

Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada; van Praag, Bernard M. S.

**Working Paper**

## The Subjective Costs of Health Losses due to Chronic Diseases: An Alternative Model Appraisal

IZA Discussion Papers, No. 313

**Provided in Cooperation with:**

IZA – Institute of Labor Economics

*Suggested Citation:* Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Ada; van Praag, Bernard M. S. (2001) : The Subjective Costs of Health Losses due to Chronic Diseases: An Alternative Model Appraisal, IZA Discussion Papers, No. 313, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn

This Version is available at:

<https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21168>

**Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:**

Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.

Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.

Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.

**Terms of use:**

*Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.*

*You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public.*

*If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence.*

IZA DP No. 313

## **The Subjective Costs of Health Losses due to Chronic Diseases: An Alternative Model Appraisal**

Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell  
Bernard M.S. van Praag

June 2001

# **The Subjective Costs of Health Losses due to Chronic Diseases: An Alternative Model for Monetary Appraisal**

**Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell**

*University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute*

**Bernard M.S. van Praag**

*University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute and IZA, Bonn*

Discussion Paper No. 313  
June 2001

IZA

P.O. Box 7240  
D-53072 Bonn  
Germany

Tel.: +49-228-3894-0  
Fax: +49-228-3894-210  
Email: [iza@iza.org](mailto:iza@iza.org)

This Discussion Paper is issued within the framework of IZA's research area *General Labor Economics*. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.

The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent, nonprofit limited liability company (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) supported by the Deutsche Post AG. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. The current research program deals with (1) mobility and flexibility of labor markets, (2) internationalization of labor markets and European integration, (3) the welfare state and labor markets, (4) labor markets in transition, (5) the future of work, (6) project evaluation and (7) general labor economics.

IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character.

## **ABSTRACT**

### **The Subjective Costs of Health Losses due to Chronic Diseases: An Alternative Model for Monetary Appraisal \***

This paper proposes a method to evaluate health losses or gains by looking at the impact on well-being of a change in health status. The paper presents estimates of the equivalent income change that would be necessary to change general satisfaction with life to the same extent as a change in health satisfaction would do. In other words, we estimate the income equivalent of health changes. Next, the health satisfaction changes are linked to specific diseases in order to estimate the income equivalent for various diseases. This method uses answers to well-being and health satisfaction questions as posed in a large German data set. We distinguish between workers and non-workers and between inhabitants of East- and West- Germany. We find, for instance, that for West-workers hearing impediments are on average equivalent to an income reduction of about 20%, and that heart blood difficulties are for the same group equivalent to a 47% income reduction.

JEL codes: I10. I12

Keywords: Chronic diseases, equivalent income, health damages, health satisfaction, well-being

Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell  
Faculty of Economics and Econometrics and SEO Amsterdam Economics  
University of Amsterdam  
Roetersstraat 11  
1018 WB Amsterdam  
The Netherlands  
Tel.: +31 20 624 24 12  
Fax : +31 20 625 89 93  
Email: adaf@seo.fee.uva.nl

---

\* We like to thank Owen O'Donell, Andrew Jones, Peter Wakker, and 2 anonymous referees for very useful observations. We are grateful to the participants of the "Ninth European Workshop on Econometrics and Health Economics", September 2000, Amsterdam, for their comments. We also like to thank the GSOEP-group and their director Prof. G. Wagner for making the data available to us.

## 1. Introduction

One of the dominant issues in Health Economics is the evaluation of health changes. Health policy decisions are often evaluated in terms of costs and benefits, including opportunity costs. A second field where the evaluation of health is becoming increasingly important is that of health damage insurance and lawsuits. Injured individuals have to be compensated for their health losses including intangible damages.

The costs associated with an illness, or the benefits of recovering from it, are of diverse nature. First, there are *economic* costs associated with medical care, informal care in the household, or income losses due to working absence. Second, there are *intangible* costs, the monetary countervalue of the loss of health *per se*. They are mostly ignored or only mentioned without quantification. However, it is felt that they may be quite substantial. In this paper we present a method, which focuses on the intangibles.

Health economists usually assume that satisfaction with health (or health utility) can be measured. It is mostly measured on a bounded scale between 0 and 1, where 0 is the value assigned to the status of death and 1 to living perfectly healthy [1]. Between these extremes, researchers try to find values for different health states. Health quality is measured frequently in Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY). There are various methods to operationalise and quantify health-*utility* and health-*utility* changes. One of the methods to evaluate health levels in terms of QALY's is by means of observing the answers to 'self-reported' health questions posed to people with the disease, or to a random group of people including but not restricted to sufferers from the disease [2,3,4,5]. Other measurement procedures are based on the Standard Gamble method and the Time Trade-Off method. One can compare

therapies and diseases in terms of health-*utility* change per dollar spent, i.e. performing cost-utility analysis. Alternatively, one can translate the health-*utility* changes in monetary values. For instance, by looking at the decrease in productivity due to the deterioration of health [6]. It is evident that there is no uniformly accepted QALY –operationalisation and that in practice the results vary according to measurement method used. A second approach which is used in health economics, but which is also very popular in environmental economics is the so – called Willingness to Pay method (WTP). In this approach individuals are asked how much money they would be willing to pay for not having the illness or its symptoms or for not having the unpleasant experience caused by the pollution of the environment. In practice the results of this method depend on the specific setting, the wording of the questions and the suspicion of the respondent that by strategic response behaviour he can influence his circumstances or the amount of monetary compensation. The mirror image is to ask for the Willingness to Accept (WTA). The two amounts should be equal in theory but this is rarely the case in practice. There is no uniformly accepted WTP–operationalisation and in practice the results vary according to the measurement method used.

In this paper, we develop an alternative method for measuring and monetarising health changes. The approach can be summarised as follows. Health satisfaction is seen as *one* of the domains of life. Other domains include financial satisfaction and job satisfaction. Individual well-being or General Satisfaction (GS) is then assumed to depend on the various domains of life satisfaction (DS). General Satisfaction (GS) and all Domain Satisfactions (DS) are measured subjectively, i.e. using individual answers to subjective questions posed in questionnaires. Recently, we estimated a structural model for individuals' well-being [7,8]. Building on that

model, we assess the impact on general satisfaction of a change in health via changes in health satisfaction. We then estimate the equivalent income change that would be necessary to change general satisfaction to the same extent. In microeconomic vocabulary, we look for the *income equivalent* variation of health changes. The empirical analysis of the GS model is based on a large German panel data set (GSOEP), which we combine with results of Cutler and Robertson [3] and Groot [5]. Their papers present estimates of the impact of chronic diseases on individual health satisfaction estimated from an American and a British micro – data set respectively. They call those impact coefficients QALY weights. Assuming that the results for the US and for the UK will be roughly similar for Germany, we pool the German data set with the American and British estimates. The reason for doing this is that similar information is not available in the German data set. Given the synthetic character of the data set, the main objective of this paper is its methodological contribution, although we conjecture that the German data ,if available, would have resulted in similar income equivalents.

This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 shows the estimates of the model. Section 5 introduces the relevant money values of health gains and losses. Section 6 concludes.

## **2. The Model**

In this section, we outline our model in simple terms. Let us assume that the individual's well-being depends on only two variables, viz., income  $y$  and health  $H$ . In that case we may describe well-being as a function of  $y$  and  $H$ , say

$$W = W(y, H) \tag{1}$$

Indifference curves in the  $(y, H)$ -space are sketched in Figure 1. The slope of these indifference curves reflects the shadow price of health. More precisely, we look for the income reduction, say  $\Delta y$ , which is equivalent to a deterioration of health, say by  $\Delta H$ .

[Figure 1 about here]

Consider an individual at A, who experiences a health loss bringing him down to D. The monetary equivalent may be measured in two ways. The income change equivalent with the health loss AD is the income loss AC. We call this the *equivalent income variation*. In our case it is measured in terms of a percentage of original income. The equivalent income variation amount is found by solving the equation

$$W(y, H + \Delta H) = W(y + \Delta y, H) \quad (2)$$

When  $\Delta H$  tends to zero we find the so-called shadow price of health

$$\left. \frac{dy}{dH} \right|_{\text{welfareconst.}} = - \frac{dW}{dH} / \frac{dW}{dy} \quad (3)$$

The second way is to look for the additional income DB, needed to bring the individual back to his or her original level of well-being. We call this the *compensating income variation*. We notice that this shadow price is the slope of the indifference curve. Hence, it varies with the point  $(y, H)$  of departure. Moreover, if the



indifference curves are not homothetic, the shadow price depends on the level of the indifference curve, say  $W$ , as well.

The function  $W$  is not assumed to be a cardinal utility function. The only use of  $W$  is that it describes the net of indifference curves. Any monotonic transformation  $\tilde{W} = j(W)$  with  $\frac{dj}{dW} > 0$  will describe the same net of indifference curves and thus will yield the same shadow prices.

Until now individual's well-being depended only on  $y$  and  $H$ . When describing this abstract model, however, we have in mind a more complex model, which was recently estimated for a large German household panel survey [7,8]. We shall refer to that study as PFF. Actually, the estimated outcomes of that study can be used for the present study .

In the model we assume that well-being or, as we call it in PFF, General Satisfaction (GS) depends on a vector of *domain* satisfactions (DS). These are qualitative and ordinal variables. On its turn the domain satisfactions may be explained by quantitative objectively measured variables such as income, age, and education.

