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## Decomposing Changes in the Distribution of Real Hourly Wages in the U.S.

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# Decomposing Changes in the Distribution of Real Hourly Wages in the U.S.

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**cemmap** working paper CWP61/19

# Decomposing Changes in the Distribution of Real Hourly Wages in the U.S.\*

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## Abstract

We analyze the sources of changes in the distribution of hourly wages in the United States using CPS data for the survey years 1976 to 2016. We account for the selection bias from the employment decision by modeling the distribution of annual hours of work and estimating a nonseparable model of wages which uses a control function to account for selection. This allows the inclusion of all individuals working positive hours and thus provides a fuller description of the wage distribution. We decompose changes in the distribution of wages into composition, structural and selection effects. Composition effects have increased wages at all quantiles but the patterns of change are generally determined by the structural effects. Evidence of changes in the selection effects only appear at the lower quantiles of the female wage distribution. These various components combine to produce a substantial increase in wage inequality.

**Keywords:** Wage inequality, wage decompositions, nonseparability, selection bias

**JEL-codes:** C14, I24, J00

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# 1 Introduction

The dramatic increase in earnings inequality in the United States is an intensely studied phenomenon (see, for example, Katz and Murphy 1992, Murphy and Welch 1992, Juhn et al. 1993, Katz and Autor 1999, Lee 1999, Lemieux 2006, Autor et al. 2008, Acemoglu and Autor 2011, Autor et al. 2016, and Murphy and Topel 2016). While this literature employs a variety of measures of earnings and inequality and utilizes different data sets, there is general agreement that earnings inequality has greatly increased since the early 1980s. As individual earnings reflect both the number of hours worked and the average hourly wage rate, understanding the determinants of each is important for uncovering the sources of earnings inequality. This paper examines the sources of changes in the distribution of hourly real wage rates in the United States for 1975 to 2015 while accounting for the drastic changes in employment rates and average annual hours worked which occurred throughout this period. To provide a fuller description of the evolution of wages we include all individuals reporting positive annual hours rather than only those working full-time or full-year.

Figure 1 recapitulates established empirical evidence on wage inequality by presenting selected quantiles of male and female real hourly wage rates from the U.S. Current Population Survey, or March CPS. The data are for the survey years 1976 to 2016, with information on average hourly wages for the calendar years 1975 to 2015, and refer to individuals aged 24 to 65 years at the time of the survey, who worked a positive number of hours the previous year, and were neither in the Armed Forces nor self-employed.<sup>1</sup> Consider first the median male wage rate. Despite a slight increase between 1987 and 1990, the overall trend between 1976 and 1994 was negative, reaching a minimum of 17.6 percentage points below its initial level.<sup>2</sup> It rises between 1994 and 2002, but falls between 2007 and 2013. The decline between 1976 and 2016 is 13.6 percentage points. The female median wage, despite occasional dips, increases by nearly 25 percentage points over the sample period. The male

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<sup>1</sup>Section 2 provides a detailed discussion of the data employed in our analysis and our sample selection process.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout the paper we refer to the survey year rather than the year for which the data are collected.

wage profile at the 25th percentile shows the same cyclical behavior as the median but a greater decline, especially between 1976 and 1994, resulting in a 2016 wage 18.2 percentage points below its 1976 level. In contrast, the female wage at the 25th percentile increases by about 17 percentage points. The profiles at the 10th percentile are similar to those of the 25th and 50th.

At higher quantiles there is a small increase in the male real wage at the 75th percentile over the sample period. However, until the late 1990s it remained below its 1976 level before increasing throughout the last 15 years of our sample period. The profile at the 90th percentile resembles that of the 75th percentile, although the periods of growth have produced larger increases. For females, there has been strong and steady growth at the 75th and 90th percentiles since 1980 with an increasing gap between each and the median wage.

Figure 2 reports the time series behavior of the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile, a commonly used summary measure of inequality. The figure confirms the widening wage gap for both males and females with increases over the sample period of 55 and 38 percent respectively. Rather than immediately focusing on these ratios, we first identify the sources of the observed wage changes. The cyclical behavior of the profiles in Figure 1 suggests that each responds to business cycle forces, although the strength of the response varies by quantile. The behavior of the various profiles also suggests that workers located at different points of the wage distribution are subject to different labor market conditions.

The previous literature has emphasized two main sources of growth in wage inequality. One is the increase in skill premia, especially the returns to education (see for example, Juhn et al. 1993, Katz and Autor 1999, Welch 2000, Autor et al. 2008, Acemoglu and Autor 2011, and Murphy and Topel 2016), but also the returns to cognitive and noncognitive skills (Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua 2006). The manner in which the prices of individual's characteristics contribute to wages is known as the "structural effect". This also reflects other factors such as declining minimum wages in real terms, the decrease in the union premium (see, for example, DiNardo et al. 1996, Lee 1999, and Autor et al. 2016), and the increasing use of noncompete clauses in employment contracts (Krueger and Posner 2018). The other

source is the change in workers' characteristics over the period considered. These include the increase in educational attainment, the decrease in unionization rates, and changes in the age structure of the workforce. The large increase in female labor force participation may have also produced changes in the labor force composition. The contribution to changes in the distribution of hourly wages attributable to these observable characteristics is known as the "composition effect".

Earlier papers (see, for example, Angrist et al. 2006, and Chernozhukov et al. 2013) estimated structural and composition effects under general conditions. However, they ignore the potential selection bias from the employment outcome (see Heckman 1974, 1979). This "selection effect" is potentially important as the movements in the employment rates and the average number of annual hours worked of both males and females, shown in Figure 3, suggest that employment behavior has undergone changes throughout our sample period. While this may partially reflect long-run trends, it may also capture responses to cyclical factors. It is possible that they are also associated with unobservable features of the workforce. Moreover, just as the returns to observable characteristics may change over time, and be different at different points of the wage distribution, the returns to these unobservables may also vary. For example, Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), hereafter MR, find that selection by females into full-time employment played an important role in explaining the variation in inequality and that the selected sample of working females became increasingly more productive in terms of unobservables during the last three decades of the twentieth century. Moreover this contributed to a reduction in the gender wage gap and an increase in wage inequality for females. Maasoumi and Wang (2019), hereafter MW, support these findings.

MR employ a separable and parametric version of the Heckman (1979) selection model (HSM) to evaluate the role of selection in changes in the conditional mean wage of females. However, to evaluate the impact of selection at different points of the wage distribution requires a nonseparable model. MW do so by employing the procedure of Arellano and Bonhomme (2017), hereafter AB, which corrects for sample selection in quantile regression models via a copula approach. Both MR and MW analyze wages for the selected sample of full-time workers. This facilitates the

use of the HSM and AB procedures, which are based on a binary selection rule. However, as noted above, to obtain a fuller understanding of the evolution of real wages it is important to examine the wages of all those working and account for their hours of work decision. Figure 4 presents the fraction of workers who work either full-time or full-year, with full-time defined as working at least 35 hours per week and full-year as working at least 50 weeks per year. There is a large increase in the fraction of full-time-full-year (FTFY) females, from 49 percent in 1976 to 69 percent in 2016, while the fraction of FTFY males increases only from 76 to 82 percent. However, while the fractions working full-time are increasing, there is a substantial number of individuals who work less than full-time.

For males, the time series patterns of the wage percentiles of FTFY workers are similar to those of all workers. This reflects that the sample of all workers is primarily composed of FTFY workers. However, a closer examination of Figure 5 reveals some notable difference across non-FTFY and FTFY males. At the 90th percentile the two groups have similar wage levels and wage trends over the whole period. However, for the 75th percentile and below the FTFY wages are clearly higher. There is a large difference at the median, and the wage at the 5th percentile of the FTFY group is higher for the whole period than that for the 25th percentile for the non-FTFY group. For females, the FTFY wage levels and trends at different quantiles are similar to those for all female workers. This is somewhat more surprising for females given the lower proportion of female workers who are FTFY. Given this result it is not surprising that the female FTFY wage distribution is similar to the female non-FTFY distribution. In fact, there are instances of specific quantiles and time periods when the females non-FTFY wage is higher than the female FTFY wage. Similar to males, the larger relative differences in favor of the FTFY group appear at the lower quantiles. Note that while we illustrate these differences by contrasting these FTFY and non-FTFY categories there may exist alternative contrasts along the annual hours distribution which would produce larger differences.

