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## Shifting Welfare Policy Positions: The Impact of Radical Right Populist Party Success Beyond Migration Politics

Representation

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## List of Radical Right Populist Parties

Table A1 holds information by country on the largest Radical Right Populist Party (RRPP). In case there is more than one party mentioned for a specific country, the RRPP with the largest vote share has changed during the period under research.

Table A1: Electorally strongest RRPPs in Western Europe

Country	Party
AT	FPÖ: Freedom Movement
BE	VB: Flemish Interest
CH	SVP: Swiss People's Party
DE	NPD: National Democratic Party REP: The Republicans AfD: Alternative for Germany
DK	DF: Danish People's Party FP: Progress Party
ES	FE de las JONS: Falange FA: Authentic Falange FE: Falange DN: National Democracy
FI	PS: True Finns
FR	FN: National Front
GB	UKIP: UK Independence Party BNP: British National Party
GR	LAOS: Popular Orthodox Rally ANEL: Independent Greeks EPEN: National Party-National Political Union PG: Front Line XA: Golden Dawn
IE	–
IS	–
IT	LN: Northern League-Federal Italy AN: National Alliance
LU	NB: National Movement
NL	CD: Centre Democrats LPF: List Pim Fortuyn PVV: Party for Freedom
NO	FrP: Progress Party
PT	PNR: National Renovator Party
SE	NyD: New Democracy SD: Sweden Democrats

## Overlapping Voter Polls (Figure 1) and Attitudes towards Redistribution

Figure 1 in the main text shows the shares of overlapping voter pools for radical right, economic centre left, and economic centre right parties. The scores represent the share of voters that are beyond/open for competition between these three party groupings. For that purpose, we relied on propensity to vote scores included in the 2014 European Election Study (Schmitt et al. 2016). These scores are derived from the question “How likely is it that you will ever vote for this party?” that was asked for each party in a country. The responses vary from 1 (“I will certainly never vote for this party”) to 10 (“I will certainly vote for this party at some time in the future”). Following Kroh, van der Brug, and van der Eijk (2007), those respondents are subject to competition who have a tied first preference, or whose second preference is only one point less than their first.

To support our argument that supporters of RRPPs hold positive stances toward welfare-state extensions, we provided the results of some additional calculations when developing our first hypothesis. The shares of RRPP supporters that support redistribution have been calculated based on respondents’ support for the statement “You are fully in favour of/opposed to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in (OUR COUNTRY)” on a 11-point scale, where 0 indicates full support and 10 indicates complete opposition to the statement. We considered all respondents with a score of 4 or lower on this scale as supporters of redistributive measures.

For both, we first calculate country averages and then rely on the overall mean of these values. As we need information on RRPP supporters, these calculations can only be done for countries with a relevant RRPP party.

## Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses

Table A2 presents regression models applied to party demeaned values to allow the estimation of both constituent terms of the interaction (see footnote 14). Moreover, the results of the empirical analysis presented in Table 2 in the main text are robust regarding various alternative model specifications. First, we replaced the election-clustered standard errors with standard errors clustered by election date and party. Second, although serial correlation does not appear to be present in the statistical models, we included a lagged dependent variable into the models. As an alternative way to deal with potential serial correlation, we also made use of Prais-Winsten regressions. None of the three alternative specifications changes the results of our empirical analysis in substantial ways. See table A3 (Models 1 to 6) below for the corresponding results.

One might argue that parties' welfare shifts do not rely on RRPPs' vote shares but on RRPPs' shifts on the welfare issue over time. Due to lacking data on welfare positions for a majority of RRPPs we cannot test this claim directly. Since most RRPPs have seen a major shift in their welfare positioning at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s (Arzheimer 2013; de Lange 2007), we excluded the first five years of our observation period to investigate whether our results depend on these years. Models 7 and 8 in table A3 report the corresponding results –they are not affected by these modifications and are similar to those reported in the main text.

Table A4 and fig. A1 present our results based on a more narrow definition of the dependent variable. Here, we restrict the content of the dependent variable to the MARPOR categories per504 and per505 to measure welfare-state positions. This has no effect on our findings. Furthermore, we tested a more fine-grained party family variable instead of our binary indicator for economically left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties (table A5). The MARPOR group provides a variable distinguishing the parties included in this analysis into six party families (regional and special issue parties remained unconsidered). Adding an interaction term between this categorical variable and RRPP vote shares to the model gives results that are substantially similar to those presented in the main text. Hence, the marginal effect plot shows statistically significant effects for radical left and social democratic parties (the most prominent left-of-centre party families) but not for the remaining party families (fig. A2).

