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Working Paper

Learning by disinflating

Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, No. 10/2012

Provided in Cooperation with:

Bank of Finland, Helsinki

Suggested Citation: Barnett, Alina; Ellison, Martin (2012) : Learning by disinflating, Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, No. 10/2012, ISBN 978-952-462-795-5, Bank of Finland, Helsinki,
<https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:fi:bof-20140807420>

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Alina Barnett – Martin Ellison

Learning by disinflating



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Learning by Disinflating*

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March 28, 2012

Abstract

Disinflationary episodes are a valuable source of information for economic agents trying to learn about the economy. In this paper we are particularly interested in how policymakers can themselves learn by disinflating. The approach differs from the existing literature, which typically focuses on the learning of private agents during a disinflation. We build a model where both the policymaker and private agents learn, and ask what happens if the policymaker has to disinflate to satisfy a new central bank mandate specifying greater emphasis on inflation stabilisation. In this case, our results show that inflation may fall dramatically before it gradually rises to its new long run level. The potential for inflation to undershoot its long run level during a disinflationary episode suggests that caution should be exercised when assessing the success of any change in the policymaker's mandate.

JEL classification: D83, E52, E58

Keywords: Disinflation, Escape Dynamics, Learning, Monetary Policy

*Two anonymous referees and the editor of this journal, Ken West, made detailed and insightful comments that significantly improved our understanding of our model. We also thank Bill Branch, Lynne Evans, Ken Kasa, Anamaria Nicolae, Andrew Scott and Jouko Vilmunen for their suggestions. Martin Ellison acknowledges support from an ESRC Research Fellowship, "Improving Monetary Policy for the 21st Century" (RES-000-27-0126). The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or the Bank of Finland.

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1 Introduction

The US disinflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s has been instrumental in shaping modern views of the monetary transmission mechanism and the efficacy of monetary policy. It is now widely accepted that disinflations create downturns, and that the standard New Keynesian model needs amending to avoid disinflations being expansionary. The need for amendments was first noted by Ball (1994) in his famous “disinflationary booms” paper, and led to models by Ball (1995) and Erceg and Levine (2003) in which private agents only slowly learn the objectives of a policymaker with imperfect credibility. Other contributions to this literature include Ireland (1995), Goodfriend and King (2005), Nicolae and Nolan (2006), Evans and Nicolae (2010) and Cogley, Matthes and Sbordone (2011).

The focus of the existing literature on disinflations is on the role of private agents learning. In this paper we argue that it is equally important to examine what the policymaker learns during a disinflation. In our view of the world, policymakers are continuously striving to improve their policies by learning about the strength of a trade-off they perceive between unemployment and inflation. Their experiences during disinflations are instrumental in shaping their beliefs about this trade-off, and hence what they perceive as the costs of disinflating. Put simply, we believe that a serious model of disinflations needs to encompass learning by both private agents and the policymaker. Only a few papers such as Sargent, Williams and Zha (2006) and Primiceri (2006) share our belief that learning by policymakers is important, and none of these papers specifically looks at the policymaker learning by disinflating.

To make our point, we construct a model in which both the policymaker and private agents have non-trivial learning problems. The policymaker is assumed to learn while solving the joint estimation and policy problem described by Sargent (1999) in *The Conquest of American Inflation*. Private agents learn according to a standard adaptive learning algorithm of the type closely associated with Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Our closest antecedent is the model used by Cho and Kasa (2008) to study currency crises, although aspects of our analysis also overlap with Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002) and Williams (2004). To induce learning by disinflating we analyse what happens if politicians decide to appoint a Rogoff (1985) conservative central banker who places greater emphasis on inflation stabilisation. In other words, we examine how the economy reacts to a change in the policymaker’s mandate when both private agents and the policymaker are learning. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explicitly examine how a policymaker learns by disinflating.