This evidence suggests the FTFY wage movements do not provide an accurate representation of the evolution of wages for all workers. This is particularly important when the individuals are non-FTFY due to spells of non-employment. This

is likely to be the case for some of the time periods in our sample as indicated by the patterns for males in Figure 4. Given that these workers are potentially more vulnerable, which may be reflected in their wage, it seems inappropriate to exclude them in an evaluation of wage inequality. It is also possible that wage differences between these two working categories might capture selection effects in addition to structural and composition effects. Moreover, the failure to include those who do not work FTFY means that the selection effects in earlier studies may reflect movement from the non-FTFY to FTFY, rather than from non-employment to FTFY.

To obtain a fuller picture of the wage distribution over a period of changing employment rates and changes in average annual hours worked, we feel it is appropriate to include all workers and account for the selection of the hours of work decision. Thus, a more general approach would allow for different selection effects at different points of the hours distribution while incorporating varying structural and compositional effects. We incorporate these considerations by employing the estimation strategy proposed by Fernández-Val, van Vuuren, and Vella (2019), hereafter FVV, for nonseparable models with a censored selection rule. We estimate the relationship between the individual's hourly wage and their characteristics while accounting for selection resulting from the individual's location in the annual hours distribution. The procedure employs distribution regression methods and accounts for sample selection via an appropriately constructed control function. The estimator requires a censored variable as the basis of the selection rule and this is provided by the number of annual working hours. The novelty of our paper is to decompose changes in the wage distribution into structural, composition and selection via a model which features a nonseparable structure and which also allows for selection into a wider range of annual working hours. Each of these features appear to be empirically important.

Our empirical results confirm previous findings, restricted to FTFY workers, regarding movements in the wage distribution. Male real wages at the median or below have decreased despite the increases in both skill premia and educational attainments. The reduction primarily reflects the large wage decreases for those with lower levels of education. Wages at the upper quantiles have increased drastically



due to the increasing skill premium. These two trends combine to substantially increase male wage inequality. Female wage growth at lower quantiles is modest although the median wage has grown steadily. Gains at the upper quantiles are substantial and also reflect increasing returns to schooling. These factors also have produced a substantial increase in female wage inequality. Our results also provide new evidence regarding the changing role of selection. These changes are especially important at the lower end of the female wage distribution. Moreover, they tend to decrease wage growth and increase wage inequality. Despite changes in the employment levels of males, both in participation and annual hours worked, there is no evidence that changes in selection have affected the male wage distribution. This result is somewhat surprising since some of the variation in male participation and hours reflects ongoing phenomena in the macro economy.

The next section discusses the data. Section 3 describes our empirical model and defines our decomposition exercise. This section also provides a comparison of our decomposition approach with that associated with the HSM. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 provides some additional discussion of the empirical results, while Section 6 presents some extensions of the decomposition exercises. Section 7 offers some concluding comments.

## 2 Data

We employ micro-level data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), or March CPS, for the 41 survey years from 1976 to 2016 which report annual earnings for the previous calendar year.<sup>3</sup> The 1976 survey is the first for which information on weeks worked and usual hours of work per week last year are available. To avoid issues related to retirement and ongoing educational investment we restrict attention to those aged 24–65 years in the survey year. This produces an overall sample of 1,794,466 males and 1,946,957 females, with an average annual sample size of 43,767 males and 47,487 females. The annual sample sizes range from a minimum of 30,767 males and 33,924 females in

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<sup>3</sup> We downloaded the data from the IPUM-CPS website maintained by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota (Flood et al. 2015).

1976 to a maximum of 55,039 males and 59,622 females in 2001.

Annual hours worked are defined as the product of weeks worked and usual weekly hours of work last year. Most of those reporting zero hours respond that they are not in the labor force (i.e., they report themselves as doing housework, unable to work, at school, or retired) in the week of the March survey. We define hourly wages as the ratio of reported annual labor earnings in the year before the survey, converted to constant 2015 prices using the consumer price index for all urban consumers, and annual hours worked. Hourly wages are unavailable for those not in the labor force. For the Armed Forces, the self-employed, and unpaid family workers annual earnings or annual hours tend to be poorly measured. Thus we exclude these groups from our sample and focus on civilian dependent employees with positive hourly wages and people out of the labor force last year. This restricted sample contains 1,551,796 males and 1,831,220 females (respectively 86.5 percent and 94.1 percent of the original sample of people aged 24–65), with average annual sample sizes of 37,849 males and 44,664 females. The subsample of civilian dependent employees with positive hourly wages contains 1,346,918 males and 1,276,125 females, with an average annual sample size of 32,852 males and 31,125 females.

The March CPS differs from the Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS, or ORG CPS, which contains information on hourly wages in the survey week for those paid by the hour and on weekly earnings from the primary job during the survey week for those not paid by the hour. Lemieux (2006) and Autor et al. (2008) argue that the ORG CPS data are preferable because they provide a point-in-time wage measure and workers paid by the hour (more than half of the U.S. workforce) may recall their hourly wages better. However, there is no clear evidence regarding differences in the relative reporting accuracy of hourly wages, weekly earnings and annual earnings. In addition, many workers paid by the hour also work overtime, so their effective hourly wage depends on the importance of overtime work and the wage differential between straight time and overtime. Furthermore, the failure of the March CPS to provide a point-in-time wage measure may be an advantage as it smooths out intra-annual variations in hourly wages.

There are concerns with using earnings data from either of the CPS files. First,

defining hourly wages as the ratio of earnings to hours worked may induce a “division bias” (Borjas 1980). Second, CPS earnings data are subject to measurement issues, including top-coding of earnings (Larrimore et al. 2008), mass points at zero and at values corresponding to the legislated minimum wage (DiNardo et al. 1996), item non-response (Meyer et al. 2015) related to extreme earnings values, earnings response from proxies, and earnings imputation procedures (Lillard et al. 1986, and Bollinger et al. 2019). Our use of distribution regression methods mitigates these first two concerns. Since there is no consensus on how to best address the others, we retain proxy responses and imputed values.

To explain the variation in hourly wage rates and annual hours of work we employ the following conditioning variables; the individual’s age and categorical variables for highest educational attainment (less than high-school, high-school graduate, some college, and college or more), race (white and non white), region of residence (North-East, South, Central, and West), and marital status (married with spouse present, and not married or spouse not present). We also employ household composition variables, including the number of household members and the number of children in the household, and indicators for the presence of children under 5 years of age and the presence of other unrelated individuals in the household.

### **3 Model and objects of interest**

Our objective is to decompose the changes over time in individual hourly wage rates at various points of the wage distribution into composition, structural and selection effects. We do this by estimating a model for the observed distribution of wages while accounting for selection and then estimating the objects of interest which capture these three effects.

