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## Robust monetary policy in a small open economy

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Kai Leitemo – Ulf Söderström

**Robust monetary policy  
in a small open economy**



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## **Robust monetary policy in a small open economy**

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Bank of Finland.

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# Robust monetary policy in a small open economy

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## Abstract

This paper studies how a central bank's preference for robustness against model misspecification affects the design of monetary policy in a New-Keynesian model of a small open economy. Due to the simple model structure, we are able to solve analytically the optimal robust policy rule, and separately analyze the effects of robustness against misspecification concerning the determination of inflation, output and the exchange rate. We show that an increased central bank preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond more aggressively or more cautiously to shocks, depending on the type of shock and the source of misspecification.

Key words: Knightian uncertainty, model uncertainty, robust control, min-max policies

JEL classification numbers: E52, E58, F41

# Robusti rahapolitiikka pienessä avotaloudessa

## Suomen Pankin tutkimus Keskustelualoitteita 20/2005

Kai Leitemo – Ulf Söderström  
Rahapolitiikka- ja tutkimusosasto

### Tiivistelmä

Rahapolitiikan suunnittelussa yksi keskeisimmistä epävarmuuksista liittyy relevantteihin kansantalouden toimintaa kuvaaviin malleihin. Tämänäyttöisen malliepävarmuuden vuoksi optimaalisten rahapoliittisten toimenpiteiden valinta vaikeutuu. Yksittäisten rahapoliittisten toimenpiteiden kansantaloudelliset vaikutukset näyttävät yhdessä mallissa järkeviltä, toisessa nurinkurisilta. Rahapolitiikan suunnittelussa tulisi tällöin suosia robusteja eli virhesietoisia toimenpiteitä, joilla on toivotut kansantaloudelliset vaikutukset useassa toisistaan hieman poikkeavassa mallissa. Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miten keskuspankin halu varautua osittain virheellisten mallien mahdollisuuteen vaikuttaa rahapolitiikan suunnitteluun modernissa dynaamisessa pienen avotalouden makromallissa. Mallin yksinkertaisen rakenteen vuoksi optimaalinen robusti rahapolitiikan ohjaussääntö voidaan ratkaista siinä analyttisesti. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan erikseen inflaation, tuotannon ja valuuttakurssien mallivirheisiin varautumisen vaikutuksia. Tulosten mukaan keskuspankin halu vahvistaa rahapolitiikan virhesietoisuutta ei aina saa sitä reagoimaan aggressiivisemmin talouteen kohdistuviin häiriöihin. Rahapolitiikan vaste riippuu tällöin häiriöiden ja mallivirheen alkuperästä.

Avainsanat: knightilainen epävarmuus, malliepävarmuus, robusti kontrolli, min-max-politiikat

JEL-luokittelu: E52, E58, F41

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# 1 Introduction

Good policy design requires a good understanding of private sector behavior. Such an understanding is important not only in order to identify market deficiencies and hence policy objectives, but also when trying to meet objectives in the best possible way. Recently, the New-Keynesian model as laid out by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Goodfriend and King (1997), Clarida et al (1999) and others has established itself as the mainstream model for monetary policy analysis. This model captures the sluggish adjustment of prices and the intertemporal consumption decision in a model framework with optimizing households and firms. With only a limited number of equations, the model is having a strong influence and has provided policymakers with several guiding policy principles in responding to the different disturbances in the economy (see, eg, Clarida et al, 1999, and King, 2000). More recently, the New-Keynesian framework has been extended to open economies (see, eg, Galí and Monacelli, 2004, or Clarida et al, 2002).

Although the New-Keynesian model has many attractive theoretical properties, it has been criticized by many researchers, most notably for not fitting the data well.<sup>1</sup> One response to such criticism is to design more complex models that are better able to capture the behavior of macroeconomic variables, following, eg, Christiano et al (2005). Such models gain in realism but lose in tractability. An alternative route is to acknowledge that the simple model is a potentially misspecified description of reality, and to design policy to take this possibility of misspecification into account. In this paper we follow the second route and allow for the possibility that the model may not be the correct representation of private sector behavior. Rather, we will assume that the true model of private sector behavior lies in some neighborhood around the reference model, and we analyze how monetary policy should be designed in order to work reasonably well for all models inside this neighborhood. This problem has recently been addressed by Hansen and Sargent (2004) using ‘robust control’ techniques. Assuming that the policymaker is unable to formulate a probability distribution over plausible models, the robust policymaker designs policy for the worst possible outcome within a pre-specified set of models.<sup>2</sup>

We apply robust control techniques developed by Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Giordani and Söderlind (2004) to a simple New Keynesian open-economy model developed by Galí and Monacelli (2004) and Clarida et al (2002). The simple model structure allows us to find closed-form solutions for the optimal robust policy and the equilibrium behavior of the economy. We also generalize the standard robust control framework by allowing the policymaker’s preference for robustness to differ across equations, reflecting the confidence the policymaker has in each relationship. For instance, the policymaker may be quite confident about one of the equations (eg, the Phillips

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<sup>1</sup>See, eg, Ball (1994), Mankiw (2001), or Estrella and Fuhrer (2002).

<sup>2</sup>Note that the robust policy is designed for one of the least likely outcomes of the model, but only within a prespecified set of models. In typical applications, this set of models is chosen so that the policymaker cannot statistically reject any of the models inside the set. In our analysis, we focus on marginal amounts of robustness, so monetary policy is robust against very small degrees of misspecification.

curve) and believe that robustness to deviations from this equation is not important, but at the same time be very uncertain about some other equation (eg, the exchange rate relationship). This approach allows us to consider each equation in turn and ask what is the appropriate response of robust policy to misspecification in this particular equation. Thus we will consider several different types of misspecification within the model: misspecification in firms' price-setting, misspecification in consumer behavior, and misspecification in the model determining the exchange rate.<sup>3</sup>

The ability to focus on specification errors in particular equations seems important. Policymakers are more confident in some relationships than in others, and so regard some types of specification errors to be more important than others. In open economies, monetary policymakers are particularly uncertain about the effects of the exchange rate on the economy and the effects of monetary policy on the exchange rate. Using our approach, we are able to analyze the proper response of monetary policy to such specification errors, while keeping other sources of misspecification fixed.

One important part of the analysis will focus on the effects of model misspecification and the central bank's preference for robustness on monetary policy. Thus far, there is no consensus about whether increased uncertainty should lead to more aggressive or more cautious policy behavior. Following the seminal analysis of Brainard (1967), it is well-accepted that increased uncertainty about the effects of policy should lead to more cautious policy behavior, at least within a Bayesian framework. However, Craine (1979) and Söderström (2002) show that this result does not generalize to all parameters in the model: increased uncertainty about the persistence of inflation should instead make policy more aggressive.

Within the robust control literature, increased uncertainty tends to lead to more aggressive policy behavior (see, eg, Hansen and Sargent, 2001, 2004, Giannoni, 2002, and Giordani and Söderström, 2004), but these studies typically use numerical methods to solve for the optimal robust policy in a closed economy. In a companion paper, Leitemo and Söderström (2004), we use our analytical approach to show that the aggressiveness result seems to be an inherent feature of robust policy in a closed economy. In the present paper, however, we will show that this result does not carry over to the open economy: depending on the source of misspecification and the type of disturbance hitting the economy, optimal robust policy in an open economy can be either more aggressive or more cautious than the non-robust policy.

A second set of results concern the effects on the macroeconomy of the central bank's fear of model misspecification. As the central bank designs policy to do well in the worst-case scenario, this will have important consequences for the economy in other more likely outcomes. We show that the price of being robust to misspecification in the Phillips curve or the exchange rate equations comes in the form of inefficiently high output variability, whereas

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<sup>3</sup>Leitemo and Söderström (2005) study the effects of exchange rate model misspecification on the performance of optimized simple monetary policy rules. In their framework, the central bank is uncertain about the exchange rate model, but private agents have perfect information about the exact specification of the model. In the present paper both the central bank and private agents have doubts about the true model.

robustness against misspecification in the output equation comes at the cost of higher inflation variability.

Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the New Keynesian open-economy model and review some terminology. In Section 3 we derive the stochastic equilibrium under a robust policymaker, both in the ‘worst-case’ model when misspecification is present and in the ‘approximating’ model, which is the most likely outcome. Section 4 is devoted to analyzing the effects of an increased preference for robustness, while Section 5 presents a numerical example. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.

## 2 A simple New-Keynesian open-economy model

We use a very simple model of a small open economy developed by Galí and Monacelli (2004) and Clarida et al (2002), but deviate from these authors by introducing a time-varying premium on foreign bond holdings. This enables us to analyze misspecification concerning the model determining the exchange rate, which is an important goal of the paper. The model is a generalization of the canonical New-Keynesian model for a closed economy developed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Goodfriend and King (1997) and others, and carefully examined by Clarida et al (1999).

The world is assumed to consist of two countries: a small open home country and a large, approximately closed, foreign country. The two countries share preferences and technology and produce traded consumption goods. In the home country, firms produce domestic goods using labor as the only input, and households consume domestic and imported goods.

Define by  $\pi_t$  the rate of inflation in the domestic goods sector; by  $x_t$  the output gap in the domestic economy, ie, the log deviation of domestic output from its flexible-price level; and by  $e_t$  the real exchange rate, defined in terms of the domestic price level as

$$e_t = s_t + p_t^f - p_t, \tag{2.1}$$

where  $s_t$  is the nominal exchange rate,  $p_t^f$  is the price level in the foreign economy, and  $p_t$  is the price level of domestically produced goods.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Formally,  $e_t$  defined as in equation (2.1) is the terms of trade, the difference between the price on imported goods (the foreign price level denominated in domestic currency) and domestic goods. A more traditional way of defining the real exchange rate would be in terms of the domestic consumer price index:

$$q_t = s_t + p_t^f - p_t^c,$$

where  $p_t^c = (1 - \omega)p_t + \omega(p_t^f + s_t)$ , and where  $\omega$  is the share of imports in domestic consumption. However, since the equation determining  $e_t$  is derived from the uncovered interest rate parity condition determining the nominal exchange rate, we will nevertheless refer to it as the real exchange rate. Our definition is not crucial to our results: the traditional real exchange rate  $q_t$  is related to our real exchange rate  $e_t$  by

$$q_t = (1 - \omega)e_t,$$

so changes in  $e_t$  are proportionally reflected in changes in  $q_t$ .

The domestic inflation rate, the output gap and the real exchange rate are interrelated according to the following three equations

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + \alpha e_t + \Sigma_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi, \quad (2.2)$$

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} [i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}] - \gamma [E_t e_{t+1} - e_t] + \Sigma_x \varepsilon_t^x, \quad (2.3)$$

$$e_t = E_t e_{t+1} - [i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}] + \Sigma_e \varepsilon_t^e. \quad (2.4)$$

Equation (2.2) is a New-Keynesian Phillips curve for the open economy, where the rate of domestic inflation depends on expected future inflation and current marginal cost, which is affected by the output gap and the exchange rate. The real exchange rate affects marginal cost through households' labor supply decision: households value their wage relative to the consumer price index (which includes prices of imported goods), so the equilibrium wage depends on the real exchange rate. The inflation shock,  $\varepsilon_t^\pi$ , is due to productivity disturbances which affect the flexible-price level of the real exchange rate.

Equation (2.3) is an expectational IS curve, expressed in terms of the output gap, that relates the output gap to the expected future output gap, the real interest rate (as households substitute consumption over time), and the real exchange rate (as consumption is partly satisfied through imported goods). The demand shock  $\varepsilon_t^x$  reflects productivity disturbances which affect the flexible-price level of output, or, equivalently, changes in the natural real interest rate.

Finally, equation (2.4) is a real interest parity condition, where the expected rate of real depreciation is related to the real interest rate differential (also in terms of domestic inflation) between the domestic and foreign economies. All foreign variables are assumed to be exogenous, and therefore set to zero. The exchange rate disturbance,  $\varepsilon_t^e$ , reflects the fact that domestic households pay a premium on foreign bond holdings.

All shocks  $\varepsilon_t^j$  are assumed to be white noise with zero mean and unit variance. This allows us to find a closed-form solution for the robust control problem.