The short run effects of appointing a conservative central banker are potentially dramatic

in our model. If the policymaker is learning then inflation may fall rapidly to a very low level shortly after the conservative central banker is appointed, before eventually rising back to a new long run equilibrium. Such undershooting of inflation is potentially hazardous if it gives politicians a false sense of how successful changing the central bank's mandate has been. The idea that external events can cause sudden and dramatic shifts in the macroeconomy has also been explored by McGough (2006) in the context of shocks to the natural rate of output that cause the economy to escape from its self confirming equilibrium, a paper that shares some techniques with ours. The long run effects of appointing a conservative central banker in our model are lower and less volatile inflation, as predicted in the working paper of Gerali and Lippi (2002).

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model of learning by a policymaker and private agents, and models how politicians change the policymaker's mandate. The long and short run effects of appointing a conservative central banker are derived and discussed in Section 3 and Section 4 respectively. Section 5 presents simulation results that quantify the likely magnitude and duration of any inflation undershooting. A final Section 6 concludes.

2 Model

The fundament of our model is the Sargent (1999) framework in which the policymaker learns through solving a joint estimation and policy problem. To it we add adaptive learning by private agents à la Evans and Honkapohja (2001), and the possibility of politicians changing the mandate of the policymaker by appointing a Rogoff (1985) conservative central banker. The exposition of our model begins with an explanation of the true structure of the economy that links policy and private expectations to macroeconomic outcomes, and proceeds by describing the estimation and optimisation problem of the policymaker. How we model the appointment of a conservative central banker is next, followed by a definition of the learning of private agents to complete the model.

2.1 Structure of the economy

Macroeconomic outcomes are determined by the inflation expectations of private agents π_t^e and the level of inflation intended by the policymaker x_t . They are subject to real and nominal shocks. In equation (1), unemployment U_t is a function of the natural rate of unemployment

U^* , inflation that is unexpected by private agents, $\pi_t - \pi_t^e$, and a real shock $\nu_{1t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_1^2)$. In equation (2), inflation π_t depends on the level of inflation intended by the policymaker x_t and a nominal shock $\nu_{2t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_2^2)$.¹

$$U_t = U^* - \theta(\pi_t - \pi_t^e) + \nu_{1t} \quad (1)$$

$$\pi_t = x_t + \nu_{2t} \quad (2)$$

The structure of the economy implies that unemployment deviates from its natural rate whenever there is a gap between the inflation intended by the policymaker and the inflation expected by private agents. Such a gap arises naturally in our model as the policymaker and private agents are both learning. It means that disinflations will be costly.

2.2 Learning by the policymaker

The estimation problem of the policymaker is taken from Sargent (1999). Accordingly, the policymaker understands that unemployment and inflation are interrelated, but does not know the true structure of the economy (1). Instead, it believes there is a trade-off between unemployment and inflation that may be shifting over time. The policymaker learns each period by estimating the relationship between unemployment and inflation:

$$U_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \pi_t + \xi_t \quad (3)$$

using discounted least squares. This is equivalent to the policymaker employing a constant gain learning algorithm to form and update its beliefs $\gamma_t = (\gamma_{0t}, \gamma_{1t})'$ about the parameters in (3), with the constant gain reflecting the policymaker's concern that there may be shifts in the trade off between unemployment and inflation. The beliefs of the policymaker are updated according to:

$$\gamma_{t+1} = \gamma_t + a \left(R_t^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \pi_t \end{pmatrix} (U_t - \gamma_{0t} - \gamma_{1t} \pi_t) \right), \quad (4)$$

$$R_{t+1} = R_t + a \left(\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \pi_t \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \pi_t \end{pmatrix} - R_t \right), \quad (5)$$

where a is the constant gain or exponential rate at which the policymaker discounts past data. R_t is a 2×2 matrix that describes the precision of the current coefficient estimates.²

¹ ν_{2t} can also be interpreted as a control error made by the policymaker.

²Equations (4)-(5) for updating beliefs have the same recursive form as equations (4.2.4)-(4.2.5) in Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002). They hence do not quite correspond to recursive least squares learning, which would require the more usual timing assumption of R_{t+1}^{-1} on the right hand side of equation (4).