#### **3.1 Model**

We consider a version of the HSM where the censoring rule for the selection process incorporates the information provided in the CPS on annual hours worked, rather

than the binary employment/non-employment decision. The model has the form:

$$Y = g(X, \varepsilon), \quad \text{if } H > 0, \quad (1)$$

$$H = \max \{h^*(Z, \eta), 0\}, \quad (2)$$

where  $Y$  is the logarithm of hourly wages,  $H$  is annual hours worked,  $X$  and  $Z$  are vectors of observable conditioning variables, with  $X$  strictly contained in  $Z$ ,  $g$  and  $h^*$  are unknown smooth functions, and  $\varepsilon$  and  $\eta$  are respectively a vector and a scalar of potentially dependent unobservable variables with strictly increasing distribution functions (DFs)  $F_\varepsilon$  and  $F_\eta$ . We shall refer to  $\max\{h^*, 0\}$  as the selection rule. We assume that  $\varepsilon$  and  $\eta$  are independent of  $Z$  in the total population, and that  $h^*$  is strictly increasing in its second argument. Equation (2) can be considered a reduced-form representation for annual hours worked. The model is a nonparametric and nonseparable version of the Tobit type-3 model (see, for example, Amemiya 1984, Vella 1993, Honoré et al. 1997, Chen 1997, and Lee and Vella 2006). The most general treatment of this model, and best suited for our objectives, is provided by FVV.<sup>4</sup>

Due to the potential dependence between  $\varepsilon$  and  $\eta$ , the assumption that  $Z$  is independent of  $\varepsilon$  in the total population does not exclude their dependence in the selected population with  $H > 0$ . FVV show that  $Z$  is independent of  $\varepsilon$  conditional on  $V = F_{H|Z}(H|Z)$  and  $H > 0$ , where  $F_{H|Z}(h|z) = \mathbb{P}(H \leq h | Z = z)$  denotes the conditional DF of  $H$  given  $Z = z$ , which implies that  $F_{H|Z}(H|Z)$  is an appropriate control function for the selected population.<sup>5</sup> The intuition behind this result is that  $V = F_\eta(\eta)$  under the conditions in FVV, so  $V$  can be interpreted as an index for the error term in the hours equation. This control function can be estimated via a distribution regression of  $H$  on all the variables in  $Z$ .

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<sup>4</sup>This model could be estimated via the AB procedure although the FVV estimator is simpler to implement in this context. However, as the AB procedure only requires a binary selection rule it is more generally applicable than the FVV estimator.

<sup>5</sup>This result is closely related to that of Imbens and Newey (2009), who consider estimation and identification of a nonseparable model with a single continuous endogenous explanatory variable. Their model, however, does not include a selection mechanism.

## 3.2 Counterfactual distributions

We consider linear functionals of global objects of interest, including counterfactual DFs, constructed by integrating local objects of interest with respect to different joint distributions of the conditioning variables and the control function.<sup>6</sup> Counterfactual DFs enable the construction of wage decompositions and facilitate counterfactual analyses similar to those in DiNardo et al. (1996), Ñopo (2008), Fortin et al. (2011), and Chernozhukov et al. (2013). We focus on functionals for the selected population. To simplify notation, we use the superscript  $s$  to denote conditioning on  $H > 0$ . We also denote by  $\mathbf{1}(A)$  the indicator function of the event  $A$ .

Our decompositions are based on the following representation of the observed DF of  $Y$ :<sup>7</sup>

$$G_Y^s(y) = \int G(y, z, v) dF_{Z,V}^s(z, v),$$

where

$$G(y, z, v) = \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{1}\{g(x, \varepsilon) \leq y\} \mid V = v] \quad (3)$$

denotes the local distribution structural function (LDSF):<sup>8</sup>

$$F_{Z,V}^s(z, v) = \frac{\mathbf{1}\{h(z, v) > 0\} F_{Z,V}(z, v)}{\int \mathbf{1}\{h(z, v) > 0\} dF_{Z,V}(z, v)}$$

denotes the joint DF of  $Z$  and  $V$  in the selected population,  $h(z, v) = h^*(z, F_\eta^{-1}(v))$ , and  $F_{Z,V}(z, v)$  denotes the joint DF of  $Z$  and  $V$  in the total population.

Our counterfactual DFs are constructed by combining the DFs  $G$  and  $F_{Z,V}$  with the selection rule (2) for different groups, each group corresponding to a different time period or a subpopulation defined by certain characteristics. Specifically, let  $G_t$  denote the LDSF in group  $t$ , let  $F_{Z_k, V_k}$  denote the joint DF of  $Z$  and  $V$  in group  $k$ , and let  $\max\{h_r, 0\}$  denote the selection rule in group  $r$ . The counterfactual DF of  $Y$  when  $G$  is as in group  $t$ ,  $F_{Z,V}$  is as in group  $k$ , and the selection rule is as in group  $r$

<sup>6</sup>We use the term local object to refer to indicate it is conditional on a given value of  $V$ .

<sup>7</sup>We refer to FVV for details

<sup>8</sup>The LDSF gives the DF of wages if all individuals with control function equal to  $v$  had observable characteristics equal to  $x$ .

is defined as:

$$G_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(y) = \frac{\int G_t(y, x, v) \mathbf{1}\{h_r(z, v) > 0\} dF_{Z_k, V_k}(z, v)}{\int \mathbf{1}\{h_r(z, v) > 0\} dF_{Z_k, V_k}(z, v)}. \quad (4)$$

Since the mapping  $v \mapsto h(z, v)$  is monotonic, the condition  $h_r(z, v) > 0$  in (4) is equivalent to the condition:

$$v > F_{H_r|Z}(0|z), \quad (5)$$

where  $F_{H_r|Z}(0|z)$  is the probability of working zero annual hours conditional on  $Z = z$  in group  $r$ . Given  $G_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(y)$ , the counterfactual quantile function (QF) of  $Y$  when  $G$  is as in group  $t$ ,  $F_{Z,V}$  is as in group  $k$ , and the selection rule is as in group  $r$  is defined as:

$$q_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(\tau) = \inf\{y \in \mathbb{R}: G_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(y) \geq \tau\}, \quad 0 < \tau < 1, \quad (6)$$

Under these definitions, the observed DF and QF of  $Y$  for the selected population in group  $t$  are  $G_{Y_{(t,t,t)}}^s$  and  $q_{Y_{(t,t,t)}}^s$  respectively. FVV show that (4) and (6) are nonparametrically identified if  $\mathcal{Z}_k \subseteq \mathcal{Z}_r$  and  $(\mathcal{X}\mathcal{V}_k \cap \mathcal{Z}\mathcal{V}_r) \subseteq \mathcal{Z}\mathcal{V}_t$ , where  $\mathcal{Z}_k$  denotes the support of  $Z$  in group  $k$ ,  $\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{V}_k$  denotes the support of  $Z$  for the selected population in group  $k$ , namely the set of possible combinations of observable characteristics  $Z$  and values of the control function  $V$  for the individuals in group  $k$  working a positive number of annual hours, etc.<sup>9</sup>

Using (6), we can decompose the difference in the observed QF of  $Y$  for the selected population between any two groups, say group 1 and group 0, as:

$$q_{Y_{(1,1,1)}}^s - q_{Y_{(0,0,0)}}^s = \underbrace{[q_{Y_{(1,1,1)}}^s - q_{Y_{(1,1,0)}}^s]}_{[1]} + \underbrace{[q_{Y_{(1,1,0)}}^s - q_{Y_{(1,0,0)}}^s]}_{[2]} + \underbrace{[q_{Y_{(1,0,0)}}^s - q_{Y_{(0,0,0)}}^s]}_{[3]}, \quad (7)$$

where [1] is a selection effect that reflects changes in the selection rule given the joint distribution of the conditioning variables and the control function, [2] is a composition effect that reflects changes in the joint distribution of the conditioning variables and the control function, and [3] is a structural effect that reflects changes

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<sup>9</sup> These conditions are weaker than requiring  $\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{V}_k \subseteq \mathcal{Z}\mathcal{V}_r$  and  $\mathcal{Z}\mathcal{V}_k \subseteq \mathcal{Z}\mathcal{V}_t$ , which guarantees that  $h_r$  and  $G_t$  are identified for all combinations of  $z$  and  $v$  over which we integrate.

in the conditional distribution of the outcome given the conditioning variables and the control function.

### 3.3 Comparison with the Heckman selection model

When applied to changes over time in the DF of hourly wages, the decomposition (7) yields effects that are defined differently from those derived by MR for a parametric version of the HSM. More precisely, the selection effect in MR excludes a component that we attribute to the selection effect, includes another that we attribute to the composition effect, and contains one that in nonseparable models cannot be separately identified from the structural effect.

