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Screening Discrimination in Financial Markets: Evidence from CEO-Fund Manager Dyads[✧]

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ABSTRACT

This study provides evidence that investors' demographic similarity to CEOs facilitates informed trading after accounting for selective distribution of information. Mutual fund managers overweight firms whose CEOs resemble them in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender. Significantly higher trade performance in the sub-portfolio of similar CEOs indicates that this overweighting reflects informational advantage. Consistently, for similar CEOs, fund managers are better able to identify valuable CEO-firm matches and firms with positive future earnings. The evidence supports theories of screening discrimination according to which in-group bias is a rational response to asymmetric information and has implications for fund manager diversity.

JEL classification: G11, G23, J10

Keywords: CEO-investor demographic similarity, fund manager diversity, in-group bias, informational advantage, investment decisions, mutual fund performance, screening discrimination

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While the literature has established the view that familiarity breeds investment (see, e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Hubermann (2001), Keloharju, Knüpfer, and Linnainmaa (2012), Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2012)), it has remained less clear about how familiarity affects investor information. In this regard, Huberman (2001) argues that the defining property of familiarity is to be better informed about the familiar but concludes that “*it seems that the bias favoring the familiar does not reflect the exploitation of informational advantage*” (p. 676). In fact, most empirical studies on familiarity in financial markets support this view, particularly if familiarity stems from sharing the same ethnicity, gender or political values (e.g., Ewens and Townsend (2019), Jannati et al. (2019), Wintoki and Xi (2019)).¹

This study provides robust evidence in contrast to the view that familiarity yields no informational advantage in financial markets. Specifically, we study investors’ demographic similarity to CEOs in a panel of almost 2.7 million distinct CEO-mutual fund manager dyads, covering the period after the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD). In line with theories of screening discrimination (e.g., Cornell and Welch (1996)), we find that demographic similarity facilitates informed trading. Fund managers overweight firms whose CEOs resemble them in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender. This overweighting is associated with superior trade and overall fund performance and with measures of fund managers’ enhanced understanding of CEOs and their firms.

The evidence in this study has potential implications for fund manager allocation and diversity. *All else equal*, our results suggest that fund manager diversity may not per se be valuable. When allocating managers to funds, fund families should consider fund manager demographics depending on the CEO demographics that prevail in funds’ investment styles. That is, given the low demographic diversity of corporate CEOs, fund manager diversity can

¹ Several other studies support this conclusion by providing evidence for uninformed discrimination or in-group bias in financial markets. For example, Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019) and Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Spalt (2015), respectively, find significantly lower investor flows to mutual funds whose managers are female or have foreign-sounding names, despite no performance differences. Furthermore, studying misconduct in the financial advisory industry, Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2018) find that, although females have significantly lower propensities of repeat misconduct, male managers are more likely to forgive missteps made by other males. The literature on investor home bias is more ambiguous: while various studies find no informational advantage, some studies find that proximity (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), ethnic origin (Du, Yu, and Yu (2017)), or having studied in a specific country (Jagannathan, Jiao, and Karolyi (2018)) is associated with informational advantage. Overall, most evidence suggests that less informed or prejudiced decisions survive the competitive forces of financial markets, while relatively little is known about the benefits of familiarity and its informational channels.

have (informational) costs and it can be rational for some fund families to limit the diversity of some of their funds. This result is consistent with and provides a potential explanation for the low fraction of women and ethnic minorities in the mutual fund industry.

Our study assumes and provides evidence that the process by which fund managers make investment decisions incorporates CEO information. This result is consistent with the notion that CEOs represent firms in the public, giving them a face and attracting considerable attention (Malmendier and Tate (2009, 2015)). It is also in line with a wealth of evidence suggesting that CEOs are major decision makers (Fama (1980)) who shape the firms they manage (Hambrick and Mason (1984)) and have significant impact on firm performance and strategy (see, e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005), Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2017)).

The theoretical underpinning of our study is developed from theories of screening discrimination (e.g., Aigner and Cain (1977), Cornell and Welch (1996)), a type of statistical discrimination, as well as related information-based homophily (Kets and Sandroni (2019)). According to the former, demographic similarity to the CEO can be expected to help fund managers overcome asymmetric information because similarity between two individuals can increase the precision of the signals that one individual receives about the other. Specifically, applying Cornell and Welch's (1996) model, a fund manager can evaluate noisy signals about CEO "qualities" and the firms CEOs lead – e.g., conference calls and investor presentations, interviews, personal meetings, past performance – more precisely if both belong to the same group. The idea is that similarity facilitates the interpretation of such signals and consequently lowers the signals' noise.² Kets and Sandroni (2019) also argue that similarity to others reduces uncertainty about those others' future actions as it is easier to take the perspective of someone who belongs to the own group (e.g., Williams, Parker, and Turner (2007)).³

We derive testable empirical predictions from the above theories. First, if demographic similarity yields informational advantage, fund managers should either over- or underweight

² For example, demographically similar people likely find it easier to "read between the lines" and interpret their (non)verbal communication, e.g., gestures, manners, and style of speech (Schefflen (1972), Mehrabian (1981)).

³ In the spirit of Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), fund managers may focus on acquiring information about firms with similar CEOs as similarity can constitute an initial information endowment and hence a comparative advantage. Yet, discrimination might be unintentional (Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan, 2005).

firms headed by similar CEOs. Second, fund managers' investments in firms with similar CEOs should outperform their investments in firms with dissimilar CEOs.

In contrast, theories of taste-based discrimination (Becker (1957)), fear of the unknown (Cao et al. (2011)), in-group favoritism (e.g., Turner, Brown, and Tajfel (1979), Tajfel (1982)), or miscalibrated beliefs (e.g., Bordalo et al. (2016)) all imply that demographic (dis)similarity between fund managers and CEOs can cause the former to make less informed or "prejudiced" investment decisions. These theories predict that fund managers overweight firms with similar CEOs although similarity does not yield informational advantage. Accordingly, fund managers' investments in firms with similar CEOs can be expected to exhibit an equal or even an inferior performance compared to investments in firms with dissimilar CEOs, as the latter have a higher hurdle to be included in the fund portfolio. To conclude, only theories of (or related to) screening discrimination predict that in-group bias will reflect informational advantage and ultimately yield superior performance. Thus, comparing the performance of fund managers' investments in firms with and without demographically similar CEOs allows to draw inferences about the existence of screening discrimination in financial markets.

To test the above predictions, we examine similarity in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender because these demographics are exogenous to CEOs and fund managers, which arguably allows us to study first-order effects of similarity. Other dimensions of interpersonal similarity, such as the same educational background or political views, can be caused by similarity in age, ethnicity or gender, but not vice versa. Importantly, it is also plausible that fund managers are aware of these demographics as they can be inferred directly from a CEO's name and look.

Consistent with both information- and preference-/belief-based theories, fund managers significantly overweight firms managed by demographically similar CEOs relative to their fund's investment style. This result holds for age, ethnicity, and gender, and when we use a similarity score based on these demographics. It is robust to controlling for CEO demographics and for a variety of firm and fund variables. Furthermore, providing a first indication that the in-group bias towards similar CEOs reflects informational advantage,

firms whose CEOs resemble fund managers demographically are significantly more likely to belong to the largest 10% of a funds' investment style-adjusted excess portfolio holdings.⁴

We study the post-RegFD period to mitigate concerns of CEOs' selective distribution of information. Yet, RegFD does not completely eliminate such concerns. In fact, CEOs might treat demographically similar fund managers preferentially as they share similar networks (e.g., via school ties). Our results are robust to excluding both educational and local networks. They are also robust to considering only those funds with arguably limited access to firm management (e.g., funds belonging to small families or funds with low-tenure managers).

We address endogeneity more broadly. Our results are upheld when we use stock-time fixed effects that account for virtually any unobserved CEO and firm heterogeneity. We also exploit variation in demographic similarity due to changing CEO-fund manager dyads. First, we use fund-stock fixed effects to account for funds' endogenous selection of stocks. Second, we exploit variation caused by CEO departures, which allows us to hold the match between fund managers and funds constant, accounting for the endogenous matching between the two. Fund managers are significantly more likely to sell stocks (relative to holding or buying them) after CEO changes that decrease their demographic similarity to CEOs. For robustness, we focus on plausibly exogenous CEO departures caused by sudden and unexpected deaths.

Next, we provide evidence that fund managers' in-group bias towards demographically similar CEOs reflects informational advantage. To this end, we compare fund managers' trading performance in their sub-portfolio of firms managed by demographically similar CEOs to their sub-portfolio of firms managed by dissimilar CEOs. That is, we compare the performance of investments made by the same fund manager at the same time. This approach eliminates concerns of omitted variables on fund and manager level, particularly differences in managerial ability, connectedness, and demographics, which may drive performance.

On average, fund managers exhibit a superior next-quarter trading performance in their sub-portfolio of firms managed by demographically similar CEOs. In particular, we find that

⁴ We find only limited evidence that fund managers underweight firms headed by similar CEOs, which is consistent with Huberman (2001) who argues that „[...] people tend to buy (and hold) the familiar stocks, not sell them.“ (p. 675). However, we find that demographic similarity to CEOs, on average, is negatively associated with whether fund managers hold stocks in the first place. Thus, consistent with informational advantage, fund managers are less likely to invest in firms whose CEOs resemble them demographically – i.e., they are more selective – but significantly overweight such firms upon deciding to buy the respective stocks.

the difference in risk-adjusted returns between the stocks bought and the stocks sold is significantly higher for trades in firms with similar CEOs, even after excluding educational and local networks. For example, compared to the fund's concurrent trades in firms with dissimilar CEOs, the difference in quarterly Carhart four-factor alphas between stocks bought and stocks sold is 33 basis points higher if fund managers have a similar age, the same ethnicity, and the same gender as the CEO. The results are upheld when we adjust stock performance by the average performance of firms whose CEOs have similar demographics. Thus, even within the universe of firms with similar CEOs, fund managers select those stocks that perform better. Based on this evidence we conclude that the in-group bias towards demographically similar CEOs reflects informational advantage.

To further support this conclusion and to understand the potential channels through which demographic similarity enables fund managers to better understand and evaluate CEOs and their firms, we conduct two additional tests. First, we build on theories and empirical evidence according to which the quality of the match between CEOs and firms is a pivotal factor for firm performance (e.g., Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013), Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth (2016)). We provide evidence indicating that fund managers are more capable of identifying valuable CEO-firm matches when CEOs are similar, consistent with theories of screening discrimination predicting that similarity facilitates the interpretation of signals about CEO "qualities" that help assess CEO fit to specific firms. Fund managers overweight particularly those demographically similar CEOs who, *ex post*, are associated with negative stock returns to announcements of their departures. Second, following Baker et al. (2010), we study stock returns to next-quarter earnings announcements of fund managers' portfolio firms to test whether similarity to CEOs also helps fund managers interpret and forecast earnings fundamentals and news. We find that fund managers' recent buys (sells) of firms with similar CEOs are associated with significantly higher (lower) announcement returns.

Taken together, our study provides robust evidence that demographic similarity to firms' CEOs helps fund managers overcome informational asymmetries, consistent with theories of screening discrimination. In additional tests, we find that fund managers' superior investment decisions associated with overweighting similar CEOs also translate into better performance at the fund level and thus benefit fund investors. Consistently, we also find a positive relation of overweighting similar CEOs with a fund's Active Share (as per Cremers and Petajisto

(2009)) and industry concentration (as per Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005)). The stronger deviation from the benchmark and lower industry diversity of fund holdings are supportive of the informational advantage of CEO-fund manager similarity.

Our study complements Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2017)). The authors use unique data from an Indian bank and find that shared codes and beliefs between borrowers and lenders, measured as similarity in terms of caste and religion, increase access to credit and loan size and reduces collateral requirements and default. Similar to our study, Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2017) provide evidence that similarity between economic agents makes financial decisions more informed. While both studies overlap, significant differences remain. Our study provides primary evidence for screening discrimination in financial markets. Specifically, we study the U.S. mutual fund industry, which is important to understand given its \$17.7 trillion assets under management (Investment Company Institute (2019)). In contrast, Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2017)) study one state-owned bank in India, one of the world's few caste systems, which may arguably raise concerns of generalizability given their focus on similarity in terms of caste and religion. Moreover, Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2017) study loan officers who usually meet potential borrowers before they make investment decisions and who can use loan covenants thereafter. In contrast, we study mutual fund managers who have at most limited (if any) personal contact to CEOs prior to and after investing. This setting is significantly different and makes it less likely that informational advantage is due to personal contact among familiar individuals pre or post investment. In sum, our study complements Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2017), supports the generalizability of their results, and suggests that similarity in terms of demographics other than caste and religion facilitate information production.⁵ Thereby, we contribute to the literature on statistical discrimination and the role of soft information in asset management.

In addition, our study contributes to two strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the emerging literature on in-group bias in financial markets (see, e.g., Ewens and Townsend (2019), Jannati et al. (2019), Wintoki and Xi (2019)). In contrast to our study, this literature suggests that in-group bias does not reflect informational advantage but rather preferences or

⁵ In untabulated tests we examine similarity based on religious denominations and find results that support Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2017).

incorrect stereotypes.⁶ The closest study to ours is Wintoki and Xi (2019) who also examine mutual fund managers. The authors find that fund managers overweight companies managed by executives and directors with whom they share a similar political partisan affiliation. They find that this political partisan bias does not reflect superior information. Our study is significantly different from Wintoki and Xi (2019). They study shared values, i.e., similar political attitudes, which are endogenously determined and costly to observe. In contrast, we study shared status in terms of exogenous demographics. This difference may explain why we find that in-group bias reflects informational advantage, while Wintoki and Xi (2019) do not.

