOs' IPR policies and their membership in a formal empirical analysis. We attempt to fill this gap based on the fact that a firm can choose between different SSOs to develop a standard, and different IPR policies in these SSOs may play different roles on the behavior of the SSOs membership. In our empirical analysis, we focus on the rules on the disclosure of SEPs, and member obligations to make licensing commitment. Furthermore, we also discuss the roles of the SSOs' policy-making processes on the SSOs membership.

To implement the empirical analysis, we uniquely quantify IPR rules and policymaking rules in SSOs.

5.1 Indices for IPR policies

We highlight major IPR policies summarized in Bekkers and Andrew (2013), Barron and Spulber (2018) and the Searle Center Database (SCDB). Some of them are related to the SEPs and their licenses, and some of them may influence a company's behavior as a participant in SSOs. The indexation of IPR policies is as follows.

- (1) **Licensing terms:** Almost all SSOs in our sample require licensing on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, which is the least restrictive option. Additionally, there is another option in which firms are willing to offer licenses of SEPs royalty-free. We convert all the policies into an index. In this case, if an SSO requires royalty-free on FRAND terms, we set it to 3. If an SSO requires FRAND while royalty-free is optional, we set it to 2. The index is 1 if only FRAND, and zero for the case of "no obligation".
- (1) **Disclosure requirement:** Almost all SSOs expect their members to disclose their patents that may be (or potentially become) essential to a standard. We set it to 2 if one SSO requires disclosure, and set it to 1 if the requirement is not a strict yes or only being "encouraged", and zero for the case of "Not specified".
- (2) **Disclosure timing:** Many SSOs generally ask for "timely" disclosure, or disclosing SEPs "as early as possible", and some of them have adopted more specific policies. The required timing can be a specified number of days either after the publication of a specification, standard or draft standard, or before the (final) vote on a standard. In addition, SSOs may require that a disclosure statement must be made simultaneously with a technical contribution to the standard. The most generous disclosure policy allows patents to be disclosed within 90 days from the issuance of a final specification. Furthermore, some SSOs that do specify a disclosure timing require disclosure prior to approval/vote on a standard. We set the related index to 2 for these two cases. On the other hand, we set it to 1 for the case of "as soon as possible", and zero for the case of "not specified".
- (3) **Discourage blanket statement:** These are generic statements by a firm declaring that it holds one or more SEPs for a specific standard or standard project, as opposed to the disclosure of a specific and clearly identified patent or patent claim. Some of the SSOs accept but discourage blanket declarations. Blanket declarations generally are not allowed if the patent holder chooses not to make its patents available for licensing. If an SSO explicitly requires the disclosure of special patents we give the index a score of 2. If an SSO discourages blanket

declarations, we give a 1. Otherwise, if the blanket statement is allowed we give -1; and zero denotes for the case of “not specified”.

In addition to specifying the general nature of the required licensing offer for SEPs, many SSOs adopt additional rules on SEP licensing. Here we consider another two licensing rules.

- (4) **Defensive:** If an SSO explicitly allows the defensive suspension of a FRAND or royalty-free licensing contract on SEPs in case the patent holder is sued by the licensee, we set the related index to 2, and if the SSO allows this condition but does not claim explicitly, we set it to 1. Otherwise for the case of “not allowed” we set it to -1, and zero for the case of “not specified”.
- (5) **Irrevocability:** There is no example of an SSO policy stipulating that licensing commitments may be revocable. So, if it is irrevocability, we set it to 1, and zero for “not specified”.

Overall, we see that there are many dimensions to IPR policies related to SSOs and how we are able to quantify them.

5.2 Indices for SSO policymaking process

Further, we also consider some variables which represent the features of the SSOs’ policy-making processes. Again, these would figure in firms’ decision to join or remain in a particular SSO.