To illustrate this, suppose that the population model in any period  $t$  is the following fully parametric version of the HSM:

$$Y_t = \alpha'_t X_t + \epsilon_t, \quad \text{if } H_t > 0, \quad (8)$$

$$H_t = \max\{\gamma'_t Z_t + \eta_t, 0\}, \quad (9)$$

where the first element of the vector  $X_t$  is the constant term, and  $\epsilon_t$  and  $\eta_t$  are distributed independently of  $Z_t$  as bivariate normal with zero means, unit variances, and correlation coefficient  $\rho_t$ .<sup>10</sup>

The counterfactual mean of  $Y$  for the selected population when the local average structural function (LASF)<sup>11</sup> is as in group  $t$ ,  $F_{Z,V}$  is as in group  $k$ , and the selection rule is as in group  $r$ . Using the notation above, this has the form:

$$\mu_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s = \frac{\int \mu_t(x, v) \mathbf{1}\{h_r(z, v) > 0\} dF_{Z_k, V_k}(z, v)}{\int \mathbf{1}\{h_r(z, v) > 0\} dF_{Z_k, V_k}(z, v)}, \quad (10)$$

where:

$$\mu_t(x, v) = \alpha'_t x + \rho_t \Phi^{-1}(v)$$

denotes the LASF in group  $t$ . The observed mean of  $Y_t$  for the selected population

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<sup>10</sup>We present the selection rule in this censored form in order to employ our approach although our discussion of the HSM which follows is based on the binary rule that only  $\mathbf{1}(H_t > 0)$  is observed.

<sup>11</sup>The LASF  $\mu(x, v) = \mathbb{E}[g(x, \epsilon) | V = v]$  gives the mean value of wage if all individuals with control function equal to  $v$  had observable characteristics equal to  $x$ .

(after integrating over the distribution of  $Z_t$ ) is:

$$\mu_{Y_{(t,t,t)}}^s = \alpha'_t \mathbb{E}[X_t | H_t > 0] + \rho_t \mathbb{E}[\lambda(\gamma'_t Z_t) | H_t > 0],$$

where  $\lambda(\cdot)$  denotes the inverse Mills ratio. We decompose the difference  $\mu_{Y_{(1,1,1)}}^s - \mu_{Y_{(0,0,0)}}^s$  between two time periods,  $t = 0$  and  $t = 1$ , into selection, composition and structural effects.

MR define the selection effect as:

$$\rho_1 \mathbb{E}[\lambda(\gamma'_1 Z_1) | H_1 > 0] - \rho_0 \mathbb{E}[\lambda(\gamma'_0 Z_0) | H_0 > 0].$$

This effect consists of the following three elements:

$$\begin{aligned} & \rho_1 \int [\lambda(\gamma'_1 z) \Phi_1(\gamma'_1 z) - \lambda(\gamma'_0 z) \Phi_1(\gamma'_0 z)] dF_{Z_1}(z) + \\ & + \rho_1 \left[ \int \lambda(\gamma'_0 z) \Phi_1(\gamma'_0 z) dF_{Z_1}(z) - \int \lambda(\gamma'_0 z) \Phi_0(\gamma'_0 z) dF_{Z_0}(z) \right] + \\ & + (\rho_1 - \rho_0)' \mathbb{E}[\lambda(\gamma'_0 Z_1) | H_0 > 0], \quad (11) \end{aligned}$$

where  $\Phi_k(\gamma'_r z) = \Phi(\gamma'_r z) / \int \Phi(\gamma'_r z) dF_{Z_k}(z)$  is the counterfactual probability of selection in group  $k$  when the selection rule is as in group  $r$  and  $\Phi(\cdot)$  denotes the standard normal DF. The first two elements in (11) capture the effect of changes over time in the composition of the selected population in terms of observable characteristics. The first element results from applying the selection rule from period 0 to period 1 holding the composition of period 1 fixed, whereas the second component results from changing the distribution of characteristics from period 1 to period 0. The third element captures the effect of changes over time in the composition of the selected population in terms of unobservables through the correlation coefficient.<sup>12</sup> In our view, the first and third elements rightfully belong to the selection effect, whereas the second element belongs to the composition effect as it is driven by changes over time in the distribution of  $Z$ .

We now present the selection, composition and structural effects for our decom-

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<sup>12</sup> MR make the strong assumption that the distribution of the covariates does not change over time, i.e.,  $F_{Z_0} = F_{Z_1}$ , so the second component drops out.



position and compare them with the corresponding effects in MR. Plugging this expression for the LASF  $\mu_t(x, v)$  into (10) gives, after some straightforward calculations:

$$\mu_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s = \int [\alpha'_t x + \rho_t \lambda(\gamma'_r z)] \Phi_k(\gamma'_r z) dF_{Z_k}(z).$$

Thus, our selection effect is:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{Y_{(1,1,1)}}^s - \mu_{Y_{(1,1,0)}}^s &= \alpha'_1 \int x [\Phi_1(\gamma'_1 z) - \Phi_1(\gamma'_0 z)] dF_{Z_1}(z) + \\ &+ \rho_1 \int [\lambda(\gamma'_1 z) \Phi_1(\gamma'_1 z) - \lambda(\gamma'_0 z) \Phi_1(\gamma'_0 z)] dF_{Z_1}(z). \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

The first element on the right-hand-side of (12) is the effect on the average wage of changes over time in the composition of the selected population in terms of observable characteristics resulting from applying the selection equation from period 0 to period 1. It is positive when the selected population contains relatively more individuals with characteristics that are associated with higher average wages. This element is missing in the selection effect in (11). The second element is the corresponding effect for the unobservable characteristics and corresponds to the first element in (11).

Our composition effect is:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{Y_{(1,1,0)}}^s - \mu_{Y_{(1,0,0)}}^s &= \alpha'_1 \left[ \int x \Phi_1(\gamma'_0 z) dF_{Z_1}(z) - \int x \Phi_0(\gamma'_0 z) dF_{Z_0}(z) \right] + \\ &+ \rho_1 \left[ \int \lambda(\gamma'_0 z) \Phi_1(\gamma'_0 z) dF_{Z_1}(z) - \int \lambda(\gamma'_0 z) \Phi_0(\gamma'_0 z) dF_{Z_0}(z) \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

The first element on the right-hand-side of (13) is the change in the average wage resulting directly from changes over time in the distribution of the observable characteristics, while its second element is the same as the second element in (11).

Finally, our structural effect is:

$$\mu_{Y_{(1,0,0)}}^s - \mu_{Y_{(0,0,0)}}^s = (\alpha_1 - \alpha_0)' \mathbb{E}[X_0 | H_0 > 0] + (\rho_1 - \rho_0) \mathbb{E}[\lambda(\gamma'_0 Z_0) | H_0 > 0]. \quad (14)$$

The first element on the right-hand-side of (14) reflects the impact of changes over time in the returns to observable characteristics, while the second element captures

the type and degree of selection and is the same as the third element in (11). As the expectation involving the inverse Mills ratio is positive, the contribution of this element is positive whenever  $\rho_1 > \rho_0$ .

Finally, we illustrate with a simple example that the two elements of the structural effect cannot generally be identified when the model is nonseparable. Consider a multiplicative version of the parametric HSM, which is obtained by replacing (8) with

$$Y_t = \alpha'_t X_t \epsilon_t, \quad \text{if } H_t > 0,$$

and weakening the parametric assumption on the joint distribution of  $\epsilon_t$  and  $\eta_t$  by only requiring that  $\eta_t \sim N(0, 1)$  and  $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_t | Z_t, H_t > 0] = \rho_t \lambda(\gamma'_t Z_t)$ . In this case  $\alpha_t$  and  $\rho_t$  cannot be separately identified from the moment condition:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_t | Z_t, H_t > 0] = \alpha'_t X_t \rho_t \lambda(\gamma'_t Z_t).$$

While this discussion focuses on the decomposition of the mean wage, others have also investigated the decomposition of the distribution of wages. Both AB and MW derive selection effects at different points of the distribution. That is, they employ the Machado and Mata (2005) method to simulate the wage distribution that would result if everybody in the population worked based on estimates of the model's parameters obtained via the AB procedure. Thus in this example the AB approach would provide selection free estimates of  $\alpha$  for the sample for which they are identified and then simulate wages using these estimates. Thus, similar to MR, this approach ignores the structural and composition effects operating through the selection effects. They interpret the difference between this distribution and the uncorrected distribution of wages as a selection effect although some of this difference reflects composition and structural effects. This differs from our approach which investigates the counterfactual distribution for a more "restrictive selection regime" than is observed but in which the selection effects are not contaminated with components of the others. Note that the term "restrictive selection regime" implies a setting in which the participation rate is lower.