In the German survey there are satisfaction questions with respect to six domains of life: Financial satisfaction (FS), Health satisfaction (HS), Job satisfaction (JS), Leisure satisfaction (LS), Housing satisfaction (HoS), and Environmental satisfaction (ES).

The model can be described as

$$GS = GS(DS_1, \dots, DS_6) \quad (4)$$

$$DS_j = DS_j(x) \quad j = 1, \dots, 6 \quad (5)$$

General Satisfaction (GS) is considered as an aggregate of the domain satisfactions (DS).

The model is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.

[Figure 2 about here]

Detailed specifications and the estimated model, as far as relevant for the present subject, will be shown in Section 4. What is relevant for this paper is that GS (after suitable specification) can be modelled and explained according to the equation

$$GS = g_1 JS + g_2 FS + g_3 HoS + g_4 HS + g_5 LS + g_6 ES + e \quad (6)$$

Equation (6) describes the net of indifference curves; in this paper we are specially interested in the trade-off between health satisfaction and income. Let Health Satisfaction (HS) be reduced by  $\Delta HS$ , then we may keep GS constant by increasing Financial Satisfaction (FS) by  $\frac{g_4}{g_2} \Delta HS$ . Income increases have a positive effect on financial satisfaction (FS). Actually income has an effect on *all* six domain satisfactions, including health itself [9]. Hence, in order to calculate the income decrease equivalent to a reduction of HS, we have to include and add up all indirect effects, i.e. the effects via *all* DS (see Figure 2).

In order to make the calculation method applicable in practice, we have to specify  $\Delta HS$  numerically. In other words, we have to specify the health *change* from a base situation in a 0 to 10 scale, where we use the cardinal specification from the survey questionnaire. If we can translate the effect caused by real diseases into

changes in HS, then it is also possible to calculate the money value of health damage, due to those diseases such as 'difficulty in seeing', and 'diabetes'. This step, where we will borrow US and UK estimates, will be presented in Section 5.

An obvious question is why we choose for this *indirect* model rather than for a straightforward model in which General Satisfaction is *directly* explained by objectively measurable variables  $x$ . This would imply that our function  $W(.)$  would not have health satisfaction  $HS$  as an argument but the underlying variables which determine health, e.g., the variables which describe the prevalence of chronic illnesses. This model, however, would give difficulties, for many variables have a different effect on different domains and the balance effect on GS is difficult to measure and to interpret. For instance, age may be assumed to have a negative effect on health, while age (up to a certain point) has a positive effect on income and hence presumably on welfare. By the use of the intermediary variables  $DS$  we are able to identify the different influences of the various  $x$ -variables via the different domains on GS and thus we get a more exact picture of the complex phenomenon. A second reason why we choose this somewhat complex model is that in the literature there are estimates available of the effects of illnesses on Health Satisfaction but not on the effect of illnesses on General Satisfaction <sup>1</sup>.

### **3. Description of the Data.**

For the empirical analysis of the structure of well-being, we make use of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) [11]. The GSOEP is a longitudinal household panel, which was started in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984. After the reunion

---

<sup>1</sup> We know of one exception with respect to migraine. See Groot and Maassen van den Brink [10]

East-German households have also been included. In [7,8] we developed and estimated a 'structural' model of well-being.

Our data set covers more than 19,000 individuals of which about 30% are Eastern individuals. We studied the period from 1992 to 1997. The two regions of the country have separately lived under very different regimes for 45 years. Although there is a continuous process of adaptation to the West, it seems warranted to consider the two sub-samples over the period considered as reflecting two populations. A considerable part of the respondents are non-working. Also here we thought it was wise to consider them as different populations, given the scope of our study. About 30% of Western non-workers are 65 years old or older, and 65% are females. For the Eastern non-workers, these percentages are 26% and 62% respectively. So we ended up with four sub-panels of individuals.

It is conceivable that Easterners move to the West and reversely or that individuals without a job get paid work. Those transitions are, however, fairly rare [12,13], so we preferred to define a respondent who switches from one status (regional or employment-wise) to another as a new respondent in the new group.

The GSOEP-survey is interesting to us as it contains a set of subjective satisfaction questions with respect to DS. They run like this:

*'How satisfied are you today with the following areas of your life?*

*(Please answer by using the following scale, in which 0 means totally unhappy and 10 means totally happy)*

*How satisfied are you with your*

*Health* .....

*Job* .....

*Income* .....

*Dwelling* .....

*Free-time*.....

*Environmental condition in your area*.....

A similar question is asked with respect to 'life as a whole'. [cf. 14]. Such subjective questions are now standard in psychological and sociological surveys [c.f.15]. In the GSOEP, this GS question runs as follows:

*And finally, we would like to ask you about your satisfaction with your life in general. Please answer by using the following scale, in which 0 means totally unhappy, and 10 means totally happy.*

*How happy are you at present with your life as a whole? \_\_\_\_\_*

Table 1 presents some summary statistics of the data. Satisfactions are on a 0 to 10 scale. Table 1 also presents also the household monthly net income in German Marks.

[Table 1 about here]

#### 4. The Estimated Model.

In order to explain GS , we need a cardinalisation of the DS variables. Here, we face a problem, because there is no generally accepted cardinalisation. In the questionnaire there is chosen for a discrete cardinalisation into 0,1,...,10, but this is *just one* cardinalisation. For the analysis of the paper, we are interested in the trade- off –ratios between the DS. They describe, for instance, which increase in Financial Satisfaction compensates a specific decrease in Health Satisfaction in terms of General Satisfaction. We shall now show that the choice of the cardinalisation of the DS is rather irrelevant. Let us assume that GS may be described by the equation

$$GS = \mathbf{g}_1 DS_1 + \mathbf{g}_2 DS_2 \quad (7)$$

The trade- off- ratio between  $DS_1$  and  $DS_2$  ,when keeping GS, constant, is

$$\left( \frac{\partial DS_1}{\partial DS_2} \right)_{GS=constant} = \mathbf{g}_2 / \mathbf{g}_1 \quad (8)$$

Let us now consider a second cardinalisation, which is a monotonic function of the first. We define

$$D\check{S}_i = f_i(DS_i) \quad i = 1,2 \quad (9)$$

With respect to the second cardinalisation the previous equation is rewritten as

$$GS = \mathbf{g}_1 f_1^{-1}(D\check{S}_1) + \mathbf{g}_2 f_2^{-1}(D\check{S}_2) = \mathbf{g}_1 f_1^{-1}(f_1(DS_1)) + \mathbf{g}_2 f_2^{-1}(f_2(DS_2)) \quad (10)$$

We see that  $GS$  in terms of the *second* cardinalisation will be non – linear, when one or both ‘translation’ rules  $f$  are non- linear. However, if we apply the chain rule , we see that we get the same trade – off ratio with respect to the *first* cardinalisation. The coefficients of the DS depend on the cardinalisation rule applied to DS. Nevertheless, whether we explain  $GS$  in terms of the first or second cardinalisation is immaterial with respect to the value of the trade – off ratio. Hence, it is just a matter of econometric convenience which cardinalisation we apply to explain  $GS$  from domain satisfactions. Given the fact that in a Probit (or regression) model it is undesirable to use bounded explanatory variables, we cardinalise the DS such that their range is the whole real axis. Terza [16] describes a method to cardinalize qualitative variables, such that they can be used as explanatory variables in a regression (or Probit) equation. We apply the ‘translation’ - method proposed by Terza, but other methods are also conceivable. Terza’s method runs as follows.

Let there be  $k$  ordered classes of the variable  $DS$ , then we denote the class frequencies by  $p_1, \dots, p_k$  and we the intercepts  $\mathbf{m}$  by the following equations

$$\begin{aligned} N(\mathbf{m}_1) &= p_1 \\ N(\mathbf{m}_2) &= p_1 + p_2 \\ &\dots\dots \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

Then we define the values

$$D\ddot{S}(i) = E(Y | \mathbf{m}_{i-1} \leq Y \leq \mathbf{m}_i) \tag{12}$$

where the expectation is taken with respect to the  $N(0,1)$  – distribution [17]. These values are used as explanatory variables in eq.(8). We notice that this translation rule

does not depend on individual characteristics of the respondent. We shall not dwell on this translation rule as it is clear from the above that the translation rule is in fact irrelevant, provided that there is one.

Equations (4) and (5) in Section 2 describe the model. Here, we present the estimation method. We refer to [7] for a more detailed description. We start with the estimation of (4). As the data set covers 6 consecutive years, we include 5 time dummies  $C_t$  (time fix effects). In order to account for the individual unobserved component we introduce individual random effects. Hence, the disturbance term for individual  $n$ , and time  $t$  is

$$\mathbf{e}_{nt} = v_n + \mathbf{h}_{nt} \quad (13)$$

where  $v_n$  is the individual random effect. We postulate the usual assumptions, i.e.  $E(v) = E(\mathbf{h}) = 0$ ,  $\mathbf{s}^2(\mathbf{h}) = 1$  and  $Cov(v, \mathbf{h}) = 0$ . Both  $\mathbf{h}$  and  $v$  are normally distributed. As usual in Ordered Probit, we normalise by  $\mathbf{s}^2(\mathbf{e}) = \mathbf{s}^2(v) + 1$ . We notice that, due to the individual random effect,  $\mathbf{s}^2(\mathbf{e})$  is not equal to one, as standard in probit analysis, but it equals  $\mathbf{s}^2(v) + 1$ , where  $\mathbf{s}^2(v)$  has to be estimated. The fact that we have to apply ordered Probit analysis on panel data, makes the analysis technically more difficult. However, it is possible to estimate ordered probit equations on a panel, including individual random effects. We use LIMDEP 7.0 for this job.