Second, our study contributes to the literature on factors that facilitate mutual fund managers' information production. This literature has focused on fund managers' education and job experience (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Cici et al. (2018)) as well as educational and local networks (e.g., Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015)). We extend this literature by providing evidence that fund managers' demographic similarity to CEOs is associated with more informed investment decisions, even after accounting for fund manager background and networks.

1 Theoretical background and empirical predictions

Several theories in economics and social psychology predict that familiarity, i.e., demographic similarity to CEOs in our context, affects investors' processing and use of information, and ultimately their investment decisions. These theories can be classified into *information-based theories*, which predict that investment decisions will be based on (superior) information, and *preference/belief-based theories* predicting less informed or "prejudiced" decisions.

How can similarity to firms' CEOs help investors overcome asymmetric information and facilitate informed investment decisions? According to theories of screening discrimination

⁶ Ewens and Townsend (2019) find that early-stage investors express more interest in entrepreneurs with whom they share the same gender, despite no within-gender screening/monitoring advantages. In fact, among the startups that male investors express interest in, those led by males underperform those led by females. In a concurrent working paper, Jannati, et al. (2019) study sell-side equity analysts and find that earnings forecasts are lower when Republican analysts assess firms run by Democrat CEOs, when domestic analysts assess firms run by foreign CEOs, and when male analysts assess firms run by female CEOs. Both studies examine gender similarity, as in our study, but find no evidence of informational advantage, perhaps because they consider different settings. None of the studies, however, examine similarity in terms of age or different ethnicities.

(e.g., Aigner and Cain (1977), Cornell and Welch (1996)), similarity between two individuals can increase the precision of the signals that one individual receives about the quality of another individual. Hence, according to this type of statistical discrimination, in-group bias towards similar individuals can emerge as a rational response to asymmetric information.

Particularly, in Cornell and Welch's (1996) model individuals possess "qualities" that are not directly observable, such as skills and intangible characteristics, which qualify an individual for a certain position (Arrow (1972)). In case of CEOs, one can think of such qualities as the ability to make strategic decisions or adapt to changes, innate talent, or CEO values such as integrity, leadership, and political orientation. These qualities should matter to investors in their attempts to assess the impact and value of CEOs and firms and anticipate their future actions.⁷ However, investors must rely on indirect assessment procedures, i.e., they have to evaluate noisy signals to measure these qualities when they make investment decisions. Such signals may include conference calls and investor presentations, firms' press releases, CEO interviews and press portrayals, personal meetings, or prior firm performance. Cornell and Welch (1996) argue that the noise of such signals is lower when the individual being assessed is of a similar background. That is, familiarity facilitates making more accurate assessments, which allow to better distinguish between high- and low-quality individuals. For example, people of the same ethnicity or gender will find it easier to interpret their verbal and nonverbal communication, while people of a similar age will use a similar language and have a joint framework for assessing each other's personal history and values as they grew up at the same time and hence experienced similar formative events and settings. Consistently, the literature suggests that people interpret various culturally intermediated signals, such as dress, gestures, manners, and style of speech (e.g., Schefflen (1972), Mehrabian (1981)) and that nonverbal cues have a considerable cultural element (e.g., Archer and Akert (1977)).

Consistent with Cornell and Welch (1996), Kets and Sandroni (2019) provide a theory of information-based homophily. This theory predicts that similarity to others reduces an individual's uncertainty about those others' future actions because it is easier to take other

⁷ Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that these CEO qualities matter for firm outcomes such as performance and reporting quality. On the role of CEO adaptability and strategic decision making, see Guay, Taylor, and Xiao (2015) and Baum and Wally (2003), respectively; on the role of integrity, see Erhard, Jensen, and Zaffron (2009) and Dikolli et al. (2019); on the role of political orientation, see, e.g., Unsal, Hassan, and Zirek (2016).

people's perspectives if they belong to one's own group (e.g., Williams, Parker, and Turner (2007), Heinke and Louis (2009)).

In terms of empirically testable predictions, these *information-based theories* suggest that investors may over- and/or underweight firms managed by demographically similar CEOs because they have an informational advantage stemming from their similarity to these CEOs. Specifically, even if all investors receive the same noisy signals about a CEO's quality, investors may process and evaluate these signals more accurately if they are similar to the CEO. For example, if they share a similar background with a CEO, investors may find it easier to interpret conference calls and interviews with this CEO, "read between the lines", and understand or envision the CEO's plans for the firm. Conversely, in case of dissimilar CEOs, investors have to rely on population means of dissimilar CEO groups or stereotypes. The latter can be incorrect due to miscalibrated beliefs (Bordalo et al. (2016)). Thus, for the same investor investments in firms managed by demographically similar CEOs can be expected to exhibit superior performance, reflecting superior information, compared to investments in firms with dissimilar CEOs.⁸

In contrast to theories of screening discrimination, *preference/belief-based theories*, i.e., theories of taste-based discrimination (Becker (1957)), fear of the unknown (Cao et al. (2011)), in-group favoritism (e.g., Turner, Brown, and Tajfel (1979), Tajfel (1982)), or miscalibrated beliefs (e.g., Bordalo et al. (2016)) all suggest that (dis)similarity between CEOs and fund managers may cause the latter to make less informed or "prejudiced" investment decisions. Specifically, these theories allow for the following empirical predictions. First, investors can be expected to overweight firms led by demographically similar CEOs. Second, investors make less or uninformed investment decisions, i.e., they overweight firms led by similar CEOs not because they have superior information, but because they have preferences for in-group CEOs or prejudices against dissimilar CEOs. Specifically, even if all investors receive the same noisy signals about a CEO's quality or plans for the firm, investors may evaluate these signals overly positively for in-group CEOs,

⁸ As similarity attracts (Byrne (1971), McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001)), investors may also be more aware of and may acquire more information about similar CEOs and their firms, which also facilitates screening. Even if investors are not aware of their informational advantage, attraction can explain why, in the first place, they tend to screen (and then invest in) firms managed by similar CEOs.

whereas they may ignore or undervalue the signals if CEOs are not similar.⁹ Consequently, for the same investor, investments in firms with similar CEOs can be expected to exhibit an equal or even an inferior performance compared to investments in firms with dissimilar CEOs.

To conclude, while both information- and preference/belief-based theories are consistent with an in-group bias towards demographically similar CEOs, the theories differ in terms of predicted performance. Specifically, only information-based theories predict that investments in similar CEOs outperform investments in dissimilar CEOs for the same investor. Hence, examining investor performance allows to infer which theories are likely to apply.

2 Data and variables

2.1 Data

To test the empirical predictions developed in Section 1, we combine several data sources to obtain a panel of CEOs and mutual fund managers. First, we retrieve information on fund characteristics from the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database (CRSP MF). Fund characteristics include, e.g., fund age and fees, fund returns, fund families, locations and investment objectives as well as total net assets under management. Information at the share-class level is aggregated at the fund level using share class total net assets as weights. We focus on actively-managed U.S. domestic equity funds and eliminate all international, sector, balanced, bond, index, and money market funds. Funds are categorized into six different styles by their dominating investment objective using CRSP style codes (Mid Cap (EDCM), Small Cap (EDCS), Micro Cap (EDCI), Growth (EDYG), Growth & Income

⁹ According to social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel (1978), Tajfel (1982)), individuals derive their self-concept from membership in social groups, which are defined on the basis of similar identities. The literature (e.g., Tajfel (1978), Turner, Brown, and Tajfel (1979), Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis (2002)) argues that people have systematically more favorable views about members of their own groups, whereas they are indifferent or have less favorable views about members of other groups. This in-group favoritism is associated with higher levels of perceived competence (Baskett (1973)) and more positive performance evaluations (Pulakos and Wexley (1983)). Experimental evidence by Heath and Tversky (1991) supports the view that people have confidence in the familiar and suggests that they are even willing to pay a premium to bet on their own judgements. Furthermore, the theory of taste-based discrimination (Becker (1957)) suggests that discrimination against others who do not belong to an individual's group results from a personal prejudice or 'taste for discrimination', which causes an individual to act as if there were a cost of associating with dissimilar people. That is, investors may be willing to forgo valuable investments in firms led by dissimilar CEOs – e.g., CEOs with a different ethnicity or gender – putting their prejudices against these CEOs ahead of economic profits.

(EDYB), and Income (EDYI)). When CRSP Style Code information is missing, we use the classifications according to Lipper, Strategic Insight, and Wiesenberger to identify a fund's dominating investment objective. We match the CRSP MF data to the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings Database (MF Holdings) using the MFLINKS tables. We limit our analysis to holdings of common stocks (share codes 10 and 11). Additional information about these stocks is retrieved from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database.

We obtain fund managers' names as well as their start and end dates at the respective fund from the Morningstar Direct Mutual Fund Database (MS Direct), which is more accurate in terms of fund manager information than the CRSP MF database (see, e.g., Patel and Sarkissian (2017)), and eliminate cases for which MS Direct reports anonymous management teams. We merge MS Direct with the aforementioned databases using fund CUSIPs.

Information on CEOs' names, their age and gender are from ExecuComp and Board Analyst's The Corporate Library (TCL). The latter covers a large universe of firms from 2001 onwards. Using both databases allows us to cover a broader range of common stocks held by mutual funds, which reduces the bias towards larger firms. We eliminate observations where a firm is run by more than one CEO and require the identity of the CEO to be available for at least 67% of the stocks held by a fund at a given report date. The median (mean) fraction of the stocks in a fund's portfolio for which we have CEO information is 92% (89.5%). Since mutual funds report their holdings several times throughout the year while both ExecuComp and TCL provide information only as of fiscal-year end, we use information from ExecuComp and hand-collected data to identify the exact dates when CEOs took office.

Further, we follow Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015) and identify the ethnicity of CEOs and fund managers using their surnames in the classification algorithm of Ambekar et al. (2009), which categorizes names into 13 different ethnic groups. For robustness, we use two alternative approaches to classify ethnic groups, which we explain in Section 3. Following Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019), we determine a fund manager's gender by comparing the first name to a list provided by the United States Social Security Administration (SSA) containing the most popular first male and female names. We enrich our data set with educational information for CEOs and fund managers, which we obtain

primarily from Capital IQ, Marquis Who's Who, and MS Direct. In addition, we manually collected biographical data from Bloomberg, fund company websites, LinkedIn, and SEC filings. Because fund manager age frequently is unavailable, we follow Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and assume that fund managers are 21 upon receiving their bachelor's degree.

Our final sample comprises 2,487 actively managed diversified U.S. domestic equity mutual funds and 3,716 common stocks for the period 2001-2011. These funds and firms are managed by 4,862 fund managers and 5,552 CEOs, respectively, which account for 2,692,554 (1,407,801) distinct CEO-fund manager (team) dyads. Hence, parameter identification in our study results from a large number of varying CEO-fund manager combinations.

2.2 Variables

We use different measures of demographic similarity between CEOs and fund managers based on their age, ethnicity, and gender. We calculate the fraction of a fund's managers who match a firm's CEO in terms of age, ethnicity or gender, respectively (*PctMgrMatch*). Following Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2012), we include all observations with available information for at least one fund manager. We calculate fractions based on the number of fund managers with available information. Regarding similarity in age, we use an interval of plus or minus five years around the CEO's age as our main similarity measure. We use different age measures for robustness in Appendix B. The variable *Avg. PctMgrMatch* measures the average fraction of fund managers with the same age, ethnicity, and gender as the CEO. Alternatively, we measure similarity via indicator variables that are equal to one if all of a fund's managers, respectively, have a similar age, same ethnicity or same gender as the CEO (*AllMatch*). The variable *Similarity Score* combines demographic dimensions by summing up the aforementioned dummy variables across all three dimensions. Accordingly, the similarity score can take on values between 0 and 3.

In Section 3, we use the variable *Excess Weight* as the main dependent variable to study the relation between fund managers' investment decisions and their similarity to CEOs. *Excess Weight* is defined as the weight that a fund manager assigns to a stock in her portfolio relative to the average weight in the fund's investment style in a given quarter. Alternatively, we also use unadjusted portfolio weights (*Portfolio Weights*) as well as an indicator variable,

Top 10% Bet, which is equal to one if a stock belongs to the largest 10% of excess weights in the fund's respective investment style.

In Section 4, we examine the performance of fund managers' investment decisions based on risk-adjusted returns. We use quarterly stock performance based on Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas (*Carhart Alpha*) as well as the stock characteristic-adjusted performance measure of Daniel et al. (1997) (*DGTW*), compounded over the three months within a quarter. We determine alphas by taking the difference of realized stock return and the expected excess stock return in the quarter. The expected return in a month is calculated using factor loading estimations from the prior 24 months and factor realizations in the current month. We compound both realized and expected returns over the quarter before taking their difference. Monthly factor returns are obtained from Kenneth French's website. For robustness, we adjust both of the above performance measures by the average performance of firms whose CEOs are demographically similar to the CEOs of firms fund managers have invested in. Thereby, we can test whether fund managers choose better performing stocks out of the universe of CEOs who share similar demographics, which speaks to informational advantage.

In the analyses presented in Sections 3 and 4, we control for a large number of stock and fund characteristics that could affect both portfolio weights and stock performance. At the stock level, we include the quarterly stock return (i.e., the compounded monthly return within the quarter), the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization, the natural logarithm of the firm's age (based on the first CRSP listing date), and the book-to-market ratio. Using CRSP daily stock return and trading data, we also control for stocks' quarterly turnover (i.e., the average of the daily number of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding over all trading days of a quarter), its quarterly return volatility and the quarterly mean-adjusted stock illiquidity based on a daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.