2.3 The policy problem

The optimisation problem of the policymaker follows Sargent (1999), and is to minimise a weighted average of the quadratic deviations of unemployment and inflation from their target levels of zero. The weight β_t assigned to inflation stabilisation is mandated by politicians. The policy problem is constrained by the policymaker's perceived structure of the economy (3), the policymaker's current estimates $(\gamma_{0t} \ \gamma_{1t})'$ of the parameters in it, and tacit acknowledgement that inflation is not completely under the control of the policymaker:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{x_t} E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \delta^s (U_{t+s}^2 + \beta_{t+s} \pi_{t+s}^2), \\ \text{s.t.} \\ U_{t+s} = \gamma_{0t} + \gamma_{1t} \pi_{t+s} + \xi_{t+s}, \\ \pi_{t+s} = x_{t+s} + v_{2t+s}. \end{aligned}$$

The fully optimal policy maximises the policymaker's objective, subject not only to the beliefs of the policymaker and the current mandate, but also subject to the way beliefs are updated (4)-(5) and any changes expected in future mandates. Including these constraints would make the policy problem highly nonlinear, so we follow Sargent (1999) and invoke anticipated utility maximisation as the policymaker's decision criterion. The policymaker then treats its beliefs as fixed at their current values, now and into the future, even though it knows they may subsequently change. Kreps (1998) argues that maximising anticipated utility in this way is a simple and robust strategy for a policymaker facing a complex dynamic problem such as ours.³ The solution of the policy problem determines intended inflation as a function of the current beliefs and mandate of the policymaker:

$$x_t = -\frac{\gamma_{0t} \gamma_{1t}}{\beta_t + \gamma_{1t}^2}. \quad (6)$$

The policymaker sets intended inflation (6) at the beginning of the period, and updates its beliefs through (4)-(5) at the end of the period. Note that the assumption of anticipated utility maximisation removes all the dynamics from the policy problem. Policy is set period-by-period in a series of static problems, and there is no need for the policymaker to adjust policy in anticipation of future changes in its mandate.⁴

³The numerical simulations of Cogley, Colacito and Sargent (2007) also suggest that maximising anticipated utility gives a good approximation to the fully optimal policy.

⁴Similarly, the policymaker in our model has no incentive to change policy in response to pre-announced

2.4 Changing the policymaker's mandate

To induce disinflations in our model, we allow politicians to change the mandate of the policymaker by appointing a Rogoff (1985) conservative central banker. This is the central innovation of our paper. We allow for time variation in β_t , the weight on inflation stabilisation in the policymaker's mandate, whereas the existing literature follows Sargent (1999) and keeps β_t constant. We assume that politicians decide on the timing, severity and abruptness of the change in mandate by choosing the parameters β_L, β_H, s and ϕ in the function:

$$\beta_t = \beta_L + \frac{\beta_H - \beta_L}{1 + e^{-\phi(t-s)}}, \quad (7)$$

so the change in mandate is centred on time s and involves an increase in the weight assigned to inflation stabilisation from β_L to β_H . The parameter ϕ governs the abruptness of the change in mandate, with higher values of ϕ corresponding to more abrupt changes. As $\phi \rightarrow \infty$ the change becomes instantaneous. Figure 1 shows an example of how β_t evolves when $\beta_L = 1, \beta_H = 2.5, s = 5$ and $\phi = 2.5$.