Appendix A shows how to derive this model from the optimizing behavior of a representative agent in a small open economy, giving a structural interpretation to all parameters in the model, following Galí and Monacelli (2004), Clarida et al (2002) and Walsh (2003, Ch. 6.5).<sup>5</sup> The parameter  $\beta$  is the discount factor of domestic households and firms, while the parameters  $\kappa$ ,  $\alpha$ ,  $\sigma$ , and  $\gamma$  depend on 'deep' parameters according to

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<sup>5</sup>Galí and Monacelli (2004) and Clarida et al (2002) eliminate the exchange rate from the model using the UIP condition (2.4) with  $\varepsilon_t^e = 0$ , thus reaching a formulation of the open-economy model that is isomorphic to the closed-economy model. We are particularly interested in model misspecification concerning the UIP condition, and therefore include the time-varying premium  $\varepsilon_t^e$ . As a consequence, we cannot eliminate the exchange rate from the system.

$$\kappa \equiv \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)(\hat{\sigma} + \eta)}{\theta}, \quad (2.5)$$

$$\alpha \equiv \frac{\omega(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)}{\theta}, \quad (2.6)$$

$$\sigma \equiv \frac{\hat{\sigma}}{1-\omega}, \quad (2.7)$$

$$\gamma \equiv (2-\omega)\omega\delta - \frac{\omega(1-\omega)}{\hat{\sigma}}, \quad (2.8)$$

where  $\theta$  is the probability that a firm is not able to change its price in a given period in the sticky-price model of Calvo (1983);  $\hat{\sigma}$  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution;  $\eta$  is the elasticity of the representative household's labor supply;  $\omega$  is the share of imports in domestic consumption, ie, the degree of openness; and  $\delta$  is the elasticity of substitution across domestic and foreign goods. Clearly, the parameters  $\kappa, \alpha, \sigma$  and  $\beta$  are always positive, and also  $\gamma$  will be positive for typical parameterizations, as  $(2-\omega)\omega > (1-\omega)\omega$  and  $\delta$  is typically not much smaller than  $\hat{\sigma}^{-1}$ .

### 3 Robust monetary policy

#### 3.1 Introducing model misspecification

We close the model by assuming that the short-term interest rate  $i_t$  is set by a central bank to minimize a standard objective function which is quadratic in deviations of inflation and the output gap from their zero target levels

$$\min_{\{i_t\}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [\pi_t^2 + \lambda x_t^2], \quad (3.1)$$

where  $\lambda$  is the central bank's weight on output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization.<sup>6</sup> However, the central bank worries about model misspecification: while the model (2.2)–(2.4) is seen as the most likely model, the central bank acknowledges that this benchmark model may be misspecified. Therefore, the central bank wants to design policy to be robust against reasonable deviations from the benchmark model. To formalize these fears of model misspecification, we follow Hansen and Sargent (2004) and introduce in each equation a second type of disturbance, denoted  $v_t^j$ , which is controlled by a fictitious ‘evil agent’,

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<sup>6</sup>This objective function is often used to characterize monetary policy with an inflation target, a strategy that is very common in small open economies (see, eg, Svensson, 2000). As shown by Galí and Monacelli (2004), when  $\hat{\sigma} = \eta = 1$  this objective function represents a second-order approximation of the utility loss for the representative consumer resulting from deviations from the optimal strict inflation-targeting policy (in the model without a foreign exchange premium). Note also that although the central bank is aware that the model may be misspecified, it does not take into account that model misspecification may affect its objectives, but takes the objective function (3.1) as given.

who represents the central bank's worst fears concerning misspecification. Thus, the misspecified model is given by

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + \alpha e_t + \Sigma_\pi [v_t^\pi + \varepsilon_t^\pi], \quad (3.2)$$

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} [i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}] - \gamma [E_t e_{t+1} - e_t] + \Sigma_x [v_t^x + \varepsilon_t^x], \quad (3.3)$$

$$e_t = E_t e_{t+1} - [i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}] + \Sigma_e [v_t^e + \varepsilon_t^e]. \quad (3.4)$$

The specification errors  $v_t^j$  will be allowed to feed back from the state variables, so although the errors enter the model as additive shocks, they may well disturb the model in the same way as multiplicative parameter uncertainty (see Hansen and Sargent, 2004).<sup>7</sup> The central bank then designs policy for the worst possible outcome of the model, where the evil agent chooses the amount of misspecification  $v_t^j$  optimally, given some constraints (to be specified below). This model will be referred to as the *worst-case model*, and is the outcome that the central bank fears the most, against which it wants policy to be robust. The most likely outcome of the model, on the other hand, is one where the central bank sets policy and agents form expectations to reflect misspecification in the worst-case model, but there is no such misspecification in practice (so all  $v_t^j$  are zero). We will refer to this model as the *approximating model*.

The amount of misspecification, measured by  $v_t^j$ , is scaled by the parameter  $\Sigma_j$ , which determines the volatility of the shock in equation  $j$ . Intuitively, the specification error is disguised by the disturbance term  $\varepsilon_t^j$ , so if the disturbance has no variance, the specification error would be detected immediately. The larger is the variance of the disturbance, the larger can the specification error be without being detected.

## 3.2 Setting up the control problem

To design the robust policy, the central bank takes into account a certain degree of model misspecification by minimizing its objective function in the worst possible model within a given set of plausible models. Depending on its preference for robustness, the central bank allocates a budget  $\eta_j$  to the evil agent, which is used to create misspecification in equation  $j$ . In contrast to Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Giordani and Söderlind, we will distinguish between different sources of model misspecification, by allowing the evil agent to have different budget constraints for the different controls. Thus the budget constraints are

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<sup>7</sup>Onatski and Williams (2003) point out that the Hansen-Sargent approach to robustness does not capture all types of parameter uncertainty, and that the 'robust' rules may be fragile to certain sources of uncertainty that are not captured by the robust control approach.

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (v_t^\pi)^2 \leq \eta_\pi, \quad (3.5)$$

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (v_t^x)^2 \leq \eta_x, \quad (3.6)$$

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (v_t^e)^2 \leq \eta_e. \quad (3.7)$$

In a standard non-robust control problem we would have  $\eta_j = 0$  for all  $j$ , while the standard robust control problem would have a common constraint on misspecification in all equations:  $E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [(v_t^\pi)^2 + (v_t^x)^2 + (v_t^e)^2] \leq \eta$ . Here, in addition to analyzing the general effects of misspecification, letting all  $\eta_j$  be positive, we can also analyze specification errors in one equation at a time by setting one  $\eta_j > 0$  and the other two to zero.

Following Hansen and Sargent (2004) the robust monetary policy is obtained by solving the minmax problem

$$\min_{\{i_t\}} \max_{\{v_t^j\}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [\pi_t^2 + \lambda x_t^2] \quad (3.8)$$

subject to the misspecified model (3.2)–(3.4) and the evil agent's budget constraints (3.5)–(3.7). The central bank thus sets the interest rate to minimize the value of its intertemporal loss function, while the evil agent sets its controls to maximize the central bank's loss, given the constraints on misspecification. The Lagrangian for this problem is given by

$$\begin{aligned} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \{ & \pi_t^2 + \lambda x_t^2 - \theta_\pi (v_t^\pi)^2 - \theta_x (v_t^x)^2 - \theta_e (v_t^e)^2 \\ & - \mu_t^\pi [\pi_t - \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} - \kappa x_t - \alpha e_t - \Sigma_\pi v_t^\pi - \Sigma_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi] \\ & - \mu_t^x [x_t - E_t x_{t+1} + \sigma^{-1} (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}) \\ & \quad + \gamma (E_t e_{t+1} - e_t) - \Sigma_x v_t^x - \Sigma_x \varepsilon_t^x] \\ & - \mu_t^e [e_t - E_t e_{t+1} + i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - \Sigma_e v_t^e - \Sigma_e \varepsilon_t^e] \}, \end{aligned} \quad (3.9)$$

where the  $\mu_t^j$  variables are Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (3.2)–(3.4) and the  $\theta_j$  parameters determine the set of models available to the evil agent against which the policymaker wants to be robust. These parameters are related to the evil agent's budget  $\eta_j$ : as  $\eta_j$  approaches zero,  $\theta_j$  approaches infinity, and the degree of misspecification approaches zero.

Throughout, we will focus on marginal amounts of model misspecification. For sufficiently large amounts of misspecification, the evil agent will be able to overturn any relationship in the model, so the approximating model (2.2)–(2.4) is not a good description of reality. We therefore want to consider reasonable degrees of model misspecification that cannot be easily identified by the policymaker.<sup>8</sup> More specifically, we will analyze the effects of small increases

<sup>8</sup>In numerical approaches to robust control, the amount of misspecification can be chosen such that the policymaker cannot distinguish between the approximating model and the worst-case model at reasonable statistical significance levels. See Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Giordani and Söderlind (2004).



in the preference for robustness starting from the non-robust policy, ie, small decreases in each  $\theta_j$  starting from  $\theta_j = \infty$ .

### 3.3 Optimality conditions

We assume that neither the central bank nor the evil agent has access to any commitment mechanism. Consequently, we take expectations as given in the optimization and look for a discretionary equilibrium. From the first-order conditions we can derive the following optimality conditions relating inflation, output and the degree of misspecification to each other:

$$x_t = - \left[ \frac{\kappa}{\lambda} + \frac{\alpha}{(\gamma + \sigma^{-1})\lambda} \right] \pi_t = -A\pi_t, \quad (3.10)$$

$$v_t^\pi = \frac{\Sigma}{\pi} \theta_\pi \pi_t, \quad (3.11)$$

$$v_t^x = \frac{\Sigma}{x} \theta_x [\lambda x_t + \kappa \pi_t], \quad (3.12)$$

$$v_t^e = -\frac{\Sigma_e}{\sigma \theta_e} [\lambda x_t + \kappa \pi_t], \quad (3.13)$$

where

$$A \equiv \frac{\kappa}{\lambda} + \frac{\alpha}{(\gamma + \sigma^{-1})\lambda}. \quad (3.14)$$

Combining these equations we obtain

$$v_t^\pi = \frac{\Sigma}{\pi} \theta_\pi \pi_t, \quad (3.15)$$

$$v_t^x = -\frac{\alpha \Sigma_x}{(\gamma + \sigma^{-1})\theta_x} \pi_t, \quad (3.16)$$

$$v_t^e = \frac{\alpha \sigma^{-1} \Sigma_e}{(\gamma + \sigma^{-1})\theta_e} \pi_t. \quad (3.17)$$

This immediately gives us our first set of results.

**Proposition 3.1 (*Optimal output–inflation trade-off*)**

*The optimal output–inflation trade-off is not affected by the central bank’s preference for robustness.*

**Proof.** See equations (3.15)–(3.17): given  $\theta_j$ , each  $v_j$  is increasing in  $\Sigma_j$ . ■

Thus, the presence of model misspecification will not alter the central bank's optimal 'targeting rule' in equation (3.10). However, as there is some misspecification in each equation, the optimal (reduced form) interest rate rule for the central bank will be affected by model misspecification.<sup>9</sup>

**Proposition 3.2 (*Misspecification and shocks*)**

*Given the preference for robustness, the degree of misspecification in an equation depends positively on the variance of the shock associated with the equation.*

**Proof.** See equations (3.15)–(3.17): given  $\theta_j$ , each  $v_j$  is increasing in  $\Sigma_j$ . ■

Intuitively, the larger is the variance of a given shock, the more difficult it is for the central bank to identify misspecification in that particular equation. Therefore the central bank wants to guard against such specification errors.

**Proposition 3.3 (*Misspecification and inflation*)**

*The degree of misspecification in all equations is larger when inflation is further away from steady state.*

**Proof.** See equations (3.15)–(3.17): all  $v_j$  increase (in absolute value) in  $\pi_t$ . ■

The central bank fears all shocks that have inflationary effects as these force the central bank to reduce the output gap further to achieve the desired trade-off between inflation and the output gap. The evil agent adds to such shocks through misspecification in all equations. In the worst-case model, misspecification in the Phillips curve will increase inflation further when inflation is already high. Misspecification in the output equation forces output down when inflation is high, increasing the cost of counteracting an already high inflation rate. The final misspecification, in the exchange rate equation, induces an exchange rate depreciation when inflation is high, leading to higher inflation and larger costs of achieving the desired trade-off between inflation and output.

