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### Working Paper Welfare issues in price control on occasions of calamities, emergencies, and like occurrences

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# Welfare Issues in Price Control on Occasions of Calamities, Emergencies, and Like Occurrences

Sonny N. Domingo and Ma. Divina C. Olaguera

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For comments, suggestions or further inquiries please contact:

The Research Information Department, Philippine Institute for Development Studies

18th Floor, Three Cyberpod Centris - North Tower, EDSA corner Quezon Avenue, 1100 Quezon City, Philippines

Tel Nos: (63-2) 3721291 and 3721292; E-mail: publications@mail.pids.gov.ph

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### Welfare Issues in Price Control on Occasions of Calamities, Emergencies and Like Occurrences<sup>1</sup>

#### Abstract

Traditional interventions during and after major disaster events usually focus on the welfare of individuals and households, often at the expense or neglect of local economic recovery. The Price Act (RA7581) establishes a mechanism that supposedly protects consumers from inadequate supply of goods and unreasonable price increase in occasions of disasters and emergencies. RA7581 is an example of a double-edged policy which protects a section of the populace (consumers) and holds back another (local enterprises). This study focuses on the implications of RA7581 during disaster events, and answer issues on the effects of price control on consumer protection and local economic recovery as well as provides discourse on the effects of price control imposition during occasions of calamities, emergencies and like occurrences.

Tag: Price control, DRRM, Price Act, Welfare Issues

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Report prepared by Sonny N. Domingo and Ma Divina C. Olaguera, Senior Research Fellow and Research Analyst II, respectively, at the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS).

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#### Welfare Issues in Price Control on Occasions of Calamities, Emergencies and Like Occurrences

#### 1.0 Introduction

When disasters strike, governments are compelled to put disaster response strategies in place. Traditional interventions during and after major disaster events usually focus on the welfare of individuals and households, often at the expense or neglect of local economic recovery. In the Philippines, around 99.5 percent (896,839 establishments) are micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) according to latest data from the Philippine Statistics Authority. MSMEs provide employment to 65 percent of the country's labor force which makes it vital in terms of local recovery (Reliefweb, 2014).

The Price Act (RA7581) establishes a mechanism that supposedly protects consumers from inadequate supply of goods and unreasonable price increase in occasions of disasters and emergencies. Cavallo et al (2013), however, demonstrated that the immediate impacts of disasters were mostly in product availability and not in prices. Meanwhile, Salerno (2006) explains that the immediate effect of price controls or any government intervention, in this case a price freeze, upon the market is shortage of goods as it discourages production just when it is needed most.

RA7581 is an example of a double-edged policy which protects a section of the populace (consumers) and holds back another (local enterprises). This study focuses on the implications of RA7581 during disaster events, and answer issues on the effects of price control on consumer protection and local economic recovery as well as provides discourse on the effects of price control imposition during occasions of calamities, emergencies and like occurrences.

#### Republic Act 7581 or the Price Act (1992) as amended by RA10623

The Price Act, signed on May 27, 1992, is an Act that provides protection to consumers by stabilizing the prices of basic necessities and prime commodities during periods of calamity, emergency or widespread manipulation. Figure 1 below illustrates the type of basic necessities and prime commodities covered by the Price Act.

The prices of basic necessities are automatically frozen at prevailing prices or placed under automatic price control whenever:

- That area is proclaimed or declared a disaster area or under a state of calamity
- That area is declared under an emergency
- The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in that area
- That area is placed under martial law

- That area is declared to be in a state of rebellion
- A state of war is declared in that area



Figure 1. Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities specified under the Price Act

The law mandates that if the prevailing price of any basic necessity is excessive or unreasonable, the implementing agency may recommend to the president the imposition of a price ceiling for the sale of the basic necessity at a price other than its prevailing price (The Price Act, 1992). As also stated in the law, price control shall only last for 60 days. Illegal acts of price manipulation such as hoarding, profiteering, and cartel are also comprehensively defined under this law.

To carry out its mandates, the National Price Coordinating Council was created and is composed of secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Health, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the Department of Transportation and Communication, the Department of Justice, director-general of NEDA, and representatives from consumers' sector, producers' sector, manufacturers and retailers' sectors.

On September 6, 2013, President Aquino signed the Republic Act 10623 or an Act amending certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7581 on. Under RA 0623, basic necessities list is expanded

to include bottled water, instant noodles, fresh fruits, and LPG and kerosene. Prime commodities also included livestock and fishery feeds<sup>2</sup>.

#### 2.0 Zamboanga Siege: A Case Study

On September 9, 2013, around 200 fully armed members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) entered Zamboanga City, took over several barangays and attempted to raise the Bangsamoro flag at the City Hall. The siege lasted for three weeks leaving more than 200 people dead, hundreds wounded, 10,000 homes destroyed, and around 118,000 residents displaced and scattered in 57 evacuation centers.

Table 1 below shows the amount of damage, losses, and needs in different sectors. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) reported an estimated damage of PHP 3.26 billion with the majority of coming from the social sector (housing, health and education). The total amount of losses is at PHP 2.90 billion wherein 85 percent (PHP 2.48 billion) is incurred from the Industry, Trade and Services sector. The Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) also reflected an amount of PHP 2.53 billion needed for reconstruction and recovery.

Sector	Damages (Php)	Losses (Php)	Needs (Php)
Infrastructure			
Power	40,453,800.72	51,350,258.75	79,149,930.32
Water	8,264,918.00	5,395,862.73	61,900,000.00
Roads and Bridges	9,330,743.98	109,158,890.81	133,042,811.68
Telecommunications	729,027.82	803,318.77	909,279.63
Sub-Total	58,778,490.52	166,708,331.06	275,002,021.63
Social			
Housing	2,613,418,800.00	118,272,460.00	1,613,416,200.00
Health	7,554,561.06	14,531,221.91	8,645,604.05
Education	204,037,245.02	61,352,753.72	290,709,813.44
Sub-Total	2,825,010,606.08	194,156,435.63	1,912,771,617.49
Productive			
Agriculture	18,495,000.00	9,911,420.60	21,250,000.00
Tourism		37,200,000.00	
Culture	26,700,000.00	5,430,000.00	35,155,000.00
Industry, Trade & Service	159,186,907.42	2,484,480,828.65	51,099,000.00
Sub-Total	204,381,907.42	2,537,022,249.25	107,504,000.00
Cross Sectoral			
Government	176,239,490.05	939,450.00	232,635,295.27

Table 1. Results of the Post Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) - Zambanga Siege, 2013

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> IRR for amended Price Act released, <u>http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Economy&title=irr-for-amended-price-act-released&id=81084</u>

Sub-Total	176,239,490.05	939,450.00	232,635,295.27
Grand Total	3,264,410,494.07	2,898,826,465.94	2,527,912,934.39

Source: ndrrmc.gov.ph

#### 2.1 Response and Interventions

Zamboanga siege affected 6 barangays and estimated 27,000 families in 2013. As of August 2017, there are around 600 families or more than 3000 individuals left in the recovery shelters. Arrangements with the National Housing Authority (NHA) are currently in progress to transfer those people occupying the recovery shelters to their permanent shelters. Aside from the actual procurement process within government which is very tedious, looking for possible relocation area has also become a problem.

The damage brought by the Zamboanga siege was not anticipated, as gathered from informant interviews. Relocation of the affected families from the danger zone was done but more problems surfaced. The situation was further aggravated when a flashflood occurred a few weeks later which affected other parts of the city. Those affected by flashfloods and indirectly affected by the siege also went inside the transitory shelters which resulted to problems in profiling. This had become a problem because the government interventions and assistance from the international humanitarian stakeholders are only for the siege victims. Furthermore, it was found out that during the first few days, a lot of people were coming in even those who were not really victims because they knew that food and shelter are being given. Tagging was done and several steps were instituted to be able to screen out non-evacuees.

Water and sanitation were a big problem in the evacuation centers. Cases of prostitution, drugs, and petty crimes are also unavoidable at the time since people have no livelihood. There were also several issues on human right violation and culture sensitivity which are unavoidable when dealing with thousands of people. Assistance from the national and international partners were considered a big help to manage the situation although it took time for them to normalize things.

In order to manage the situation, an informant mentioned that the involvement of the community played a vital role. This was done through communication with the religious leaders, tribal leader, community leaders, etc. to make them understand what the government is trying to do and also to eliminate misconceptions. It was also mentioned that through this strategy, the community was also able to provide insights on how to manage the affairs in the recovery shelters or transitory sites.

To provide the basic necessities of people, the barangay officials were initially tasked to distribute the relief goods. Unfortunately, it was realized that this mechanism was not effective because these people also tend to prioritize their family and relatives first and some of them also hoarded. It has become an issue of survival and it was unavoidable. An emergency meeting of the Crisis Management Committee was called and decided to utilize the parish instead. Aside from the relief goods given to the affected families, cash-for-work assistance, livelihood programs, food-for-work were provided by international organizations such as CSFI, International Red Cross and World Food Program. Some of the evacuees were also able to establish small stores. Community kitchens were established to cater the needs of around 121,000 individuals. Materials for construction were also provided by the NHA.

Moreover, consultants were hired to work on paradigm shift in terms of livelihood and conduct skills development. Eventually, participants are provided with starter kits. This was done with some group of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) but it has not sustained. One of the reasons is that people still opted to pursue buy and sell. The problem with buy and sell is that some might even be related to illegal activities such smuggling or stealing.

#### 2.2 Supply and Demand Disruptions

The City's Commercial District was immediately shutdown on the first day due to its proximity to the standoff between government forces and the rebels. There was an economic imbalance in the city in a sense that there were parts that are closed while the remaining parts are business as usual. The problem was that people felt that the siege might be extended for a prolong duration which resulted to panic buying and cases of hoarding. The commodity supply within the city was then depleting. An imbalance in terms of supply and circulation of money was also observed. These imbalance, according to an informant, resulted to the increase in prices of agricultural products and basic commodities. Another problem is that locally manufactured products were not able to exit the area. Curfew was also imposed in the entire city in which business owners were largely affected.

Due to closure of businesses, the DTI negotiated with some suppliers and store owners and made arrangements with chambers to open up especially those that were not within the affected areas. In return, business owners requested for security especially those with warehouses are near the conflict areas in which the PNP and AFP immediately provided.

Moreover, Zamboanga City is considered the economic hub of neighboring provinces. During the siege, these provinces were also paralyzed as these were very dependent in terms of commerce and trade. For security purposes, the movement of the vessels, both those entering and exiting the city was controlled. To address the supply issue, the DTI facilitated arrangements with other government agencies, shipping lines, distributors and suppliers to design special trips for the supply to enter.

#### 2.3 Price Control during the Siege

Several government offices that were interviewed had different accounts of what exactly happened in terms of prices and price control implementation during the siege.

During the siege, there were no observed problems when it comes to prices of commodities since only some parts of the city was affected. It was reported that only one market was closed down because of its proximity to the area of engagement or war zone and all other markets are operational. It really did not affect the traders although there are problems on shipping out the products. Banks and gasoline stations were also open. The prices did not increase and there are no reported cases of panic buying. The DTI provincial officials and staff went around despite the risk and install the price control which was done through posting of Suggested Retail Price (SRP) posters in grocery and convenience stores. An informant commented that is unavoidable that business sectors would take advantage of the situation at the time. The local government also monitored if there are increases in the prices. The Office of Civil Defense (OCD) recollected the closing down of stores during the first few days which led to some people panic buying. This was not considered a major issue at the time. Price increase was also not a problem during the siege.

The market administrators and residents that were interviewed, however, observed that there was no monitoring of prices done in the entire duration of the siege possibly because of security reasons. Prices have also increased due to high demand and depleting stocks in the market which was unavoidable. Another justification mentioned is that the suppliers have also increased their prices which leave them no choice but to sell in higher retail price. It should be clear under the law where (point at distribution channel) to actually impose the freeze.

Panic buying was also observed. Those who have the means took advantage and purchased in bulks. This is favorable on the part of business owners because they can easily dispose their products. One suggested that there should be a way to control the volume being purchased by people so that everybody will have the chance to buy, even those who have lesser means.

On the issue that price control was never really imposed during those times due to impracticality, DTI strongly disagreed and assured that they went around and installed posters and tarpaulin containing the price control commodities at all stores in the city. Radio announcements were also done to inform everybody. It was just unfortunate, according to an informant, that some did not listen. A key informant also disagreed on other people's claim that the prices during that time increased as they were certain that the stores were compliant because of their strict leadership.

Monitoring of prices of goods are not conducted in both markets that were visited and interviewed. Vendors and administrators do not have an actual list or database of prices. One suggested that DTI and DA should partner in terms of monitoring prices.

#### 2.4 Preparedness Before and After the Siege

The government offices, business owners, and residents admitted that they were not prepared for a disaster like the Zamboanga siege before it actually happened. To their recollection, there are no similar events that had happened in the recent history of the country. There was no template for them to follow and it was argued that it is not comparable to natural calamities. If a similar event would strike the city again, an informant confidently said that they are much prepared now compared to before. Construction of evacuation centers is now included in the city plan. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) provided the city government a budget of 33M for the construction of evacuation in the city center, as well 20M each for east and west coast. One of the problems though is the purpose of those evacuation centers when there is no disaster.

Experience is the best teacher, according to the DRRM Officer. Learning on what happened during the siege, he can say that they are now more prepared than before. The barangay officials and community itself are now providing information to the authority unlike before. The local government encourages them to share any information they have. It was stressed that the government cannot do it alone and there is a need for participation. Communication and openness were said to be the key factors in augmenting the ability to be resilient and prepared.

The Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (LDRRMC) is also functional. The council is required to meet quarterly. Their next agenda for the coming meeting is the avian flu and coming up with a contingency plan for biohazard risks. It also was fortunate that the local DRRM plan was approved three days before the siege and they were able to use it as manual to act accordingly. After the siege, they were able to come up with ideas on how to better address the problems. Currently, they are into contingency planning, proactiveness and ensuring the safety of the people. The local officials practically meet once or twice a week to discuss issues in the community and never leave things neglected.

Looking back, if they were to do something better it would be on the intelligence gathering and validation. Even before the siege, they were already receiving reports that something was going to happen but it was not recognized and there were no means to further validate. They also admitted that they lack community support at the time.