Figure 1: Example of change in the policymaker's mandate

2.5 Learning by private agents

We assume that private agents learn using a standard adaptive learning algorithm. This is motivated by agents interpreting changing mandates of the policymaker as signalling a change in its future mandate. An analysis of announcement effects would be interesting but is beyond the scope of this paper. It would require a model with either dynamics in the monetary transmission mechanism or agents who place some weight on announcements when forming their inflation expectations.

drastic change, requiring them to change their perception of the structure of the economy, and therefore requiring learning on their part.⁵ Assuming that private agents learn also brings our model closer to the empirical evidence that disinflations create downturns and unemployment. If private agents have rational expectations in our model then unemployment (1) is i.i.d. and disinflations are costless. Cho and Kasa (2008) assume adaptive learning by private agents to similarly generate output losses after a currency crisis. Following their lead, private agents in our model learn according to:

$$\pi_{t+1}^e = \pi_t^e + a(\pi_t - \pi_t^e), \quad (8)$$

where a is the constant gain at which they discount past data. Private agents discount past data at the same rate as the policymaker, in implicit acknowledgement that the structure of the economy may be changing over time.⁶ The higher the value of a the more they believe there are changes, so the more they weight current data and discount past data.

3 Long run dynamics

The dynamics of the model are described by the structure of the economy (1)-(2), the learning of the policymaker (4)-(5), the solution of the policy problem (6), the policymaker's mandate (7) and the learning of private agents (8). This is a system of ordinary difference equations in unemployment, inflation, the beliefs of the policymaker, the mandate of the policymaker and expected inflation. We characterise its dynamics by applying stochastic approximation techniques taken from Cho, Williams and Sargent (2002). To do so, the equations for the learning of the policymaker are written as:

$$\frac{\gamma_{t+1} - \gamma_t}{a} = R_t^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ x_t + v_{2t} \end{pmatrix} (U^* - \theta(x_t + v_{2t} - \pi_t^e) + \nu_{1t} - \gamma_{0t} - \gamma_{1t}(x_t + v_{2t})), \quad (9)$$

$$\frac{R_{t+1} - R_t}{a} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ x_t + v_{2t} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & x_t + v_{2t} \end{pmatrix} - R_t, \quad (10)$$

which can be interpreted as a discrete-time approximation of a continuous-time process perturbed by shocks v_{1t} and v_{2t} . Taking the limit as $a \rightarrow 0$ and adjusting the time scale accordingly, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that the limiting behavior of the policymaker's beliefs are nearly deterministic and can be approximated by an ordinary differential equation.

⁵Andolfatto and Gomme (2003) have a model in this vein.

⁶Allowing private agents to discount past data at a greater or lesser rate than the policymaker does not have a qualitative impact on our results.

As the gain tends to zero, the approximation error in (9)-(10) disappears, and applying a weak law of large numbers ensures that the stochastic element becomes negligible and there is weak convergence across time paths. The learning of the policymaker can therefore be represented by a system of deterministic ordinary differential equations:

$$\dot{R} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & x \\ x & x^2 + \sigma_2^2 \end{pmatrix} - R, \quad (11)$$

$$\dot{\gamma} = R^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} U^* - \theta(x - \pi^e) - \gamma_0 - \gamma_1 x \\ (U^* - \theta(x - \pi^e) - \gamma_0 - \gamma_1 x)x - (\theta + \gamma_1)\sigma_2^2 \end{pmatrix}, \quad (12)$$

known as the *mean dynamics*. They describe the expected evolution of policymaker's beliefs. The appropriate time scale of the mean dynamics is a times that of the ordinary difference equations (9)-(10). We present all our results in the time scale of the ordinary difference equations, to ease comparison between behaviour implied by the mean dynamics and that observed in model simulations. Similar limit calculations for the behaviour of learning by private agents (10) as $a \rightarrow 0$ define the mean dynamics of the inflation expectations of private agents:

$$\dot{\pi}^e = x - \pi^e. \quad (13)$$

The mean dynamics of the beliefs of the policymaker (11)-(12) and the inflation expectations of private agents (13) together form a system of ordinary differential equations in γ , R and π^e . If for the moment we assume there is no change in the policymaker's mandate, then β is fixed and the long-run outcome is the fixed point at which $\dot{\gamma} = \dot{R} = \dot{\pi}^e = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\gamma}_0 &= U^* \left(1 + \frac{\theta^2}{\beta} \right), \\ \bar{\gamma}_1 &= -\theta, \\ \bar{U} &= U^*, \\ \bar{\pi} &= \bar{\pi}^e = \bar{x} = \frac{\theta U^*}{\beta}, \end{aligned}$$

a self confirming equilibrium (SCE) in the terminology of Sargent (1999). It is unique in our model.⁷ The self confirming equilibrium has the same long run inflation bias that appears in Nash equilibrium in our model if the policymaker and private agents are assumed to have rational expectations. When the mandate of the policymaker is assumed to change according

