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Changing male perceptions of gender equality

Evidence from an experimental study

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Abstract: Reducing gender inequality is a critically important development challenge, especially in countries with widespread and deep-rooted prejudices against women. In this study, we use a randomized control trial to examine whether facilitating Vietnamese men to reflect about gender equality can reduce their gender bias. We randomly selected two groups of husbands and requested one group to make comments on gender-related laws and another group to write stories about gender equality. We find that commenting on gender-related laws reduces men's bias against women slightly, while writing stories has a strong effect on reducing existing prejudice against women. Moreover, writing gender-related stories improves men's knowledge of gender-related laws. Nonetheless, there is only a small effect of this treatment on doing housework. Changing men's behaviour in practice requires stronger, more sustained interventions.

Keywords: gender inequality, male perception, experimental design, women empowerment, cognitive dissonance **JEL classification:** J16, K38, D91, C93

Reference is made to the paper's online appendix HERE.

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The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research provides economic analysis and policy advice with the aim of promoting sustainable and equitable development. The Institute began operations in 1985 in Helsinki, Finland, as the first research and training centre of the United Nations University. Today it is a unique blend of think tank, research institute, and UN agency—providing a range of services from policy advice to governments as well as freely available original research.

1 Introduction

Gender equality is one of the critically important Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that countries throughout the world aim to achieve, and it is widely recognized that there is a two-way relationship between gender equality and economic development (Duflo 2012). Empirical studies show that a positive relation between gender equality in education and economic growth exists (see, for example, Appiah and McMahon 2002; Klasen 2002; Duflo 2012; Diebolt and Perrin 2013). At the same time, gender inequality is higher in low-income countries, especially in Asia and Africa.

Discrimination against women may happen from sex selection and abortion in utero (World Bank 2012) to less breastfeeding (Jayachandran and Kuziemko 2011) and education during childhood (Duflo 2012). It is widely documented that women are less likely to participate in labour markets and earn less income (World Bank 2012). Prejudice and limited economic influence cause women to have less power than men in most decisions in families and societies.

Policy makers as well as researchers have long been interested in different policies and programmes to reduce gender inequality (e.g. World Bank 2012; Addison et al. 2016; Sharma and Tarp 2018). Eswaran (2014) discusses several programmes to empower women such as education, credit, family planning, increasing the political participation of women, reform of inheritance, and property laws. In this study, we provide evidence on an alternative approach to reducing gender inequality: that of trying to change the perceptions and comportment of men.

We aim to establish whether it is possible through two specific interventions to help change the bias of husbands on gender equality, and in turn alter their behaviour with a view to promoting gender equality. A randomized control trial design is relied on together with data from the 2016 Viet Nam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS).¹ Two groups of husbands (treatment groups) were randomly selected. The first group was asked to read and comment on selected articles of the 2006 Law on Gender Equality and the 2007 Law on Domestic Violence Prevention and Control. The second group was tasked with writing virtuous stories on gender equality. Subsequently, we used the 2018 VARHS data to measure the impact of these two interventions on perceptions about gender issues and the behaviour of husbands. The key result is that commenting on gender-related laws reduces men's prejudice slightly, while writing stories has a strong effect on reducing prejudice against women. Writing gender-related stories also improves the knowledge of gender-related laws, and there is a small effect of the treatment on doing housework.

Our study aims to make several contributions to the literature on gender equality development. First, we show that interventions targeted towards men can improve their gender perceptions and help reduce gender inequality. Most other studies have focused on interventions targeted towards women. There are several studies that provide men with group education on health and family planning. However, there are only a few rigorous impact evaluations of these interventions and the findings remain mixed (e.g. see review from World Health Organization 2007 and Ricardo et al. 2011). Instead of providing education for men, our study lets them be more active in obtaining knowledge of gender equality through commenting on legal documents and writing stories of gender issues. To our knowledge, our interventions are a unique attempt to change men's

¹ Randomized designs can provide the estimator for the impact of intervention with highly robust internal validity (Abhijit et al. 2008; Duflo et al. 2008).

perceptions and behaviour as regards gender equality. Arguably, to reduce gender equality effectively, programmes and policies should be targeted both at women and men.

Second, there are a number of influential studies which show that exposure to female leaders may reduce the bias against female leaders for both men and women (Beaman et al. 2009; Latu et al. 2013; Gangadharan et al. 2016). We wish to analyse whether self-exposure to legal documents and gender equality can change men's perceptions and attitudes towards gender issues. An underlying theory for this is contained in the literature on cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957, 1962) and self-perception (Bem 1972). According to this theory, a person who is exposed to opposing beliefs will be motivated to try to reduce this contradiction. When husbands are required in our study to comment and write stories on gender equality, they are likely to think and look for suggestions and stories about gender equality; and the more time they spend on this issue, the more likely it is that they change their gender views. In turn, if it is possible to change the gender perception and attitude of husbands, their behaviour on gender-related household chores may change.

Third, there is an influential hypothesis that people's participation in the rule-making process can increase their compliance with the rules (e.g. Fishkin 1991; Moorman et al. 1998; Malesky and Taussig 2017), and our study provides supportive evidence for this hypothesis. In this study, the participation regarding the legal framework on gender issues is achieved through the commenting on gender-related laws, and we found that this intervention does indeed help to reduce gender bias and prejudice of men, albeit at a small magnitude.

Fourth, several studies have found a significant effect of different gender-related laws on women. For example, Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) find a strongly reducing effect of divorce law reforms (allowing for unilateral divorce) on female suicide and domestic violence. Land titling with joint names of husbands and wives can increase labour participation for women in Viet Nam (Menon et al. 2016) and reduce fertility in Peru (Field 2007). To increase the effectiveness of gender-related laws, both men and women must be aware of these laws. In this study, around two-thirds of married men in Viet Nam know about the existence of the 2006 Law on Gender Equality and the 2007 Law on Domestic Violence Prevention and Control. By showing an effect, albeit at a small magnitude, of knowing the laws on male attitudes to gender equality, our study highlights the important role of disseminating information on gender-related laws to people.

Viet Nam is an interesting country case from which to learn. Viet Nam has achieved significant success in promoting gender equality and empowering women, and compared to other countries at similar levels of economic development Viet Nam has achieved higher gender development indexes. According to United Nations Human Development Report 2007/2008, Viet Nam was ranked 105th according to the Human Development Index, while the Gender-related Development Index ranked Viet Nam as 92nd among 177 countries (United Nations 2008). This said, large gender inequalities continue to exist. Many Vietnamese prefer boys to girls (Guilmoto 2012), and the sex ratio at birth (SRB) has been growing gradually and increasingly. The results of the 2009 Population and Housing Census data analysis have shown that the SRB in Viet Nam increased to 110.6 boys per 100 girls in 2009. This is significantly higher than the natural range of 104-106 boys per 100 girls (GSO 2011). Moreover, Nguyen and Tran (2017) find that families tend to continue to have children until they get a boy, and although there is almost no difference in school enrolment between boys and girls, gender gaps in employment remain. Wages for women were 15-20 per cent lower than for men with similar education and experience (Gallup 2002; Nguyen 2012). Disconcertingly, according to GSO (2011), about 32 per cent of married women have suffered violence from husbands or partners.

The government of Viet Nam was committed to promoting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and is now focused on the SDGs to 'Achieve gender equality and empower all women

and girls'. Two key laws related to gender issues have been approved. The first is the Law on Gender Equality which was approved by the National Assembly on 29 November 2006. According to this law, women are encouraged to work and are supported with credit and agricultural extension. Enterprises which use more female labourers receive preferential tax and finance. The second law is the Family Violence Prevention Law which was approved by the National Assembly on 21 November 2007. This law stipulates measures to promote family violence prevention, and the protection of and help to victims of family violence. One implication of our study is that more dissemination activities for both men and women are needed to increase compliance with these laws.

This paper is structured as follows. After this introductory section, Section 2 provides a brief overview of several interventions to empower women and reduce gender inequality. It also reviews relevant studies on gender issues in Viet Nam. Section 3 discusses the experimental design used here, while Section 4 presents the data set and the descriptive analysis. Section 5 describes the estimation method, and Section 6 offers the empirical findings. Finally, Section 7 concludes and summarizes our policy implications.

2 Literature review

To reduce gender inequality, a wide range of policies and programmes have been implemented by different countries. Typically these programmes and policies are targeted at women. One group of programmes is focused on increasing the human capital of women, and better health and education for girls is important in this context. Most countries have committed to the MDGs and SDGs on education for both boys and girls. Mortality rates have been reduced and education has indeed improved for girls (World Bank 2012). Training programmes are also provided for women (e.g. Field et al. 2010), and affirmative actions are pursued to increase the involvement of women into different programmes and activities (Eswaran 2014).

Women are less likely to have legal rights to property than men (e.g. Izumi 2007; Rao 2005; Roy 2015). A second group of programmes therefore aims to increase legal rights to assets for women (e.g. see Agarwal 1994; Izumi 2007; Duflo 2012; Rao 2005). There are several studies examining the role of land titling on women's empowerment. Field (2007) finds that, in Peru, households where both a woman's name and a man's name are on the land title tend to have a lower fertility rate. Using the Viet Nam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) 2004 and 2008, Menon et al. (2016) show that women tend to have higher education, more employment, and less housework when their names are in a land title. Newman et al. (2015) analyse the importance of joint land titling for productivity in Viet Nam using VARHS data.

A key intervention to promote gender equity is focused on increasing women's involvement in economic activities. Women, especially those in poor families, tend to have low education, and as a result typically find it difficult to get a wage job. Starting a household business is challenging because of existing credit constraints. Commercial banks are not motivated to address the needs of poor clients because of information problems and lack of collateral (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990; Boucher et al. 2008). Governments and non-governmental organizations have stepped into the gap and have provided credit to the poor, often at highly subsidized interest rates. Through microcredit, women might be more involved in economic activities, thereby promoting greater social networks and increasing their economic clout and self-confidence within both households and communities (Pitt et al. 2003; Ashraf et al. 2010). There is an increasing number of micro-credit programmes targeted at women (e.g. Kabeer 2005; Kato and Kratzer 2013). However, several

empirical studies find no effects of micro-credit on household outcomes and women's empowerment (e.g. see Goetz and Gupta 1996; Coleman 1999; Diagne and Zeller 2001).

Another type of programmes is to improve access to infrastructure and technology for women. Increasing access to electricity might further women's labour market participation and reduce their housework burdens (see Winther et al. 2017 for a review). Quisumbing and Kumar (2011) show that the access to new vegetable varieties and polyculture fish pond management technologies helped women in rural Bangladesh to build up their asset portfolios in the long run. Information is also important for women. For example, Jensen and Oster (2009) found a positive effect of television on women's empowerment in rural India.

Women's self-help groups (SHGs) in South Asia and other low-income countries have been established with support from governmental and non-governmental institutions. Participation in these groups including microfinance, training, and other women associations can bring benefits for women. Brody et al. (2017) provided a systematic review of the impact evaluation of SHGs. They find positive effects of women's SHGs on economic and political empowerment, women's mobility, and women's control over family planning. Possible mechanisms are associated with familiarity in handling money, independence in financial decision-making, solidarity, social networks, and respect from the household and other community members.

There are several studies which provide males with education on health and family planning. For example, Kim and Marangwanda (1997) find that mass media and training services provided for men increase contraceptive use in Zimbabwe. Gidycz et al. (2011) conducted group education on social norms for men and they find that the treatment group is less likely to have self-reported sexual aggression. World Health Organization (2007) and Ricardo et al. (2011) provide an overview of programmes on education and training for men. Overall, there are few studies which provide rigorous quantitative impact evaluations, and findings from these studies are mixed: some studies find significant effects of education programmes while others do not.

Gender inequality in Viet Nam has been investigated and described in several studies. For example, Le (2006) applies a descriptive approach to analyse the link between gender equality, economic development, and women's welfare. Rand and Tarp (2011) analyse the importance of gender in Vietnamese SMEs. MPI (2010) reviews the main results and challenges in fulfilling the MDGs on gender equality. While these studies find a remarkable increase in gender equality in education in Viet Nam, they also highlight gender gaps in areas such as employment and social issues.

Projects and programmes that are designed to enhance gender equality are limited in Viet Nam. An exceptional study is Bulte et al. (2016). This study carried out a randomized control trial to evaluate the impact of a business training programme for female clients of a microfinance institution in northern Viet Nam. They found that the training improved knowledge, practices, and outcomes of their households. In addition to the main training, the study invited husbands (together with their wives) to participate in the training for a subsample of respondents. The effects of inviting husbands to participate in the training on the knowledge and practices of female clients did not emerge as statistically significant. However, they found weak evidence for a differential impact on (agricultural) sales and profits.

3 Experimental design

Two main interventions are studied here, and there are two treatment groups consisting of married men. The first treatment group was asked to read and provide comments on several articles of the 2006 Law on Gender Equality and the 2007 Law on Domestic Violence Prevention and Control. The second group was asked to write insightful stories or give typical examples of gender equality in their areas.

A randomized controlled trial is conducted aiming to measure the effect of the two treatments. The sample frame used is from the 2016 VARHS (see Section 4 for further details) conducted by the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) in collaboration with the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) of the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), the Development Economics Research Group (DERG) of the University of Copenhagen, and the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER).

The 2016 VARHS households were located in 498 communes in 12 provinces throughout the country. On average, there are around seven households randomly sampled from each commune. We selected four provinces for the present study: two in the north (Phu Tho and Ha Tay provinces), one in central Viet Nam (Quang Nam province) and one in the south (Long An province). The location of the four provinces is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Map of provinces with interventions



Note: This map presents the location of the four provinces with interventions. The provinces are located in the north, centre, and south of Viet Nam.

Source: Prepared by the authors.

Our two treatment groups were randomly selected from these four provinces, as was the control group. Each group consists of around 300 husbands aged 20 to 65 years and currently living with their spouse.² We randomly selected 70 communes for treatment, meaning each treatment group consisted of 35 communes. The final numbers of control and treatment communes are presented in Panel A of Table 1, and the geographic locations of the communes are presented in the map in Figure 2.

² According to the Law on Marriage and Family of Viet Nam, men aged from 20 upwards are entitled to get married.

Provinces	Control	Treatment 1	Treatment 2	Total				
Panel A: Number of treatment and control communes								
Ha Tay	10	3	4	17				
Phu Tho	11	12	12	35				
Quang Nam	15	11	11	37				
Long An	14	9	7	30				
Total	50	35	34	119				
Panel B: Number	of household	s in the treatmer	nt and control con	nmunes				
Ha Tay	70	51	37	158				
Phu Tho	73	85	87	245				
Quang Nam	72	63	66	201				
Long An	73	62	69	204				
Total	288	261	259	808				

Table 1: Control and treatment groups

Source: Prepared by the authors using data on treatment and control groups.





Note: This map presents the location of treatment and control communes in the four provinces with interventions. Source: Prepared by the authors.

The interventions were conducted by ILSSA. While the above procedure identified 297 husbands in the first treatment group and 303 in the second, when the ILSSA team visited the households, they were able to contact 556 husbands. Others were not at home or had migrated. The

interventions took place in July 2017. The ILLSA team provided information on legal documents on gender equality and instructions to the first treatment group. The legal documents included important articles from the 2006 and 2007 laws. The first treatment group was required to read and send comments on these documents. They could send any comments on these documents, e.g. which rights of women should be provided; how to improve or help women; and how to reduce inequality. Members of the target group were informed that these comments would be considered by MOLISA in relation to improving the legal documents on gender equality.

