

Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina; Deza, Monica

Working Paper

Can Sanctuary Polices Reduce Domestic Violence?

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 12868

Provided in Cooperation with:

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Suggested Citation: Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina; Deza, Monica (2019) : Can Sanctuary Polices Reduce Domestic Violence?, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 12868, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215264>

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

Terms of use:

Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.

You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.

If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 12868

Can Sanctuary Polices Reduce Domestic Violence?

Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes
Monica Deza

DECEMBER 2019

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

IZA DP No. 12868

Can Sanctuary Polices Reduce Domestic Violence?

Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes

University of California, Merced and IZA

Monica Deza

City University of New York

DECEMBER 2019

Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity.

The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor economics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the world's largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society.

IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.

ISSN: 2365-9793

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9
53113 Bonn, Germany

Phone: +49-228-3894-0
Email: publications@iza.org

www.iza.org

ABSTRACT

Can Sanctuary Polices Reduce Domestic Violence?

Domestic violence remains a serious public problem, especially in Hispanic communities, where one in three women are victims of domestic violence in their lifetimes. Yet, less than 50 percent of Hispanic women report the incidents, indicating lack of confidence in the police and fear they might be asked about their immigration status or that of relatives and friends as two main motives for not reporting. We examine the extent to which the adoption of sanctuary policies, which limit the cooperation of local law enforcement with federal immigration authorities, affect domestic homicide rates – a crime rarely unreported. We find that sanctuary policies lower domestic homicide rates among Hispanic women, but have no effect on white-non Hispanic women or men. The impact is particularly large in counties with higher immigration enforcement and in those with more female officers. On the other hand, sanctuary policies are less effective in counties with mandated arrest laws in place. These findings are suggestive of the important role of policies that increase community trust in the police in curtailing domestic violence, whether it is by promoting the early reporting of incidents, inhibiting potential offenders or increasing women's economic independence.

JEL Classification: D1, I1, J1, K14

Keywords: domestic violence, sanctuary policies, domestic homicides, crime policy

Corresponding author:

Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes
Departement of Economics
University of California – Merced
5200 North Lake Rd.
Merced, CA 95343
USA

E-mail: camuedo-dorantes@ucmerced.edu

1. Introduction

Domestic violence accounts for 15 percent of all violent crimes in the United States (Truman and Morgan, 2014). One in seven men and one in four women will be victims of domestic violence during their lifetimes.¹ In the case of Hispanic women, this rate is one in three, with 63 percent of the victims enduring multiple episodes of domestic violence (National Latino Network, 2013).² Yet, less than 50 percent of them report the incidents, with some of the most common mentioned reasons for not reporting being fear and lack of confidence in the police, as well as fear of deportation (*e.g.* Wright and Benson, 2010; Sabina *et al.*, 2013; Reina *et al.*, 2014; Zadnik *et al.*, 2016; Mowder *et al.*, 2018).

Concerns regarding the potential cooperation of local law enforcement with immigration officials are not unique to undocumented immigrants or immigrants. Hugo *et al.* (2018) document how a majority of Latinos (55 percent) indicate worrying “a lot” or “some” about a relative or a close friend being deported, regardless of their immigration or legal status –up from 47 percent in 2017. These statistics corroborate police testimony, anecdotal reports, and empirical research suggesting that local police involvement in immigration enforcement increases fear and mistrust among immigrants (Nguyen and Gill, 2015; Nittle, 2018). With growing engagement of local law enforcement with the Department of Homeland Security, Hispanics have reported feeling more under suspicion,³ making them less likely to report criminal activity to the police for fear they may inquire about their immigration status or about the status of people they know (Theodore, 2013).

¹ Domestic violence national statistics retrieved from www.ncadv.org. Last accessed on December 13, 2019.

See, for example: http://victimsofcrime.org/docs/default-source/ncvrvw2015/2015ncvrvw_stats_ipv.pdf?sfvrsn=2

² For further references on these statistics, please visit: <http://www.nationallatinonetwork.org/learn-more/facts-and-statistics/references>. Last accessed on December 13, 2019.

³ Theodore (2013) surveyed Hispanics in Cook (Chicago), Harris (Houston), Los Angeles and Maricopa (Phoenix) in November of 2012 and found that 38 percent reported feeling under suspicion and 44 percent of the sample indicated being less likely to report a crime to the police for fear of having to disclose their immigration status or that of relatives and friends.

Several states and localities have limited the cooperation of their law enforcement agencies with federal immigration authorities via what have been labeled as “sanctuary policies”.⁴ Based on existing evidence of people being more likely to report a crime when they trust the police (Kwak, Dierenfeldt and McNeeley, 2019), sanctuary policies have been expected to increase community cooperation with the police. And, indeed, prior research has shown that relaxing immigration policies increases cooperation with the police among Hispanics (Jacome, 2018; Comino, Mastruoboni and Nicolo, 2016). Yet, despite the high misreporting rate of domestic violence and its high incidence among Hispanic women –who explicitly note concerns about immigration enforcement as a main reason for not reporting, we still know little about how sanctuary policies impact their domestic violence rates.⁵

Measuring the effect of sanctuary policies on domestic violence is challenging because sanctuary policies may affect both the *incidence* of domestic violence, as well as the probability to *report* a domestic violence incident. In terms of *incidence*, there could be different scenarios. On one hand, sanctuary policies may lower the incidence of domestic violence if offenders grow concerned about their victims’ increased likelihood to report an incident or if, in the midst of a friendlier environment toward immigrants, their victims feel safer to come out of the

⁴Through the adoption of a sanctuary policy, local enforcement agencies reduce the extent of their cooperation with federal immigration authorities. In most instances, they may fail to observe Immigration Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) requests to hold detainees beyond their release date for an additional 48 hours. The detainer (also called an “ICE hold”) is most often used to notify the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) of ICE’s intention to assume custody of an immigrant, or to request information about an immigrant’s impending release so ICE can attempt to assume custody before the immigrant is released from custody. Other times, they may fail to communicate to ICE when detainees for whom a detainer was issued are released. As such, sanctuary policies have the potential to lower deportation fears and raise cooperation with local authorities in Hispanic communities, especially those more severely threatened by immigration enforcement (Menjivar and Bejarano, 2004). See the case of Los Angeles Police Department as documented in “The LAPD Fights Crime, Not Illegal Immigration.” *LA Times*, Oct. 27, 2009. Available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/27/opinion/oe-bratton27>

⁵ Hispanic women have not only traditionally exhibited higher rates of domestic violence but, in addition, approximately 48 percent of Latinas report that their partner’s violence increased after they immigrated to the United States (Tjaden and Thoennes, 2000) .

shadows, search for better jobs and increase their financial independence and bargaining power (Aizer, 2010). On the other hand, sanctuary policies may increase the incidence of domestic violence if undocumented offenders foresee a lesser threat of deportation. Finally, it is also possible for immigration policy to lack a significant impact on the incidence of domestic violence. This could be the case if, for example, the number of individuals likely to respond to sanctuary policies is rather small, or if offenders and/or victims potentially involved in domestic violence are unaware of the policy.

Aside from their impact on the incidence of domestic violence, sanctuary policies may also alter the *reporting* of domestic violence incidents. In particular, we would expect a laxer immigration enforcement environment to increase the propensity to report domestic violence by victimized immigrants or by victims with migrant family members or friends, as they might feel safer in their interactions with law enforcement.

Because it is not feasible to distinguish between the impacts of sanctuary policies on the incidence versus the reporting of domestic violence using data on reported crimes,⁶ we focus on extreme events of domestic violence that rarely go unreported –namely, domestic homicides. Domestic homicides provide us with a lower bound of the extent of domestic violence –after all, this is a type of homicide typically preceded by repeated incidents of domestic violence.⁷ Domestic homicides are defined as homicides where the offender is the victim’s current or former romantic partner or a family member. To our knowledge, this is the first study examining how the adoption of sanctuary policies are impacting domestic homicide rates amongst the more afflicted female Hispanic community.

⁶ An alternative would be to use representative survey data on domestic violence. Unfortunately, the one survey deemed representative of criminal incidence in the United States –the National Crime Victimization Survey, does not provide information on the county of residence of the respondent for the more recent period during which sanctuary policies have been in place.

⁷ See: <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000250.pdf>. Last accessed on December 13, 2019.

This study contributes to the ongoing debate about immigration policies given the current policy environment of heightened immigration enforcement and the Administration's decision to no longer consider domestic violence as proper grounds for protection from deportation, even if referred to individuals seeking asylum. Taking into account the unintended consequences of immigration policies is crucial given the growing number of immigrants impacted by immigration enforcement,⁸ the high prevalence of domestic homicide among this subsample,⁹ and the high social cost of domestic violence.¹⁰ In addition, this study contributes to two main bodies of literature. First, it adds to the literature analyzing the impact of immigration policy on immigrants, especially the undocumented (*e.g.* Amuedo-Dorantes, Arenas-Arroyo and Sevilla, 2018; Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo, n.d.; 2018; Bohn, Lofstrom and Raphael, 2014), as well as on the particular effectiveness of sanctuary policies in combating crime (Wong, 2017; Gonzalez *et al.*, 2017). Second, it informs the literature on policy measures that can prove effective in reducing domestic violence and, ultimately, domestic homicide (Miller and Segal, 2019; Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo, 2019).¹¹

Using data from the Uniform Crime Report Supplementary Homicide Report and a quasi-experimental approach, we assess how sanctuary policies (*e.g.* Trust Acts, as well as local level ordinances, resolutions and practices intended to increase community trust and

⁸ The share of married couples with at least one non-citizen member per married couples has increased from 7 percent to 10 percent between 2001 and 2016 (authors' tabulations using the American Community Survey).

⁹ An average of three women are murdered by their partners every day. This implies that, of all the women murdered in the United States, about one-third are killed by intimate partners.

See: <https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv17.pdf>. Last accessed on December 13, 2019.

¹⁰ Finally, the physical, psychological and economic costs of domestic violence remain very high, exceeding \$8.3 billion/year (Rothman *et al.*, 2007).

¹¹ In that regard, Miller and Segal (2019) show that having more female officers increases the number of domestic violence incidents reported to the police. Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo (2019) use state-level data on VAWA self-petitions and show that the granted petitions for adjusting to a permanent immigration status increased with sanctuary policies. In our case, we explore how the adoption of sanctuary practices limiting law enforcement cooperation with federal immigration authorities might affect domestic homicide rates among Hispanic women, in particular, who are more likely to be undocumented or reside in mixed-status households than non-Hispanic women.

cooperation with the police) impact domestic homicide rates, especially among Hispanic women. We find that the adoption of sanctuary policies is accompanied by a lower rate of domestic homicides involving a female *Hispanic* victim. The effects are unique to that population, which is also more likely to encompass undocumented women and women residing in mixed-status households than other demographics, such as white non-Hispanic females. In addition, likely due to the greater prevalence of domestic homicides among women, the impacts are not present for men.