⁷The eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the system of equations (11)-(13) all have negative real parts, so the self confirming equilibrium is stable. See Appendix A for details.

to (7) the instantaneous rate of change of β is:

$$\dot{\beta} = \frac{(\beta_H - \beta_L)\phi e^{-\frac{\phi}{a}(t-s)}}{a(1 + e^{-\frac{\phi}{a}(t-s)})^2}. \quad (14)$$

As $t \rightarrow \infty$, $\dot{\beta} \rightarrow \beta_H$ and the model asymptotes to the self confirming equilibrium for a fixed $\beta = \beta_H$. It follows that initial inflation is $\theta U^*/\beta_L$ if the policymaker's mandate has previously remained unchanged for a long time, and falls in the long run to $\theta U^*/\beta_H$ after politicians change the policymaker's mandate to place greater weight on inflation stabilisation. Our model therefore exhibits the same long run reduction in inflation bias that prompted Rogoff (1985) to argue for delegating policy to a conservative central banker.

4 Short run dynamics

The fall in long run inflation after a change in the policymaker's mandate occurs as beliefs adjust to new levels consistent with the self confirming equilibrium. For the policymaker, beliefs change in the long run to $(U^*(1 + \theta^2\beta_H^{-1}), -\theta)'$. For private agents, expected inflation falls in the long run to $\theta U^*/\beta_H$. The adjustment in beliefs comes about as the policymaker and private agents learn the new self confirming equilibrium, with the stability result in footnote 6 guaranteeing that beliefs eventually converge to their long run values. What happens while beliefs are adjusting determines the short run dynamics of the model. The focus of our paper on learning by disinflating means we are particularly interested in whether adjustment is a smooth monotonic process or whether something more interesting happens before beliefs converge to their new values.

To proceed, we ask what the mean dynamics of the model imply for the transition path of beliefs and inflation under learning. The mean dynamics show what happens to beliefs and expected inflation after a change in the policymaker's mandate. To appreciate what this behaviour implies, we calculate the transition path in our model when $U^* = 5, \theta = -1, \sigma_1 = \sigma_2 = 0.3$ and the policymaker's mandate changes from $\beta_L = 1$ to $\beta_H = 2.5$ at time $s = 50$ with abruptness parameter $\phi = 0.25$ in the time scale implied by $a = 0.1$. The dynamics of the transition path are not very sensitive to particular parameter values, so these numerical results are representative of the way that beliefs and expected inflation adjust to their new long run values in our model. Figure 2 shows how policymaker's beliefs, intended and expected inflation, unemployment and the policymaker's mandate all evolve along the transition path.




Figure 2: The transition path with a changing policymaker’s mandate

The beliefs of the policymaker in the top right hand panel of Figure 2 are initialised at levels $\gamma = (10, -1)$ consistent with $\beta = \beta_L$. However, they start moving to $\gamma = (5, 0)$ as soon as the mandate of the policymaker starts to change. This is an empirical escape episode of the McGough (2006) type, synonymous with the policymaker abandoning its belief that there is a relationship between unemployment and inflation. The dynamics along the transition path are so powerful that the beliefs of the policymaker profoundly overshoot the level $\gamma = (7, -1)$ of the self confirming equilibrium for $\beta = \beta_H$. Only afterwards do the policymaker’s beliefs converge to their new long run levels.