From equations (3.15)–(3.17) we see that the Phillips curve is subject to misspecification in most parameterizations of the model. As long as  $\Sigma_\pi > 0$  and the budget is non-zero ( $\theta_\pi < \infty$ ), the evil agent will allocate misspecification to this equation. Indeed, as discussed in detail in Leitemo and Söderström (2004), in the closed-economy version of the model (when  $\alpha = \gamma = 0$ ), the central bank will only fear misspecification in the inflation equation: in the

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<sup>9</sup>Walsh (2004) obtains a similar result, showing that the 'implicit instrument rule' (similar to the targeting rule) is not affected by central bank robustness against misspecification in a New-Keynesian model of a closed economy. However, in our model this result is to a large extent due to the timing in the game between the central bank and the evil agent. Here we assume that the central bank and the evil agent each acts optimally given the other player's actions, leading to a Nash equilibrium. If we instead assume that the central bank acts as a Stackelberg leader and takes into account the misspecification of the evil agent when setting the interest rate, the optimal targeting rule will depend on the preference for robustness. Leitemo and Söderström (2004) analyze the effects of robustness under different timing assumptions in a closed-economy version of the model.

closed economy, the policymaker is able to counteract any specification errors in the output equation by an appropriate adjustment of the interest rate. As interest rate movements do not influence central bank loss independently, the central bank does not fear such specification errors. In the open economy, however, the central bank cannot directly offset output shocks by changing the interest rate, as this would affect the exchange rate and therefore inflation (see Walsh, 1999). Thus, the existence of an exchange rate channel makes the output equation more prone to misspecification, and the policymaker will fear that output is low when inflation is high. This would make the central bank lower the interest rate, leading to an exchange rate depreciation that increases inflation even further.

The stronger is the effect of the interest rate on output (the smaller is  $\sigma$ ), the more prone is the exchange rate equation to misspecification. When inflation is positive, the central bank fears that a real exchange rate depreciation will further increase inflation. In order to curb the effects on inflation, the interest rate would need to be increased, which would reduce output. This is particularly costly for the policymaker if the interest rate has a strong effect on output.

These effects of robustness against output and exchange rate misspecification are stronger when the exchange rate has a strong effect on inflation (so  $\alpha$  is large). The central bank therefore fears such specification errors more when  $\alpha$  is large. On the other hand, if the exchange rate has a sufficiently strong impact on output (so  $\gamma$  is large), the central bank will worry less about misspecification of the output or exchange rate equations. The reason is that the exchange rate depreciation (caused by higher inflation) would offset some of the negative impact of higher interest rates on output. As  $\gamma$  approaches infinity, only misspecification in the inflation equation has consequences for central bank loss.

### 3.4 Solving the model

As there is no persistence in the model, the only state variables are the three shocks,  $\varepsilon_t^\pi$ ,  $\varepsilon_t^x$  and  $\varepsilon_t^e$ , and all expectations are zero. This allows us to find a closed-form solution for the robust control problem. We will thus look for a solution for the endogenous variables  $\pi_t, x_t, e_t$ , the central bank's control  $i_t$ , and the evil agent's controls  $v_t^\pi, v_t^x, v_t^e$  in terms of the three shocks. The solution of the *worst-case model* will be of the form

$$\begin{bmatrix} \pi_t \\ x_t \\ e_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} a_\pi & a_x & a_e \\ b_\pi & b_x & b_e \\ c_\pi & c_x & c_e \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_t^\pi \\ \varepsilon_t^x \\ \varepsilon_t^e \end{bmatrix}, \quad (3.18)$$

the worst possible degree of misspecification will be given by

$$\begin{bmatrix} v_t^\pi \\ v_t^x \\ v_t^e \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \hat{a}_\pi & \hat{a}_x & \hat{a}_e \\ \hat{b}_\pi & \hat{b}_x & \hat{b}_e \\ \hat{c}_\pi & \hat{c}_x & \hat{c}_e \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_t^\pi \\ \varepsilon_t^x \\ \varepsilon_t^e \end{bmatrix}, \quad (3.19)$$

and the policy rule will be

$$i_t = d_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + d_x \varepsilon_t^x + d_e \varepsilon_t^e. \quad (3.20)$$

Finally, the approximating model, where policy is conducted according to (3.20), but there is no misspecification (so all  $v_t^j$  are zero), will be given by

$$\begin{bmatrix} \pi_t \\ x_t \\ e_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \bar{a}_\pi & \bar{a}_x & \bar{a}_e \\ \bar{b}_\pi & \bar{b}_x & \bar{b}_e \\ \bar{c}_\pi & \bar{c}_x & \bar{c}_e \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon_t^\pi \\ \varepsilon_t^x \\ \varepsilon_t^e \end{bmatrix}. \quad (3.21)$$

To find these solutions, we begin by looking for the worst-case solution for  $\pi_t, x_t, e_t$  in (3.18) and the worst possible degree of misspecification in (3.19). Noting that equations (3.10) and (3.15)–(3.17) imply that

$$b_j = -Aa_j, \quad (3.22)$$

$$\hat{a}_j = \frac{\Sigma}{\pi \theta_\pi a_j}, \quad (3.23)$$

$$\hat{b}_j = -\frac{\alpha \Sigma_x}{(\kappa + \sigma^{-1}) \theta_x} a_j, \quad (3.24)$$

$$\hat{c}_j = \frac{\alpha \sigma^{-1} \Sigma_e}{(\kappa + \sigma^{-1}) \theta_e} a_j, \quad (3.25)$$

we need only to solve for the coefficients  $a_j, c_j, d_j$ . Second, we will find the optimal policy rule (3.20). Third, we will find the solution for the approximating model (3.21) by using the optimal policy rule in the original model given by (2.2)–(2.4).

Note that we allow the evil agent only to respond to the same variables as the policymaker. This differs from the setup of Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Giordani and Söderlind (2004), where the evil agent is allowed to respond also to lagged state variables, thus introducing persistence in the shocks.<sup>10</sup> In our setup, the evil agent is not allowed to introduce serial correlation in the shocks, as there is no such persistence from the outset. This assumption is mainly for tractability, but is also consistent with the assumption in both approaches that the evil agent is not allowed to introduce additional state variables to increase the degree of serial correlation in the endogenous variables.

### 3.4.1 The worst-case model

First, to find an expression for the interest rate, we solve the output equation (3.3) for the interest rate  $i_t$  and substitute for  $x_t$  and  $v_t^x$  using

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<sup>10</sup>This is because Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Giordani and Söderlind (2004) write the model on its state-space form where the shocks are predetermined variables and are written as autoregressive processes without any persistence. The set of state variables then includes also lagged values of the shocks, and the evil agent is allowed to respond to all state variables.

the optimal trade-off in (3.10) and the worst possible output misspecification in (3.16). This yields

$$i_t = (1 - \sigma A) E_t \pi_{t+1} + \sigma B \pi_t - \sigma \gamma E_t \Delta e_{t+1} + \sigma \Sigma_x \varepsilon_t^x, \quad (3.26)$$

where

$$B \equiv A - \frac{\alpha \Sigma_x^2}{(\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) \theta_x} > 0, \quad (3.27)$$

where we evaluate the sign of all coefficients when the preference for robustness is small, so  $\theta_j$  is close to infinity. Although equation (3.26) describes central bank behavior, it is not a true reaction function due to the presence of non-predetermined variables ( $\pi_t$ ,  $e_t$  and their expectations) on the right-hand side. Instead, it is an optimal implicit instrument rule, using the terminology of Giannoni and Woodford (2003), although obtained under discretion rather than under commitment from a timeless perspective. In the closed-economy case, this rule is independent of the preference for robustness, as in Walsh (200): when  $\alpha = 0$ , no  $\theta_j$  enters equation (3.26). However, in the open economy this is no longer true, as the central bank also fears misspecification in the output equation.

To derive the true policy reaction function in (3.20) we must first solve for the forward-looking variables  $\pi_t$  and  $e_t$  as functions of the underlying shocks. Using the policy trade-off from (3.10) and the evil agent's control  $v_t^\pi$  from (3.15) in the Phillips curve (3.2), we obtain

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} - \kappa A \pi_t + \alpha e_t + \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi} \pi_t + \Sigma_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi, \quad (3.28)$$

and collecting terms we get

$$C \pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \alpha e_t + \Sigma_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi, \quad (3.29)$$

where

$$C \equiv 1 + \kappa A - \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi} > 0. \quad (3.30)$$

Likewise, using the interest rate from (3.26) and the expression for  $v_t^e$  from (3.17) in the UIP condition (3.4) yields

$$(1 + \sigma \gamma) e_t = (1 + \sigma \gamma) E_t e_{t+1} + \sigma A E_t \pi_{t+1} - D \pi_t - \sigma \Sigma_x \varepsilon_t^x + \Sigma_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.31)$$

where

$$D \equiv \sigma B - \frac{\alpha \sigma^{-1} \Sigma_e^2}{(\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) \theta_e} > 0. \quad (3.32)$$

Note that  $B$  is decreasing in the central bank's preference for robustness against output misspecification (increasing in  $\theta_x$ ),  $C$  is decreasing in the preference for inflation robustness, and  $D$  is decreasing in the preference for robustness against both output and exchange rate misspecification.

The reduced form for inflation and the exchange rate is of the form

$$\pi_t = a_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + a_x \varepsilon_t^x + a_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.33)$$

$$e_t = c_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + c_x \varepsilon_t^x + c_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.34)$$

and it is easily shown (see Appendix B) that the reduced-form coefficients are

$$a_\pi = \frac{(1 + \sigma\gamma)\Sigma_\pi}{E} > 0, \quad (3.35)$$

$$a_x = -\frac{\sigma\alpha\Sigma_x}{E} < 0, \quad (3.36)$$

$$a_e = \frac{\alpha\Sigma_e}{E} > 0, \quad (3.37)$$

$$c_\pi = -\frac{D\Sigma_\pi}{E} < 0, \quad (3.38)$$

$$c_x = -\frac{\sigma C\Sigma_x}{E} < 0, \quad (3.39)$$

$$c_e = \frac{C\Sigma_e}{E} > 0, \quad (3.40)$$

where

$$E \equiv (1 + \sigma\gamma)C + \alpha D > 0, \quad (3.41)$$

which is decreasing in the preference for robustness against all three types of specification errors.

Thus, for small degrees of robustness, inflation in the worst-case model is positively related to the inflation and exchange rate disturbances ( $a_\pi, a_e > 0$ ), but negatively related to the output disturbance ( $a_x < 0$ ). For the output gap, the coefficients are of the opposite sign (see equation (3.10)), so output is negatively related to the inflation and exchange rate disturbances, but positively related to the output disturbance. The exchange rate is positively related to the exchange rate disturbance ( $c_e > 0$ ), but negatively related to the inflation and output disturbances ( $c_\pi, c_x < 0$ ).

Equations (3.15)–(3.17) then imply that the central bank's worst possible fears concerning misspecification are given by

$$v_t^\pi = \hat{a}_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + \hat{a}_x \varepsilon_t^x + \hat{a}_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.42)$$

$$v_t^x = \hat{b}_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + \hat{b}_x \varepsilon_t^x + \hat{b}_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.43)$$

$$v_t^e = \hat{c}_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + \hat{c}_x \varepsilon_t^x + \hat{c}_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.44)$$

where

$$\hat{a}_j = \frac{\Sigma}{\pi\theta_\pi a_j}, \quad (3.45)$$

$$\hat{b}_j = -\frac{\alpha\Sigma_x}{(\kappa + \sigma^{-1})\theta_x} a_j, \quad (3.46)$$

$$\hat{c}_j = \frac{\alpha\sigma^{-1}\Sigma_e}{(\kappa + \sigma^{-1})\theta_e} a_j. \quad (3.47)$$

Misspecification in the inflation and exchange rate equations is positively related to inflation and exchange rate disturbances ( $\hat{a}_\pi, \hat{a}_e, \hat{c}_\pi, \hat{c}_e > 0$ ), but negatively related to the output disturbance ( $\hat{a}_x, \hat{c}_x < 0$ ), while misspecification in the output equation is negatively related to inflation and exchange rate disturbances ( $\hat{b}_\pi, \hat{b}_e < 0$ ), but positively related to the output disturbance ( $\hat{b}_x > 0$ ).