At the fund level, we use an indicator variable equal to one if the fund is managed by a team (zero otherwise), the natural logarithm of the fund's total net assets under management (in \$ millions), the natural logarithm of the fund's age, the fund's annual expense and turnover ratios, the fund's quarterly fund flows (i.e., the fund's percentage growth rate over the quarter as in Sirri and Tufano (1998)), and the natural logarithm of the fund family's total net assets under management (in \$ millions). Finally, to account for differences in funds'

portfolio styles, we include the fund's portfolio concentration (i.e., the Herfindahl index of portfolio weights in a quarter) as well as the value-weighted average size, value, and momentum scores of Daniel et al. (1997). All variables are defined in Appendix A.

2.3 Summary statistics

Table 1 reports summary statistics for our sample. While Panel A reports the number of distinct CEO-fund manager dyads, Panel B reports statistics on CEO and fund manager demographics. We find a similar distribution between CEOs and fund managers with respect to their ethnicities. However, while the average CEO is 55 years old and only 3% of all CEOs are females, fund managers are on average 45 years old and 11% are female. The above figures compare favorably to existing CEO and fund manager studies (e.g., Custódio and Metzger (2014), Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2011), Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2019)).

Panel C reports summary statistics for our measures of CEO-fund manager demographic similarity. Mean values for *PctMgrMatch* are 0.22 for similar age, 0.27 for same ethnicity, and 0.88 for same gender. *Avg. PctMgrMatch* has a mean (median) of 0.46 (0.44). Regarding the three *AllMatch* indicator variables, for 11%, 15%, and 73% of the sample's observations, all managers of a fund manager team have a similar age, the same ethnicity, and the same gender as a firm's CEO, respectively. The variable *Similarity Score* has a mean (median) of 0.98 (1) and a minimum and maximum value of 0 and 3, respectively.

Panels D and E report key characteristics at the stock and fund level, respectively. The average firm in our sample has a market capitalization of over \$3 billion, has been public for almost 19 years, and has a book-to-market ratio of 0.65. The average stock generates a quarterly return of 3.33%. These figures are consistent with prior literature (e.g., Brown, Wei, and Wermers (2014), Agarwal et al. (2015)). The average fund in our sample has a portfolio weight in a stock of 0.94%, total net assets of \$1.3 billion, and is approximately 14 years old. It has a turnover ratio of 87% and an expense ratio of 1.28% per year. The fund characteristics in our sample compare favorably to related studies (e.g., Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) or Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2012)).

3 Demographic similarity to CEOs and fund manager stock selection

In the following, we examine how demographic similarity between CEOs and fund managers is related to investment decisions of the latter. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 present our baseline regression results and additional robustness tests, respectively. Section 3.3 presents results from tests that exploit variation in CEO-fund manager similarity caused by changes to CEO-fund manager dyads resulting from (exogenous) CEO departures.

3.1 Baseline regression results

To capture a fund manager's preference for a stock, we use the *Excess weight* as our primary dependent variable. That is, we examine the weights fund managers assign to stocks in their portfolios relative to the average weight in their fund's investment style in a given quarter. Using style-adjusted weights ensures that funds do not just overweight certain groups of CEOs because the firms in their investment style are mainly managed by CEOs with specific demographics. We conduct regressions according to equation (1):

$$ExcessWeight_{i,j,t} = \alpha + \beta Similarity_{i,j,t} + \gamma' X_{i,j,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t} \quad (1)$$

$ExcessWeight_{i,j,t}$ is the portfolio weight of fund i in stock j at the end of quarter t in percent relative to the average weight in stock j across all funds in the same investment style as fund i . $Similarity_{i,j,t}$ is a placeholder for the different similarity measures described in Section 2.2. It either stands for the variable *Similarity Score*, or for one of the three separate *AllMatch* indicator variables, or for the fraction of a fund's managers who are similar to a CEO in terms of age, ethnicity or gender (i.e., *PctMgrMatch*) at the end of quarter t . $X_{i,j,t-1}$ is a vector of control variables at the fund and stock level. All controls, except for the *Team* dummy, enter the regression with one (quarterly) lag. To control for unobservable heterogeneity, the regressions also include style as well as industry-time fixed effects. The latter eliminate the concern that funds in a given investment style simply differ in their preference for particular industries in which specific CEO characteristics might be more or less prevalent. We define industries based on the Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification. In all regressions, we cluster standard errors at the fund-stock level.

Table 2 reports the regression results. Panel A shows the results when we use the variable *Similarity Score* and its components, i.e., the separate *AllMatch* indicator variables,

as our variables of interest. Panel B shows the results when we instead use *Avg. PctMgrMatch* and the three separate *PctMgrMatch* variables as our variables of interest. The evidence in both Panel A and Panel B indicates that fund managers place significantly larger weights on stocks of firms that are managed by CEOs who resemble them demographically. Irrespective of the similarity measure we use, the effect of CEO-fund manager similarity is always positive and statistically significant. In fact, the coefficients on all variables of interest are significant at the 1% level, except for the coefficient on *PctMgrMatch^{Age}*, which is significant at the 10% level. The levels of statistical significance do not hinge on whether we examine the *AllMatch* indicator variables or the *PctMgrMatch* variables separately or together in one regression.

The results are also economically significant. For example, the coefficient on *Similarity Score* in column (1) of Panel A suggests that, all else equal, for each one demographic dimension that fund managers share with CEOs the excess portfolio weight of a stock increases by 6.1 basis points. That is, compared to a fund manager without any demographic similarity to a firm's CEO, a fund manager who is similar to the CEO in age, ethnicity, and gender, overweights the respective stock by more than 18 basis points. Given that the average portfolio weight in our sample amounts to 94 basis points, the economic magnitude of this effect – an increase of almost 20% relative to the average portfolio weight – is meaningful.

Panel C presents results from regressions similar to that shown in equation (1) but with different dependent variables. Specifically, we use *Portfolio Weight*, i.e., the unadjusted weight of a stock in the fund's portfolio, and *Top 10% Bet*, which is an indicator variable that equals one if a stock belongs to the largest 10% of excess weights within the fund's investment style. The coefficients on both *Similarity Score* and *Avg. PctMgrMatch* are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, irrespective of the dependent variable we use. In untabulated regressions, we find the coefficients on the *AllMatch* indicator variables as well as the *PctMgrMatch* variables also remain statistically significant. The results for *Top 10% Bet* provide a first indication that the in-group bias towards demographically similar CEOs is likely to reflect informational advantage, given that fund managers will more likely take the risk of large bets if they are informed (e.g., due to career concerns).¹⁰

¹⁰ In untabulated tests, we further investigate whether demographic similarity to CEOs is also associated with the probability that fund managers hold a specific stock in the first place. To this end, we regress the dependent

Regarding the control variables, our results are consistent with extant literature. In particular, we find the funds in our sample to assign larger portfolio weights to smaller and less frequently traded firms, and those with higher last-quarter returns. These findings are consistent with, e.g., Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002) and Jiang, Verbeek, and Wang (2014) who find that active funds expect to find more investment opportunities in the less efficient small-cap segment and have a preference for past winner stocks. At the fund level, we find that team-managed funds, larger funds, and funds from larger fund families exhibit smaller excess weights. This evidence is in line with, e.g., Bär, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2011) and Huang et al. (2016) who document that teams and larger funds and fund families tend to hold more diversified portfolios. Lastly, as expected, stock concentration in the fund portfolio has a significantly positive relation with excess weights in particular stocks.

3.2 Robustness tests and alternative explanations

Table 3 presents the results from several robustness tests. For brevity, we do not show any control variables. The results shown in Panel A address the concern that the in-group bias towards demographically similar CEOs reflects CEOs' selective distribution of information. In general, this concern is mitigated as our sample starts in 2001, i.e., after the introduction of RegFD (in late 2000).¹¹ While RegFD prohibits selective disclosure of previously non-public, material information, it may not rule out that CEOs provide demographically similar fund managers with valuable non-public information. Specifically, demographic similarity may proxy for personal CEO-fund manager ties resulting from shared education or regional networks. In this regard, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) document that fund managers place larger bets on those firms where they have educational ties to the board of directors, while Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Coval and Moskowitz (2001), among others, show

variable *Hold*, which equals one if the fund holds a stock (and zero otherwise) on the variable *Similarity Score* along with the control variables used in Table 2 as well as the average weight of a stock in the investment style. We define a fund's investment universe as all stocks that are currently held by at least one fund in the fund's investment style. We find that the coefficient on *Similarity Score* amounts to -0.0028, statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that a fund manager who resembles a firm's CEO in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender has a 0.84 basis points lower probability to hold the stock of that firm. The effect is economically meaningful as the average likelihood to hold the stock, i.e., the average value of *Hold*, is 4.4 basis points. This result provides further support for the informational advantage associated with demographic similarity. Particularly, fund managers are less likely to invest in firms whose CEOs resemble them demographically – i.e., they are more selective – but upon deciding to buy such firms they significantly overweight their stocks.

¹¹ We note that Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) find that analysts' informational advantage associated with school ties to senior corporate officers vanishes after the introduction of RegFD.

that fund managers invest more in geographically proximate firms. Our baseline regression results remain qualitatively similar when we remove all stocks with educational ties between CEOs and fund managers, or all local stocks, or both.¹² For brevity, we tabulate the results only for the variable *Similarity Score*. However, the results are qualitatively similar for each single demographic dimension. We also find similar results when we use the variable *Residual Similarity* instead of *Similarity Score*. It is obtained from regressing the latter on two indicator variables that equal one, respectively, if a CEO and a fund manager attended the same school and for firms headquartered nearby the fund's management company.

Panel B reports results from regressions, which re-estimate our baseline regression model excluding all firms whose CEOs belong to the most frequent demographic groups. Our results remain qualitatively similar when we exclude all firms whose CEOs are i) British, ii) male, or iii) between 49 and 60 years old (corresponding to the 25th and 75th percentiles of CEO age), or when we exclude all firms led by CEOs who are British, male, and between 49 and 60 years of age. Hence, the in-group bias for demographically similar CEOs is not driven by and does not only apply to the most frequent CEO and fund manager demographics.

Next, Panel C presents results from tests that account for unobserved heterogeneity, which might explain our evidence provided in Section 3.1. First, we re-estimate our baseline regressions with stock-time fixed effects, i.e., we compare all fund managers invested in the same stock at the same time. This approach accounts for virtually all unobserved firm and CEO heterogeneity. Second, we replace stock-time fixed effects with fund-stock fixed effects to account for unobserved time-invariant factors that correlate with funds' endogenous selection of stocks and CEO-fund manager similarity. In both cases, the results remain qualitatively similar. The coefficient on *Similarity Score* is lower when we use fund-stock fixed effects, which is not surprising given that the (within) variation in the dependent variable *Excess Weight* is much lower per fund-stock pair.

¹² We obtain the location of the fund's management company from the CRSP MF database. Information on firm headquarters is obtained from Compustat. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), we define all stocks within a distance of 100 kilometers from fund headquarters as local stocks. The results are qualitatively the same if we alternatively eliminate all stocks from the same state as the fund company. We further define an educational connection between a fund and a CEO if at least one fund manager attended the same school as the CEO, which corresponds to the *CONNECTED1* measure in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008). We eliminate observations for which local and educational information is missing.

We provide additional robustness tests in Appendix B. Table B.1 shows results for several alternative measures of CEO-fund manager demographic similarity, which all support our previous results. With respect to age similarity, we calculate *PctMgrMatch* based on a maximum gap of three (instead of five) years between CEOs and fund managers. We also calculate the fraction of the fund’s managers who are in the same age cohort (e.g., 40s, 50s, 60s) as the CEO and we use the average age gap between CEOs and fund managers, i.e., the simple difference in years of age. As higher values of this age gap indicate less CEO-fund manager similarity, we expect a negative relation with *Excess Weight*. Regarding ethnicity, we present results for two alternative classifications. First, we use the dominating ethnicity of surnames from the ethnicity classification of the 2000 U.S. Census (from the U.S. Census Bureau). We require that the dominating ethnicity covers at least 75% of the population with a given surname. Instead of the 13 groups from the Ambekar et al. (2009) algorithm, in this case we classify CEOs and fund managers into only four groups (Asian, Black, Hispanic, and White). Second, we use an alternative algorithm from Onolytics (formerly OnoMap) that has already been used in existing academic studies, e.g., Ellahie, Tahoun, and Tuna (2017). This algorithm derives the origin of a name from both the first and last name instead of just the surname.¹³ Lastly, we construct alternative versions of the *Similarity Score*, which are each based on two of the three demographic dimensions.

Table B.2 of Appendix B presents results from regressions where we use the weights of sub-portfolios for different age cohorts, female CEOs, and different ethnicities. This approach follows Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2012) who analyze sub-portfolio weights in managers’ home states. Again, the results corroborate our previous findings, independent of whether we use OLS or Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions.

Table B.3 of Appendix B presents results from re-estimating the regressions shown in Panel A of Table 2 for sub-samples of funds with arguably limited access to firm management, i.e., small funds and funds that belong to small fund families (both with below-median size) as well as funds whose managers have a below-median tenure in the fund industry. In all three regressions, the coefficient on *Similarity Score* remains significant at the

¹³ We also obtain information from Onolytics on the likely religion for a given first and last name. In untabulated tests, we calculate the similarity between CEOs and fund managers based on whether they have the same religion. We again find a significantly positive relation between *Excess Weight* and CEO-fund manager similarity. All tests based on Onolytics exclude cases in which ethnicity is identified as “International”.

1% level, indicating that fund managers' in-group bias towards firms led by demographically similar CEOs is unlikely to reflect enhanced access to firm management.