In terms of guidance from the national government or DILG, the DRRM Officer said that they receive a lot of trainings. It can also be noted that the local office has a very good working relationship with other agencies in terms of collaboration and communication. He said that DILG and LGA are coordinating with them for future activities. One of these is the sharing of Zamboanga siege experience and bringing the good practices to other cities and local units.

In terms of financial and material support, he said that they received enough. They were also provided financing whenever they request. When asked about the current state of recovery of the city, it was said that in terms of the lives of the people, education, and mental, they have already recovered.

#### 3.0 Survey Results

A survey was conducted in 12 barangays in Zamboanga City to gather primary data from households and enterprise owners specifically the small businesses in the area. There was a total of 418 respondents to which 383 respondents are household/individuals while 35 respondents are classified as households with enterprise (Table 2). Information gathered include household and business profile, price movements before, during and after disaster, consumption, welfare impacts of disaster, coping strategies, DRR sentiments and recommendations.

Respondent Class	Number
Household/Individual	383
Household with Enterprise	35
Total	418

#### Table 2. Classification of respondents

#### 3.1 Consumer/Community Member

a. Respondent Profile and Household Information (refer to Annex - Table 1)

**Gender:** Out of the 418 respondents, 91 percent (318 respondents) were female while only 9 percent (38 respondents) were male. While majority are female respondents, these households are reportedly headed by husbands or father in the family.



**Civil Status:** More than half (66 %) of the respondents interviewed are married while 20 percent are widowed or separated. Those who responded single (4%) are generally the son or daughter of the household head. The remaining 10 percent, unknown category, also accounts for the common law or live-in.



**Age Group:** The most common age group is 46 - 60 years old (125 respondents) followed by 36 - 45 years old (119 respondents). A small proportion of respondents belong to younger groups, 25 years old and below.



**Household Members:** Figure 5 reflects that majority part of the households interviewed has 4 to 10 HH members while a small portion (26 households) has 11 members and above.



**Household Members' Age Group:** Figure 6 reveals that a larger part of households interviewed has at least 1 to 3 members that are 15 years old and below while a substantial number has at least 1 to 3 members that are 65 years old and above. These age groups, children and elderly, are considered among the most vulnerable groups when it comes to disasters as they need more care and special needs.



b. Welfare Impact of Zamboanga Siege

This part of the survey attempts to capture how the Zamboanga siege affected the welfare of the households in terms of income, employment, medical expenses, children in school, etc. It was done through series of questions with period dimension; before, during and after Zamboanga siege. Paired-Samples T-test or dependent samples T-test was conducted to determine the differences between these periods. A more detailed version of the test is included in the Annex.

**Household Income and Employment Status:** Figure 7 illustrates a significant drop in the average monthly income of households before and during Zamboanga siege which is consistent to the figure 8 which reflects that employment status during this period only ranged from partially employed to not employed at all.

These findings are consistent with the focus group discussions conducted with the residents that immediately when the siege happened, works/jobs were suspended and some lost their livelihood or businesses. Majority of them did not have savings to spend and not prepared at all for such crisis. It was reported that the affected populace relied mostly on relief goods provided by the government and international humanitarian organizations. Some of them also relied on remittances from relatives outside the city.

Significant difference was also observed in the household income during and after the siege which indicates that the residents are able to at least cope with their jobs or livelihood, as also reflected in the change in employment status, however not at the same level of income before the siege occurred. The residents reported that it took a significant amount of time before complete recovery.





**Children in School:** During the siege, classes were also suspended. Figure 9 reflects that there is a notable drop in the average number of children in school before and during the siege. The illustration on before and after siege suggests that a slight proportion of the affected population was not able to attend school after the siege.



**Medical Expenses:** Figure 10 exhibits a notable drop in the medical expenses before and during the siege. One of the possible reasons for this is that people were not able to access medical treatment during the disturbance. Some of them also reported utilization of government facilities like the Rural Health Unit during the siege.



**Credits/Debts:** Findings on the amount of credit or debt showed that it surprisingly dropped before and during the Zamboanga siege. The results of the FGDs conducted revealed that the residents are generally satisfied with the support provided by the government, which can be a reason why there is no need for some to borrow money. An increase in the amount can be observed for the during and after periods which suggests that people needed money for their immediate needs (repair of houses, capital for business, etc.)



**Number of Meals:** Figure 12 illustrates that there are only minor differences in the average number of meals per day throughout three periods. As discussed above, the residents relied mostly on relief goods provided to them which explains these minor differences. Community kitchens were established at the time to provide meals to the victims.



**Household Members:** The average number of household members before and after the siege fell (Figure 13) which probably suggests that some were able to get out of the city. It was reported that some household members lived with other relatives while others stayed in evacuation centers.



c. Disaster Impacts of the 2013 Zamboanga Siege

**Location during the Zamboanga Siege:** During the siege, 44.7 percent of the respondents reported to have transferred to temporary housing or evacuation centers. While 19.9 percent and 19.1 percent transferred to other places and chose to stay in their residence, respectively.

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Stayed in the residence	71	19.1
Transferred to temporary housing/evacuation center	166	44.7
Transferred to another barangay/municipality/province/region	74	19.9
Others (Stayed with relatives, Hostage victim, etc.)	60	16.2
Total	371	100.0

Table 3.	Location	during th	ne Zamboa	nga Siege
10010 01	Location	~~	10 Ean 110 0 0	

**Loss and Damage of Assets/Properties:** A large part (98.4 percent) of the household interviewed reported loss and damage of assets and properties. Figure 14 shows that most of the loss/damage amount to PHP 10,001 to PHP 50,000 followed by PHP 50,001 to PHP 100,000. Ten respondents reported loss/damage worth PHP 500,000 and above. These findings show that the siege had significantly affected the victims. Reported losses and damage on structures like homes and stores, since majority of them are also fire victims.



**Higher Expenses:** Majority of the respondents (78.4%) revealed that the siege resulted to increase in higher household expenses. The most common reasons cited are the increase in the prices of commodities and repair for the damaged properties.

**Recovery:** When asked about their current state of recovery, 72 percent responded that they have partially recovered while only 17 percent had completely recovered. It is also worth noting that 11 percent had not at all recovered from the severe damage brought by the siege.



Figure 16 shows that majority of those who answered partially and not at all as the state of recovery are foreseeing longer time or more than a year for them to completely recover while it also took more than a year for those who have reported complete recovery.



d. Price Movements of Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities and Household Consumption During Zamboanga

e. Sentiments and Issues on Price Control

Respondents were also asked about their sentiments and opinion on price control and its imposition. Only a slight majority (53.3%) of the respondents are familiar with the term price freeze. Meanwhile, 65.6 percent of them are in favor of this government imposed price control. The most common reasons cited are to stabilize prices, make goods affordable, and for businesses to avoid overpricing. Around 56 percent of the respondents reported that businesses in the area followed the impose price freeze while the rest observed that it was not followed.

**Satisfaction:** Figure 17 summarizes the degree of satisfaction of with the support received from the government to which 235 respondents (62.8 %) are satisfied while 14 respondents (3.7 %) are very dissatisfied. Though generally satisfied, the respondents asked for more support from the government specifically housing materials, livelihood programs, capital for businesses, and scholarship for children.



f. General Sentiments on Disaster Preparedness and Response

Figure 18 reflects the perceived disaster preparedness and response of the respondents in terms of family, community, and government in general. When it comes to their own families, 89 percent of the respondents are prepared to cope with disasters and emergencies. Majority of them reported that experiences had taught them to be ready while those who are not prepared reported that they are not financially prepared and still lack knowledge or proper orientation on emergency protocol. Regarding their own community or barangay's preparedness, still a majority (69 percent) are prepared which was credited to experience and active barangay officials. Moreover, 77 percent of the respondents believe that the government is prepared to cope with disasters.



#### **3.2 MSME/Enterprise Owner**

a. Enterprise/Business Profile

**Years in Business:** Most of the enterprise-respondents are fairly young, operating for 1 to 10 years while some were operating for 11 years and more as reflected in figure 19.



**Business Classification:** A hundred percent of those who responded classified their business as micro or those with capitalization of less than PHP 3 million needed.

b. Disaster Impacts of the 2013 Zamboanga siege on enterprise

**Preparedness:** A large number (78.6 percent) of the enterprise-respondents said that they were not prepared to address business risks before the siege and almost all (88.9 percent) of them do not have Business Continuity Plans.

**Loss and Damage and Operational Expenses:** As observed in figure 20, all of the respondents reported loss and damage to assets and properties. Around 77 percent reported that siege resulted to an increase in business operational expenses while 23.1 percent (6 respondents) said that it did not affect their expenses.



**Current State of Recovery:** Figure 21 reveals that majority of the respondents (75 percent) have partially recovered from the loss/damages to their businesses while only 11 percent reported a complete recovery. The remaining 14 percent said that they have not recovered at all and perceived that it would take them more than a year to achieve recovery.



#### c. Price Movements of Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities During Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law Declaration

#### d. Business Coping Strategies

**Operations:** During Zamboanga siege, the most common coping strategy for the enterprises is to temporarily stop operation while some opted to permanently stop operation, as summarized in Figure 22. Some have also reported to decrease their supply and source cheaper raw materials. This is also the case after the Zamboanga siege. Some reported to have borrowed money to continue operations.



**Finances:** Majority of the business owners spent their savings during and after the siege to cope with the loss and damage. Other options were selling their assets and borrowing money from banks and informal lenders.



e. Hazard Risk and Ranking among Businesses

Figure 24 shows the hazard risk level among businesses. It is evident that majority of the respondents rated terrorism/civil disturbance as the most critical due to their recent experience on the siege. This was followed by fire incidents and earthquakes. Meanwhile, loss of electricity and water supply are considered not critical at all.



#### f. Sentiments and Issues on Price Control among Businesses

Only a slight majority of the respondents (57.7 percent) are familiar with the term price freeze. Meanwhile, 50 percent agrees on its imposition while 50 percent is not very keen on it. In terms of compliance, 68.2 percent (15 respondents) reported that they have followed the imposed price freeze mainly because of their concern to consumers.

Figure 25 reflects that majority of the enterprise owners are satisfied with the support received from government while some are dissatisfied. Most of them still need more support from government particularly additional capital for business and livelihood programs.

In terms of imposition of price control, some of them recommended that there is a need to intensify monitoring of prices and proper information dissemination in part of the government.



#### g. General Sentiments on disaster Preparedness and Response

As shown in figure 26, business owners that were interviewed are generally optimistic that their own families, community/barangays, and the government are prepared to cope with disaster and emergencies. Some of them credit this to lessons learned from recent experience on siege and proper planning.



#### 4.0 Key Insights, Issues and Challenges<sup>3</sup>

#### 4.1 Price Control Implementation

As stated in the law, prices imposed for the price freeze should be the average prevailing price for 30 days before the occurrence of the emergency but it was not clearly stated at what point of distribution channel would it be based. It was recommended that it should be the prices from key accounts or large outlets. As for the actual implementation, there are provinces that do not follow such computation and freeze the price on the first day imposition.

The imposition of price control during the siege was automatic as stated under the law for the purpose of making the commodities available to consumers at any moment in time. The Local Price Coordinating Council (LPCC) was immediately convened and together with other implementing agencies they installed the price control on basic commodities only. It was argued that the imposition of price control only covers the basic commodities, though prime commodities were still monitored. In terms of prices, they imposed the average price in a month's time or the modal. Additionally, agricultural commodities were not subjected to price control because of seasonality in terms of production.

To protect the businesses and manufacturers, price control should not exceed 60 days. Extending the period may cause the disruption of flow of commodities and principles of the free market. Arguably, it is unavoidable for manufacturers to also incur higher production costs during times of emergencies and disasters.

Another issue regarding the imposition of price control is the definition of the commodity itself. An example for this is the "essential drugs" which is not yet defined by the BFAD since 1991. The type of rice and other agricultural products are also an issue. It only goes to show that some implementing agencies were not really serious about the implementation of price control.

Although the Local Price Coordinating Council (LPCC) is already in place, it was not well-structured hitherto to monitor the prices. The Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (DRRMC) also has the prerogative to get any goods to distribute it. It was also impossible to monitor the prices during those times because the market forces will automatically act.

When asked if it would be practical to implement price control during those times, the market administrators said that consumers did not actually mind the slight increase in prices (e.g. price of sardines increased by PHP 3) and only cared to buy everything they need. One said that nobody ever complained about it. People are more concerned about security and survival in times of emergencies. One added that even those who were tasked to impose price control may be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Gathered from Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) conducted with key government agencies, public market administrators in Zamboanga City and resident-evacuees during the siege

thought of their families first. It would also be reasonable to have people from other provinces to monitor the prices.

Majority of people in the area were not aware of price control. There was no information drive conducted. The IEC materials posted by the DTI were not really helpful, one remarked. The respondents are also willing to disseminate information with guaranteed partnerships with DTI and uniformed personnel. It is difficult for them to impose on their own because the possibility of resistance is high. They will be needing coordination and cooperation. For the price act to be fully implemented, there is a need to create a task force and seminar from the DTI for business owners, as recommended by the respondents.

Regarding the penalty for non-compliance to price control, the respondents said that it is too heavy for a small-time vendor in the market. On the 62 items listed under the price act, we should focus more on basic commodities like rice, milk and coffee. Types of rice should be clearly defined under the law. Agricultural products are more difficult to monitor because of erratic movement in prices unlike the processed goods.

It was difficult for the respondents to recall the prices during the siege but some observed increase in prices of goods in the market (E.g. Salt-from 8pesos/kg to 20pesos/kg; fresh chicken meat- 105pesos/kg to 130pesos/kg; galunggong-60pesos/kg to 100pesos/kg). Price of construction materials such as plywood, hollow blocks, and sand also increased. Some of the possible reasons provided are difficulty in getting the supply, increase in the price of suppliers, and expensive stall rental.

Moreover, store owners increased their prices because they knew that people would still buy from them. Respondents are not sure if the government did something about this issue and added that the focus of the government at the time is on the evacuees.

Respondents said that as consumers, they are not in the position to inform the business owners about price control. It would be better if the government itself disseminate the information through radio and TV announcements.