### 3.4.2 The policy rule

Using the solution for inflation and the exchange rate in the interest rate equation (3.26), the reduced-form solution for the interest rate is

$$\begin{aligned} i_t &= \sigma B \pi_t + \sigma \gamma e_t + \sigma \Sigma_x \varepsilon_t^x \\ &= d_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + d_x \varepsilon_t^x + d_e \varepsilon_t^e, \end{aligned} \quad (3.48)$$

where

$$d_\pi = \sigma [B a_\pi + \gamma c_\pi] > 0, \quad (3.49)$$

$$d_x = \sigma [B a_x + \gamma c_x + \Sigma_x] > 0, \quad (3.50)$$

$$d_e = \sigma [B a_e + \gamma c_e] > 0. \quad (3.51)$$

Thus, for small amounts of misspecification, monetary policy responds positively to each disturbance: positive realizations of the inflation, output or exchange rate disturbances all make the central bank raise the interest rate. (Again, see Appendix B for details.)

The result that monetary policy is tightened after positive inflation or output disturbances is well-known from the closed-economy version of the model, see, eg, Clarida et al (1999). Here in the open-economy model, policy is tightened also after a positive exchange rate disturbance: An exchange rate depreciation tends to increase domestic inflation, so by tightening policy, the central bank induces an immediate appreciation and an expected depreciation of the exchange rate, which reduces both inflation and output.

### 3.4.3 The approximating model

The solution for the worst-case model derived so far is the reduced form under the worst possible case of misspecification, so the evil agent uses its controls as efficiently as possible, and the policy rule and private agents' expectations reflect this misspecification. However, this is also a very unlikely model. In contrast, the most likely model, or using Hansen and Sargent's (2004) terminology, the 'approximating model', is when the policy rule and agents' expectations reflect the central bank's preference for robustness, but the actual misspecification is zero.

As in the worst-case model, expectations are zero. Thus we find the approximating model by using the optimal robust interest rate rule from

equation (3.48) in the original model (2.2)–(2.4).<sup>11</sup> This yields

$$\pi_t = \kappa x_t + \alpha e_t + \Sigma_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi, \quad (3.52)$$

$$x_t = -\sigma^{-1} i_t + \gamma e_t + \Sigma_x \varepsilon_t^x, \quad (3.53)$$

$$e_t = -i_t + \Sigma_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.54)$$

and the solution is

$$\pi_t = \bar{a}_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + \bar{a}_x \varepsilon_t^x + \bar{a}_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.55)$$

$$x_t = \bar{b}_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + \bar{b}_x \varepsilon_t^x + \bar{b}_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.56)$$

$$e_t = \bar{c}_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + \bar{c}_x \varepsilon_t^x + \bar{c}_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (3.57)$$

where

$$\bar{a}_\pi = \Sigma_\pi - [\alpha + \kappa(\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] d_\pi > 0, \quad (3.58)$$

$$\bar{a}_x = \kappa \Sigma_x - [\alpha + \kappa(\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] d_x < 0, \quad (3.59)$$

$$\bar{a}_e = (\alpha + \kappa\gamma) \Sigma_e - [\alpha + \kappa(\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] d_e > 0, \quad (3.60)$$

$$\bar{b}_\pi = -(\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) d_\pi < 0, \quad (3.61)$$

$$\bar{b}_x = \Sigma_x - (\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) d_x > 0, \quad (3.62)$$

$$\bar{b}_e = \gamma \Sigma_e - (\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) d_e < 0, \quad (3.63)$$

$$\bar{c}_\pi = -d_\pi < 0, \quad (3.64)$$

$$\bar{c}_x = -d_x < 0, \quad (3.65)$$

$$\bar{c}_e = \Sigma_e - d_e > 0. \quad (3.66)$$

Again see Appendix B for details.

In this most likely outcome of the model, a positive realization of the inflation shock makes the central bank tighten policy to counteract the inflationary impulse ( $d_\pi > 0$ ). This reduces the output gap ( $\bar{b}_\pi < 0$ ) and makes the real exchange rate appreciate ( $\bar{c}_\pi < 0$ ) while the net effect on inflation is positive ( $\bar{a}_\pi > 0$ ). After a positive output shock, the central bank also tightens policy ( $d_x > 0$ ), leading to a real appreciation. In a closed economy, the central bank could offset all effects of the output shock on output and inflation, but in an open economy the real exchange rate appreciation reduces inflation, so the central bank will not offset the shock completely (see Walsh, 1999). Thus, output is positively related to the output shock ( $\bar{b}_x > 0$ ), while inflation and the exchange rate are negatively related to the output shock ( $\bar{a}_x, \bar{c}_x < 0$ ). Finally, a positive exchange rate shock tends to increase inflation, so again the central bank tightens policy to offset these effects ( $d_e > 0$ ). This reduces the output gap ( $\bar{b}_e < 0$ ), but the net effects on inflation and the exchange rate are still positive ( $\bar{a}_e, \bar{c}_e > 0$ ).

As we focus on small preferences for robustness (so all  $\theta_j$  are close to infinity), the qualitative results are the same in the worst-case and the approximating models, as well as in the non-robust version of the model. However, the effects of an increased preference for robustness may well differ

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<sup>11</sup>As policy is implemented using the instrument rule (3.48), which is optimal only for the misspecified model, we can no longer use the optimal output–inflation trade-off (3.10) to determine the output gap.



between the worst-case and approximating models, also when  $\theta_j$  is very large. We now turn to analyzing how such an increase in robustness affects the behavior of policy and the economy.

## 4 The effects of robustness

The main focus of our analysis concerns the effects of the central bank's fears of model misspecification on optimal monetary policy and the resulting behavior of the economy. We will thus analyze the effects on the model solution of an increase in the preference for robustness, ie, a decrease in each  $\theta_j$ . For instance, for the coefficient of inflation on the inflation shock, we will evaluate the derivative

$$-\frac{|a_\pi|}{\theta_j}, \quad j = \pi, x, e, \quad (4.1)$$

ie, the marginal effects on the absolute value of the coefficient  $a_\pi$  of a decrease in each  $\theta_j$ .

First, we will see whether inflation, output and the exchange rate in the worst-case model are more or less sensitive to shocks under model misspecification. Second, we will analyze the consequences for the optimal policy behavior, and see whether monetary policy is more or less aggressive under model misspecification. Finally, we will demonstrate how an increased preference for robustness affects the macroeconomy in the approximating model. Some short proofs are presented here, while more extensive proofs are relegated to Appendix C.

### 4.1 The worst-case model of inflation and output

We begin by analyzing the effects of increased model misspecification (ie, an increased preference for robustness) on the worst-case model of inflation and output.

**Proposition 4.1** (*Worst-case inflation and output*)

*In the worst-case model, an increased preference for robustness against misspecification in any equation increases the response of inflation and output to all shocks.*

**Proof.** See Appendix C.1. ■

Intuitively, with an increased preference for robustness, the central bank fears that inflation and output are more sensitive to shocks, and therefore more volatile. As we do not allow for shock persistence, the central bank fears only that shocks have a larger impact on inflation and output, not that they are more persistent (as in Giordani and Söderlind, 2004).

## 4.2 The exchange rate and monetary policy

The effects of model misspecification on the exchange rate in the worst-case model are intimately related to the effects on monetary policy. We therefore discuss these in parallel.

First, as misspecification in the Phillips curve increases, the central bank will fear that inflation is more responsive to shocks. Therefore, after a positive shock to inflation, the central bank will tighten policy more, leading to a larger exchange rate appreciation in the worst-case model. After a positive exchange rate shock, the central bank again fears that the effects on inflation will be larger, and tightens policy more, leading to a smaller depreciation of the exchange rate. After a positive demand shock, the central bank fears that its policy response will lead to a larger fall in inflation. Therefore, the central bank tightens policy less than if there were no inflation misspecification, leading to a smaller exchange rate appreciation in the worst-case model.

If the central bank is more uncertain about the determination of output, it fears that shocks have a larger effect on the output gap. A positive inflation shock then leads it to tighten policy less, implying a smaller exchange rate appreciation. After a positive output shock the central bank fears that output will increase further, so the interest rate is increased more, and the exchange rate depreciates by more than when there is no output misspecification. A positive exchange rate shock leads the central bank to tighten policy to reduce the output gap and inflation and offset the exchange rate depreciation. If output is more uncertain, however, the central bank will tighten policy less, leading to a larger depreciation in the worst-case model.

Finally, if the central bank worries about misspecification in the exchange rate equation, it fears that the exchange rate is very sensitive to shocks. Therefore, after a positive inflation or exchange rate shock, it will tighten policy more. In the worst-case model, this leads to a smaller exchange rate appreciation after an inflation shock and a larger depreciation after an exchange rate shock. After a positive output shock, on the other hand, the central bank will not tighten policy as much to avoid large effects on the exchange rate. In the worst-case model, the net effect is a larger exchange rate appreciation.

These results can be summarized as follows.

**Proposition 4.2 (*Worst-case exchange rate under inflation misspecification*)**

*In the worst-case model, a larger preference for robustness against inflation misspecification makes the exchange rate more sensitive to inflation shocks, but less sensitive to output and exchange rate shocks.*

**Proof.** See Appendix C.2. ■

**Proposition 4.3 (*Worst-case exchange rate under output/exchange rate misspecification*)**

*In the worst-case model, a larger preference for robustness against output or exchange rate misspecification makes the exchange rate more sensitive to output and exchange rate shock, but less sensitive to inflation shocks.*

**Proof.** See Appendix C.2. ■

**Proposition 4.4** (*Monetary policy under inflation/exchange rate misspecification*)

*A larger preference for robustness against inflation or exchange rate misspecification makes monetary policy respond more aggressively to inflation and exchange rate shocks, but less aggressively to output shocks.*

**Proof.** See Appendix C.3. ■

**Proposition 4.5** (*Monetary policy under output misspecification*)

*A larger preference for robustness against output misspecification makes monetary policy respond more aggressively to output shocks, but less aggressively to inflation and exchange rate shocks.*

**Proof.** See Appendix C.3. ■

In general, we see that there is an ambiguous effect of increased misspecification (an increased preference for robustness) on the optimal monetary policy rule. Depending on the type of shock or the source of misspecification, an increased preference for robustness can make policy more or less aggressive in response to shocks.

### 4.3 The approximating model

Finally, we analyze the effects on the most likely development of the macroeconomy when there is an increase in the central bank's preference for robustness. As there is no misspecification in the approximating model, the effects of increased robustness come exclusively from the robust policy.

**Proposition 4.6** (*Approximating inflation and output*)

*In the approximating model, an increased preference for robustness against inflation or exchange rate misspecification makes inflation less sensitive and output more sensitive to all shocks, but increased robustness against output misspecification has the opposite effect.*

**Proof.** The inflation coefficients on the inflation and exchange rate shocks are both positive, so increased robustness has opposite effects on those coefficients relative to the coefficients in the policy rule, see equations (3.58) and (3.60). The inflation coefficient on the output shock is negative, so the effects on this coefficient are of the same sign as on the coefficient in the policy rule, see equation (3.59). The effects on the output coefficients will allways be of the opposite sign relative to the inflation coefficients, see equations (3.61)–(3.63). ■

**Proposition 4.7 (*Approximating exchange rate*)**

*In the approximating model, increased robustness against inflation or exchange rate misspecification makes the exchange rate more sensitive to inflation shocks, but less sensitive to output and exchange rate shocks. Increased robustness against output misspecification has the opposite effect.*

**Proof.** The effects on the exchange rate coefficients on the inflation and output shocks will be of the same sign as on the inflation and output coefficients in the policy rule, see equations (3.64) and (3.65). The effects on the coefficients on the exchange rate shock will be of the opposite sign relative to the exchange rate coefficient in the policy rule, see equation (3.66) ■

Thus, if the central bank fears misspecification in the inflation and exchange rate equations, it will respond more aggressively to inflation and exchange rate shocks, but less to output shocks. This makes inflation respond less and output more to all shocks. Essentially, the central bank acts as if it attached a larger weight to stabilizing inflation relative to output. The exchange rate, on the other hand, responds more to inflation shocks, but less to output and exchange rate shocks.