The second treatment group was asked to read and write evidence and stories on gender issues and equality in their localities. They could also discuss the role of men in reducing gender inequality. They were also informed that these notes would be considered in improving legal frameworks or research on gender. The topic was free, but the ILSSA team provided suggestions. Detailed materials on the legal documents and instructions are available in the online Appendix; see also Table A.4.

Each husband received VND50,000 (equivalent to US\$2.2) as a small gift. Members of the treatment groups were also provided with a stamped envelope with the printed address of ILSSA so they could easily send comments and stories to ILSSA. For those who did not send comments at an early stage, the ILSSA team called and reminded them in October 2017 and January 2018. Thus, husbands in the treatment groups were contacted three times. The team tried to convince husbands to read the legal documents more carefully and to try to send comments or stories on gender issues. The ILSSA team emphasized that while sending comments or stories would be highly appreciated it was absolutely voluntary. The reminders were conducted to keep the treatment group thinking about gender issues rather than putting pressure on them. The number of husbands who sent comments and stories is 142 (75 sent comments and 67 sent stories), accounting for 25 per cent of husbands in the two treatment groups. The comments and stories are summarized in ILSSA (2018).

In June 2018, the 2018 VARHS was conducted. A section on gender issues was added to the questionnaire and applied to husbands in the treatment and control groups. As expected, some husbands could not be surveyed in the 2018 VARHS since the interviewers were unable to contact them. However, the final (and respectable) number of husbands who were surveyed in the 2018 VARHS turned out to be 808. There are 288 husbands in the control group, and 261 and 259 husbands in the first and second treatment groups, respectively (Table 1).

4 Data and descriptive analysis

4.1 Data

As noted, the VARHS have been carried out every two years since 2006 when it covered around 2,600 rural households in 12 provinces, and they have been followed closely over time.³ In 2016, the sample size was extended to 3,582 households. The VARHS surveys have had the explicit objective of complementing the large and nationally representative Viet Nam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS). A large number of households surveyed in the VARHS have also been surveyed in the VHLSS. In fact, the original sample frame for the VARHS was the 2004 VHLSS. However, the VARHS collects additional important data such as social inclusion, access to credit,

³ The 12 provinces that are sampled in the VARHS include Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Dien Bien, Ha Tay, Khanh Hoa, Lai Chau, Lam Dong, Lao Cai, Long An, Nghe An, Phu Tho, and Quang Nam

risk, and time preference, etc. (see Ayala-Cantu et al. 2016 for additional information on the 2016 VARHS).

The VARHS collects information on both households and communes. The commune-level data include demographic information on the commune, shocks, infrastructure, access to services, and development programmes. The household- and individual-level data include demographic characteristics and employment of household members, land and agricultural production, expenditure, savings and credit, shocks and risk coping, housing condition, political connections, and social capital.

To evaluate the effect of our interventions on gender issues, we added a section on gender issues to the questionnaire of the 2018 VARHS. Table A.22 in the Appendix presents the questionnaire for this section, which was applied to men in the treatment and control groups. There are three sub-sections in this module: (i) perception or attitudes of men about gender roles (12 questions); (ii) doing housework (7 questions); and (iii) understanding laws on gender issues in Viet Nam (3 questions). We start with the Gender-Equitable Men (GEM) Scale to define questions on attitudes about gender norms (e.g. Pulerwitz and Barker 2008). We include just a few GEM questions, since the 2018 VARHS questionnaire is already very lengthy and we cannot include all the GEM scale questions. In addition, we include questions on attitudes about gender roles in taking care of the family and children, and heritage.

4.2 Balance test

A most important issue in randomized control trials is the similarity between the treatment and control groups. In Table 2, we compare several household characteristics between the treatment and control groups using the 2016 VARHS, running ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the treatment variables on individual and household characteristics. In column (1), the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether husbands belong to either the first or second treatment group. In columns (2) and (3), the dependent variables indicate individuals in the first and second treatment groups, respectively. There are two models, which differ in the number of explanatory variables. The small model includes basic demographic variables on individuals and households, and dummies of provinces. The larger model includes additional explanatory variables of employment and health of individuals and housing conditions.

Table 2: Balancing test

		Small model		Large model			
Explanatory variables	Treatment	Treatment	Treatment	Treatment	Treatment	Treatment	
	group	group 1	group 2	group	group 1	group 2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Age	0.0012	0.0010	0.0002	0.0007	0.0010	-0.0003	
	(0.0023)	(0.0024)	(0.0022)	(0.0026)	(0.0026)	(0.0025)	
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.1322	-0.0541	-0.0782	-0.1570	-0.0458	-0.1112	
	(0.1095)	(0.1859)	(0.1969)	(0.1161)	(0.1862)	(0.1971)	
Household head	0.0321	0.0093	0.0228	0.0253	0.0063	0.0190	
	(0.0475)	(0.0509)	(0.0420)	(0.0495)	(0.0518)	(0.0421)	
Complete lower secondary	0.0254	-0.0325	0.0579	0.0203	-0.0285	0.0488	
	(0.0428)	(0.0444)	(0.0419)	(0.0438)	(0.0452)	(0.0417)	
Complete upper secondary	0.0183	-0.0760	0.0943	0.0041	-0.0816	0.0857	
	(0.0650)	(0.0627)	(0.0640)	(0.0634)	(0.0600)	(0.0623)	
Complete college	-0.1211		-0.0564	-0.1225	-0.0445	-0.0760	
Log of por capita incomo	(0.0620)	(0.0000)	(0.0041)	(0.0011)	(0.0607)	(0.0059)	
Log of per capita income	(0.0201	(0.0247	(0.0034	(0.0234	(0.0220	(0.0008	
Household size	(0.0174)	0.0087	0.0133	(0.0170)	0.0155)	0.0003	
	(0.0134)	(0.0007	(0.0013)	(0.0070	(0.0000	(0.0110)	
Proportion of female	0.0228	0.0270	-0.0042	0.0192	0.0207	-0.0015	
members in households	(0.1116)	(0.0998)	(0 1145)	(0.1163)	(0.1055)	(0 1189)	
Log of population density of	0.0187	0.0122	0.0065	0.0167	0.0109	0.0059	
commune	(0.0252)	(0.0334)	(0.0265)	(0.0252)	(0.0317)	(0.0259)	
Phu Tho province	0.1643	0.0468	0.1175	0.1781	0.0596	0.1186	
	(0.1686)	(0.1761)	(0.1674)	(0.1655)	(0.1709)	(0.1671)	
Quang Nam province	0.1380	0.0236	0.1144	0.1631	0.0587	0.1044	
0	(0.1711)	(0.1848)	(0.1630)	(0.1683)	(0.1791)	(0.1646)	
Long An province	0.1349	-0.0015	0.1364	0.1221	-0.0266	0.1487	
	(0.1888)	(0.1879)	(0.2242)	(0.1821)	(0.1870)	(0.2229)	
Have wage job				-0.0473	-0.0428	-0.0045	
				(0.0431)	(0.0561)	(0.0397)	
Have non-farm work				0.0266	0.0229	0.0037	
				(0.0513)	(0.0651)	(0.0507)	
Had worked in army				-0.0019	-0.0009	-0.0010	
				(0.0477)	(0.0384)	(0.0392)	
Illness during the past 2				0.0224	-0.0387	0.0611	
weeks				(0.0788)	(0.0822)	(0.0807)	
Number of sick days during				-0.0004	-0.0002	-0.0002	
the past 12 months				(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0006)	
Log of per capita living area				0.0002	-0.0001	0.0003	
Hove fluch latring				(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)	
Have hush latime				0.0471	0.0205	0.0205	
Have tap water				(0.0000)	(0.0059)	(0.0393)	
				(0.0720	(0.0926)	(0.0001)	
Lise das or electricity for				0.0040	-0.0892	0.0933	
cooking				(0.0643)	(0.0640)	(0.0604)	
Have solid wall house				-0 1455	-0 1125	-0.0330	
				(0.1472)	(0.1363)	(0.1165)	
Constant	0.0986	-0.0495	0.1481	0.3023	0.1378	0.1645	
	(0.3070)	(0.3846)	(0.3420)	(0.3446)	(0.4224)	(0.4000)	
Observations	808	808	808	`804 [´]	`804 [´]	804	
R-squared	0.031	0.011	0.019	0.042	0.030	0.027	

Note: Treatment group 1 includes men who provided comments on legal documents on gender equality. Treatment group 2 includes men who wrote stories on gender equality in their areas. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.1 in the Appendix presents the summary statistics of the explanatory variables. It shows that none of the explanatory variables are statistically significant at the conventional levels and the size of the coefficients and the R-squared are small. This supports that the treatment and control households are not statistically different.

4.3 Descriptive analysis

The main outcomes in this study are husbands' perceptions of gender issues, doing housework, and awareness of laws on gender issues as captured by the 2018 VARHS. Husbands were asked about 12 statements on gender issues, each with three mutually exclusive responses: (i) absolutely agree; (ii) partially agree; and (iii) don't agree. With the exception of the statement 'Women have the same rights as men', the remaining 12 statements are meant to capture prejudice against women and in favour of men. Thus the responses 'absolutely agree' and 'partially agree' imply prejudice against women, while the response 'don't agree' means gender equality. Figures 3 and 4 present the distribution of husbands by their responses to the 12 statements for the control and treatment groups. Table A.2 in the Appendix reports the percentage of responses with standard errors.

For most statements, the percentage of responses indicating 'don't agree' is less than 50 per cent. For a few statements which imply strong discrimination against women such as 'There are times when a woman deserves to be beaten' and 'A university education is more important for a boy than a girl', the rate of response of 'don't agree' is around 80 per cent. More than 80 per cent of men respond 'absolutely agree' and 'partially agree' to the statements 'A woman's most important role is to take care of home and cook' and 'The most important role of men is to earn money'.



		7									
not Ish	Treatment group 2	9,7		36,7					53,7		
should k or wa clothes	Treatment group 1	6,5		39,5					54,0		
Men coo	Control group	9,0		41,	7				49,3		
do big ad of rk	Treatment group 2	10,4			54,1					35,5	
should (s insteadors) susewo	Treatment group 1	19	,5			53,3				27,2	
Men s thing hc	Control group	17,	0			53,1				29,9	
ortant is to ey	Treatment group 2		29,3				53,7			1	.7,0
ost imp of men rn mon	Treatment group 1		42,	1				45,2			12,6
The mo role (ea	Control group		41,	7				47,2			11,1
s u a Trea	Treatment group 2	3,9	17,0				79	9,2			
n a wo erves to beaten	Treatment group 1	3,1 <u>1</u>	6,1				80	,8			
whe	Control group	6,3	20,1					73,6			
anu ds are rr's lity	Treatment group 2	2	2,4			55	,6			22	,0
g the ki mothe ponsibil	Treatment group 1		35,2				47,	,9		1	.6,9
feeding the the resp	Control group		38,2					50,3			11,5
le is to home k	Treatment group 2		31,7				54,	.8			13,5
tant rol tare of tare of	Treatment group 1		41,	4				45,2			13,4
A wo impor take o a	Control group		45	5,1				45,	1		9,7
	0	% 10	% 20%	30 %	% 40	% 50	% 60	% 70)% 80)% 90	% 100
	Ab	solutely	agree	Parti	ally agr	ee	Don't a	agree			

Note: This figure presents the percentage of interviewed men by their responses or answers to several statements regarding the roles of men and women. For each statement, there are three mutually exclusive answer options for the interviewees: (i) absolutely agree; (ii) partially agree; and (iii) don't agree. Treatment group 1 includes men who provided comments on legal documents on gender equality. Treatment group 2 includes men who wrote stories on gender equality in their areas.

		-				
ceive than ents	Treatment group 2	16,2	23,9	5	9,8	
uld re ritage m par	Treatment group 1	19,9	31,4		48,7	
s sho e hei s fror	5					
Boys mor girl	Control group	20,8	24,3		54,9	
itty more r a boy girl	Treatment group 2	<mark>3,5</mark> 20,1		76,4		
ation is tant fo an for a	Treatment group 1	1 <mark>,</mark> 9 18,4		79,7		
educ impor thâ	Control group	6,3 14,2		79,5		
e, men elligent nen	Treatment group 2	10,0	41,7		48,3	
ie whol ore inte an wom	Treatment group 1	15,3	42,9		41,8	
On th are m th	Control group	19,8	40,3		39,9	
e whole, men etter business utives than omen do to treatment group 1	Treatment group 2	12,4	43,6		44,0	
	15,7	51,3		33,0		
make k exe w	Control group	21,5	44,4		34,0	
olitical vomen	Treatment group 2	18,5	48,6		32,8	
better p s than v do	Treatment group 1	17,6	55,2		27	7,2
make leader	Control group	25,7		52,4		21,9
d have hts as	Treatment group 2		52,5	3	5,1	12,4
en shoul ame rig men	Treatment group 1	4	4,4	46,	4	9,2
Wome the si	Control group	39,	2	47,9		12,8
	0	% 10 % 20	% 30 % 40 % 5	50 % 60 % 7	0 % 80 %	90 % 100
	A	bsolutely agree	Partially agree	■ Don't agree		

Figure 4: Perception of comparison between women and men

Note: This figure presents the percentage of interviewed men by their responses or answers to several statements regarding the comparison between men and women. For each statement, there are three mutually exclusive answer options for the interviewees: (i) absolutely agree; (ii) partially agree; and (iii) do not agree. Treatment group 1 includes men who provided comments on legal documents on gender equality. Treatment group 2 includes men who wrote stories on gender equality in their areas.

There are some differences in the responses between the treatment and control groups. The treatment groups, especially the second treatment group, have a higher proportion of 'don't agree' responses to several statements such as: 'Men should do big things instead of housework'; 'The most important role of men is to earn money'; 'Taking care of and feeding kids are the mother's responsibility'; 'Men are more intelligent than women'; 'Men make better business executives than women'; and 'Men make better political leaders than women'. This indicates that in 2018 the treatment groups tended to have a more equal perception of gender issues than the control group.

Figure 5 presents the distribution of men by their responses to questions on doing housework.⁴ Men were asked about their involvement in seven activities related to housework and taking care of children. For each question, there were five mutually exclusive options for the interviewees: (i) 'I do all of this'; (ii) 'I usually do this'; (iii) 'I and my wife do equally'; (iv) 'I do this sometimes'; and (v) 'I never do this'. If men are more likely to do housework, the answers should be options (i), (ii), and (iii). However, most men 'do housework sometimes' or 'never do housework'. More than 50 per cent of the men selected the second response 'I do this sometimes'. Of the seven activities, men are more likely to be involved in teaching, feeding, and bathing children. They are less likely to do the dishes and cook.

Overall, the treatment groups have a higher rate of doing housework, especially teaching children and cooking, than the control group, as captured by the 2018 VARHS. The percentage of men in the control group who say they 'never do housework' tends to be higher than in the treatment groups. For example, 8.8 per cent of the first treatment group and 10.8 per cent of the second treatment group say that they never teach their children, while this rate is 18.5 per cent for the control group.

⁴ Table A.3 in the Appendix reports the proportion of responses with standard errors.

Figure 5: Housework



Note: This figure presents the percentage of interviewed men by their responses or answers to several questions on housework done by men and women. For each statement, there are five mutually exclusive responses: (i) I do all of this; (ii) I usually do this; (iii) I and my wife do equally; (iv) I do this sometimes; and (v) I never do this. Treatment group 1 includes men who provided comments on legal documents on gender equality. Treatment group 2 includes men who wrote stories on gender equality in their areas.

Source: Authors' estimations using data from the 2018 VARHS.