3.3 Evidence from (exogenous) CEO departures

In the following, we provide a more direct test of whether fund managers incorporate CEOs in their information production process and whether demographic similarity to CEOs indeed affects fund managers' investment decisions. In particular, we exploit variation in CEO-fund manager dyads resulting from CEO departures, which lead to changes in CEO-fund manager similarity. This test allows to hold fund manager-fund pairs constant, whereby we account for the endogenous matching between funds and managers.

We test whether a change in fund managers' demographic similarity to a firm's CEO, as caused by the change of the CEO, is associated with the likelihood of fund managers selling the firm's stock. The identifying assumption of this test is that CEO departures and changes in firm fundamentals due to these departures are unrelated to demographic similarity between CEOs and fund managers. We focus on fund trades in the quarter of CEO departure to minimize concerns that fund managers trade because firm fundamentals change materially. Consistent with theory and our previous results, we expect fund managers to be more (less) likely to sell a stock if the firm's new CEO is less (more) similar to them.

We identify 1,890 CEO departures during our sample period. To analyze how these departures relate to fund manager trades, we calculate the similarity of fund managers to both the former and the new CEOs in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender. We eliminate cases where the composition of the fund manager team or the fund manager changes around the quarter of a CEO departure. That is, holding the firm and the fund manager-fund match constant, we compare the demographic similarity of two CEO-fund manager dyads that differ only because CEO demographics differ.

As the dependent variable, we use the indicator variable *Sell*, which is equal to one if the fund sells shares of the stock of a firm that experiences a CEO departure (as compared to holding or buying the stock). We relate the sell decision to several independent variables that measure changes in demographic similarity around CEO departures. These variables are *Similarity Increase^{Score}*, *Similarity Increase^{Age}*, *Similarity Increase^{Ethnicity}* and *Similarity Increase^{Gender}*. All four variables are indicator variables, which are equal to one if either the

variable *Similarity Score* or the respective *AllMatch* indicator variables increase. That is, the variables capture instances in which fund managers become demographically more similar to a firm's (new) CEO. Our regressions include stock-time fixed effects to mitigate concerns that fund managers simply trade in reaction to CEO departures coinciding with considerable changes in firm characteristics. Our results are upheld when we compare fund managers' trading behavior within the same stock in the same investment style.

We report the regression results in Table 4. Panel A shows results that are based on all CEO departures. However, one might argue that some mutual funds have an impact on the likelihood of CEOs being replaced (see, e.g., Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003)). To address this concern, we perform two additional analyses. First, we re-estimate the regressions in Panel A using only those turnovers that are neither classified as forced nor as unclassified turnovers according to Jenter and Kanaan (2015). The results are shown in Panel B. Second, we focus only on those CEO turnovers, which are caused by sudden and unexpected CEO deaths (excluding murders or suicides). Because sudden CEO deaths occur randomly and are arguably exogenous to current firm and market conditions (see Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth (2016), Nguyen and Nielsen (2014), Quigley, Crossland, and Campbell (2017)), they provide variation in CEO-fund manager similarity, which is plausibly exogenous to mutual funds impact on CEO turnover decisions. Data on sudden CEO deaths for the years 2001-2007 is provided by Timothy Quigley and corresponds to the sudden death data used in Quigley, Crossland, and Campbell (2017). For the years 2008-2011, we hand-collect sudden CEO deaths following the procedures described in Nguyen and Nielsen (2014) and Quigley, Crossland, and Campbell (2017)). We show the results for sudden CEO deaths in Panel C.¹⁴

Because sudden CEO deaths are unexpected shocks to both firms, it is not immediately clear in many cases who will (finally) succeed the deceased CEO and firms typically need a considerable amount of time to find a successor (see Rivolta (2018) on delayed successions). Moreover, fund managers first have to learn about the death, its consequences, and who will be the successor. Hence, we focus on a longer period of time after the event and compare the weight that a fund held in the stock at the beginning of the quarter during which the CEO died with the average portfolio weight in the stock in the year after the death. Accordingly,

¹⁴ We thank Dirk Jenter, Florian Peters, and Alexander Wagner for graciously sharing their CEO turnover data. We also thank Timothy Quigley for sharing his CEO sudden death data.

we define the indicator variable *Sell* as being equal to one if the average portfolio weight in the stock in the year after the CEO death is lower than before the death (and zero otherwise). We have 35 cases of sudden CEO deaths in our sample period, which still leaves us with a sample size of more than 1,300 observations as each death event affects several mutual funds.

The results in all three panels of Table 4 support our expectation that an increase in demographic similarity due to a CEO change makes a fund manager less likely to sell the stock of the affected firm. The coefficient on the variable *Similarity Increase*^{Score} is negative and statistically significant, at the 1% level in Panels A and B and at the 5% level in Panel C. Furthermore, across all three panels, the coefficients on *Similarity Increase*^{Age}, *Similarity Increase*^{Ethnicity} and *Similarity Increase*^{Gender} are always negative and statistically significant in seven out of nine regressions. In terms of economic magnitude, column (1) of Panel A, suggests that, all else equal, an increase in overall demographic similarity between a CEO and a fund manager is associated with a decrease in the probability that the firm's stock will be sold by that fund manager of 2.8 percentage points. This difference accounts for almost 8% of the average likelihood to sell a stock (which is 35.8%).

The above results provide additional evidence that changes in demographic similarity to CEOs bring about economically meaningful changes in the portfolios of fund managers. We conclude that fund managers indeed react to who is leading a firm, and whether that person resembles them demographically, instead of just trading on basic firm characteristics.

4 Does the in-group bias towards similar CEOs reflect informational advantage?

As fund managers' in-group bias towards demographically similar CEOs is consistent with both information-based and preference/belief-based theories, we conduct several analyses in this section to test whether the in-group bias reflects informational advantage. In Section 4.1, we compare the performance of fund managers' trades in firms led by demographically similar and dissimilar CEOs. Section 4.2 provides evidence on potential channels through which demographic similarity to CEOs can facilitate informed fund manager trading. Finally, in Section 4.3 we examine performance consequences and trading behavior at the fund level.

4.1 Evidence from fund managers' trades in similar and dissimilar CEOs

In the following, we consider the performance of fund managers' investments as a direct test of whether overweighting demographically similar CEOs reflects informational advantage. If so, we should find that fund managers' investments in firms with demographically similar CEOs outperform their investments in firms with dissimilar CEOs. However, in case fund managers invest more in similar CEOs because of preferences or miscalibrated beliefs, we would expect to find either a negative relative performance or no performance differences. To test our empirical expectations, we analyze whether the next-quarter performance of fund manager trades is related to their demographic similarity to CEOs. In this regard, several studies argue that trades are more appropriate to identify informational advantage (and biases) of fund managers than stock holdings because they better capture active investment decisions (see, e.g., Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015)). Accordingly, we examine trading returns, i.e., the performance of buys over sells.

To study trade performance, we use an approach similar to Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2017) and define a trade as a buy (sell) if the fund increases (decreases) the number of shares in the stock. Since we are interested in the success of a trading-based strategy, we eliminate observations for which the number of shares does not change. We then conduct the following regression at the fund-stock level (see equation (2)):

$$\begin{aligned} Perf_{i,j,t+1} = & \alpha + \beta_1 Similarity_{i,j,t} + \beta_2 Buy_{i,j,t} + \beta_3 Similarity_{i,j,t} \times Buy_{i,j,t} \\ & + \gamma' X_{j,t} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t+1} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$Perf_{i,j,t+1}$ denotes the stock performance in the quarter following the trade. We examine risk-adjusted trading returns using both the stock characteristic-adjusted performance measure of Daniel et al. (1997) (*DGTW*) and quarterly stock performance based on Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas (*Carhart Alpha*). $Similarity_{i,j,t}$ represents the measure of demographic similarity between the manager(s) of fund i and the CEO of stock j . To capture similarity, we use the same variables as in Section 3, but again focus on the variable *Similarity Score* for brevity. $Buy_{i,j,t}$ is an indicator variable, which equals one for buys and zero for sells. In regression equation (2), β_2 captures the performance differences of buys and sells in case fund managers are not demographically similar to a CEO, while the sum of β_2 and β_3 measures the same performance difference but now for funds whose managers are

similar to the CEO. Thus, β_3 represents a difference-in-differences-like estimator for the comparison of buy-sell performance differences between fund managers' trades in firms with similar and firms with dissimilar CEOs. $X_{j,t-1}$ is a vector of the same stock-level control variables as in equation (1), which refer to the quarter preceding the stock performance calculation. We do not report these controls for brevity. As before, we add industry-time fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the fund-stock level.

To better identify whether demographic similarity to CEOs results in informational advantage, we additionally include fund-time fixed effects in the regressions. This way, we compare the relation between trade performance and demographic similarity to CEOs for the same fund manager(s) at the same time, which eliminates concerns of omitted variables on fund and fund manager level. Importantly, this approach allows us to account for differences in fund managers' ability and skills as well as their connectedness and demographics. Nevertheless, our results are qualitatively similar if we omit fund-time fixed effects and instead control for the same fund-level variables as used in Table 2.

Table 5 presents the regression results. In Panel A and Panel B the dependent variables are *DGTW* and *Carhart Alpha*. In contrast to Panel A, the results in Panel B are based on regressions, which exclude fund managers' educational and local networks. In Panel C, we adjust the two performance measures by the average performance of firms whose CEOs are demographically similar to the CEOs managing the firms that fund managers have invested in. This adjustment allows us to test whether fund managers are able to select better performing stocks even within the universe of firms whose CEOs are demographically similar, which speaks even more to informational advantage. The results in all three panels (Panel A, B and C) indicate that, on average, demographic similarity to the CEO is associated with significantly higher performance of fund manager's trades. In particular, the coefficient on the interaction term *Similarity* \times *Buy*, our variable of interest, is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all regression specifications. This evidence suggests that fund managers' in-group bias towards demographically similar CEOs, on average, reflects informational advantage, supporting information-based theories.¹⁵

The performance effect is economically meaningful. For example, column (2) of Panel A suggests that the buy-sell difference based on Carhart alphas for trades is -14.4 basis points

¹⁵ In untabulated regressions, we find qualitatively similar results when we use net buys and net sells.

per quarter if a fund's managers do not resemble a CEO in terms of demographics. On the contrary, a buy-sell strategy of the same fund in the same quarter delivers a 33 ($= 3 \times 11$) basis points higher performance per quarter for trades in firms led by CEOs who resemble fund managers in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender. This difference is sizeable given that the average difference in quarterly Carhart alphas of stocks bought and stocks sold in the sample is -22 basis points. In this regard, we note that the general underperformance of funds' stocks bought relative to stocks sold is in line with Dyakov, Jiang, and Verbeek (2017) who find that mutual funds' sells have outperformed their buys since the beginning of the millennium.

Table B.3 of Appendix B presents results from re-estimating the regressions shown in Panel A of Table 5 for sub-samples of funds with limited access to firm management. The coefficient on *Similarity Score* \times *Buy* remains significant at the 1% level for small funds and those that belong to small fund families and at the 5% level for funds with low-tenure managers. Hence, fund managers' superior trade performance in firms led by demographically similar CEOs is unlikely to reflect enhanced access to firm management.

We separately consider the three dimensions of the similarity score in Table B.4 of Appendix B. We find the positive performance effect of demographic similarity between CEOs and fund managers to be driven by age and gender similarity, which are associated with Carhart alphas of 13.5 and 21.9 basis points, respectively. The results are significant for both the *PctMgrMatch* variables and the *AllMatch* indicator variables. The variables provide no indication that ethnic similarity to CEOs is associated with superior performance. Hence, fund managers' overweighting of CEOs with whom they share the same ethnicity likely does not reflect informational advantage but rather preferences (or stereotypes), comparable to the home-state bias in Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2012). This result is in line with McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) who point out that differences in ethnicities (still) cause the strongest divide in society. They argue that people of different age and gender are less prejudiced against each other than people of different ethnic groups because the former interact significantly more often (e.g., in households and neighborhoods).

4.2 Potential channels of informed fund manager trading

The previous section provides *prima facie* evidence suggesting that fund managers' in-group bias towards demographically similar CEOs reflects informed trading. In this section, we conduct two additional tests to provide further support for this conclusion and to understand potential channels through which similarity to CEOs facilitates informed trading.

As a first test, we study whether demographic similarity to a CEO enables fund managers to more accurately assess the quality of the match between that CEO and the firm he or she manages. Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that the quality of the CEO-firm match is an important factor for firm performance (see, e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Eisdeldt and Kuhnen (2013), Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth (2016)). In order to evaluate the CEO-firm match, fund managers must understand how well the "qualities" of the incumbent CEO match the current and future managerial skill needs of the firm. According to theories of screening discrimination as described in Section 1, demographic similarity facilitates the interpretation of noisy signals about CEO qualities. Therefore, we expect fund managers to be more capable of identifying valuable CEO-firm matches if CEOs are similar to them.

To test our expectation, we again use the CEO turnover data provided by Jenter and Kanaan (2015) and Peters and Wagner (2014). Following the empirical literature (e.g., Nguyen and Nielsen (2014), Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth (2016)), we interpret stock returns in reaction to announcements of CEO departures as the market's assessment of the departing CEO's contribution to future firm value (net of the expected successor), and hence as indicative of the quality of the CEO-firm match. Accordingly, we define a CEO-firm match as a high-quality match – *ex post* – if the stock return in the three-day event window $(-1,+1)$ around the announcement of a CEO departure, i.e., $CAR(-1,+1)$, is in the bottom quartile of the distribution of all CEO turnover events in the CEO turnover sample, zero otherwise. Mean $CAR(-1,+1)$ in the bottom quartile is -3%, i.e., shareholder value declines indicating that the CEO-firm match was valuable. Alternatively, we directly use the variable $CAR(-1,+1)$, for which higher values indicate lower CEO-firm match quality. To test whether fund managers overweight those demographically similar CEOs who are valuable matches for the firms they manage, we regress *Excess Weight* on the interaction term *Similarity Score* \times *CEO-firm Match Quality* and its baseline effects, along with the same controls as used in Table 2.