If instead the central bank fears misspecification in the output equation, the effects go in the opposite direction. The central bank responds more aggressively to output shocks, but less to inflation and exchange rate shocks, which makes inflation respond more and output less to all shocks, while the exchange rate responds less to inflation shocks but more to output and exchange rate shocks.

#### 4.4 Summary

Table 1 summarizes the effects of increased robustness on the reduced-form coefficients. The third column shows the sign of each coefficient, and the next three columns show the effects of an increase the preference for robustness (so a decrease in the  $\theta$ 's) on the absolute values of the reduced-form coefficients. Thus, a positive sign implies that the variable in question is more sensitive to that particular shock when robustness increases, and vice versa.

We see that robustness against exchange rate misspecification has qualitatively very similar effects as robustness against inflation misspecification. The only exception regards the effects on the exchange rate in the worst-case model. On the other hand, robustness against output misspecification always has the opposite effects on policy and the approximating model relative to inflation and exchange rate misspecification.

From Table 1 it is again clear that the effects of robustness on monetary policy are ambiguous: A robust policymaker may respond more or less aggressively to shocks than a non-robust policymaker, depending on both the shock and the source of misspecification.

Table 1: Effects of increased robustness on reduced-form coefficients

Equation	Coefficient on	Sign	Source of misspecification		
			Inflation ( $\theta_\pi$ )	Output ( $\theta_x$ )	Exchange rate ( $\theta_e$ )
<i>Worst-case model</i>					
Inflation ( $\pi_t$ )	Inflation ( $a_\pi$ )	+	+	+	+
	Output ( $a_x$ )	-	+	+	+
	Exchange rate ( $a_e$ )	+	+	+	+
Output ( $x_t$ )	Inflation ( $b_\pi$ )	-	+	+	+
	Output ( $b_x$ )	+	+	+	+
	Exchange rate ( $b_e$ )	-	+	+	+
Exchange rate ( $e_t$ )	Inflation ( $c_\pi$ )	-	+	-	-
	Output ( $c_x$ )	-	-	+	+
	Exchange rate ( $c_e$ )	+	-	+	+
<i>Policy rule</i>					
Interest rate ( $i_t$ )	Inflation ( $d_\pi$ )	+	+	-	+
	Output ( $d_x$ )	+	-	+	-
	Exchange rate ( $d_e$ )	+	+	-	+
<i>Approximating model</i>					
Inflation ( $\pi_t$ )	Inflation ( $\bar{a}_\pi$ )	+	-	+	-
	Output ( $\bar{a}_x$ )	-	-	+	-
	Exchange rate ( $\bar{a}_e$ )	+	-	+	-
Output ( $x_t$ )	Inflation ( $\bar{b}_\pi$ )	-	+	-	+
	Output ( $\bar{b}_x$ )	+	+	-	+
	Exchange rate ( $\bar{b}_e$ )	-	+	-	+
Exchange rate ( $e_t$ )	Inflation ( $\bar{c}_\pi$ )	-	+	-	+
	Output ( $\bar{c}_x$ )	-	-	+	-
	Exchange rate ( $\bar{c}_e$ )	+	-	+	-

Note: For each coefficient in the reduced-form model, Column 3 shows the sign of the coefficient, and Columns 4–6 show the effects of an increased central bank preference for robustness on the absolute value of the coefficient. Thus, +/- implies that increased robustness makes the variable in question more/less sensitive to that particular shock.

## 5 A numerical example

To obtain a feeling for the quantitative effects of an increased preference for robustness, this section presents a simple numerical example. Of course, as the model is highly stylized, all quantitative results need to be interpreted with care. Nevertheless, this example will illustrate the relative importance of the different types of misspecification on the model coefficients.

To parameterize the model, we take values for the structural parameters from Galí and Monacelli (2004):  $\hat{\sigma} = \delta = 1$ ,  $\eta = 3$ ,  $\theta = 0.75$ ,  $\beta = 0.99$ , and  $\omega = 0.4$ . This implies that the coefficients in the model (2.2)–(2.4) are given by  $\kappa = 0.343$ ,  $\alpha = 0.0343$ ,  $\sigma = 1.667$ , and  $\gamma = 0.4$ . Finally, we set the relative weight on output stabilization in the central bank’s loss function to  $\lambda = 0.25$ , and the shock variances  $\Sigma_j$  are all set to unity.<sup>12</sup>

We then investigate how an increased preference for robustness against one source of misspecification (ie, a decrease in each  $\theta_j$ , keeping the other  $\theta$ ’s fixed at a large value) affects the parameters in the central bank’s worst-case model, the policy rule and the approximating model. The results are reported in Figures 1–7. It is immediately clear that an increased preference for robustness (moving from right to left in each panel) has different quantitative effects on the coefficients in the worst-case and approximating models as well as in the policy rule. In general, there are large effects of all sorts of misspecification fears on the coefficient on inflation shocks in all equations, both in the worst-case model, the approximating model and in the policy rule, while the effects are substantially smaller for most other coefficients. This reflects the fact that inflation shocks pose the most difficult trade-off for the central bank, as there are no direct effects of monetary policy on inflation, only through the output gap and the exchange rate.

We also note that for very small values of  $\theta_x$  and  $\theta_e$ , some coefficients reverse sign. For instance, when  $\theta_x$  falls below 0.03 the central bank fears that inflation shocks have a positive impact on the exchange rate (see Figure 3b), leading it to reduce the interest rate after positive inflation shocks (Figure 4b). In practical applications, such cases could possibly be excluded using ‘detection probabilities’ to determine the relevant preference for robustness. However, as the present model is much too stylized to bring to the data, such applications are beyond the scope of this paper.

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<sup>12</sup>In the objective function derived as a second-order approximation to utility, Galí and Monacelli (2004) show that  $\lambda = (1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)(1 + \eta)/(\epsilon\theta)$ , where  $\epsilon$  is the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated domestic goods. Using their value of  $\epsilon = 6$ , this implies that  $\lambda = 0.0572$ . We use a slightly larger (and possibly more realistic) value for  $\lambda$ . However, the qualitative results are not sensitive to the value of  $\lambda$ .

## 6 Concluding remarks

Using a simple model of a small open economy we have analyzed how optimal monetary policy and the behavior of the economy are affected by the central bank's desire to be robust against model misspecification. Our simple model enables us to solve analytically for the optimal robust policy, as well as the central bank's worst-case model and the most likely approximating model. Our framework also allows us to analyze cases when the policymaker is more confident about some equations in the model than others. It thus restricts the evil agent to introduce misspecification where it will hurt the most, but forces it to consider misspecification in equations that are perceived to be particularly prone to specification errors.

Our analysis shows that an increase in the central bank's preference for robustness has ambiguous effects on the optimal policy behavior, depending not only on the shock to which the central bank responds, but also on what part of the model the central bank perceives as most uncertain. Although our model is highly stylized, we believe this ambiguity to carry over also to more elaborate models. In numerical applications the effects of increased misspecification will therefore depend crucially on the calibration of the parameters that determine the central bank's relative faith in the different model equations.

In a companion paper (Leitemo and Söderström, 2004) we focus on the optimal robust policy in the closed-economy version of our model. There, the results are unambiguous: the robust policy always responds more aggressively to shocks than the non-robust policy, confirming the results of previous research. As a consequence, inflation is less volatile and output is more volatile under the robust policy. The present paper shows that the effects of robustness in the open economy are more complex. This is because the open economy presents more complicated trade-offs for the central bank, at least when we allow for shocks to the exchange rate.

Key parameters in our approach are the different preferences for robustness relating to the different equations in the model. We envision that future research can use Bayesian techniques in distributing the budgets of misspecification among the model equations based on the probability that each equation is a good representation of true economies. This would be a step towards integrating Bayesian and Knightian uncertainty into a single unifying analysis of model uncertainty.

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# Appendix A

## Model appendix

This Appendix briefly derives our open-economy model from microfoundations. For more details, see Galí and Monacelli (2004), Clarida et al (2002), or Walsh (2003, Ch. 6.5), who provides a textbook treatment. We deviate from these authors by introducing a time-varying premium on foreign exchange, in order to analyze uncertainty about exchange rate determination.

### A.1 Domestic households

Households in the home country consume a CES composite of domestic goods ( $C_t^d$ ) and imported foreign goods ( $C_t^m$ ), defined as

$$C_t = [(1 - \omega)^{1/\delta} (C_t^d)^{(\delta-1)/\delta} + \omega^{1/\delta} (C_t^m)^{(\delta-1)/\delta}]^{\delta/(\delta-1)}, \quad (6.1)$$

where  $\omega$  is the share of foreign goods in consumption and  $\delta$  is the elasticity of substitution across domestic and foreign goods. Households obtain utility from consumption and disutility from supplying labor ( $N_t$ ) according to

$$U(C_t, N_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\hat{\sigma}}}{1-\hat{\sigma}} - \frac{N_t^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta}, \quad (6.2)$$

where  $\hat{\sigma}$  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and  $\eta$  is the elasticity of labor supply.

The household chooses paths of consumption, labor supply, and holdings of one-period domestic bonds, which pay the nominal interest rate  $i_t$  and foreign bonds, which pay the risk-adjusted interest rate  $\exp(\phi_t)i_t^f$ , where  $\phi_t$  is a time-varying premium on foreign bond holdings. Intertemporal optimization then gives the log-linearized consumption Euler condition

$$c_t = E_t c_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}} [i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}^c], \quad (6.3)$$

where  $\beta$  is the household's discount factor and  $\pi_t^c$  is the consumer price inflation rate, defined as  $\pi_t^c \equiv p_t^c - p_{t-1}^c$ , where the CPI is given by

$$p_t^c = (1 - \omega)p_t + \omega p_t^m, \quad (6.4)$$

where  $p_t$  and  $p_t^m$  are the price levels for domestic and imported goods.

Optimal allocation across domestic and foreign bond holdings gives the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition

$$i_t = i_t^f + E_t \Delta s_{t+1} + \phi_t, \quad (6.5)$$

where  $s_t$  is the nominal exchange rate, and  $\phi_t$  is the premium on foreign exchange. The optimal labor-leisure choice implies that

$$\eta n_t + \hat{\sigma} c_t = w_t - p_t^c. \quad (6.6)$$

where  $w_t$  is the nominal wage. Finally, relative demand for domestic and imported goods satisfies

$$c_t^d - c_t^m = -\delta [p_t - p_t^m]. \quad (6.7)$$

We define the real exchange rate in terms of the domestic price level as

$$e_t = s_t + p_t^f - p_t, \quad (6.8)$$

which, assuming that the law of one price holds, is equal to the terms of trade  $p_t^m - p_t$ . Then we can express the UIP condition (6.5) in real terms as

$$i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} = i_t^f - E_t \pi_{t+1}^f + E_t \Delta e_{t+1} + \phi_t. \quad (6.9)$$

We can then also write the CPI in (6.4) as

$$p_t^c = p_t + \omega e_t, \quad (6.10)$$

the CPI inflation rate as

$$\pi_t^c = \pi_t + \omega \Delta e_t, \quad (6.11)$$

and the labor supply condition in (6.6) as

$$\eta n_t + \hat{\sigma} c_t = w_t - p_t - \omega e_t. \quad (6.12)$$

Log-linearizing the consumption index (6.1), we get

$$c_t = (1 - \omega) c_t^d + \omega c_t^m, \quad (6.13)$$

and combining with (6.7) and (6.8) to eliminate  $c_t^m$  gives

$$c_t = c_t^d - \omega \delta e_t. \quad (6.14)$$

## A.2 Domestic firms

Domestic firms act under monopolistic competition and produce a differentiated good using only labor inputs according to the production function

$$Y_t = \exp(a_t) N_t, \quad (6.15)$$

where  $a_t$  is a productivity disturbance.