Similarly to the decomposition of  $\mathbf{e}$  into a time-variable and a time-constant component, it is attractive to decompose the Domain Satisfaction into their mean over the observation period and the deviation from that mean, that is



$$DS_{nkt} = D\bar{S}_{kn} + (DS_{nkt} - D\bar{S}_{kn}) \quad (14)$$

The inclusion of  $D\bar{S}$  is interpreted by [18] as picking up the correlation between the individual random effect and the explanatory variables. Here, we interpret  $D\bar{S}$  as the effect that the mean income has independently of the effect of the deviations from it. A second but complementary interpretation is a decomposition into a *level* and a *shock* effect, as for instance Friedman's (1957) income decomposition into a permanent and a transitory component.

For GS, we specify and estimate the General Satisfaction equation by Ordered Probit. We postulate,

$$GS_{nt} = \mathbf{g}_1 D\ddot{S}_{1nt} + \dots + \mathbf{g}_6 D\ddot{S}_{6nt} + \mathbf{d}' D\ddot{S}_n + \mathbf{1} Z_n + \mathbf{e}_{nt} \quad (15)$$

Here we introduce an auxiliary variable  $Z$ . Actually, we may assume that there is an element which influences *both*  $D\ddot{S}$  and  $GS$ . It is a personality trait. There are individuals, who have an optimist character and see things from the 'sunny side', while others are always pessimistic and inclined to downrate their situation. If such a factor is present, it will be included in the error terms of the  $DS$  and in the error term of  $GS$ . In that case the explanatory variables  $DS$  will be correlated with the  $GS$ -error, which will cause an endogeneity bias. Hence, we have to construct an additional explanatory variable  $Z_n$ , which represents this latent trait. How this variable has been constructed, we will explain below when we consider the  $DS$  more in detail.

Similarly, we estimate the six  $DS$ . It is intuitively obvious that the six domain satisfactions  $D\ddot{S}_j (j = 1, \dots, 6)$  depend on objectively measurable variables such as *age*,

and *income*. The  $DS_j$  are not categorical variables such as the GS but are values on the real axis. Thus, we estimate the domain satisfactions by OLS regression equations

$$DS_{jnt} = C_t + \mathbf{b}'_j x_{nt} + \mathbf{a}'_j \bar{x}_n + \mathbf{e}_{jnt} + \mathbf{h}_{jn} \quad j=1, \dots, 6, \quad (16)$$

Because (16) is estimated by OLS,  $\mathbf{s}^2(\mathbf{e}_{jnt})$  is not assumed to be equal to 1 but it has to be estimated by the model. We notice that each equation may be separately estimated by OLS using standard panel econometrics. It is rather probable that the six error terms are correlated, which would point to a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model. However, it is well – known that in this case simple OLS regressions yield also consistent estimates for the separate equations. As all the explanatory variables are exogenous, there are no identification difficulties, even if each of the six equations would have the same set of explanatory variables. This, however, is not the case. It might be argued that the structure is essentially more complex as one domain satisfaction may affect another. For instance, Health Satisfaction may explain Job Satisfaction or *vice versa* [19]. Then we would have a block of simultaneous equations with the usual identification pitfalls. However, we are not interested here in the structural model but only in the reduced model. We interpret the equation block as a reduced model.

Let us now return to the construction of the variable Z, which we introduced in the GS – equation (15). We may assume that this is also an explanatory variable for the *DS*. As it is omitted it is a component for the residual. More precisely we may assume

$$\mathbf{e}_{nit} = \mathbf{q}_i \widehat{Z}_n + v_{ni} + \mathbf{h}_{nit} \quad (17)$$

where the variable  $\widehat{Z}_n$  is present in each domain error term with a domain specific effect  $\mathbf{q}_i$ . A similar structure will hold for the calculated residuals, although the  $Z$  – effect will be partly annulled due to its correlation with the included explanatory variables. Hence, we may construct a variable  $Z$ , which varies proportionally with the latent  $\widehat{Z}_n$  by adding all the 36 domain residuals per individual. The variables  $\mathbf{n}$  and  $\mathbf{e}$  will average out while the individually constant  $Z$  will not average out.

It is this  $Z$  - construct which is used in the  $GS$  – estimation. We see that the effect of this variable is quite significant. A comparison of the estimated equation *with* and *without* the addition of  $Z$  shows that all the coefficients of  $DS$  are considerably reduced if the term is added but that this reduction is by approximately the same factor, such that the trade – off ratios are only marginally changed. All coefficients stay significant. The same holds for the mean  $DS$ . We do not reproduce this comparison at this place but the tables can be asked from the authors. The coefficient of  $Z$  is a weighted covariance between the domain error terms and the  $GS$ - error. The whole procedure is a kind of Heckman correction [20]. In this way we eliminate the endogeneity bias. Moreover, we annul the covariance between the error terms and we may deal with the recursive system under the assumption that the error covariance matrix is diagonal (see e.g. Greene(2000),p.675)).

## 5. Estimation Results

This section presents the estimation results for equation (15) and (16). In Table 2 we present the estimates for the GS-equation where we include all the six domain satisfactions ( $DS$ ) and their means over the six – year period. The first column gives the estimated coefficients for Western workers, while the second column displays the t-values. The other columns give the corresponding values for Eastern workers, Western non-workers, and Eastern non-workers respectively.

The most interesting coefficients are the domain coefficients. We see the shock effects in the first block, while the level effects are the sum of the shock effects and the coefficients of the corresponding ‘mean’ – variables. So we find for a Western worker that the *level* effect of job satisfaction on general satisfaction is  $0.265+0.087=0.352$  , while the shock effect is 0.265. We see that all domain effects are strongly significant. Given the ordinal character of the  $DS$  – variables, it is impossible to compare the effects of the  $DS$  directly. In three of the four equations  $Z$  has a significant negative coefficient. If we estimate the equation without  $Z$ , we find smaller coefficients of the  $DS$  – variables, although the trade off ratios remain virtually unchanged.

The relative contribution of the individual random effect to the total variance, that is  $\frac{\mathbf{s}^2(\mathbf{n})}{1+\mathbf{s}^2(\mathbf{n})}$ , turns out to be fairly large at about 25 to 31%. This equals also the intertemporal correlation coefficient between the errors .

Next, we discuss the results for the  $DS$  equations. There is a growing body of literature that examines subjective well-being questions [21, 22, 23] for specific domains. In this context it is impossible to present and discuss all six domain satisfactions equations (see PFF). We restrict ourselves to the presentation of the equations for Health Satisfaction and Financial Satisfaction.

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 presents the results for the Financial Satisfaction equation. We see that financial satisfaction depends on income in two ways. First there is a dependency on mean ( $\ln(\text{family income})$ ), which resembles Friedman's [24] permanent income concept. Second there is an effect of current income. For West workers the relevant income effect is

$$0.120x_{nt} + 0.262\bar{x}_n = 0.120(x_{nt} - \bar{x}_n) + 0.382\bar{x}_n \quad (18)$$

The coefficient 0.120 is the *shock* effect and 0.382 is the *level* effect. The level effect are the effects that we shall use in our calculations in section 5. Apart from income we see a strong age effect which is parabolic in  $\ln$ -age. Satisfaction falls with age under *ceteris paribus* conditions and reaches for Western workers a minimum at the age of 44. There is a notable effect of education: for Westerners, financial satisfaction rises with their education level. For Easterners the effect is non-significant (workers) or even strongly negative (non-workers). For workers, the number of adults in the household has a strong negative effect. For Westerners, the number of children has also a negative impact on FS. Moreover, we notice that the effect of income on FS becomes larger as one has more children to maintain (see the interaction term). Males are less satisfied than females and living together with a partner increases one's satisfaction with the financial situation. The presence of more than one income earner in the household has a slight negative non-significant effect. Having savings makes one feel better.

Table 4 presents the results for Health Satisfaction. Table 4 shows that income correlates positively with health satisfaction. The positive correlation between income and health is well accepted [9,25]. Nevertheless, the current income coefficients are not significant. The mean income coefficients are all positive but significant at 10% only for Westerners. This points to the hypothesis that income in this equation serves as a proxy for lifestyle and becomes important only, when more direct descriptors of lifestyle are not included in the set of explanatory variables. A family with a lower income will have a lifestyle and a risk-behaviour that is more damaging to health (for instance, smoking, drinking, or obesity) and usually will be living in less healthy environments. The current income would approximate the access that individuals have to doctors and medicine. Thus, our results seem to indicate that the life-style effect is more important for health satisfaction (and status) than the income *per se*. It is also true that less healthy individuals are less productive and, as a consequence, have lower earnings. Therefore, the direction of the causality between health and income is not always clear [25]. Age is an important determinant for health satisfaction, i.e., younger people are more satisfied with their health (see also [26]). Education correlates significantly and positively with health satisfaction. Again, well educated people have most probably lifestyles that are healthier (see also [26]) and thus education could be indicating life-style. The average number of children has a positive and significant effect for Eastern non-workers, while the effect is non-significant for the other three groups. Kerkhofs and Lindeboom [26] using Dutch data for 1993 studied the influence of exogenous variables on mis-reporting health status. They found that labour market status was the only variable that had a significant effect on mis-reporting. This would support the division of the sample in four sub-groups.