CEO-firm Match Quality is a placeholder variable equaling either $CAR (-1,+1) < p25$ or $CAR (-1,+1)$.

Table 6 reports the regression results. The results in the first two columns are based on regressions that use all observations. The results in the third and fourth variable are based on regressions that exclude all observations in the year prior to CEO departure to rule that events or firm performance causing the CEO's departure drive our results. The coefficients on both *Similarity Score x CEO-firm Match Quality* and *Similarity Score* are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or better. That is, fund managers overweight particularly those firms led by similar CEOs who are valuable matches for their firms. This result indicates that demographic similarity to CEOs allows fund managers to better assess a CEO's fit with the firm he or she manages and hence identify valuable CEO-firm matches.¹⁶

As a second test, we follow Baker et al. (2010) as well as Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2017) and study stock returns to next-quarter earnings announcements of fund managers' portfolio firms. Returns to earnings announcements are useful for detecting informed trading (Baker et al. (2010)) as they contain significant information about firms' future earnings prospects. Hence, they allow to test whether fund managers are better able to assess and forecast earnings fundamentals, as well as interpret and act upon news prior to earnings announcements, if they are demographically similar to firms' CEOs.

We retrieve earnings announcement dates for our sample firms from IBES. For each firm and quarter, we use the first earnings announcement date after the fund manager's trading decision. For the event windows $(-1,+1)$ and $(-2,+2)$ around these events, we calculate abnormal stock returns, i.e., $CAR (-1,+1)$ and $CAR (-2,+2)$. We regress these returns on the interaction term *Similarity Score x Buy* and its two baseline effects, along with controls for CEO demographics and last-quarter stock characteristics (those used in previous analyses). To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we additionally include fund-time fixed effects as well as industry-time fixed effects. That is, we compare investments in firms from the same industry made by the same fund (manager) at the same time. Table 7 reports the regression results.

¹⁶ Consistent with and complementing the results in Table 6, we find in untabulated regressions that fund managers particularly overweight firms whose CEOs have significant decision-making power (as per Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005)) and thus impact on firm value. For example, CEOs who simultaneously hold the position of chairman of the board (i.e., CEO duality) or CEOs who are the only inside directors on the board.

We find that fund managers' recent buys (sells) of firms with demographically similar CEOs are associated with significantly higher (lower) announcement returns. In fact, the coefficient on *Similarity Score* \times *Buy* is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both regression specifications, while the coefficient on *Similarity Score* (i.e., sells of firms with similar CEOs) is negative and significant at the 10% and 5% level in specifications (1) and (2), respectively. Thus, in case fund managers resemble CEOs demographically, their trades are more accurate predictors for stock returns to firms' earnings announcements. Consistent with the results for trade performance, we find that the results for earnings announcement returns are driven by demographic similarity in terms of age and gender, as shown in Table B.5 of Appendix B.

Taken together, the two tests presented in this section support our previous results and provide evidence on the potential channels through which fund managers' demographic similarity to CEOs facilitates informed trading.

4.3 Performance and trading behavior at the fund level

In this last section, we test whether the superior performance associated with investing in demographically similar CEOs also translates into superior performance at the overall fund level. This question is of particular interest to fund investors. Even if fund managers have informational advantage due to their similarity to firms' CEOs, they still manage diversified funds and their own demographics might not be sufficiently covered by the CEOs of firms in their investment universe. So, their portfolio will also consist of a significant fraction of less similar CEOs and it is not clear ex ante whether better performance in the sub-portfolio of demographically similar CEOs will translate into overall fund performance.

We measure a fund's probability to invest in CEOs who resemble fund managers demographically via the variable *Similarity Overweighting*. It is defined as the deviation of the fund's weight in the fund manager's age cohort, ethnicity, or gender from the average weight of the respective demographic in the fund's investment style. To take into account that portfolio weights in some fund manager demographics (e.g., female gender) are smaller due to a smaller number of CEOs sharing the respective demographic, we divide the deviation by

the average weight of the fund manager’s demographic in the fund’s investment style.¹⁷ For funds with multiple managers, we use the average relative deviation across all managers. To capture a fund’s overall tendency to invest in similar CEOs, we use the simple average of *Similarity Overweighting* for the measures of age cohort, ethnicity, and gender.

We regress fund performance in quarter t on the value of *Similarity Overweighting* in quarter $t-1$ and the same lagged fund-level control variables as used in Table 2. We measure fund performance via Carhart (1997) alphas. We use fund performance based on gross-of-fee returns, i.e., the net-of-fee return plus one twelfth of the annual total expense ratio, because gross-of-fee returns more accurately capture differences in fund managers’ investment decisions and skills. However, we repeat the analysis using net-of-fee returns to identify costs and benefits for fund investors. The regressions include style and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The regression results are shown in the first two columns of Table 8.

The results suggest that the likelihood of fund managers investing in firms managed by demographically similar CEOs has performance consequences also at the overall fund level. Specifically, we find a positive coefficient on *Similarity Overweighting*, which is statistically significant at the 1% level, irrespective of whether we measure fund performance via gross-of-fee returns or net-of-fee returns. In terms of economic significance, column (1) of Table 8 suggests that an increase in *Similarity Overweighting* by one standard deviation relates to an increase in next-quarter Carhart alphas of 4.1 (0.47×0.087) basis points. This effect is sizeable given that the average (median) Carhart alpha for funds in our sample is only 8 (4) basis points. We thus conclude that fund manager investments in firms with demographically similar CEOs benefit overall fund performance and impact the wealth of fund investors.

In untabulated tests, we find that the above performance results are upheld when we control for fund manager diversity using the coefficient of variation of manager ages and Teachman's entropy indices for ethnic and gender diversity. Consistent with our evidence on the performance benefits of investing in demographically similar CEOs, we find that above-

¹⁷ This measure is conceptually similar to the $\text{bias}_{\text{state}}$ measure in Giannetti and Laeven (2016). Furthermore, note that using the five-year age difference as before is not feasible at the sub-portfolio level as we cannot compare the weights across different funds with different manager ages. We instead focus on portfolio weights in age cohorts as in the robustness section.

median age and gender diversity are associated with lower fund performance (as in Evans et al., 2019).

To provide additional evidence in support of the informational advantage of investing in demographically similar CEOs, we also consider trading behavior. Following Jagannathan, Jiao, and Karolyi (2018), we examine a fund's Active Share and diversity of fund holdings. The variable *Active Share*, defined as per Cremers and Petajisto (2009), measures the extent to which fund manager stock holdings deviate from their respective weights in a benchmark index. The variable *ICI*, defined as per Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), measures the diversity of fund holdings in terms of industry concentration. We regress the two measures of trading behavior in quarter t on *Similarity Overweighting* in quarter $t-1$ and the same set of lagged fund-level controls as before. The results are shown in the third and fourth column of Table 8. The coefficient on *Similarity Overweighting* is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both regressions. This evidence indicates that as funds invest more in firms led by demographically similar CEOs they deviate more from their benchmark and exhibit a lower industry diversity of their holdings, which is supportive of informational advantage. Further, the latter result also supports the model of Cornell and Welch (1996), which predicts that demographic similarity to CEOs should increase the variance of investee firms per industry because fund managers receive more precise signals about CEOs and their firms.

5 Conclusion

This study provides robust evidence of screening discrimination in financial markets. We find that mutual fund managers overweight firms whose CEOs resemble them in terms of age, ethnicity, and gender. This in-group bias towards demographically similar CEOs is supported by variation in CEO-fund manager dyads resulting from (exogenous) CEO departures. We show that overweighting demographically similar CEOs reflects informational advantage, in line with theories of screening discrimination according to which in-group bias can emerge as a rational response to asymmetric information. Specifically, fund managers' next-quarter trading performance is significantly higher in the sub-portfolio of demographically similar CEOs. This superior performance also translates into better overall fund performance. Furthermore, fund managers invest more in valuable CEO-firm matches when firms are

managed by demographically similar CEOs, and their buys (sells) of these firms are associated with significantly higher (lower) next-quarter earnings announcement returns.

The evidence provided in this study indicates that fund managers' similarity to CEOs facilitates informed trading. Hence, both mutual fund families and investors should consider to take fund manager demographics into account. Investors should do so when they select funds that tend to invest in industries and or specific types of firms that are associated with high fractions certain CEO demographics. Fund families should do so when they allocate fund managers to funds or fund teams. In this regard, the evidence implies that it can be rational for fund families to limit the demographic diversity of some of their funds.

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Table 1 – Summary statistics

This table reports summary statistics for the CEO-fund manager panel used in this study. Panel A reports the number of CEO-fund manager (team) dyads, i.e., the number of distinct combinations of CEOs and fund managers (or fund manager teams). Panel B reports mean values for CEO and fund manager demographics. *Age* is shown in years. *Female* represents the fraction of CEOs and fund managers who are female. The remaining rows in Panel B report the distribution of the 13 distinct CEO and fund manager ethnicities, which we derive from the surname-based name classification algorithm of Ambekar et al. (2009). Panel C reports summary statistics for measures of demographic similarity between CEOs and fund managers. The variables *AllMatch* are indicator variables that equal one if all of the fund's managers have the same age, ethnicity or gender as the CEO, respectively (and zero otherwise). *Similarity Score* is the sum of the three *AllMatch* indicator variables. The variables *PctMgrMatch* are defined as the fractions of fund managers per fund with the same age (i.e., with an age difference ≤ 5 years), ethnicity or gender as the CEO, respectively. *Avg. PctMgrMatch* is the average fraction of fund managers with similar age, same ethnicity, and same gender as the CEO. Panel D reports summary statistics for stock characteristics at the firm-quarter level. Panel E reports fund characteristics at the fund-quarter level. All variables are defined in Appendix A.

Panel A: Number of distinct CEO-fund manager (team) dyads

CEO-fund manager dyads	2,692,554
CEO-fund manager team dyads	1,407,801

Panel B: CEO and fund managers characteristics

	CEOs (N=5,552)	Fund managers (N=4,862)
Age	55	45
Female (%)	2.70	11.33
African (%)	2.00	2.24
British (%)	49.42	46.95
East Asian (%)	2.61	3.46
East European (%)	3.49	4.18
French (%)	5.28	3.62
German (%)	3.21	2.86
Hispanic (%)	3.73	2.70
Indian (%)	3.40	3.54
Italian (%)	6.54	5.62
Japanese (%)	1.51	1.93
Jewish (%)	14.09	18.44
Muslim (%)	2.68	2.39
Nordic (%)	2.04	2.06

Panel C: Measures of demographic CEO-fund manager similarity

	Mean	Median	SD
PctMgrMatch ^{Age}	0.22	0.00	0.33
PctMgrMatch ^{Ethnicity}	0.27	0.00	0.37
PctMgrMatch ^{Gender}	0.89	1.00	0.24
Avg. PctMgrMatch	0.46	0.44	0.19
AllMatch ^{Age} (0/1)	0.11	0.00	0.31
AllMatch ^{Ethnicity} (0/1)	0.15	0.00	0.36
AllMatch ^{Gender} (0/1)	0.73	1.00	0.45
Similarity Score	0.98	1.00	0.72

Panel D: Stock characteristics (N=3,716)

	Mean	Median	SD
Firm Size	3,233	702	6,241
Firm Age	18.89	14.00	17.07
Book-to-market Ratio	0.65	0.51	0.69
Quarterly Return (%)	3.33	2.08	25.01
Quarterly Stock Turnover (*100)	0.95	0.68	1.08
Quarterly Volatility (*100)	44.22	39.32	22.54
Amihud Illiquidity (*100)	4.73	0.08	114.03

Panel E: Fund characteristics (N=2,487)

	Mean	Median	SD
Portfolio Weight (%)	0.94	0.58	1.15
Excess Weight (%)	0.00	-0.15	0.98
Top 10% Bet (0/1)	0.10	0.00	0.30
Team (0/1)	0.65	1.00	0.47
Fund Size	1,282.78	194.90	5,432.45
Fund Age	13.83	10.00	13.36
Turnover Ratio (%)	86.66	67.00	73.00
Expense Ratio (%)	1.28	1.23	0.52
Quarterly Fund Flows (%)	6.27	-0.92	51.45
Stock Concentration (*100)	2.35	2.00	2.37
Size Score	4.08	4.49	0.98
Value Score	2.93	2.91	0.36
Momentum Score	3.09	3.07	0.46
Family Size	25,088.62	4,139.00	70,563.63

Table 2 – CEO-fund manager demographic similarity and portfolio choice

This table presents results from regressions of stock selection measures, mainly the excess portfolio weight in a stock, on variables measuring the demographic similarity between fund managers and firms' CEOs along with controls for fund and stock characteristics and several fixed effects. The dependent variable in Panel A and B is *Excess Weight*, which is defined as the portfolio weight of the stock in the fund portfolio (in percent) in quarter *t* minus the average weight of the stock in portfolios of the fund's investment style. In Panel A, the independent variables are the three *AllMatch* indicator variables, which equal one if all of the fund's managers have a similar age, the same ethnicity, and the same gender as the CEO, respectively (and zero otherwise). The variable *Similarity Score* is the sum of the three *AllMatch* indicator variables. In Panel B, the independent variables are three *PctMgrMatch* variables defined as the fraction of fund managers per fund who have similar age (i.e., age difference ≤ 5 years), the same ethnicity or the same gender as the CEO. *Avg. PctMgrMatch* is the average fraction of fund managers with the same age, ethnicity, and gender as the CEO. All similarity measures refer to quarter *t*. All control variables, except for *Team*, enter the regressions with one lag. In Panel C, the dependent variable is either *Portfolio Weight*, i.e., the portfolio weight of the stock in the fund portfolio (in percent) or *Top 10% Bet*, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the stock belongs to the largest 10% of a fund's holdings in the fund's investment style. All variables are defined in Appendix A. A constant is included in all regressions but not reported for brevity. All regressions include CEO ethnicity, industry-time, and style fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Panel A: Complete demographic matches between CEOs and fund managers