The third group of outcomes is awareness of legal documents on gender issues (Figure 6). The treatment groups are (as captured by the 2018 VARHS) more likely to know the existence of several laws related to gender. More specifically, 72.8 per cent of the first treatment group and 81.5 per cent of the second treatment group know there is a law on gender equality, while this rate is 70.5 per cent in the control group. The rate of men who know about the maternity leave regulation for women is also slightly higher in the treatment groups than in the control group.



Figure 6: Awareness of legal documents on gender equality in Viet Nam

Note: This figure presents the percentage of interviewed men by their responses to questions on the existence of several laws on gender issues. For each question, there are three mutually exclusive answer options for the interviewees: (i) Yes; (ii) No; and (iii) I don't know. Treatment group 1 includes men who provided comments on legal documents on gender equality. Treatment group 2 includes men who wrote stories on gender equality in their areas.

Source: Authors' estimations using data from the 2018 VARHS.

5 Estimation methods

In this study, we use regression models to estimate the effect of our two interventions on the outcome variables. The regression model is:

$$Y_{i,j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Treatment 1_j + \beta_2 Treatment 2_j + X'_{i,j} \beta_3 + u_{i,j}$$
(1)

where $Y_{i,j}$ in an outcome of interest of male individual *i* in commune *j*. *Treatment* 1_j is a dummy indicating that the individuals live in communes with the first treatment. These individuals received legal documents and were requested to comment on them. *Treatment* 2_j is a dummy indicating

that individuals live in communes with the second treatment, where husbands were requested to write a story on gender issues. $X_{i,j}$ and $u_{i,j}$ are observed and unobserved variables, respectively.

The control variables include basic demographic characteristics of individuals such as age, education, and ethnicity. Household characteristics include household size, log of per capita income, and the proportion of female members. We control for these household variables, since there can be a correlation between these variables and gender perception. We also control for province fixed effects and population density of communes. We have implemented models without control variables as a robustness check, and the results with and without control variables are very similar. For interpretation, we use the models with control variables, noting that adding control variables can reduce potential selection biases and increase estimator efficiency.

There are several types of dependent variables in this study. For each question on gender issues, there are mutually exclusive responses. Accordingly, we use the multinomial logit model to estimate the effect of the treatments on the probability of choosing responses. However, the multinomial logit model relies on the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives and the logistic function. We therefore also use linear probability models to estimate the probability of choosing each response relative to not choosing that response. While linear probability models are robust (e.g. Nichols 2011), they can result in estimates of explanatory variables smaller than -1 or larger than 1, which are unrealistic. This problem is more likely to happen when the value of dependent variables is close to 0 or 1 (e.g. Baum et al. 2012).

There are 22 dependent variables based on 12 questions on gender perceptions, seven questions on housework, and three questions on awareness of laws on gender issues. We run regressions for all the 22 dependent variables. In addition, to reduce the number of dimensions of variables, we construct aggregate variables using dummy variables. For questions on perception of gender issues, we first define dummy variables indicating responses 'don't agree' for all statements, except for the statement 'Women have the same rights as men'. For this statement, the dummy variable is 1 for 'absolutely agree', and 0 otherwise. Then we create a variable, which is the sum of these dummy variables. So a higher value means a more positive perception of gender equality or less prejudice against women.

For housework, we create dummy variables which are equal to 1 for the responses 'I do all of this', 'I usually do this', and 'I and my wife do equally', and 0 for the responses 'I do this sometimes' and 'I never do this'. Then, we also create a discrete variable which is the sum of the dummy variables. A higher value of this variable means men do more housework.

In addition to the sum of the dummy variables, we make use of the principal components approach of Filmer and Pritchett (2001) to compute an aggregate index of the dummy variables.⁵ According to this approach, an index is constructed as the first principal component of a vector of dummy variables indicating the perception of gender equality. The aggregate index, denoted by I_j , for husband *i* is computed as follows:

$$A_j = \sum_p a_p \left(\frac{x_{p,i} - \bar{x}_p}{s_p}\right) \tag{2}$$

⁵ This approach is widely used to construct the wealth or asset index of households. For example, Filmer and Scott (2008) and Kolenikov and Angeles (2009) use this approach to construct asset indexes of households, and they show that rankings of different welfare measures such as education, health care, fertility, child mortality, and the labour market, are very similar to the ranking of asset indices.

where x_p denotes the dummy variable p, and \bar{x} denotes the mean of the variable in the sample. s is the standard deviation of variable x_p , and the p-dimensional vector of weight a is chosen to maximize the sample variance of A, subject to $\sum_p a_p^2 = 1$. The weight a is also called the vector of scores of variables, which can be estimated using principal component analysis.

The main advantage of the aggregated index approach is that it reduces the number of dimensions of component variables, while maintaining the variation among these variables. Depending on the type of dependent variables, regressions can be multinomial logit, probit, Poisson or OLS. When multinomial logit and probit models are used, marginal effects are reported for interpretation. Regarding standard errors, we should cluster these at the treatment levels to limit biases caused by the error correlation within a unit. So, the standard error is clustered at the commune level.

6 Empirical results

6.1 Impacts of the treatment

Table 3 presents the effect of the two treatments on the perceptions or beliefs of husbands about the gender issues. This table reports the marginal effects of the two treatments from the multinomial logit regressions of dependent variables. The dependent variables are responses to the 12 questions on gender issues. The original coefficients of the multinomial logit regressions are reported in Tables A.5 to A.8 in the Appendix. It should be noted that the marginal effects are the estimated effects of the treatments on the probability of selecting a response among all the three responses, so the sum of the marginal effects on the three responses is equal to zero.

		Treatment 1		Treatment 2			
	Absolutely	Partially	Don't	Absolutely	Partially	Don't	
Outcome variables	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
A woman's most important role	-0.0247	-0.0167	0.0414	-0.1129**	0.0769	0.0360	
is to take care of home and cook	(0.0661)	(0.0581)	(0.0301)	(0.0511)	(0.0553)	(0.0368)	
Taking care of and feeding the	-0.0237	-0.0387	0.0624	-0.1453***	0.0393	0.1060**	
kids are the mother's responsibility	(0.0669)	(0.0524)	(0.0449)	(0.0488)	(0.0493)	(0.0478)	
There are times when a woman	-0.0252	-0.0358	0.0610	-0.0140	-0.0313	0.0453	
deserves to be beaten	(0.0162)	(0.0364)	(0.0405)	(0.0142)	(0.0381)	(0.0415)	
The most important role of men	0.0207	-0.0299	0.0092	-0.1037*	0.0505	0.0532	
is to earn money	(0.0561)	(0.0513)	(0.0273)	(0.0571)	(0.0539)	(0.0372)	
Men should do big things	0.0196	0.0202	-0.0399	-0.0645**	0.0099	0.0545	
instead of housework	(0.0262)	(0.0484)	(0.0504)	(0.0253)	(0.0537)	(0.0543)	
Men should not cook or wash	-0.0219	-0.0260	0.0478	0.0056	-0.0573	0.0517	
clothes	(0.0238)	(0.0509)	(0.0603)	(0.0230)	(0.0458)	(0.0507)	
Women should have the same	0.0527	-0.0157	-0.0370	0.1642***	-0.1645***	0.0003	
rights as men	(0.0654)	(0.0500)	(0.0323)	(0.0627)	(0.0494)	(0.0308)	
On the whole, men make better	-0.0895**	0.0290	0.0605	-0.0841***	-0.0392	0.1233***	
political leaders than women do	(0.0349)	(0.0579)	(0.0554)	(0.0285)	(0.0453)	(0.0461)	
On the whole, men make better	-0.0602**	0.0773	-0.0171	-0.0916***	-0.0193	0.1109*	
business executives than women do	(0.0302)	(0.0703)	(0.0723)	(0.0244)	(0.0601)	(0.0603)	
On the whole, men are more	-0.0443	0.0262	0.0181	-0.0900***	-0.0085	0.0985	
intelligent than women	(0.0282)	(0.0615)	(0.0675)	(0.0248)	(0.0604)	(0.0620)	
A university education is more	-0.0134**	0.0402	-0.0268	-0.0079	0.0474	-0.0395	
important for a boy than for a girl	(0.0053)	(0.0372)	(0.0383)	(0.0059)	(0.0380)	(0.0389)	

Table 3: Treatment effects on male perception of gender equality (multinomial logit, marginal effects)

Boys should receive more	0.0015	0.0758*	-0.0772	-0.0247	-0.0038	0.0285
heritage than girls from parents	(0.0433)	(0.0459)	(0.0547)	(0.0487)	(0.0491)	(0.0744)

Notes: This table reports the marginal effect of the two treatments in multinomial logit of the responses to different statements on gender issues. It reports only the coefficient of the treatment variables. The control variables are similar to those in the small model in Table 2. The full results of the multinomial logit are presented in Tables A.5 to A.8 in the Appendix. The marginal effect measures the effect of the treatments on the probability of choosing one response instead of not choosing this response. The three responses are mutually exclusive. Thus the total effect of the treatment on these three responses is equal to zero.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01.

Source: Authors' estimations using data from the 2018 VARHS.

The first treatment, which is the request for comments on gender-related laws, has a negative and significant effect on a few dependent variables. It reduces the probability of men selecting 'absolutely agree' in the statements 'On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do' by 0.09, 'On the whole, men make better business executives than women do' by 0.06, and 'A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl' by 0.013.

The effects of the first treatment on other outcomes are not statistically significant. However, the first treatment tends to have a negative sign in the probability of choosing 'absolutely agree' and a positive sign in the probability of choosing 'don't agree'. This tentatively suggests that the first treatment improves the perception of husbands about gender equality, albeit at the small magnitude.

There is a strong effect of the second treatment (i.e. the request to write stories about gender issues) on perceptions. Most estimates of the effect on the response 'absolutely agree' are negative and significant. It means that these husbands are less likely to agree with the bias or prejudice against women. The treatment also increases the probability of agreeing with the statement 'Women should have the same rights as men'. While the effect of the treatment on 'don't agree' is positive for most dependent variables, it is only statistically significant for three statements: 'Taking care of and feeding the kids are the mother's responsibility', 'Men make better political leaders than women do', and 'Men make better business executives than women do'.

There are no statistically significant effects of the second treatment on the statements 'There are times when a woman deserves to be beaten' and 'A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl'. This reflects that the percentage of husbands not agreeing with these statements is very high. Men who agree with these statements are likely to be very conservative and biased against women. A large sample size would be required to detect a significant effect or alternatively a strong intervention would be needed to change the perception of the conservative husbands.

Table 4 presents the marginal effect of the treatment on doing housework by men. The original coefficients of the multinomial logit regressions are reported in Tables A.9 to A.11 in Appendix. There are seven dependent variables corresponding to the seven questions on housework activities. For each question, there are five responses, but for simplicity we group the first and the second (I do all of this' and 'I usually do this' into one group, and the fourth and fifth responses (I do this sometimes' and 'I never do this') into one group. The remaining response, i.e., I and my wife do equally', is unchanged.

Both treatment effects have a positive effect on the response 'I and my wife do equally' and a negative effect on 'I do this sometimes or never do this' for all the dependent variables. However, only a few effects are statistically significant at conventional levels. Specifically, the first treatment has a significant effect on the regression of 'washing clothes', while the second treatment has a

significant effect on 'buying food' and 'cooking'. This finding suggests that although the treatment can help change men's perceptions, it might not be enough to change their behaviour in practice. A stronger treatment or intervention is called for.

		Treatment 1			Treatment 2	
Outcome variables	I do all of this or	I and my wife do	I do this sometimes	I do all of this or	I and my wife do	I do this sometimes
	usually do this	equally	do this	usually do this	equally	do this
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Washing clothes	-0.0104	0.0767**	-0.0663	0.0032	0.0606	-0.0638
	(0.0190)	(0.0359)	(0.0447)	(0.0161)	(0.0372)	(0.0420)
Buying food	0.0126	0.0103	-0.0229	0.0117	0.0517	-0.0634*
	(0.0204)	(0.0325)	(0.0365)	(0.0207)	(0.0371)	(0.0372)
Cooking	0.0106	0.0433	-0.0539	0.0116	0.0905**	-0.1021***
	(0.0144)	(0.0396)	(0.0407)	(0.0142)	(0.0395)	(0.0375)
Cleaning dishes after meal	-0.0058	0.0406	-0.0348	0.0031	0.0238	-0.0268
	(0.0089)	(0.0394)	(0.0410)	(0.0112)	(0.0366)	(0.0364)
Cleaning house	-0.0305	0.0584	-0.0279	-0.0022	0.0258	-0.0235
	(0.0221)	(0.0485)	(0.0584)	(0.0205)	(0.0495)	(0.0540)
Teaching children	0.0614	0.0044	-0.0658	0.0487	0.0244	-0.0731
	(0.0452)	(0.0432)	(0.0649)	(0.0348)	(0.0479)	(0.0508)
Feeding and bathing children	0.0283	0.0026	-0.0309	0.0150	0.0294	-0.0443
	(0.0196)	(0.0616)	(0.0687)	(0.0200)	(0.0534)	(0.0553)

Table 4: Treatment effects on doing housework (marginal effects in multinomial logit)

Notes: This table reports the marginal effect of the two treatments in multinomial logit of the responses to different questions on housework. It reports only the coefficient of the treatment variables. The control variables are similar to those in the small model in Table 2. The full results of the multinomial logit are presented in Tables A.9 to A.11 in the Appendix.

For each dependent variable (a question on a housework), there are five mutually exclusive answer options: (i) I do all of this; (ii) I usually do this; (iii) I and my wife do equally; (iv) I do this sometimes; and (v) I never do this. For simplicity, we group the first and second options into one, and the fourth and fifth options into one choice.

The marginal effect measures the effect of the treatments on the probability of choosing one response instead of not choosing this response. The three responses are mutually exclusive. Thus the total effect of the treatment on these three responses is equal to zero.

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: Authors' estimations using data from the 2018 VARHS.

Table 5 reports the marginal effect of the probit regressions of the awareness of laws related to gender on the treatment variables. While there is no significant effect of the first treatment (request for comments on gender-related laws), there is a positive and significant effect of the second treatment (request to write stories). Men in the treatment groups are (based on the 2018 VARHS) more likely to know the existence of the law on gender equality and to know that women are entitled to have maternity leave.

Table 5: Treatment effects on awareness of laws

	Probit model (marginal effects)						
Explanatory variables	Know that women are allowed maternity leave	Know the existence of law on prevention of violence against women	Know the existence of law on gender equality				
	(1)	(2)	(3)				
Treatment group 1: comment on	0.0273	-0.0689	0.0257				
legal documents on gender equality	(0.0250)	(0.0457)	(0.0556)				
Treatment group 2: write stories	0.0589**	0.0178	0.1090**				
on gender equality	(0.0236)	(0.0428)	(0.0494)				
Age	0.0012	0.0009	0.0004				
	(0.0010)	(0.0017)	(0.0017)				
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.0108	-0.0163	-0.0326				
	(0.0419)	(0.0681)	(0.0595)				
Household head	-0.0469**	-0.0117	-0.0822**				
	(0.0190)	(0.0396)	(0.0382)				
Complete lower secondary	0.0005	-0.0213	0.0001				
	(0.0228)	(0.0307)	(0.0346)				
Complete upper secondary	0.0250	0.0913**	0.0703				
	(0.0275)	(0.0417)	(0.0465)				
Complete college	0.0451	0.1522***	0.1715***				
	(0.0302)	(0.0460)	(0.0478)				
Log of per capita income	0.0145*	0.0038	0.0179				
	(0.0074)	(0.0117)	(0.0128)				
Household size	0.0037	0.0021	-0.0031				
	(0.0064)	(0.0093)	(0.0111)				
Proportion of female members	0.0090	-0.0265	-0.2212**				
	(0.0606)	(0.0960)	(0.0896)				
Log of population density of	-0.0055	-0.0025	-0.0081				
commune	(0.0050)	(0.0070)	(0.0119)				
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes				
Observations	808	808	808				
R-squared	0.075	0.054	0.054				

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: Authors' estimations using data from the 2018 VARHS.