- (1) **Open meetings:** Many SSOs provide information and opportunities to participate to non-members. The level of openness to the general public varies substantially between different SSOs. We set the index to 2 for “Yes”, 1 for “Invitation-based”, zero for “Not specified”, and -1 for the case of “No”.
- (2) **Quorum:** In the SSOs, a vote on a standard document typically is conditioned on the existence of a sufficient quorum for meetings. The quorum range varies between different SSOs from 30 to 100% (consensus decision-making process) of eligible voting members. We add a value of 0% for the case of “no quorum”. Voting power may substitute for market power in some cases (Spulber, 2018).
- (3) **Approval:** The requirement for the approval of a standard ranges from a simple majority (50.1 %) to unanimity (100%) of expressed votes (abstentions not counted). We use the percentages of approval thresholds in our empirical analysis.
- (4) **Appeals allowed:** Many SSOs allow members to appeal votes and decisions on standards. Here, we set 1 for the case of “Yes”, zero for “Not specified”, and -1 for “No”.

Again, different dimensions of SSO policymaking process are quantified.

We also utilize *Betweenness centrality* measured in the one-mode network, number of patent applications to USPTO, and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measured by 4-digit International Patent Classifications (IPC) that have been issued by USPTO to US patents for each member company as control variables in our regressions.¹³ Patents capture the technological process of a firm, while the HHI index captures market power, and *Betweenness centrality* captures the importance of the firm in spatial terms. Alternatively, patents and HHI can be viewed as control variables on the size and scope of the firms’ IPR portfolio.

¹³ Whereas, HHI captures market power, firms looking to join SSOs face a tradeoff between market power and voting power (Spulber, 2018).

{Insert Table 2 here}

Table 2 presents the statistics of indices for the IPR policies and other covariables for the four communities. Compared with the other three clusters, the indices in Community 4 show a stronger tendency or commitment in *Licensing terms*, *Disclosure requirement*, and *Defensive suspension* of FRAND. The SSOs in Community 4 are also more open to the general public and non-members. Contrast to those in Community 4, the SSOs in Community 1 seem more reluctant to providing information and opportunities to outsiders. Furthermore, Community 1 shows higher values of Betweenness centrality for member firms, suggesting that the companies are involved in more SSOs activities and located at more central positions in the one mode network. Compared with the other three communities, the SSOs in Community 3 reveal their IPR policies more in moderation.

In our sample, the number of patents was the highest in Community 1, and the lowest in Community 4. At the same time, market concentration, denoted by HHI, shows the same trend across communities (Table 2).

The formal econometric analysis will reveal, which of these factors strongly dictate firms' placement in different communities.

5.3 Econometric framework

To explain the drivers of SSO membership in different communities, we employ a formal econometric methodology. Because explanatory variables are typically observed only for the chosen alternative (or community in our paper) and not for the other alternatives. That is, these variables are case-specific (or community-specific). So, we use multinomial logit model to test our hypothesis that deals with the probability of belonging to a community.¹⁴

If j community is the base community, the multinomial logit model specifies that

$$P(y = i|X_i) = \frac{\exp(X_i\beta_i)}{1 + \sum_{m \neq j} \exp(X_m\beta_m)}; \quad i = 1, 2, \dots; j - 1, j + 1, \dots, J \quad (2)$$

For the base community j ,

$$P(y = j|X_j) = \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{m \neq j} \exp(X_m\beta_m)} \quad (3)$$

Where X_i are the regressors for i th community-specific, which include the indexes discussed above for the IPR policies and policymaking process in the SSOs in which the community i 's member firms are involved. X_i also includes some control covariables such as the logarithm of the number of USPTO patents, *Betweenness centrality* and HHI for the member firms in the community i .

Due to the fact that the SSOs' IPR policies seem to be more moderate, we set Community 3 as the base community, and compare the other three communities with Community 3. Thus, a positive coefficient from the regressions would mean that member firms in this community favor that IPR policy as compared with those in the base community.

¹⁴ See the details of the multinomial logit model in Wooldridge (2010, p.644).

5.4 Regression results

{Insert Table 3 here}

We utilize the multinomial logit regression technique to investigate the relations between SSOs membership and their IPR policies. The multinomial logit estimates are summarized in Table 3.