Dependent variable:		<i>Excess Weight</i>					
Similarity Score	0.061 *** (31.47)						
AllMatch^{Age}		0.027 *** (7.26)				0.024 *** (6.50)	
AllMatch^{Ethnicity}			0.048 *** (13.73)			0.041 *** (11.44)	
AllMatch^{Gender}				0.090 *** (28.94)		0.091 *** (28.52)	
Firm Size	-0.054 *** (-29.92)	-0.054 *** (-30.24)	-0.054 *** (-30.62)	-0.054 *** (-30.81)	-0.054 *** (-30.15)	-0.054 *** (-30.15)	-0.054 *** (-30.15)
Firm Age	0.011 *** (8.68)	0.011 *** (8.66)	0.011 *** (8.86)	0.011 *** (8.75)	0.011 *** (8.63)	0.011 *** (8.63)	0.011 *** (8.63)
Book-to-market Ratio	0.006 *** (3.80)	0.005 *** (3.49)	0.005 *** (3.57)	0.005 *** (3.63)	0.005 *** (3.84)	0.006 *** (3.84)	0.006 *** (3.84)
Quarterly Return	0.040 *** (17.09)	0.041 *** (17.37)	0.042 *** (18.09)	0.042 *** (18.26)	0.042 *** (17.17)	0.041 *** (17.17)	0.041 *** (17.17)
Quarterly Stock Turnover	-0.474 *** (-4.10)	-0.492 *** (-4.26)	-0.447 *** (-3.96)	-0.445 *** (-3.94)	-0.476 *** (-4.12)	-0.476 *** (-4.12)	-0.476 *** (-4.12)
Quarterly Volatility	-0.002 (-0.21)	-0.000 (-0.00)	-0.005 (-0.74)	-0.006 (-0.91)	-0.002 (-0.33)	-0.002 (-0.33)	-0.002 (-0.33)
Amihud Illiquidity	-0.001 (-0.51)	-0.001 (-0.37)	-0.001 (-0.44)	-0.001 (-0.52)	-0.001 (-0.55)	-0.001 (-0.55)	-0.001 (-0.55)
Team	-0.004 (-1.45)	-0.041 *** (-14.96)	-0.029 *** (-10.53)	-0.018 *** (-7.14)	-0.008 *** (-2.73)	-0.008 *** (-2.73)	-0.008 *** (-2.73)
Fund Size	-0.041 *** (-31.70)	-0.042 *** (-32.04)	-0.041 *** (-31.96)	-0.041 *** (-31.94)	-0.041 *** (-31.71)	-0.041 *** (-31.71)	-0.041 *** (-31.71)
Fund Age	0.040 *** (14.07)	0.041 *** (14.38)	0.039 *** (14.08)	0.037 *** (13.65)	0.040 *** (14.17)	0.040 *** (14.17)	0.040 *** (14.17)
Turnover Ratio	-0.051 ***	-0.053 ***	-0.054 ***	-0.054 ***	-0.051 ***	-0.051 ***	-0.051 ***

	(-18.74)	(-19.56)	(-20.05)	(-20.45)	(-18.79)
Expense Ratio	13.104 ***	12.569 ***	12.658 ***	13.115 ***	13.330 ***
	(18.50)	(17.96)	(18.41)	(18.65)	(18.75)
Quarterly Fund Flows	0.022 ***	0.022 ***	0.021 ***	0.020 ***	0.022 ***
	(6.66)	(6.64)	(6.41)	(6.28)	(6.77)
Stock Concentration	33.000 ***	33.132 ***	33.658 ***	33.440 ***	32.935 ***
	(24.90)	(25.05)	(25.81)	(25.53)	(24.78)
Size Score	-0.155 ***	-0.158 ***	-0.164 ***	-0.160 ***	-0.154 ***
	(-32.64)	(-33.41)	(-36.10)	(-34.69)	(-32.02)
Value Score	-0.052 ***	-0.054 ***	-0.051 ***	-0.051 ***	-0.052 ***
	(-10.25)	(-10.61)	(-10.31)	(-10.25)	(-10.31)
Momentum Score	-0.084 ***	-0.082 ***	-0.075 ***	-0.074 ***	-0.084 ***
	(-19.79)	(-19.43)	(-18.31)	(-18.13)	(-19.74)
Family Size	-0.033 ***	-0.034 ***	-0.031 ***	-0.031 ***	-0.033 ***
	(-36.56)	(-36.94)	(-36.05)	(-36.25)	(-36.53)
CEO Age	0.034 ***	0.015 *	0.002	0.003	0.015 *
	(3.95)	(1.75)	(0.22)	(0.36)	(1.69)
CEO Female	0.052 ***	0.008	0.006	0.072 ***	0.075 ***
	(8.26)	(1.34)	(1.00)	(11.12)	(11.32)
CEO ethnicity fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Style fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,322,245	4,323,383	4,433,235	4,434,723	4,322,245
Adj. R-Squared	0.258	0.257	0.257	0.259	0.258

Panel B: Fraction of fund managers similar to the CEO

Dependent variable:	<i>Excess Weight</i>				
Avg. PctMgrMatch	0.067 ***				
	(9.87)				
PctMgrMatch^{Age}		0.007 *			0.006 *
		(1.84)			(1.74)
PctMgrMatch^{Ethnicity}			0.032 ***		0.032 ***
			(8.85)		(8.59)
PctMgrMatch^{Gender}				0.037 ***	0.039 ***
				(8.01)	(8.02)
Controls as in Panel A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,322,245	4,323,383	4,433,235	4,434,723	4,322,245
Adj. R-Squared	0.257	0.257	0.257	0.257	0.257

Panel C: Alternative dependent variables

Dependent variable:	<i>Portfolio Weight</i>		<i>Top 10% Bet</i>	
Similarity Score	0.069 ***		0.012 ***	
	(33.48)		(21.45)	
Avg. PctMgrMatch		0.089 ***		0.019 ***
		(12.18)		(9.48)
Controls as in Panel A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,322,245	4,322,245	4,322,245	4,322,245
Adj. R-Squared	0.409	0.407	0.165	0.165

Table 3 – Addressing alternative explanations

This table presents robustness checks for the baseline regressions in Table 2. For brevity, we only report coefficients for the main variable of interest, *Similarity Score*, and omit control variables. The dependent variable is *Excess Weight*, defined as in Table 2. The regressions are similar to those in Table 2. Panel A reports results from regressions of the baseline regression model shown in Table 2 after eliminating either stocks with educational ties between CEOs and fund managers, local stocks, or both. Educational ties exist if at least one fund manager attended the same university as the CEO. Local stocks are defined as stocks of companies headquartered in a distance of less than 100 kilometers from the fund's management company. We further run a regression in which we replace *Similarity Score* by the variable *Residual Similarity*, which we obtain from regressing the variable *Similarity Score* for a given fund-firm-quarter combination on two indicator variables which are, respectively, equal to one for local stocks and educational ties. Panel B reports results from regressions of the baseline regression model shown in Table 2, which exclude observations for CEOs with the most frequent demographics, i.e., age between the 25th and 75th percentiles of the age distribution (49-60 years), British CEOs, and male CEOs. Panel C reports results from regressions that account for unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous selection by including either stock-time fixed effects or fund-stock fixed effects. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level.

Panel A: Exclude educational and local networks

	Coeff. <i>Similarity Score</i>	t-statistic	Obs
W/o educational networks	0.056	26.41	3,623,975
W/o local stocks	0.062	32.93	3,753,822
W/o educational networks + local stocks	0.057	27.68	3,142,293
Residual Similarity	0.061	27.88	3,636,163

Panel B: Exclude most frequent demographics

	Coeff. <i>Similarity Score</i>	t-statistic	Obs
W/o British male CEOs aged 49-60 years	0.060	23.39	2,997,265
W/o British CEOs	0.060	14.81	2,145,275
W/o male CEOs	0.060	3.91	94,724
W/o CEOs aged 49-60 years	0.061	23.11	1,677,396

Panel C: Accounting for endogenous matching/unobserved heterogeneity

	Coeff. <i>Similarity Score</i>	t-statistic	Obs
Stock-time fixed effects	0.063	31.53	4,322,643
Fund-stock fixed effects	0.013	6.25	4,176,391

Table 4 – Changes in demographic similarity caused by (exogenous) CEO departures

This table presents results from regressions of the variable *Sell* on measures of increasing similarity between the fund manager(s) and the CEO, which result from changes to CEO-fund manager dyads caused by CEO departures. All analyses are based only those funds whose managers do not change in the quarter of CEO departure, i.e., the fund manager-fund match remains constant. The dependent variable in Panel A and B is *Sell*, which is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund has decreased its number of shares in the stock in the quarter during which the CEO departure occurred (and zero otherwise). *Similarity Increase* is a placeholder for four indicator variables, which equal one, respectively, if the variable *Similarity Score* or the individual *AllMatch* indicator variables (for age, ethnicity, and gender) increase (and zero otherwise). In Panel B, CEO departures classified as “forced” or “unclassified” turnovers based on Jenter and Kanaan (2015) and Peters and Wagner (2014) are excluded. The regression results in Panel C are based only on CEO departures caused by sudden and unexpected CEO deaths for which the CEO successor is announced within six months. In Panel C, the dependent variable *Sell* is an indicator variable, which equals one if the fund has decreased its portfolio weight in the stock in the year after the death compared to the portfolio weight right before the event (and zero otherwise). All regressions include stock-time fixed effects. A constant is included in all regressions but not reported for brevity. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Panel A: All CEO departures

Dependent variable:	<i>Sell</i>			
	<i>Similarity Score</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Gender</i>
Similarity Increase	-0.028 *** (-6.69)	-0.021 *** (-4.59)	-0.053 *** (-8.97)	-0.043 * (-1.67)
Stock-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	102,725	102,789	109,176	109,198
Adj. R-Squared	0.032	0.031	0.032	0.031

Panel B: Exclude forced and unclassified turnovers

Dependent variable:	<i>Sell</i>			
	<i>Similarity Score</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Gender</i>
Similarity Increase	-0.020 *** (-3.72)	-0.020 *** (-3.47)	-0.035 *** (-4.56)	-0.024 (-0.54)
Stock-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	59,150	59,180	62,688	62,718
Adj. R-Squared	0.023	0.023	0.024	0.024

Panel C: Sudden CEO deaths only

Dependent variable:	<i>Sell</i>			
	<i>Similarity Score</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Gender</i>
Similarity Increase	-0.066 ** (-2.06)	-0.029 (-0.85)	-0.128 *** (-3.05)	-0.357 *** (-3.90)
Stock-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,341	1,341	1,378	1,378
Adj. R-Squared	0.085	0.082	0.088	0.082

Table 5 – CEO-fund manager demographic similarity and trade performance

This table presents results from regressions of measures of fund manager trade performance in the next quarter on the interaction term *Similarity Score* \times *Buy* and its baseline effects, along with controls for CEO demographics and lagged stock characteristics (similar to those used in Table 2). The dependent variables capturing next-quarter stock performance are the compounded stock characteristic-adjusted stock return within the quarter, as per Daniel et al. (1997) (*DGTW*), or the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of the stock (*Carhart Alpha*). To determine the Carhart alpha, the difference between realized and expected returns is used, where the expected excess return of the stock is calculated as the sum of the products of estimated factor loadings and current factor values. Factor loadings are estimated over the prior 24 months. *Buy* is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund has increased the number of shares in a stock during the quarter, and zero if the fund has decreased the number of shares. In Panel C, performance measures are adjusted for the average performance of CEOs with similar demographics instead of controlling for CEO demographics. The dependent variable is the next-quarter stock performance (as defined above) relative to the value-weighted performance of stocks managed by CEOs in the same age cohort, and with the same ethnicity and gender. All regressions include fund-time and industry-time fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Panel A: Stock performance

Dependent variable:	<i>DGTW</i>	<i>Carhart Alpha</i>
Similarity Score \times Buy	0.114 *** (5.16)	0.110 *** (4.34)
Similarity Score	-0.041 * (-1.70)	-0.045 (-1.61)
Buy	-0.163 *** (-6.29)	-0.144 *** (-4.81)
Stock and CEO controls	Yes	Yes
Fund-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Industry-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,731,250	4,671,220
Adj. R-Squared	0.133	0.138

Panel B: Stock performance w/o educational and local networks

Dependent variable:	<i>DGTW</i>	<i>Carhart Alpha</i>
Similarity Score \times Buy	0.100 *** (3.76)	0.103 *** (3.38)
Similarity Score	-0.044 (-1.54)	-0.060 * (-1.83)
Buy	-0.148 *** (-4.62)	-0.123 *** (-3.33)
Controls as in Panel A	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,198,431	3,157,229
Adj. R-Squared	0.143	0.148

Panel C: Stock performance adjusted for CEO demographics

Dependent variable:	<i>DGTW</i>		<i>Carhart Alpha</i>	
Similarity Score × Buy	0.105	***	0.102	***
	(4.80)		(4.06)	
SimilarityScore	0.008		-0.022	
	(0.37)		(-0.85)	
Buy	-0.159	***	-0.154	***
	(-6.17)		(-5.17)	
Controls as in Panel A (w/o CEO controls)	Yes		Yes	
Observations	4,731,250		4,671,220	
Adj. R-Squared	0.121		0.128	