#### 4.2 Suggested Retail Price (SRP)

The Suggested Retail Price (SRP) is computed by the DTI through a fishbone analysis. Whenever a manufacturer wants to increase the price of their goods, the DTI conducts a fishbone analysis to estimate whether the increase is reasonable thus comes to the decision of whether allow the manufacturer to impose the proposed increase.

An informant strongly believes on the free market forces instead of the imposition of the Suggested Retail Prices (SRPs) to the manufacturers. According to him, there has been a case where a sardine manufacturer closed down because the department did not allow for an increase in price. He also described the SRPs as oppressive for the case of a big canning meat processor

that has been requesting for an increase in price for 4 years. Another negative impact of the SRP implementation is it discourages innovations and compromises the quality of the goods. One sardine manufacturer would like to use a flip top can, which would mean an increase in the price of raw materials, but the SRP only allows them to sell at a certain price. Keeping the price down also resulted to some manufacturer compromising the quality of their products, an example would be more water content and lowest-quality fish for a can of sardines.

Recently, there has been some works done by the current officials of DTI to study the extent of power and authority when it comes to SRP implementation. It turns out that there has been no official Department Orders, Circulars, or related documents in place that would further clarify the implementation of SRPs. The law itself and Implementing Rules and Regulations were executed arbitrarily. This was supported by a paper published by DOJ (2012) saying that SRP is a manufacturer's suggested retail price and the government has no business telling them what price they have to sell their goods. The said paper also encouraged DTI and other agencies involved to stop dictating the prices but instead suggesting prices only from time to time.

Moreover, as clearly stated in the law, it was argued that the purpose of SRP is only for information and guidance and not for compliance. To support this argument, there are no written penalties for the violation of SRPs. Additionally, the said misinterpretation of the law was further aggravated by the media people. A journalist commented that letting the manufacturer set their own price would increase the inflation rate.

It was also mentioned that the law is outdated since there are commodities that should not be included. One example is *sawali*, that is supposed to be monitored by the DENR. As for him, there are no if not few quantities of this commodity sold in the market nowadays thus there is no need to be regulated. Though there was an amendment to the law few years ago, it only included few commodities such as noodles, bottled water, household LPG and kerosene. There was even issue on the type of each commodity as it was not specifically stated in the law (i.e. what type of noodles; instant, spaghetti, etc.).

The law mandates the concerned government agencies to only suggest a retail price but not exactly a price ceiling. There is a caveat that manufacturers should not sell their commodity at a price more than its reasonable price. But given the technology now, reasonable price may vary depending on the area or location. Prices on the different channels of distribution may differ due to added costs. Economic values should be incorporated to be fair.

#### 4.3 Market Forces

Market forces play a very vital role in the economy. Even in times of disaster or emergencies, it is reasonable to allow the businesses to price their own goods for them to be operational. Otherwise, controlling them would result to shutting down. The government can provide alternative by immediately coming in and become the supplier of all commodities including

construction materials for certain duration and people through financial assistance may buy from them. Another point emphasized is that donations should be given in kind not cash to not further burden the local economy.

If there are numerous market players, it is unlikely that there is manipulation. The more competition there is, the better for the consumers since the natural tendency is to compete by lowering the price. The exemption for this is the case for oil since it was deregulated and the guarantee of return under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA). Looking at other basic commodities (e.g. bread, sardines, coffee, etc.), the market is flooded with various brands. If they price themselves out of the market, they lose more than they would have gained if they did not increase their price. An example cited is the case where a coffee brand requested for an increase in price due to increase in the prices of raw materials. DTI found it reasonable therefore allowed it. Weeks after, DTI found out that the said coffee brand did not pursue the increase of their product because of their competition; an imported product from Indonesia. It was mentioned that one of the duties of DTI now is develop the market which also entails inviting players from other countries. On the question of whether this would kill the local manufacturers, he remarked that they are not protectionist and only doing their duty for the benefits of the consumers.

Another principle is that competition also encourages innovation. For bread, an example is the agreement between DTI and manufacturers to produce a cheaper formulation on their product line that sells at a much cheaper price that would cater to low income households (e.g. Pinoy Tasty for only PHP 35 per loaf). The manufacturers are requested to recover the increase in prices of raw materials from their high-end products and not increase the price of the cheaper ones.

#### 4.4 Price Monitoring

DTI was able to conduct monitoring in Mindanao because of their special project this year called the Project Enforcement Team aimed to enforce all fair-trade law given a budget of 18M. But on their regular budget, he revealed that it is not possible for them to conduct such wide monitoring. The funding for the said project next year was not approved by the DBM.

DTI is currently conducting increased monitoring of prices wherein they found out that the prices of products that do not have SRPs are fairly stable which for them disproves the point that during emergencies the consumers are at the mercy of the manufacturers. There were reports that there is actually low demand in the affected areas because of the relief goods coming in. It was argued that the demand that kept the prices of the commodities down. Furthermore, based on their observation, Mindanao has a high compliance in terms of price freeze. During the monitoring, there were only 2 products (coffee and laundry soap) that were overpriced by about 10-15 centavos.

Moreover, it was found out that manufacturers, grocery owners, key accounts and distributors in Mindanao are in favor of the imposition and extension of martial law mainly because of security reasons. As for price control, it was not imposed anymore because the issue according to an informant is more of security emergency and not an economic one. The only abnormalities observed are only within the war zone not for the rest of Mindanao. There was also no incidence of skyrocketing prices because there are no problems in terms of inventory. Warehouses in the region have enough supply for 1.5 months while grocery stores have up to half to one-month supply. Practically, they would not increase their prices. After martial law, a monitoring will be conducted again to look at discrepancies in prices.

DTI is not in-charge of monitoring of agricultural product since it is under the Department of Agriculture. It was found out that rice, the most important commodity in the market is not actually being regulated by the implementing agencies. DTI has been trying to set up a meeting with DA and has been looking for the consumer protection counterpart in the agency.

#### 5.0 Recommendations and Other Insights

**Strengthened Local Price Coordinating Councils (LPCCs):** Under the law, there should be a Local Price Coordinating Council (LPCC) in the local government levels that has the overall responsibility of the imposition and monitoring of price freeze in case of emergencies and disaster. Currently, the DTI is encouraging the establishment and activation of this council for the better implementation of the price control. Part of the arrangement with the local government would be immediately assigning the members of the LPCCs after winning the election and provide the names and contact numbers to DTI. This council will also be tasked to declare the prevailing price at the local level since they are the more knowledgeable on the situation on the ground. The LPCCs can also be used as the LGU-DTI-Industry platform for discourse exchanges at the local level. Since the DTI has limited means to monitor prices, the establishment and activation of the LPCCs would be a great help. With this, the Mayor will have to fund the monitoring and local staff can go around given proper capacity building and trainings.

LPCC meetings are quarterly conducted and is considered very functional. DTI claimed that they have formed a very good network through this council. To further strengthen this, it was recommended for each implementing agency, not only DTI, to create a unit or office specifically for the implementation of the price control. They have observed that the number of complaints and responsibilities just keep on going so there should be a special unit for it already in other agencies. It would be better also to expand the power of the council, not only limited to advisory.

**Diskwento Caravan:** One of the main considerations during a disaster is the very limited supply of commodities. During the Surigao earthquake, one of the interventions done by DTI is the *Diskwento* Caravan, in partnership with local manufacturers, to bring in supplies in the area and discourage hoarding. It is better to allow the manufacturers to increase their stocks and provide them the opportunity to be able to market it.

**E-presyo:** E-presyo is one of the interventions of DTI when it comes to monitoring. The provincial and regional offices send their price monitoring in real time and can be accessed by the public online. It was admitted that prices in a way at times could be outdated. This is because of the lack of manpower to regularly monitor the prices in a province. One of the strategies planned by DTI is to increase their campaign for more consumer organizations. They are planning to approach the existing cooperatives and encourage them to become a consumer organization and gather the data needed.

**Price Act:** Price control should be imposed during emergencies and disasters since the purchasing power of the consumers during those times are also compromised. Additionally, this issue must also be prioritized in discussions during a disaster. All food, not only basic commodities, should also be included in the imposition of price control.

In order to come up with more amendments to the law, the DTI still needs to fully appreciate the concept of price freeze and SRPs. One of the things that can be looked at now is the flexibility when it comes to extension of price control (e.g. extend beyond 60 days if needed). It was also claimed that interventions and activities such as convening the LPPC, coming up with related resolutions, and posting IEC materials were not institutionalized nationwide and that Zamboanga City is the only one doing these.

Good working relationship and communication between the DTI and local government also played an important role to carry out interventions during the siege. DTI was given award and recognition by the local government because of their commitment and dedication to their work during the siege. According to them, it was personal initiative and integrity aside from following orders and trusting their leaders that helped them do their job during those risky times. Commitment to public service and integrity are also important. Government officials and employees should have the heart to deliver.

**DRRM:** There is a need to establish a national agency handling disaster since the Office of the Civil Defense (OCD) right now only has coordinative functions. There should also be a law tailored fit for human-induced disasters. In terms of fund, the allocated 5 percent DRRM funding for local government is insufficient especially for the low-income class municipalities. LGUs would be needing more to be fully prepared and resilient. The issue on the availability of fund for the creation of DRRM offices was also tackled. The budget is still embedded in the budget of the LGU which means that hiring of positions for the said office would conflict with the DBM circular on the 45 percent limit on Personnel Services. It was recommended to enact a law that will enable the budget for the hiring or creation of positions to be taken from the 5 percent DRRM fund instead of the annual budget of the city.

To further augment the capacity as part of the bureaucracy, there is a need to capacitate the LGUs in terms of skills when it comes to response. Leadership of the Search Rescue and Retrieval (SRR) should also be given to the civilian. It is also high time to give the leadership of logistics to another agency like DPWH. Logistics basically covers transportation; restoration of communication, water, power; and passability of roads. We should be able to establish and institutionalize teams responsible for these.

There should be a comprehensive inventory of all DRRM assets for both government and private. It is very important to know first the existing resources before mobilization. This could also be done by the OCD, if only they were not tied to conducting capacity building activities.

The crafters of the law think that disasters just come and go and forgot that everything should start from prevention, mitigation and good planning, according to him. He added that good planning is the key to level up preparedness. This can be made possible through hiring intelligent, knowledgeable and capable people. DRRM offices should be independent and free from politics since these would compromise its efficiency.
**Warm bodies:** There is a need to fly in police or security officers from other provinces those who do not have mental baggage because the tendency is that the local policemen were also victims and will prioritize securing their families no matter what happens. This setup is also applicable to price monitoring and imposition of price control.

**Resiliency:** In order to further augment the resiliency of the city, it was recommended to have the technology in place. After the siege, the City Mayor prioritized programs on security not only for armed conflict but also for calamities. Funds were allocated for a security surveillance system which will be bid out before 2017 ends. Capacity building for disaster preparedness for individual and community as well are being conducted. Hazard simulation and unannounced drills were regularly conducted to ground actions especially for response.

**Satisfaction and needs:** In general, the respondents are satisfied with the government support during the time. Livelihood programs including trainings and scholarship programs are the two things that they would like to request from the government now. Moreover, it would also be better to widen the coverage of programs like 4Ps and SLPs.

**Preparedness:** Respondents admitted that they were not ready for the siege and they did not expect such crisis to happen. When asked if they prepared now, they said that there are physically and mentally prepared but not financially. Most of them do not have savings because they only earn enough for their day to day living.

On barangay preparedness, there is an observed increase in the number of checkpoints and security personnel in the area. There are no trainings conducted on the barangay level.

On city preparedness, drills are conducted regularly.

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Information	Frequency	Valid Percent	
Sex			
Male	38	9	
Female	380	91	
Total	418	100	
Civil Status			
Single	16	4	
Married	276	66	
Widowed	71	17	
Divorced/Separated	13	3	
Unknown	42	10	
Total	418	100	
Age			
17 years old and below	5	1	
18-25 years old	15	4	
26-35 years old	73	19	
36-45 years old	119	31	
46-60 years old	125	33	
60 years old and above	44	12	
Total	381	100	
Number of Household Members			
1-3 members	37	10	
4-6 members	175	47	
7-10 members	133	36	
11 members and above	26	7	
Total	371	100	
Number of HH Members Under 15 y/o			
1-3 members	189	73	
4-6 members	62	24	
7-10 members	9	3	
Total	260	100	
Number of HH Members Over 64 y/o			
1-3 members	71	96	
4-6 members	3	4	
Total	74	100	

#### A. Table 1. Consumer-Respondent and Household Profile

>Total number of respondents: 418

>Missing cases are already excluded, as reflected on some items

### A.Table 2. Welfare Impact of Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law: Household Income – Paired Samples Test

	Items		Std.	Std. Error	95% Cor Interva Differ	ifidence l of the rence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 1	Before Zamboanga Siege - During Zamboanga Siege	4959.215	6433.088	359.060	4252.799	5665.631	13.812	320	0.000
Pair 2	During Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	-2449.248	4110.582	230.510	-2902.771	-1995.726	-10.625	317	0.000
Pair 3	Before Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	2224.991	5703.442	306.619	1621.914	2828.069	7.257	345	0.000
Pair 4	Before Martial Law - During Martial Law	65.476	669.282	36.512	-6.346	137.299	1.793	335	0.074
Pair 5	During Martial Law - After Martial Law	-194.352	3979.062	229.349	-645.689	256.985	-0.847	300	0.397
Pair 6	Before Martial Law - After Martial Law	-131.229	3956.668	228.059	-580.026	317.568	-0.575	300	0.565

## A.Table 3. Welfare Impact of Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law: Employment Status – Paired Samples Test

	Items		Std.	Std. Error	95% Cor Interva Differ	nfidence I of the rence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 1	Before Zamboanga Siege - During Zamboanga Siege	-0.380	0.678	0.039	-0.458	-0.303	-9.673	296	0.000
Pair 2	During Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	0.289	0.601	0.035	0.220	0.357	8.293	297	0.000
Pair 3	Before Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	-0.078	0.403	0.022	-0.121	-0.035	-3.534	333	0.000
Pair 4	Before Martial Law - During Martial Law	-0.012	0.135	0.007	-0.027	0.002	-1.637	328	0.103
Pair 5	During Martial Law - After Martial Law	-0.007	0.116	0.007	-0.020	0.007	-1.000	294	0.318
Pair 6	Before Martial Law - After Martial Law	-0.020	0.164	0.010	-0.039	-0.002	-2.134	294	0.034