The variance of  $v$  is more than 50% of the total residual variance. In order to compare our health satisfaction coefficients with a cross-section ordered probit, the coefficients of Table 3 need to be multiplied by about 0.8 or 0.9 depending on the sub-sample.

## 6. The monetary value of a health change

In Section 5 we estimated General Satisfaction as a function of six domain satisfactions and of various objectively measurable variables. Similarly, the six domain satisfactions are explained by objective variables... The level effects of the six domain satisfactions on General Satisfaction are tabulated in Table 5.

[Table 5 about here]

We notice that the level effect of health satisfaction for West-workers is 0.501, i.e.  $0.324 + 0.177$ . This implies that if health satisfaction is reduced by  $\Delta HS$ , GS decreases by  $0.501 \Delta HS$ . Thus, it is possible to translate such a health loss in terms of an equivalent income loss  $\Delta y$ .

The effect of ln-income changes on GS is fairly complex in this model, as income appears as one of the explanatory variables in *each* DS. Hence, there are six indirect effects. All those six ln-income effects are tabulated in Table 6.

[Table 6 about here]

Hence, the effect of an income change on GS via job satisfaction is  $0.352 * 0.084$ . Let us denote a column in Table 5 by  $a_1, \dots, a_6$  and the corresponding column of Table 6 by

$b_1, \dots, b_6$ , then the total income effect on GS (for each sub-sample) will be

$$\sum_{i=1}^6 a_i b_i \quad (19)$$

Then we may calculate the relative income change,  $\Delta \ln y$ , that is equivalent to a change in health satisfaction by  $\Delta HS$ . For West Workers, this is found by solving the equation

$$0.501 \Delta HS = \left( \sum_{j=1}^6 a_j b_j \right) \Delta \ln y \quad (20)$$

which yields

$$\Delta \ln y = \frac{0.501}{\sum_{j=1}^6 a_j b_j} \Delta HS \quad (21)$$

We shall denote the value of the multiplier in equation (21) by  $k$ . The values for the four sub-samples, say  $k_{ww}$ ,  $k_{ew}$ ,  $k_{wnw}$ , and  $k_{enw}$  are given below in Table 7.

[Table 7 about here]

The remaining question is how to translate health changes, for instance caused by an illness such as diabetes, into a numerical value of  $\Delta HS$ . An obvious way would be to re-estimate the equation for health satisfaction where we include a disease-dummy



variable, which is zero for a healthy person and one for an individual with the disease.. Unfortunately, in our German data set we do not have this information. Instead we make use of the estimates recently found by Cutler and Richardson [3] for US data and by Groot [5] for British data. They estimated a health satisfaction equation by Ordered Probit, which include dummy variables for various illnesses. Obviously a strong *caveat* is that we extrapolate health effects estimated from British and USA respondents to Germans. Moreover, these effects have been estimated on the basis of a different functional specification. Nevertheless, for a first illustration, lacking better, it will do. We also notice that the estimates of Groot [5] and of Cutler and Richardson [3] yield roughly comparable disease effects, which makes it probable that the figures may also hold approximately for German respondents. An additional limitation is that the illnesses among individuals are not differentiated according to the degree of severity. In other words, individuals with, e.g., diabetes have the dummy variable 'diabetes' equal to 1 regardless of the severity of the 'diabetes' they suffer from.

The equivalent income variation (AC in Figure 1) is  $(1 - e^{k*d})$ , where  $d$  is the coefficient of the disease on HS. The results of  $k$  are presented in Table 7, and the values of  $d$ , borrowed from Cutler and Richardson [3] and Groot [5], are presented in Table 8. The Health satisfaction equation in our model has a residual variance, which differs from that in Cutler and Richardson [3] and Groot [5]. Their residual variance is equal to 1 by the Probit- normalization convention. In our case, it equals the sum of the error term and the individual random effect. In order to correct for that, the coefficient estimates of Cutler and Richardson [3] and Groot [5] have to be multiplied by a correction factor ,which is given in the last row in Tables 8 and 9.

[Table 8 about here]

[Table 9 about here]

In Table 8 and Table 9, we present estimates for the equivalent income variations for various diseases.

Table 8 and Table 9 show that working individuals living in the West who, for example, get problems in hearing, suffer a decline on well-being equivalent to a reduction of their income by 17.6% when using Cutler's and Robertson's estimates, and 20% when using Groot's estimates. If the individual is not working, these percentages would be higher and equal 22.6% and 26% respectively. Similarly, the Eastern workers experience a lower relative income equivalent reduction than the Eastern non-workers for any given illness. The differences between Easterners and Westerners are also rather considerable, being higher for Working Westerners in comparison to Working Easterners, and for Non-working Easterners in comparison to Non-Working Westerners. A critical illness such as diabetes would decrease Western working individuals' well-being as much as reducing income by 59%, with Cutler and Richardson estimates, and 41% if using Groot's estimates.

Since the income equivalent is estimated as a percentage of income, it follows that individuals with higher income have, in absolute terms, a higher income equivalent for a health deterioration. The logarithmic specification of income, which causes this effect, is well accepted in utility theory, and in agreement with results in experimental psychology. In the field of income taxation it is the reason behind progressive taxation. This does not imply that society has to value the health of richer individuals more than that of poorer ones. The interested reader should notice that other complementary or alternative approaches such as monetary valuation of a life-year by means of on-going economic production, or WTP valued by means of CVM, lead also

to health valuations that depend on the income of the individual.

## 7. Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, we addressed the question of what is the value of health gains and losses, expressed in monetary terms. The subject has a long history in health economics. Torrance [27] in his now classical exposition distinguishes between 'economic benefits' and the 'value of health improvement per se'. It is 'the value to the patient, family or society of the health improvement itself, regardless of any economic consequences'.

There is a well-established protocol on how to assess the 'economic benefits', although there are still a lot of unsolved problems, where *ad hoc* decisions have to be made. The second type of benefits, also sometimes called 'intangibles', is still much more problematic, although it is generally felt that it is an important component as well. Neglect of this component 'because we do not know how to measure it' leads to a gross under valuation of health deterioration. When we look for the value of a health gain or loss the first question is who is the evaluator: the individual him or herself, the medical doctor, the family, or society? In our approach we focus on the individual, although we do not ignore that other parties are also involved. The persons themselves, however, are the only ones who can assess the *subjective* value of a health gain or loss. If other parties also benefit, for example, from the health improvement of a beloved person, their indirect benefit will be necessarily a function of the improvement the patient him or herself perceives. So we think that the information from self-reporting health gains and losses stands central in the question of how to evaluate changes in health.

Now there are two approaches to value health in monetary terms. The first one

is to assess the health change by means of a specific health scale. Here typically, the worst situation (mostly 'dead') is evaluated by zero and the best health by one. This is the so-called QALY-approach. We can say that a person's health has been improved by 0.20 QALY. A second stage is then to relate the money cost of the therapy with the QALY-gain, yielding a QALY per dollar output measure. In health economics there is not a generally accepted method of QALY measurement. Cutler and Richardson [3], quoting Neumann et al. [28] remark that 40% of the measurements are based on the subjective opinion of the doctor. Hence QALY-measurements from different studies are difficult to compare. If we wish to monetarise health in order to perform CBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) we are faced with the question how to translate QALY's in money terms. Monetarisation is then realised by, for example, looking at the economic output forgone per year (see, for example, [6,29]). A second approach to assess the monetary value of health is by a WTP study. This approach and its limitations are discussed in the health economics [6] and environmental economics literature [30].

Our approach is of a different flavour. What we really need is an (ordinal) utility function  $U(y, H)$  such that  $\frac{dU}{dy} / \frac{dU}{dH}$  is the trade-off, that is the shadow price of health in terms of money. If we have such an instrument, we have a 'money-metric' [31] for health and we may circumvent the 'monetarisation of QALY'-problem. In this paper this is precisely what we have done. We have estimated an ordinal utility function, or rather the corresponding net of indifference curves, such that changes in health satisfaction can be evaluated in terms of changes in general satisfaction and hence in terms of money. So we escape the problem of cardinal utility measurement (needed for the QALY approach). At the same time we are in principle able (although we borrowed in this paper relevant figures from Cutler and Richardson , [3] and

Groot, [5]) to evaluate health changes caused by specific medical states /diseases in terms of an ordinal variable health and to link changes in health satisfaction with equivalent changes in income. This approach is particularly useful for valuing health when we focus on the individual (and not the society as a whole). Such is the case in health damage insurance or lawsuits, which are of increasing importance.

The present method is not intended to make the QALY-methodology redundant, but rather it must be seen as a complement to the QALY-method, with itself remains necessary for the evaluation of medical therapies in terms of health gains.

Obviously this method is in its initial stage and should be validated. Moreover a number of refinements may be conceived of. Nevertheless, we think these first results sufficiently promising to bring them to the attention of our colleagues.

## References


1. Drummond MF, O'Brien BJ, Stoddart, GL, Torrance, GW. *Methods for the economic evaluation of health care programmes*. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1997.
2. Fryback, D.G. Methodological issues in measuring health status and health-related quality of life for population health measures: A brief overview of the "HALY family of measures. In *Summarizing Population Health: Directions for the Development and Application of Population Metrics*, Field M.G., Gold, M.R., (eds). National Academy Press: Washington DS, 1998; 39-57.
3. Cutler D, Richardson E. Measuring the health of the U.S. population. *Brooking Papers: Microeconomics* 1997; **1997**: 217-271.
4. Wit GA de, Busschbach JJV, Charro, FTh de. Sensitivity and perspective in the valuation of health status: whose values count?. *Health Economics* 2000; **9**: 109-126.
5. Groot W. Adaptation and scale of reference bias in self-assessments of quality of life. *Journal of Health Economics* 2000; **19**: 403-420.
6. Hurley J. An overview of the normative economics of the health sector. In *Handbook of Health Economics*, Culyer AJ, Newhouse JP (eds). Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.: Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2000; 55-118.
7. Praag BMS van, Frijters P, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. A structural model of well-being: with an application to German Data. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2000; No. 2000-053/3, the Netherlands.
8. Frijters P, *Explorations of welfare and well-being*. Thesis Publishers Amsterdam, 1999.