Our findings prove robust to several specification and identification checks. In particular, we first show lack of differential trends in domestic homicides in sanctuary vs. non-sanctuary localities prior to the adoption of any policy. Second, we address endogeneity concerns based on the non-random location of Hispanic communities, the selective adoption of sanctuary policies and the presence of potential confounders, such as simultaneous changes in policing at the local level. Third, we investigate potential determinants of the effectiveness of sanctuary policies in lowering domestic homicide among Hispanic women. We find that counties exposed to a higher level of interior immigration enforcement enjoyed a greater reduction in domestic violence homicides following the implementation of a sanctuary policy, which lowers fear of deportation and promotes community cooperation with the police. Additionally, counties with a greater number of female police officers experienced a larger decrease in domestic homicide—a finding in line with domestic violence reporting rising with the presence of female police officers (Miller and Segal, 2014). Lastly, the effects are smaller in localities with mandated arrest policies for domestic violence. Overall, these findings are suggestive of the value of sanctuary policies in increasing police trust and, possibly, promoting early reporting of incidents before they escalate to homicides, which may also inhibit offending. In addition, we explore the possibility that sanctuary policies might have affected

the financial independence of potential victims, increasing their ability to end an abusive relationship and their bargaining power within the household.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, and Section 3 explains the methodology. In Section 4, we present and discuss our main findings, identification and robustness checks. Heterogeneity analyses aimed at pinning down the mechanisms at play are performed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our key results and concludes the study.

2. Data and Descriptive Statistics

2.1 Unified Crime Report Data

We use 2003 through 2017 data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), which provide information on homicides reported to the police, regardless of whether they were murders, manslaughters or justifiable homicides. This time span covers a period of intense increase in immigration enforcement, as well as one characterized by the development of sanctuary policies. All law enforcement agencies operating under a U.S. jurisdiction, state, county, city, university/college, tribal or under a federal law enforcement agency submit crime data to the UCR either through a state UCR program or directly to the FBI's. The UCR program has a large coverage and offers high data accuracy.¹²

The UCR consists of several other datasets, including one on Offenses Known to Police and another one on Arrests. However, because immigration policy is likely to impact the reporting of offenses to the police, any detected changes in either reported crimes or arrests following the adoption of a sanctuary policy could be either due to changes in reporting and/or

¹² Between 88 to 96 percent of the U.S. population is covered by agencies that report to the FBI's UCR Program (Maltz, 1999).

to changes in the incidence of criminal activity. Homicides, on the other hand, are unlikely to go unreported. Hence, changes in their rates are likely to reflect changes in the incidence of criminal activity.

Although violent crimes, such as domestic violence, already have a dramatically higher social cost than property crimes, homicides represent the pinnacle. Their cost accounts for 60 percent of the per capita expected cost of crime (Chalfin and McCrary, 2018). Therefore, policies affecting the incidence of homicides can prove helpful at reducing crime-related costs.

The unit of analysis in the SHR is a homicide incident. The dataset contains detailed information on each incident, including the gender, age and ethnic background of the victim, her/his relationship to the offender, and weapon used.¹³ The SHR also includes some demographics of the offender, although the latter are largely missing. The SHR has information on 210,240 incidents taking place between 2003 and 2017. Because SHR reports incidents, a missing agency-year could either imply that the agency did not have any homicides in that period, or that the agency has missing data for that year. While homicides rarely go unreported, we prevent mismeasurement issues by restricting the analysis the 158,643 incidents that occurred in agencies corresponding to cities with at least 10,000 inhabitants –these are cities that also appear consistently in the sample and are unlikely to be covered by another larger agency.¹⁴ This results in a sample consisting of 1,134 counties. Since the analysis is focused on large agencies, it is fair to assume that any missing county-year cells are indicative of no homicides being reported in that county-year.¹⁵ Nevertheless, as a robustness check, we also conduct the analysis using the subsample of agencies that report at least one homicide

¹³ We focus on demographics of the victim because demographics of the offender are largely missing.

¹⁴ Among the 3149 agencies corresponding to cities with at least 10,000 inhabitants, 23 percent of them report at least one homicide every year between 2003 and 2017.

¹⁵ Among these 1,134 counties, 25 percent report at least one homicide every year between 2003 and 2017.

every year and, therefore, appear consistently every year. As we shall discuss, the results prove robust to using this subsample.

Our outcome of interest is the county rate of homicides per 100,000 residents, which is estimated separately according to the type of relationship of the offender and victim, *i.e.* strangers, acquaintances,¹⁶ family members,¹⁷ or partners/family.¹⁸ Table 1 contains some sample descriptive statistics. County-year cells for the overall sample are summarized in Panel A. Observations corresponding to sanctuary counties are summarized in Panel B, whereas observations corresponding to non-sanctuary counties are summarized in Panel C. Panel D further provides summary statistics for observations corresponding to counties that eventually implement sanctuary policies prior to its implementation, whereas Panel E contains summary statistics for the years following the implementation of a sanctuary policy in adopting counties.¹⁹

According to Panel A, the modal relationship between offender and victim is acquaintance (with a rate of 0.981 homicides per 100,000 residents). Furthermore, summary statistics from Panels B and C reveal that, over the sample period being examined, homicide rates involving family, significant others or partners were slightly higher in counties without a sanctuary policy in place (averaging 0.281 per 100,000 residents) when compared to sanctuary counties (0.253 per 100,000 residents). A similar pattern is observed for women, for whom the family homicide rate in the case of Hispanics is 0.011 per 100,000 residents in non-sanctuary states and 0.019 in sanctuary counties. In fact, a closer look at Panels D and E

¹⁶ Acquaintance involves the following codes: AQ (Acquaintance), EE (employee), ER (employer), FR (Friend), NE (Neighbor) and OK (Other known to victim).

¹⁷ Family involves BR (brother), DA (daughter), FA (father), IL (in law), MO (mother), OF (other family), SD (stepdaughter), SF (stepfather), SI (sister), SM (stepmother), SO (son), SS (stepson).

¹⁸ Partner involves the following codes: BF (boyfriend), CH (common law husband), CW (common law wife), GF (girlfriend), HO (homosexual relationship), HU (husband), WI (wife) as well as ex-husband (XH) and ex-wife (XW).

¹⁹ Summary statistics for agencies that report at least one homicide every single year are similar. Since the analysis focuses on agencies with at least 10,000 residents, most of them would likely have a homicide every year.

uncovers a reduction in the Hispanic female homicide rate involving family, significant others or partners from before to after the implementation of a sanctuary policy from 0.059 to 0.053 per 100,000 residents –a reduction that supports the notion that sanctuary policies might prove helpful in lowering the incidence of domestic homicides.

2.2 Data on Sanctuary Policies

Our purpose is to assess how the adoption of sanctuary policies has impacted domestic homicide rates, especially among Hispanic women enduring some of the highest domestic violence rates and, yet, more likely to indicate not reporting to the police due to fear they might be inquired about their legal status or that of people they know.

As noted by the American Immigration Council,²⁰ over the past decades, several cities, counties and states have adopted policies aimed at protecting their residents, regardless of their immigration status. While the policies have varied greatly in nature, the ones that have received most attention in recent years have been a subset of laws, policies and resolutions limiting the cooperation of local law enforcement with federal immigration authorities in their application of immigration law. This is done in various ways, with the most common ones involving one or more of the following elements: restricting the ability of police to make arrests due to federal immigration violations; prohibiting 287(g) agreements between the local enforcement agencies and Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) that deputize local police officers to enforce federal immigration laws; limiting the response to ICE detainers;²¹ refusing to contract with the federal government to hold immigrants in detention; refusing to allow ICE into local jails

²⁰ See:

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/sanctuary_policies_an_overview.pdf. Last accessed on December 4, 2019.

²¹ An ICE detainer—or “immigration hold”—is one of the tools used by ICE to apprehend individuals who encounter local and state law enforcement agencies. It is a written request that a local jail or other law enforcement agency detain an individual for an additional 48 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) after his or her release date in order to provide ICE agents extra time to decide whether to take the individual into federal custody for removal purposes.

without a warrant, and/or restricting immigration enforcement in sensitive locations like hospitals, schools or court houses (Graber and Marquez, 2016).

Sanctuary policies quickly expanded following a peak in interior immigration enforcement around 2012. A number of states enacted the so-called Trust Acts, covering all jurisdictions within the state.²² In addition, several cities and counties in states without a Trust Act adopted resolutions and ordinances that limited the cooperation of their law enforcement personnel with federal immigration authorities.²³ The adoption of these policies, arguably aimed at promoting community trust and cooperation with the police –particularly in immigrant communities, rendered the localities implementing the policies the label of “sanctuary cities.” To gauge the impact of these sanctuary policies on domestic homicide rates, we create a dichotomous variable indicative of whether the county had a sanctuary policy in place in a given year ($SP_{c,t}$). As shown by Figures 1 and 2, these practices evolved over the period studied, taking off after a peak in interior immigration enforcement and stabilizing after 2014. The initial sanctuary counties were concentrated in the Pacific Northwest. They were followed by counties in California, as well as localities in the Southwest and in the Northeast of the United States. Overall, as shown in Table A in the Appendix, the average share of (county, year) observations with a sanctuary policy in place in our sample hovered around 12 percent.

2.3 Other Data Sources

The analysis also includes several time-varying county-level controls potentially affecting homicide rates. First, we account for the tougher interior immigration enforcement environment that often preceded the adoption of sanctuary policies. This is done through an

²² For instance, California Senate Bill 54 effectively makes California a “sanctuary state” by legalizing and standardizing state wide non-cooperation policies between California law enforcement agencies and federal immigration authorities. See: <https://www.fairus.org/legislation/state-local-legislation/california-sanctuary-state-bill-sb-54-summary-and-history>. Last accessed on December 13, 2019.

²³ See: <https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States>. Last accessed on December 13, 2019.

index intended to proxy for the intensity of interior immigration enforcement in any given county and year. The index, which is described in detail in the Appendix, takes into account the plurality of interior immigration enforcement initiatives adopted over the time period under examination –all of which might have contributed to the overall environment affecting the reporting and incidence of domestic violence.

Secondly, we account for several demographic traits known to be correlated with criminal activity that are collected from the bridged-race population estimates, *i.e.* the share of males, the share of blacks, the share of minors, the share of population between 18 and 25 years of age, the share of males between 18 and 25 years of age, and the share of Hispanics. These estimates are produced by the U.S. Census Bureau in collaboration with the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Additionally, we control for the number of officers per 10,000 residents –obtained from the UCR Police Employee (Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted Program-LEOKA) and for the rate of overall homicides to account for overall trends homicide rates.

3. Methodology

3.1 Empirical Approach

Our goal is to gauge the extent to which the adoption of sanctuary policies might have affected domestic homicide rates among Hispanic women. As noted earlier, our focus on Hispanic women is due to the higher incidence of domestic homicide among this collective and the low reporting rates of domestic violence among Hispanic women due to fear law enforcement might inquire about their immigration status or that of people they know. Since domestic violence precedes domestic homicide, policy lowering the incidence of domestic violence could potentially prevent homicides from taking place. Given the role played by sanctuary cities in limiting the cooperation of local law enforcement agencies with immigration

officials and Hispanic women's reticence to report domestic violence for fear they might be inquired about their immigration status or that of people they know, we are particularly interested in gauging how the adoption of sanctuary policies might impact the incidence of domestic homicides among this demographic.