The analysis shows a higher effect of the second treatment than the first. There is a possible explanation for this. The laws are succinct and comprehensive. It is difficult for people who are not legal experts to comment on the law. Comments sent by the first treatment group are often short, and they mainly mention how to make the law more effective and to increase the punishment of violators (ILSSA 2018). The comments are often made right after reading the legal documents. If the husbands cannot make comments, they might forget the documents. On the other hand, writing stories about gender would require husbands to think and observe people more often. They can also ask and discuss this issue with other people more easily than discussing legal documents.

6.2 Robustness analyses

We conduct several robustness analyses. First, we estimate the multinomial logit models without any control variables. Second, we estimate the probability of selecting different responses using linear probability models (Tables A.12 to A.A.17 in the Appendix). The effects are very similar to those from the multinomial logit models with control variables. Third, we use the aggregate variables as measures of gender perception and doing housework. Column (1) in Table 6 reports the regression regarding the perception of gender equality. This dependent variable ranges from 0 for men with the highest prejudice to 12 for those with the lowest prejudice against women. Column (2) in Table 6 reports the regression where the dependent variable is involvement in housework. This variable varies from 0 for men who rarely do household to 7 for men who often do housework. Results from Poisson estimators show that the two treatments have a positive effect, indicating that treated husbands are more alert to gender equality and do more housework. However, only the effect of the second treatment (i.e. the request to write stories) on gender perception is statistically significant. It increases the percentage of selecting responses that show no prejudice against women by 16.2 per cent.

In columns (3) and (4) of Table 6, the aggregate index of responses that show no prejudice against women and the aggregate index of responses for doing housework are used as the dependent variables. We standardize the aggregate index by mean and standard deviation of the index of the control group so that we can interpret the regression coefficient as the standard deviation change of the control group. Similarly to the previous results, the first treatment has positive but insignificant effects on the indexes. The second treatment increases the perception index by 0.29 standard deviation and increases the housework index by 0.17 standard deviation.

In column (5) of Table 6, the aggregate index is constructed using the dummy variables from all 22 questions. A higher value means a greater perception of gender equality, doing more housework, and knowing gender-related laws. It shows that the second treatment group increases this gender index by 0.28 standard deviation.

	Poissor	n model	OLS			
Explanatory variables	Perception of gender equality	Doing housework	Index of perception of gender equality	Index of doing housework	Index of gender issues	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Treatment group 1: comment on	0.0486	0.1626	0.0893	0.1205	0.1334	
legal documents on gender equality	(0.0741)	(0.1661)	(0.1306)	(0.1241)	(0.1356)	
Treatment group 2: write stories	0.1621**	0.2206	0.2917**	0.1736*	0.2826***	
on gender equality	(0.0631)	(0.1389)	(0.1167)	(0.1034)	(0.1032)	
Age	0.0011	-0.0119**	0.0019	-0.0091**	-0.0054	
	(0.0022)	(0.0050)	(0.0042)	(0.0040)	(0.0043)	
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	0.0028	0.0790	0.0165	0.0767	0.0451	
	(0.1220)	(0.2046)	(0.2233)	(0.1950)	(0.2203)	
Household head	-0.1010**	-0.0933	-0.2188**	-0.0687	-0.1636*	
	(0.0466)	(0.1149)	(0.0939)	(0.0929)	(0.0967)	
Complete lower secondary	0.0089	0.1213	0.0313	0.0854	0.0784	
	(0.0543)	(0.1205)	(0.0950)	(0.0857)	(0.0838)	
Complete upper secondary	0.0569	0.0064	0.1062	0.0021	0.0695	
	(0.0561)	(0.1537)	(0.1008)	(0.1107)	(0.1053)	

Table 6: Effects of interventions on awareness of law

Complete college	0.2889***	0.2587	0.5619***	0.2732	0.4716**
	(0.0791)	(0.2057)	(0.1718)	(0.1995)	(0.1846)
Log of per capita income	0.0488**	0.0967	0.0807**	0.0518*	0.0738**
	(0.0247)	(0.0673)	(0.0367)	(0.0309)	(0.0329)
Household size	0.0100	-0.0415	0.0212	-0.0318	-0.0132
	(0.0144)	(0.0349)	(0.0270)	(0.0239)	(0.0242)
Proportion of female members	-0.1163	0.2836	-0.2045	0.2263	0.0723
	(0.1509)	(0.3529)	(0.2836)	(0.2825)	(0.3007)
Log of population density of	0.0203	-0.0230	0.0349	-0.0204	-0.0010
commune	(0.0162)	(0.0300)	(0.0280)	(0.0276)	(0.0311)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.8304**	-0.3369	-1.1143*	-0.2636	-0.6799
	(0.3655)	(0.8683)	(0.5786)	(0.4636)	(0.5282)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808
R-squared			0.050	0.083	0.073

Notes: Column (1) reports the regression of the number of selecting responses that are not prejudice against women, i.e. 'absolutely agree' for statement 'Women should have the same rights as men' and 'don't agree' for other statements. This variable ranges from 0 for men with the highest prejudice to 12 for those with the lowest prejudice against women. Column (2) reports the regression of the number of responses indicating involvement in housework, i.e. 'I do all of this', 'I usually do this', and 'I and my wife do equally'. This variable varies from 0 for men rarely doing housework to 7 for men often doing housework. In columns (3) and (4), the aggregate index of responses that are not prejudice against women and the aggregate index of responses of doing housework are used as the dependent variables. In column (5), the aggregate index is constructed using the dummy variables from all 22 questions. The higher value means more gender equality perception, more doing housework, and knowing gender-related laws.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: Authors' estimations using data from the 2018 VARHS.

Fourth, in Table A.18 in the Appendix, we exclude a treatment commune which has an extraordinarily high number of households (44 husbands) and re-run the regression for the dependent variables in Table 6. The results (i.e. the sign and magnitude of coefficients of the treatments) are very similar. The second treatment helps improve the gender perception of husbands.

The regressions also reveal several interesting findings on the association between individual and household characteristics and gender equality. There is no correlation between age and gender perceptions. However, older men are less likely to do housework than younger men. Household heads have a lower value of the aggregate indexes, suggesting the heads are more likely to have bias against women. Highly educated men (with a college degree) and those with higher per capita income have a greater perception of gender equality and knowledge of legal documents.

6.3 Heterogenous effects

We examine the heterogenous effects of the two treatments by including interactions between the treatments and several explanatory variables. We use the two dependent variables, which are the aggregate index of gender perception and the aggregate index of all gender variables (including variables on perception, housework, and awareness of gender-related laws).

The first interacted variable is whether a man sent comments or stories on gender issues. As already discussed, around 25 per cent of the treated husbands sent either comments or stories. We first examine whether the men who sent comments or stories were different from other men. Table A.19 in the Appendix shows that overall, men who sent comments or stories are not very different

from those who did not send comments or stories. They are somewhat older, belong to ethnic minorities, and do not have a wage job.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 show that the effect of the treatments, especially the second treatment, on gender perception is larger for those who send comments or stories. The perception index of husbands who were in the second treatment and who did not send stories is around 0.24 standard deviation higher than the control group, while the perception index of husbands who sent stories is around 0.54 standard deviation higher than the control group. This finding indicates that spending time and effort on the gender issues can lead to a large change in perception about gender equality.

The effect of the second treatment on gender perception is higher for older people. As age increases by one year, the effect of the second treatment on the index of gender perception is increased by 0.0176 standard deviation. We find a lower effect of the treatment on the household head. This is likely because heads are more conservative in changing perception about gender equality than other male household members.

	Index of	Index of	Index of	Index of	Index of	Index of
	perception	gender	perception	gender	perception	gender
Explanatory variables	of gender	issues	of gender	issues	of gender	issues
	equality	(0)	equality	(4)	equality	(6)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(0)
Treatment group 1	0.0672	0.0996	-0.5627	-0.0108	0.4170*	0.6154**
	(0.1451)	(0.1522)	(0.4989)	(0.5203)	(0.2458)	(0.2665)
Treatment group 2	0.2378*	0.2441**	-0.5708	0.0050	0.5603***	0.4296**
	(0.1224)	(0.1139)	(0.4483)	(0.5071)	(0.1949)	(0.1812)
Treatment group 1 ×	0.0725	0.1081				
Sending comments	(0.1890)	(0.1588)				
Treatment group 1 ×	0.3018*	0.2184				
Sending stories	(0.1745)	(0.1818)				
Treatment group 1 ×			0.0133	0.0030		
Age			(0.0089)	(0.0091)		
Treatment group 2 ×			0.0176*	0.0056		
Age			(0.0091)	(0.0103)		
Treatment group 1 ×					-0.4126*	-0.6025**
Household head					(0.2150)	(0.2461)
Treatment group 2 ×					-0.3393*	-0.1879
Household head					(0.2009)	(0.2153)
Age	0.0013	-0.0059	-0.0083*	-0.0082*	0.0021	-0.0048
	(0.0041)	(0.0042)	(0.0048)	(0.0045)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)
Household head	-0.2204**	-0.1655*	-0.2136**	-0.1612*	0.0133	0.0788
	(0.0939)	(0.0969)	(0.0936)	(0.0964)	(0.1347)	(0.1338)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-1.0978*	-0.6568	-0.5721	-0.5293	-1.3353**	-0.9206*
	(0.5610)	(0.5230)	(0.6042)	(0.5508)	(0.5770)	(0.5225)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808	808
R-squared	0.055	0.076	0.055	0.074	0.055	0.083

Table 7: Heterogenous effects: interactions with comment sending, age and house head (OLS regression)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8 shows that the effect of the treatment is remarkably higher for the Kinh majority than for ethnic minorities. In our sample, Kinh men account for 91 per cent. It also emerges that there are no effects of the treatments on the ethnic minorities. This might be because a large proportion of ethnic minorities cannot read and write Vietnamese. The effect of the treatments is higher for men with high per capita income. The interaction between the second treatment and a college degree is positive but not statistically significant.

	Index of	Index of	Index of	Index of	Index of	Index of
Explanatory variables	gender equality	issues	gender equality	issues	gender equality	issues
-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment group 1	-0.5938	-0.6540*	-1.9524***	-1.1857	0.0880	0.1062
	(0.3697)	(0.3466)	(0.7112)	(0.7848)	(0.1342)	(0.1395)
Treatment group 2	-0.5391	-0.4451	-1.6791**	-0.9867	0.2747**	0.2554**
	(0.4779)	(0.4708)	(0.8446)	(0.7705)	(0.1228)	(0.1110)
Treatment group 1 ×	0.7279*	0.8439**				
Kinh	(0.3983)	(0.3853)				
Treatment group 1 ×	0.8952*	0.7797				
Kinh	(0.4926)	(0.4913)				
Treatment group 1 ×			0.1975***	0.1276*		
Log of income			(0.0697)	(0.0756)		
Treatment group 1 ×			0.1911**	0.1231		
Log of income			(0.0827)	(0.0751)		
Treatment group 1 ×					-0.0128	0.4519
					(0.3434)	(0.3497)
College degree					(0.3867)	(0.3720)
	-0.6100*	-0.5777	-0.0107	0.0275	0.0096	0.0392
Kinh (Yes=1, No =0)	(0.3501)	(0.3668)	(0.2242)	(0.2203)	(0.2237)	(0.2196)
Log of per capita	0.0783**	0.0710**	-0.0416	-0.0050	0.0815**	0.0743**
income	(0.0366)	(0.0325)	(0.0366)	(0.0406)	(0.0368)	(0.0325)
Complete college	0.5579***	0.4681**	0.5789***	0.4826***	0.4827**	0.2215
	(0.1669)	(0.1791)	(0.1679)	(0.1817)	(0.1913)	(0.2150)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.4765	-0.0355	0.1826	0.1565	-1.1041*	-0.6420
	(0.6168)	(0.5870)	(0.5490)	(0.5903)	(0.5807)	(0.5318)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808	808
	0.059	0.082	0.060	0.077	0.052	0.076

	Table 8: Heterogenous effect	ts: interactions with Kinh	, income, and education	(OLS regression)
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: Authors' estimations using data from the 2018 VARHS.

In Tables 7 and 8, the dependent variable is index of perception of gender equality and index of gender issues. For robustness analysis, we also use the dependent variables, which are the count variables measuring the perception of gender equality and doing housework (as presented in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6). The regressions are reported in Tables A.20 and A.21 in the Appendix. The interactions have similar signs as those in Tables 7 and 8.

7 Conclusions

Viet Nam has achieved much success in reducing gender gaps in education and employment. However, large wage disparities persist and perceptions about equality reflect deep-seated biases. This study shows that most men (more than 80 per cent) believe that the main role of men is 'to earn money' and 'to do big things instead of housework', while the main role of women is to 'take care of children' and to 'do housework'. As a result, most men, around 70–90 per cent, reported that they only sometimes or never do housework such as cleaning, cooking, and washing.

We conducted two interventions to better grasp how to improve gender equality in rural Viet Nam. Instead of empowering women, we focused on reducing men's prejudice against women. We randomly selected two groups of husbands and requested one group to make comments on gender-related laws and another group to write stories on gender equality. We found that commenting on gender-related laws slightly reduces the prejudice or beliefs of men vis-à-vis women. Interestingly, there is a strong effect of writing stories on the prejudice against or beliefs about women. Writing gender-related stories improves men's perceptions about gender equality. It also improves knowledge of gender-related laws. However, there is only a small effect of the treatment on doing housework. Hence, the treatment is not strong enough to change the behaviour of men.

There are heterogenous effects of the treatments. The effect is larger for men who sent comments or stories than for those who did not send comments or stories. We also found a lower effect of the treatment on the household head. This is likely because heads are more conservative in changing perception about gender equality than other household members. The effect of the treatment is remarkably higher for Kinh people and for those with higher income than for ethnic minorities and for those with lower income.