Scale used: 1=Full-time employment 2=Partial employment 3=Unemployed

			Pair						
Items					95% Confidence Interval of the				
			Std.	Std. Error	Diffe	rence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 1	Before Zamboanga Siege - During Zamboanga Siege	1.287	1.773	0.100	1.090	1.484	12.857	313	0.000
Pair 2	During Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	-1.099	1.822	0.103	-1.302	-0.896	-10.671	312	0.000
Pair 3	Before Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	0.192	1.040	0.057	0.081	0.304	3.400	337	0.001
Pair 4	Before Martial Law - During Martial Law	0.000	0.234	0.013	-0.025	0.025	0.000	328	1.000
Pair 5	During Martial Law - After Martial Law	0.000	0.246	0.014	-0.028	0.028	0.000	298	1.000
Pair 6	Before Martial Law - After Martial Law	0.003	0.174	0.010	-0.016	0.023	0.333	298	0.739

A.Table 4. Welfare Impact of Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law: Number of Children in School – Paired Samples Test

## A.Table 5. Welfare Impact of Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law: Medical Expenses – Paired Samples Test

					95% Cor	ifidence			
	Items			Std.	Interva	of the			
			Std.	Error	Differ	ence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 1	Before Zamboanga Siege - During Zamboanga Siege	3954.481	42739.313	2522.822	-1011.172	8920.134	1.567	286	0.118
Pair 2	During Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	-251.581	8871.277	526.413	-1287.764	784.602	-0.478	283	0.633
Pair 3	Before Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	1291.223	14076.627	823.772	-330.084	2912.530	1.567	291	0.118
Pair 4	Before Martial Law - During Martial Law	631.696	8977.440	533.653	-418.754	1682.146	1.184	282	0.238
Pair 5	During Martial Law - After Martial Law	26.765	588.987	35.713	-43.545	97.074	0.749	271	0.454
Pair 6	Before Martial Law - After Martial Law	684.007	9148.987	554.739	-408.138	1776.153	1.233	271	0.219

A.Table 6. Welfare Im	pact of Zamboanga S	iege and Martial Law:	Credits or Debts -	Paired Samples Test

Paired Differences									
Items					95% Confidence Interval of the				
			Std.	Std. Error	Differ	ence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 1	Before Zamboanga Siege - During Zamboanga Siege	1929.634	29646.552	1726.089	-1467.423	5326.690	1.118	294	0.265
Pair 2	During Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	-1059.031	18453.942	1089.302	-3203.097	1085.034	-0.972	286	0.332
Pair 3	Before Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	916.376	32526.607	1919.985	-2862.717	4695.470	0.477	286	0.634
Pair 4	Before Martial Law - During Martial Law	58.065	1423.416	85.218	-109.689	225.818	0.681	278	0.496
Pair 5	During Martial Law - After Martial Law	1030.007	21311.781	1289.848	-1509.347	3569.361	0.799	272	0.425
Pair 6	Before Martial Law - After Martial Law	1089.348	21269.582	1287.294	-1444.978	3623.674	0.846	272	0.398

### A.Table 7. Welfare Impact of Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law: Number of Meals – Paired Samples Test

			Paired						
	ltome				95% Cor	nfidence			
	items		C+d	Std Error	Diffe				Sig (2
			Stu.	Stu. LITUI	Diffe	chee			Jig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 1	Before Zamboanga Siege - During Zamboanga Siege	0.097	0.405	0.023	0.053	0.142	4.293	317	0.000
Pair 2	During Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	-0.061	0.357	0.020	-0.100	-0.021	-3.005	313	0.003
Pair 3	Before Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	0.038	0.248	0.014	0.010	0.065	2.710	319	0.007
Pair 4	Before Martial Law - During Martial Law	-0.013	0.137	0.008	-0.028	0.003	-1.637	319	0.103
Pair 5	During Martial Law - After Martial Law	0.000	0.167	0.010	-0.019	0.019	0.000	286	1.000
Pair 6	Before Martial Law - After Martial Law	-0.014	0.144	0.009	-0.031	0.003	-1.638	286	0.103

#### A.Table 8. Welfare Impact of Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law: Number of Household Members – Paired Samples Test

			Pair						
					95% Cor	nfidence			
	Items				Interva	l of the			
			Std.	Std. Error	Diffe	rence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 1	Before Zamboanga Siege - During Zamboanga Siege	0.055	2.019	0.111	-0.164	0.274	0.492	328	0.623
Pair 2	During Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	0.377	2.397	0.133	0.116	0.638	2.843	325	0.005
Pair 3	Before Zamboanga Siege - After Zamboanga Siege	0.484	2.656	0.144	0.201	0.767	3.364	340	0.001
Pair 4	Before Martial Law - During Martial Law	0.009	0.123	0.007	-0.004	0.022	1.343	329	0.180
Pair 5	During Martial Law - After Martial Law	-0.007	0.143	0.008	-0.023	0.010	-0.816	294	0.415
Pair 6	Before Martial Law - After Martial Law	0.003	0.101	0.006	-0.008	0.015	0.577	294	0.565

A.Table 9. Disaster Impacts of the 2013 Zamboanga Siege- Consumer/Individual

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Location during the Zamboanga siege		
Stayed in the residence	71	19.1
Transferred to temporary housing/evacuation center	166	44.7
Transferred to another barangay/municipality/province/region	74	19.9
Others (Stayed with relatives, Hostage victim, etc.)	60	16.2
Total	371	100.0
Decline in Income		
Yes	310	84.5
No	57	15.5
Total	367	100.0
Loss and Damage of Assets/Properties		
Yes	364	98.4
No	6	1.6
Total	370	100.0
Amount of Loss and Damage		
Below 1,000	3	0.8
1,001 - 10,000	20	5.7
10,001 - 50,000	131	37.1
50,001 - 100,000	95	26.9
100,001 - 250,000	60	17.0
250,001 - 500,000	34	9.6
500,001 - 1,000,000	9	2.5
Above 1,000,000	1	0.3
Total	353	100.0
Higher Expenses		
Yes	287	78.4
No	79	21.6
Total	366	100.0
If recovered from the losses and increase in expenses		
Not at all	42	11.3
Partially	267	72.0
Completely	62	16.7
Total	371	100.0
Partially and not at all recovered: estimated duration before		
complete recovery		
Less than a year	5	1.6
One year	15	4.9

More than a year	287	93.5
Total	307	100.0
Completely recovered: duration before complete recovery		
Less than a year	1	1.7
One year	3	5.2
More than a year	54	93.1
Total	58	100.0

				Paired Differ					
	Items				95% Confiden	ce Interval			
	items		Std.	Std. Error	of the Diff	erence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 1	M4_Rice_DZS - M4_Rice_AZS	-0.210	1.087	0.077	-0.362	-0.058	-2.732	199	0.007
Pair 2	M4_Rice_DML - M4_Rice_AML	-0.072	0.486	0.028	-0.126	-0.017	-2.581	306	0.010
Pair 3	M4_Corn_DZS - M4_Corn_AZS	-0.032	0.429	0.044	-0.121	0.056	-0.726	92	0.470
Pair 4	M4_Corn_DML - M4_Corn_AML	-0.038	0.236	0.023	-0.083	0.008	-1.646	105	0.103
Pair 5	M4_RootCrop_DZS - M4_RootCrop_AZS	-0.020	0.424	0.042	-0.103	0.064	-0.470	100	0.640
Pair 6	M4_RootCrop_DML - M4_RootCrop_AML	-0.049	0.381	0.034	-0.117	0.019	-1.420	122	0.158
Pair 7	M4_Bread_DZS - M4_Bread_AZS	-0.063	0.457	0.035	-0.131	0.005	-1.820	174	0.070
Pair 8	M4_Bread_DML - M4_Bread_AML	-0.024	0.361	0.023	-0.070	0.021	-1.061	244	0.290
Pair 9	M4_FreshFish_DZS - M4_FreshFish_AZS	-0.140	0.751	0.055	-0.248	-0.031	-2.538	185	0.012
Pair 10	M4_FreshFish_DML - M4_FreshFish_AML	-0.058	0.485	0.029	-0.115	0.000	-1.980	277	0.049
Pair 11	M4_DriedFish_DZS - M4_DriedFish_AZS	-0.068	0.530	0.040	-0.147	0.011	-1.706	175	0.090
Pair 12	M4_DriedFish_DML - M4_DriedFish_AML	-0.079	0.350	0.022	-0.123	-0.034	-3.490	241	0.001
Pair 13	M4_CannedFish_DZS - M4_CannedFish_AZS	0.036	0.602	0.047	-0.056	0.128	0.774	165	0.440
Pair 14	M4_CannedFish_DML - M4_CannedFish_AML	0.012	0.496	0.032	-0.050	0.075	0.390	240	0.697
Pair 15	M4_OthMarineProd_DZS -	-0.032	0.474	0.042	-0.116	0.052	-0.755	124	0.452
	M4_OthMarineProd_AZS								
Pair 16	M4_OthMarineProd_DML -	0.014	0.335	0.028	-0.041	0.069	0.499	142	0.619
	M4_OthMarineProd_AML								
Pair 17	M4_FreshPork_DZS - M4_FreshPork_AZS	0.083	0.539	0.078	-0.073	0.240	1.071	47	0.290
Pair 18	M4_FreshPork_DML - M4_FreshPork_AML	0.033	0.258	0.033	-0.033	0.100	1.000	59	0.321
Pair 19	M4_FreshBeef_DZS - M4_FreshBeef_AZS	0.107	0.640	0.070	-0.032	0.246	1.533	83	0.129
Pair 20	M4_FreshBeef_DML - M4_FreshBeef_AML	0.010	0.301	0.030	-0.050	0.070	0.332	99	0.741
Pair 21	M4_PoultryMeat_DZS - M4_PoultryMeat_AZS	0.138	0.844	0.081	-0.023	0.298	1.702	108	0.092

A.Table 10. Price Movements of Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities During Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law Declaration – Paired Samples Test- Consumer/Individual

			I						
	Items				95% Confiden	ce Interval			
	items		Std.	Std. Error	of the Diff	erence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 22	M4_PoultryMeat_DML - M4_PoultryMeat_AML	0.058	0.430	0.035	-0.010	0.126	1.681	154	0.095
Pair 23	M4_FreshEggs_DZS - M4_FreshEggs_AZS	0.012	0.625	0.049	-0.084	0.108	0.249	164	0.803
Pair 24	M4_FreshEggs_DML - M4_FreshEggs_AML	-0.064	0.502	0.032	-0.126	-0.001	-2.012	250	0.045
Pair 25	M4_PotWater_DZS - M4_PotWater_AZS	-0.040	0.496	0.044	-0.127	0.048	-0.897	125	0.371
Pair 26	M4_PotWater_DML - M4_PotWater_AML	-0.070	0.352	0.027	-0.123	-0.017	-2.601	171	0.010
Pair 27	M4_FreshMilk_DZS - M4_FreshMilk_AZS	0.034	0.532	0.056	-0.078	0.146	0.598	88	0.551
Pair 28	M4_FreshMilk_DML - M4_FreshMilk_AML	-0.075	0.357	0.035	-0.144	-0.007	-2.175	105	0.032
Pair 29	M4_ProcMilk_DZS - M4_ProcMilk_AZS	0.051	0.679	0.069	-0.085	0.187	0.744	97	0.459
Pair 30	M4_ProcMilk_DML - M4_ProcMilk_AML	-0.047	0.277	0.024	-0.095	0.002	-1.917	127	0.057
Pair 31	M4_FreshVeg_DZS - M4_FreshVeg_AZS	-0.012	0.491	0.038	-0.087	0.063	-0.315	166	0.753
Pair 32	M4_FreshVeg_DML - M4_FreshVeg_AML	-0.032	0.381	0.024	-0.080	0.015	-1.335	246	0.183
Pair 33	M4_FreshFruits_DZS - M4_FreshFruits_AZS	-0.030	0.482	0.037	-0.103	0.044	-0.800	167	0.425
Pair 34	M4_FreshFruits_DML - M4_FreshFruits_AML	-0.077	0.466	0.031	-0.139	-0.015	-2.456	220	0.015
Pair 35	M4_InstaNoodles_DZS - M4_InstaNoodles_AZS	0.056	0.741	0.058	-0.059	0.171	0.954	161	0.342
Pair 36	M4_InstaNoodles_DML - M4_InstaNoodles_AML	-0.100	0.503	0.031	-0.162	-0.039	-3.209	258	0.002
Pair 37	M4_Coffee_DZS - M4_Coffee_AZS	0.039	0.402	0.030	-0.020	0.098	1.302	178	0.194
Pair 38	M4_Coffee_DML - M4_Coffee_AML	-0.067	0.398	0.025	-0.117	-0.018	-2.688	251	0.008
Pair 39	M4_Sugar_DZS - M4_Sugar_AZS	-0.005	0.497	0.036	-0.076	0.066	-0.145	190	0.884
Pair 40	M4_Sugar_DML - M4_Sugar_AML	-0.063	0.405	0.025	-0.112	-0.015	-2.560	268	0.011
Pair 41	M4_CookOil_DZS - M4_CookOil_AZS	0.006	0.453	0.034	-0.061	0.072	0.164	180	0.870
Pair 42	M4_CookOil_DML - M4_CookOil_AML	-0.059	0.455	0.029	-0.116	-0.003	-2.074	252	0.039
Pair 43	M4_Salt_DZS - M4_Salt_AZS	-0.027	0.265	0.020	-0.066	0.011	-1.390	183	0.166
Pair 44	M4_Salt_DML - M4_Salt_AML	-0.048	0.320	0.020	-0.088	-0.008	-2.375	248	0.018
Pair 45	M4_LaundSoapDet_DZS -	0.051	0.549	0.042	-0.031	0.133	1.238	174	0.217
	M4_LaundSoapDet_AZS								