9. Deaton AS, Paxson CH. Ageing and Inequality in Income and Health. *American Economic Review* 1998; **88**: 248-253.
10. Groot and Maassen van den Brink The willingness to pay for migraine headache. presented at the Health Economics workshop at Bergen university, Norway, may 26-27, 2000.
11. Wagner GG, Burkhauser RV, Behringer F. The English language public use file of the German Socio-Economic Panel. *Journal of Human Resources* 1993; **28**: 429-433.
12. Hunt J, Determinants of non-employment and unemployment durations in East Germany. NBER Working Paper Series No. 7128 1999; Cambridge, MA.
13. Hunt J. Why do people still live in East Germany?. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper No. 123 2000; Bonn, Germany.
14. Cantril H. *The pattern of human concerns*. Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 1965.
15. Veenhoven R. World Database of Happiness. *Social Indicators Research* 1995; **34**: 299-313.
16. Terza, J. V. Estimating linear models with ordinal qualitative regressors. *Journal of Econometrics*, 1987; **34**: 275-291.
17. Maddala GS. *Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK, 1983.
18. Mundlak Y. On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data. *Econometrica* 1978; **46**: 69-85.
19. Clark AE, Oswald AJ. Unhappiness and Unemployment. *Economic Journal* 1994; **104**: 648-659.


20. Heckman J. The common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection, and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models. *The Annals of Economic and Social Measurement* 1976; **5**: 475-492.
21. Oswald AJ. Happiness and Economic Performance. *Economic Journal* 1997; **107**: 1815-31.
22. Plug EJS, van Praag BMS. Family equivalence scales within a narrow and broad welfare context. *Journal of Income Distribution* 1995; **4**: 171-186.
23. Frey BS, Stutzer A. Measuring preferences by subjective well-being. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 1999; **155**: 755-778.
24. Friedman M. *A theory of the consumption function*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1957.
25. Smith JP. Healthy bodies and thick wallets: the dual relation between health and economic status. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 1999; **13**: 145-166.
26. Kerkhofs M, Lindeboom M. Subjective health measures and state dependent reporting errors. *Health Economics* 1995; **4**: 221-235.
27. Torrance GW. Measurement of health state utilities for economic appraisal. *Journal of Health Economics* 1986; **5**: 1-30.
28. Neumann PJ, Zinner DE, Wright J. Forthcoming. Are methods for estimating QALYS improving?, *Medical Decision Making* 1997, **17**: 402-408.
29. Viscusi WK. The value of risks to life and health. *Journal of Economics Literature* 1993; **31**: 1912-1946.
30. Hausman JA (ed). *Contingent valuation, a critical assessment*. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.: Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 1993.
31. Samuelson P. Complementarity: An essay on the 40th anniversary of the Hicks-Allen revolution in demand theory. *Journal of Economic Literature* 1974; **69**: 255-89.



**Figure 1: Indifference curves, health-income**



**Figure 2: the effect of income on well-being**



**Table 1: Average and standard deviations of satisfaction levels and income in the GSOEP, 1992-1997**

|                                   | West Workers | East Workers | West<br>Non-Workers | East<br>Non-Workers |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| General Satisfaction              | 7.21 (1.632) | 6.46 (1.615) | 6.95 (1.947)        | 6.12 (1.970)        |
| Job Satisfaction                  | 7.15 (1.972) | 6.83 (2.074) |                     |                     |
| Financial Satisfaction            | 7.09 (1.887) | 6.28 (1.890) | 6.99 (2.120)        | 6.12 (2.136)        |
| Housing Satisfaction              | 7.42 (2.145) | 6.66 (2.297) | 7.57 (2.186)        | 6.96 (2.319)        |
| Health Satisfaction               | 7.06 (2.073) | 6.90 (1.941) | 6.27 (2.484)        | 5.94 (2.364)        |
| Leisure Satisfaction              | 6.40 (2.318) | 5.89 (2.392) | 7.48 (2.235)        | 7.18 (2.245)        |
| Environment Satisfaction          | 6.26 (2.008) | 4.99 (2.073) | 3.68 (2.065)        | 5.13 (2.174)        |
| Net Family Income (monthly in DM) | 4034 (2150)  | 3393 (1516)  | 3115 (2014)         | 2438 (1318)         |
| Number of Observations            | 29099        | 11668        | 19965               | 8021                |

**Table 2: General Satisfaction**

Ordered Probit with Individual Random Effect and Fix Time Effects

|                          | West Workers |                         | East Workers |                         | West Non-Workers |                         | East Non-Workers |                         |
|--------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
|                          | Estimate     | Estimate/<br>Std. Error | Estimate.    | Estimate/<br>Std. Error | Estimate         | Estimate/<br>Std. Error | Estimate.        | Estimate/<br>Std. Error |
| Constant                 | 4.147        | 86.317                  | 4.774        | 52.202                  | 3.860            | 87.905                  | 4.098            | 59.593                  |
| Dummy for 1992           | 0.250        | 10.212                  | -0.011       | -0.289                  | 0.220            | 7.670                   | -0.039           | -0.837                  |
| Dummy for 1993           | 0.189        | 8.268                   | -0.046       | -1.248                  | 0.184            | 6.677                   | -0.090           | -2.152                  |
| Dummy for 1994           | 0.118        | 4.961                   | 0.078        | 2.128                   | -0.007           | -0.235                  | -0.245           | -5.575                  |
| Dummy for 1995           | 0.139        | 6.085                   | 0.151        | 3.981                   | 0.064            | 2.401                   | -0.058           | -1.308                  |
| Dummy for 1996           | 0.121        | 5.140                   | 0.116        | 3.031                   | 0.068            | 2.497                   | 0.048            | 1.098                   |
| Job Satisfaction         | 0.265        | 17.128                  | 0.376        | 15.905                  | XXX              | XXX                     | XXX              | XXX                     |
| Finan. Satisfaction      | 0.244        | 15.954                  | 0.383        | 15.855                  | 0.243            | 15.003                  | 0.455            | 16.000                  |
| House Satisfaction       | 0.146        | 9.607                   | 0.238        | 9.748                   | 0.178            | 9.482                   | 0.387            | 12.739                  |
| Health Satisfaction      | 0.324        | 20.481                  | 0.297        | 11.494                  | 0.448            | 25.395                  | 0.548            | 17.800                  |
| Leis. Satisfaction       | 0.125        | 8.050                   | 0.168        | 6.725                   | 0.168            | 9.206                   | 0.354            | 12.396                  |
| Envir. Satisfaction      | 0.093        | 5.964                   | 0.186        | 7.270                   | 0.138            | 7.894                   | 0.293            | 10.131                  |
| Mean (Job S.)            | 0.087        | 5.316                   | 0.053        | 2.081                   | XXX              | XXX                     | XXX              | XXX                     |
| Mean (Financial S.)      | 0.393        | 21.416                  | 0.476        | 15.899                  | 0.517            | 27.413                  | 0.441            | 14.847                  |
| Mean (House S.)          | 0.002        | 0.130                   | -0.054       | -2.068                  | 0.022            | 1.026                   | -0.060           | -2.013                  |
| Mean (Health S.)         | 0.177        | 10.733                  | 0.148        | 5.092                   | 0.210            | 12.808                  | 0.111            | 3.965                   |
| Mean (Leisure S.)        | 0.099        | 6.049                   | 0.101        | 3.772                   | 0.014            | 0.736                   | 0.181            | 6.310                   |
| Mean (Environ. S.)       | -0.043       | -2.613                  | 0.038        | 1.389                   | -0.072           | -3.805                  | 0.018            | 0.617                   |
| Z                        | -0.067       | -0.923                  | -0.587       | -5.041                  | -0.278           | -3.475                  | -1.411           | -9.986                  |
| Std Deviation $v_i$      | 0.593        | 66.788                  | 0.585        | 38.602                  | 0.673            | 58.187                  | 0.628            | 34.186                  |
| Variance due to $v_i$ as | 0.260        |                         | 0.255        |                         | 0.312            |                         | 0.283            |                         |
| % of the total variance  |              |                         |              |                         |                  |                         |                  |                         |
| Number Observations      | 29636        |                         | 11941        |                         | 20427            |                         | 8335             |                         |
| Log Likelihood           | -43444       |                         | -18303       |                         | -33125           |                         | -14321           |                         |
| LogLik/Observation       | -1.466       |                         | -1.533       |                         | -1.622           |                         | -1.718           |                         |
| Num. Of Individuals      | 7995         |                         | 3157         |                         | 6353             |                         | 2651             |                         |

\* This is the minimum of the quadratic form in  $\ln(\text{age})$ .