To that end, we exploit the geographic and temporal variation in the adoption of sanctuary policies by U.S. counties over the 2003-2017 period by estimating the following benchmark model separately for male and female Hispanic victims, as well as for their white non-Hispanic counterparts:

$$(1) \quad y_{c,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 SP_{c,t} + X'_{c,t} \beta_2 + \gamma_c + \theta_t + \gamma_c t + \varepsilon_{c,t}$$

where $y_{c,t}$ measures the share of domestic homicides per 100,000 residents in county c and year t . The vector $SP_{c,t}$ is a dummy indicative of the adoption of sanctuary policies by county c in year t . Equation (1) also includes a vector of county-level time-varying demographic traits ($X_{c,t}$), such as the share of Hispanics, blacks, males, minors, and the share of populations thought to be more crime-prone, as is the case with the share of 18 to 25 year olds, and the share of males between 18 and 25 years of ages in each county-year. In addition, the vector $X_{c,t}$ includes information on the state-year rate of officers per 10,000 residents, the overall homicide rate to capture secular trends in violent crime, and the total population in each county-year. Finally, the vector $X_{c,t}$ also accounts for the intensity of interior immigration enforcement, as captured by the index described in the Data Appendix.

Equation (1) incorporates a vector of county fixed effects, γ_c , which captures county-specific and time-invariant traits, as well as a vector of year fixed effects, θ_t . In the case of crime, there are several variables that vary at the state level that can be important determinants of crime. Examples include year-to-year changes in public funding for policing and prisons, as well as year-to-year changes in police training, police tactics, anti-crime sentiment or

socioeconomic conditions. Addressing these potential confounders is crucial when studying crime. While some of the literature attempts to account for these factors using state-by-year fixed effects (Bondurant, Lindo and Swensen, 2019; Swensen, 2015), some of the states in our sample implemented statewide sanctuary policies. The inclusion of state-by-year fixed effects would eliminate the variation at the state-year level of such policies and prevent us from gauging their effectiveness. Hence, we opt for a less restrictive state-specific time trend, $\gamma_c t$. The latter allow us to take into account, for example, linear year-to-year changes in these covariates. Nevertheless, in alternative model specifications included in the Appendix, we also experiment with a more restrictive specification that includes the abovementioned state-by-year fixed effects. In addition, we experiment with including a treatment-specific linear trend to account for the possibility that counties that ever-adopted a sanctuary policy may be systematically different from non-adopting counties. Finally, equation (1) is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Observations are weighted by the population in each county and year,²⁴ and standard errors are clustered at the county level.

If sanctuary policies reduce domestic homicide, either because victims are reporting domestic violence earlier, before it escalates to homicide; because offenders are deterred by their victims' increased willingness to come forward to the police; or through the economic empowerment of potential victims (Aizer, 2000), we would expect: $\beta_1 < 0$. There are, of course, other possibilities. For instance, $\beta_1 = 0$ if either offenders/victims are not responsive to the policies, in which case sanctuary policies might not prove helpful in preventing domestic violence. This might occur if individuals are not aware of policy changes and/or those inclined to be involved in domestic violence are not the responsive to the policy. Finally, it could also

²⁴ As we shall discuss, we also experiment with using the county's population in the base year –that is, prior to the adoption of any immigration enforcement or sanctuary policy, as an alternative weight as a robustness check.

be the case that: $\beta_1 > 0$. This could occur, for example, if the offender is an undocumented immigrant who now feels less threatened by deportation.

3.2 Robustness Checks

If sanctuary policies are driving the effect on domestic homicides, we should observe a first order effect among women more likely to be undocumented themselves or more likely to reside in mixed-status households or communities, as would be the case with Hispanic women. Unique impacts among this population would also be suggestive of the observed impacts not being driven by confounding factors unrelated to immigration policy that might be impacting *all types* of homicides, or domestic violence endured by *all victims*.²⁵ To address this issue, we estimate whether sanctuary policies affect domestic homicides among white non-Hispanic victims and male victims.

We estimate various model specifications as robustness checks. First, we experiment with using an alternative weight –namely, the county’s population in a base year (*i.e.* 2003), instead of the population in the respective year. This enables us to account for potential changes in population size associated with the implementation of sanctuary cities. Second, we re-estimate equation (1) using an alternative sample, as is the case with agencies that report at least one homicide every year included in the sample. Because the SHR reports homicides at the incident level, an agency-year cell appears in the dataset if there is at least one homicide. Therefore, it is unclear if a missing agency-year cell corresponds to missing data or to zero homicides. To address this issue, we experiment with restricting the sample to large agencies, which are unlikely to have missing years. We can then assume that missing agency-year data corresponds to zero domestic violence homicides, even though missing agency-years are likely

²⁵ We also consider subgroups for whom the reporting of domestic violence is less likely to be impacted by sanctuary policies as it is typically done by third parties, like teachers, neighbors and individuals outside the immediate family, *e.g.* children.

to indicate the lack of homicides since the latter are not likely to go unreported. Finally, we experiment with an alternative specification definition of sanctuary policies that uses the fraction of the year the policy was in place as opposed to as a binary variable.

3.3 Threats to Identification

In order for our research design to be valid, we first have to evaluate the extent to which some threats to identification could pose a problem. First, we evaluate whether the policies were endogenously implemented by confirming the lack of pre-existing differential trends on domestic homicides across counties with and without sanctuary policies. To that end, we restrict the sample to county-year cells without a sanctuary policy in place. Then, we regress domestic homicide rates on a linear trend and a linear trend interacted with whether the county ever adopts a sanctuary policy. If counties with and without a sanctuary policy share domestic homicide trends, the interaction term should not be statistically different from zero.

Second, we examine whether the adoption timing of a sanctuary policy is dependent on a county's domestic homicide rate prior to the policy implementation. To do this, we first predict the adoption timing (month, year) of each sanctuary policy based on the rate of domestic homicides with a Hispanic female victim in the base year (*i.e.* 2003), along with the remaining covariates included in equation (1) –all measured in 2003. In addition, we perform a similar estimation in which we replace the regressors with a 2003 base value with the average for years prior to the implementation of a sanctuary policy. If the adoption of a sanctuary policy is unrelated to prior levels of domestic violence homicides with a Hispanic victim, the coefficient on that regressor should be statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Third, we examine the extent to which Hispanics might be selectively residing in counties that are friendlier to immigrants and more likely to adopt a sanctuary policy. If sanctuary policies attract more Hispanics, homicides with a Hispanic victim should

mechanically increase, other things equal. Note this would be in the opposite direction of the found policy impact. Also, any mechanical effect on overall homicides should affect Hispanic women and men, as well as the overall rate of Hispanic homicides regardless of the relationship of the victim and the offender. The fact that we find an effect only among Hispanic women and that the impact is negative support the notion that the found policy effects are not mechanical. However, we still evaluate if demographic traits of this population (*e.g.* share of Hispanics, white non-Hispanics and population size) changed upon implementation of a sanctuary policy by re-estimating equation (1) using the share of Hispanics, white non-Hispanics and the natural logarithm of the population as our dependent variables as opposed to controls.

Finally, we check the role played by other potentially confounding factors, including changes in local policing. To that end, we estimate equation (1) replacing the dependent variable with the natural logarithm of the rate of total officers, male officers and female officers at the county level, respectively. If localities, in expectation that the adoption of a sanctuary policy might increase crime, might hire more police and lead to a drop in domestic violence homicides. Once more, we do not suspect we should be concerned about this possibility, since that would lower the overall homicide, not necessarily domestic violence homicides with a Hispanic victim. Nevertheless, we still evaluate the extent to which sanctuary policies might have altered the size or composition of the local police.

3.4 Heterogeneous Effects and Mechanisms

We next evaluate several heterogeneous impacts of sanctuary policies with the purpose of learning about the potential mechanisms through which the policies appear to be having an effect. To that end, we *first* examine if the impacts are larger in counties where immigrants, particularly those who are themselves undocumented or are related to family or friends who

lack legal immigration status, might have a greater incentive to avoid interactions with local law enforcement for fear they might be questioned about their legal status or that of people they know. Since such an incentive might have been greater in areas with a stringent implementation of interior immigration enforcement initiatives, we distinguish between the impacts of sanctuary policies in areas with greater, as opposed to lower, immigration enforcement. *Second*, we explore if the impact of sanctuary policies is larger in counties with more female officers, given prior findings by the literature pointing to the important role of female officers in increasing the reporting of domestic violence (Miller and Segal, 2019). *Third*, we examine if the effect of sanctuary policies on domestic homicides was any different in areas with a mandated arrest law in place. Iyengar (2007) shows how the certainty of arrest reducing domestic violence. If the main effect of sanctuary policies is to increase police trust, their effectiveness should be lower in counties where a mandated arrest law is in place. *Finally*, we gauge the extent to which women's improved economic situation might be contributing to the success of sanctuary policies in lowering domestic homicides among Hispanic women.

To conclude, we also explore if having a greater local Hispanic network affects the extent to which sanctuary policies affect domestic homicides. A priori, it is ambiguous. A larger Hispanic network could help diffuse information about immigration policies and, potentially, increase the effectiveness of the policy. Alternatively, a larger network could serve as a protective factor to offender and/or potential victims, inhibiting the effectiveness of the policies. Learning about the differential impact of the policies based on the population composition of the locality is helpful for implementation purposes.

4. Are Sanctuary Policies Effective at Reducing Domestic Violence Homicides?

4.1 Main Findings

Table 2 displays the results from estimating equation (1) for all homicides, as well as for various types of homicides according to the relationship of the victim with the perpetrator, *i.e.* stranger, acquaintance, family member, family member or partner, or family member restricted to the immediate or nuclear family as defined in Iyengar (2007). We perform the analysis separately by gender and ethnicity. Based on the estimates therein, the adoption of sanctuary policies helped lower domestic homicides perpetrated by family members against female Hispanic victims. The effect of the policies is rather large given the relatively rare occurrence of Hispanic homicides when compared to overall property or violent crimes. In particular, the adoption of sanctuary policies cutting Hispanic women's domestic homicides by approximately 0.012 homicides per 100,000 residents –a 62 percent reduction in the homicide rate from prior to the implementation of the sanctuary policy. If we restrict the attention to domestic homicides perpetrated by members of the nuclear family, the impact is a reduction of 0.008 homicides per 100,000 residents or 52 percent. While these estimates seem large, they are in line with findings from prior literature on domestic homicides (Iyengar, 2007). Policies shaping rather infrequent events, as is the case with domestic homicide, tend to have comparably large effects. Take, for instance, a reduction of domestic homicides with a Hispanic victim from 2 to 1 in a given (county, year), which would imply a 50 percent cut. In this vein, Iyengar (2007) finds that domestic homicides increased by 54 percent following the implementation of mandatory arrest laws. Given our narrower focus on domestic homicide with a Hispanic victim, we should expect an even larger effect on the inevitably smaller baseline for this subgroup of domestic homicides.