			I	Paired Differ					
	Items				95% Confiden	ce Interval			
			Std.	Std. Error	of the Diff	erence			Sig. (2-
	1	Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 46	M4_LaundSoapDet_DML -	-0.051	0.449	0.029	-0.108	0.007	-1.739	235	0.083
	M4_LaundSoapDet_AML								
Pair 47	M4_Firewood_DZS - M4_Firewood_AZS	0.037	0.358	0.034	-0.031	0.105	1.070	108	0.287
Pair 48	M4_Firewood_DML - M4_Firewood_AML	-0.007	0.251	0.021	-0.048	0.034	-0.332	143	0.740
Pair 49	M4_Charcoal_DZS - M4_Charcoal_AZS	0.208	0.719	0.059	0.092	0.324	3.531	148	0.001
Pair 50	M4_Charcoal_DML - M4_Charcoal_AML	-0.026	0.397	0.026	-0.078	0.026	-1.000	227	0.318
Pair 51	M4_LPG_DZS - M4_LPG_AZS	0.015	0.568	0.070	-0.125	0.155	0.217	65	0.829
Pair 52	M4_LPG_DML - M4_LPG_AML	0.013	0.254	0.029	-0.045	0.070	0.445	77	0.658
Pair 53	M4_Kerosene_DZS - M4_Kerosene_AZS	0.033	0.450	0.058	-0.083	0.150	0.574	59	0.568
Pair 54	M4_Kerosene_DML - M4_Kerosene_AML	-0.011	0.107	0.011	-0.034	0.011	-1.000	86	0.320
Pair 55	M4_Candles_DZS - M4_Candles_AZS	-0.073	0.502	0.048	-0.168	0.022	-1.521	109	0.131
Pair 56	M4_Candles_DML - M4_Candles_AML	-0.040	0.270	0.020	-0.080	0.000	-1.957	174	0.052
Pair 57	M4_EssentDrugs_DZS - M4_EssentDrugs_AZS	-0.016	0.282	0.025	-0.066	0.034	-0.631	125	0.529
Pair 58	M4_EssentDrugs_DML - M4_EssentDrugs_AML	-0.032	0.231	0.017	-0.066	0.001	-1.911	184	0.058
Pair 59	M4_Flour_DZS - M4_Flour_AZS	0.042	0.558	0.051	-0.059	0.143	0.821	118	0.413
Pair 60	M4_Flour_DML - M4_Flour_AML	-0.043	0.339	0.026	-0.095	0.010	-1.614	163	0.109
Pair 61	M4_DPCPork_DZS - M4_DPCPork_AZS	0.054	0.297	0.040	-0.026	0.133	1.352	55	0.182
Pair 63	M4_DPCBeef_DZS - M4_DPCBeef_AZS	0.100	0.409	0.046	0.009	0.191	2.188	79	0.032
Pair 64	M4_DPCBeef_DML - M4_DPCBeef_AML	-0.017	0.182	0.017	-0.049	0.016	-1.000	120	0.319
Pair 65	M4_DPCPoultMeat_DZS -	0.068	0.498	0.053	-0.037	0.174	1.284	87	0.203
	M4_DPCPoultMeat_AZS								
Pair 66	M4_DPCPoultMeat_DML -	0.018	0.187	0.018	-0.017	0.052	1.000	113	0.319
	M4_DPCPoultMeat_AML								
Pair 67	M4_OtherDairyProd_DZS -	0.118	0.474	0.057	0.003	0.232	2.046	67	0.045
	M4_OtherDairyProd_AZS								

			I	Paired Differ					
	Items				95% Confiden	ce Interval			
	items		Std.	Std. Error	of the Diff	erence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 68	M4_OtherDairyProd_DML -	-0.010	0.304	0.031	-0.071	0.051	-0.332	97	0.741
	M4_OtherDairyProd_AML								
Pair 69	M4_Onions_DZS - M4_Onions_AZS	0.172	0.734	0.057	0.058	0.285	2.989	162	0.003
Pair 70	M4_Onions_DML - M4_Onions_AML	-0.068	0.477	0.031	-0.130	-0.007	-2.195	233	0.029
Pair 71	M4_Garlic_DZS - M4_Garlic_AZS	0.114	0.622	0.047	0.021	0.206	2.423	175	0.016
Pair 72	M4_Garlic_DML - M4_Garlic_AML	-0.054	0.356	0.023	-0.099	-0.009	-2.357	239	0.019
Pair 73	M4_Vinegar_DZS - M4_Vinegar_AZS	-0.029	0.393	0.030	-0.087	0.030	-0.962	174	0.337
Pair 74	M4_Vinegar_DML - M4_Vinegar_AML	-0.043	0.379	0.025	-0.091	0.006	-1.722	234	0.086
Pair 75	M4_Patis_DZS - M4_Patis_AZS	-0.018	0.327	0.031	-0.079	0.043	-0.576	112	0.566
Pair 77	M4_SoySauce_DZS - M4_SoySauce_AZS	-0.019	0.428	0.034	-0.086	0.048	-0.556	158	0.579
Pair 78	M4_SoySauce_DML - M4_SoySauce_AML	-0.072	0.361	0.024	-0.120	-0.024	-2.972	221	0.003
Pair 79	M4_ToiletSoap_DZS - M4_ToiletSoap_AZS	-0.028	0.446	0.043	-0.114	0.058	-0.653	105	0.515
Pair 80	M4_ToiletSoap_DML - M4_ToiletSoap_AML	-0.055	0.349	0.029	-0.112	0.002	-1.903	144	0.059
Pair 81	M4_Fertilizer_DZS - M4_Fertilizer_AZS	-0.031	0.177	0.031	-0.095	0.032	-1.000	31	0.325
Pair 82	M4_Fertilizer_DML - M4_Fertilizer_AML	-0.045	0.302	0.045	-0.137	0.046	-1.000	43	0.323
Pair 84	M4_PestHerb_DML - M4_PestHerb_AML	0.041	0.286	0.041	-0.041	0.123	1.000	48	0.322
Pair 85	M4_PLFFeeds_DZS - M4_PLFFeeds_AZS	0.071	0.378	0.071	-0.075	0.218	1.000	27	0.326
Pair 86	M4_PLFFeeds_DML - M4_PLFFeeds_AML	-0.043	0.295	0.043	-0.131	0.044	-1.000	45	0.323
Pair 89	M4_Paper_DZS - M4_Paper_AZS	0.024	0.587	0.065	-0.105	0.153	0.376	81	0.708
Pair 90	M4_Paper_DML - M4_Paper_AML	-0.060	0.343	0.027	-0.113	-0.008	-2.264	165	0.025
Pair 91	M4_SchoolSupp_DZS - M4_SchoolSupp_AZS	0.035	0.637	0.060	-0.083	0.153	0.588	113	0.558
Pair 92	M4_SchoolSupp_DML - M4_SchoolSupp_AML	-0.035	0.272	0.019	-0.073	0.003	-1.818	200	0.071
Pair 93	M4_NipaShing_DZS - M4_NipaShing_AZS	0.514	0.944	0.113	0.289	0.739	4.558	69	0.000
Pair 94	M4_NipaShing_DML - M4_NipaShing_AML	-0.013	0.470	0.053	-0.119	0.093	-0.241	77	0.810
Pair 95	M4_Sawali_DZS - M4_Sawali_AZS	0.097	0.762	0.097	-0.097	0.290	1.000	61	0.321
Pair 96	M4_Sawali_DML - M4_Sawali_AML	0.000	0.378	0.045	-0.089	0.089	0.000	70	1.000

			I						
	ltems				95% Confiden	ce Interval			
			Std.	Std. Error	of the Diff	erence			Sig. (2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 97	M4_Cement_DZS - M4_Cement_AZS	0.459	0.848	0.109	0.242	0.676	4.228	60	0.000
Pair 98	M4_Cement_DML - M4_Cement_AML	-0.015	0.366	0.044	-0.103	0.074	-0.331	67	0.742
Pair 99	M4_Clinker_DZS - M4_Clinker_AZS	0.138	0.511	0.067	0.004	0.272	2.055	57	0.044
Pair 100	M4_Clinker_DML - M4_Clinker_AML	0.077	0.444	0.055	-0.033	0.187	1.397	64	0.167
Pair 101	M4_GISheets_DZS - M4_GISheets_AZS	0.145	0.524	0.071	0.004	0.287	2.058	54	0.044
Pair 102	M4_GISheets_DML - M4_GISheets_AML	0.032	0.254	0.032	-0.032	0.097	1.000	61	0.321
Pair 103	M4_HollBlocks_DZS - M4_HollBlocks_AZS	0.556	0.904	0.123	0.309	0.802	4.515	53	0.000
Pair 104	M4_HollBlocks_DML - M4_HollBlocks_AML	0.031	0.248	0.031	-0.031	0.092	1.000	64	0.321
Pair 105	M4_Plywood_DZS - M4_Plywood_AZS	0.355	0.925	0.117	0.120	0.590	3.021	61	0.004
Pair 106	M4_Plywood_DML - M4_Plywood_AML	-0.025	0.423	0.048	-0.120	0.069	-0.532	78	0.596
Pair 107	M4_Plyboard_DZS - M4_Plyboard_AZS	0.158	0.527	0.070	0.018	0.298	2.260	56	0.028
Pair 108	M4_Plyboard_DML - M4_Plyboard_AML	0.063	0.353	0.045	-0.026	0.153	1.426	62	0.159
Pair 109	M4_ConstNails_DZS - M4_ConstNails_AZS	0.464	1.008	0.135	0.194	0.734	3.445	55	0.001
Pair 110	M4_ConstNails_DML - M4_ConstNails_AML	-0.076	0.501	0.056	-0.188	0.036	-1.349	78	0.181
Pair 111	M4_Batteries_DZS - M4_Batteries_AZS	0.093	0.559	0.076	-0.060	0.245	1.218	53	0.229
Pair 112	M4_Batteries_DML - M4_Batteries_AML	-0.048	0.408	0.045	-0.136	0.041	-1.070	83	0.288
Pair 113	M4_ElectSupp_DZS - M4_ElectSupp_AZS	0.036	0.470	0.063	-0.091	0.163	0.574	54	0.568
Pair 114	M4_ElectSupp_DML - M4_ElectSupp_AML	-0.079	0.483	0.048	-0.175	0.016	-1.647	100	0.103
Pair 115	M4_LightBulbs_DZS - M4_LightBulbs_AZS	-0.041	0.584	0.068	-0.176	0.095	-0.597	73	0.552
Pair 116	M4_LightBulbs_DML - M4_LightBulbs_AML	-0.088	0.474	0.045	-0.177	0.000	-1.987	112	0.049
Pair 117	M4_SteelWire_DZS - M4_SteelWire_AZS	-0.019	0.412	0.056	-0.131	0.094	-0.331	53	0.742
Pair 118	M4_SteelWire_DML - M4_SteelWire_AML	0.061	0.345	0.043	-0.024	0.146	1.425	65	0.159
Pair 119	M4_AllOthrDrugs_DZS - M4_AllOthrDrugs_AZS	0.000	0.354	0.039	-0.078	0.078	0.000	80	1.000
Pair 120	M4_AllOthrDrugs_DML - M4_AllOthrDrugs_AML	0.000	0.253	0.023	-0.045	0.045	0.000	125	1.000

A.Table 11. Household Consumption of Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities Changes During Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law Declaration

Basic Necessities	s and Prime	During Za Sie	amboanga ege	After Za Si	mboanga ege	During N	lartial Law	After Ma	artial Law
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Mean	20.84	3.00	10.83		8.42	20.50	8.67	17.60
	N	44	1	71		73	4	55	5
Rice	Std. Deviation	18.788		13.009		8.803	17.059	9.555	16.134
	Minimum	1	3	1		1	2	1	2
	Maximum	50	3	50		50	35	50	35
	Mean	13.80		11.60	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
	N	5		5	1	4	1	1	1
Corn	Std. Deviation	20.499		21.466		0.000			
	Minimum	1		2	2	2	1	2	1
	Maximum	50		50	2	2	1	2	1
	Mean	1.33		3.00	1.00	2.33	1.00	2.40	1.00
	N	3		8	1	6	2	5	1
Root crops	Std. Deviation	0.577		3.117		1.506	0.000	1.673	
	Minimum	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
	Maximum	2		10	1	5	1	5	1
	Mean	8.89	1.00	3.69	0.50	3.53		1.45	0.75
	N	9	1	18	1	16		10	2
Bread	Std. Deviation	16.624		6.948		6.443		1.301	0.354
	Minimum	1	1	1	1	1		1	1
	Maximum	50	1	30	1	20		5	1
	Mean	33.52		18.86	1.00	16.05	20.00	16.73	9.00
Frach Fich	N	22		33	2	52	1	37	3
	Std. Deviation	43.220		21.192	0.000	16.959		18.839	9.644
	Minimum	2		2	1	2	20	1	2

Basic Necessities	and Prime	During Za Sie	amboanga ege	After Za Si	mboanga ege	During N	lartial Law	After Ma	artial Law
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum	150		100	1	100	20	100	20
	Mean	37.55	4.00	7.40	3.00	7.33	3.00	6.50	2.67
	N	11	2	15	3	12	3	4	3
Dried Fish	Std. Deviation	61.671	2.828	12.755	2.646	8.015	2.646	9.037	2.887
	Minimum	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Maximum	200	6	50	6	20	6	20	6
	Mean	12.32	3.00	2.39		3.56		3.30	20.00
	N	11	2	27		49		43	1
Canned Fish	Std. Deviation	29.599	1.414	1.059		5.247		4.993	
	Minimum	1	2	1		1		1	20
	Maximum	100	4	5		20		20	20
	Mean	1.33				2.00	2.00	6.00	
Other Marine	N	3				1	1	2	
Products	Std. Deviation	0.577						5.657	
Troducts	Minimum	1				2	2	2	
	Maximum	2				2	2	10	
	Mean	10.00		11.63		8.38		12.43	
	N	1		8		8		7	
Fresh Pork	Std. Deviation			7.347		5.579		9.554	
	Minimum	10		3		2		2	
	Maximum	10		20		20		30	
	Mean			25.20		39.33		40.00	
Fresh Beef	N			10		12		10	
	Std. Deviation			29.634		52.991		56.911	
	Minimum			2		2		5	