The behaviour of intended and expected inflation in the bottom left hand panel of Figure 2 provides an explanation for why policymaker’s beliefs overshoot after a change in the policymaker’s mandate. The disinflation starts as soon as the mandate places increased emphasis on inflation stabilisation. The initial fall in intended inflation is a surprise to private agents, so unemployment rises in the bottom right hand panel of Figure 2. Shortly after-

wards, private agents start revising their inflation expectations downwards and there follows a protracted period during which intended and expected inflation both fall. Private agents forming adaptive expectations continue to be surprised by the falls in inflation, but the gap between intended and expected inflation does not increase so unemployment is high but stable. The policymaker sees that successive reductions in inflation have no incremental effect on unemployment, which causes it to doubt their belief in a relationship between inflation and unemployment. The beliefs of the policymaker gradually adjust to reflect a weakening belief in the relationship between inflation and unemployment, a process only halted when intended inflation has fallen to its target level of zero and the disinflation comes to an end. At this point, inflation is driven purely by nominal shocks which do induce movements in unemployment, so the policymaker begins to rediscover a relationship between inflation and unemployment. Inflation rises steadily back to the value $\theta U^* \beta_H^{-1} = 2$ consistent with the self confirming equilibrium for $\beta = \beta_H$. Unemployment similarly returns to its natural rate $U^* = 5$.

Inflation dramatically undershoots its long run value when the policymaker is learning by disinflating. A change in the policymaker's mandate causes inflation to fall to a level close to zero in our model, a result we believe is new in the literature. The tendency for inflation to undershoot suggests that politicians need to exhibit restraint before claiming that low levels of inflation are a consequence of their decision to change the policymaker's mandate. If the policymaker is learning by disinflating then the undershoot in inflation may create an unwarranted sense in politicians that inflation is under control. In reality, inflation is destined to rise again, albeit to a long run level that is lower than before the mandate was changed.

5 Simulation results

The results of the previous section suggest that inflation may undershoot its new long run level after a change in the policymaker's mandate. Whether this happens depends on how tightly beliefs follow the mean dynamics during their transition to levels consistent with the new mandate. To quantify this probability, we simulate the model many times and keep track of how often inflation undershoots its new long run target. We set $U^* = 5, \theta = -1, \sigma_1 = \sigma_2 = 0.3$, and assume that the policymaker's mandate changes from $\beta_L = 1$ to $\beta_H = 2.5$ at time $s = 50$ with abruptness parameter $\phi = 0.25$ as before. The gain coefficients in the learning of the policymaker and private agents are set at $a = 0.1$. We simulate the model 5000 times and

present the results in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Simulated dynamics with a changing policymaker's mandate

The solid line in the left hand panel of Figure 3 is the median simulated path of inflation. The dashed lines in the same panel are the tenth and ninetieth percentile paths, so inflation undershoots its long run level of 2 in the vast majority of the simulations. The median behaviour of intended and expected inflation confirms the predictions of our analytical results. Intended inflation falls as soon as the policymaker's mandate changes, with expected inflation beginning to fall shortly afterwards. The disinflation continues until inflation is close to its target level of zero, at which point inflation begins rising again. The right hand panel of Figure 3 shows unemployment increasing and then returning to its natural rate during the disinflation. The dip in unemployment after period $t = 100$ coincides with a rise in intended inflation, and is caused by the inflation expected by private agents falling below that intended by the policymaker.

The learning of the central bank is instrumental in inflation undershooting its long run level. To see this more clearly, we consider a variant of our model in which only private agents are learning. We assume that the central bank knows the structure of the economy (1)-(2),

and operates under discretion to solve the following policy problem:

$$\min_{x_t} E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \delta^s (U_{t+s}^2 + \beta_{t+s} \pi_{t+s}^2),$$

s.t.