Table 6 – CEO-fund manager demographic similarity and the quality of the CEO-firm match

This table presents results from regressions of the dependent variable is *Excess Weight* (defined as in Table 2) on the interaction term *Similarity Score x CEO-firm Match Quality* and its baseline effects, along with the same control variables as used in Table 2. *Similarity Score* is defined as in Table 2. *CEO-firm Match Quality* is a proxy variable that captures the quality of the match between a CEO and the firm he or she manages. In the first and third row, this proxy variable for CEO-firm match quality, i.e., $CAR(-1,+1) < p25$, is an indicator variable that equals one if the cumulative Carhart four-factor adjusted abnormal stock return in the three-day event window $(-1,+1)$ around the announcement of the CEO leaving the firm is in the bottom quartile across all turnover events in the CEO turnover sample (Jenter and Kanaan (2015), Peters and Wagner (2014)), and zero otherwise. Mean $CAR(-1,+1)$ in the bottom quartile of the CEO turnover sample is -0.0298, which indicates a decline in shareholder value reflecting the loss of a valuable CEO-firm match. In the second and fourth column, the proxy variable, i.e., $CAR(-1,+1)$, is the cumulative Carhart four-factor adjusted abnormal stock return in the three-day event window $(-1,+1)$ around the announcement of the CEO leaving the firm. In this regard, lower stock returns in reaction to CEO turnovers indicate that the respective CEO is associated with a significant positive contribution to future firm value and hence that the CEO-firm match was of relatively high quality. The regression results shown in the first two columns Table 6 are based on all observations in the fund holdings for a given CEO-firm combination. The regression results shown in the last two columns are based on only those observations prior to the year preceding the quarter during which CEO turnover was announced. All regressions include industry-time and style fixed effects. A constant is included in all regressions but not reported for brevity. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Dependent variable:	Excess weight			
	All observations		Excluding observations in the year prior to the quarter of CEO turnover announcement	
	Stock market reaction to CEO turnover announcements			
Proxy for CEO-firm match quality:	CAR (-1,+1) < p25	CAR (-1,+1)	CAR (-1,+1) < p25	CAR (-1,+1)
Similarity Score × CEO-firm Match Quality	0.025 * (1.94)	-0.266 *** (-2.95)	0.034 ** (2.20)	-0.310 *** (-2.86)
Similarity Score	0.043 *** (5.80)	0.049 *** (7.45)	0.039 *** (4.44)	0.048 *** (6.05)
CEO-firm Match Quality	-0.023 (-1.36)	0.235 ** (2.06)	-0.035 * (-1.69)	0.309 ** (2.19)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fund and stock controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Style fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	235,850	235,850	157,081	157,081
Adj. R-Squared	0.244	0.244	0.243	0.243

Table 7 – CEO-fund manager demographic similarity and earnings announcement returns

This table presents results from regressions of abnormal stock returns around corporate earnings announcements on the interaction term *Similarity Score* \times *Buy* and its baseline effects, along with controls for CEO demographics and lagged stock characteristics (similar to those used in Table 2). Earnings announcement dates are from IBES and refer to the first earnings announcement date in the quarter following the trading decision in the respective stock. The dependent variables are the cumulative Carhart four-factor adjusted abnormal stock returns (in percent) over the three-day (-1,+1) or five-day (-2,+2) event window around the earnings announcement dates, denoted *CAR* (-1,+1) and *CAR* (-2,+2). *Buy* is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund has increased the number of shares in a stock during the quarter, and zero if the fund has decreased the number of shares. *Similarity Score* is defined as in Table 2. All regressions include fund-time and industry-time fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Dependent variable:	<i>CAR</i> (-1,+1)	<i>CAR</i> (-2,+2)
Similarity Score \times Buy	0.025 *** (2.90)	0.035 *** (3.62)
Similarity Score	-0.016 * (-1.74)	-0.023 ** (-2.27)
Buy	-0.052 *** (-5.14)	-0.093 *** (-8.15)
Stock and CEO controls	Yes	Yes
Fund-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Industry-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,706,347	4,706,216
Adj. R-Squared	0.044	0.052

Table 8 – Performance and trading behavior at the fund level

This table presents results from regressions of quarterly mutual fund performance, or alternatively measures of trading behavior, on a fund's lagged probability to invest in CEOs who are demographically similar to the fund manager(s) as well as fund controls. The dependent variable in the first two columns are the Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas (i.e., *Carhart Alpha*) based on either gross-of-fee returns (in column 1) or net-of-fee returns (in column 2). The performance measures are in percent. In the third column, the dependent variable is the *Active Share* measure as per Cremers and Petajisto (2009). In the fourth column, the dependent variable is the Industry Concentration Index (*ICI*) as per Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005). The variable *Similarity Overweighting* measures a fund's probability to invest in CEOs who are demographically similar to the fund's manager(s). The variable is calculated as the average of the deviations of the fund's weight in its manager's age cohort, ethnicity, and gender from the average weight of the respective demographic in the fund's investment style, divided by the average weight of the demographic in the investment style. All independent variables are valid as of the end of the quarter preceding the fund performance calculation. All regressions include time and investment style fixed effects. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Dependent variable:	<i>Carhart alpha</i>		<i>Active Share</i>		<i>ICI</i>
	<i>Gross-of-fees</i>	<i>Net-of-fees</i>			
<i>Similarity Overweighting</i>	0.087 *** (2.92)	0.086 *** (2.91)	0.009 *** (3.13)		0.008 *** (3.75)
Team	-0.057 * (-1.88)	-0.056 * (-1.87)	-0.006 (-1.36)		-0.003 * (-1.72)
Fund size	-0.035 *** (-3.49)	-0.036 *** (-3.53)	0.000 (0.17)		0.002 *** (3.35)
Fund age	0.090 *** (3.92)	0.088 *** (3.83)	0.010 *** (2.61)		-0.000 (-0.22)
Turnover ratio	-0.084 *** (-2.94)	-0.083 *** (-2.93)	-0.010 ** (-2.24)		0.002 (1.27)
Expense ratio	-1.195 (-0.21)	-24.619 *** (-4.44)	4.613 *** (6.09)		0.987 *** (4.33)
Quarterly fund flows	-0.064 (-0.74)	-0.061 (-0.69)	0.013 *** (3.67)		-0.002 ** (-2.28)
Stock concentration	0.041 (0.05)	0.029 (0.04)	3.399 *** (5.59)		0.989 *** (9.83)
Size score	-0.025 (-0.70)	-0.023 (-0.65)	-0.093 *** (-18.74)		-0.009 *** (-4.44)
Value score	-0.136 *** (-2.98)	-0.137 *** (-3.02)	0.014 ** (2.24)		-0.009 *** (-4.32)
Momentum score	-0.072 * (-1.68)	-0.073 * (-1.72)	0.013 ** (2.49)		0.003 ** (2.00)
Family size	0.008 (1.59)	0.009 * (1.67)	-0.005 *** (-4.51)		-0.001 *** (-3.14)
Style fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Number of observations	51,956	51,956	27,521		45,988
Adj. R-Squared	0.076	0.077	0.526		0.282

Appendix A: Variable definitions

Variable	Definition
CEO characteristics	
CEO Age	Natural logarithm of the CEO's age in years.
CEO Ethnicity	Indicator variables for the thirteen different ethnicities reported in Panel B of Table 1.
CEO Female	Indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is female, and zero otherwise.
CEO-firm Match Quality	Proxy variable that captures the quality of the CEO-firm match. It is either the cumulative Carhart four-factor adjusted abnormal stock return in the three-day event window (-1,+1) around the announcement of the CEO leaving the firm or an indicator variable equal to one if the cumulative Carhart four-factor adjusted abnormal stock return in the three-day event window (-1,+1) around the announcement of the CEO leaving the firm is in the bottom quartile of all turnover events in the sample, and zero otherwise.
CEO-fund manager similarity measures	
PctMgrMatch ^{Age}	Fraction of the fund's managers with similar age (+/- 5 years) as the CEO.
AllMatch ^{Age}	Indicator variable equal to one if the fund's managers all have a similar age (+/- 5 years) as the CEO, and zero otherwise.
PctMgrMatch ^{Ethnicity}	Fraction of the fund's managers with the same ethnicity as the CEO.
AllMatch ^{Ethnicity}	Indicator variable equal to one if the fund's managers all have the same ethnicity as the CEO, and zero otherwise.
PctMgrMatch ^{Gender}	Fraction of the fund's managers with the same gender as the CEO.
AllMatch ^{Gender}	Indicator variable equal to one if the fund's managers all have the same gender as the CEO, and zero otherwise.
Avg. PctMgrMatch	Average of PctMgrMatch ^{Age} , PctMgrMatch ^{Ethnicity} , and PctMgrMatch ^{Gender} .
Similarity Score	Sum of AllMatch ^{Age} , AllMatch ^{Ethnicity} , and AllMatch ^{Gender} .
Residual Similarity	The residual from a regression of the variable Similarity Score on indicator variables for educational networks and local stocks.
Similarity Increase	Indicator variable equal to one if the Similarity Score or the individual AllMatch dummies, respectively, increase around the quarter of CEO departure, and zero otherwise.
Stock characteristics	
Firm Size	Natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the company at the end of a quarter in millions of dollars.
Firm Age	Natural logarithm of the age of the company in years, measured as the difference between the current year and the first CRSP listing date.

Book-to-market Ratio	Ratio of book value of shareholder equity and market capitalization of equity.
Quarterly Return	Compounded monthly stock return within a quarter. Monthly returns are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles.
Quarterly Stock Turnover	Average daily turnover ratio of the stock within a quarter, where turnover is the daily number of shares traded divided by total shares outstanding.
Quarterly Volatility	Annualized standard deviation of daily returns of a stock within a quarter.
Amihud Illiquidity	Mean-adjusted quarterly illiquidity of a stock based on a daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.
DGTW	Compounded monthly stock-characteristic adjusted return of a stock within a quarter, as in Daniel et al. (1997).
Carhart Alpha	Quarterly Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of a stock, measured as the difference between realized and expected excess stock returns. The expected excess return is calculated as the product of realized factor values and factor loadings, which were estimated using the stock's return over the previous 24 months.
CAR (+1,-1)	Cumulative Carhart 4-factor adjusted abnormal return of the stock over a three-day (-1,+1) window around the first earnings announcement date in the quarter following the trading decision.
CAR (+2,-2)	Cumulative Carhart 4-factor adjusted abnormal return of the stock over a three-day (-1,+1) window around the first earnings announcement date in the quarter following the trading decision.
Fund and fund-stock characteristics	
Portfolio Weight	Percentage of the total portfolio value that the fund holds in the stock at a report date.
Excess Weight	Portfolio weight of the stock in the fund's portfolio minus the average weight of the stock across funds in the same investment style in the respective quarter.
Top 10% Bet	Indicator variable equal to one, if the fund's chosen excess weight is in the largest decile across all excess weights in the same investment style in the respective quarter, and zero otherwise.
Sell	Indicator variable equal to one if the fund has decreased its number of shares in the stock in the quarter of the CEO departure event, and zero otherwise.
Buy	Indicator variable equal to one if the fund has increased its number of shares in the stock in a given quarter, and zero if it has decreased its number of shares.

Local Stock	Indicator variable equal to one if the company headquarter of the stock is in a distance of less than 100 kilometers from the fund's management company, and zero otherwise.
Educational Network	Indicator variable equal to one if at least one of the fund's managers attended the same university as the CEO, and zero otherwise.
Team	Indicator variable equal to one if the fund is managed by a team, and zero otherwise.
Fund Size	Natural logarithm of total net assets under management in millions of dollars at the end of a quarter.
Fund Age	Natural logarithm the fund's age in years, measured as the current year minus the year of fund inception.
Turnover Ratio	Minimum of the fund's security purchases and sales divided by the average total net assets under management during the calendar year.
Expense Ratio	The funds' fees charged for total services.
Quarterly Fund Flows	The fund's percentage growth rate over a quarter adjusted for the internal growth of the fund as in Sirri and Tufano (1998).
Stock Concentration	Herfindahl index of portfolio weights for a fund at a report date.
Size, Value, Momentum Score	Value-weighted average quintile scores of the stocks in the fund's portfolio at a report date along the respective dimension following Daniel et al. (1997).
Family Size	Natural logarithm of the total net assets under management of the fund's family at the end of a quarter in millions of dollars.
Similarity Overweighting	Average of the deviations of the fund's weights in its managers' age cohort, ethnicity, and gender from the average weight of the respective characteristic in the investment style relative to the average weight of the characteristic in the investment style.
Active Share	A fund's quarterly Active Share measure as per Cremers and Petajisto (2009).
ICI	A fund's quarterly industry concentration index (ICI) as per Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005).

Appendix B: Additional results

Table B.1 – Alternative measures of CEO-fund manager demographic similarity

This table reports results from re-estimating the baseline regression in Panel A of Table 2 using alternative measures of demographic similarity between CEOs and fund managers. For brevity, only the coefficients of interest are shown. The dependent variable is *Excess Weight*, defined as in Table 2. The variable *Avg. Age Gap* is defined as the average age difference between the fund managers and the CEO in years. $PctMgrMatch^{AgeGap3}$ is the fraction of a fund's managers with an age difference to the CEO 3 or less years. $PctMgrMatch^{SameAgeCohort}$ is the fraction of a fund's managers in the same age cohort (i.e., 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, etc.) as the CEO. $PctMgrMatch^{Census_Ethnicity}$ is the fraction of fund managers with the same ethnicity (White, Black, Asian, or Hispanic) based on the 2000 U.S. Census ethnicity classification of surnames. $PctMgrMatch^{Onolytics_Ethnicity}$ is the fraction of fund managers with the same ethnicity based on the classification of first and last names using the Onolytics software. *Similarity Score (Age+Ethnicity)*, *Similarity Score (Age+Gender)*, *Similarity Score (Ethnicity+Gender)* are the pairwise *Similarity Score* variables based on all possible combinations of two demographics. The control variables are the same as in Table 2. All regressions include style and industry-time fixed effects as well as CEO ethnicity fixed effects (as in Table 2). t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level.