**Table 3: Financial Satisfaction**

OLS with Individual Random Effect and Fix Time Effects

|                          | West Workers |                       | East Workers |                       | West Non-Workers |                       | East Non-Workers |                       |
|--------------------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------------|
|                          | Estimate     | Estimate/<br>Std. Dev | Estimate.    | Estimate/<br>Std. Dev | Estimate         | Estimate/<br>Std. Dev | Estimate.        | Estimate/<br>Std. Dev |
| Constant                 | 1.815        | 2.081                 | 1.404        | 1.03                  | 8.473            | 11.348                | 10.549           | 8.917                 |
| Dummy for 1992           | 0.214        | 13.308                | -0.076       | -2.904                | 0.078            | 3.800                 | -0.232           | -6.485                |
| Dummy for 1993           | 0.105        | 6.352                 | 0.007        | 0.248                 | 0.117            | 5.493                 | -0.140           | -4.171                |
| Dummy for 1994           | 0.054        | 3.266                 | -0.288       | -11.195               | 0.181            | 8.583                 | -0.021           | -0.641                |
| Dummy for 1995           | 0.035        | 2.146                 | -0.030       | -1.189                | 0.117            | 5.715                 | -0.012           | -0.369                |
| Dummy for 1996           | 0.015        | 0.846                 | -0.025       | -0.932                | 0.021            | 0.923                 | -0.081           | -2.302                |
| Ln(age)                  | -2.830       | -5.71                 | -2.677       | -3.455                | -6.833           | -16.667               | -7.255           | -11.337               |
| Ln(age) ^ 2              | 0.373        | 5.343                 | 0.336        | 3.061                 | 0.941            | 16.730                | 0.992            | 11.342                |
| <i>Min. Age*</i>         | 44.596       |                       | 53.876       |                       | 37.791           |                       | 38.684           |                       |
| Ln(family income)        | 0.120        | 5.496                 | 0.231        | 6.109                 | 0.122            | 4.397                 | 0.205            | 4.077                 |
| Ln(yrs. education)       | 0.116        | 2.797                 | -0.032       | -0.485                | 0.141            | 2.559                 | -0.273           | -3.520                |
| Ln(adults)               | -0.087       | -4.124                | -0.139       | -3.617                | -0.013           | -0.435                | -0.068           | -1.139                |
| Ln(children+1)           | -0.359       | -1.731                | 0.018        | 0.052                 | -0.341           | -1.409                | -0.289           | -0.607                |
| ln(f.inc.)*ln(ch.+1)     | 0.038        | 1.551                 | -0.021       | -0.493                | 0.034            | 1.143                 | 0.025            | 0.426                 |
| Gender                   | -0.023       | -1.394                | -0.037       | -1.698                | -0.152           | -7.159                | -0.086           | -3.015                |
| Ln(Savings)              | 0.015        | 6.28                  | 0.017        | 4.246                 | 0.018            | 5.318                 | 0.024            | 4.283                 |
| Living together?         | 0.094        | 4.777                 | 0.172        | 4.267                 | 0.140            | 7.192                 | 0.054            | 1.528                 |
| More than 1 Earner       | -0.015       | -0.854                | -0.073       | -2.292                |                  |                       |                  |                       |
| Mean (ln(f.inc))         | 0.262        | 8.2                   | 0.225        | 4.289                 | 0.291            | 7.402                 | 0.157            | 2.372                 |
| Mean (ln(savings))       | 0.043        | 9.899                 | 0.031        | 4.614                 | 0.050            | 8.858                 | 0.045            | 5.137                 |
| Mean (ln(ch+1))          | -0.080       | -2.498                | -0.154       | -2.803                | -0.207           | -4.822                | -0.253           | -3.301                |
| Mean (ln(adults))        | -0.065       | -2.283                | 0.042        | 0.893                 | -0.127           | -3.212                | -0.023           | -0.324                |
| Std Deviation $v_i$      | 0.564        |                       | 0.463        |                       | 0.620            |                       | 0.495            |                       |
| Variance due to $v_i$ as | 0.745        |                       | 0.287        |                       | 0.386            |                       | 0.279            |                       |
| % of the total variance  |              |                       |              |                       |                  |                       |                  |                       |
| Number Observations      | 30622        |                       | 12357        |                       | 20867            |                       | 8536             |                       |
| R-squared: within        | 0.014        |                       | 0.035        |                       | 0.011            |                       | 0.037            |                       |
| R-squared: between       | 0.116        |                       | 0.132        |                       | 0.181            |                       | 0.201            |                       |
| R-squared: overall       | 0.074        |                       | 0.080        |                       | 0.146            |                       | 0.142            |                       |
| Num. Of Individuals      | 8148         |                       | 3236         |                       | 6419             |                       | 2699             |                       |

\* This is the minimum of the quadratic form in ln(age).

**Table 4: Health Satisfaction**

OLS with Individual Random Effect and Fix Time Effects

|   | West Workers |                         | East Workers |                         | West Non-Workers |                         | East Non-Workers |                         |
|---|--------------|-------------------------|--------------|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|
|   | Estimate     | Estimate/<br>Std. Error | Estimate.    | Estimate/<br>Std. Error | Estimate         | Estimate/<br>Std. Error | Estimate.        | Estimate/<br>Std. Error |
| Constant  | -1.121       | -1.333                  | -0.935       | -0.712                  | 5.254            | 7.357                   | 2.731            | 2.315                   |
| Dummy for 1992                                      | 0.016        | 1.148                   | 0.132        | 6.366                   | 0.001            | 0.037                   | 0.021            | 0.746                   |
| Dummy for 1993                                      | -0.008       | -0.577                  | 0.109        | 5.213                   | 0.021            | 1.211                   | 0.053            | 2.021                   |
| Dummy for 1994                                      | -0.002       | -0.139                  | 0.042        | 2.050                   | -0.003           | -0.179                  | 0.023            | 0.914                   |
| Dummy for 1995                                      | -0.002       | -0.130                  | 0.039        | 1.955                   | 0.000            | 0.000                   | -0.005           | -0.193                  |
| Dummy for 1996                                      | -0.035       | -2.374                  | 0.029        | 1.329                   | -0.001           | -0.031                  | 0.050            | 1.803                   |
| Ln(age)   | 0.852        | 1.778                   | 0.627        | 0.834                   | -2.536           | -6.446                  | -1.125           | -1.741                  |
| Ln(age) ^ 2   | -0.238       | -3.531                  | -0.207       | -1.940                  | 0.210            | 3.891                   | 0.023            | 0.260                   |
| <i>Max.Age*</i>                                     | 5.976        |                         | 4.560        |                         | 424.307          |                         | 4.E+10           |                         |
| Ln(family income)                                   | 0.004        | 0.232                   | 0.032        | 1.175                   | -0.009           | -0.456                  | 0.015            | 0.399                   |
| Ln(yrs. education)                                  | 0.131        | 3.068                   | 0.193        | 2.697                   | 0.233            | 4.215                   | 0.273            | 3.359                   |
| Ln(children+1)                                      | 0.012        | 0.063                   | -0.147       | -0.494                  | -0.222           | -1.067                  | 0.814            | 1.999                   |
| ln(f.inc.)*ln(ch.+1)                                | 0.000        | 0.005                   | 0.017        | 0.469                   | 0.027            | 1.060                   | -0.095           | -1.862                  |
| Gender  | 0.082        | 4.928                   | 0.104        | 4.301                   | -0.001           | -0.025                  | 0.027            | 0.878                   |
| Living together?                                    | -0.011       | -0.843                  | 0.017        | 0.634                   | 0.044            | 2.492                   | -0.003           | -0.099                  |
| Ln(Savings)   | 0.006        | 2.748                   | -0.002       | -0.480                  | 0.008            | 3.014                   | 0.003            | 0.582                   |
| Mean (ln(f.inc))                                    | 0.097        | 3.236                   | 0.071        | 1.432                   | 0.069            | 1.944                   | 0.020            | 0.325                   |
| Mean (ln(ch+1))                                     | 0.019        | 0.773                   | -0.096       | -2.209                  | -0.012           | -0.395                  | -0.149           | -2.690                  |
| Mean (ln(savings))                                  | 0.018        | 4.355                   | 0.014        | 2.108                   | 0.020            | 3.749                   | 0.017            | 2.096                   |
| Std Deviation $v_i$                                 | 0.643        |                         | 0.595        |                         | 0.702            |                         | 0.658            |                         |
| Variance due to $v_i$ as<br>% of the total variance | 0.515        |                         | 0.513        |                         | 0.549            |                         | 0.532            |                         |
| Number Observations                                 | 30669        |                         | 12359        |                         | 20883            |                         | 8532             |                         |
| R-squared: within                                   | 0.008        |                         | 0.023        |                         | 0.006            |                         | 0.009            |                         |
| R-squared: between                                  | 0.126        |                         | 0.124        |                         | 0.274            |                         | 0.262            |                         |
| R-squared: overall                                  | 0.083        |                         | 0.090        |                         | 0.191            |                         | 0.174            |                         |
| Num. Of Individuals                                 | 8153         |                         | 3238         |                         | 6424             |                         | 2705             |                         |

\* This is the minimum of the quadratic form in ln(age).