The estimation results show that coefficients of *Betweenness centrality* are consistently and significantly positive for Community 1, relatively to that in Community 3 (base community), suggesting that member firms in community 1 are involved in more SSOs, and positioned more central in the one-mode network. On the other hand, the size of the patent portfolio held by member firms, (i.e., log of number of patents) is negative and significant in 1 and 4, implying that compared with these two communities, member firms in the communities 2 and 3 are more likely to be those whose patent portfolio size is comparatively larger. At the same time, the estimates of *HHI* for the member firms show strongly significant and negative in Community 2 and somewhat negative and significant in Community 4. This suggests that member firms in the two communities might hold a more concentrated (market powerful) patent portfolio in more specific technology fields.

Then we turn to the estimation results for *Licensing terms* and *Disclosure requirement*, which we suppose represent the core IPR policy of SSOs. As indicated by Bekkers and Updegrove (2012), most SSOs' IPR policies have two core elements: (1) rules for providing licensing commitments and (2) rules for disclosure of patents that may have essential claims. For all SSOs, the minimum goal is to ensure that all known essential IPRs are available under FRAND license terms.

The estimates of *Licensing terms* are strongly positive and significant in communities or clusters 1, 2 and 4. These results imply that member firms in the three communities favor the FRAND terms relatively more compared with those in Community 3. Particularly for Community 4, the larger size of estimated coefficients implies that firms favoring the FRAND policy most likely choose as membership in Community 4, relative to other communities.

With regard to *Disclosure requirement*, however, the estimated coefficients show significantly negative for firms in communities 2 and 4, suggesting that compared with firms in Community 3, the firms in the two communities are with a decreased reliance on rules of disclosure requirement. For instance, in the Community 2, more than 80 firms are involved in the activities of PCI-SIG. According to the Searle Center Database (SCDB), this SSO did not specify their members to disclose their patents that may be or become essential to a standard.

The disclosure element of IPR policies also includes *Disclosure timing*, *Blanket statement*, *Defensive* and *Irrevocability*. On the whole, the coefficients of these policies in the Community 2 reveal strongly significant and positive relation. Compared with member firms in the other three communities, member firms in Community 2 have a tendency to pursue early disclosure and discourage blanket disclosure. At the same time, the member firms in communities 1 and 2 are more likely involved in SSOs that allow defensive suspension of a FRAND or royalty-free licensing contract on SEPs if the patent holder is sued by the licensee.

Furthermore, our regressions also include variables which represent the features of the SSOs' policy-making processes, i.e., *Open meetings*, *Quorum*, *Approval* and *Appeals allowed*. The estimated coefficients of *Open meetings* are significantly negative, implying that the member firms in Community 1 seem to be reluctant in openness to the general public. On the other hand, for Community 1, the estimates of *Quorum* and *Appeals allowed* show significantly negative and positive, respectively. Relative to the other three communities, the member firms in Community 1 have a

tendency to pursue a policy that is associated with a lower quorum range of eligible voting members that must be present when voting on the standard document, and allows members to appeal votes and decisions on standards.

Finally, as for the features of approval thresholds for standards, the estimates of *Approval* are significantly negative in Community 2, which means that the SSOs with lower approval thresholds for standards may attract more member firms to be active in this community.

In closing, we provide some perspective on our findings in relation to the literature. Unlike Chiao et al. (2007), where the relationship between user friendliness and concessions is examined in the nature of the SSOs, we paid more attention to the individual member firms and their consideration of the IPR policies of SSOs. Our empirical results suggest that member firms' consideration of IPR policy orientation or features of the SSOs' policymaking processes are very mixed and vary across different communities/clusters. Thus, our results provide more information on the behavior of market participants on the SSOs, especially on the SSOs' IPR policies. One implication is that regulations that mandate standards, should consider potential implication on firms' propensities to join SSOs that might vary widely across industries. The concluding section follows.

6 Conclusions

Standards Setting Organizations are essential to production and commerce, albeit their recognition is less on the part of consumers. Membership in SSOs is voluntary on the part of firms, and most SSOs favor open source standard-setting procedures. With voluntary membership and the ability to join multiple SSOs, yet very little is formally known about firms' propensities to join SSOs and which factors matter in significantly driving such decisions.