## 4 Empirical results

### 4.1 Hours equation

The left panel of Figure 3 plots the employment rates of males and females, defined as the percentage of the sample reporting positive annual hours of work. The male employment rate fluctuates cyclically around a downward trend starting at 90.0 percent, falling to a minimum of 82.1 percent in 2012, and is 83.1 percent in 2016. The female rate increases from a low of 56.5 percent in 1976 to a high of 75.3 percent in 2001, and falls to 70.0 percent in 2016. The right panel of Figure 3 plots average annual hours of work for wage earners. For males they vary cyclically around a slight upward trend, increasing from 2032 hours in 1976 to 2103 hours in 2016, after reaching a maximum of 2160 hours in 2001. For females they increase rapidly from 1515 hours in 1976 to 1792 hours in 2000, then increase slowly to 1838 hours in 2016. These patterns suggest important movements along both the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply.

An assumption of our model is that the number of annual hours of work is continuously distributed for values above the observed minimum number of hours worked for each year of our sample. To explore this, Figure 6 plots the DFs of annual hours worked by those working positive annual hours, separately by gender, for the survey years 1976, 1996 and 2016. These years are chosen to be illustrative. Our aim is not to illustrate how the DF of hours has changed over our period, but rather to illustrate the presence of both point masses and a continuous component in the distribution of annual hours of work. For example, while there is a large jump in the DF at 2080 annual hours, corresponding to the large fraction of workers working exactly 40 hours per week for 52 weeks, we also observe a nonzero fraction of workers at a large number of other values of annual hours of work. This indicates that the control function also takes on a large number of values. As we do not make any assumptions regarding the distribution of the unobservables in the hours equation, the large spike at 2080 hours does not constitute a violation of our assumptions. However, we acknowledge that it produces no variation in the control function at this particular point, for given values of  $Z$ , and we explore the implications of this

below.

As described in more detail in the Appendix, we estimate the control function, defined as the conditional DF of annual hours, via a logistic distribution regression of annual hours of work on the set of conditioning variables in  $Z$ , separately by gender and survey year, including both workers and nonworkers. The conditioning variables in  $Z$  include a quadratic term in age, a set of indicators for the highest educational attainment reported, an indicator for not being married with spouse present, an indicator for being nonwhite, a set of indicators for the region of residence, linear terms in the number of household members and the number of children in the household, and indicators for the presence in the household of children aged less than 5 years and of unrelated individuals. We also include the interaction of the quadratic age term with the educational indicators.

Except for the household size and composition variables, all the other conditioning variables appear in both the models for annual hours and hourly wages. Thus, variation in household size and composition provides one source of identification, as it induces variation in the control function for the sample of workers which is distinct from that induced by variation in the conditioning variables also included in the model for hourly wages. While one might argue that household size and composition may affect hourly wage rates, we regard our exclusion restrictions as reasonable and note that similar restrictions have been previously employed (see, for example, MR). However, given the potentially contentious use of these exclusion restrictions, we explore the impact of not using them below. Given the selection rule, the assumption that annual hours of work do not affect the hourly wage rate means that the variation in hours across individuals is the other source of identification. As our focus is on the wage equation, we do not discuss the results for the hours equation.

## 4.2 Decompositions

We now estimate gender-specific wage equations for each survey year by distribution regression over the subsample with positive hourly wages. The conditioning variables include all those present in the equation for annual hours, with the excep-

tion of the household size and composition variables. In addition, we include the control function, its square, and interactions between the other conditioning variables and the control function. Decomposing the changes in the wage distribution as shown in (7) requires a base year. The steadily increasing female participation rate suggests that 1976 is a reasonable choice for females, as it has the lowest level of participation over our period. One can then plausibly assume that those with a certain combination of  $x$  and  $v$  working in 1976 also have a positive probability of working in any other year, as required by the identification conditions outlined in FVV. A sensible choice for males is 2010, the bottom of the Great Recession, as it has the lowest level of participation over our sample period. The different base years for males and females means that we can compare trends but not wage levels across genders. Irrespective of the base year we present the changes relative to 1976.

The decompositions at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles are shown in Figures 7–11. They capture the impact of changes in the specified components. For example, the selection effect reflects the contribution of a change in the selection process on the wage distribution. We commence with the median (Figure 9). During our sample period, the median wage of males decreases by 13 percent while that of females increases by 20 percent. The structural and the total effects are very similar for males, with the small difference due to the composition effect. There is no evidence of any change in the selection effects. The composition effect increases the median wage by around 2 percent and most likely reflects the increasing educational attainment of the workforce. The structural component, which appears to be strongly procyclical, produces large negative effects. While there are some upturns, coinciding with periods of economic expansion, the structural effect is negative for the entire period. This negative structural effect is consistent with Chernozhukov et al. (2013) who perform a similar exercise for the period 1979 to 1988 without correcting for sample selection.

Figure 9 reveals that the increase in the female median wage is entirely driven by the composition effect. The structural effect is negative for the whole period, but less substantial than that for males. The contribution of the selection component is negative but negligible. This contrasts with MR, who find that the selection effect

changes from negative and large to positive and large. We do not find evidence of such a drastic effect but, as highlighted above, our definition of the selection effect differs from that employed by MR and our approach includes the non-FTFY workers. If their assertion that the correlation between  $\varepsilon$  and  $\eta$  increased over time is correct, implying that the selected sample of females became increasingly more productive relative to the total population, then our selection effect might underestimate the total change in the wage distribution due to changes in the selected sample over time. We do not, however, find support for their conclusion that the least productive females, in terms of unobservables, were working in the 1970s and 1980s. Our selection effect measures the difference between the observed wage distribution in any given year and the counterfactual distribution if the “least likely to participate” females among the selected sample would not have participated. If these females would also be the most productive, this would reduce the wage in the “counterfactual” year and reflect a positive change in the selection effect in our figures for the 1970s and the 1980s. We find no support for a positive change in the selection effect.

The decompositions suggest the decline in the median male wage is due to the prices associated with the male skill characteristics. As previous evidence highlights the returns to higher levels of schooling have generally increased, and the male labor force has become increasingly more educated, this suggests that the returns to those individuals with the lowest levels of education has markedly decreased. A similar pattern is observed for the female median wage although the less substantial negative structural impact is offset by the composition effects.

Figures 7 and 8 report the decompositions at the 10th and 25th percentiles and they are remarkably similar for males. They suggest that the reductions in the male wage rate capture the prices associated with the human capital of individuals located at these lower quantiles. There is evidence of a negative structural component of around 25 to 30 percent at each of these quantiles in both the late 1990s and the late 2010s. While these effects are somewhat offset by the composition effects, the overall effect on wages is negative. There are no signs of selection effects for males. Our results at the 10th percentile for the period 1979 to 1988 appear to differ from

those in Chernozhukov et al. (2013). However, that study breaks the structural effect into separate components due to changes in the mandatory minimum wage, unionization, and the returns to any other characteristic. Not surprisingly, changes in the mandatory minimum wage have a large impact on the 10th percentile. Our estimate of the structural effect combines these various components and also includes the variation in the prices of unobservables. Our results are consistent with their study at all other percentiles.

The evidence at the 10th and 25th percentiles for females is very different to that for males. First, there are greater differences between the 10th and 25th percentiles. The negative structural effects for females are more evident at the 10th percentile. The structural effects are small at the 25th percentile and offset by the composition effects. For both the 10th and 25th percentiles the overall wage changes become positive in the late 1990s and generally increase over the remainder of the sample.

Figures 10 and 11 present the decompositions at the 75th and 90th percentiles. At the 75th percentile, the male wage shows a small increase. The structural component displays a similar pattern to that for females at the lower quantiles discussed above. That is, initially there is a large decrease before rebounding and remaining relatively flat from the early 2000s. The negative changes resulting from the structural component are not sufficiently large to dominate the positive composition effects so the overall wage growth at the 75th percentile is positive from the early 2000s onwards.