The above findings lead to several policy implications. First, reducing gender inequality should involve policies that are targeted at men. Changing the perception and behaviour of men can help improve gender equality. Second, engaging men with legal documents and exposing them to gender stories is important. Exposure to and thinking about gender issues are important initiatives to help change perceptions about gender equality. Third, changing perceptions is easier than changing behaviour. Changing behaviour such as increasing men's housework requires stronger measures and is likely to take a longer time.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Summary statistics of explanatory variables

Variables	Туре	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Age	Discrete	808	49.34	9.581	21	66
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	Binary	808	0.913	0.281	0	1
Household head	Binary	808	0.798	0.402	0	1
Complete lower secondary	Binary	808	0.444	0.497	0	1
Complete upper secondary	Binary	808	0.203	0.402	0	1
Complete college	Binary	808	0.054	0.227	0	1
Log of per capita income	Continuous	808	10.34	1.11	0	14.59
Household size	Discrete	808	4.340	1.460	1	10
Proportion of female members	Continuous	808	0.488	0.148	0	0.857
Log of population density of commune	Continuous	808	5.799	2.147	0	8.108
Ha Tay province	Binary	808	0.196	0.397	0	1
Phu Tho province	Binary	808	0.303	0.460	0	1
Quang Nam province	Binary	808	0.249	0.433	0	1
Long An province	Binary	808	0.252	0.435	0	1
Have wage job	Binary	808	0.531	0.499	0	1
Have non-farm work	Binary	808	0.192	0.394	0	1
Had worked in army	Binary	808	0.295	0.456	0	1
Illness during the past 2 weeks	Binary	808	0.085	0.280	0	1
Number of sick days during the past 12 months	Discrete	808	9.032	37.71	0	365
Log of per capita living area	Continuous	804	3.074	0.621	0	4.83
Have flush latrine	Binary	808	0.894	0.309	0	1
Have tap water	Binary	808	0.349	0.477	0	1
Use gas or electricity for cooking	Binary	808	0.859	0.348	0	1
Have solid wall house	Binary	808	0.973	0.163	0	1

Questions	Response	Control group	Treatment group: comment on legal	Treatment group: write stories	Total
	Abaalutalu agraa	15 1	document	24.7	20.6
	Absolutely agree	45.1	41.4	31.7	39.6
A woman's most	Dortiolly ograd	(5.0)	(0.3)	(3.3)	(2.9)
take care of home	Partially agree	45.1 (4 5)	45.Z	04.0 (2.2)	40.3
and cook	Don't ograa	(4.5)	(5.2)	(3.3)	(2.0)
	Don't agree	(1.0)	(2.4)	(3.2)	(1 4)
	Absolutoly agroo	(1.9)	(2.4)	(3.2)	(1.4)
Taking ages of and	Absolutely agree	(4.0)	(6.7)	(4.2)	(2.0)
feeding the kids are	Partially agree	(4.0)	(0.7)	(4.2) 55.6	(2.3)
the mother's	r artially agree	(3.5)	(4.8)	$(4 \ A)$	(2.4)
responsibility	Don't agree	(0.3)	(4.0)	(+.+)	(2. 4) 16.6
	Dontagree	(1.9)	(3.2)	(3.4)	(1 7)
	Absolutely agree	6.3	3.1	39	4.5
Thoro are times	Abbolatory agree	(2.1)	(1.6)	(1 1)	(1.0)
when a woman	Partially agree	20.1	16.1	17.0	17.8
deserves to be	r artially agroo	(3.4)	(2.8)	(3.6)	(2.0)
beaten	Don't agree	73.6	80.8	79.2	77.7
	2011109.00	(3.7)	(3.2)	(3.8)	(2.2)
	Absolutely agree	41.7	42.1	29.3	37.9
		(4.5)	(6.1)	(4.2)	(3.2)
The most important	Partially agree	47.2	45.2	53.7	48.6
role of men is to earn money	i alliany agree	(4.0)	(4.7)	(4.1)	(2.6)
	Don't agree	11.1	12.6	17.0	13.5
		(1.8)	(2.6)	(2.4)	(1.3)
	Absolutely agree	17.0	19.5	10.4	15.7
	,	(2.3)	(4.4)	(2.7)	(2.0)
Men should do big	Partially agree	53.1	53.3	54.1	53.5
things not nouse	, ,	(3.4)	(3.8)	(4.3)	(2.3)
WORK	Don't agree	29.9	27.2	35.5	30.8
	-	(3.3)	(4.4)	(4.1)	(2.4)
	Absolutely agree	9.0	6.5	9.7	8.4
		(2.7)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(1.2)
Men should not cook	Partially agree	41.7	39.5	36.7	39.4
or wash clothes		(3.3)	(4.4)	(4.0)	(2.3)
	Don't agree	49.3	54.0	53.7	52.2
		(3.9)	(4.9)	(4.3)	(2.6)
	Absolutely agree	39.2	44.4	52.5	45.2
		(4.2)	(5.9)	(5.2)	(3.1)
Women have the	Partially agree	47.9	46.4	35.1	43.3
same rights as men		(3.5)	(4.8)	(4.9)	(2.7)
	Don't agree	12.8	9.2	12.4	11.5
		(2.8)	(1.9)	(2.1)	(1.4)
	Absolutely agree	25.7	17.6	18.5	20.8
On the whole, men		(3.5)	(3.8)	(2.9)	(2.0)
make better political	Partially agree	52.4	55.2	48.6	52.1
do		(3.6)	(4.9)	(2.8)	(2.3)
u0	Don't agree	21.9	27.2	32.8	27.1
		(3.0)	(4.0)	(2.9)	(2.0)
On the whole, men	Absolutely agree	21.5	15.7	12.4	16.7
make better	Dentially	(3.3)	(3.5)	(2.7)	(2.0)
than women do	Partially agree	44.4	51.3	43.6	46.4
		(3.9)	(5.9)	(4.7)	(2.9)

Table A.2: Percentage of responses of men to questions on gender issues

Questions	Response	Control group	Treatment group: comment on legal document	Treatment group: write stories	Total
	Don't agree	34.0	33.0	44.0	36.9
		(3.5)	(5.4)	(4.6)	(2.8)
	Absolutely agree	19.8	15.3	10.0	15.2
On the whole man		(4.0)	(2.9)	(2.3)	(2.0)
on the whole, men	Partially agree	40.3	42.9	41.7	41.6
than women		(4.4)	(5.1)	(6.4)	(3.2)
	Don't agree	39.9	41.8	48.3	43.2
	-	(4.0)	(5.4)	(6.2)	(3.1)
	Absolutely agree	6.3	1.9	3.5	4.0
A university		(1.8)	(0.9)	(2.0)	(1.0)
education is more	Partially agree	14.2	18.4	20.1	17.5
important for a boy than for a girl		(2.0)	(3.3)	(3.6)	(1.7)
	Don't agree	79.5	79.7	76.4	78.6
		(2.9)	(3.5)	(3.4)	(1.9)
	Absolutely agree	20.8	19.9	16.2	19.1
Boys should receive		(4.5)	(5.2)	(3.2)	(2.6)
	Partially agree	24.3	31.4	23.9	26.5
dirls from parents		(2.2)	(4.1)	(3.9)	(2.2)
gine nom parento	Don't agree	54.9	48.7	59.8	54.5
		(4.8)	(6.6)	(5.5)	(3.5)

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

This table reports the percentage of interviewed men by their responses or answers to several statements regarding the comparison between men and women. For each statement, there are three mutually exclusive answer options for the interviewees: (i) absolutely agree; (ii) partially agree; and (iii) don't agree.

Treatment group 1 includes men who provided comments on legal documents on gender equality. Treatment group 2 includes men who wrote stories on gender equality in their areas.

Table A.3: Doing housework	
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Housework	Responses	Control group	Treatment group: comment on	Treatment group: write stories	Total
			document		
	I do everything	0.7	0.8	1.2	0.9
		(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.3)
	I do this usually	6.3	4.6	6.2	5.7
		(1.8)	(1.5)	(1.7)	(1.0)
Washing slathas	I and my wife do	10.4	19.0	16.2	147
wasning clothes	equaliy	(2.1)	(3.1)	(2.6)	(1.5)
	I do this sometimes	(2.1)	(3.1)	(2.0)	(1.5)
		(3.0)	(4.3)	(4.3)	(2.3)
	I never do this	(0.0)	13.8	13.9	(2.3) 14 4
		(2.6)	(2.4)	(3.3)	(1.7)
	l do everything	0.0	0.8	1.2	0.6
	i de eterjamig	(0.0)	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.3)
	l do this usually	5.6	5.7	5.0	5.4
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(1.2)	(1.5)	(1.3)	(0.8)
	I and my wife do	()	(-)	(-)	()
Buying food	equally	11.5	13.0	18.1	14.1
		(2.8)	(3.0)	(2.9)	(1.7)
	I do this sometimes	64.9	65.9	62.2	64.4
		(3.3)	(4.0)	(4.4)	(2.3)
	I never do this	18.1	14.6	13.5	15.5
		(2.8)	(2.6)	(3.0)	(1.7)
	I do everything	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.6
		(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)
	I do this usually	2.8	3.5	4.2	3.5
		(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.5)	(0.7)
Cooking	I and my wife do	11 0	15.9	20.8	16.0
COOKING	equally	(2.4)	(3.1)	(3.0)	(1 7)
	I do this sometimes	(2.4)	(3.1)	(3.0)	(1.7)
	r do tillo sometimes	(2.8)	(4.3)	(3.8)	(2 0)
	I never do this	13.5	10.8	10.4	(2.0)
		(2.4)	(2.0)	(2.3)	(1.3)
	l do everything	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.5
	r do ovorytrinig	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.2)
	I do this usually	3.1	2.7	3.9	3.2
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(0.9)	(0.8)	(1.4)	(0.6)
Cleaning dishes	I and my wife do	()	()	()	()
cleaning disnes	equally	13.2	18.0	16.6	15.8
altermea		(2.4)	(3.3)	(2.3)	(1.6)
	I do this sometimes	64.6	56.3	60.2	60.5
		(3.1)	(4.6)	(3.6)	(2.2)
	I never do this	18.4	22.6	18.9	19.9
		(2.5)	(3.7)	(3.3)	(1.8)
	I do everything	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.6
		(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)
	I do this usually	9.4	6.5	9.7	8.5
Cloaning house	Lond musife -l-	(1.9)	(1.8)	(2.0)	(1.2)
Cleaning nouse	i and my wife do	10.1	2/1	21 6	21.2
	equaliy	(2.2)	(3.5)	(3.6)	21.2 (2.1)
	I do this sometimes	(J.2) 61 8	59.0	60.2	60.4
		(3.4)	(5.1)	(3.9)	(2.5)
		(0. +)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(2.0)

Housework	Responses	Control group	Treatment group: comment on	Treatment group: write stories	Total
			legal document		
	I never do this	10.1	9.6	8.1	9.3
		(2.0)	(2.3)	(2.5)	(1.3)
	I do everything	0.3	1.2	0.4	0.6
	, ,	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.4)	(0.3)
	I do this usually	7.3	11.9	10.8	9.9
		(1.8)	(3.5)	(2.6)	(1.5)
Teaching children	I and my wife do				
	equally	24.0	25.8	29.3	26.3
		(3.8)	(4.0)	(3.3)	(2.1)
	I do this sometimes	49.8	52.3	48.6	50.2
		(3.4)	(5.4)	(2.8)	(2.3)
	I never do this	18.5	8.8	10.8	12.9
		(3.6)	(2.1)	(2.5)	(1.8)
	I do everything	1.0	1.9	0.0	1.0
		(0.6)	(0.9)	(0.0)	(0.4)
	I do this usually	3.1	4.6	5.4	4.3
		(0.9)	(1.1)	(1.9)	(0.8)
	I and my wife do				
	equally	25.1	26.9	30.1	27.3
		(4.2)	(4.5)	(4.1)	(2.5)
	I do this sometimes	50.2	54.2	51.4	51.9
		(3.4)	(5.8)	(4.9)	(2.8)
	I never do this	20.6	12.3	13.1	15.5
		(3.7)	(2.6)	(2.9)	(1.9)

Notes: This table presents the percentage of interviewed men by their responses or answers to several questions on housework done by men and women. For each statement, there are five mutually exclusive responses: (i) I do all of this; (ii) I usually do this; (iii) I and my wife do equally; (iv) I do this sometimes; and (v) I never do this.

Treatment group 1 includes men who provided comments on legal documents on gender equality. Treatment group 2 includes men who wrote stories on gender equality in their areas.

Table A.4: Awareness of legal documents on gender equality in Viet Nam

Questions	Response	Control	Treatment	Treatment	Total
		group	group:	group: write	
			legal	3101165	
			document		
	Yes	87.5	90.8	93.8	90.6
Is there a law in Viet Nam		(2.5)	(2.4)	(2.0)	(1.4)
that guarantees mothers	No	2.1	0.8	1.2	1.4
inne on when their child		(1.0)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.5)
leave)?	Don't know	10.4	8.4	5.0	8.0
		(2.0)	(2.3)	(1.9)	(1.2)
Are there any laws in Viet Nam about protection of violence against women?	Yes	79.9	72.0	81.9	78.0
		(2.9)	(4.4)	(3.4)	(2.3)
	No	6.3	6.5	5.4	6.1
		(1.5)	(3.1)	(2.0)	(1.3)
	Don't know	13.9	21.5	12.7	16.0
		(2.2)	(3.4)	(2.4)	(1.7)
	Yes	70.5	72.8	81.5	74.8
Are there any laws in Viet		(4.5)	(4.5)	(3.2)	(2.5)
	No	9.0	7.7	6.6	7.8
equality?		(2.0)	(3.2)	(2.3)	(1.5)
oquality:	Don't know	20.5	19.5	12.0	17.5
		(3.4)	(3.5)	(1.7)	(1.8)

Notes: This table presents the percentage of interviewed men by their responses to questions on the existence of several laws on gender issues. For each question, there are three mutually exclusive answer options for the interviewees: (i) yes; (ii) no; and (iii) I don't know.

Treatment group 1 includes men who provided comments on legal documents on gender equality. Treatment group 2 includes men who wrote stories on gender equality in their areas.

Table A.5: Multinomial logit model of perception of women's role

Explanatory variables	A womar	n's most	Taking ca	re of and	There are ti	mes when a
	important ro	le is to take	feeding the l	kids are the	woman des	erves to be
	care of hom	e and cook	mother's rea	sponsibility	bea	iten
	Absolutely	Partially	Absolutely	Partially	Absolutely	Partially
	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree
Treatment group 1: comment on	-0.4253	-0.3941	-0.4393	-0.4336	-0.8240	-0.3077
legal documents on gender equality	(0.3585)	(0.2729)	(0.4186)	(0.2654)	(0.5686)	(0.2901)
Treatment group 2: write stories	-0.6251*	-0.1678	-1.1162***	-0.5147*	-0.4527	-0.2581
on gender equality	(0.3663)	(0.3575)	(0.3727)	(0.2810)	(0.4389)	(0.3039)
Age	0.0126	-0.0107	0.0164	0.0041	0.0086	-0.0048
	(0.0126)	(0.0131)	(0.0136)	(0.0140)	(0.0178)	(0.0120)
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.4956	-0.4299	-0.0287	-0.1006	-0.1474	-0.1128
	(0.5299)	(0.5323)	(0.5506)	(0.4501)	(0.9143)	(0.3367)
Household head	0.5106	0.1482	0.5170*	-0.0934	0.1260	0.3693
	(0.3155)	(0.2926)	(0.3069)	(0.2449)	(0.4918)	(0.2550)
Complete lower secondary	-0.3673	0.1342	-0.3658	-0.0664	0.0948	0.0340
	(0.2854)	(0.3007)	(0.2341)	(0.2231)	(0.3170)	(0.2069)
Complete upper secondary	-0.4639	-0.1939	-0.7823**	-0.3449	-0.3838	-0.7784**
	(0.3506)	(0.3487)	(0.3054)	(0.3007)	(0.4648)	(0.3855)
Complete college	-1.1288*	-0.4434	-0.8676	-0.1359	-0.1598	-0.5962
	(0.5900)	(0.4578)	(0.5341)	(0.4155)	(0.7875)	(0.5098)
Log of per capita income	-0.1264	0.0681	-0.2212*	-0.0199	0.1339	-0.1890***
	(0.1123)	(0.1360)	(0.1162)	(0.1344)	(0.2021)	(0.0688)
Household size	-0.0873	-0.0624	-0.0367	0.0178	-0.0825	0.0104
	(0.0691)	(0.0667)	(0.0738)	(0.0687)	(0.1131)	(0.0713)
Proportion of female members	-0.5224	-0.4989	0.0722	-0.2611	0.9733	0.6438
	(0.8153)	(0.7633)	(0.7686)	(0.7188)	(1.1188)	(0.6362)
Log of population density of	-0.0770	-0.0120	-0.0320	0.0133	-0.1593	-0.0403
commune	(0.0748)	(0.0626)	(0.0862)	(0.0586)	(0.1189)	(0.0426)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	5.7136***	3.1737*	3.9407**	2.1042	-2.6860	0.5267
	(1.5591)	(1.6599)	(1.8043)	(1.8295)	(3.0454)	(1.2069)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808	808
R-squared	0.0945	0.0945	0.0622	0.0622	0.0618	0.0618