Importantly, sanctuary policies appear to uniquely alter domestic homicide rates of women, not those of men—who have lower domestic violence rates. Similarly, we fail to find an impact of sanctuary policies on other white, but non-Hispanic women. The fact that sanctuary policies only lower domestic homicide rates among Hispanic women and not among white non-Hispanic women or men serves as a check against the presence of confounding factors responsible for an overall decline in overall homicide or female homicide rates unrelated to the role of sanctuary policies in preventing deathly incidents, *per se*.

Overall, Table 2 indicates that the impact of sanctuary policies is not widespread but, rather, it appears to be focused on a group more likely impacted by the recent intensification of immigration enforcement, as would be the case with Hispanics and, given the greater incidence of domestic violence on women: Hispanic women.

4.2 Robustness Checks

Thus far, the results in Table 2 suggest that the laxer cooperation between local law enforcement agencies and Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) embodied in the adoption of sanctuary policies and practices have contributed to a reduction in the domestic homicides involving Hispanic victims, especially women. In this section, we perform a number of robustness and identification checks aimed at assessing the reliability of our findings.

First, we use an alternative specification that incorporates state by year fixed-effects, as opposed to state-specific linear trends, to more thoroughly account for potential confounders that could vary across states and on a year-to-year basis, such as changes in public funding, anti-immigrant sentiments, and/or police funding.²⁶ The results from this exercise are

²⁶ As noted earlier, a shortcoming of including state-by-year fixed effects is that we lose the policy variation when sanctuary policies originate from state-level Trust Acts. Since we still need to account for crime determinants that vary at the state level (*e.g.* public funding, police funding, among others), the main specification uses a state-specific trend.

displayed in Table C in the Appendix. Even though we lose some of the policy variation, we continue to find that the adoption of sanctuary policies cuts down the Hispanic female domestic homicide rate by 73 percent, or by 45 percent if we restrict the focus to homicides committed by members of the nuclear family.²⁷ These impacts are still significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Second, we include treatment-specific time trends identifying localities that ever adopted a sanctuary policy and also obtain similar results. The inclusion of these trends is intended to capture any idiosyncratic differences across counties that ever adopt a sanctuary policy and those that do not. As can be seen in Table D in the Appendix, our results continue to prove robust to this alternative specification, with the impact of sanctuary policies in curtailing domestic homicide rates among Hispanic women remaining similar in magnitude and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

Third, we experiment with conducting the analysis using triple differences to more directly compare changes in domestic homicide rates of Hispanic women to those of non-Hispanic women, pre vs. post the adoption of these policies, in ‘treated’ vs. ‘control’ counties. The advantage of this specification is that it relies less on the temporal variation in the implementation of the policy for identification. Again, as shown in Table E in the Appendix, we find that sanctuary policies continue to lower domestic homicide rates by an amount similar to the one documented in Table 2.

Fourth, focusing on domestic homicides involving Hispanic women, we experiment with changing the sample weight used in the estimation. The estimates in Table 2 use the county’s population in the year in question as the weight. To address any concerns regarding

²⁷ As noted earlier, these effects might seem large due to the low baseline for domestic homicides involving a Hispanic female victim.

the potential endogenous nature of the county's population, we replicate the estimation in Panel B of Table 2 (displayed again at the top of Table 3, in Panel A, as reference) using, instead, the county's population in the base year –that is, in 2003. This is a date prior to the adoption of the vast majority of sanctuary policies. The results from this alternative check are displayed in Panel B of Table 3. The estimated impact of sanctuary policies on the rate of domestic homicides of Hispanic women does not visibly change when we use this alternative weight.

Fifth, focusing on domestic homicides involving Hispanic women, we consider restricting the sample to agencies reporting at least one homicide in each of the fifteen years in our sample to avoid making any assumptions regarding any missing homicide figures in a given year in our sample. As can be seen in Panel C of Table 3, the results prove robust to the use of this somewhat smaller sample.

Sixth, focusing on domestic homicides involving Hispanic women, we experiment with an alternative specification where the sanctuary policy dummy is replaced by a variable indicative of the fraction of the year during which the policy was in place. As shown by the estimates in Panel D of Table 3, our results prove largely robust to the use of this alternative sanctuary measure.

Finally, we conduct somewhat of a placebo check –similar in spirit to the one conducted using domestic homicides among white non-Hispanic women in Panel D of Table 2. Specifically, we consider domestic homicides involving children. Even though domestic violence affects both women and children in the household, Iyengar (2007) finds that spouses and minors respond differentially to policies that change the incentive to report domestic violence because child abuse is often reported by teachers and individuals outside the household. If that is the case and the effectiveness of sanctuary policies hinges on the earlier reporting of incidents to the police by Hispanic women, sanctuary policies should prove less

effective in combating child abuse and domestic homicides among minors. Indeed, based on the estimates in Table 4, sanctuary policies do not seem to have significantly altered children’s homicides by family members, regardless of their ethnicity.²⁸

Overall, the results in Table 3 and Appendix Tables C, D and E corroborate the findings from Table 2 by showing they prove robust to the use of alternative fixed-effects, weights, agencies, measurement of sanctuary policies and estimation approach (*i.e.* triple differences).

4.3 Identification Checks

In this section, we conduct several identification checks intended to address concerns regarding the ability to speak about causal impacts of sanctuary policies on domestic homicide rates. First, we address a long-standing concern when gauging the effect of any policy – namely, the possibility that the effects predated the adoption of the policy itself. To assess if this is a valid assumption in our case, we create a time trend, which we interact with a dummy indicative of whether the county is one adopting a sanctuary policy during the period under analysis. We then restrict our sample to county-year cells without sanctuary policies –this implies using data periods preceding the adoption of a sanctuary policy in the case of counties that eventually do so, and all periods for counties that never implement a sanctuary policy. If there were pre-existing differential trends in domestic homicide rates across counties that end up adopting a sanctuary policy and counties that do not, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term described above –the so-called ‘SP Ever Trend’, should be statistically different from zero. However, as can be seen in Table 5, we fail to find evidence of a pre-existing differential trend in domestic homicide rates across the two sets of counties.

²⁸ The policies appear linked to a lower homicide rate of Hispanic minors. If abuse is typically reported by individuals outside the home, the possibility exists that the policies might have removed some barriers to reporting in Hispanic communities, but that individuals reporting the events might not be aware of who the offender was.

Second, as an additional check for pre-existing differential trends, we conduct an event study exploring the trajectory of domestic homicide rates in counties up to three years before and up to three years after the adoption of a sanctuary policy. The coefficients of interest, which are plotted in Figure 3, support the notion of a break in the trend in domestic homicides involving Hispanic female victims following the implementation of a sanctuary policy. In addition, the fact that domestic homicides did not decline during years prior to the adoption of a sanctuary policy further eliminates any concerns regarding the endogenous adoption of the policy in response to pre-existing trends in domestic homicides.

Third, we address the concern regarding the potential endogenous timing of the policy adoption by evaluating the extent to which prior domestic homicide rates are predictive of sanctuary policies implementation timing. To gauge if that should be a concern in our case, we conduct two different regressions. The first regression uses data from our base year (*i.e.* 2003), excluding any counties that might have already adopted a sanctuary policy by 2003 from our analysis. Using that sample, we attempt to predict the adoption timing of sanctuary policies based on county-level traits, as well as on domestic homicide rates, in 2003. The results, which are displayed in column (1) of Table 6 suggest that counties' Hispanic female homicide rates prior to the adoption of sanctuary policies do not help predict the adoption of such policies. Rather, population traits, such as the county's size or share of minorities (blacks, Hispanics), delay the timing of sanctuary policies, whereas a higher share of minors or of working-age adults speeds it up. As an alternative check, we experiment with using, instead of data from 2003, averages on county traits over the period preceding the adoption of a sanctuary policy when predicting the timing of the policy adoption. As shown in column (2), earlier domestic homicides rates do not help us predict the adoption timing of sanctuary policies, reassuring us

about the exogenous nature of the policy adoption with regards to the county's prior domestic homicide rate history.

Fourth, we assess the effect of sanctuary policies on the ability of people to vote with its feet, choosing the locality where they wish to live based on the policies in place. To assess if this should be a matter of concern in our case, Table 7 first explores the extent to which the adoption of a sanctuary policy helps predict counties' size and demographic composition, as captured by the share of Hispanics and white non-Hispanics. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 7, we are unable to establish a statistically significant link between the adoption of a sanctuary policy and county-level size or its Hispanic composition.²⁹

Finally, we also explore the possibility that other confounders, such as changes in local policing, might be driving the results. If the estimated effectiveness of sanctuary policies in lowering domestic homicide rates is confounded by changes in policing, such as more police officers or the use of more female officers possibly facilitating the reporting of incidents by women, we would expect the two variables (*i.e.* those referred to the level of policing and the sanctuary policy indicator) to be positively correlated. However, as shown by the estimates in Panel B of Table 7, we are unable to find empirical evidence of such links when we model the share of officers to residents in the county, or the share of male or female officers to county residents, as a function of whether the county had a sanctuary policy in place.

In sum, the impacts documented in Table 2 do not appear to pre-date the implementation of sanctuary policies, do not appear endogenous to our outcome of interest, do not seem to have been the byproduct of selective residential choices made by Hispanics, and they do not appear to be linked to local changes in policing.

²⁹ Even if sanctuary policies affected choice of residence, it would potentially attract Hispanics. Since an increase in Hispanic residents would mechanically result in an increase in Hispanic homicides even in the absence of any change in behavior, this is not a concern since our findings indicate a decrease in homicides with a Hispanic female victim.

5. Mechanisms and Heterogeneous Impacts

In this section, we gain a better understanding of three potential mechanisms through which sanctuary policies might be lowering domestic homicide rates among Hispanic women: (1) Increased trust in police, which is conducive to early reporting of domestic violence incidents prior to escalation and also conducive to inhibiting potential offenders for fear they might be reported by their victims; (2) labor market effects, which could potentially affect bargaining power in the household; and (3) network effects that arise from exposure to other Hispanics, which could make people better informed about sanctuary policies

5.1 Increased Trust in Local Law Enforcement

While we cannot directly test whether sanctuary policies increased trust in local law enforcement, the following patterns are suggestive that sanctuary policies were more effective in counties that facilitated cooperation with the police.

In principle, we would expect Hispanics to particularly mistrust local law enforcements and have lower reporting rates to avoid interaction, in counties with “tougher” immigration enforcement (*e.g.* local law enforcement is more likely to cooperate with immigration officials). If sanctuary policies achieve their goal of increasing trust and cooperation of the community with the police, the adoption of a sanctuary policy might have caused prospective offenders to pause given their victims’ potentially greater likelihood to report the event to the police and might have caused victims to report domestic violence incidents before they escalate. This would, in turn, translate into a greater policy effectiveness in lowering domestic homicides in these counties originally with more immigration enforcement.