Basic Necessities	and Prime	During Za Sie	imboanga ege	After Za Si	mboanga ege	During N	lartial Law	After Ma	artial Law
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum			100		180		180	
	Mean	16.67		13.64		22.76	9.00	12.04	10.00
	Ν	3		25		29	2	28	1
Poultry Meat	Std. Deviation	20.207		11.986		54.296	1.414	10.522	
	Minimum	5		1		2	8	2	10
	Maximum	40		40		300	10	40	10
	Mean	3.21		1.93	1.00	2.08	1.00	2.20	1.33
	N	12		28	1	54	1	42	3
Fresh Eggs	Std. Deviation	5.417		0.900		1.873		2.156	0.577
	Minimum	1		1	1	1	1	1	1
	Maximum	20		5	1	10	1	10	2
	Mean	10.75		2.83	20.00	3.56		2.50	1.50
	Ν	8		12	1	9		4	2
Potable water	Std. Deviation	17.044		1.697		2.789		1.732	0.707
	Minimum	1		1	20	1		1	1
	Maximum	50		5	20	10		5	2
	Mean	3.00		2.00		3.00		3.00	
	N	3		1		4		4	
Fresh Milk	Std. Deviation	1.732				1.414		1.414	
	Minimum	2		2		2		2	
	Maximum	5		2		5		5	
	Mean	5.00		5.00		3.75		4.50	
Processed Milk	Ν	4		6		12		8	
FIOCESSEU WIIK	Std. Deviation	4.243		4.099		3.361		3.891	
	Minimum	2		1		1		1	

Basic Necessities	s and Prime	During Za Si	amboanga ege	After Za Si	mboanga ege	During N	Nartial Law	After Ma	artial Law
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum	11		10		11		11	
	Mean	3.00		3.41	1.00	3.82	2.00	3.50	2.00
	N	7		22	1	22	1	18	3
Fresh Vegetables	Std. Deviation	1.414		2.039		2.938		2.307	1.000
	Minimum	2		1	1	1	2	1	1
	Maximum	5		10	1	15	2	10	3
	Mean	5.08	3.00	6.14	1.50	3.05	2.00	4.36	1.67
	N	13	2	21	2	19	1	14	3
Fresh Fruits	Std. Deviation	6.689	1.414	6.988	0.707	1.393		4.765	0.577
	Minimum	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1
	Maximum	20	4	20	2	5	2	20	2
	Mean	2.33	2.00	2.42	2.00	2.67		2.32	
	N	9	1	36	1	66		46	
Instant Noodles	Std. Deviation	1.225		0.937		2.195		2.042	
	Minimum	1	2	1	2	1		1	
	Maximum	4	2	5	2	13		10	
	Mean	1.73		1.69		1.88		1.93	
- <i>1</i>	Ν	11		32		41		30	
Coffee	Std. Deviation	1.191		0.998		1.400		1.484	
	Minimum	1		1		1		1	
	Maximum	5		5		7		7	
	Mean	3.20		3.00		4.05	2.00	5.87	2.33
Sugar	Ν	15		35		44	3	30	3
Sugar	Std. Deviation	2.981		2.532		6.563	1.732	9.547	1.528
	Minimum	1		1		1	1	1	1

Basic Necessities	and Prime	During Za Sid	amboanga ege	After Za Si	mboanga ege	During N	Nartial Law	After Ma	artial Law
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum	10		10		45	4	45	4
	Mean	4.20		7.00		7.15		7.54	
	N	10		29		46		35	
Cooking Oil	Std. Deviation	4.104		6.216		6.716		6.823	
	Minimum	1		1		1		1	
	Maximum	10		30		30		26	
	Mean	1.00		2.00		1.83			
	N	1		5		6			
Salt	Std. Deviation			0.707		0.753			
	Minimum	1		1		1			
	Maximum	1		3		3			
	Mean	1.67	1.00	2.06	1.00	2.36	1.00	2.59	1.00
Loundry Coop /	N	3	1	17	1	25	2	17	1
Laundry Soap /	Std. Deviation	0.577		0.748		1.680	0.000	1.770	
Detergents	Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Maximum	2	1	3	1	7	1	7	1
	Mean	4.00		6.00		49.63	1.00	64.63	2.00
	N	1		4		8	1	8	1
Firewood	Std. Deviation			2.708		55.649		81.212	
	Minimum	4		4		2	1	2	2
	Maximum	4		10		140	1	190	2
	Mean	20.00	1.00	31.07		25.89		23.52	2.00
Characal	N	10	1	43		82		69	1
Charcoal	Std. Deviation	14.720		37.765		28.089		41.124	
	Minimum	5	1	2		1		1	2

Basic Necessities	and Prime	During Za Sie	amboanga ege	After Za Si	mboanga ege	During N	lartial Law	After Ma	artial Law
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum	40	1	180		150		300	2
	Mean	24.00		48.33		100.00		115.00	
	N	3		3		3		2	
LPG	Std. Deviation	24.249		27.538		86.603		120.208	
	Minimum	2		20		50		30	
	Maximum	50		75		200		200	
	Mean	1.00		1.50		3.50	1.00	3.50	
	N	1		6		2	1	2	
Kerosene	Std. Deviation			0.837		2.121		2.121	
	Minimum	1		1		2	1	2	
	Maximum	1		3		5	1	5	
	Mean	1.00		1.20	1.00	1.20		1.25	
	N	2		5	1	5		4	
Candles	Std. Deviation	0.000		0.447		0.447		0.500	
	Minimum	1		1	1	1		1	
	Maximum	1		2	1	2		2	
	Mean	2.00		3.00		4.63		7.50	1.00
	N	1		8		8		6	1
Essential Drugs	Std. Deviation			3.024		6.948		11.572	
	Minimum	2		1		1		1	1
	Maximum	2		10		20		30	1
	Mean	4.00		3.89	1.00	4.94	1.00	4.50	1.00
Flour	N	5		19	1	16	1	14	1
TIOUI	Std. Deviation	3.674		2.826		8.152		8.873	
	Minimum	1		1	1	1	1	1	1

Basic Necessities	and Prime	During Za Sid	amboanga ege	After Za Si	mboanga ege	During N	Nartial Law	After Ma	artial Law
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum	10		10	1	35	1	35	1
	Mean	1.50		1.33		1.25		1.25	
	N	2		3		4		4	
Dried/Processed/C	Std. Deviation	0.707		0.577		0.500		0.500	
anned Pork	Minimum	1		1		1		1	
	Maximum	2		2		2		2	
	Mean	1.50		1.36		1.81		1.93	
	N	2		7		8		7	
Dried/Processed/C	Std. Deviation	0.707		0.627		1.413		1.484	
anned Beer	Minimum	1		1		1		1	
	Maximum	2		2		5		5	
	Mean	2.17		1.83		1.50		1.50	
Dried/Processed/C	N	3		6		6		6	
anned Poultry	Std. Deviation	2.466		1.602		0.837		0.837	
Meat	Minimum	1		1		1		1	
	Maximum	5		5		3		3	
	Mean			2.33		2.67		2.00	2.00
	N			3		3		2	1
Other Dairy	Std. Deviation			0.577		1.155		0.000	
Products	Minimum			2		2		2	2
	Maximum			3		4		2	2
	Mean	12.40		5.26		6.17	10.00	6.48	
Onions	N	10		43		60	1	40	
UNIONS	Std. Deviation	18.130		9.459		7.372		8.397	
	Minimum	2		1		1	10	1	

Basic Necessities	and Prime	During Za Sie	amboanga ege	After Za Si	mboanga ege	During N	Nartial Law	After Ma	artial Law
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum	60		60		40	10	40	
	Mean	11.57		5.92		8.08	10.00	9.60	5.00
	N	14		39		63	1	43	1
Garlic	Std. Deviation	20.665		12.838		12.163		13.640	
	Minimum	1		1		1	10	1	5
	Maximum	80		80		60	10	60	5
	Mean	1.71		1.13	1.00	1.29		1.25	
	N	7		16	1	17		8	
Vinegar	Std. Deviation	1.496		0.465		0.470		0.463	
	Minimum	1		1	1	1		1	
	Maximum	5		2	1	2		2	
	Mean	5.00							
	N	1							
Patis	Std. Deviation								
	Minimum	5							
	Maximum	5							
	Mean	1.71		1.48	1.00	1.48	1.00	1.17	
	N	7		23	1	23	1	12	
Soy Sauce	Std. Deviation	1.496		0.665		0.665		0.389	
	Minimum	1		1	1	1	1	1	
	Maximum	5		3	1	3	1	2	
	Mean	1.00		2.22	1.00	2.07	1.00	1.17	
Toilet Soan	N	1		9	2	14	1	6	
Tonet Soap	Std. Deviation			1.302	0.000	1.439		0.408	
	Minimum	1		1	1	1	1	1	

Basic Necessities	and Prime	During Za Sie	amboanga ege	After Zamboanga Siege		During N	Aartial Law	After Martial Law	
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum	1		5	1	5	1	2	
	Mean								
	N								
Fertilizer	Std. Deviation								
	Minimum								
	Maximum								
	Mean					1.50		1.50	
Pesticides and	N					2		2	
Herbicides	Std. Deviation					0.707		0.707	
	Minimum					1		1	
	Maximum					2		2	
	Mean			2.00		2.00		2.00	
Poultry/Livestock/F	Ν			1		1		1	
ishery Feeds	Std. Deviation								
lonery recas	Minimum			2		2		2	
	Maximum			2		2		2	
	Mean								
Veterinary	N								
Products	Std. Deviation								
	Minimum								
	Maximum								
	Mean	1.00		1.17		1.53		1.55	
Paper	N	3		12		15		11	
raper	Std. Deviation	0.000		0.389		1.125		1.214	
	Minimum	1		1		1		1	

Basic Necessities	and Prime	During Za Sie	amboanga ege	After Za Si	mboanga ege	During N	Nartial Law	After Martial Law	
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum	1		2		5		5	
	Mean	2.50		2.12	1.00	2.36		1.67	
	N	8		17	1	22		15	
School Supplies	Std. Deviation	1.604		1.054		1.177		1.047	
	Minimum	1		1	1	1		1	
	Maximum	5		5	1	5		5	
	Mean	1.00		8.43		8.43		8.58	
	N	1		14		14		12	
Nipa Shingles	Std. Deviation			2.848		2.848		2.875	
	Minimum	1		2		2		2	
	Maximum	1		11		11		11	
	Mean	7.80		8.40		8.40		8.40	
	N	5		5		5		5	
Sawali	Std. Deviation	3.033		3.578		3.578		3.578	
	Minimum	4		2		2		2	
	Maximum	10		10		10		10	
	Mean	2.00		11.83		12.08		12.08	
	N	1		12		13		13	
Cement	Std. Deviation			13.224		12.692		12.692	
	Minimum	2		2		2		2	
	Maximum	2		50		50		50	
	Mean			5.00		5.00		5.00	
Clinker	N			1		1		1	
CHINCI	Std. Deviation								
-	Minimum			5		5		5	

Basic Necessities	and Prime	During Za Sie	amboanga ege	After Zamboanga Siege		During N	lartial Law	After Martial Law	
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Maximum			5		5		5	
	Mean			5.00		5.00		4.00	
	N			1		1		1	
GI Sheets	Std. Deviation								
	Minimum			5		5		4	
	Maximum			5		5		4	
	Mean	2.00		1.85		2.07		2.07	
	N	1		13		14		14	
Hollow blocks	Std. Deviation			0.555		0.997		0.997	
	Minimum	2		1		1		1	
	Maximum	2		3		5		5	
	Mean	2.00		4.63	1.00	4.56	1.00	4.75	1.00
	N	1		16	1	18	1	16	1
Plywood	Std. Deviation			3.538		3.729		3.958	
	Minimum	2		2	1	1	1	1	1
	Maximum	2		15	1	15	1	15	1
	Mean	3.50		10.00				15.00	
	N	2		2				1	
Plyboard	Std. Deviation	2.121		7.071					
	Minimum	2		5				15	
	Maximum	5		15				15	
	Mean	1.00		1.29		1.21		1.16	1.00
	N	2		24		24		19	3
Construction Nails	Std. Deviation	0.000		0.464		0.415		0.375	0.000
	Minimum	1		1		1		1	1
	Maximum	1		2		2		2	1

Basic Necessities	s and Prime	During Za Sid	amboanga ege	After Zamboanga Siege		During Martial Law		After Martial Law	
Commod	ities	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased	Price increase d	Price decreased	Price increased	Price decreased
	Mean			1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	
	N			2	4	1	2	2	
Batteries	Std. Deviation			0.000	0.000		0.000	0.707	
	Minimum			1	1	1	1	1	
	Maximum			1	1	1	1	2	
	Mean	2.00		1.92		1.90	1.00	1.67	1.00
	N	1		13		10	1	9	1
Electrical Supplies	Std. Deviation			0.494		0.568		0.707	
	Minimum	2		1		1	1	1	1
	Maximum	2		3		3	1	3	1
	Mean	1.00	1.00	1.20	1.00	1.11	1.00	1.25	1.00
	N	1	1	10	1	9	1	4	3
Light Bulbs	Std. Deviation			0.422		0.333		0.500	0.000
	Minimum	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Maximum	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	1
	Mean								
	N								
Steel wire	Std. Deviation								
	Minimum								
	Maximum								
	Mean	1.50		2.00		2.00		1.50	
	N	2		2		1		2	
All Other Drugs	Std. Deviation	0.707		0.000				0.707	
	Minimum	1		2		2		1	
	Maximum	2		2		2		2	

A.Table 12. Household Consumption of Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities Changes During Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law Declaration- Paired Samples Test-Consumer/Individual