Firms face a constant elasticity demand curve for its output, and also face sticky prices, following Calvo (1983), so in each period there is a fixed probability  $1 - \theta$  that the firm will be able to change its price. When prices can be adjusted, firms maximize the expected discounted value of profits. This implies that inflation in the domestic sector follows the New-Keynesian Phillips curve

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \hat{\kappa} v_t, \quad (6.16)$$

where  $\hat{\kappa} \equiv (1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)/\theta$  and  $v_t$  is real marginal cost, given by

$$v_t = w_t - p_t - a_t, \quad (6.17)$$

and where  $w_t - p_t$  is the real product wage, which is deflated by the domestic price level.

### A.3 The foreign country

Foreign demand for domestic goods is given by

$$c_t^{df} = y_t^f + \delta e_t, \quad (6.18)$$

where  $y_t^f$  is foreign income (or output), which satisfies the Euler condition

$$y_t^f = E_t y_{t+1}^f - \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma}} \left[ i_t^f - E_t \pi_{t+1}^f \right]. \quad (6.19)$$

### A.4 Equilibrium

Equilibrium requires that production equal consumption, so the production of domestic goods satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} y_t &= (1 - \omega)c_t^d + \omega c_t^{df} \\ &= (1 - \omega)c_t + (2 - \omega)\omega\delta e_t + \omega y_t^f, \end{aligned} \quad (6.20)$$

using (6.14) and (6.18), and combining with the consumption Euler equation (6.3) we obtain

$$y_t = E_t y_{t+1} - \frac{1 - \omega}{\hat{\sigma}} \left[ i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}^c \right] - (2 - \omega)\omega\delta E_t \Delta e_{t+1} - \omega E_t \Delta y_{t+1}^f. \quad (6.21)$$

Denoting by  $\bar{z}$  the flexible-price level of the variable  $z$ , the flexible-price equilibrium is characterized by the goods market equilibrium condition

$$\bar{y}_t = \bar{c}_t, \quad (6.22)$$

the labor market equilibrium condition

$$a_t = (\hat{\sigma} + \eta)\bar{y}_t - \eta a_t + \omega \bar{e}_t, \quad (6.23)$$

where we have combined equations (6.12), (6.17), the log-linearized production function  $y_t = a_t + n_t$ , and (6.22). Assuming that the foreign exchange premium is zero in the flexible-price equilibrium, the real UIP condition (6.9), the Euler equation (6.21), and the foreign Euler equation (6.19) imply that the real interest rate satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} &= i_t^f - E_t \pi_{t+1}^f + E_t \Delta \bar{e}_{t+1} \\ &= \frac{\hat{\sigma}}{1 - \omega} E_t \Delta \bar{y}_{t+1} - \frac{(2 - \omega)\omega\delta\hat{\sigma}}{1 - \omega} E_t \Delta e_{t+1} - \frac{\omega}{1 - \omega} \left[ i_t^f - E_t \pi_{t+1}^f \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (6.24)$$

Assuming that all disturbances are white noise, all expectations of future variables are zero, so (6.24) gives

$$\bar{e}_t = \Psi \left[ \bar{y}_t - y_t^f \right], \quad (6.25)$$

where

$$\Psi \equiv \frac{\hat{\sigma}}{1 - \omega + (2 - \omega)\omega\delta\hat{\sigma}}, \quad (6.26)$$

and the labor-market equilibrium condition (6.23) then implies that

$$\bar{y}_t = \frac{1}{\hat{\sigma} + \eta + \omega\Psi} \left[ (1 + \eta)a_t - \omega\Psi y_t^f \right]. \quad (6.27)$$

## A.5 The final steps

Combining the expression for marginal cost in (6.17), the labor supply condition (6.12), and using  $c_t = y_t = a_t + n_t$  we can express real marginal cost as

$$\begin{aligned} v_t &= \eta n_t + \hat{\sigma}c_t + \omega e_t - a_t \\ &= (\hat{\sigma} + \eta)y_t - \eta a_t + \omega e_t - a_t, \end{aligned} \quad (6.28)$$

and in the flexible-price equilibrium, the marginal product of labor satisfies

$$a_t = (\hat{\sigma} + \eta)\bar{y}_t - \eta a_t + \omega\bar{e}_t, \quad (6.29)$$

so

$$v_t = (\hat{\sigma} + \eta)x_t + \omega[e_t - \bar{e}_t], \quad (6.30)$$

where  $x_t$  is the output gap, defined as

$$x_t \equiv y_t - \bar{y}_t, \quad (6.31)$$

and where the flexible-price level of the real exchange rate is, combining (6.25) and (6.27)

$$\bar{e}_t = \frac{(1 + \eta)\Psi}{\hat{\sigma} + \eta + \omega\Psi} a_t - \left[ \Psi + \frac{\omega\Psi}{\hat{\sigma} + \eta + \omega\Psi} \right] y_t^f.$$

This implies that we can write the Phillips curve (6.16) as

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \hat{\kappa}(\hat{\sigma} + \eta)x_t + \hat{\kappa}\omega e_t - \hat{\kappa}\omega\bar{e}_t, \quad (6.32)$$

and the Euler equation (6.21) can be written as

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= E_t x_{t+1} - \frac{1 - \omega}{\hat{\sigma}} \left[ i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}^c \right] - (2 - \omega)\omega\delta E_t \Delta e_{t+1} \\ &\quad + E_t \Delta \bar{y}_{t+1} - \omega E_t \Delta y_{t+1}^f \\ &= E_t x_{t+1} - \frac{1 - \omega}{\hat{\sigma}} \left[ i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} \right] - \left[ (2 - \omega)\omega\delta - \frac{\omega(1 - \omega)}{\hat{\sigma}} \right] E_t \Delta e_{t+1} \\ &\quad + E_t \Delta \bar{y}_{t+1} - \omega E_t \Delta y_{t+1}^f. \end{aligned} \quad (6.33)$$

Finally, setting all foreign variables to zero, equations (6.32), (6.33) and (6.9) give a complete description of the small open economy:

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa x_t + \alpha e_t + \Sigma_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi, \quad (6.34)$$

$$x_t = E_t x_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} [i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}] - \gamma [E_t e_{t+1} - e_t] + \Sigma_x \varepsilon_t^x, \quad (6.35)$$

$$e_t = E_t e_{t+1} - [i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1}] + \Sigma_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (6.36)$$

where

$$\kappa \equiv \frac{(\hat{\sigma} + \eta)(1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)}{\theta}, \quad (6.37)$$

$$\alpha \equiv \frac{\omega(1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)}{\theta}, \quad (6.38)$$

$$\sigma \equiv \frac{\hat{\sigma}}{1 - \omega}, \quad (6.39)$$

$$\gamma \equiv (2 - \omega)\omega\delta - \frac{\omega(1 - \omega)}{\hat{\sigma}}, \quad (6.40)$$

$$\varepsilon_t^\pi \equiv -\frac{(1 - \theta)(1 - \beta\theta)(1 + \eta)\omega\Psi}{(\hat{\sigma} + \eta + \omega\Psi)\theta\Sigma_\pi} a_t, \quad (6.41)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_t^x &\equiv \frac{1}{\Sigma_x} {}_t[\bar{y}_{t+1} - \bar{y}_t] \\ &= \frac{1 + \eta}{(\hat{\sigma} + \eta + \omega\Psi)\Sigma_x} [{}_t a_{t+1} - a_t], \end{aligned} \quad (6.42)$$

$$\varepsilon_t^e \equiv \frac{1}{\Sigma_e} \phi_t. \quad (6.43)$$

## Appendix B

### The reduced form

First, it is useful to define

$$\Theta_j^{-1} \equiv \frac{\Sigma_j}{(\gamma + \sigma^{-1})\theta_j} > 0, \quad (6.44)$$

for  $j = \pi, x, e$ , and we note that  $\lim_{\theta_j \rightarrow \infty} \Theta_j^{-1} = 0$ .

#### B.1 The worst-case model

To find the reduced form for inflation and the exchange rate in the worst-case model, first write equations (3.29) and (3.31) as

$$\pi_t = a_1 E_t \pi_{t+1} + a_2 e_t + a_3 \varepsilon_t^\pi, \quad (6.45)$$

$$e_t = E_t e_{t+1} + c_1 E_t \pi_{t+1} + c_2 \pi_t + c_3 \varepsilon_t^x + c_4 \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (6.46)$$

where

$$a_1 \equiv \frac{\beta}{C}, \quad (6.47)$$

$$a_2 \equiv \frac{\alpha}{C}, \quad (6.48)$$

$$a_3 \equiv \frac{\Sigma}{\pi} C, \quad (6.49)$$

$$c_1 \equiv \frac{\sigma A}{1 + \sigma\gamma}, \quad (6.50)$$

$$c_2 \equiv -\frac{D}{1 + \sigma\gamma}, \quad (6.51)$$

$$c_3 \equiv -\frac{\sigma \Sigma_x}{1 + \sigma\gamma}, \quad (6.52)$$

$$c_4 \equiv \frac{\Sigma}{e} 1 + \sigma\gamma, \quad (6.53)$$

and we seek a solution of the form

$$\pi_t = a_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + a_x \varepsilon_t^x + a_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (6.54)$$

$$e_t = c_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + c_x \varepsilon_t^x + c_e \varepsilon_t^e, \quad (6.55)$$

where the  $a_j, c_j$  coefficients remain to be determined.

Setting expectations to zero and combining (6.45)–(6.46) with (6.54)–(6.55) we obtain

$$a_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + a_x \varepsilon_t^x + a_e \varepsilon_t^e = a_2 [c_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + c_x \varepsilon_t^x + c_e \varepsilon_t^e] + a_3 \varepsilon_t^\pi, \quad (6.56)$$

$$c_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + c_x \varepsilon_t^x + c_e \varepsilon_t^e = c_2 [a_\pi \varepsilon_t^\pi + a_x \varepsilon_t^x + a_e \varepsilon_t^e] + c_3 \varepsilon_t^x + c_4 \varepsilon_t^e. \quad (6.57)$$

Thus, the coefficients satisfy

$$a_\pi = a_2 c_\pi + a_3, \quad (6.58)$$

$$a_x = a_2 c_x, \quad (6.59)$$

$$a_e = a_2 c_e, \quad (6.60)$$

$$c_\pi = c_2 a_\pi, \quad (6.61)$$

$$c_x = c_2 a_x + c_3, \quad (6.62)$$

$$c_e = c_2 a_e + c_4, \quad (6.63)$$

and the solution of this system is

$$\begin{aligned} a_\pi &= a_2 c_2 a_\pi + a_3 \\ &= \frac{a_3}{1 - a_2 c_2}, \end{aligned} \quad (6.64)$$

$$c_\pi = \frac{a_3 c_2}{1 - a_2 c_2}, \quad (6.65)$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_x &= c_2 a_2 c_x + c_3 \\ &= \frac{c_3}{1 - a_2 c_2}, \end{aligned} \quad (6.66)$$

$$a_x = \frac{a_2 c_3}{1 - a_2 c_2}, \quad (6.67)$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_e &= c_2 a_2 c_e + c_4 \\ &= \frac{c_4}{1 - a_2 c_2}, \end{aligned} \quad (6.68)$$

$$a_e = \frac{a_2 c_4}{1 - a_2 c_2}. \quad (6.69)$$

The reduced-form coefficients are then given by

$$a_\pi = \frac{a_3}{1 - a_2 c_2} = \frac{(1 + \sigma\gamma)\Sigma_\pi}{E} > 0, \quad (6.70)$$

$$a_x = \frac{a_2 c_3}{1 - a_2 c_2} = -\frac{\sigma\alpha\Sigma_x}{E} < 0, \quad (6.71)$$

$$a_e = \frac{a_2 c_4}{1 - a_2 c_2} = \frac{\alpha\Sigma_e}{E} > 0, \quad (6.72)$$

$$c_\pi = \frac{a_3 c_2}{1 - a_2 c_2} = -\frac{D\Sigma_\pi}{E} < 0, \quad (6.73)$$

$$c_x = \frac{c_3}{1 - a_2 c_2} = -\frac{\sigma C\Sigma_x}{E} < 0, \quad (6.74)$$

$$c_e = \frac{c_4}{1 - a_2 c_2} = \frac{C\Sigma_e}{E} > 0, \quad (6.75)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} E &\equiv (1 - a_2 c_2)(1 + \sigma\gamma)C \\ &= (1 + \sigma\gamma)C + \alpha D > 0. \end{aligned} \quad (6.76)$$

Note that we evaluate the signs of all coefficients for an infinitesimal preference for robustness, so  $\theta_j \rightarrow \infty$ .