According to the estimates displayed in Panel A of Table 8, sanctuary policies seem to have contributed to lowering the rate of domestic homicides involving Hispanic women to a greater extent in counties that were exposed to higher levels of interior immigration

enforcement –as captured by an interior immigration enforcement index above the 25th percentile. In particular, the incidence of domestic homicides involving Hispanic female victims dropped by 0.022 homicides/100,000 residents in counties with a “high level of interior immigration enforcement” following the adoption of a sanctuary policy, whereas the reduction averaged 0.01 homicides/100,000 residents in counties with a “lower level of interior immigration enforcement”. The average rate of Hispanic women’s domestic homicides in counties with a high level of interior immigration enforcement prior to the adoption of a sanctuary policy was 0.027 per 100,000 residents. In counties with a low level of interior immigration enforcement, that figure was 0.018 per 100,000 residents. As such, sanctuary policies helped lower the incidence of Hispanic women’s domestic homicide rates by 77 percent in counties with a higher level of immigration enforcement, and by 55 percent in counties with a lower level of immigration enforcement. These differential impact suggests fear to report to law enforcement as a potential obstacle addressed by the sanctuary policy. In fact, increased trust in the police might have contributed to lowering other homicide rates as well. In counties with a greater exposure to immigration enforcement, sanctuary policies seem to have contributed to an overall drop of the murder rate by 0.044 homicides/100,000 residents (a 31 percent decrease relative to its mean in counties with high immigration enforcement prior to the implementation of the sanctuary policy).

A second county trait that can shed some light on the extent to which the adoption of sanctuary policies might have increased police trust and, thereby, helped prevent homicides, refers to its law enforcement agency’s workforce composition. Miller and Segal (2019) show that a larger presence of female officers helps with the reporting of crimes. If that is the case and sanctuary policies help increase community trust in the police, we should expect to see a greater reduction in domestic homicides in counties with a larger number of female police

officers. Panel B in Table 8 displays the results from such an exercise. Based on the estimates therein, sanctuary policies appear to be more effective in lowering Hispanic women's domestic homicide rates in localities with a larger number of female officers. For instance, an increase in the number of female officers of 10 percent would reduce Hispanic women's domestic homicides by 2 percent more in sanctuary counties than in non-sanctuary counties. This finding further hints on the importance of increased trust in the police as a channel for curtailing domestic homicides.

Finally, we also consider examining differential policy responses according to whether the county is already affected by other policies that target domestic violence, particularly mandated arrest law. Mandated arrest laws require the police to arrest reported offenders. If sanctuary policies lower domestic homicides by increasing victims' trust in the police, we should observe a diminished impact in the presence of a mandated arrest law. To assess if that is the case, we create a dummy indicative of whether the state where the county is located had a mandatory arrest law in the year in question. Then, we interact that dummy with the sanctuary policy dummy. Panel C in Table 8 displays the results from such an exercise. As shown therein, the effectiveness of sanctuary policies in reducing domestic homicides among Hispanic women effectively dissipates when the state has a mandated arrest law in place, whereas it prevails in sanctuary counties without a mandated arrest law in place. This result further supports the notion that promoting an environment where victims feel safer interacting with the police can prove largely effective in curtailing domestic violence.

5.2 Labor Market Effects and Bargaining Power

We next check on a *second channel* –namely, the possibility that sanctuary policies improve the labor market opportunities of Hispanic females, particularly those who are immigrant and more likely to be impacted directly or indirectly by sanctuary policies.

Financial independence is one of the factors shown to lower the incidence of domestic violence (Aizer, 2010). The estimates in Table 9 address that possibility. Sanctuary policies appear to have helped lower Hispanic immigrant women's propensity to be unemployed by 0.6 percentage points or 10 percent. These impacts might have strengthened their economic situation and bargaining power, which, in turn, might have helped lower their exposure to domestic violence. Nevertheless, Hispanic immigrant men seem to have also benefited from these policies, reducing their unemployment rate by 0.6 percentage points and their earnings by 2.1 percent. Hence, it is questionable the extent to which sanctuary policies might have improved the relative (when compared to men) bargaining power of women most likely affected by sanctuary policies. However, they might have still enjoyed increased financial independence, which could possibly allow them to break away from abusive relationships.

5.3 Network Effects

Finally, we explore how the size of the Hispanic community might have contributed to the effectiveness of sanctuary policies. A larger Hispanic network could impact the effectiveness of the policy in several ways. First, it could magnify the effectiveness of the observed policy impacts mechanically (areas with more Hispanics might experience, other things equal, a greater reduction in the incidence of domestic homicides involving that population). Second, the presence of more Hispanics might help diffuse the information regarding sanctuary policies. Greater awareness of the policy could result in a greater impact. Third, a greater Hispanic network might "protect" potential offenders in the community, but also potential victims, by alerting them of dangerous signs and ways to evade domestic violence. Hence, it is unclear if the policies should end up having a greater or smaller effectiveness in reducing domestic homicides in localities with more Hispanics. To empirically assess if there is a differential impact in communities with more Hispanics, we interact the

sanctuary policy dummy with an indicator for whether the share of Hispanics in the county is above the 90th percentile in the base year 2003. Based on the estimates in Table 10, the impact of sanctuary policies on domestic homicides does not appear to significantly differ based on the share of Hispanics in the community, suggesting that any mechanical and/or network effects might be cancelling each other out. From a practitioner's point of view, the effectiveness of sanctuary policies is not contingent on the size of the Hispanic community in the county.

6. Summary and Conclusions

We assess if the adoption of a sanctuary policy can help lower domestic homicide rates among Hispanic women, who exhibit among the highest domestic homicide rates and among the lowest rates of domestic violence reporting due, in part, to fear they might be asked about their immigration status or that of people they know. Our results suggest that sanctuary policies have contributed to lowering domestic homicides rates among Hispanic women between 52 and 62 percent, depending on the relationship of the victim to the offender. These impacts, which prove robust to several robustness and identification checks, might seem large. However, they are in line with prior literature findings for domestic homicide. For instance, focusing on all domestic homicides, Iyengar (2007) finds that the implementation of mandatory arrest laws increase intimate partner homicides by 54 percent, possibly as reporting decreases. Given our narrower focus on domestic homicides with a Hispanic victim, baselines should be lower and, therefore, the impacts larger. Finally, the effects are unique to Hispanic women, suggesting the impacts are not driven by potential confounders affecting all homicide rates or other groups less likely to misreport due to fear about immigration enforcement, as would be the case with white non-Hispanic women or minors.

Finally, it is worth noting that the effects are exclusively observed in areas where interior immigration enforcement is rather intense, possibly areas where Hispanic victims were most afraid to contact the police for fear of deportation, suggesting that a potential channel might be increased trust in the police. This hypothesis is further strengthened by the fact that the effectiveness is greater when more female police officers are present, further reinforcing the importance of community trust in law enforcement. Similarly, the impacts dissipate in the presence of mandatory arrest laws, suggesting that the increased trust placed in the police through a sanctuary policy may be less beneficial in counties that already have laws to address domestic violence. In addition, sanctuary policies might have marginally contributed to the financial independence of Hispanic women, helping some of them to come out of the shadows and, possibly, lower their propensity to be victims of domestic homicides.

In sum, sanctuary policies appear effective in offering Hispanic women a true sanctuary against domestic violence. Further research gauging other impacts of these policies is well warranted.

References

- Aizer, Anna. 2010. "The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence" *American Economic Review*, 100 (September): 1847–59.
- Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina and Esther Arenas-Arroyo. n.d. "Immigration Enforcement and Children's Living Arrangements." *Forthcoming in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*.
- . 2018. "Split Families and the Future of Children: Immigration Enforcement and Foster Care Placements" *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings*, 108: 368–72.
- . 2019. "Police Trust and Domestic Violence: Evidence from Immigration Policies", IZA Discussion Paper No. 12721.
- Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, Esther Arenas-Arroyo, and Almudena Sevilla. 2018. "Immigration Enforcement and Economic Resources of Children with Likely Unauthorized Parents" *Journal of Public Economics*, 158: 63–78.
- Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina and Cynthia Bansak. 2012. "The Labor Market Impact of Mandated Employment Verification Systems" *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings*, 103: 543-8.
- . 2014. "Employment Verification Mandates and the Labor Market Outcomes of Likely Unauthorized and Native Workers" *Contemporary Economic Policy*, 32: 671-680.
- Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina and Mary Lopez. 2017. "The Hidden Educational Costs of Intensified Immigration Enforcement." *Southern Economic Journal* 84 (1): 120–54.
- Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina and Susan Pozo. 2014. "On the Intended and Unintended Consequences of Enhanced Border and Interior Immigration Enforcement: Evidence from Deportees" *Demography*, 51: 2255-2279.
- Bartel, Ann P. 1989. "Where Do the New U.S. Immigrants Live?" *Journal of Labor Economics*, 7 (4): 371–91.
- Bartik, Timothy J. 1991. "Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies?" W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, Michigan.
- Bohn, Sarah, Magnus Lofstrom, and Steven Raphael. 2014. "Did the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Act Reduce the States Unauthorized Immigrants?" *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 96 (2): 258–69.
- Bondurant, Samuel, Jason Lindo and Isaac Swensen. 2018. "Substance abuse treatment centers and local crime" *Journal of Urban Economics*, 104: 124-133.
- Breidling, Matthew J., Sharon G Smith, Kathleen C Basile, Mikel L. Walters, Jieru Chen, and Melissa Merrick. 2014. "Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Intimate Partner Violence Victimization — National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey" *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*, 63 (8).

- Card, David. 2001. "Immigrant Inflows , Native Outflows , and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher Immigration" *Journal of Labor Economics*, 19 (1): 22–64.
- Chalfin, Aaron and Justin McCrary (2018) Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory and Evidence. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 100(1)
- Cortes, Patricia, and Jose Tessada. 2011. "Low-Skilled Immigration and the Labor Supply of Highly Skilled Women" *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 3 (July): 88–123.
- Decimos No Mas Network. 2015. "Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault in the Latin@ Community", November 16. Available at <http://www.decimosnomas.org/wp-content/uploads/4.16-NO-MAS-STUDY-media-findings-FINAL-FINAL-updated-Avon-logo-11.16.15.pdf>
- Frieze, Irene H., and A. Browne. 1989. "Violence in Marriage" in L.E. Ohlin & M. H. Tonry *Family Violence*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Gonzalez-O'Brien, Benjamin, Loren Collingwood, and Stephen Omar El-Khatib. 2017. "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration," *Urban Affairs Review*, 55 (1): 3-40.
- Graber, Lena and Nikki Marquez. 2016. "Searching for Sanctuary: An Analysis of America's Counties and Their Voluntary Assistance with Deportations" Immigrant Legal Resource Center, December 2016. Available at: https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sanctuary_report_final_1-min.pdf. Last accessed on December 4, 2019.
- Hugo, Mark L., Ana Gonzalez-Barrera and Jens M. Krogstad. 2018. "Views of Immigration Policy", *Hispanic Trends*, Pew Research Center, Washington DC. Available at www.pewresearch.org.
- Iyengar, Radha. 2007. "Does the Certainty of Arrest Reduce Domestic Violence? Evidence from Mandatory and Recommended Arrest Laws" NBER Working Paper No. 13186.
- Kasturirangan, Aarati, Sandhya Krishnan, and Stephanie Riger. 2004. "The Impact of Culture and Minority Status on Women's Experience of Domestic Violence" *Trauma, Violence and Abuse*, 5 (4): 318–32.
- Kwak, Hyounggon, Rick Dierenfeldt, and Susan McNeeley. 2019. "The Code of the Street and Cooperation with the Police: Do Codes of Violence, Procedural Injustice, and Police Ineffectiveness Discourage Reporting Violent Victimization to the Police?" *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 60: 25–34.
- Menjívar, Cecilia and Cynthia L. Bejarano. 2004. "Latino Immigrants' Perception of Crime and Police Authorities in the United States: A Case Study from the Phoenix Metropolitan Area" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 27(1): 120-148.
- Miller, Amalia R., and Carmit Segal. 2019. "Do Female Officers Improve Law Enforcement Quality? Effects on Crime Reporting and Domestic Violence Escalation" *The Review of Economic Studies*, 86(5): 2220–2247.