Notes: This table reports the multinomial logit model. For each dependent variable, there are three mutually exclusive answer options: (i) absolutely agree; (ii) partially agree; and (iii) don't agree. The reference or base option in this multinomial logit is 'Don't agree'.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.6: Multinomial logit model of perception of men's roles

Explanatory variables	The most im of men is to	portant role earn money	Men shou things in house	ld do big stead of work	Men should wash c	not cook or lothes
	Absolutely agree	Partially agree	Absolutely agree	Partially agree	Absolutely agree	Partially agree
Treatment group 1: comment on	-0.0195	-0.1342	0.2807	0.1667	-0.4167	-0.1547
equality	(0.3118)	(0.2506)	(0.2991)	(0.2464)	(0.4399)	(0.2372)
Treatment group 2: write stories	-0.7033**	-0.3099	-0.7242**	-0.1523	-0.0160	-0.2442
on gender equality	(0.3575)	(0.2898)	(0.3162)	(0.2523)	(0.3697)	(0.2088)
Age	-0.0212	-0.0128	0.0015	0.0037	0.0006	-0.0017
2	(0.0181)	(0.0177)	(0.0136)	(0.0105)	(0.0130)	(0.0080)
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	0.4005	-0.1825	0.6502	0.7702	-0.1249	0.3376
	(0.4125)	(0.3141)	(0.5819)	(0.4762)	(0.5597)	(0.2871)
Household head	0.1812	-0.1892	0.4574	0.1425	0.2431	0.0479
	(0.3125)	(0.2810)	(0.2906)	(0.1891)	(0.3217)	(0.1943)
Complete lower secondary	-0.0776	0.1033	-0.2104	-0.2478	0.1565	-0.4188**
	(0.3136)	(0.2797)	(0.2938)	(0.1819)	(0.3431)	(0.1827)
Complete upper secondary	0.1791	0.2048	-0.5932	-0.0435	0.2678	-0.3527
	(0.3793)	(0.3203)	(0.3945)	(0.2118)	(0.4369)	(0.2492)
Complete college	-1.2041*	-0.5173	-0.7445	-0.4277	-0.4951	-0.7058**
	(0.6173)	(0.4393)	(0.6980)	(0.3503)	(0.8252)	(0.3549)
Log of per capita income	0.1596*	0.1252**	-0.1935	-0.0634	-0.2755***	-0.1177
	(0.0841)	(0.0511)	(0.1276)	(0.1014)	(0.0886)	(0.0940)
Household size	0.0174	0.1001	-0.0047	0.0107	-0.0451	0.0004
	(0.0923)	(0.0717)	(0.0979)	(0.0559)	(0.0898)	(0.0554)
Proportion of female members	-0.2670	-1.3109*	0.1047	-0.0444	0.1380	0.2143
	(0.8456)	(0.7806)	(0.8358)	(0.5441)	(0.9734)	(0.4666)
Log of population density of	-0.0516	-0.0366	-0.1289*	-0.1189**	-0.0638	-0.0604
commune	(0.0655)	(0.0548)	(0.0740)	(0.0501)	(0.0958)	(0.0383)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.0281	1.9713*	0.8038	0.8681	1.8252	0.9576
	(1.3510)	(1.0581)	(1.8031)	(1.2839)	(1.4269)	(1.1652)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808	808
R-squared	0.0729	0.0729	0.0630	0.0630	0.0415	0.0415

Notes: This table reports the multinomial logit model. For each dependent variable, there are three mutually exclusive answer options: (i) absolutely agree; (ii) partially agree; and (iii) don't agree. The reference or base option in this multinomial logit is 'Don't agree'.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.7: Multinomial logit model of perception of gender equality

Explanatory variables	Women shou	uld have the	On the wh	nole, men	On the wh	nole, men
	same right	ts as men	make better political		make better business	
			leaders than	women do	executives t	han women
					d	0
	Absolutely	Partially	Absolutely	Partially	Absolutely	Partially
	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree
Treatment group 1: comment on	0.4523	0.2986	-0.7717**	-0.1577	-0.4510	0.2015
legal documents on gender equality	(0.4205)	(0.3031)	(0.3410)	(0.2760)	(0.3694)	(0.3207)
Treatment group 2: write stories	0.3525	-0.4022	-0.9403***	-0.4862**	-1.0654***	-0.3164
on gender equality	(0.3595)	(0.2774)	(0.2815)	(0.2230)	(0.2884)	(0.2646)
Age	-0.0060	-0.0102	0.0123	-0.0051	0.0019	-0.0163*
	(0.0153)	(0.0145)	(0.0132)	(0.0104)	(0.0116)	(0.0090)
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.5387	-0.0680	-0.1467	0.7011**	-0.2714	-0.0423
	(0.5932)	(0.5630)	(0.4702)	(0.3399)	(0.5126)	(0.3280)
Household head	-0.1956	-0.1175	0.2902	0.3933*	0.5873**	0.7095***
	(0.2876)	(0.3462)	(0.2787)	(0.2095)	(0.2995)	(0.2205)
Complete lower secondary	-0.1019	0.1823	-0.2583	0.1596	-0.5059*	0.1641
	(0.3000)	(0.2705)	(0.2654)	(0.2086)	(0.2874)	(0.2103)
Complete upper secondary	0.0825	0.2411	-0.0821	-0.0403	-0.0925	-0.0517
	(0.3388)	(0.3068)	(0.2859)	(0.2350)	(0.3315)	(0.2503)
Complete college	1.0199	-0.1701	-0.3687	-0.2081	-0.5146	-0.8474**
	(0.7325)	(0.6793)	(0.5111)	(0.3832)	(0.5355)	(0.4000)
Log of per capita income	0.0059	-0.0175	-0.2750*	-0.0707	-0.2251*	-0.0956
	(0.0944)	(0.0876)	(0.1541)	(0.1246)	(0.1340)	(0.1166)
Household size	-0.0214	-0.0127	-0.1003	0.0115	-0.0633	-0.0548
	(0.0904)	(0.0955)	(0.0708)	(0.0663)	(0.0703)	(0.0607)
Proportion of female members	0.4473	1.1752	0.8153	0.5581	0.6050	0.3756
	(0.8601)	(0.9124)	(0.7411)	(0.6496)	(0.7504)	(0.5747)
Log of population density of	-0.0295	-0.0686	0.0822	-0.0600	0.0542	-0.0422
commune	(0.0773)	(0.0459)	(0.1067)	(0.0689)	(0.1166)	(0.0650)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.9599	1.3493	1.8529	0.8707	1.1014	1.7528
	(1.5384)	(1.5371)	(2.0973)	(1.4232)	(1.9716)	(1.3733)
Observations	`808 [´]	808	`808 [´]	808	`808 [′]	808
R-squared	0.116	0.116	0.0649	0.0649	0.0814	0.0814

Notes: This table reports the multinomial logit model. For each dependent variable, there are three mutually exclusive answer options: (i) absolutely agree; (ii) partially agree; and (iii) don't agree. The reference or base option in this multinomial logit is 'Don't agree'.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.8: Multinomial logit model of	perception of gender equality	(continued)
		(

Explanatory variables	Men are more intelligent than women		A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl		Boys should receive more heritage than girls from parents	
	Absolutely agree	Partially agree	Absolutely agree	Partially agree	Absolutely agree	Partially agree
Treatment group 1: comment on	-0.4588	0.0211	-1.2019**	0.2791	0.1519	0.4017*
legal documents on gender equality	(0.3573)	(0.2788)	(0.5486)	(0.2667)	(0.3352)	(0.2307)
Treatment group 2: write stories	-1.1239***	-0.2295	-0.6431	0.3359	-0.2049	-0.0643
on gender equality	(0.3211)	(0.2634)	(0.5098)	(0.2670)	(0.4275)	(0.2887)
Age	0.0135	0.0003	0.0132	-0.0166*	0.0031	-0.0091
C C	(0.0117)	(0.0082)	(0.0218)	(0.0094)	(0.0107)	(0.0085)
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.2973	-0.3065	-2.0237**	-0.5205	-0.3244	-0.7663**
	(0.4678)	(0.3518)	(0.9523)	(0.4373)	(0.4776)	(0.3005)
Household head	0.4549	0.5395**	0.0956	0.1265	0.1484	-0.2916
	(0.3072)	(0.2192)	(0.5024)	(0.2736)	(0.2704)	(0.2248)
Complete lower secondary	-0.7202***	0.0030	0.3848	0.2381	0.2925	0.1483
	(0.2677)	(0.1966)	(0.4267)	(0.2439)	(0.2786)	(0.2658)
Complete upper secondary	-0.1065	0.1304	-0.1541	-0.0631	-0.0353	-0.1969
	(0.3190)	(0.2281)	(0.5030)	(0.2863)	(0.3113)	(0.3241)
Complete college	-1.3915**	-1.1770***	-13.925***	-2.1011**	-1.0873	-0.7149
	(0.6208)	(0.4312)	(0.4606)	(1.0562)	(0.7204)	(0.4957)
Log of per capita income	-0.1716	-0.0528	-0.2776**	-0.3262**	0.0171	-0.0424
.	(0.1178)	(0.0957)	(0.1192)	(0.1278)	(0.0676)	(0.0817)
Household size	-0.0349	-0.0452	-0.1812*	-0.1022	-0.0551	-0.0023
	(0.0813)	(0.0653)	(0.0976)	(0.0805)	(0.0678)	(0.0648)
Proportion of female members	0.4708	0.3598	0.4089	0.6487	0.6993	0.3825
	(0.7349)	(0.5813)	(1.1134)	(0.6388)	(0.7689)	(0.6459)
Log of population density of	0.0310	-0.0681	0.0461	-0.0370	-0.0036	-0.0296
commune	(0.1190)	(0.0539)	(0.1090)	(0.0475)	(0.0801)	(0.0385)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.3114	0.6385	1.9036	2.7681	0.4792	2.3166*
	(1.8115)	(1.2147)	(2.8875)	(1.6885)	(1.4609)	(1.3649)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808	808
R-squared	0.0939	0.0939	0.0844	0.0844	0.108	0.108

Notes: This table reports the multinomial logit model. For each dependent variable, there are three mutually exclusive answer options: (i) absolutely agree; (ii) partially agree; and (iii) don't agree. The reference or base option in this multinomial logit is 'Don't agree'.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.9: Multinomial logit model of housework: washing and cooking

Explanatory variables	Washing		Buying fo	ood and stuff	Cooking		
	I do all of	I and my	I do all of	I and my	I do all of	I and my	
	this, or I	wife do	this, or I	wife do	this, or I	wife do	
	usually do	this	usually do	this	usually do	this	
	this	equally	this	equally	this	equally	
I reatment group 1: comment on	-0.1312	0.6333**	0.2473	0.1157	0.3874	0.3558	
equality	(0.4384)	(0.2802)	(0.3582)	(0.3118)	(0.4335)	(0.3003)	
Treatment group 2: write stories	0.1419	0.5237*	0.2822	0.4924	0.4782	0.7000**	
on gender equality	(0.3393)	(0.2944)	(0.3623)	(0.3144)	(0.4090)	(0.2730)	
Age	-0.0170	-0.0301**	-0.0136	-0.0228*	-0.0040	-0.0314**	
	(0.0212)	(0.0131)	(0.0202)	(0.0129)	(0.0210)	(0.0125)	
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.1934	0.1054	-0.6289	0.3965	-0.1015	0.8908**	
	(0.6689)	(0.4221)	(0.6781)	(0.4152)	(0.7103)	(0.3940)	
Household head	-0.2070	-0.3258	-0.4940	0.0604	-0.3934	0.1317	
	(0.3626)	(0.2483)	(0.3819)	(0.3073)	(0.4172)	(0.2301)	
Complete lower secondary	-0.0799	0.0563	-0.0770	0.1413	0.4319	0.4070	
	(0.3281)	(0.2365)	(0.3520)	(0.2590)	(0.4819)	(0.2515)	
Complete upper secondary	-0.3898	-0.1530	0.0149	-0.0323	-0.0954	0.1785	
	(0.4180)	(0.3050)	(0.4691)	(0.3297)	(0.6498)	(0.3021)	
Complete college	-0.1374	0.6576	1.0320*	0.1052	0.9535	0.2763	
	(0.7700)	(0.4695)	(0.6017)	(0.5347)	(0.7530)	(0.5020)	
Log of per capita income	0.2734	0.1628	0.2138	-0.0243	0.3781	-0.0102	
	(0.2241)	(0.1435)	(0.2059)	(0.1420)	(0.2577)	(0.1076)	
Household size	-0.2176	-0.1252	-0.1756	-0.0617	-0.1866	-0.0494	
	(0.1350)	(0.0795)	(0.1068)	(0.0871)	(0.1239)	(0.0712)	
Proportion of female members	1.5654	0.0556	0.3138	-0.9057	1.6429	0.0927	
	(1.2167)	(0.7634)	(1.2724)	(0.6907)	(1.3519)	(0.6668)	
Log of population density of	-0.0935	-0.0341	-0.0373	-0.0032	-0.0993	0.0129	
commune	(0.0715)	(0.0646)	(0.0847)	(0.0789)	(0.0741)	(0.0733)	
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Constant	-3.1710	-2.2505	-2.6561	-1.6147	-6.3360**	-2.0828	
	(3.1454)	(1.6515)	(2.2313)	(1.7535)	(2.9560)	(1.3574)	
Observations	808	808	808	808	807	807	
R-squared	0.0825	0.0825	0.0695	0.0695	0.0716	0.0716	

Notes: This table reports the multinomial logit model. For each dependent variable (a question on a housework), there are five mutually exclusive answer options: (i) I do all of this; (ii) I usually do this; (iii) I and my wife do equally; (iv) I do this sometimes; and (v) I never do this. For simplicity, we group the first and second options into one, and the fourth and fifth options into one choice. The reference or base option in this multinomial logit is 'I do this sometimes or I never do this'.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.10: Multinomial	loait model	of housework:	cleaning	dishes and house
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Explanatory variables	Cleaning dishes after meal		Cleaning house		
	I do all of this, or I usually do	l and my wife do this equally	I do all of this, or I usually do	l and my wife do this equally	
	this	- 1 7	this		
Treatment group 1: comment on legal	-0.1992	0.3035	-0.3870	0.3082	
documents on gender equality	(0.3952)	(0.2861)	(0.3931)	(0.2905)	
Treatment group 2: write stories on	0.1518	0.1883	0.0041	0.1546	
gender equality	(0.4252)	(0.2725)	(0.3076)	(0.2986)	
Age	-0.0088	0.0001	-0.0279*	-0.0137	
	(0.0239)	(0.0121)	(0.0163)	(0.0092)	
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.9194	0.0728	-0.4851	0.2845	
	(0.7864)	(0.3297)	(0.5780)	(0.3554)	
Household head	-0.4791	0.0640	-0.4445	-0.2549	
	(0.3934)	(0.2662)	(0.3356)	(0.2227)	
Complete lower secondary	0.1171	0.0036	0.1357	0.4472*	
	(0.5075)	(0.2185)	(0.3171)	(0.2434)	
Complete upper secondary	-0.9245	-0.2031	-0.2625	0.4041	
	(0.7630)	(0.3618)	(0.4672)	(0.2894)	
Complete college	0.7124	-0.1978	0.5569	0.4508	
	(0.7978)	(0.5259)	(0.5174)	(0.4299)	
Log of per capita income	0.4841	0.1578	0.3999**	0.0926	
	(0.2943)	(0.1349)	(0.1801)	(0.1112)	
Household size	-0.1529	-0.0273	-0.0518	-0.0268	
	(0.1385)	(0.0701)	(0.0942)	(0.0660)	
Proportion of female members	3.0455	0.3061	2.3606**	0.4677	
	(1.9506)	(0.7266)	(1.0222)	(0.6218)	
Log of population density of commune	-0.0377	-0.0487	0.0159	0.0354	
Log of population density of commune	(0.0785)	(0.0586)	(0.0813)	(0.0527)	
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Constant	-7.1306**	-3.9421***	-5.4854**	-3.0785**	
	(3.3555)	(1.4901)	(2.4720)	(1.3071)	
Observations	808	808	808	808	
R-squared	0.0542	0.0542	0.0455	0.0455	