$$U_{t+s} = U^* - \theta(\pi_{t+s} - \pi_{t+s}^e) + \nu_{1t+s},$$

$$\pi_{t+s} = x_{t+s} + \nu_{2t+s},$$

$$\{\pi_{t+s}^e\} \text{ given.}$$

The solution of the policy problem determines intended inflation as a function of the inflation expectations of private agents:

$$x_t = \frac{\theta}{\beta_t + \theta^2} (U^* + \theta \pi_t^e). \quad (15)$$

As before, private agents form inflation expectations using the standard adaptive learning algorithm, so the economy with no central bank learning is described by equations (1)-(2), (7)-(8) and (15). Simulations of this model in Figure 4 show inflation monotonically declining to its new long run level after a change in the policymaker's mandate. The rate at which inflation falls depends on the speed with which private agents learn, but inflation never systematically undershoot its long run value. If the central bank operates under commitment then the policy problem internalises the learning of private agents. This leads to a faster disinflation, but still does not lead to undershooting.




Figure 4: Simulated dynamics when the central bank does not need to learn

Whilst the learning of private agents does not cause inflation to undershoot its long run level, it is important for explaining why unemployment rises when disinflating. This is apparent

in a version of the model where the central bank learns but private agents have rational expectations. The model is exactly as in Section 2, except the inflation expectations of private agents are rational at $\pi_t^e = x_t$, rather than being formed by the adaptive learning algorithm (8). Figure 5 shows that inflation still undershoots its long run level in many simulations of the model, but unemployment is no longer affected by the disinflation. We therefore confirm that it is the learning of the central bank that causes inflation undershooting in the model, but it is the learning of private agents that causes disinflations to be costly.




Figure 5: Simulated dynamics when private agents have rational expectations

Although the model is highly stylised, it is reasonable to ask whether our story can lead to disinflations that are not only qualitatively of the right character (as argued above) but are also quantitatively acceptable in some interesting sense. A natural metric is the sacrifice ratio, defined as the cumulative loss of output divided by the change in inflation over the duration of the disinflation. If output is assumed to be proportional to unemployment then the sacrifice ratio in simulations of our model is close to 9. This is reasonable but at the high end of the empirical estimates collated by Ascari and Ropele (2011). The main determinant of the sacrifice ratio in our model is the gain parameter a , since this determines how quickly the policymaker and private agents update their beliefs. If the gain is increased slightly then agents learn faster, the disinflation is less protracted, and the sacrifice ratio falls comfortably close to the midpoint of the empirical estimates.⁸ We therefore argue that our model can

⁸The parameter θ describing the effect of unexpected inflation on unemployment is traditionally seen as an important determinant of the sacrifice ratio. It is less so in our framework because, whilst an increase in θ does lead to higher unemployment during the disinflation, it also makes the fall in inflation from $\theta U^*/\beta_L$ to $\theta U^*/\beta_H$ larger. The numerator and denominator of the sacrifice ratio therefore increase in tandem and the overall effect is muted.

generate quantitatively plausible disinflations even though it is highly stylised.

6 Conclusion

The undershooting of inflation in our model occurs because the policymaker is learning by disinflating. This emphasis on learning by the policymaker contrasts with the existing literature, which typically focuses on the learning by private agents. There is considerable evidence that policymakers do learn by disinflating. For example, Bordo et al. (2007) argue that policymakers were learning in three great American disinflations. In the post civil war disinflation, learning led to a temporary suspension of monetary tightening in 1867 as Congress and the US Treasury observed the sharp price deflation having a contractionary impact on the economy. Monetary tightening only resumed in 1869, with policymakers learning to adopt a more gradual approach. In the post World War I disinflation, policymakers instead learned to take a much more aggressive stance and rapidly disinflated in the 1920s.

The Volcker disinflation is closest to our analysis as it was predicated on a desire to reduce inflation, rather than the post civil war and post WWI disinflation which aimed at reducing prices to a level consistent with the gold standard. As such, the danger of inflation undershooting and creating a false sense of how successful changing the central bank's mandate has been its highest during the Volcker disinflation. The evolution of inflation after the Volcker disinflation is shown in Figure 6, where inflation did fall but began to pick up after 1998. It is difficult to decide whether this is the undershooting of inflation predicted by our model, since inflation started to fall again at the beginning of the 2001 recession.