Moreover, we conducted a jackknife test to check whether a single country drives the results presented in Model 3 in the main text. We thus repeated the regression analysis while excluding one country in each repetition. Figure A3 shows the resulting regression coefficients for the base term as well as the corresponding interaction effect between RRPP vote share and right-of-centre party status. The figure illustrates that the base term remains negative and statistically significant in all cases indicating that left-of-centre parties' pro-welfare shifts in response to increasing RRPP vote shares are not driven by a single country in our analysis. The jackknife analysis confirms the results of our main model. Furthermore, France and the United Kingdom are of particular interest as these are the only countries employing purely majoritarian electoral systems. Our results are not affected if these cases are jointly dropped from the analysis (table A6).

We conducted similar checks while iterating over party families as provided by the coding of the MARPOR group in order to inspect whether our results are mainly attributable to the impact of specific party ideologies. In general, fig. A4 shows that the presented results are robust to the exclusion of single party families from the analysis. Again, the base and the interaction term show the expected sign and are substantially large in all models

Table A2: The impact of RRPPs' vote shares on the positions of non-RRPPs on welfare - party demeaned values

DV: Welfare Position			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
RRPP vote share	-.047*** (.018)	-.043** (.017)	-.062*** (.018)
Cultural protectionism	.120*** (.044)	.118*** (.041)	.112*** (.041)
Party size	-.034** (.014)	-.032** (.013)	-.030** (.013)
Government	.380*** (.115)	.356*** (.127)	.345*** (.127)
Unemployment rate		.074*** (.028)	.073*** (.028)
Immigration rate		-.010 (.167)	-.007 (.169)
GDP per capita		-.068 (.248)	-.073 (.250)
GINI		-.038 (.065)	-.036 (.065)
Centre of gravity		1.017*** (.211)	1.014*** (.212)
Right-of-centre party			0.000 (.090)
RRPP vote * Right-of-centre			.050** (.022)
Constant	-0.000 (.072)	0.000 (.063)	-0.000 (.066)
SE clustering	✓	✓	✓
Observations	670	670	670
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.033	.141	.143

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A3: Robustness – Model specifications

	DV: Welfare Position							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
RRPP vote share	-.043* (.022)	-.062*** (.023)	-.043** (.020)	-.063*** (.021)	-.043** (.014)	-.063*** (.015)	-.039* (.020)	-.061*** (.021)
Cultural protectionism	.118** (.053)	.112** (.052)	.108** (.046)	.102** (.045)	.114** (.038)	.107** (.038)	.103** (.049)	.100** (.049)
Party size	-.032 (.021)	-.030 (.022)	-.028* (.015)	-.027* (.015)	-.032* (.014)	-.031* (.014)	-.015 (.018)	-.012 (.018)
Government	.356* (.197)	.345* (.197)	.330** (.147)	.321** (.147)	.364** (.136)	.356** (.135)	.261 (.166)	.227 (.165)
Unemployment rate	.074** (.036)	.073** (.037)	.071** (.031)	.070** (.031)	.074** (.021)	.073** (.021)	.093** (.037)	.093** (.037)
Immigration rate	-.010 (.189)	-.007 (.190)	-.005 (.190)	-.004 (.192)	-.004 (.116)	-.0029 (.115)	.086 (.232)	.086 (.233)
GDP per capita	-.068 (.308)	-.073 (.310)	-.016 (.287)	-.023 (.288)	-.078 (.172)	-.054 (.173)	.099 (.380)	.099 (.381)
GINI	-.038 (.079)	-.036 (.079)	-.028 (.073)	-.027 (.073)	-.039 (.046)	-.040 (.046)	-.064 (.083)	-.058 (.083)
Centre of gravity	1.017*** (.268)	1.014*** (.270)	1.022*** (.241)	1.017*** (.242)	1.018*** (.149)	1.015*** (.149)	1.030*** (.288)	1.034*** (.288)
LDV			.016 (.060)	.014 (.060)				
RRPP vote * Right-of-centre		.050** (.020)		.050** (.025)		.052** (.024)		.056** (.027)
Constant	-1.631 (2.879)	-1.594 (2.895)	-2.514 (2.788)	-2.441 (2.788)	-1.882 (1.662)	-2.041 (1.660)	-3.328 (3.460)	-3.424 (3.475)
Party fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
2-way SE clustering	✓	✓						
Election SE clustering			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Prais-Winsten regression								
Observations	670	670	636	636	670	670	571	571
(Adjusted) R <sup>2</sup>	.509	.511	.520	.522	.647	.654	.517	.519

Note:

Observation period in models 7 and 8: 1990-2017. R-squared report in models 5 and 6, all other models report the adjusted R-squared values.

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A4: Robustness - DV: per504 and per505

	DV: Welfare Position (per504 and per505)	
	(1)	(2)
RRPP vote share	-.051*** (.020)	-.065*** (.021)
Cultural protectionism	.122** (.048)	.118** (.048)
Party size	-.033** (.016)	-.032** (.016)
Government	.338** (.148)	.331** (.147)
Unemployment rate	.089*** (.033)	.088*** (.034)
Immigration rate	.039 (.194)	.041 (.195)
GDP per capita	-.087 (.293)	-.090 (.294)
GINI	-.034 (.078)	-.033 (.078)
Centre of gravity	1.220*** (.263)	1.217*** (.264)
RRPP vote * Right-of-centre		.036 (.027)
Constant	-1.409 (2.985)	-1.383 (2.987)
Party fixed effects	✓	✓
SE clustering	✓	✓
Observations	670	670
R <sup>2</sup>	.640	.641
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.525	.526

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01






Figure A1: Marginal Effects Plot (table A4)

*Note:* The error bars indicate 90% confidence bands.