The changes in the female hourly wage rate at the 75th percentile highlight that the larger movements have occurred at the upper percentiles of the wage distribution. The changes in the structural component are initially negative before turning positive around the mid 1980s. From the beginning of the 1980s the positively trending structural component combines with the composition effect to produce a steadily increasing wage. However, while the decomposition at the 75th percentile suggests that the structural components are an important contribution to inequality at higher quantiles of the distribution, the results at the 90th percentile are even more supportive of this perspective. For males the structural component is less negative than at lower quantiles and this, combined with the positive composition

effect, produces a wage gain for the whole period. For females the structural component is positive from the middle of the 1980s and has a larger positive effect than the composition effect. The two effects combine to produce a remarkable 41 percent growth in the wage.

Figures 9–11 suggest that selection effects cannot explain the observed changes in the males’ wage distribution. At the 50th, 75th and the 90th percentiles the selection effect is essentially zero. This is not surprising as males in this area of the wage distribution have a strong commitment to the labor force. Moreover, there is likely to be relatively little movement on either the extensive or intensive margin given males’ level of commitment to full-time employment. One might suspect that it would be more likely to uncover changes in the selection effects at the lower parts of the wage distribution as these individuals are likely to have a weaker commitment to full-time employment or their level of employment may be reduced via spells of unemployment. However, the evidence does not support this.

For females, there is little evidence of changes in selection at the higher quantiles. Females located in this part of the wage distribution are likely to have had a relatively strong commitment to employment in 1976 and thus there were no substantial moves in their hours distribution. Moreover, these individuals are less likely to incur periods of unemployment. However, at the 10th and 25th percentiles the selection effects seem economically important.<sup>13</sup> At the 10th percentile in 2016 the selection effect contribution is 2.2 percent, while the total wage change is between 8 and 9 percent. Thus the female wage was lowered by 2 percent due to the increased participation of females. This is consistent with the finding by MR of “positive selection” for the 1990s. We also find a similar relationship for the late 1970s and 1980s. Our results generally suggest a positive relationship between the control variable  $V$  and wages at the bottom of the distribution. This implies that those with the highest number of working hours, after conditioning on their observable characteristics, had the highest wages. The trends implied by our results suggest that selection becomes more important as we move further down the female wage distribution. This is similar to the findings of AB which studies the evolution of female wages in the

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<sup>13</sup> The confidence intervals for these selection effects are presented in Figure 12. They indicate that for several time periods selection effects are statistically significantly different from zero.



British labor market for the period 1978 to 2000.

## 5 Discussion

We now discuss four important issues, namely, the validity of our exclusion restrictions, the composition of our wage sample, the exclusion of hours from the wage equation, and the discreteness of annual hours of work.<sup>14</sup>

We noted above that the use of household composition variables as exclusion restrictions can be seen as controversial in this setting for both males and females. We highlight that these are the same exclusion restrictions which are employed in the MR and MW papers. However, to provide further insight on the impact of these exclusion restrictions we reproduced the decompositions when we first excluded the household variables from both the hours and wage equations and then included them in both equations. For each of these two new specifications the model is now identified by the variation in the number of hours worked. We do not find any remarkable changes from either model, in comparison to the specification employed above, with respect to the presence or magnitude of selection effects. The only notable difference is the presence of occasionally larger negative selection effects at the bottom decile for females for the specification which excludes the family composition variables from both equations.

Now consider the issues related to the composition of our wage sample. As we construct our control function using the hours of annual work variable we are imposing, for example, that an individual who works 2 hours a week for 50 weeks of the year is the same, in terms of unobservables, as an identical individual who works 50 hours a week for only 2 weeks. Given the interpretation of the control function this may be unreasonable. We check for the sensitivity of our results to this assumption by censoring the data at various points of the hours distribution. Our empirical work above employs wages for all those working positive hours so we reproduce the decomposition exercises after censoring the data at the 5th, 10th,

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<sup>14</sup> The discussion that follows is based on reproducing our empirical work while incorporating the issue under focus. Tables or graphs with the results are not included but are available from the authors.

and 25th percentiles of the hours distribution. That is, we exclude the individuals working lower numbers of hours from our wage sample while retaining them in the estimation of the hours equation. We also repeat the decomposition exercise using the full time full year selection rule employed by MR. The increased censoring has the impact of making the wage sample more homogenous. Note, however, that as this exercise is changing the sample size of the wage sample it is not reasonable to compare results at the same quantiles across samples. However, with the exception of the structural effects for females at the upper quartile the results for the structural, composition and total effects at different quantiles are very similar for the different censoring rules and the FTFY samples. The only notable difference is the absence of the selection effects except for the larger samples. That is, once we censor the bottom of the hours distribution the selection effects even disappear at the lower quantiles for females. This is consistent with our earlier discussion that the selection effects capture the impact of the inclusion of those with a weaker commitment to market employment. We highlight that we find no evidence of a change in selection effects using the FTFY sample corresponding to the MR selection rule. However, as we discussed in detail above, this reflects the different definitions of selection effects and the inability to disentangle components of their selection effect from the structural effect in our setting.

In addition to employing these different censoring rules based on annual hours, we reproduce all of our empirical analysis using weekly hours rather than annual hours. This eliminates the variation due to differences in weeks worked and avoids the issue discussed above of treating different types of individuals, in terms of the unobservables, as the same. We do not find any differences for the decomposition exercises using the corresponding control functions from the two different hours variables. This is reassuring as it suggests we are not introducing some type of misspecification error by incorrectly treating individuals who arrive at the same number of annual hours by different combinations of weeks and weekly hours as the same.

Next consider the exclusion of annual hours from the hourly wage equation. While it is not typical to include annual hours in hourly wage equations, there may

be reasons to expect that the number of hours worked per year matter. Despite an early literature (see for example Barzel, 1973) on how labor productivity may vary with hours, and some evidence of overtime premia and part-time penalties, there has been a general lack of attention to how hourly wages vary with hours. Most investigations focus on full-time workers ignoring the large variation in annual hours within this category of workers. To address this issue we re-estimate the model including annual hours as a conditioning variable and noting that the inclusion of the control function accounts for the endogeneity of hours in addition to the selection issues. We explore various specifications allowing hours to enter the wage model in a variety of ways. We then evaluated the impact of various levels of annual hours on wages. More precisely, we evaluate the effect on hourly wages of working 500, 1000, 1500 and 2000 hours per year. For males, we found that there was a highly variable and non monotonic relationship across years. However the relationship fluctuated wildly and there was no clear relationship. Moreover, for many years there was no evidence of an hours effect. This evidence supports the exclusion of hours from the wage equation in that the variability suggests an imprecise estimate of the hours effect. For females the evidence is not as clear. The estimated premium from working full time appears too large to be consistent with the raw data, and there is a large increase in hourly wages from going from 1500 annual hours to 2000 annual hours. This also appears to be inconsistent with the raw data. In addition, as with males, the estimates display big jumps (both upwards and downwards) across years. We conclude that these effects may reflect collinearity between the control function and the hours variable or the impact of our exclusion restrictions. Thus we conclude that there is no strong evidence to support the inclusion of hours in the female wage equation. Note that it is not clear what the implications for our results of incorrectly omitting annual hours from the wage equation would be. It is possible that the hours effect might be inappropriately attributed to the selection effect due to the correlation between hours and the control function. However, the absence of selection effects suggests that if the results are affected, then it is only at the lower quantiles unless the exclusion of hours is masking the selection effects.

Finally consider the discreteness of annual hours. Figure 6 reveals a large jump

in the distribution function at 2080 hours for both males and females, reflecting the large number of individuals who report working exactly 40 hours per week for 52 weeks. This and other mass points in the distribution of annual hours imply corresponding mass points in the distribution of the control function suggesting that it is inconsistent with being distributed uniformly. In fact, these mass points may reflect “rounding up” by the respondents. In this case, the underlying control function is still uniform but the estimated control function is not. One way to investigate this is to draw from a uniform distribution between the mass points of the estimated control function or alternatively, adding an arbitrarily small amount of noise to the observed hours. Both methods result in exactly the same simulated control function. With this new control function we reproduced the empirical work. For each of the empirical exercises the introduction of the noise had no notable consequences.