**Table 5: Level Effects of DS on GS**

| Level Effects              | West Workers | East Workers | West<br>Non-Workers | East<br>Non-Workers |
|----------------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Job Satisfaction           | 0.352        | 0.429        | XXX                 | XXX                 |
| Financial Satisfaction     | 0.637        | 0.859        | 0.760               | 0.896               |
| House Satisfaction         | 0.148        | 0.184        | 0.200               | 0.327               |
| Health Satisfaction        | 0.501        | 0.445        | 0.658               | 0.659               |
| Leisure Satisfaction       | 0.224        | 0.269        | 0.182               | 0.535               |
| Environmental Satisfaction | 0.050        | 0.221        | 0.066               | 0.311               |

**Table 6: Income effects on DS and GS**

| Level Income Effects<br>on GS and on each DS | West<br>Workers | East<br>Workers | West<br>Non-Workers | East<br>Non-Workers |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Job Satisfaction                             | 0.238           | 0.247           |                     |                     |
| Financial Satisfaction                       | 0.398           | 0.448           | 0.423               | 0.236               |
| House Satisfaction                           | 0.297           | 0.113           | 0.414               | 0.225               |
| Health Satisfaction                          | 0.101           | 0.110           | 0.068               | 0.016               |
| Leisure Satisfaction                         | 0.064           | 0.052           | 0.062               | 0.100               |
| Environmental Satisfaction                   | 0.211           | 0.186           | 0.108               | 0.043               |



**Table 7: Health-income multipliers**

|            | West Workers | East Workers | West<br>Non-Workers | East<br>Non-Workers |
|------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|            | $k_{ww}$     | $k_{ew}$     | $k_{wnw}$           | $k_{enw}$           |
| Multiplier | 1.098        | 0.723        | 1.409               | 1.819               |

**Table 8: Value of Illness as % of current income (US)**

| Disease, Coefficients from<br>Cutler and Richardson (1997),<br>Corrected for Std. Deviation | West Workers | East Workers | West<br>Non-Workers | East<br>Non-Workers | Disease<br>Coeff. |
|---|--------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Arthritis   | 0.429        | 0.290        | 0.523               | 0.613               | -0.578            |
| Skin Conditions   | 0.263        | 0.170        | 0.332               | 0.404               | -0.315            |
| Diabetes  | 0.593        | 0.423        | 0.695               | 0.782               | -0.927            |
| Other endocrine   | 0.395        | 0.265        | 0.485               | 0.573               | -0.518            |
| Hypertension  | 0.305        | 0.200        | 0.381               | 0.460               | -0.375            |
| Ischemic heart disease  | 0.546        | 0.383        | 0.647               | 0.737               | -0.814            |
| Stroke  | 0.489        | 0.337        | 0.588               | 0.679               | -0.692            |
| Other circulatory   | 0.408        | 0.275        | 0.500               | 0.588               | -0.541            |
| Asthma  | 0.497        | 0.343        | 0.596               | 0.687               | -0.708            |
| Bronchitis  | 0.301        | 0.197        | 0.377               | 0.455               | -0.37             |
| Sinusitis   | 0.170        | 0.108        | 0.218               | 0.270               | -0.192            |
| Other respiratory   | 0.262        | 0.170        | 0.330               | 0.402               | -0.313            |
| Digestive   | 0.471        | 0.322        | 0.568               | 0.659               | -0.656            |
| Hearing Impairments   | 0.176        | 0.112        | 0.226               | 0.280               | -0.200            |
| Amputee Impairments   | 0.253        | 0.164        | 0.320               | 0.390               | -0.301            |
| Paralysed Impairments   | 0.571        | 0.404        | 0.673               | 0.761               | -0.873            |
| Orthopaedic Impairments   | 0.276        | 0.179        | 0.347               | 0.421               | -0.333            |
| $\sqrt{\mathbf{s}^2(\mathbf{e}) + \mathbf{s}^2(\nu)}$ of HS eq.                             | 0.884        | 0.820        | 0.909               | 0.902               |                   |

**Table 9: Value of Illness as % of current income (UK)**

| Disease, Coefficients from Groot (2000), Corrected for Std. Deviation | West Workers | East Workers | West Non-Workers | East Non-Workers | Disease Coeff. |
|---|--------------|--------------|------------------|------------------|----------------|
| Problems with arms, legs, etc.  | 0.449        | 0.305        | 0.544            | 0.635            | -0.614         |
| Difficulty in seeing  | 0.205        | 0.131        | 0.262            | 0.322            | -0.237         |
| Difficulty in hearing   | 0.205        | 0.131        | 0.262            | 0.322            | -0.237         |
| Skin conditions, allergies  | 0.120        | 0.075        | 0.155            | 0.195            | -0.132         |
| Chest, breathing problems   | 0.393        | 0.263        | 0.483            | 0.570            | -0.515         |
| Heart, blood  | 0.467        | 0.319        | 0.564            | 0.655            | -0.648         |
| Stomach, liver, kidney  | 0.574        | 0.407        | 0.676            | 0.764            | -0.88          |
| Diabetes  | 0.414        | 0.279        | 0.507            | 0.596            | -0.552         |
| Nerves, anxiety, depression   | 0.488        | 0.336        | 0.587            | 0.678            | -0.691         |
| Alcohol, drugs  | 0.430        | 0.291        | 0.524            | 0.614            | -0.58          |
| Epilepsy  | 0.422        | 0.285        | 0.515            | 0.605            | -0.566         |
| Migraine, chronic headaches   | 0.233        | 0.150        | 0.295            | 0.361            | -0.273         |
| $\sqrt{\mathbf{s}^2(\mathbf{e}) + \mathbf{s}^2(\nu)}$ of HS eq.       | 0.884        | 0.820        | 0.909            | 0.902            |                |

## IZA Discussion Papers

| No  | Author(s)                                 | Titel  | Area | Date  |
|-----|---|--|------|-------|
| 231 | G. Saint-Paul                             | The Economics of Human Cloning   | 5    | 12/00 |
| 232 | E. Bardasi<br>M. Francesconi              | The Effect of Non-Standard Employment on Mental Health in Britain  | 5    | 12/00 |
| 233 | C. Dustmann<br>C. M. Schmidt              | The Wage Performance of Immigrant Women: Full-Time Jobs, Part-Time Jobs, and the Role of Selection                     | 1    | 12/00 |
| 234 | R. Rotte<br>M. Steininger                 | Sozioökonomische Determinanten extremistischer Wahlerfolge in Deutschland: Das Beispiel der Europawahlen 1994 und 1999 | 3    | 12/00 |
| 235 | W. Schnedler                              | Who gets the Reward? An Empirical Exploration of Bonus Pay and Task Characteristics                                    | 5    | 12/00 |
| 236 | R. Hujer<br>M. Caliendo                   | Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policy: Methodological Concepts and Empirical Estimates                             | 6    | 12/00 |
| 237 | S. Klasen<br>I. Woolard                   | Surviving Unemployment without State Support: Unemployment and Household Formation in South Africa                     | 3    | 12/00 |
| 238 | R. Euwals<br>A. Börsch-Supan<br>A. Eymann | The Saving Behaviour of Two Person Households: Evidence from Dutch Panel Data  | 5    | 12/00 |
| 239 | F. Andersson<br>K. A. Konrad              | Human Capital Investment and Globalization in Extortionary States  | 5    | 01/01 |
| 240 | W. Koeniger                               | Labor and Financial Market Interactions: The Case of Labor Income Risk and Car Insurance in the UK 1969-95             | 5    | 01/01 |
| 241 | W. Koeniger                               | Trade, Labor Market Rigidities, and Government-Financed Technological Change   | 2    | 01/01 |
| 242 | G. Faggio<br>J. Konings                   | Job Creation, Job Destruction and Employment Growth in Transition Countries in the 90's                                | 4    | 01/01 |
| 243 | E. Brainerd                               | Economic Reform and Mortality in the Former Soviet Union: A Study of the Suicide Epidemic in the 1990s                 | 4    | 01/01 |
| 244 | S. M. Fuess, Jr.<br>M. Millea             | Pay and Productivity in a Corporatist Economy: Evidence from Austria   | 5    | 01/01 |

|     |  |  |     |       |
|-----|--|--|-----|-------|
| 245 | F. Andersson<br>K. A. Konrad               | Globalization and Human Capital Formation  | 5   | 01/01 |
| 246 | E. Plug<br>W. Vijverberg                   | Schooling, Family Background, and Adoption:<br>Does Family Income Matter?  | 5   | 01/01 |
| 247 | E. Plug<br>W. Vijverberg                   | Schooling, Family Background, and Adoption:<br>Is it Nature or is it Nurture?                                    | 5   | 01/01 |
| 248 | P. M. Picard<br>E. Toulemonde              | The Impact of Labor Markets on Emergence and<br>Persistence of Regional Asymmetries                              | 2   | 01/01 |
| 249 | B. M. S. van Praag<br>P. Cardoso           | “Should I Pay for You or for Myself?”<br>The Optimal Level and Composition of<br>Retirement Benefit Systems      | 3   | 01/01 |
| 250 | T. J. Hatton<br>J. G. Williamson           | Demographic and Economic Pressure on<br>Emigration out of Africa   | 1   | 01/01 |
| 251 | R. Yemtsov                                 | Labor Markets, Inequality and Poverty in Georgia   | 4   | 01/01 |
| 252 | R. Yemtsov                                 | Inequality and Income Distribution in Georgia  | 4   | 01/01 |
| 253 | R. Yemtsov                                 | Living Standards and Economic Vulnerability in<br>Turkey between 1987 and 1994                                   | 4   | 01/01 |
| 254 | H. Gersbach<br>A. Schniewind               | Learning of General Equilibrium Effects and the<br>Unemployment Trap   | 3   | 02/01 |
| 255 | H. Gersbach<br>A. Schniewind               | Product Market Reforms and Unemployment in<br>Europe   | 3   | 02/01 |
| 256 | T. Boeri<br>H. Brücker                     | Eastern Enlargement and EU-Labour Markets:<br>Perceptions, Challenges and Opportunities                          | 2   | 02/01 |
| 257 | T. Boeri                                   | Transition with Labour Supply  | 4   | 02/01 |
| 258 | M. Rosholm<br>K. Scott<br>L. Husted        | The Times They Are A-Changin’:<br>Organizational Change and Immigrant<br>Employment Opportunities in Scandinavia | 1   | 02/01 |
| 259 | A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell<br>B. M.S. van Praag | Poverty in the Russian Federation  | 4   | 02/01 |
| 260 | P. Cahuc<br>F. Postel-Vinay                | Temporary Jobs, Employment Protection and<br>Labor Market Performance  | 1/3 | 02/01 |