We also note that

$$a_x = -\frac{\sigma\alpha\Sigma_x}{(1+\sigma\gamma)\Sigma_\pi}a_\pi, \quad (6.77)$$

$$a_e = \frac{\alpha\Sigma_e}{(1+\sigma\gamma)\Sigma_\pi}a_\pi, \quad (6.78)$$

$$c_\pi = -\frac{D}{1+\sigma\gamma}a_\pi, \quad (6.79)$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_x &= \frac{C}{\alpha}a_x \\ &= -\frac{\sigma C\Sigma_x}{(1+\sigma\gamma)\Sigma_\pi}a_\pi, \end{aligned} \quad (6.80)$$

$$\begin{aligned} c_e &= \frac{C}{\alpha}a_e \\ &= \frac{C\Sigma_e}{(1+\sigma\gamma)\Sigma_\pi}a_\pi. \end{aligned} \quad (6.81)$$

## B.2 The policy rule

Using the interest rate equation (3.26), the reduced form for the interest rate is

$$\begin{aligned} i_t &= \sigma B\pi_t + \sigma\gamma e_t + \sigma\Sigma_x\varepsilon_t^x, \\ &= \sigma B[a_\pi\varepsilon_t^\pi + a_x\varepsilon_t^x + a_e\varepsilon_t^e] + \sigma\gamma[c_\pi\varepsilon_t^\pi + c_x\varepsilon_t^x + c_e\varepsilon_t^e] + \sigma\Sigma_x\varepsilon_t^x, \\ &= d_\pi\varepsilon_t^\pi + d_x\varepsilon_t^x + d_e\varepsilon_t^e, \end{aligned} \quad (6.82)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} d_\pi &= \sigma[Ba_\pi + \gamma c_\pi] \\ &= \sigma\left[B - \frac{\gamma D}{1+\sigma\gamma}\right]a_\pi \\ &= [\sigma B + \alpha\gamma\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1}]\frac{\Sigma_\pi}{E} > 0, \end{aligned} \quad (6.83)$$

$$\begin{aligned} d_x &= \sigma[Ba_x + \gamma c_x + \Sigma_x] \\ &= \sigma\left[\Sigma_x - (\alpha B + \gamma C)\frac{\sigma\Sigma_x}{E}\right] \\ &= \sigma[E - \alpha\sigma B - \sigma\gamma C]\frac{\Sigma_x}{E} > 0, \end{aligned} \quad (6.84)$$

$$\begin{aligned} d_e &= \sigma[Ba_e + \gamma c_e] \\ &= \sigma\left[B + \frac{\gamma C}{\alpha}\right]a_e \\ &= [\alpha B + \gamma C]\frac{\sigma\Sigma_e}{E} > 0, \end{aligned} \quad (6.85)$$

where we note that

$$\begin{aligned}
& E - \alpha\sigma B - \sigma\gamma C \\
&= (1 + \sigma\gamma)C + \alpha D - \alpha\sigma B - \sigma\gamma C \\
&= C + \alpha(D - \sigma B) \\
&= C - \sigma^{-1}\alpha^2\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1} > 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{6.86}$$

using (3.32) and (3.41).

### B.3 The approximating model

To find the solution for the approximating model, use the policy rule (6.82)–(6.85) in the equations for inflation, output and the exchange rate, setting all expectations to zero:

$$i_t = d_\pi\varepsilon_t^\pi + d_x\varepsilon_t^x + d_e\varepsilon_t^e, \tag{6.87}$$

$$\pi_t = \kappa x_t + \alpha e_t + \Sigma_\pi\varepsilon_t^\pi, \tag{6.88}$$

$$x_t = -\sigma^{-1}i_t + \gamma e_t + \Sigma_x\varepsilon_t^x, \tag{6.89}$$

$$e_t = -i_t + \Sigma_e\varepsilon_t^e. \tag{6.90}$$

The solution is

$$\pi_t = \bar{a}_\pi\varepsilon_t^\pi + \bar{a}_x\varepsilon_t^x + \bar{a}_e\varepsilon_t^e, \tag{6.91}$$

$$x_t = \bar{b}_\pi\varepsilon_t^\pi + \bar{b}_x\varepsilon_t^x + \bar{b}_e\varepsilon_t^e, \tag{6.92}$$

$$e_t = \bar{c}_\pi\varepsilon_t^\pi + \bar{c}_x\varepsilon_t^x + \bar{c}_e\varepsilon_t^e, \tag{6.93}$$

where

$$\bar{c}_\pi = -d_\pi < 0, \tag{6.94}$$

$$\bar{c}_x = -d_x < 0, \tag{6.95}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{c}_e &= \Sigma_e - d_e \\
&= \Sigma_e - [\alpha B + \gamma C] \frac{\sigma\Sigma_e}{E} \\
&= [E - \alpha\sigma B - \sigma\gamma C] \frac{\Sigma_e}{E} > 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{6.96}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{b}_\pi &= \gamma\bar{c}_\pi - \sigma^{-1}d_\pi \\
&= -(\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) [\sigma B + \alpha\gamma\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\Sigma_\pi}{\pi} E < 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{6.97}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{b}_x &= \Sigma_x + \gamma\bar{c}_x - \sigma^{-1}d_x \\
&= \Sigma_x - \sigma(\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) [E - \alpha\sigma B - \sigma\gamma C] \frac{\Sigma_x}{E} \\
&= \{(1 + \sigma\gamma)C + \alpha D - \sigma(\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) [C - \sigma^{-1}\alpha^2\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1}]\} \frac{\Sigma_x}{E} \\
&= [\alpha D + (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})\alpha^2\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\Sigma_x}{E} > 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{6.98}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{b}_e &= \gamma \bar{c}_e - \sigma^{-1} d_e \\
&= \gamma \Sigma_e - (\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) [\alpha B + \gamma C] \frac{\sigma \Sigma_e}{E} \\
&= \{ \gamma E - \sigma (\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) [\alpha B + \gamma C] \} \frac{\Sigma_e}{E} \\
&= \{ \gamma [C - \sigma^{-1} \alpha^2 \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] - [\alpha B + \gamma C] \} \frac{\Sigma_e}{E} \\
&= - [\alpha B + \gamma \sigma^{-1} \alpha^2 \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\Sigma_e}{E} < 0, \tag{6.99}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{a}_\pi &= \Sigma_\pi + \kappa \bar{b}_\pi + \alpha \bar{c}_\pi \\
&= \Sigma_\pi - [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] [\sigma B + \alpha \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\Sigma}{\pi} E \\
&= \{ E - [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] [\sigma B + \alpha \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \} \frac{\Sigma}{\pi} E \\
&= \{ (1 + \sigma \gamma) C + \alpha [\sigma B - \sigma^{-1} \alpha \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \\
&\quad - [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] [\sigma B + \alpha \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \} \frac{\Sigma}{\pi} E \\
&\quad - [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] \alpha \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1} \} \frac{\Sigma}{\pi} E \\
&= \{ (1 + \sigma \gamma) \left[ 1 + \kappa A - \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi} \right] - \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) \sigma [A - \alpha \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1}] \\
&\quad - \sigma^{-1} \alpha^2 \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1} - [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] \alpha \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1} \} \frac{\Sigma}{\pi} E \\
&= \{ (1 + \sigma \gamma) \left[ 1 - \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi} \right] + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1}) \alpha \sigma \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1} - \sigma^{-1} \alpha^2 \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1} \\
&\quad - [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] \alpha \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1} \} \frac{\Sigma}{\pi} E > 0, \tag{6.100}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{a}_x &= \kappa \bar{b}_x + \alpha \bar{c}_x \\
&= \{ \kappa E - [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] \sigma [E - \alpha \sigma B - \sigma \gamma C] \} \frac{\Sigma_x}{E} \\
&= \{ \kappa [(1 + \sigma \gamma) C + \alpha D] - [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] \sigma [C - \sigma^{-1} \alpha^2 \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \} \frac{\Sigma_x}{E} \\
&= \{ \alpha [\kappa D - \sigma C] + [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] \alpha^2 \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1} \} \frac{\Sigma_x}{E} \\
&= \{ \alpha \left[ \kappa (\sigma A - \alpha \sigma \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1} - \sigma^{-1} \alpha \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}) - \sigma \left( 1 + \kappa A - \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi} \right) \right] \right. \\
&\quad \left. + [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] \alpha^2 \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1} \} \frac{\Sigma_x}{E} \\
&= \{ \alpha \left[ -\alpha \sigma \kappa \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1} - \sigma^{-1} \alpha \kappa \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1} - \sigma + \sigma \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi} \right] \right. \\
&\quad \left. + [\alpha + \kappa (\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] \alpha^2 \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1} \} \frac{\Sigma_x}{E} < 0, \tag{6.101}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\bar{a}_e &= \kappa \bar{b}_e + \alpha \bar{c}_e \\
&= (\alpha + \kappa\gamma)\Sigma_e - [\alpha + \kappa(\gamma + \sigma^{-1})] [\alpha B + \gamma C] \frac{\sigma \Sigma_e}{E} \\
&= \{(\alpha + \kappa\gamma) [E - \alpha\sigma B - \sigma\gamma C] - \kappa [\alpha B + \gamma C]\} \frac{\Sigma_e}{E} \\
&= \{(\alpha + \kappa\gamma) [C - \sigma^{-1}\alpha^2\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1}] - \kappa [\alpha B + \gamma C]\} \frac{\Sigma_e}{E} \\
&= \left\{ \alpha [C - \kappa B] - (\alpha + \kappa\gamma)\sigma^{-1}\alpha^2\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1} \right\} \frac{\Sigma_e}{E} \\
&= \left\{ \alpha \left[ 1 + \kappa A - \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi} - \kappa A - \alpha\kappa\Sigma_x\Theta_x^{-1} \right] - (\alpha + \kappa\gamma)\sigma^{-1}\alpha^2\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1} \right\} \frac{\Sigma_e}{E} \\
&= \left\{ \alpha \left[ 1 - \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi} - \alpha\kappa\Sigma_x\Theta_x^{-1} \right] - (\alpha + \kappa\gamma)\sigma^{-1}\alpha^2\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1} \right\} \frac{\Sigma_e}{E} > 0. \quad (6.102)
\end{aligned}$$

## Appendix C

### The effects of increased robustness

This Appendix provides some proofs of the propositions in Section 4.