## 6 Extensions

We now present some extensions of the decomposition exercises presented in Section 4.2.

### 6.1 Educational premia

Our results show that the structural effects are often the main source of changes in the distribution of wages. Since substantial empirical evidence documents the importance of education in the increasing wage dispersion (see, for example, Autor et al. 2008, and Murphy and Topel 2016), we try to isolate the specific role of education treating, as customary in this literature, an individual’s education level as exogenous. Hence, we do not attempt to distinguish between whether the returns to education have increased or whether the returns to unobserved characteristics positively correlated with education have increased.

We represent education by three indicators for the highest education level attained, namely “high school graduate,” “some college,” and “college or more”. The

excluded category is “high school dropout”.<sup>15</sup> The educational attainment of the workforce increased dramatically over our sample period. The fraction of male workers with at most a high-school degree fell from 64.1 percent in 1976 to 38.4 percent in 2016, while the fraction of those with at least a college degree rose from 20.4 percent in 1976 to 35.2 percent in 2016. The trends for females are even more striking, as the fraction of those with at most a high-school degree fell from 69.1 percent in 1976 to 29.7 percent in 2016, while the fraction of those with at least a college degree rose from 16.1 percent in 1976 to 40.1 percent in 2016.

We estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of education under the assumption that the data available in each survey year represent a sample of size  $n$ ,  $\{(H_i, Y_i, Z_i)\}_{i=1}^n$ , from the distribution of the random vector  $(H, Y, Z)$ , where  $Y_i$  is only observed when  $H_i > 0$  and  $Z_i$  contains all the variables in  $X_i$ .<sup>16</sup> Under this assumption, the average effect of changing the education level from  $e_0$  to  $e$  is estimated as:

$$\frac{1}{n_e} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf{1}\{E_i = e\} \hat{\mu}(X_i^*, e, \hat{V}_i) - \frac{1}{n_{e_0}} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf{1}\{E_i = e_0\} \hat{\mu}(X_i^*, e_0, \hat{V}_i),$$

where  $E_i$  is education level of individual  $i$ ,  $X_i^*$  consists of the other conditioning variables in  $X_i$ ,  $n_e$  and  $n_{e_0}$  are the number of individuals with education level equal to  $e$  and  $e_0$  respectively, and  $\hat{V}_i$  denotes the estimated control function for individual  $i$ . The function  $\hat{\mu}$  is the estimated LASF based on a flexibly specified OLS regression of log wages on  $X_i^*$ ,  $E_i$ , and  $V_i$ . As we use log wages these effects can all be interpreted as percentage changes. To satisfy identification restrictions outlined by FVV, we calculate the wage increase that workers with education level  $e_0$  would expect to receive if they achieved a higher level of education  $e$ .

The patterns of the ATEs over the period 1976–2016 are similar for males and females.<sup>17</sup> The ATE for the “high school graduate” versus “high school dropout”

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<sup>15</sup> Since 1992, the CPS measures educational attainment by the highest year of school or degree completed rather than the previously employed highest year of school attendance. Although the educational recode by the IPUM-CPS aims at maximizing comparability over time, there is a discontinuity between 1991 and 1992 in how those with a high school degree and some college are classified.

<sup>16</sup> For simplicity we suppress the time subscript.

<sup>17</sup> The results are available from the authors.

contrast increases from about 25 percent at the beginning of the period to around 30 percent at the end, after peaking at around 35 percent in the late 1990s. The ATE for the “some college” to “high school dropout” contrast starts at about 35 percent, the same as the peak level for the high school premium, and reaches about 45 percent at the end of the period after increasing to about 50 percent in the late 1990s. Even with the small decline in the last 10 years, the overall increase over the period is substantial. The ATE for the “college or more” to “high school dropout” contrast is sizable and despite a small decline in the late 1970s (which is stronger for females), it increases sharply between 1976 and 2016, from about 50 percent for males and about 70 percent for females to about 90 percent for both genders. We also examine the variation in these respective effects by estimating the quantile treatment effects for each of these educational contrasts. Although we do not report the results we refer to the major findings below.

These results confirm the findings from the existing literature, dating back to Murphy and Welch (1992), that the education premia have increased remarkably since the early 1980s. The slowest increase is for the high-school premium, especially at the lower percentiles, while the fastest is for the college premium, especially at the upper percentiles. These increases are neither uniform across the distribution of wages, as they differ across percentiles, nor uniform over time, as they are mostly concentrated during the 1980s and 1990s. Our results show that the high-school premium tends to present an inverted U-shaped pattern, especially at the lower percentiles, while the college premium tends to increase monotonically throughout the period, though at a slower rate after the 1990s, especially at the lower percentiles. As a consequence, during the 1980s and 1990s, both the high-school and the college premia rise, especially at the higher percentiles, but the college premium increases faster. After the 1990s, the college premium continues rising, though at a slower rate, but the high school premium tends to fall, especially at the lower percentiles. As both the levels and the trends of the education premia are remarkably similar for males and females, this evidence suggests that the returns to education are not the only contributing factors to the patterns of between-gender wage inequality.

While we do not attempt to isolate here the role of other conditioning variables,

they are included in the decomposition exercises presented in Section 4.2. These decompositions reveal that the mechanisms driving wages differ both by gender and location in the wage distribution. For males, the fall in wages at the median or below largely reflects the increasing penalty associated with lower education and other forces that negatively affect the lower skilled, as revealed by the large negative structural effects for this area of the wage distribution. With the general trend towards rising educational attainments, the composition effects are positive and partly offset the negative structural effects. However, the large and increasing educational premium signals that the “penalty” associated with lower education has increased. The negative structural effects for males are not restricted to the lower part of the wage distribution. For females, there are wage increases at each quantile we examined and these reflect, in part, positive and increasing composition effects. Moreover, while the structural effects are generally negative for the whole period at the 10th and 25th percentiles, they are typically positive at the quantiles we examined above the median. Most notably, the structural effects for females are not dampening wage growth to the same extent as for males and at some quantiles these structural effects are even substantial contributors to wage growth. At the lower parts of the female wage distribution the impact of selection is negative and can be substantial. Selection effects become more important as we move down the wage distribution. The patterns at the 10th and 25th percentiles are suggestive of possible larger selection effects at lower percentiles.

Our investigation does not provide direct insight into the macro factors generating these wage profiles. Nor does it provide evidence on the role of particular institutional factors which may influence certain segments of the workforce. However it does seem that the mechanisms affecting the wages at the bottom are very different than those influencing the top. At the top the evidence is supportive of an increasing skill premium. At the bottom it appears that the prevailing considerations are those associated with decreasing protection of lower wage workers. These include the decrease in the real value of the minimum wage, the reduction in unionization and the union premium, and the increase in employer bargaining power.

## 6.2 Wage Inequality

We now examine the issue of wage inequality, which rose dramatically as measured by increases in the 90/10 interdecile ratio of 55 percent for males and 38 percent for females. Although our evidence shows that changes in hourly wages at different points in the distribution are affected differently by the relevant factors, we are unable to directly infer the respective contribution of these factors to the changes in inequality. The left panel of Figure 13 provides a decomposition of the changes in the decile ratio for males. Recall that wage changes at the 10th percentile are due to the large negative structural effects, with no evidence of selection effects and a small positive composition effect at least up to the early 1990s. On the other hand, the large gains at the 90th percentile reflect steadily increasing composition and structural effects, with no signs of changes in selection effects. Thus, unsurprisingly, the large increase in the decile ratio for males is mostly due to the structural effects. The composition effects are much smaller but also tend to increase inequality, mainly through their large positive contribution at the upper tail of the distribution.