- Mowder, Denise, Faith Lutze and Hyon Namgung. 2018. "Ayúdame! Who can help me? the help-seeking decisions of battered undocumented latinas" *Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice*, 16(3): 205-224.
- Muchow, Ashley N. and Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes. 2019. "Immigration enforcement awareness and community engagement with police: Evidence from Los Angeles." Department of Criminology, Law, and Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago.
- National Latino Network. 2013. "Realidades Latinas: A National Survey on the Impact of Immigration and Language Access on Latina Survivors", April. Available at: http://www.nationallatinonetwork.org/images/files/NLNRealidades_Latinas_The_Impact_of_Immigration_and_Language_Access_FINAL.pdf
- Nelson, Heidi D., Christina Bougatsos, and Ian Blazina. 2012. "Screening Women for Intimate Partner Violence: A Systematic Review to Update the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force Recommendation." *Annals of Internal Medicine* 156 (11). American College of Physicians: 796. doi:10.7326/0003-4819-156-11-201206050-00447.
- Nguyen, Mai Thi, and Hannah Gill. 2015. "Interior Immigration Enforcement: The Impacts of Expanding Local Law Enforcement Authority." *Urban Studies* 53 (2): 302–23. doi:10.1177/0042098014563029.
- Nittle, Nadra K. 2018. "Racial Profiling and Police Brutality Against Hispanics", February 20, ThoughtCo. Available at: www.thoughtco.com
- Orloff, Leslye E., Deeana Jang, and Catherine F. Klein. 1995. "With No Place to Turn: Improving Legal Advocacy for Battered Immigrant Women." *Famliy Law Quartely*, 29(2) 29 (2).
- Passel, Jeffrey S. 2006. *Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.* Pew Research Center Report. Available at: <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2006/03/07/size-and-characteristics-of-the-unauthorized-migrant-population-in-the-us/>.
- Preston, Julia. 2011. "Immigration Crackdown Also Snares Americans," *New York Times*.
- Raj, Anita, Rosalyn Liu, Jennifer McCleary-Sills, and Jay G. Silverman. 2005. "South Asian Victims of Intimate Partner Violence More Likely than Non-Victims to Report Sexual Health Concerns." *Journal of Immigrant Health* 7 (2): 85–91. doi:10.1007/s10903-005-2641-9.
- Reina, Angelica S., Brenda J. Lohman, and Marta M. Maldonado. 2014. "'He said they'd deport me': factors influencing domestic violence help-seeking practices among Latina immigrants", *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 29(4): 593-615.
- Rothman, Emily F., Jeanne Hathaway, Andrea Stidsen and Heather F. de Vries. 2007. "How employment helps female victims of intimate partner violence: A qualitative study." *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*, 12(2), 136-143.
- Sabina, Chiara, Carlos A. Cuevas, and Jennifer L. Schally. 2013. "The effect of immigration and acculturation on victimization among a national sample of Latino women" *Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychology*, 19(1): 13-26.

- Stock, James, and Motohiro Yogo. 2005. "Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression." In *Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg*, Andrew DWK, 80–105. New York: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Swensen, Isaac. 2015. "Substance Abuse Treatment and Mortality", *Journal of Public Economics*, 122, 13-30.
- Theodore, Nick. 2013. "Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in Immigration Enforcement" Department of Urban Planning and Policy, University of Illinois, Chicago. Available at: www.policylink.org
- Vaughan, Jessica M. 2013. *Deportation Numbers Unwrapped Raw Statistics Reveal the Real Story of ICE Enforcement in Decline*. Center for Immigration Studies, no. October: 1–16.
- Zadnik, Elizabeth, Chiara Sabina, and Carlos A. Cuevas. 2016. "Violence Against Latinas: The Effects of Undocumented Status on Rates of Victimization and Help-Seeking" *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 31(6): 1141-53.
- Tjaden, Patricia, and Nancy Thoennes. 2000. *Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence*. National Institute of Justice Report, no. Control, National Institute of Justice and Centers for Disease: 55.
<http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/abstractdb/AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=181867>.
- Truman, Jennifer L. and Rachel E. Morgan. 2014. *Nonfatal Domestic Violence, 2003–2012* U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics BJS Special Report NCJ 244697. Available at:
<https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ndv0312.pdf> [Last accessed on 1/10/2019]
- Watson, Tara. 2014. "Inside the Refrigerator: Immigration Enforcement and Chilling Effects in Medicaid Participation" *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 6 (3): 313–38.
- Wong, Tom K. 2017. "The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy." Center for American Progress and National Immigration Law Center Paper.
- Wright, Emily M. and Michael L. Benson. 2010. "Immigration and Intimate Partner Violence: Exploring the Immigrant Paradox" *Social Problems*, 57(3): 480-503.

Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics

Type of Homicide	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Fam/Part	Restricted Family
Panel A: All Counties						
All	4.333	0.671	0.981	0.269	0.595	0.198
Victim Hispanic Male	0.515	0.133	0.120	0.020	0.026	0.013
Victim Hispanic Female	0.086	0.009	0.014	0.014	0.045	0.010
Victim White Non-Hispanic Male	0.260	0.073	0.081	0.021	0.031	0.017
Victim White Non-Hispanic Female	0.119	0.010	0.022	0.020	0.065	0.015
Panel B: Sanctuary Counties						
All	4.547	0.742	0.924	0.253	0.554	0.187
Victim Hispanic Male	0.782	0.187	0.168	0.025	0.032	0.017
Victim Hispanic Female	0.111	0.012	0.016	0.019	0.057	0.014
Victim White Non-Hispanic Male	0.308	0.094	0.086	0.021	0.033	0.018
Victim White Non-Hispanic Female	0.135	0.012	0.024	0.024	0.075	0.018
Panel C: Non-sanctuary Counties						
All	4.180	0.621	1.023	0.281	0.625	0.205
Victim Hispanic Male	0.325	0.094	0.086	0.016	0.022	0.010
Victim Hispanic Female	0.067	0.007	0.012	0.011	0.036	0.008
Victim White Non-Hispanic Male	0.225	0.058	0.077	0.020	0.031	0.016
Victim White Non-Hispanic Female	0.108	0.009	0.020	0.017	0.058	0.013
Panel D: Sanctuary Counties Prior to Policy Implementation						
All	4.644	0.777	0.977	0.246	0.565	0.188
Victim Hispanic Male	0.805	0.202	0.175	0.025	0.032	0.017
Victim Hispanic Female	0.113	0.012	0.016	0.019	0.059	0.015
Victim White Non-Hispanic Male	0.298	0.093	0.083	0.019	0.030	0.017
Victim White Non-Hispanic Female	0.130	0.012	0.024	0.020	0.070	0.017
Panel E: Sanctuary Counties After Policy Implementation						
All	4.312	0.658	0.794	0.268	0.527	0.183
Victim Hispanic Male	0.727	0.152	0.150	0.026	0.032	0.017
Victim Hispanic Female	0.109	0.012	0.015	0.017	0.053	0.009
Victim White Non-Hispanic Male	0.333	0.096	0.095	0.026	0.040	0.021
Victim White Non-Hispanic Female	0.147	0.011	0.026	0.032	0.086	0.022
Total county-year cells	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010

Table 2: The Effect of Sanctuary Policies (SP) on Homicide Rates by Gender

Homicide Type	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Fam/Part	Restricted Family
Panel A: Male Hispanic Victims						
SP	0.032 (0.056)	0.018 (0.014)	0.010 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.801	0.200	0.174	0.0252	0.0319	0.0169
Panel B: Female Hispanic Victims						
SP	0.002 (0.012)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.008** (0.004)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.112	0.0124	0.0158	0.0191	0.0585	0.0154
Panel C: Male White Non-Hispanic Victims						
SP	-0.035 (0.030)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.012)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.000 (0.004)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.297	0.0926	0.0823	0.0193	0.0298	0.0165
Panel D: Female White Non-Hispanic Victims						
SP	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.000 (0.005)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.131	0.0120	0.0236	0.0204	0.0698	0.0168

Notes: ‘Partner’ refers to any of the following: boy/girlfriend, common law husband/wife, ex-husband/wife, husband/wife, irrespective of whether the relationship is hetero or homosexual. ‘Family’ refers to any of the following: brother/sister, daughter/son, father/mother, step siblings/parents, in laws, and other family members. ‘Fam/Part’ includes the two prior categories. Finally, the ‘Restricted Family’ category uses Iyengar’s (2007) family definition, which excludes other family members from the family category described before. All regressions include a constant term, as we all county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level. Means reported correspond to county-year cells prior to the implementation of sanctuary policies.

Table 3
Robustness Checks: The Effect of Sanctuary Policies on the Hispanic Female Homicide Rate

Homicide Type	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Fam/Part	Restricted Family
Panel A: Weight = County population – Main Model Specification in Table 2, Panel B						
SP	0.002 (0.012)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.012** (0.005)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.008** (0.004)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.112	0.0124	0.0158	0.0191	0.0585	0.0154
Panel B: Alternative weight = County population in base year						
SP	0.003 (0.012)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.008** (0.004)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.112	0.0125	0.0156	0.0189	0.0581	0.0153
Panel C: Alternative sample = Agencies reporting at least one domestic homicide per year during the entire period						
SP	0.003 (0.017)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.005)
Observations	3,524	3,524	3,524	3,524	3,524	3,524
Mean	0.117	0.0141	0.0163	0.0189	0.0560	0.0155
Panel D: Alternative SP measure = SP is the fraction of the year the policy was in place						
SP	-0.002 (0.013)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.013** (0.005)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.010** (0.004)
Observations	16,530	16,530	16,530	16,530	16,530	16,530
Mean	0.112	0.0124	0.0158	0.0191	0.0585	0.0154

Notes: ‘Partner’ refers to any of the following: boy/girlfriend, common law husband/wife, ex-husband/wife, husband/wife, irrespective of whether the relationship is hetero or homosexual. ‘Family’ refers to any of the following: brother/sister, daughter/son, father/mother, step siblings/parents, in laws, and other family members. ‘Fam/Part’ includes the two prior categories. Finally, the ‘Restricted Family’ category uses Iyengar’s (2007) family definition, which excludes other family members from the family category described before. All regressions include a constant term, as well as county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level. Means reported correspond to county-year cells prior to the implementation of sanctuary policies.