To address this gap, in this paper, we attempt to examine the relationship between SSOs' IPR policies and their membership. We employed the Searle Center Database on the SSOs, and merge the SCDB's *sso* policies file with the SCDB's *member* file, to obtain a sample for approximately 1060 member firms and indices of IPR policies for 28 SSOs.

By using social network software *Pajek*, we built a two-mode network for the relation between the SSOs and their member firms, in which, we highlighted some indexes like *Betweenness centrality*, and *community* to explore the features of the two-mode network.

We then implemented an empirical analysis to investigate the relationship between the SSOs' IPR policies and the membership. We paid attention to the fact that a company can choose between different SSOs to develop a standard, and different IPR policies in these SSOs may play different roles on the behavior of the SSOs membership. Consequently, we focused on some crucial IPR policies and features of the SSOs' policy-making processes.

Our main findings revealed that the member firms IPR policy orientation or features of the SSOs' policy making processes vary across different communities. As pointed out by Bekkers and Updegrove (2012) and Farrell et al. (2007), many SSOs have rules or policies relevant to the patent hold-up problem. These policies cover several very important areas, such as disclosure rules, requiring certain disclosures of essential patents, the timing and locus of license negotiations; and licensing rules, governing the level and structure of royalties. And most SSOs often require participants to license essential patents on "Fair, Reasonable and Non-discriminatory (FRAND)" terms.

On the whole, most of the member firms favor the FRAND terms, whereas the member companies in Community 2 have a strong tendency to pursue early disclosure and discourage blanket disclosure.

Note that Community 2 include leading global firms that share more SSOs such as PCI-SIG and JEDEC Solid State Technology Association on developing standards for the semiconductor and microelectronics industry.

The empirical analysis results also showed that, most member firms, especially those in Community 1, seem to be with low openness level and reluctant to provide information and opportunities to the general public, even those companies in Community 1 are involved in most SSOs activities. This finding has implications for knowledge flows and diffusion of information. The results showed that firms' patent portfolio and market power also affected tendencies to belong to certain SSO communities over others.

Although there exist heavily overlaps among the SSOs in which member firms are involved, the firms' SSOs IPR policy orientation can be still identified in our empirical analysis. Certain SSO IPR policies can substitute for government regulations. These policy choices are more likely related to member firms' technology features or IPR strategies. Consequently, the relationship between the SSOs IPR policies, and the member firms' technology features and IPR strategies are expected to be explored in future studies. Nevertheless, the present research has provided unique graphical and empirical insights into the formation and memberships of networks across SSOs.

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
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Data Availability Statement


The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources listed.

Figure 1: Image of Betweenness centrality



Notes: *Betweenness* centrality calculates the extent to which a company is located on the shorted path between any two nodes in the one-mode network (see Section 4). The vertex (of the firms) sizes show values of *Betweenness centrality*, and the positions of the vertexes (of the firms) in the networks are determined with the Kamada–Kawai energy command of *Pajek*, which makes the vertices with high values of *Betweenness centrality* occupying the central position, (inversely, vertices with low values of the *Betweenness centrality* situate peripherally) in the one-mode network.

Figure 2: Image of Communities



Notes: The Louvain method is used to place firms in communities. This method searches for the partition of vertices into clusters with the highest value of modularity. Lines connected with firms within a community are supposed to have larger values than those between communities. The larger values suggest that member firms in a community are involved in more same SSOs than those between communities.

Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics

Community	1	2	3	4
Key members	INTEL	NEC	TOSHIBA	BOEING
	IBM	TEXAS INSTRUMENTS	STMICROELECTRONICS	RAYTHEON COMPANY
	HITACHI	SUN MICROSYSTEMS	GOOGLE	MITRE
	HEWLETT-PACKARD	PHILIPS	CANON	LOCKHEED MARTIN
	SIEMENS	THOMSON	DELL COMPUTER	AVAYA
	NOKIA	THALES	ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES	BAE SYSTEMS
	ERICSSON AB	OKI ELECTRIC INDUSTRY	RICOH	WIND RIVER
	MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS	RENESES ELECTRONICS	NVIDIA	RED HAT
	MITSUBISHI	SANYO	ROBERT BOSCH	VIASAT
	MICROSOFT	GENERAL DYNAMICS	HONEYWELL	SOFTWARE AG
	HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES	TYCO ELECTRONICS	SANDISK	SAP AG
	FUJITSU	NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR	TOYOTA MOTOR	TATA CONSULTANCY
	SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS	COMPAQ	HYUNDAI	QINETIQ
	CISCO SYSTEMS	GENERAL ELECTRIC	LENOVO	INVENSYS
	NTT	XILINX	DOLBY LABORATORIES	CRITICAL PATH
	ALCATEL-LUCENT	LSI LOGIC	VICTOR COMPANY OF JAPAN	DELOITTE
	NORTEL NETWORKS	LSI	LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL	DIGITAL EQUIPMENT
	ORACLE	ALTERA	PIONEER ELECTRONIC	INFOSYS
	SONY	NORTHROP GRUMMAN	DENSO	TRW
	ZTE	YOKOGAWA ELECTRIC	ADOBE SYSTEMS	OBJECTIVE INTERFACE SYSTEMS
				
Total	376	368	228	94
SSOs mostly involved	TIA	PCI-SIG	CEA	TOG
	ETSI	JEDEC	Wi-Fi Alliance	OASIS
	3GPP	VESA	PCI-SIG	DMTF

Source: Own calculations based on GMOP. (Table-Figure_Source)

Table 2: Descriptive statistics

Variables	Community 1			Community 2			Community 3			Community 4		
	Obs.	Mean	SD	Obs.	Mean	SD	Obs.	Mean	SD	Obs.	Mean	SD
<i>Licensing terms</i>	1970	1.79	0.82	1416	1.76	0.78	849	1.55	0.72	269	2.48	0.77
<i>Disclosure requirement</i>	1970	1.25	0.61	1416	1.06	0.73	849	1.37	0.69	269	1.43	0.67
<i>Disclosure timing</i>	1937	1.18	0.61	1411	1.23	0.56	839	1.16	0.52	258	0.84	0.66
<i>Discourage blanket</i>	1970	0.70	1.26	1416	0.52	1.18	849	0.85	1.29	269	0.67	1.28
<i>Defensive</i>	1923	0.30	0.57	1392	0.46	0.73	837	0.09	0.87	204	0.54	0.57
<i>Irrevocability</i>	1970	0.48	0.50	1416	0.37	0.48	849	0.30	0.46	269	0.52	0.50
<i>Open meetings</i>	1978	0.19	0.90	1432	0.27	1.02	862	0.60	1.22	280	0.83	0.94
<i>Quorum</i>	1896	0.36	0.22	1385	0.47	0.20	823	0.43	0.20	225	0.54	0.35
<i>Approval</i>	1953	0.66	0.19	1417	0.61	0.15	851	0.64	0.16	280	0.62	0.30
<i>Appeals allowed</i>	1978	0.49	0.52	1432	0.33	0.49	862	0.51	0.53	280	0.48	0.50
<i>No. of Patents</i>	1978	8212.9	19034.2	1432	2505.4	6132.1	862	4487.1	11946.0	280	1001.6	1641.7
<i>Betweenness centrality</i>	1978	1.35	1.11	1432	0.75	0.75	862	0.78	0.74	280	0.58	0.70
<i>HHI</i>	1933	0.81	0.13	1419	0.76	0.18	858	0.80	0.15	276	0.72	0.24


Note: Data source for patents and HHI is PATSTAT ver. Oct. 2016, and *Betweenness centrality* is measured by the software *Pajek* 4.05. The other variables come from Bekker and Updegrave (2013) and SCDB.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics

Dependent variables →	Probability in Community 1			Probability in Community 2			Probability in Community 4		
<i>Licensing terms</i>	0.201*** (3.11)	0.357*** (5.46)	0.363*** (4.74)	0.389*** (5.82)	0.371*** (5.51)	0.309*** (4.15)	1.096*** (6.47)	1.173*** (5.67)	1.215*** (4.05)
<i>Disclosure requirement</i>	-0.272*** (-3.38)	-0.131 (-1.16)	-0.143 (-1.18)	-0.960*** (-10.96)	-0.815*** (-7.29)	-0.727*** (-6.11)	-0.702*** (-3.17)	-1.713*** (-4.75)	-1.743*** (-4.09)
<i>Disclosure timing</i>	0.166* (1.89)	-0.030 (-0.25)	-0.021 (-0.16)	0.703*** (7.36)	0.630*** (4.81)	0.494*** (3.62)	-0.493*** (-2.91)	0.008 (0.04)	-0.002 (-0.01)
<i>Discourage blanket</i>	-0.056 (-1.15)	-0.029 (-0.53)	-0.029 (-0.51)	0.118** (2.41)	0.215*** (3.85)	0.134** (2.26)	0.252* (1.83)	0.323** (2.17)	0.300** (2.02)
<i>Defensive</i>	0.240*** (3.17)	0.239*** (2.60)	0.230** (2.53)	0.646*** (7.91)	0.799*** (8.63)	0.771*** (8.44)	0.592*** (4.18)	0.458* (1.93)	0.400 (1.39)
<i>Irrevocability</i>	0.602*** (5.41)		-0.053 (-0.33)	-0.050 (-0.46)		0.478*** (2.87)	0.231 (0.78)		-0.030 (-0.08)
<i>Open meetings</i>		-0.509*** (-9.37)	-0.418*** (-5.76)		-0.262*** (-4.20)	0.187** (2.27)		0.107 (1.27)	0.262 (1.45)
<i>Quorum</i>		-0.878*** (-4.32)	-1.816*** (-6.45)		1.048*** (4.46)	0.038 (0.12)		1.095*** (3.33)	-3.406*** (-5.72)
<i>Approval</i>		0.470 (1.49)	-0.625 (-1.52)		-1.625*** (-4.68)	-1.509*** (-2.85)		2.354*** (5.74)	-0.638 (-0.29)
<i>Appeals allowed</i>		0.452*** (3.95)	0.662*** (4.64)		-0.141 (-1.06)	-0.476** (-2.49)		-0.838*** (-4.08)	0.182 (0.47)
<i>Log (No. of Patents)</i>	-0.188*** (-5.59)	-0.169*** (-5.14)	-0.188*** (-5.32)	0.031 (0.93)	0.050 (1.60)	0.029 (0.85)	-0.141** (-2.12)	-0.208*** (-2.61)	-0.210*** (-2.64)
<i>Betweenness Centrality</i>	1.001*** (11.95)	1.002*** (12.25)	0.995*** (11.21)	-0.019 (-0.23)	-0.060 (-0.76)	-0.051 (-0.58)	0.151 (0.85)	-0.008 (-0.05)	0.461** (2.36)
<i>HHI</i>	-0.489 (-1.54)	-0.432 (-1.40)	-0.424 (-1.30)	-1.544*** (-4.73)	-1.395*** (-4.52)	-1.361*** (-4.10)	-1.340** (-2.23)	-0.615 (-0.75)	-0.584 (-0.71)
Chi2 [p-value]	880.3 [0.00]	753.8 [0.00]	967.8 [0.00]	880.3 [0.00]	753.8 [0.00]	967.8 [0.00]	880.3 [0.00]	753.8 [0.00]	958.7 [0.00]
Log likelihood	-4455.59	-4578.15	-3987.80	-4455.59	-4578.15	-3987.80	-4455.59	-4578.15	-3987.21
No. of observations	4234	4267	4015	4234	4267	4015	4234	4015	4015

Notes: (1) The values in the parentheses are robust t statistics in these multinomial logit regressions. (2) ***, ** and * denote significant level at 1, 5, 10% respectively. (3) Community 3 is set as the base category.

APPENDIX



Converting 2-mode network (companies and SSOs) to 1-mode network (companies)