Notes: This table reports the multinomial logit model. For each dependent variable (a question on a housework), there are five mutually exclusive answer options: (i) I do all of this; (ii) I usually do this; (iii) I and my wife do equally; (iv) I do this sometimes; and (v) I never do this. For simplicity, we group the first and second options into one, and the fourth and fifth options into one choice. The reference or base option in this multinomial logit is 'I do this sometimes or I never do this'.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.11: Multinomial logit model of housework

Explanatory variables	Teaching children		Feeding and bathing child		
	I do all of	I and my wife	I do all of	I and my wife	
	this, or I	do this	this, or I	do this	
	usually do	equally	usually do	equally	
	this		this		
Treatment group 1: comment on legal	0.6907	0.1196	0.6364	0.0548	
documents on gender equality	(0.4606)	(0.2605)	(0.4162)	(0.3334)	
Treatment group 2: write stories on	0.5915	0.2117	0.3953	0.1748	
gender equality	(0.3638)	(0.2562)	(0.4373)	(0.2752)	
Age	-0.0341**	-0.0080	-0.0094	-0.0164*	
	(0.0140)	(0.0098)	(0.0169)	(0.0097)	
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.1106	0.1405	0.1057	-0.0052	
	(0.5603)	(0.3348)	(0.6935)	(0.3104)	
Household head	-0.7143**	-0.0321	-0.1595	0.1771	
	(0.3150)	(0.2353)	(0.3729)	(0.2071)	
Complete lower secondary	-0.1841	0.4247**	-0.4229	0.1730	
	(0.2604)	(0.1869)	(0.3485)	(0.2390)	
Complete upper secondary	-0.7086*	0.4138	-0.6842	0.1367	
	(0.4200)	(0.2542)	(0.5746)	(0.3017)	
Complete college	0.1672	0.6945*	0.4543	0.4276	
	(0.6301)	(0.4119)	(0.7333)	(0.4534)	
Log of per capita income	0.2789	0.0317	0.3599	0.1586	
	(0.1742)	(0.1009)	(0.2876)	(0.1068)	
Household size	-0.0842	-0.0398	-0.0871	0.0131	
	(0.0778)	(0.0770)	(0.0921)	(0.0612)	
Proportion of female members	1.1256	0.1425	1.6734	-0.0601	
	(0.8267)	(0.6402)	(1.4144)	(0.5940)	
	-0.0992*	-0.0422	-0.1794***	-0.0518	
Log of population density of commune	(0.0520)	(0.0625)	(0.0632)	(0.0583)	
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Constant	-2.4269	-2.3445	-5.4261*	-2.5235*	
	(2.1478)	(1.4506)	(3.1444)	(1.4369)	
Observations	806	806	806	806	
R-squared	0.0776	0.0776	0.0678	0.0678	

Notes: This table reports the multinomial logit model. For each dependent variable (a question on a housework), there are five mutually exclusive answer options: (i) I do all of this; (ii) I usually do this; (iii) I and my wife do equally; (iv) I do this sometimes; and (v) I never do this. For simplicity, we group the first and second options into one, and the fourth and fifth options into one choice. The reference or base option in this multinomial logit is 'I do this sometimes or I never do this'.

Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.12: Treatment effects on male perception of gender equality (marginal effects, no control variables)

		Treatment 1			Treatment 2	
Outcome variables	Absolutely	Partially	Don't	Absolutely	Partially	Don't
	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree
A woman's most important role	-0.0369	-0.0032	0.0401	-0.1337**	0.0927*	0.0409
is to take care of home and cook	(0.0773)	(0.0667)	(0.0339)	(0.0586)	(0.0548)	(0.0413)
Taking care of and feeding the	-0.0302	-0.0340	0.0643	-0.1581***	0.0425	0.1156***
kids are the mother's responsibility	(0.0720)	(0.0554)	(0.0441)	(0.0565)	(0.0551)	(0.0446)
There are times when a woman	-0.0276	-0.0397	0.0673	-0.0193	-0.0308	0.0502
deserves to be beaten	(0.0208)	(0.0416)	(0.0443)	(0.0176)	(0.0458)	(0.0480)
The most important role of men	0.0040	-0.0216	0.0176	-0.1241**	0.0630	0.0611*
is to earn money	(0.0719)	(0.0587)	(0.0354)	(0.0596)	(0.0560)	(0.0339)
Men should do big things	0.0226	0.0041	-0.0267	-0.0684**	0.0119	0.0566
instead of housework	(0.0431)	(0.0491)	(0.0530)	(0.0341)	(0.0539)	(0.0526)
Men should not cook or wash	-0.0258	-0.0218	0.0476	0.0055	-0.0496	0.0441
clothes	(0.0310)	(0.0545)	(0.0635)	(0.0295)	(0.0505)	(0.0569)
Women should have the same	0.0542	-0.0172	-0.0370	0.1345**	-0.1293**	-0.0052
rights as men	(0.0728)	(0.0588)	(0.0325)	(0.0652)	(0.0579)	(0.0315)
On the whole, men make better	-0.0756*	0.0190	0.0566	-0.0663*	-0.0463	0.1125**
political leaders than women do	(0.0453)	(0.0600)	(0.0548)	(0.0401)	(0.0446)	(0.0448)
On the whole, men make better	-0.0502	0.0649	-0.0147	-0.0839**	-0.0120	0.0959
business executives than women do	(0.0392)	(0.0706)	(0.0668)	(0.0369)	(0.0622)	(0.0587)
Men are more intelligent than	-0.0375	0.0224	0.0151	-0.0908**	0.0106	0.0802
women	(0.0393)	(0.0673)	(0.0673)	(0.0389)	(0.0770)	(0.0718)
A university education is more	-0.0362**	0.0441	-0.0078	-0.0194	0.0609	-0.0415
important for a boy than for a girl	(0.0153)	(0.0431)	(0.0468)	(0.0179)	(0.0439)	(0.0449)
Boys should receive more	-0.0082	0.0713	-0.0632	-0.0454	-0.0036	0.0490
heritage than girls from parents	(0.0640)	(0.0479)	(0.0802)	(0.0513)	(0.0467)	(0.0711)

Notes: This table reports the marginal effect of the two treatments in multinomial logit of the responses to different statements on gender issues. There are no control variables in this model. The marginal effect measures the effect of the treatments on the probability of choosing one response instead of not choosing this response. The three responses are mutually exclusive. Thus the total effect of the treatment on these three responses is equal to zero.

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.13: Treatment effects on male perception of gender equality (OLS, with control variables)

		Treatment 1			Treatment 2	
Outcome variables	Absolutely	Partially	Don't	Absolutely	Partially	Don't
	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree	agree
A woman's most important role	-0.0209	-0.0171	0.0380	-0.1021**	0.0689	0.0332
is to take care of home and cook	(0.0596)	(0.0535)	(0.0270)	(0.0463)	(0.0520)	(0.0341)
Taking care of and feeding the	-0.0189	-0.0317	0.0506	-0.1385***	0.0432	0.0953**
kids are the mother's responsibility	(0.0689)	(0.0536)	(0.0375)	(0.0495)	(0.0487)	(0.0411)
There are times when a woman	-0.0298	-0.0404	0.0701	-0.0195	-0.0319	0.0514
deserves to be beaten	(0.0251)	(0.0401)	(0.0469)	(0.0211)	(0.0422)	(0.0470)
The most important role of men	0.0186	-0.0310	0.0124	-0.0949*	0.0411	0.0537
is to earn money	(0.0525)	(0.0493)	(0.0234)	(0.0538)	(0.0516)	(0.0348)
Men should do big things	0.0296	0.0039	-0.0335	-0.0676**	0.0115	0.0561
instead of housework	(0.0328)	(0.0480)	(0.0466)	(0.0289)	(0.0529)	(0.0528)
Men should not cook or wash	-0.0210	-0.0264	0.0474	0.0085	-0.0559	0.0474
clothes	(0.0297)	(0.0496)	(0.0610)	(0.0276)	(0.0442)	(0.0505)
Women should have the same	0.0393	-0.0062	-0.0331	0.1316**	-0.1341***	0.0025
rights as men	(0.0558)	(0.0426)	(0.0330)	(0.0516)	(0.0425)	(0.0316)
On the whole, men make better	-0.0948**	0.0396	0.0552	-0.0874**	-0.0265	0.1138***
political leaders than women do	(0.0420)	(0.0550)	(0.0486)	(0.0354)	(0.0425)	(0.0405)
On the whole, men make better	-0.0729*	0.0796	-0.0067	-0.1077***	-0.0054	0.1131**
business executives than women do	(0.0378)	(0.0633)	(0.0644)	(0.0324)	(0.0561)	(0.0547)
Men are more intelligent than	-0.0594	0.0336	0.0258	-0.1107***	0.0070	0.1037*
women	(0.0392)	(0.0533)	(0.0618)	(0.0351)	(0.0540)	(0.0601)
A university education is more	-0.0433**	0.0433	-0.0000	-0.0290	0.0505	-0.0215
important for a boy than for a girl	(0.0186)	(0.0334)	(0.0415)	(0.0212)	(0.0356)	(0.0418)
Boys should receive more	-0.0033	0.0683	-0.0651	-0.0249	-0.0014	0.0263
heritage than girls from parents	(0.0458)	(0.0421)	(0.0459)	(0.0490)	(0.0416)	(0.0636)

Notes: This table reports the effect of the two treatments in linear probability models of the responses to different statements on gender issues. It reports only the coefficients of the treatment variables. The control variables are similar to those in the small model in Table 2. The coefficients measure the effect of the treatments on the probability of choosing one response instead of not choosing this response. The three responses are mutually exclusive. Thus the total effect of the treatment on these three responses is equal to zero.

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	_	Treatment 1			Treatment 2	
	I do all of	I and my	I do this	I do all of	I and my	I do this
Outcome variables	this or	wife do	sometimes	this or	wife do	sometimes
	usually do	equally	or never	usually do	equally	or never
	this		do this	this		do this
Washing	-0.0168	0.0851*	-0.0683	0.0028	0.0672*	-0.0700
	(0.0219)	(0.0447)	(0.0540)	(0.0230)	(0.0388)	(0.0494)
Buying food	0.0097	0.0177	-0.0274	0.0063	0.0690	-0.0753*
	(0.0217)	(0.0471)	(0.0472)	(0.0202)	(0.0445)	(0.0429)
Cooking	0.0079	0.0459	-0.0538	0.0118	0.0968**	-0.1087**
	(0.0177)	(0.0470)	(0.0488)	(0.0210)	(0.0419)	(0.0448)
Cleaning dishes after meal	-0.0079	0.0511	-0.0431	0.0038	0.0370	-0.0409
	(0.0130)	(0.0439)	(0.0461)	(0.0166)	(0.0362)	(0.0355)
Cleaning house	-0.0282	0.0634	-0.0352	-0.0006	0.0383	-0.0377
	(0.0260)	(0.0512)	(0.0603)	(0.0239)	(0.0502)	(0.0517)
Teaching children	0.0597	0.0154	-0.0751	0.0407	0.0512	-0.0918
	(0.0447)	(0.0566)	(0.0720)	(0.0375)	(0.0526)	(0.0584)
Feeding and bathing children	0.0253	0.0183	-0.0436	0.0139	0.0502	-0.0641
	(0.0211)	(0.0639)	(0.0708)	(0.0252)	(0.0605)	(0.0663)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	Treatment 1	l		Treatment 2			
Outcome variables	I do all of this or usually do this	I and my wife do equally	I do this sometimes or never do this	I do all of this or usually do this	l and my wife do equally	I do this sometimes or never do this	
Washing	-0.0165	0.0745**	-0.0580	0.0056	0.0552*	-0.0608	
	(0.0225)	(0.0303)	(0.0414)	(0.0212)	(0.0321)	(0.0387)	
Buying food	0.0128	0.0088	-0.0216	0.0103	0.0549	-0.0652*	
	(0.0199)	(0.0321)	(0.0357)	(0.0204)	(0.0360)	(0.0357)	
Cooking	0.0099	0.0371	-0.0505	0.0150	0.0840**	-0.0987***	
	(0.0148)	(0.0338)	(0.0368)	(0.0163)	(0.0352)	(0.0337)	
Cleaning dishes after meal	-0.0068	0.0381	-0.0313	0.0073	0.0217	-0.0290	
	(0.0122)	(0.0376)	(0.0398)	(0.0161)	(0.0349)	(0.0351)	
Cleaning house	-0.0310	0.0567	-0.0257	-0.0010	0.0228	-0.0218	
	(0.0267)	(0.0440)	(0.0560)	(0.0248)	(0.0456)	(0.0515)	
Teaching children	0.0599	0.0035	-0.0624	0.0457	0.0258	-0.0667	
	(0.0402)	(0.0406)	(0.0613)	(0.0303)	(0.0462)	(0.0482)	
Feeding and bathing children	0.0269	0.0030	-0.0288	0.0184	0.0290	-0.0427	
	(0.0179)	(0.0574)	(0.0649)	(0.0195)	(0.0500)	(0.0517)	

Table A.15: Treatment effects on doing housework (OLS, with control variables)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Source: Authors' estimations using data from the 2018 VARHS.