|     |                              |   |   |       |
|-----|------------------------------|---|---|-------|
| 261 | M. Lindahl                   | Home versus School Learning:<br>A New Approach to Estimating the Effect of<br>Class Size on Achievement | 5 | 02/01 |
| 262 | M. Lindahl                   | Summer Learning and the Effect of Schooling:<br>Evidence from Sweden                                    | 5 | 02/01 |
| 263 | N. Datta Gupta<br>N. Smith   | Children and Career Interruptions:<br>The Family Gap in Denmark   | 5 | 02/01 |
| 264 | C. Dustmann                  | Return Migration, Wage Differentials, and the<br>Optimal Migration Duration                             | 1 | 02/01 |
| 265 | M. Rosholm<br>M. Svarer      | Structurally Dependent Competing Risks  | 1 | 02/01 |
| 266 | C. Dustmann<br>O. Kirchkamp  | The Optimal Migration Duration and Activity<br>Choice after Re-migration                                | 1 | 02/01 |
| 267 | A. Newell                    | The Distribution of Wages in Transition Countries   | 4 | 03/01 |
| 268 | A. Newell<br>B. Reilly       | The Gender Pay Gap in the Transition from<br>Communism: Some Empirical Evidence                         | 4 | 03/01 |
| 269 | H. Buddelmeyer               | Re-employment Dynamics of Disabled Workers  | 3 | 03/01 |
| 270 | B. Augurzky<br>C. M. Schmidt | The Evaluation of Community-Based<br>Interventions: A Monte Carlo Study                                 | 6 | 03/01 |
| 271 | B. Augurzky<br>C. M. Schmidt | The Propensity Score: A Means to An End   | 6 | 03/01 |
| 272 | C. Belzil<br>J. Hansen       | Heterogeneous Returns to Human Capital and<br>Dynamic Self-Selection                                    | 5 | 03/01 |
| 273 | G. Saint-Paul                | Distribution and Growth in an Economy with<br>Limited Needs   | 5 | 03/01 |
| 274 | P. J. Pedersen<br>N. Smith   | Unemployment Traps: Do Financial Dis-<br>incentives Matter?   | 3 | 03/01 |
| 275 | G. S. Epstein<br>T. Lecker   | Multi-Generation Model of Immigrant Earnings:<br>Theory and Application                                 | 1 | 03/01 |
| 276 | B. Amable<br>D. Gatti        | The Impact of Product Market Competition on<br>Employment and Wages                                     | 5 | 03/01 |

|     |   |  |   |       |
|-----|---|--|---|-------|
| 277 | R. Winter-Ebmer                                   | Evaluating an Innovative Redundancy-Retraining Project: The Austrian Steel Foundation                          | 6 | 03/01 |
| 278 | T. M. Andersen                                    | Welfare Policies, Labour Taxation and International Integration  | 2 | 04/01 |
| 279 | T. M. Andersen                                    | Product Market Integration, Wage Dispersion and Unemployment   | 2 | 04/01 |
| 280 | P. Apps<br>R. Rees                                | Household Saving and Full Consumption over the Life Cycle  | 7 | 04/01 |
| 281 | G. Saint-Paul                                     | Information Technology and the Knowledge Elites  | 5 | 04/01 |
| 282 | J. Albrecht<br>A. Björklund<br>S. Vroman          | Is There a Glass Ceiling in Sweden?  | 5 | 04/01 |
| 283 | M. Hagedorn<br>A. Kaul<br>V. Reinthaler           | Welfare Analysis in a Schumpeterian Growth Model with Capital  | 7 | 04/01 |
| 284 | H. Rapoport<br>A. Weiss                           | The Optimal Size for a Minority  | 1 | 04/01 |
| 285 | J. Jerger<br>C. Pohnke<br>A. Spermann             | Gut betreut in den Arbeitsmarkt?<br>Eine mikroökonomische Evaluation der Mannheimer Arbeitsvermittlungsagentur | 5 | 04/01 |
| 286 | M. Fertig<br>C. M. Schmidt                        | First- and Second-Generation Migrants in Germany –What Do We Know and What Do People Think                     | 1 | 04/01 |
| 287 | P. Guggenberger<br>A. Kaul<br>M. Kolmar           | Efficiency Properties of Labor Taxation in a Spatial Model of Restricted Labor Mobility                        | 3 | 04/01 |
| 288 | D. A. Cobb-Clark                                  | Getting Ahead: The Determinants of and Payoffs to Internal Promotion for Young U.S. Men and Women              | 5 | 04/01 |
| 289 | L. Cameron<br>D. A. Cobb-Clark                    | Old-Age Support in Developing Countries: Labor Supply, Intergenerational Transfers and Living Arrangements     | 3 | 04/01 |
| 290 | D. A. Cobb-Clark<br>M. D. Connolly<br>C. Worswick | The Job Search and Education Investments of Immigrant Families   | 1 | 04/01 |

|     |  |   |   |       |
|-----|--|---|---|-------|
| 291 | R. T. Riphahn  | Cohort Effects in the Educational Attainment of Second Generation Immigrants in Germany: An Analysis of Census Data | 1 | 05/01 |
| 292 | E. Wasmer  | Between-group Competition in the Labor Market and the Rising Returns to Skill: US and France 1964-2000              | 5 | 05/01 |
| 293 | D. Cobb-Clark<br>T. F. Crossley                      | Gender, Comparative Advantage and Labor Market Activity in Immigrant Families                                       | 1 | 05/01 |
| 294 | Š. Jurajda   | Estimating the Effect of Unemployment Insurance Compensation on the Labor Market Histories of Displaced Workers     | 3 | 05/01 |
| 295 | F. Duffy<br>P. P. Walsh                              | Individual Pay and Outside Options: Evidence from the Polish Labour Force Survey                                    | 4 | 05/01 |
| 296 | H. S. Nielsen<br>M. Rosholm<br>N. Smith<br>L. Husted | Intergenerational Transmissions and the School-to-Work transition of 2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation Immigrants          | 1 | 05/01 |
| 297 | J. C. van Ours<br>J. Veenman                         | The Educational Attainment of Second Generation Immigrants in The Netherlands                                       | 1 | 05/01 |
| 298 | P. Telhado Pereira<br>P. Silva Martins               | Returns to Education and Wage Equations   | 5 | 06/01 |
| 299 | G. Brunello<br>C. Lucifora<br>R. Winter-Ebmer        | The Wage Expectations of European College Students  | 5 | 06/01 |
| 300 | A. Stutzer<br>R. Lalive                              | The Role of Social Work Norms in Job Searching and Subjective Well-Being<br>The Role of Social Work                 | 5 | 06/01 |
| 301 | J. R. Frick<br>G.G. Wagner                           | Economic and Social Perspectives of Immigrant Children in Germany   | 1 | 06/01 |
| 302 | G. S. Epstein<br>A. Weiss                            | A Theory of Immigration Amnesties   | 1 | 06/01 |
| 303 | G. A. Pfann<br>B. F. Blumberg                        | Social Capital and the Uncertainty Reduction of Self-Employment   | 5 | 06/01 |
| 304 | P. Cahuc<br>E. Wasmer                                | Labour Market Efficiency, Wages and Employment when Search Frictions Interact with Intra-firm Bargaining            | 2 | 06/01 |



|     |  |  |     |       |
|-----|--|--|-----|-------|
| 305 | H. Bonin   | Fiskalische Effekte der Zuwanderung nach Deutschland: Eine Generationenbilanz  | 1   | 06/01 |
| 306 | H. Bonin<br>G. Abío<br>E. Berenguer<br>J. Gil<br>C. Patxot | Is the Deficit under Control? A Generational Accounting Perspective on Fiscal Policy and Labour Market Trends in Spain | 2   | 06/01 |
| 307 | G. A. Pfann  | Downsizing   | 1/5 | 06/01 |
| 308 | G. A. Pfann<br>D. S. Hamermesh                             | Two-Sided Learning, Labor Turnover and Worker Displacement   | 1   | 06/01 |
| 309 | G. Brunello  | On the Complementarity between Education and Training in Europe  | 5   | 06/01 |
| 310 | U. Sunde   | Human Capital Accumulation, Education and Earnings Inequality  | 5   | 06/01 |
| 311 | G. Brunello  | Unemployment, Education and Earnings Growth  | 3   | 06/01 |
| 312 | C. Furnée<br>M. Kemler<br>G. A. Pfann                      | The Value of Pain Relief   | 5   | 06/01 |
| 313 | A. Ferrer-i-Carbonell<br>B. M.S. van Praag                 | The Subjective Costs of Health Losses due to Chronic Diseases: An Alternative Model for Monetary Appraisal             | 7   | 06/01 |