Similarity measure	Coeff.	t-statistic	Obs
Avg. Age Gap	-0.001	-4.46	4,323,383
$PctMgrMatch^{Age\ gap\ 3yrs}$	0.009	2.20	4,323,383
$PctMgrMatch^{SameAgeCohort}$	0.011	3.27	4,323,383
$PctMgrMatch^{Census_Ethnicity}$	0.102	13.03	2,575,696
$PctMgrMatch^{Onolytics_Ethnicity}$	0.027	6.64	2,965,895
Similarity Score (Age+Ethnicity)	0.038	14.82	4,322,245
Similarity Score (Age+Gender)	0.070	27.24	4,323,383
Similarity Score (Ethnicity+Gender)	0.071	33.16	4,433,235

Table B.2 – Sub-portfolio weights of CEO characteristics

This table reports results from regressions of the variable *Excess Sub-portfolio Weight* on the variables *PctMgrMatch* and, alternatively, the *AllMatch* indicator variables. The regressions describe the relation between fund managers' demographic similarity between to CEOs and the aggregate weights of CEO demographics. The table presents separate results for similarity based on similar age cohorts, the same ethnicity, and the same gender. *Excess Sub-portfolio Weight* is the fund's excess weight of an age cohort, ethnicity, or of female CEOs, measured as the fund's portfolio weight in the respective group relative to the average weight of the group in the fund's investment style. If a particular group is not held by a fund, a sub-portfolio weight of zero is assigned. The independent variables of interest are the respective *PctMgrMatch* variables and the *AllMatch* indicator variables, defined as in Table 2, and valid at the end of the quarter, for which we calculate portfolio weights. Additional control variables at the fund level are similar to those in Table 2. All control variables except for *Team* are valid at the beginning of the quarter, for which we calculate portfolio weights. All regressions include time and style fixed effects. Panel A reports results from OLS regressions. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by fund. Panel B reports results from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on Newey and West (1987) adjusted standard errors using a lag length parameter of four. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Panel A: OLS regressions

Dependent variable:	<i>Excess Sub-portfolio Weight</i>					
	Age cohort		Ethnicity		Female	
PctMgrMatch	0.264 **		0.380 ***		0.132	
	(2.41)		(3.18)		(1.31)	
AllMatch		0.319 ***		0.410 ***		0.212 *
		(2.61)		(2.73)		(1.67)
Team	0.038 **	0.067 ***	0.028 ***	0.052 ***	0.037	0.056
	(2.22)	(3.29)	(2.73)	(3.95)	(0.82)	(1.20)
Fund Size	-0.017 ***	-0.016 ***	-0.010 ***	-0.010 ***	-0.034 **	-0.034 **
	(-2.90)	(-2.78)	(-2.88)	(-2.77)	(-2.03)	(-2.02)
Fund Age	0.011	0.010	0.007	0.006	0.049	0.049
	(0.81)	(0.74)	(0.84)	(0.72)	(1.38)	(1.37)
Turnover Ratio	-0.035 ***	-0.035 ***	-0.019 **	-0.018 **	-0.019	-0.020
	(-2.58)	(-2.60)	(-2.40)	(-2.32)	(-0.72)	(-0.75)
Expense Ratio	-9.588 ***	-9.562 ***	-5.385 ***	-5.389 ***	-4.384	-4.410
	(-3.30)	(-3.29)	(-3.21)	(-3.21)	(-0.89)	(-0.90)

Quarterly Fund Flows	-0.011 (-0.90)	-0.011 (-0.85)	-0.010 (-1.32)	-0.010 (-1.32)	-0.025 (-0.61)	-0.025 (-0.61)
Stock Concentration	-1.517 (-1.11)	-1.519 (-1.10)	-0.960 (-1.14)	-0.972 (-1.15)	-0.857 (-0.68)	-0.868 (-0.69)
Size Score	0.462 *** (18.93)	0.462 *** (18.89)	0.281 *** (19.44)	0.281 *** (19.31)	-0.120 ** (-2.53)	-0.120 ** (-2.53)
Value Score	-0.286 *** (-11.62)	-0.284 *** (-11.49)	-0.175 *** (-11.75)	-0.174 *** (-11.65)	0.345 *** (4.50)	0.346 *** (4.51)
Momentum Score	0.062 *** (3.64)	0.063 *** (3.64)	0.036 *** (3.47)	0.036 *** (3.49)	-0.100 ** (-2.26)	-0.101 ** (-2.27)
Family Size	-0.002 (-0.47)	-0.002 (-0.52)	-0.001 (-0.61)	-0.001 (-0.60)	-0.012 (-1.17)	-0.011 (-1.16)
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Style fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	366,120	366,120	618,215	618,215	46,989	46,989
Adj. R-Squared	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.010	0.011

Panel B: Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions

Dependent variable:	<i>Excess Sub-portfolio Weight</i>					
	Age cohort		Ethnicity		Female	
PctMgrMatch	0.230 *** (3.50)		0.424 *** (4.95)		0.134 *** (3.34)	
AllMatch		0.302 *** (3.99)		0.452 *** (4.38)		0.233 *** (4.03)
Controls as in Panel A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Style fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	366,120	366,120	618,215	618,215	46,989	46,989
Avg. R-Squared	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.049	0.050

Table B.3 – Sub-samples of funds with limited access to firm management

This table reports results from re-estimating the baseline regressions shown in Panel A of Table 2 (see Panel A) and Panel A of Table 5 (see Panel B) for sub-samples of funds with limited access to firm management. Sub-samples comprise either funds with below-median fund size (*Small funds*), or funds with below-median fund family size (*Small fund families*), or funds with below-median manager tenure (*Low-tenure managers*), where manager tenure is measured as tenure in the fund industry. For brevity, only the coefficients on the main variables of interest, *Similarity Score* and its interactions, are reported. Control variables, including all fixed effects, are the same as in Table 2 and Table 5, respectively. t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Panel A: Portfolio choice of low-access funds (sub-samples for Panel A of Table 2)			
Dependent variable:	<i>Excess weight</i>		
Sub-sample:	Small funds	Small fund families	Low-tenure managers
Similarity Score	0.063 ***	0.035 ***	0.062 ***
	(19.57)	(9.40)	(17.34)
Controls as in Table 2	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	1,588,954	1,584,604	2,317,108
Adj. R-Squared	0.253	0.381	0.347

Panel B: Trade performance of low-access funds (sub-samples for Panel A of Table 5)			
Dependent variable:	<i>Carhart alpha</i>		
Sub-sample:	Small funds	Small fund families	Low-tenure managers
Similarity Score × Buy	0.151 ***	0.154 ***	0.090 **
	(3.63)	(3.51)	(2.48)
Similarity Score	-0.032	0.015	-0.045
	(-0.73)	(0.33)	(-1.10)
Buy	-0.163 ***	-0.135 **	-0.182 ***
	(-3.20)	(-2.57)	(-4.49)
Controls as in Table 5	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	1,839,405	1,594,923	2,594,488
Adj. R-Squared	0.138	0.137	0.139

Table B.4 – Trade performance per demographic dimension

This table presents results from regressions of measures of fund manager trade performance in the next quarter on the interaction term *Similarity* \times *Buy* and its baseline effects, along with controls for CEO demographics and lagged stock characteristics (similar to those used in Table 2). The dependent variables capturing next-quarter stock performance are the compounded stock characteristic-adjusted stock return within the quarter, as per Daniel et al. (1997) (*DGTW*), or the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of the stock (*Carhart Alpha*). *Buy* is an indicator variable equal to one if the fund has increased the number of shares in a stock during the quarter, and zero if the fund has decreased the number of shares. *Similarity* is a placeholder, which stands either for the variable *PctMgrMatch* (in the age, ethnicity or gender dimension), or for the *AllMatch* indicator variables, which are all defined as in Table 2. Panels A, B, and C, respectively, report results for similarity based on age, ethnicity, and gender. Control variables for stock characteristics and CEO demographics are the same as in Table 5, valid in the quarter preceding the stock performance calculation. All regressions include fund-time and industry-time fixed effects. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Panel A: Similarity in age

Dependent variable:	Stock performance			
	<i>DGTW</i>		<i>Carhart Alpha</i>	
	<i>PctMgrMatch</i>	<i>AllMatch</i>	<i>PctMgrMatch</i>	<i>AllMatch</i>
Similarity \times Buy	0.156 ***	0.169 ***	0.098 *	0.135 **
	(3.41)	(3.39)	(1.85)	(2.34)
Similarity	-0.091 **	-0.075 *	-0.065	-0.054
	(-2.45)	(-1.89)	(-1.49)	(-1.16)
Buy	-0.090 ***	-0.074 ***	-0.062 ***	-0.055 ***
	(-4.94)	(-4.48)	(-2.96)	(-2.89)
Stock and CEO controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fund-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,732,213	4,732,213	4,672,185	4,672,185
Adj. R-Squared	0.133	0.133	0.138	0.138

Panel B: Similarity in ethnicity

Dependent variable:	Stock performance			
	<i>DGTW</i>		<i>Carhart Alpha</i>	
	<i>PctMgrMatch</i>	<i>AllMatch</i>	<i>PctMgrMatch</i>	<i>AllMatch</i>
Similarity \times Buy	-0.059	-0.072 *	-0.039	-0.063
	(-1.47)	(-1.65)	(-0.84)	(-1.27)
Controls as in Panel A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,850,244	4,850,244	4,788,980	4,788,980
Adj. R-Squared	0.133	0.133	0.138	0.138

Panel C: Similarity in gender

Stock performance				
Dependent variable:	<i>DGTW</i>		<i>Carhart Alpha</i>	
	<i>PctMgrMatch</i>	<i>AllMatch</i>	<i>PctMgrMatch</i>	<i>AllMatch</i>
Similarity × Buy	0.302 ***	0.237 ***	0.156 **	0.219 ***
	(4.93)	(6.92)	(2.21)	(5.54)
Controls as in Panel A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,850,244	4,851,370	4,790,106	4,790,106
Adj. R-Squared	0.133	0.133	0.138	0.138

Table B.5 – Prediction of earnings announcement returns per demographic dimension

This table presents results from regressions of abnormal stock returns around corporate earnings announcements on the interaction term *Similarity* \times *Buy* and its baseline effects, along with controls for CEO demographics and lagged stock characteristics (similar to those used in Table 2). Earnings announcement dates are from IBES and refer to the first earnings announcement date in the quarter following the trading decision in the respective stock. The dependent variables *CAR* $(-1,+1)$ and *CAR* $(-2,+2)$ are the cumulative Carhart four-factor adjusted abnormal stock returns (in percent) over the three-day $(-1,+1)$ or five-day $(-2,+2)$ event window, respectively, around the earnings announcement dates. *Buy* is an indicator variable that equals one if the fund has increased the number of shares in a stock during the quarter, and zero if the fund has decreased the number of shares. *Similarity* is a placeholder, which stands either for the variable *PctMgrMatch* (for age, ethnicity or gender), or for the *AllMatch* indicator variables, which are all defined as in Table 2. Panels A, B, and C, respectively, report results for similarity based on age, ethnicity, and gender. Control variables for stock characteristics and CEO demographics are the same as in Table 7, valid in the quarter preceding the earnings announcement. All regressions include fund-time and industry-time fixed effects. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered at the fund-stock level. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.

Panel A: Similarity in age

Dependent variable:	<i>CAR</i> $(-1,+1)$		<i>CAR</i> $(-2,+2)$	
	PctMgrMatch	AllMatch	PctMgrMatch	AllMatch
Similarity \times Buy	0.033 * (1.86)	0.040 ** (2.05)	0.055 *** (2.78)	0.064 *** (2.95)
Similarity	-0.026 * (-1.83)	-0.043 *** (-2.77)	-0.028 * (-1.71)	-0.048 *** (-2.77)
Buy	-0.036 *** (-5.09)	-0.033 *** (-5.17)	-0.072 *** (-9.10)	-0.067 *** (-9.33)
Stock and CEO controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fund-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Industry-time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,707,310	4,707,310	4,707,179	4,707,179
Adj. R-Squared	0.044	0.044	0.052	0.052

Panel B: Similarity in ethnicity

Dependent variable:	<i>CAR</i> $(-1,+1)$		<i>CAR</i> $(-2,+2)$	
	PctMgrMatch	AllMatch	PctMgrMatch	AllMatch
Similarity \times Buy	-0.015 (-0.96)	-0.015 (-0.90)	-0.014 (-0.78)	-0.022 (-1.17)
Controls as in Panel A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,824,859	4,824,859	4,824,728	4,824,728
Adj. R-Squared	0.044	0.044	0.053	0.053

Panel C: Similarity in gender

Dependent variable:	<i>CAR (-1,+1)</i>		<i>CAR (-2,+2)</i>	
	PctMgrMatch	AllMatch	PctMgrMatch	AllMatch
Similarity × Buy	0.047 * (1.95)	0.050 *** (3.76)	0.064 ** (2.39)	0.064 *** (4.31)
Controls as in Panel A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,825,983	4,825,983	4,825,852	4,825,852
Adj. R-Squared	0.044	0.044	0.053	0.053

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