Table 4: The Effect of Sanctuary Policies on the Homicide Rate of Minors

Type of Homicide	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Restricted Family
Panel A: All Minor Victims					
SP	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.006 (0.011)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.442	0.0620	0.104	0.107	0.0947
Panel B: Victim Hispanic Minors					
SP	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.007** (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.112	0.0231	0.0252	0.0227	0.0197
Panel C: Victim White non-Hispanic Minors					
SP	-0.008 (0.006)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.0277	0.00249	0.00728	0.0127	0.0121

Notes: ‘Family’ refers to any of the following: brother/sister, daughter/son, father/mother, step siblings/parents, in laws, and other family members. The ‘Restricted Family’ category uses Iyengar’s (2007) family definition, which excludes other family members from the family category described before. All regressions include a constant term, as we all county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level. Means reported correspond to county-year cells prior to the implementation of sanctuary policies.

Table 5: Identification Check #1: Assessing Differential Pre-trends

Homicide Type	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Fam/Part	Restricted Family
Panel A: Male Hispanic Victims						
SP Ever Trend	-0.00485 (0.01688)	0.00177 (0.00524)	0.00069 (0.00331)	0.00084 (0.00066)	0.00079 (0.00091)	0.00030 (0.00036)
Observations	15,988	15,988	15,988	15,988	15,988	15,988
Mean	0.485	0.130	0.116	0.0194	0.0253	0.0126
Panel B: Female Hispanic Victims						
SP Ever Trend	-0.00101 (0.00205)	-0.00033 (0.00043)	0.00011 (0.00054)	0.00043 (0.00038)	-0.00011 (0.00104)	0.00042 (0.00034)
Observations	15,988	15,988	15,988	15,988	15,988	15,988
Mean	0.0823	0.00859	0.0134	0.0134	0.0437	0.0101
Panel C: Female White Non-Hispanic Victims						
SP Ever Trend	-0.00066 (0.00248)	0.00074 (0.00060)	-0.00012 (0.00068)	-0.00049 (0.00053)	-0.00069 (0.00117)	-0.00062 (0.00046)
Observations	15,988	15,988	15,988	15,988	15,988	15,988
Mean	0.115	0.00999	0.0215	0.0179	0.0621	0.0140

Notes: ‘Partner’ refers to any of the following: boy/girlfriend, common law husband/wife, ex-husband/wife, husband/wife, irrespective of whether the relationship is hetero or homosexual. ‘Family’ refers to any of the following: brother/sister, daughter/son, father/mother, step siblings/parents, in laws, and other family members. ‘Fam/Part’ includes the two prior categories. Finally, the ‘Restricted Family’ category uses Iyengar’s (2007) family definition, which excludes other family members from the family category described before. All regressions include a constant term, as well as county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 6
Identification Check #2: Predicting Sanctuary Policy Adoption

	Using Base Year (2003) Data	Using Data for Pre-Implementation Years
Hispanic Female Homicide Rate	3.251 (16.902)	171.820 (126.823)
Total Officers	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Murders Rate	0.198 (0.298)	-0.121 (0.404)
Ln Population	-5.015** (2.514)	-5.089** (2.716)
Share Male	-1.799 (2.876)	0.367 (2.891)
Share Blacks	-0.273* (0.159)	-0.101 (0.163)
Share of Minors	2.223** (0.991)	0.678 (0.886)
Share of Young Adult Pop 18-25	0.976 (4.278)	2.463 (4.686)
Share of Working-age Pop	1.975* (1.146)	0.746 (1.082)
Share of Young Male Pop 18-25	-1.632 (8.047)	-4.737 (8.727)
Share Hispanics	-0.233* (0.129)	-0.213* (0.127)
Observations	206	206
Mean of Dependent Variable	138.8	138.8

Notes: The first column uses data on all non-sanctuary counties in 2003. All regressors refer to 2003 as well, and the model is trying to predict the later adoption date, if any, of a sanctuary policy. In column 2, we use the same number of counties as in column 1; however, the regressors refer to the average value of the county's traits over the entire period we observe the county prior to the adoption of a sanctuary policy, if the latter was ever adopted. Both regressions contain a constant term and state fixed-effects. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 7: Identification Checks #3: Potential Confounders

Panel A: Do Sanctuary Policies Affect the Share of Hispanics in the County?			
	Share Hispanics	Share White Non-Hispanic	Ln (Pop)
SP	0.028 (0.093)	-0.147 (0.174)	0.002 (0.004)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	16.02	64.82	13.03
Panel B: Are Sanctuary Policies Correlated to Local Law Enforcement?			
	Ln (Rate of Officers)	Ln (Rate of Male Officers)	Ln (Rate of Female Officers)
SP	-0.010 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.026 (0.022)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	4.919	4.788	2.755

Notes: All regressions include a constant term, as we all county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 8: Mechanism #1: Increased Trust in the Police

Homicide Type	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Fam/Part	Restricted Family
Panel A: Do the effects on Hispanic female homicides vary with the intensity of interior immigration enforcement?						
SP*Low IE	0.006 (0.012)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.007 (0.010)	-0.007* (0.004)
SP*High IE	-0.047*** (0.013)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.010** (0.005)	-0.022*** (0.007)	-0.031*** (0.010)	-0.016** (0.008)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.112	0.0124	0.0158	0.0191	0.0585	0.0154
Panel B: Do the effects on Hispanic female homicides vary with the number of female officers?						
SP	-0.014 (0.016)	0.004 (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.020 (0.016)	0.009* (0.005)
SP*ln(Female Officers)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Observations	16,449	16,449	16,449	16,449	16,449	16,449
Mean	0.112	0.0125	0.0158	0.0191	0.0587	0.0154
Panel C: Do the effects on Hispanic female homicides vary with the existence of mandatory arrest laws?						
SP	0.001 (0.015)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.010 (0.012)	-0.011** (0.005)
SP*Mandated Arrest Law	0.005 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.007 (0.007)	0.010* (0.006)	0.006 (0.014)	0.011* (0.006)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.112	0.0124	0.0158	0.0191	0.0585	0.0154

Notes: ‘Partner’ refers to any of the following: boy/girlfriend, common law husband/wife, ex-husband/wife, husband/wife, irrespective of whether the relationship is hetero or homosexual. ‘Family’ refers to any of the following: brother/sister, daughter/son, father/mother, step siblings/parents, in laws, and other family members. ‘Fam/Part’ includes the two prior categories. Finally, the ‘Restricted Family’ category uses Iyengar’s (2007) family definition, which excludes other family members from the family category described before. All regressions include a constant term, as well as county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. ‘Low IE’ stands for a level of interior immigration enforcement below the 25th percentile, whereas ‘High IE’ stands for a level above the 25th percentile. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level. Means reported correspond to county-year cells prior to the implementation of sanctuary policies.

Table 9
Mechanism #2: Improvements in Socioeconomic Conditions of Hispanic Immigrants

Panel A: Female Hispanic Immigrants			
Outcome	NILF	Unemployed	Ln (Earnings)
SP	0.012 (0.010)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.005 (0.013)
Observations	615,264	615,264	338,710
Mean	0.467	0.0530	9.304
Panel B: Male Hispanic Immigrants			
Outcome	NILF	Unemployed	Ln (Earnings)
SP	0.004 (0.007)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.021*** (0.008)
Observations	592,697	592,697	492,646
Mean	0.177	0.0511	9.745

Notes: All regressions include a constant term, as we all county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level.

Table 10
Heterogeneous Effects of Sanctuary Policies on the Hispanic Female Homicide Rate based on Networks

Homicide Type	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Fam/Part	Restricted Family
SP	-0.009 (0.009)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.011* (0.006)	-0.005* (0.003)
SP*Highly Hispanic	0.034 (0.025)	0.002 (0.007)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.009)	0.009 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.008)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.112	0.0124	0.0158	0.0191	0.0585	0.0154

Notes: ‘Partner’ refers to any of the following: boy/girlfriend, common law husband/wife, ex-husband/wife, husband/wife, irrespective of whether the relationship is hetero or homosexual. ‘Family’ refers to any of the following: brother/sister, daughter/son, father/mother, step siblings/parents, in laws, and other family members. ‘Fam/Part’ includes the two prior categories. Finally, the ‘Restricted Family’ category uses Iyengar’s (2007) family definition, which excludes other family members from the family category described before. All regressions include a constant term, as well as county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. ‘Highly Hispanic’ means the county is one with a share of Hispanics above the 90th percentile in a base year (2003). *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level. Means reported correspond to county-year cells prior to the implementation of sanctuary policies.

Figure 1: Number of Counties Adopting a Sanctuary Policy by Year





Figure 3: Event Study



Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the counts of domestic homicides with a Hispanic female victim per 100,000 residents. The event study has a constant term, as we all county and year fixed-effects. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level.

DATA APPENDIX

Interior Immigration Enforcement

The past two decades have witnessed an impressive expansion of interior immigration enforcement. Between 2003 and 2013, funding for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency –the federal agency responsible for interior immigration enforcement– increased approximately 80 percent, apprehensions more than doubled, and removals increased by three-fold.³⁰ The increase in the intensity of interior immigration enforcement has been made evident by the greater participation of local and state governments in a number of immigration enforcement initiatives and programs, all of which are schematically summarized in Table A in this appendix. For instance, E-Verify is a free internet-based system provided by the United States government that allows employers to determine the employment eligibility of new hires. As of January 2015, the number of participating employers had risen above 550,000 and 19 states had enacted legislation requiring some level of mandatory E-Verify use (either among all employers, or by public sector employers and contractors).³¹ Bohn *et al.* (2014) document that the 2007 Legal Arizona Workers Acts (LAWA) –which mandated, for the first time, all Arizona employers to use E-Verify– reduced the employment of likely unauthorized immigrants. Looking across all states, Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2012, 2014) find that the state adoption of mandatory E-Verify laws results in unauthorized migrants relocating to states without mandatory legislation or being forced to accept employment in the underground economy. In the process of evading state mandates or employers who have adopted E-Verify, greater emotional and financial stress is likely to be placed on unauthorized immigrants and their families.

In addition to E-verify, programs such as 287(g) and Secure Communities strengthened the partnership between federal immigration authorities and state and local police, further intensifying interior immigration enforcement. The U.S. government’s 287(g) program allowed state and local law enforcement to establish a partnership with the federal government under joint Memorandum of Agreements, in which state and local law enforcement would receive federal authority for immigration enforcement within their jurisdictions. In 2006, only five counties collaborated with the federal government. By 2008, that number had jumped to 41 counties (Wong, 2012). Between 2006 and 2010, the budget for 287(g) increased from \$5 million to \$68 million, with over 1,500 state and local law enforcement officers trained and granted authorization to enforce federal immigration laws (Nyugen and Gill, 2015). In response to the rolling out of the program, immigrants altered their residential choices. Watson (2013) finds that immigrants responded to local 287(g) agreements by relocating within the United States, but that this internal migration effect was concentrated among educated non-citizens.