Table A.16: Treatment effects on awareness of gender-related laws (OLS, no control variables)	

Explanatory variables	Perception of gender equality	Doing housework	Know that women are allowed maternity leave	Aware of laws on prevention of violence against women	Aware of law on gender equality
Treatment group 1: comment on	0.0210	0.0454	0.0330	-0.0783	0.0231
legal documents on gender	(0.0297)	(0.0469)	(0.0349)	(0.0523)	(0.0644)
Treatment group 2: write stories	0.0669**	0.0662*	0.0632**	0.0199	0.1098*
on gender equality	(0.0273)	(0.0380)	(0.0314)	(0.0456)	(0.0564)
Constant	0.3788***	0.2222***	0.8750***	0.7986***	0.7049***
	(0.0186)	(0.0296)	(0.0252)	(0.0288)	(0.0453)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808
R-squared	0.015	0.007	0.008	0.010	0.012

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	Perception	Doing	Know that	Aware of	Aware of
	of gender	housework	women are	laws on	law on
Explanatory variables	equality		allowed	prevention	gender
			leave	against	equality
			icave	women	
Treatment group 1: comment on	0.0195	0.0396	0.0306	-0.0751	0.0296
legal documents on gender equality	(0.0288)	(0.0413)	(0.0329)	(0.0463)	(0.0609)
Treatment group 2: write stories	0.0670**	0.0564	0.0641**	0.0125	0.1131**
on gender equality	(0.0262)	(0.0342)	(0.0300)	(0.0401)	(0.0533)
Age	0.0005	-0.0030**	0.0012	0.0007	0.0003
	(0.0009)	(0.0013)	(0.0011)	(0.0018)	(0.0017)
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	0.0025	0.0247	-0.0051	-0.0261	-0.0362
	(0.0491)	(0.0642)	(0.0385)	(0.0726)	(0.0613)
Household head	-0.0423**	-0.0231	-0.0515**	-0.0054	-0.0751*
	(0.0204)	(0.0307)	(0.0234)	(0.0390)	(0.0394)
Complete lower secondary	0.0034	0.0286	0.0018	-0.0205	-0.0029
	(0.0215)	(0.0282)	(0.0274)	(0.0316)	(0.0364)
Complete upper secondary	0.0235	0.0016	0.0301	0.0968**	0.0706
	(0.0228)	(0.0365)	(0.0317)	(0.0470)	(0.0505)
Complete college	0.1356***	0.0904	0.0450	0.1616***	0.1714***
	(0.0377)	(0.0653)	(0.0396)	(0.0562)	(0.0563)
Log of per capita income	0.0172**	0.0172*	0.0214	0.0046	0.0220
	(0.0081)	(0.0102)	(0.0132)	(0.0126)	(0.0147)
Household size	0.0040	-0.0102	0.0041	0.0022	-0.0027
	(0.0060)	(0.0079)	(0.0070)	(0.0093)	(0.0112)
Proportion of female members	-0.0483	0.0758	0.0237	-0.0290	-0.2104**
	(0.0626)	(0.0928)	(0.0726)	(0.0948)	(0.0880)
Log of population density of	0.0081	-0.0068	-0.0064	-0.0018	-0.0094
commune	(0.0060)	(0.0091)	(0.0057)	(0.0061)	(0.0117)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.1296	0.1320	0.6762***	0.6319***	0.7025***
	(0.1295)	(0.1527)	(0.2061)	(0.2161)	(0.2202)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808
R-squared	0.055	0.083	0.045	0.056	0.058

Table A.17: Effects of interventions on perception of gender equality and awareness of law (OLS)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.18: Effects of interventions on gender indexes: excluding the large population commune

	Poisson model		OLS		
Explanatory variables	Perception of gender equality	Doing housework	Index of perception of gender equality	Index of doing housework	Index of gender issues
Treatment group 1: comment on	0.0487	0.1621	0.0888	0.1194	0.1322
legal documents on gender equality	(0.0744)	(0.1671)	(0.1314)	(0.1248)	(0.1358)
Treatment group 2: write stories	0.1757**	0.1842	0.3328**	0.1452	0.2817**
on gender equality	(0.0702)	(0.1428)	(0.1289)	(0.1128)	(0.1150)
Age	0.0018	-0.0110**	0.0032	-0.0084**	-0.0042
	(0.0023)	(0.0052)	(0.0043)	(0.0042)	(0.0044)
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.0041	0.0758	0.0040	0.0761	0.0367
	(0.1266)	(0.2046)	(0.2338)	(0.1963)	(0.2253)
Household head	-0.1093**	-0.0964	-0.2330**	-0.0721	-0.1725*
	(0.0487)	(0.1237)	(0.0982)	(0.1008)	(0.1040)
Complete lower secondary	0.0330	0.1083	0.0777	0.0759	0.0958
	(0.0537)	(0.1278)	(0.0911)	(0.0911)	(0.0875)
Complete upper secondary	0.0819	0.0309	0.1450	0.0240	0.1087
	(0.0590)	(0.1605)	(0.1071)	(0.1176)	(0.1085)
Complete college	0.3152***	0.2627	0.6193***	0.2881	0.5117***
	(0.0780)	(0.2143)	(0.1639)	(0.2065)	(0.1828)
Log of per capita income	0.0510*	0.1217*	0.0825*	0.0641*	0.0841**
	(0.0280)	(0.0722)	(0.0426)	(0.0336)	(0.0362)
Household size	0.0113	-0.0363	0.0218	-0.0286	-0.0103
	(0.0156)	(0.0363)	(0.0293)	(0.0255)	(0.0259)
Proportion of female members	-0.1286	0.2472	-0.2198	0.1953	0.0437
	(0.1570)	(0.3690)	(0.2966)	(0.2970)	(0.3140)
Log of population density of	0.0220	-0.0277	0.0401	-0.0241	-0.0011
commune	(0.0165)	(0.0304)	(0.0289)	(0.0284)	(0.0318)
Province fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.7519*	-0.6015	-1.2448**	-0.3904	-0.8459
	(0.3861)	(0.9216)	(0.6100)	(0.4803)	(0.5347)
Observations	764	764	764	764	764
R-squared			0.057	0.085	0.077

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.19: Regression of groups sending comments or stories

		OLS			Probit	
	Sending	Sending	Sending	Sending	Sending	Sending
Explanatory variables	comments	comments	stories	comments	comments	stories
	or stories	(yes=1)	(yes=1)	or stories	(yes=1)	(yes=1)
	(yes=1)	0.0004	0.0045*	(yes=1)		0.0400**
Age	0.0016	0.0001	0.0015*	0.0063	0.0003	0.0132**
	(0.0014)	(0.0012)	(0.0008)	(0.0056)	(0.0063)	(0.0064)
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	-0.0756*	0.0170	-0.0925*	-0.3394*	0.1148	-0.6373**
	(0.0438)	(0.0449)	(0.0547)	(0.1883)	(0.3331)	(0.2967)
Household head	0.0223	0.0205	0.0018	0.1002	0.1096	0.0122
	(0.0404)	(0.0384)	(0.0219)	(0.1683)	(0.2126)	(0.1970)
Complete lower	-0.0121	-0.0154	0.0033	-0.0542	-0.0959	0.0212
secondary	(0.0292)	(0.0235)	(0.0195)	(0.1211)	(0.1248)	(0.1778)
Complete upper	0.0103	-0.0293	0.0396	0.0432	-0.1800	0.3049
secondary	(0.0428)	(0.0348)	(0.0305)	(0.1712)	(0.1975)	(0.2418)
Complete college	0.0220	0.0385	-0.0165	0.0855	0.1773	-0.2685
	(0.0638)	(0.0573)	(0.0307)	(0.2649)	(0.2688)	(0.4812)
Log of per capita income	-0.0126	-0.0037	-0.0089	-0.0459	-0.0158	-0.0697
	(0.0131)	(0.0074)	(0.0108)	(0.0419)	(0.0313)	(0.0518)
Household size	0.0009	-0.0026	0.0035	0.0035	-0.0120	0.0242
	(0.0115)	(0.0102)	(0.0056)	(0.0427)	(0.0518)	(0.0363)
Proportion of female	0.0859	0.0334	0.0525	0.3844	0.2107	0.5589
members in households	(0.0897)	(0.0701)	(0.0488)	(0.3777)	(0.3945)	(0.4083)
Log of population	0.0079	0.0086	-0.0007	0.0390	0.0598	0.0001
density of commune	(0.0098)	(0.0093)	(0.0053)	(0.0484)	(0.0705)	(0.0454)
Have wage job	-0.1014**	-0.0716	-0.0298	-0.4160**	-0.4028*	-0.2354
	(0.0508)	(0.0494)	(0.0237)	(0.1810)	(0.2255)	(0.1856)
Have non-farm work	-0.0765	-0.0649	-0.0116	-0.3040	-0.3709	-0.0701
	(0.0615)	(0.0553)	(0.0367)	(0.2299)	(0.2594)	(0.2784)
Log of per capita living	0.0002	0.0000	0.0002	0.0010	0.0001	0.0020
area	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0016)
Have flush latrine	-0.0010	-0.0011	0.0001	0.0023	-0.0229	0.0326
	(0.0377)	(0.0294)	(0.0287)	(0.1644)	(0.1855)	(0.2496)
Have tap water	0.0053	0.0281	-0.0228	0.0133	0.1296	-0.2333
	(0.0500)	(0.0477)	(0.0232)	(0.2010)	(0.2343)	(0.2259)
Use gas or electricity	0.0816**	0.0466	0.0350	0.3734*	0.2659	0.3331
for cooking	(0.0409)	(0.0311)	(0.0263)	(0.1942)	(0.1951)	(0.2290)
Have solid wall house	0.0571	0.0428	0.0143	0.3360	0.4008	0.1254
	(0.0783)	(0.0559)	(0.0622)	(0.4193)	(0.4716)	(0.5079)
Constant	0.0933	0.0202	0.0730	-1.5246**	-2.0521**	-1.8674**
	(0.1730)	(0.1175)	(0.1420)	(0.7342)	(0.8189)	(0.8705)
Observations	`804 [´]	804	`804 [´]	804	804	`804 ´
R-squared	0.035	0.026	0.032	0.040	0.040	0.067
Have tap water Use gas or electricity for cooking Have solid wall house Constant Observations R-squared	0.0053 (0.0500) 0.0816** (0.0409) 0.0571 (0.0783) 0.0933 (0.1730) 804 0.035	0.0281 (0.0477) 0.0466 (0.0311) 0.0428 (0.0559) 0.0202 (0.1175) 804 0.026	-0.0228 (0.0232) 0.0350 (0.0263) 0.0143 (0.0622) 0.0730 (0.1420) 804 0.032	0.0133 (0.2010) 0.3734* (0.1942) 0.3360 (0.4193) -1.5246** (0.7342) 804 0.040	0.1296 (0.2343) 0.2659 (0.1951) 0.4008 (0.4716) -2.0521** (0.8189) 804 0.040	-0.2333 (0.2259) 0.3331 (0.2290) 0.1254 (0.5079) -1.8674** (0.8705) 804 0.067

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Explanatory variables	Perception of gender equality	Doing housework	Perception of gender equality	Doing housework	Perception of gender equality	Doing housework
Treatment group 1	0.0419	0.1400	-0.2750	0.2472	0.2097*	0.6282**
	(0.0828)	(0.1891)	(0.2698)	(0.5728)	(0.1226)	(0.2789)
Treatment group 2	0.1361**	0.1919	-0.3243	0.1811	0.2765***	0.2716
	(0.0660)	(0.1499)	(0.2300)	(0.5718)	(0.0948)	(0.2494)
Treatment group 1 ×	0.0223	0.0690				
Sending comments	(0.0997)	(0.1759)				
Treatment group 1 ×	0.1403*	0.1533				
Sending stories	(0.0774)	(0.1868)				
Treatment group 1 ×			0.0066	-0.0018		
Age			(0.0049)	(0.0112)		
Treatment group 2 ×			0.0099**	0.0008		
Age			(0.0046)	(0.0122)		
Treatment group 1 ×					-0.2073*	-0.6066**
Household head					(0.1059)	(0.2925)
Treatment group 2 ×					-0.1476	-0.0718
Household head					(0.1002)	(0.2878)
Age	0.0007	-0.0123**	-0.0047*	-0.0114*	0.0012	-0.0107**
	(0.0022)	(0.0050)	(0.0027)	(0.0069)	(0.0022)	(0.0048)
Household head	-0.1023**	-0.0961	-0.0966**	-0.0909	0.0133	0.1476
	(0.0465)	(0.1156)	(0.0466)	(0.1143)	(0.0748)	(0.1983)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.8384**	-0.3205	1.1299***	-0.3571	0.7257**	-0.5544
	(0.3546)	(0.8699)	(0.3751)	(0.8885)	(0.3661)	(0.8370)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808	808

Table A.20: Heterogenous effects: interactions with comment sending, age, and household head (Poisson regression)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Explanatory variables	Perception of gender equality	Doing housework	Perception of gender equality	Doing housework	Perception of gender equality	Doing housework
Treatment group 1	-0.3380*	-0.5487*	-1.2954**	-0.9253	0.0488	0.1217
	(0.1821)	(0.3247)	(0.5332)	(1.4508)	(0.0772)	(0.1756)
Treatment group 2	-0.3066	-0.2566	-0.9208	-0.9336	0.1574**	0.1969
	(0.2594)	(0.3725)	(0.5691)	(1.3583)	(0.0674)	(0.1504)
Treatment group 1 ×	0.4139**	0.7857**				
Kinh	(0.1997)	(0.3873)				
Treatment group 1 ×	0.5052*	0.5255				
Kinh	(0.2648)	(0.4187)				
Treatment group 1 ×			0.1292**	0.1050		
Log of income			(0.0507)	(0.1401)		
Treatment group 1 ×			0.1045*	0.1115		
Log of income			(0.0541)	(0.1313)		
Treatment group 1 ×					-0.0108	0.4982
College degree					(0.1543)	(0.3722)
Treatment group 1 ×					0.0742	0.2849
College degree					(0.1597)	(0.3668)
	-0.3471**	-0.4089	-0.0144	0.0651	0.0007	0.0785
Kinh (Yes=1, No=0)	(0.1651)	(0.2928)	(0.1226)	(0.2036)	(0.1224)	(0.2040)
Log of per capita	0.0470*	0.0922	-0.0205	0.0268	0.0492**	0.0962
income	(0.0243)	(0.0662)	(0.0192)	(0.0780)	(0.0248)	(0.0669)
Complete college	0.2880***	0.2521	0.2930***	0.2601	0.2728***	-0.0035
	(0.0766)	(0.2004)	(0.0776)	(0.2048)	(0.0970)	(0.3105)
Control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	1.1909***	0.1927	1.5720***	0.3996	0.8319**	-0.2808
	(0.3652)	(0.8908)	(0.3011)	(0.9589)	(0.3671)	(0.8762)
Observations	808	808	808	808	808	808
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level						

Table A.21: Heterogenous effects: interactions with Kinh, income, and education (Poisson regression)

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.22: Questionnaires on gender issues

SECTION 13D: PERCEPTION OF GENDER ISSUES

(Ask to husbands who participated in the intervention)

1. This sectio Please feel fr about the foll	n will ask you about your views regarding role of men and women in life. ee any way you like – there are no right or wrong answers. Do you think owing statements?	 Absolutely agree Partially agree Don't agree 	CODE		
1a	A woman's most important role is to take care of the home and cook				
1b	Taking care of and feeding the kids are the mother's responsibility				
1c	There are times when a woman deserves to be beaten				
1d	The most important role of men is to earn money				
1e	Men should do big things instead of housework				
1f	Men should not cook or wash clothes				
1g	Women have the same rights as men				
1h	On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do				
1i	On the whole, men make better business executives than women do				
1j	On the whole, men are more intelligent than women				
1k	A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl				
11	Boys should receive more heritage than girls from parents				
2. How do yo	u and your wife divide the following tasks?	•	CODE		
2a	Washing clothes				
2b	Buying food	1 I do eventhing			
2c	Preparing food	2. Usually me			
2d	Cleaning bowl after meal	3. Shared equally between me and wife			
2e	Cleaning the house	4. Sometimes I do			
2f	Teaching children	5. I never do			
2g	Feeding or giving bath to children				
3. Understand	ding gender policies:		CODE		
3a	Is there a law in Viet Nam that guarantees mothers time off when their child is born (i.e. maternity leave)?	1. Yes			
3b	Are there any laws in Viet Nam about protection of violence against women?	2. No			
3c	Are there any laws in Viet Nam about gender equality?				

Source: Questionnaire used by ILSSA.