Figure 6: 12 month change in the GDP price deflator

It appears that policymakers did learn during the Volcker disinflation. In particular, policymakers began to argue that there had been a flattening of the Phillips curve, such that changes in output would have less impact on inflation than before. For example, Bernanke (2008) refers to work by Mishkin (2007):

“As he noted, many studies of the conventional Phillips curve find that the sensitivity of inflation to activity indicators is lower today than in the past (that is, the Phillips curve appears to have become flatter); and that the long-run effect on inflation of ‘supply shocks’, such as changes in the price of oil, also appears to be lower than in the past.”

Arguing that the Phillips curve has become flatter is what we would expect if the policymaker is learning by disinflating. It is consistent with the policymaker in our model learning to update its estimate γ_{1t} of the slope of the perceived relationship between unemployment and inflation. Further support for the idea that policymakers learnt during the Volcker disinflation is provided by Tillmann (2010), who reports that FOMC forecasts are consistent with the notion that the Phillips curve changed during the second half of the 1990s and that, on average, FOMC members took that into account when submitting their forecasts.

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A Condition for stability of self confirming equilibrium

A sufficient condition for local asymptotic stability is that all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of equations (11) - (13) have negative real parts at the self confirming equilibrium. The Jacobian is defined by:

$$J = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial \dot{\gamma}}{\partial \gamma} & \frac{\partial \dot{\gamma}}{\partial \pi^e} & \frac{\partial \dot{\gamma}}{\partial R} \\ \frac{\partial \dot{\pi}^e}{\partial \gamma} & \frac{\partial \dot{\pi}^e}{\partial \pi^e} & \frac{\partial \dot{\pi}^e}{\partial R} \\ \frac{\partial \dot{R}}{\partial \gamma} & \frac{\partial \dot{R}}{\partial \pi^e} & \frac{\partial \dot{R}}{\partial R} \end{pmatrix}.$$

At the self confirming equilibrium $\frac{\partial \dot{\gamma}}{\partial R}|_{SCE} = \frac{\partial \dot{\pi}^e}{\partial R}|_{SCE} = 0$ and $\frac{\partial \dot{R}}{\partial R}|_{SCE} = -I$ so two of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian at the self confirming equilibrium are $\lambda_1 = -1$ and $\lambda_2 = -1$, which trivially have negative real parts as required. The remaining eigenvalues are the eigenvalues of:

$$\begin{pmatrix} R^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} -1 \\ -\frac{\theta u^*}{\beta} \end{pmatrix} & R^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{\theta u^*}{\beta} \\ -\frac{u^{*2} \theta^2}{\beta^2} - \sigma \end{pmatrix} & R^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} \theta \\ \frac{\theta^2 u^*}{\beta} \end{pmatrix} \\ \frac{\theta}{\beta + \theta^2} & -\frac{(\beta - \theta)^2 u^{*2}}{\beta(\beta + \theta)^2} & -1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

The properties of determinants derived in Ellison and Yates (2007) mean that multiplying the first two rows of the matrix by the positive definite matrix R does not change the sign of the determinant. We therefore do this and subtract $\frac{\theta u^*}{\beta}$ times the first row from the second row to obtain a matrix which has eigenvalues of the same sign as the Jacobian:

$$\begin{pmatrix} -1 & -\frac{\theta u^*}{\beta} & \theta \\ 0 & -\sigma & 0 \\ \frac{\theta}{\beta + \theta^2} & -\frac{(\beta - \theta)^2 u^{*2}}{\beta(\beta + \theta)^2} & -1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

The remaining eigenvalues are $\lambda_3 = -\sigma$, $\lambda_4 = -1 + \sqrt{\frac{\theta^2}{\beta + \theta^2}}$ and $\lambda_5 = -1 - \sqrt{\frac{\theta^2}{\beta + \theta^2}}$. They all have negative real parts and the self confirming equilibrium is stable.

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