			Paire					
					95% Cor	nfidence		
	Items			Std.	Interva	l of the		
			Std.	Error	Diffe	rence		
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df
Pair 1	M5_Rice_DZS - M5_Rice_AZS	0.033	0.662	0.049	-0.064	0.129	0.670	182
Pair 2	M5_Rice_DML - M5_Rice_AML	-0.034	0.259	0.017	-0.067	-0.001	-2.013	235
Pair 3	M5_Corn_DZS - M5_Corn_AZS	-0.041	0.481	0.056	-0.152	0.071	-0.725	73
Pair 5	M5_RootCrops_DZS - M5_RootCrops_AZS	0.051	0.462	0.047	-0.042	0.144	1.092	97
Pair 6	M5_RootCrops_DML - M5_RootCrops_AML	-0.038	0.191	0.019	-0.075	-0.001	-2.029	105
Pair 7	M5_Bread_DZS - M5_Bread_AZS	0.000	0.451	0.035	-0.069	0.069	0.000	167
Pair 8	M5_Bread_DML - M5_Bread_AML	-0.063	0.312	0.022	-0.105	-0.020	-2.886	207
Pair 9	M5_FreshFish_DZS - M5_FreshFish_AZS	0.011	0.469	0.036	-0.059	0.082	0.324	173
Pair 10	M5_FreshFish_DML - M5_FreshFish_AML	0.068	0.363	0.024	0.021	0.114	2.872	235
Pair 11	M5_DriedFish_DZS - M5_DriedFish_AZS	-0.115	0.511	0.040	-0.194	-0.037	-2.895	164
Pair 12	M5_DriedFish_DML - M5_DriedFish_AML	-0.034	0.206	0.014	-0.062	-0.006	-2.359	206
Pair 13	M5_CannedFish_DZS - M5_CannedFish_AZS	0.020	0.376	0.031	-0.041	0.081	0.653	148
Pair 14	M5_CannedFish_DML - M5_CannedFish_AML	0.000	0.362	0.026	-0.051	0.051	0.000	198
Pair 15	M5_OtherMarine_DZS - M5_OtherMarine_AZS	-0.087	0.410	0.038	-0.163	-0.011	-2.276	114
Pair 16	M5_OtherMarine_DML - M5_OtherMarine_AML	0.016	0.379	0.034	-0.051	0.083	0.470	125
Pair 17	M5_FreshPork_DZS - M5_FreshPork_AZS	-0.093	0.294	0.045	-0.183	-0.003	-2.075	42
Pair 18	M5_FreshPork_DML - M5_FreshPork_AML	-0.036	0.270	0.036	-0.109	0.037	-1.000	54
Pair 19	M5_FreshBeef_DZS - M5_FreshBeef_AZS	-0.065	0.296	0.034	-0.132	0.002	-1.923	76
Pair 20	M5_FreshBeef_DML - M5_FreshBeef_AML	0.022	0.147	0.015	-0.009	0.052	1.422	91
Pair 21	M5_PoultryMeat_DZS - M5_PoultryMeat_AZS	-0.041	0.380	0.039	-0.118	0.035	-1.070	96
Pair 22	M5_PoultryMeat_DML - M5_PoultryMeat_AML	-0.016	0.253	0.023	-0.061	0.029	-0.706	124
Pair 23	M5_FreshEggs_DZS - M5_FreshEggs_AZS	-0.019	0.504	0.041	-0.100	0.061	-0.479	153
Pair 24	M5_FreshEggs_DML - M5_FreshEggs_AML	-0.005	0.362	0.025	-0.054	0.045	-0.192	206

		Paired Differences						
					95% Cor	nfidence		
	Items			Std.	Interva	l of the		
			Std.	Error	Diffe	rence		
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df
Pair 25	M5_PotWater_DZS - M5_PotWater_AZS	-0.019	0.334	0.032	-0.082	0.045	-0.576	107
Pair 26	M5_PotWater_DML - M5_PotWater_AML	-0.057	0.287	0.024	-0.105	-0.009	-2.346	140
Pair 27	M5_FreshMilk_DZS - M5_FreshMilk_AZS	-0.099	0.384	0.046	-0.189	-0.008	-2.165	70
Pair 28	M5_FreshMilk_DML - M5_FreshMilk_AML	-0.037	0.246	0.027	-0.091	0.017	-1.348	81
Pair 29	M5_ProcessedMilk_DZS - M5_ProcessedMilk_AZS	-0.038	0.376	0.043	-0.123	0.046	-0.903	77
Pair 31	M5_FreshVegetables_DZS - M5_FreshVegetables_AZS	0.024	0.495	0.039	-0.052	0.101	0.631	163
Pair 32	M5_FreshVegetables_DML - M5_FreshVegetables_AML	-0.023	0.247	0.017	-0.057	0.010	-1.390	212
Pair 33	M5_FreshFruits_DZS - M5_FreshFruits_AZS	-0.007	0.526	0.043	-0.092	0.078	-0.156	148
Pair 34	M5_FreshFruits_DML - M5_FreshFruits_AML	-0.021	0.178	0.013	-0.047	0.004	-1.640	186
Pair 35	M5_InstantNoodles_DZS - M5_InstantNoodles_AZS	0.077	0.491	0.039	0.000	0.155	1.965	154
Pair 36	M5_InstantNoodles_DML - M5_InstantNoodles_AML	0.028	0.374	0.026	-0.022	0.078	1.096	213
Pair 37	M5_Coffee_DZS - M5_Coffee_AZS	-0.023	0.555	0.042	-0.105	0.060	-0.543	175
Pair 38	M5_Coffee_DML - M5_Coffee_AML	-0.022	0.290	0.019	-0.060	0.016	-1.148	224
Pair 39	M5_Sugar_DZS - M5_Sugar_AZS	-0.045	0.519	0.039	-0.122	0.032	-1.156	177
Pair 40	M5_Sugar_DML - M5_Sugar_AML	-0.018	0.269	0.018	-0.054	0.018	-1.000	220
Pair 41	M5_CookingOil_DZS - M5_CookingOil_AZS	0.006	0.521	0.040	-0.072	0.084	0.145	173
Pair 42	M5_CookingOil_DML - M5_CookingOil_AML	-0.052	0.279	0.019	-0.090	-0.014	-2.707	211
Pair 43	M5_Salt_DZS - M5_Salt_AZS	-0.070	0.502	0.038	-0.145	0.006	-1.821	171
Pair 44	M5_Salt_DML - M5_Salt_AML	-0.005	0.122	0.009	-0.022	0.012	-0.576	201
Pair 45	M5_LaundSoapDet_DZS - M5_LaundSoapDet_AZS	0.043	0.525	0.041	-0.038	0.124	1.044	162
Pair 46	M5_LaundSoapDet_DML - M5_LaundSoapDet_AML	-0.005	0.193	0.014	-0.033	0.022	-0.377	188
Pair 47	M5_Firewood_DZS - M5_Firewood_AZS	0.011	0.374	0.039	-0.066	0.087	0.276	93
Pair 48	M5_Firewood_DML - M5_Firewood_AML	0.000	0.229	0.021	-0.042	0.042	0.000	114
Pair 49	M5_Charcoal_DZS - M5_Charcoal_AZS	0.055	0.537	0.047	-0.039	0.149	1.152	127
Pair 50	M5_Charcoal_DML - M5_Charcoal_AML	0.000	0.354	0.027	-0.052	0.052	0.000	176

			Paire	d Differend	ces			
					95% Cor	nfidence		
	Items			Std.	Interva	l of the		
			Std.	Error	Diffe	rence		
	1	Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df
Pair 51	M5_LPG_DZS - M5_LPG_AZS	-0.080	0.396	0.056	-0.193	0.033	-1.429	49
Pair 53	M5_Kerosene_DZS - M5_Kerosene_AZS	-0.059	0.420	0.059	-0.177	0.059	-1.000	50
Pair 54	M5_Kerosene_DML - M5_Kerosene_AML	-0.015	0.124	0.015	-0.046	0.015	-1.000	64
Pair 55	M5_Candles_DZS - M5_Candles_AZS	-0.104	0.515	0.050	-0.203	-0.005	-2.074	105
Pair 56	M5_Candles_DML - M5_Candles_AML	-0.013	0.163	0.013	-0.040	0.013	-1.000	149
Pair 57	M5_EssentDrugs_DZS - M5_EssentDrugs_AZS	-0.036	0.464	0.044	-0.123	0.051	-0.815	111
Pair 58	M5_EssentDrugs_DML - M5_EssentDrugs_AML	-0.033	0.242	0.020	-0.072	0.006	-1.677	151
Pair 59	M5_Flour_DZS - M5_Flour_AZS	-0.021	0.525	0.054	-0.128	0.086	-0.390	94
Pair 60	M5_Flour_DML - M5_Flour_AML	-0.056	0.291	0.026	-0.107	-0.004	-2.140	125
Pair 61	M5_DPCPork_DZS - M5_DPCPork_AZS	-0.038	0.277	0.038	-0.116	0.039	-1.000	51
Pair 62	M5_DPCPork_DML - M5_DPCPork_AML	0.017	0.131	0.017	-0.017	0.052	1.000	57
Pair 63	M5_DPCBeef_DZS - M5_DPCBeef_AZS	-0.042	0.311	0.037	-0.115	0.031	-1.136	71
Pair 64	M5_DPCBeef_DML - M5_DPCBeef_AML	0.010	0.098	0.010	-0.009	0.029	1.000	103
Pair 65	M5_DPCPoultMeat_DZS - M5_DPCPoultMeat_AZS	-0.027	0.232	0.027	-0.081	0.027	-1.000	73
Pair 67	M5_OtherDairyProd_DZS - M5_OtherDairyProd_AZS	-0.039	0.195	0.022	-0.083	0.005	-1.755	76
Pair 69	M5_Onions_DZS - M5_Onions_AZS	0.000	0.531	0.043	-0.086	0.086	0.000	149
Pair 70	M5_Onions_DML - M5_Onions_AML	-0.031	0.177	0.031	-0.095	0.032	-1.000	31
Pair 71	M5_Garlic_DZS - M5_Garlic_AZS	-0.313	1.061	0.188	-0.695	0.070	-1.667	31
Pair 72	M5_Garlic_DML - M5_Garlic_AML	0.000	0.253	0.018	-0.036	0.036	0.000	188
Pair 73	M5_Vinegar_DZS - M5_Vinegar_AZS	-0.059	0.496	0.038	-0.135	0.016	-1.549	168
Pair 74	M5_Vinegar_DML - M5_Vinegar_AML	-0.010	0.265	0.019	-0.047	0.027	-0.534	199
Pair 75	M5_Patis_DZS - M5_Patis_AZS	-0.048	0.401	0.039	-0.125	0.030	-1.215	104
Pair 76	M5_Patis_DML - M5_Patis_AML	0.000	0.128	0.012	-0.023	0.023	0.000	122
Pair 77	M5_SoySauce_DZS - M5_SoySauce_AZS	0.000	0.464	0.037	-0.073	0.073	0.000	158
Pair 78	M5_SoySauce_DML - M5_SoySauce_AML	-0.016	0.279	0.020	-0.055	0.024	-0.774	192

			Paire	d Differend	ces			
					95% Cor	nfidence		
	Items			Std.	Interva	l of the		
			Std.	Error	Diffe	rence		
	[	Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df
Pair 79	M5_ToiletSoap_DZS - M5_ToiletSoap_AZS	-0.010	0.505	0.051	-0.111	0.091	-0.199	98
Pair 80	M5_ToiletSoap_DML - M5_ToiletSoap_AML	-0.027	0.212	0.020	-0.067	0.013	-1.347	109
Pair 81	M5_Fertilizer_DZS - M5_Fertilizer_AZS	-0.053	0.226	0.037	-0.127	0.022	-1.434	37
Pair 83	M5_PestHerb_DZS - M5_PestHerb_AZS	-0.032	0.315	0.056	-0.148	0.083	-0.571	30
Pair 84	M5_PestHerb_DML - M5_PestHerb_AML	-0.022	0.149	0.022	-0.067	0.023	-1.000	44
Pair 85	M5_PLFFeeds_DZS - M5_PLFFeeds_AZS	-0.094	0.296	0.052	-0.201	0.013	-1.791	31
Pair 86	M5_PLFFeeds_DML - M5_PLFFeeds_AML	0.027	0.164	0.027	-0.028	0.082	1.000	36
Pair 87	M5_VetProd_DZS - M5_VetProd_AZS	-0.065	0.250	0.045	-0.156	0.027	-1.438	30
Pair 89	M5_Paper_DZS - M5_Paper_AZS	-0.087	0.455	0.051	-0.189	0.014	-1.718	79
Pair 90	M5_Paper_DML - M5_Paper_AML	-0.040	0.257	0.021	-0.082	0.001	-1.914	148
Pair 91	M5_SchoolSupp_DZS - M5_SchoolSupp_AZS	0.018	0.569	0.054	-0.089	0.124	0.332	111
Pair 92	M5_SchoolSupp_DML - M5_SchoolSupp_AML	-0.018	0.321	0.025	-0.068	0.031	-0.727	164
Pair 93	M5_NipaShing_DZS - M5_NipaShing_AZS	-0.082	0.400	0.057	-0.196	0.033	-1.429	48
Pair 95	M5_Sawali_DZS - M5_Sawali_AZS	0.021	0.565	0.081	-0.143	0.185	0.256	47
Pair 96	M5_Sawali_DML - M5_Sawali_AML	0.000	0.204	0.029	-0.059	0.059	0.000	48
Pair 97	M5_Cement_DZS - M5_Cement_AZS	-0.070	0.258	0.039	-0.149	0.010	-1.775	42
Pair 99	M5_Clinker_DZS - M5_Clinker_AZS	-0.143	0.472	0.073	-0.290	0.004	-1.961	41
Pair 100	M5_Clinker_DML - M5_Clinker_AML	0.021	0.146	0.021	-0.022	0.064	1.000	46
Pair 101	M5_GISheets_DZS - M5_GISheets_AZS	-0.116	0.391	0.060	-0.237	0.004	-1.950	42
Pair 103	M5_HollBlocks_DZS - M5_HollBlocks_AZS	-0.050	0.221	0.035	-0.121	0.021	-1.433	39
Pair 104	M5_HollBlocks_DML - M5_HollBlocks_AML	-0.021	0.146	0.021	-0.064	0.022	-1.000	46
Pair 105	M5_Plywood_DZS - M5_Plywood_AZS	-0.022	0.745	0.110	-0.243	0.200	-0.198	45
Pair 106	M5_Plywood_DML - M5_Plywood_AML	-0.097	0.298	0.038	-0.172	-0.021	-2.557	61
Pair 107	M5_Plyboard_DZS - M5_Plyboard_AZS	-0.075	0.267	0.042	-0.160	0.010	-1.778	39
Pair 108	M5_Plyboard_DML - M5_Plyboard_AML	-0.021	0.146	0.021	-0.064	0.022	-1.000	46