For females the evidence is harder to interpret. There is an increasingly positive composition effect at the first decile but the negative structural effect produces a decline in wages. At the upper decile, there is a steadily increasing composition effect and a structural effect which is generally increasing wages. The large increase in the total effect for the majority of the sample period reflects the sum of these two positive effects. At the lower decile, the evidence suggests that the changes in the selection effects are negatively affecting wage growth, while there is no sign of selection at the upper decile. The right panel of Figure 13 presents the decomposition of the changes in the decile ratio for females. In the light of our previous remarks, it is not surprising that these changes mostly reflect the structural effect. The composition effect is negative but small, and largely acts through the lower part of the wage distribution. The selection effect is positive and, in some periods, it contributes a relatively large fraction of the total change. This result is consistent with MR although it appears that our results primarily reflect the impact of selection on the bottom of the female wage distribution.

Although our primary focus is not on gender inequality, we examine the trends in



the male/female ratio at different points of the wage distribution. Figure 14 reveals several interesting findings. First, at all points of the wage distribution, females appear to be catching up, with the greatest gains at the median or below. This result should be treated with caution as it largely reflects a reduction in the male wage, not an increase in the female wage. Second, the improvement in the relative position of females is almost entirely due to structural effects. As our previous evidence suggests that the sign and size of the structural effects varies both over time and by location in the wage distribution, it is surprising that the impact on the gender wage ratios is so clear. Third, the composition effects also have steadily increased the relative performance of females at all quantiles, though the size of the effect diminishes as we move up the wage distribution and is smallest at the upper decile. Finally, the selection effects are increasing gender inequality, though they only appear to play a role in the lower part of the wage distribution.

## 7 Conclusions

This paper documents the changes in female and male wages over the period 1976 to 2016. We decompose these changes into structural, composition and selection components by estimating a nonseparable model with selection. We find that male real wages at the median and below have decreased despite an increasing skill premium and an increase in educational attainment. The reduction is primarily due to large decreases of the wages of the individuals with lower levels of education. Wages at the upper quantiles of the distribution have increased drastically due to a large and increasing skill premium and this has, combined with the decreases at the lower quantiles, substantially increased wage inequality. Female wage growth at lower quantiles is modest although the median wage has grown steadily. The increases at the upper quantiles for females are substantial and reflect increasing skill premia. These changes have resulted in a substantial increase in female wage inequality. As our sample period is associated with large changes in the participation rates and the hours of work of females we explore the role of changes in “selection” in wage movements. We find that the impact of these changes in selection is to decrease the wage growth of those at the lower quantiles with very little evidence of selection ef-

fects at other locations in the female wage distribution. The selection effects appear to increase wage inequality.

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


Figure 1: Percentiles of real hourly wages




Figure 2: Decile ratios




Figure 3: Employment rates and average annual hours worked of employees




Figure 4: Fraction of wage earners working full-time (FT), full-year (FY), and full-time full-year (FTFY)






Figure 5: Percentiles of real hourly wages




Figure 6: Distribution functions of positive annual hours of work




Figure 7: Decompositions at the 10th percentile




Figure 8: Decompositions at the 25th percentile.




Figure 9: Decompositions at the 50th percentile




Figure 10: Decompositions at the 75th percentile




Figure 11: Decompositions at 90th percentile




Figure 12: Selection components and associated 95% confidence intervals for females at various percentiles




Figure 13: Decompositions of the decile ratio




Figure 14: Decomposition of the changes in the ratio of male to female wages

## Appendix: Estimation and inference

We follow FVV and employ a multistep semiparametric method based on distribution regression to estimate the global objects of interest, namely the counterfactual DF  $G_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(y)$ , the counterfactual QF  $q_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(\tau)$ , and the ATE of education. The reduced-form specifications used in each step can be motivated by parametric restrictions on model (1)–(2). We refer to Chernozhukov et al. (2019) for examples of such restrictions. For each group, we assume a sample of size  $n$ ,  $\{(H_i, Y_i * \mathbf{1}\{H_i > 0\}, Z_i)\}_{i=1}^n$ , from the distribution of the random vector  $(H, Y * \mathbf{1}\{H > 0\}, Z)$ , where  $Y * \mathbf{1}\{H > 0\}$  indicates that  $Y$  is observable only when  $H > 0$ .

In the first step we estimate the control function for each group using logistic distribution regression (Foresi and Peracchi 1995, and Chernozhukov et al. 2013). More precisely, for every observation in the selected sample with  $H_i > 0$ , we set:

$$\widehat{V}_i = \Lambda(R_i' \widehat{\pi}(H_i)), \quad R_i = r(Z_i), \quad i = 1, \dots, n,$$

where  $\Lambda(u) = (1 + e^{-u})^{-1}$  is the standard logistic DF,  $r(z)$  is a  $d_r$ -dimensional vector of transformations of  $z$  with good approximating properties (such as polynomials, B-splines, or interactions), and:

$$\widehat{\pi}(h) = \arg \max_{\pi \in \mathbb{R}^{d_r}} \sum_{i=1}^n [\mathbf{1}\{0 < H_i \leq h\} \log \Lambda(R_i' \pi) + \mathbf{1}\{H_i > h\} \log \Lambda(-R_i' \pi)],$$

for  $h$  in the empirical support  $\mathcal{H}_n$  of  $H$ .

In the second step we estimate the LASF  $\mu(x, v)$  and the LDSF  $G(y, x, v)$  for each group using flexibly parametrized ordinary least squares (OLS) and distribution regressions, where the unknown control function is replaced by its estimator  $\widehat{V}_i$  from the previous step. For reasons explained in FVV, we estimate over a sample trimmed with respect to the censoring variable  $H$ . We employ the following trimming indicator among the selected sample:

$$T = \mathbf{1}\{0 < H \leq \bar{h}\}$$

for some  $\bar{h} \in (0, \infty)$  such that  $\mathbb{P}(T = 1) > 0$ . The estimator of the LASF is  $\widehat{\mu}(x, v) = w(x, v)' \widehat{\beta}$ , where  $w(x, v)$  is a  $d_w$ -dimensional vector of transformations of



$(x, v)$  with good approximating properties, and  $\widehat{\beta}$  is the OLS estimator:

$$\widehat{\beta} = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^n T_i \widehat{W}_i \widehat{W}_i' \right]^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^n T_i \widehat{W}_i Y_i,$$

where  $\widehat{W}_i = w(X_i, \widehat{V}_i)$ . The estimator of the LDSF is  $\widehat{G}(y, x, v) = \Lambda(w(x, v)' \widehat{\beta}(y))$ , where  $y \in \mathbb{R}$  and  $\widehat{\beta}(y)$  is the logistic distribution regression estimator:

$$\widehat{\beta}(y) = \arg \max_{b \in \mathbb{R}^{d_w}} \sum_{i=1}^n T_i \left[ \mathbf{1}\{Y_i \leq y\} \log \Lambda(\widehat{W}_i' b) + \mathbf{1}\{Y_i > y\} \log \Lambda(-\widehat{W}_i' b) \right].$$

Finally, in the third step we use (5) to estimate the counterfactual DF (4) by:

$$\widehat{G}_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(y) = \frac{1}{n_{kr}^s} \sum_{i=1}^n \Lambda(\widehat{W}_i' \widehat{\beta}_t(y)) \mathbf{1}\{\widehat{V}_i > \Lambda(R_i' \widehat{\pi}_r(0))\},$$

where the average is taken over the sample values of  $\widehat{V}_i$  and  $Z_i$  in group  $k$ ,  $n_{kr}^s = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf{1}\{\widehat{V}_i > \Lambda(R_i' \widehat{\pi}_r(0))\}$ ,  $\widehat{\beta}_t(y)$  is the logistic distribution regression estimator for group  $t$  from the second step, and  $\widehat{\pi}_r(0)$  is the distribution regression estimator for group  $r$  from the first step. Given  $\widehat{G}_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(y)$ , we estimate the counterfactual QF (6) by:

$$\widehat{q}_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(\tau) = \inf\{y \in \mathbb{R} : \widehat{G}_{Y_{(t,k,r)}}^s(y) \geq \tau\}, \quad 0 < \tau < 1.$$

Following FVV, inference is based on the weighted bootstrap (Praestgaard and Wellner 1993). This method obtains the bootstrap version of the estimator of interest by repeating all the estimation steps including sampling weights drawn from a nonnegative distribution.