Note first that

$$\frac{B}{\theta_\pi} = \frac{B}{\theta_e} = 0, \quad (6.103)$$

$$\frac{B}{\theta_x} = \frac{\alpha \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1}}{\theta_x} > 0, \quad (6.104)$$

$$\frac{C}{\theta_\pi} = \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi^2} > 0, \quad (6.105)$$

$$\frac{C}{\theta_x} = \frac{C}{\theta_e} = 0, \quad (6.106)$$

$$\frac{D}{\theta_\pi} = 0, \quad (6.107)$$

$$\frac{D}{\theta_x} = \frac{\alpha \sigma \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1}}{\theta_x} > 0, \quad (6.108)$$

$$\frac{D}{\theta_e} = \frac{\sigma^{-1} \alpha \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}}{\theta_e} > 0, \quad (6.109)$$

$$\frac{E}{\theta_\pi} = \frac{(1 + \sigma \gamma) \Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi^2} > 0, \quad (6.110)$$

$$\frac{E}{\theta_x} = \frac{\alpha^2 \sigma \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1}}{\theta_x} > 0, \quad (6.111)$$

$$\frac{E}{\theta_e} = \frac{\alpha^2 \sigma^{-1} \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}}{\theta_e} > 0. \quad (6.112)$$

#### C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1

The reduced-form coefficients for inflation in the worst-case model are given by

$$a_\pi = \frac{(1 + \sigma \gamma) \Sigma_\pi}{E}; \quad a_x = -\frac{\sigma \alpha \Sigma_x}{E}; \quad a_e = \frac{\alpha \Sigma_e}{E},$$

and the output coefficients are given by  $b_j = -Aa_j$  for all  $j$ . Thus, all coefficients depend negatively (in absolute value) on  $E$ , and the effects of increased robustness (a decrease in any  $\theta_j$ ) on the absolute value of all coefficients have the opposite sign relative to the effects on the coefficient  $E$ , which are all negative (see above). Therefore, the inflation and output coefficients all increase in absolute value when misspecification in any equation increases (any  $\theta_j$  falls).  $\square$

## C.2 Proof of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3

Note that the exchange rate coefficients can be written as

$$c_\pi = -\frac{D}{1 + \sigma\gamma} a_\pi < 0, \quad (6.113)$$

$$c_x = \frac{C}{\alpha} a_x < 0, \quad (6.114)$$

$$c_e = \frac{C}{\alpha} a_e > 0. \quad (6.115)$$

### Proof of Proposition 4.2

The effects of increased robustness against inflation misspecification on the inflation and output coefficients in the exchange rate equation are given by

$$\begin{aligned} -\frac{|c_\pi|}{\theta_\pi} &= -\frac{1}{1 + \sigma\gamma} \left[ a_\pi \frac{D}{\theta_\pi} + D \frac{a_\pi}{\theta_\pi} \right] \\ &= \frac{(1 + \sigma\gamma) D \Sigma_\pi^3}{E^2 \theta_\pi^2} > 0, \end{aligned} \quad (6.116)$$

$$\begin{aligned} -\frac{|c_x|}{\theta_\pi} &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \left[ a_x \frac{C}{\theta_\pi} + C \frac{a_x}{\theta_\pi} \right] \\ &= -\frac{1}{\alpha} \left[ \frac{\sigma\alpha\Sigma_x}{E} \frac{\Sigma_\pi^2}{\theta_\pi^2} - C \frac{\sigma\alpha(1 + \sigma\gamma)\Sigma_\pi^2\Sigma_x}{E^2\theta_\pi^2} \right] \\ &= -[E - (1 + \sigma\gamma)C] \frac{\sigma\Sigma_\pi^2\Sigma_x}{E^2\theta_\pi^2} \\ &= -\frac{\sigma\alpha D \Sigma_\pi^2 \Sigma_x}{E^2 \theta_\pi^2} < 0. \end{aligned} \quad (6.117)$$

The coefficient on the exchange rate is given by

$$c_e = -\frac{\Sigma_e}{\sigma\Sigma_x} c_x, \quad (6.118)$$

so all derivatives have the opposite sign to those of  $c_x$ .  $\square$

### Proof of Proposition 4.3

The effects of increased robustness against output and exchange rate misspecification on the inflation and output coefficients in the exchange rate

equation are given by

$$\begin{aligned}
-\frac{|c_\pi|}{\theta_x} &= -\frac{1}{1+\sigma\gamma} \left[ a_\pi \frac{D}{\theta_x} + D \frac{a_\pi}{\theta_x} \right] \\
&= -\frac{1}{1+\sigma\gamma} \left[ \frac{(1+\sigma\gamma)\Sigma_\pi \sigma \alpha \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1}}{E} - D \frac{\sigma^2 \alpha^2 \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_x^2}{E^2 \theta_x^2} \right] \\
&= -\frac{1}{1+\sigma\gamma} \left[ \frac{\sigma^2 \alpha \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_x^2}{E \theta_x^2} - D \frac{\sigma^2 \alpha^2 \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_x^2}{E^2 \theta_x^2} \right] \\
&= -[E - \alpha D] \frac{\sigma^2 \alpha \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_x^2}{(1+\sigma\gamma) E^2 \theta_x^2} \\
&= -(1+\sigma\gamma) C \frac{\sigma^2 \alpha \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_x^2}{(1+\sigma\gamma) E^2 \theta_x^2} < 0
\end{aligned} \tag{6.119}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
-\frac{|c_\pi|}{\theta_e} &= -\frac{1}{1+\sigma\gamma} \left[ a_\pi \frac{D}{\theta_e} + D \frac{a_\pi}{\theta_e} \right] \\
&= -\frac{1}{1+\sigma\gamma} \left[ \frac{(1+\sigma\gamma)\Sigma_\pi \sigma^{-1} \alpha \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}}{E} - D \frac{\alpha^2 \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_e^2}{E^2 \theta_e^2} \right] \\
&= -\frac{1}{1+\sigma\gamma} \left[ \frac{\alpha \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_e^2}{E \theta_e^2} - D \frac{\alpha^2 \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_e^2}{E^2 \theta_e^2} \right] \\
&= -[E - \alpha D] \frac{\alpha \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_e^2}{(1+\sigma\gamma) E^2 \theta_e^2} \\
&= -(1+\sigma\gamma) C \frac{\alpha \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_e^2}{(1+\sigma\gamma) E^2 \theta_e^2} < 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{6.120}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
-\frac{|c_x|}{\theta_x} &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \left[ a_x \frac{C}{\theta_x} + C \frac{a_x}{\theta_x} \right] \\
&= \frac{\sigma^3 \alpha^2 C \Sigma_x^3}{(1+\sigma\gamma) E^2 \theta_x^2} > 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{6.121}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
-\frac{|c_x|}{\theta_e} &= \frac{1}{\alpha} \left[ a_x \frac{C}{\theta_e} + C \frac{a_x}{\theta_e} \right] \\
&= \frac{\sigma \alpha^2 C \Sigma_x \Sigma_e^2}{(1+\sigma\gamma) E^2 \theta_e^2} > 0,
\end{aligned} \tag{6.122}$$

and again all derivatives of  $c_e$  have the opposite sign to those of  $c_x$ .  $\square$

### C.3 Proofs of Propositions 4.4 and 4.5

Recall that the policy rule coefficients are given by

$$d_\pi = [\sigma B + \alpha \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\Sigma_\pi}{E} > 0, \tag{6.123}$$

$$d_x = \sigma [E - \alpha \sigma B - \sigma \gamma C] \frac{\Sigma_x}{E} > 0, \tag{6.124}$$

$$d_e = [\alpha B + \gamma C] \frac{\sigma \Sigma_e}{E} > 0, \tag{6.125}$$

and that

$$\begin{aligned}
& E - \alpha\sigma B - \sigma\gamma C \\
&= C + \alpha(D - \sigma B) \\
&= C - \sigma^{-1}\alpha^2\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1} > 0.
\end{aligned} \tag{6.126}$$

#### Proof of Proposition 4.4

The effects on the policy rule coefficients of increased robustness against inflation and exchange rate misspecification are given by

$$\begin{aligned}
-\frac{|d_\pi|}{\theta_\pi} &= [\sigma B + \alpha\gamma\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\Sigma_\pi E}{E^2 \theta_\pi} > 0, \\
-\frac{|d_\pi|}{\theta_e} &= [\sigma B + \alpha\gamma\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\Sigma_\pi E}{E^2 \theta_e} + \frac{\Sigma_\pi \alpha\gamma\Sigma_e\Theta_e^{-1}}{E \theta_e} > 0, \\
-\frac{|d_x|}{\theta_\pi} &= \frac{\sigma^2\gamma\Sigma_x C}{E \theta_\pi} - \frac{\sigma^2(\alpha B + \gamma C)\Sigma_x E}{E^2 \theta_\pi} \\
&= \frac{\sigma^2\gamma\Sigma_x\Sigma_\pi^2}{E\theta_\pi^2} - \frac{(1 + \sigma\gamma)\sigma^2(\alpha B + \gamma C)\Sigma_x\Sigma_\pi^2}{E^2\theta_\pi^2} \\
&= -[(1 + \sigma\gamma)(\alpha B + \gamma C) - \gamma E] \frac{\sigma^2\Sigma_x\Sigma_\pi^2}{E^2\theta_\pi^2} \\
&= -[\alpha B + \gamma C - \gamma(E - \sigma\alpha B - \sigma\gamma C)] \frac{\sigma^2\Sigma_x\Sigma_\pi^2}{E^2\theta_\pi^2} < 0, \tag{6.127}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
-\frac{|d_x|}{\theta_e} &= -\frac{\sigma^2(\alpha B + \gamma C)\Sigma_x E}{E^2 \theta_e} < 0, \\
-\frac{|d_e|}{\theta_\pi} &= -\frac{\sigma\gamma\Sigma_e C}{E \theta_\pi} + (\alpha B + \gamma C) \frac{\sigma\Sigma_e E}{E^2 \theta_\pi} \\
&= -\frac{\sigma\gamma\Sigma_\pi^2\Sigma_e}{E\theta_\pi^2} + (\alpha B + \gamma C) \frac{(1 + \sigma\gamma)\sigma\Sigma_\pi^2\Sigma_e}{E^2\theta_\pi^2} \\
&= [(1 + \sigma\gamma)(\alpha B + \gamma C) - \gamma E] \frac{\sigma\Sigma_\pi^2\Sigma_e}{E^2\theta_\pi^2} > 0, \tag{6.128}
\end{aligned}$$

$$-\frac{|d_e|}{\theta_e} = (\alpha B + \gamma C) \frac{\sigma\Sigma_e E}{E^2 \theta_e} > 0. \quad \square$$



## Proof of Proposition 4.5

The effects on the policy rule coefficients of increased robustness against output misspecification are given by

$$\begin{aligned}
-\frac{|d_\pi|}{\theta_x} &= -\frac{\sigma \Sigma_\pi B}{E \theta_x} + [\sigma B + \alpha \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\Sigma_\pi E}{E^2 \theta_x} \\
&= -\frac{\alpha \sigma \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1}}{E \theta_x} + [\sigma B + \alpha \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\alpha^2 \sigma \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1}}{E^2 \theta_x} \\
&= -[E - \alpha \sigma B - \alpha^2 \gamma \Sigma_e \Theta_e^{-1}] \frac{\alpha \sigma \Sigma_\pi \Sigma_x \Theta_x^{-1}}{E^2 \theta_x} < 0, \tag{6.129}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
-\frac{|d_x|}{\theta_x} &= \frac{\alpha \sigma^2 \Sigma_x B}{E \theta_x} - \frac{\sigma^2 (\alpha B + \gamma C) \Sigma_x E}{E^2 \theta_x} \\
&= \frac{\alpha^2 \sigma^2 \Sigma_x^2 \Theta_x^{-1}}{E \theta_x} - \frac{\alpha^2 \sigma^3 (\alpha B + \gamma C) \Sigma_x^2 \Theta_x^{-1}}{E^2 \theta_x} \\
&= [E - \sigma (\alpha B + \gamma C)] \frac{\alpha^2 \sigma^2 \Sigma_x^2 \Theta_x^{-1}}{E^2 \theta_x} > 0, \tag{6.130}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
-\frac{|d_e|}{\theta_x} &= -\frac{\alpha \sigma \Sigma_e B}{E \theta_x} + (\alpha B + \gamma C) \frac{\sigma \Sigma_e E}{E^2 \theta_x} \\
&= -\frac{\alpha^2 \sigma \Sigma_x \Sigma_e \Theta_x^{-1}}{E \theta_x} + (\alpha B + \gamma C) \frac{\alpha^2 \sigma^2 \Sigma_x \Sigma_e \Theta_x^{-1}}{E^2 \theta_x} \\
&= -[E - \sigma (\alpha B + \gamma C)] \frac{\alpha^2 \sigma \Sigma_x \Sigma_e \Theta_x^{-1}}{E^2 \theta_x} < 0. \quad \square \tag{6.131}
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 1: Effects of an increased preference for robustness on the coefficients in the worst-case model for inflation




Figure 2: Effects of an increased preference for robustness on the coefficients in the worst-case model for output




Figure 3: Effects of an increased preference for robustness on the coefficients in the worst-case model for the exchange rate




Figure 4: Effects of an increased preference for robustness of the coefficients in the policy rule




Figure 5: Effects of an increased preference for robustness on the coefficients in the approximating model for inflation




Figure 6: Effects of an increased preference for robustness on the coefficients in the approximating model for output





Figure 7: Effects of an increased preference for robustness on the coefficients in the approximating model for the exchange rate





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