			Paire	d Differend	ces			
	ltoms				95% Cor	nfidence		
	items		Std	Std. Error	Diffe	rence		
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df
Pair 109	M5_ConstNails_DZS - M5_ConstNails_AZS	-0.096	0.603	0.084	-0.264	0.072	-1.151	51
Pair 110	M5_ConstNails_DML - M5_ConstNails_AML	-0.094	0.294	0.037	-0.167	-0.020	-2.553	63
Pair 111	M5_Batteries_DZS - M5_Batteries_AZS	-0.145	0.591	0.080	-0.305	0.014	-1.826	54
Pair 112	M5_Batteries_DML - M5_Batteries_AML	-0.055	0.229	0.027	-0.108	-0.001	-2.043	72
Pair 113	M5_ElectricalSupplies_DZS -	-0.020	0.589	0.083	-0.187	0.147	-0.240	49
	M5_ElectricalSupplies_AZS							
Pair 114	M5_ElectricalSupplies_DML -	-0.090	0.358	0.038	-0.165	-0.014	-2.368	88
	M5_ElectricalSupplies_AML							
Pair 115	M5_LightBulbs_DZS - M5_LightBulbs_AZS	-0.053	0.586	0.067	-0.187	0.081	-0.782	75
Pair 116	M5_LightBulbs_DML - M5_LightBulbs_AML	-0.049	0.217	0.021	-0.092	-0.006	-2.282	101
Pair 117	M5_SteelWire_DZS - M5_SteelWire_AZS	0.000	0.369	0.055	-0.111	0.111	0.000	44
Pair 119	M5_AllOthrDrugs_DZS - M5_AllOthrDrugs_AZS	-0.052	0.394	0.045	-0.141	0.037	-1.157	76
Pair 120	M5_AllOthrDrugs_DML - M5_AllOthrDrugs_AML	0.019	0.192	0.019	-0.018	0.055	1.000	107

A.Table 13. Sentiments and Issues in Price Control- Consumer/Individual

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Are you familiar with the term "price freeze" during times of disaster or emergencies?		
Yes	201	53.3
No	176	46.7
Total	377	100.0
Do you agree with the government imposed price freeze?		
Yes	248	65.6
No	130	34.4
Total	378	100.0
Do firms or businesses in your area/region follow the imposed price freeze?		
Yes	206	56.0
No	162	44.0
Total	368	100.0
Satisfaction with the support from the government		
Very dissatisfied	14	3.7
Dissatisfied	99	26.5
Satisfied	235	62.8
Very Satisfied	26	7.0
Total	374	100.0

# A.Table 14. General Sentiments on Disaster Preparedness and Sentiments- Consumer/Individual

Sentiments and Issues	Y	ES	NO		
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	
Is your <b>family</b> prepared to cope with disasters and/or emergencies?	338	89	42	11	
Is the <b>community/ barangay</b> prepared to cope with disasters and/or emergencies?	255	69	117	32	
Is the <b>government</b> prepared to cope with disasters and/or emergencies?	286	77	86	23	
Can we do more to prepare and respond to disasters and emergencies?	303	86	50	14	

#### A.Table 15. Enterprise/Business Profile

Information	Frequency	Valid Percent		
Years in Business				
1 - 5 years	11	38		
6 - 10 years	12	41		
11 - 20 years	5	17		
More than 20 years	1	3		
Total	29	100		
Description of Business				
Single proprietorship	30	97		
Non-stock, non-profit corporation	1	3		
Total	31	100		
Classification of Business				
Micro (capitalization < 3M)	30	100		

>Total number of respondents: 35

>Missing cases are already excluded, as reflected on some items

## A.Table 16. Disaster Impacts of the 2013 Zamboanga Siege- Business/Enterprise

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Were you prepared to address business risks before the event?		
Yes	6	21.4
No	22	78.6
Total	28	100.0
Business Continuity Plan		
Yes	3	11.1
No	24	88.9
Total	27	100.0
Loss and Damage of Assets/Properties		
Yes	28	100.0
No	0	0.0
Total	28	100
Higher Operational Expenses		
Yes	20	76.9
No	6	23.1
Total	26	
If recovered from the losses and increase in expenses		
Not at all	4	14.3
Partially	21	75.0
Completely	3	10.7
Total	28	100
Partially and not at all recovered: estimated duration before complete recovery		
Less than a year		
One year		
More than a year	25	100.0
Total		
Completely recovered: duration before complete recovery		
Less than a year	1	14.3
One year		
More than a year	6	85.7
Total	7	100

		Paired Differences							
					95% Confidence				
	Items			Std.	Interval of the				Sig.
			Std.	Error	Difference				(2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 1	M11_Rice_DZS - M11_Rice_AZS	-0.364	0.809	0.244	-0.907	0.180	-1.491	10	0.167
Pair 5	M11_RootCrops_DZS - M11_RootCrops_AZS	-0.286	0.756	0.286	-0.985	0.413	-1.000	6	0.356
Pair 7	M11_Bread_DZS - M11_Bread_AZS	-0.571	0.976	0.369	-1.474	0.331	-1.549	6	0.172
Pair 9	M11_FreshFish_DZS - M11_FreshFish_AZS	-0.333	0.707	0.236	-0.877	0.210	-1.414	8	0.195
Pair 10	M11_FreshFish_DML - M11_FreshFish_AML	0.286	0.756	0.286	-0.413	0.985	1.000	6	0.356
Pair 11	M11_DriedFish_DZS - M11_DriedFish_AZS	-0.250	1.282	0.453	-1.322	0.822	-0.552	7	0.598
Pair 13	M11_CannedFish_DZS - M11_CannedFish_AZS	-0.250	0.707	0.250	-0.841	0.341	-1.000	7	0.351
Pair 16	M11_OtherMarineProd_DML -	-0.500	0.707	0.500	-6.853	5.853	-1.000	1	0.500
	M11_OtherMarineProd_AML								
Pair 19	M11_FreshBeef_DZS - M11_FreshBeef_AZS	-1.000	1.414	1.000	-13.706	11.706	-1.000	1	0.500
Pair 21	M11_PoultMeat_DZS - M11_PoultMeat_AZS	-1.333	1.155	0.667	-4.202	1.535	-2.000	2	0.184
Pair 22	M11_PoultMeat_DML - M11_PoultMeat_AML	1.000	1.414	1.000	-11.706	13.706	1.000	1	0.500
Pair 23	M11_FreshEggs_DZS - M11_FreshEggs_AZS	0.000	1.000	0.333	-0.769	0.769	0.000	8	1.000
Pair 24	M11_FreshEggs_DML - M11_FreshEggs_AML	-0.273	0.647	0.195	-0.707	0.162	-1.399	10	0.192
Pair 25	M11_PotWater_DZS - M11_PotWater_AZS	-0.400	0.894	0.400	-1.511	0.711	-1.000	4	0.374
Pair 31	M11_FreshVegetables_DZS -	0.000	1.265	0.516	-1.327	1.327	0.000	5	1.000
	M11_FreshVegetables_AZS								
Pair 33	M11_FreshFruits_DZS - M11_FreshFruits_AZS	0.000	1.000	0.333	-0.769	0.769	0.000	8	1.000
Pair 35	M11_InstantNoodles_DZS - M11_InstantNoodles_AZS	0.667	1.633	0.667	-1.047	2.380	1.000	5	0.363
Pair 37	M11_Coffee_DZS - M11_Coffee_AZS	-0.200	1.135	0.359	-1.012	0.612	-0.557	9	0.591
Pair 39	M11_Sugar_DZS - M11_Sugar_AZS	-0.077	0.862	0.239	-0.598	0.444	-0.322	12	0.753
Pair 40	M11_Sugar_DML - M11_Sugar_AML	-0.167	0.577	0.167	-0.533	0.200	-1.000	11	0.339
Pair 41	M11_CookingOil_DZS - M11_CookingOil_AZS	-0.167	0.577	0.167	-0.533	0.200	-1.000	11	0.339
Pair 42	M11_CookingOil_DML - M11_CookingOil_AML	0.167	0.577	0.167	-0.200	0.533	1.000	11	0.339

A.Table 17. Price Movements of Basic Necessities and Prime Commodities During Zamboanga Siege and Martial Law Declaration - Paired Samples Test - Business/Enterprise
			Paired Differences						
					95% Cor	ifidence			
Items				Std.	Interval of the				Sig.
			Std.	Error	Differ	ence			(2-
		Mean	Deviation	Mean	Lower	Upper	t	df	tailed)
Pair 45	M11_LaundSoapDet_DZS - M11_LaundSoapDet_AZS	-0.222	0.667	0.222	-0.735	0.290	-1.000	8	0.347
Pair 49	M11_Charcoal_DZS - M11_Charcoal_AZS	-0.286	1.380	0.522	-1.562	0.991	-0.548	6	0.604
Pair 50	M11_Charcoal_DML - M11_Charcoal_AML	0.111	0.333	0.111	-0.145	0.367	1.000	8	0.347
Pair 59	M11_Flour_DZS - M11_Flour_AZS	-0.300	0.675	0.213	-0.783	0.183	-1.406	9	0.193
Pair 69	M11_Onions_DZS - M11_Onions_AZS	-0.200	0.632	0.200	-0.652	0.252	-1.000	9	0.343
Pair 70	M11_Onions_DML - M11_Onions_AML	-0.200	0.632	0.200	-0.652	0.252	-1.000	9	0.343
Pair 71	M11_Garlic_DZS - M11_Garlic_AZS	-0.333	0.778	0.225	-0.828	0.161	-1.483	11	0.166
Pair 72	M11_Garlic_DML - M11_Garlic_AML	0.000	0.894	0.270	-0.601	0.601	0.000	10	1.000
Pair 73	M11_Vinegar_DZS - M11_Vinegar_AZS	-0.444	0.882	0.294	-1.122	0.233	-1.512	8	0.169
Pair 77	M11_SoySauce_DZS - M11_SoySauce_AZS	-0.222	0.667	0.222	-0.735	0.290	-1.000	8	0.347
Pair 79	M11_ToiletSoap_DZS - M11_ToiletSoap_AZS	-0.333	0.816	0.333	-1.190	0.524	-1.000	5	0.363
Pair 91	M11_SchoolSupp_DZS - M11_SchoolSupp_AZS	-0.500	1.000	0.500	-2.091	1.091	-1.000	3	0.391
Pair 110	M11_ConstNails_DML - M11_ConstNails_AML	-0.500	0.707	0.500	-6.853	5.853	-1.000	1	0.500
Pair 111	M11_Batteries_DZS - M11_Batteries_AZS	1.000	1.414	1.000	-11.706	13.706	1.000	1	0.500
Pair 112	M11_Batteries_DML - M11_Batteries_AML	-0.667	1.155	0.667	-3.535	2.202	-1.000	2	0.423
Pair 115	M11_LightBulbs_DZS - M11_LightBulbs_AZS	1.000	1.414	1.000	-11.706	13.706	1.000	1	0.500

## A.Table 18. Business Coping Strategies: Operations

Stratogios	During Zamboanga Siege		After Zamboanga Siege		During Martial Law		After Martial Law	
Strategies	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Temporarily stopped operation	13	56.5	6	33.3				
Permanently stopped operation	6	26.1	5	27.8	4	25	3	21.4
Decreased production/merchandise	2	8.7	4	22.2	5	31.3	4	28.6
Sourced cheaper raw materials	2	8.7	2	11.1	6	37.5	6	42.9
Sourced supplies on credit			1	5.6	1	6.3	1	7.1
Total	23	100.0	18	100.0	16	100.0	14	100.0

## A.Table 19. Business Coping Strategies: Finances

Strategies	During Zamboanga Siege		After Zamboanga Siege		During Martial Law		After Martial Law	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Spent savings	16	76.2	13	72.2	9	69.2	9	81.8
Pawned assets	1	4.8	1	5.6	1	7.7	1	9.1
Sold assets	1	4.8						
Borrowed money from bank	1	4.8	1	5.6	2	15.4	1	9.1
Borrowed money from informal								
lenders	1	4.8	2	11.1				
Others	1	4.8	1	5.6	1	7.7		
Total	21	100.0	18	100.0	13	100.0	11	100.0

## A.Table 20. Hazard Risk Level among Businesses (% of respondents)

Disaster Risk	Very Critical	Critical	Slightly Critical	Not at all Critical	Not Applicable
Typhoon	7.4	29.6	33.3	25.9	3.7
Flooding	11.1	14.8	40.7	22.2	11.1
Fire	48.1	29.6	18.5	3.7	
Earthquake	33.3	18.5	29.6	11.1	7.4
Terrorism/ Civil Disturbance	84.6	3.8	7.7		3.8
Storm Surge	11.5	11.5	19.2	19.2	38.5
Loss of Electricity	7.4	18.5	37.0	37.0	
Loss of Water Supply		14.8	44.4	37.0	3.7
Wind Damage	3.8	15.4	30.8	30.8	19.2
Landslide		22.2	14.8	29.6	33.3

A.Table 21. Sentiments and Issues in Price Control – Business/Enterprise

Items	Frequency	Valid Percent
Are you familiar with the term "price freeze" during times of disaster or emergencies?		
Yes	11	42.3
No	15	57.7
Total	26	100.0
Do you agree with the government imposed price freeze?		
Yes	12	50.0
No	12	50.0
Total	24	100.0
Does your firm or business follow the imposed price freeze?		
Yes	15	68.2
No	7	31.8
Total	22	100.0
Satisfaction with the support from the government		
Very dissatisfied	2	8.3
Dissatisfied	8	33.3
Satisfied	13	54.2
Very Satisfied	1	4.2
Total	24	100.0

## A.Table 22. General Sentiments on Disaster Preparedness and Sentiments – Business/Enterprise

Sentiments and Issues	Y	ES	NO		
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage	
Is your <b>business</b> prepared to cope with disasters and/or emergencies?	16	70	7	30	
Is the <b>community/ barangay</b> prepared to cope with disasters and/or emergencies?	15	68	7	32	
Is the <b>government</b> prepared to cope with disasters and/or emergencies?	14	64	8	36	
Can we do more to prepare and respond to disasters and emergencies?	21	96	1	5	