³⁰ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Budget in Brief*, fiscal years 2003-2013 (<http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget>). Data on apprehensions can be found in Table 33 at: <http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics-2013-enforcement-actions>, and data on interior removals can be found at:

<http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-and-discretion-reviewing-record-and-options-change>

³¹ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, E-Verify Overview, 2015.

(http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-Verify_Native_Documents/e-verify-presentation.pdf)

In 2008, as ICE debated whether to continue renewing 287(g) agreements, Secure Communities was introduced.³² Secure Communities is an information-sharing program used in the apprehension and deportation of unauthorized immigrants. Under the program, local law enforcement agencies can submit information from arrests, such as fingerprints, to an integrated database with ICE that allows for the identification of the immigration status and criminal activity of any individual. In the latter case, ICE requests that local authorities hold certain individuals for deportation. By 2013, every jurisdiction in the United States was covered under Secure Communities, compared to just 14 jurisdictions in 2008.³³ Both programs, the latter one replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) in 2015, have been criticized for aiding in the deportation of immigrants with no criminal records, creating a strong fear of law enforcement officials among immigrants, and pushing unauthorized migrants and their families into the shadows (*e.g.* Nguyen and Gill, 2015; Preston, 2011).³⁴

Finally, a number of state-level omnibus immigration laws further contributed to the intensification of interior immigration enforcement. According to the National Conference of State Legislators, five states adopted laws similar to Arizona's SB 1070 in 2011 (*i.e.* Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah). One year later, five additional states introduced immigration enforcement legislation (*i.e.* Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Rhode Island, and West Virginia).³⁵ Despite the recent drop in proposed state-level immigration enforcement legislation, the increase in omnibus immigration laws after 2010 received considerable national attention and identified the states that wanted to take immigration enforcement into their own hands, thereby fostering an atmosphere of fear and anxiety resulting from increased family separations and migrant abuse reports. In that regard, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2014) document how apprehension in a state with an omnibus immigration law is more likely to lead to family separation, as well as how the incidence of physical and verbal abuse towards unauthorized migrants increases with the number of states enacting such laws.

Because domestic homicides are not likely to respond to one single immigration enforcement initiative but, rather, to the environment created by the various measures described above, we construct an index intended to proxy for the intensity of interior immigration enforcement in any given county. To that end we collected historical data on the various initiatives, which are detailed in Table B in this appendix. Specifically, data on 287(g) agreements at the county and state levels is gathered from ICE's 287(g) Fact Sheet website.³⁶ Data on the rolling of the Secure Communities program at the county level is compiled from ICE's releases on activated jurisdictions.³⁷ Once it reached nationwide coverage, Secure Communities was replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program in 2015, although the program was reinstated by President Donald Trump in February 2017. Finally, data on state level

³² In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) decided not to any new agreements.

³³ <http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities>

³⁴ A portion of Secure Communities was temporarily suspended by DHS from November 20, 2014 through January 25, 2017. The program was reactivated from January 25, 2017 through the end of the 2017 fiscal year. See <http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities>

³⁵ National Conference of State Legislators, <http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2013-immigration-report.aspx>

³⁶ See: <https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/287g>

³⁷ See: <https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf>

employment verification mandates and omnibus immigration laws is gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures.³⁸

In addition to serving as a proxy for the immigration enforcement environment in any given county, the index offers an important advantage –namely, the ability to better capture the interconnectedness of immigration enforcement; a system administered by various federal, state, and local authorities and agencies with similar missions and implementing a continuum of alike policing measures. By combining the various policies into one index, we are able to work with a more manageable and comprehensive measure of interior immigration enforcement that addresses the fact that many of these policies are also highly correlated. The index is constructed by adding the dichotomous variables for the various enforcement initiatives (k) in place in a given county c and year t as follows:³⁹

$$IE_{c,t} = \sum_{k \in K}^K \mathbf{1}(IE_{c,t}^k)$$

where $\mathbf{1}(IE_{c,t}^k)$ is an indicator function that informs about the implementation of a particular policy in county c during year t .⁴⁰ Figure A, below, shows the number of counties with a positive immigration enforcement index in any given year, as well as the number with an above median index –counties we will later on classify as having a higher intensity of interior immigration enforcement. The graph underscores how interior immigration enforcement took off after 2006, following the rolling adoption of 287(g) agreements and, later on, Secure Communities, which reached nationwide coverage by 2012. Overall, over the period under examination, the index, which ranged from 0 to 5 for each of the enforcement initiatives considered, averaged 0.70 (see Table A in the Appendix).

³⁸ See: <http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-e-verify-action.aspx> and http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statefed/omnibus_laws.pdf

³⁹ Where k refers to each policy –namely: 287(g) local agreements, 287(g) state agreements, Secure Communities, Omnibus Immigration Laws and E-Verify mandates. We include both police-based and employment-based initiatives because domestic violence is also correlated to economic dependency on the part of the abused spouse (*e.g.* Aizer, 2000).

⁴⁰ We recognize that the index is simply a proxy of the intensity of immigration enforcement to which respondents in a particular county might be exposed. The true intensity of any enforcement measure will inevitably vary across jurisdictions, since alike measures might be implemented more or less strictly depending on who is in charge of its implementation and other unobserved local traits. To address that limitation, we include county fixed-effects to help capture such idiosyncrasies. In addition, we experiment with using simple dichotomous indicators of whether the intensity of enforcement is relatively ‘high’ or ‘low’. Results prove robust to the use of different controls for interior immigration enforcement.

Table A: Summary Statistics of Covariates

	All	No Sanctuary Policy	Post-SP	Pre-SP
Total Officers	32,646.22	25,480.58	39,880.05	43,897.51
Murder's Rate	4.33	4.18	4.31	4.64
Ln (Population)	13.13	12.64	13.86	13.81
% Male	49.13	49.04	49.27	49.24
% Black	13.48	14.57	11.85	11.99
% Minor	24.20	24.34	22.78	24.52
% Pop 18-25	11.60	11.68	11.19	11.61
% Pop 18-64	63.01	62.65	63.35	63.59
% Male 18—25	5.91	5.94	5.72	5.95
% Hispanic	17.02	12.58	24.14	22.90
SP	0.12	0.00	1	0.00
IE	0.70	0.73	1.01	0.52

Note: The covariates are at the county-year level, except for total officers which is at the state-year level since officers at the county level has too many missing observations, especially when we do it by gender.

Table B: Description of Enforcement Laws

Nature of the Law	Law	Years	Where?	Objective	Who implements it?	Scope	Signed by	What it Consists of:
Police-Based Measures	287(g)	2002-2012	Street/Jail	Make communities safer by the identification and removal of serious criminals	State and local law enforcement entities	State and Local	State and local enforcement entities signed a contract (Memorandum of Agreement - MOA) with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)	<p>There are various functions:</p> <p>Task Force: allows local and state officers interrogate and arrest noncitizens during their regular duties on law enforcement operations.</p> <p>Jail enforcement permits local officers to question immigrant who have been arrested on state and local charges about their immigration status.</p> <p>Hybrid model: which allow participate in both types of programs.</p>
	SC	2009-2014 2017-	Nation's jail and prisons	Identify noncitizens who have committed serious crime using biometric information	Police	Local	Jurisdictions	The program allows for the submission of biometric information on detainees that is contrasted against records in FBI and DHS databases.
	OILs	2010-	Street/Jail	Identification noncitizen	State and local law enforcement entities	State	State governor	<p>Comprehensive laws that may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A “show me your papers” clause, enabling the police to request proper identification documentation during a lawful stop. Require that schools report students’ legal status.
Employment-Based Measures	E-Verify	2006-	Firms	Deter the hiring of unauthorized immigrants.	Employer	State	State governor	Electronic program that allows employers to screen newly hired workers for work eligibility.

Table C
The Effect of Sanctuary Policies on the Hispanic Female Homicide Rate using State by Year Fixed Effects

Homicide Type	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Fam/Part	Restricted Family
SP	-0.015 (0.009)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.014** (0.007)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.007* (0.004)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.113	0.0124	0.0158	0.0191	0.0589	0.0154

Notes: ‘Partner’ refers to any of the following: boy/girlfriend, common law husband/wife, ex-husband/wife, husband/wife, irrespective of whether the relationship is hetero or homosexual. ‘Family’ refers to any of the following: brother/sister, daughter/son, father/mother, step siblings/parents, in laws, and other family members. ‘Fam/Part’ includes the two prior categories. Finally, the ‘Restricted Family’ category uses Iyengar’s (2007) family definition, which excludes other family members from the family category described before. All regressions include a constant term, as we all county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level. Means reported correspond to county-year cells prior to the implementation of sanctuary policies.

Table D
The Effect of Sanctuary Policies on the Hispanic Female Homicide Rate using a Treatment Trend

Homicide Type	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Fam/Part	Restricted Family
SP	0.008 (0.014)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.008** (0.004)
Observations	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010	17,010
Mean	0.113	0.0124	0.0158	0.0191	0.0589	0.0154


Notes: ‘Partner’ refers to any of the following: boy/girlfriend, common law husband/wife, ex-husband/wife, husband/wife, irrespective of whether the relationship is hetero or homosexual. ‘Family’ refers to any of the following: brother/sister, daughter/son, father/mother, step siblings/parents, in laws, and other family members. ‘Fam/Part’ includes the two prior categories. Finally, the ‘Restricted Family’ category uses Iyengar’s (2007) family definition, which excludes other family members from the family category described before. All regressions include a constant term, as we all county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level. Means reported correspond to county-year cells prior to the implementation of sanctuary policies.

Table E
The Effect of Sanctuary Policies on the Hispanic Female Homicide Rate using Triple Differences

Homicide Type	Murder Rate	Stranger	Acquaintance	Family	Fam/Part	Restricted Family
SP*Hispanic Victim	-0.085** (0.041)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.021* (0.011)	-0.042*** (0.011)	-0.075*** (0.024)	-0.015 (0.011)
SP	0.027 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.001 (0.013)	0.008 (0.011)	0.023 (0.025)	0.004 (0.011)
Observations	20,836	20,836	20,836	20,836	20,836	20,836
Mean	0.369	0.0386	0.0566	0.0585	0.195	0.0720

Notes: ‘Partner’ refers to any of the following: boy/girlfriend, common law husband/wife, ex-husband/wife, husband/wife, irrespective of whether the relationship is hetero or homosexual. ‘Family’ refers to any of the following: brother/sister, daughter/son, father/mother, step siblings/parents, in laws, and other family members. ‘Fam/Part’ includes the two prior categories. Finally, the ‘Restricted Family’ category uses Iyengar’s (2007) family definition, which excludes other family members from the family category described before. All regressions include a constant term, as we all county and year fixed-effects, and a state-specific time trend. Estimates are weighted by the size of the county, and standard errors are clustered at the county level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level. Means reported correspond to county-year cells prior to the implementation of sanctuary policies.

Figure A: Number of Counties with Interior Immigration Enforcement Policies by Year



Notes: 'Any IE' equals 1 when the interior immigration enforcement is positive, whereas 'High IE' equals 1 when the interior immigration enforcement index is above the 25th percentile.