Table A5: Robustness – Party Family Interaction (Reference Category: Liberals)

	DV: Welfare Position
RRPP vote share	.008 (.030)
Cultural protectionism	.110** (.048)
Party size	-.035** (.015)
Government	.367** (.148)
Unemployment rate	.078** (.032)
Immigration rate	.003 (.192)
GDP per capita	-.074 (.286)
GINI	-.043 (.075)
Centre of gravity	.989*** (.243)
RRPP vote * Greens	-.037 (.036)
RRPP vote * Radical Left	-.104** (.049)
RRPP vote * Soc. Dem.	-.094*** (.030)
RRPP vote * Cons./Christ. Dem.	-.038 (.030)
RRPP vote * Agrarian	-.054 (.071)
Constant	-1.525 (2.826)
Party fixed effects	✓
SE clustering	✓
Observations	670
R <sup>2</sup>	.633
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.510

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A2: Marginal effects plot (table A5)

*Note:* The error bars indicate 90% confidence bands.




Figure A3: Jackknife analysis – Countries

*Note:* The error bars indicate 90% confidence bands.




Figure A4: Jackknife analysis – Party Families

*Note:* The error bars indicate 90% confidence bands.

Table A6: Robustness – France and United Kingdom excluded

	DV: Welfare Position	
	(1)	(2)
RRPP vote share	-.050** (.020)	-.070*** (.021)
Cultural protectionism	.118** (.050)	.111** (.049)
Party size	-.040*** (.015)	-.037** (.015)
Government	.406** (.160)	.396** (.159)
Unemployment rate	.079** (.032)	.076** (.033)
Immigration rate	.047 (.195)	.048 (.196)
GDP per capita	-.084 (.297)	-.093 (.298)
GINI	-.048 (.081)	-.042 (.082)
Centre of gravity	.965*** (.249)	.969*** (.249)
RRPP vote * Right-of-centre		.051** (.026)
Constant	-1.324 (2.885)	-1.310 (2.897)
Party fixed effects	✓	✓
SE clustering	✓	✓
Observations	610	610
R <sup>2</sup>	.634	.637
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.523	.525

*Note:*

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A7: Alternative Conditional Effects

	DV: Welfare Position								
	All non-RRPPs			Left-of-centre			Right-of-centre		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
RRPP vote share	-.025 (.026)	-.037* (.022)	-.034 (.024)	-.042 (.026)	-.047** (.024)	-.057** (.027)	.001 (.043)	-.024 (.037)	-.009 (.032)
Cultural protectionism	.116** (.047)	.118** (.047)	.115** (.046)	.164*** (.058)	.165*** (.057)	.171*** (.057)	.033 (.071)	.028 (.071)	.031 (.070)
Party size	-.029* (.015)	-.034** (.016)	-.028** (.015)	-.011 (.019)	-.019 (.020)	-.013 (.020)	-.031 (.023)	-.032 (.023)	-.027 (.023)
Government	.354** (.146)	.438** (.189)	.354** (.150)	.209 (.195)	.415* (.226)	.181 (.198)	.312 (.269)	.225 (.358)	.295 (.271)
Unemployment rate	.075** (.032)	.074** (.031)	.078** (.032)	.019 (.031)	.020 (.031)	.018 (.031)	.137*** (.045)	.142*** (.045)	.151*** (.046)
Immigration rate	-.014 (.191)	-.012 (.191)	.009 (.194)	-.026 (.185)	-.007 (.188)	-.033 (.186)	-.033 (.279)	.0001 (.280)	.095 (.307)
GDP per capita	-.065 (.284)	-.063 (.282)	-.089 (.285)	-.097 (.290)	-.099 (.291)	-.103 (.290)	.051 (.372)	.036 (.374)	-.002 (.383)
GINI	-.039 (.074)	-.040 (.074)	-.036 (.075)	-.116 (.071)	-.116 (.072)	-.115 (.072)	.035 (.109)	.030 (.108)	.033 (.108)
Centre of gravity	1.020*** (.242)	1.020*** (.242)	1.001*** (.245)	1.019*** (.249)	1.021*** (.247)	1.030*** (.253)	1.041*** (.387)	1.024*** (.382)	1.016*** (.382)
RRP vote * Party size	-.001 (.001)			-.001 (.001)			-.001 (.002)		
RRPP vote * Government		-.015 (.018)			-.032 (.025)			.015 (.041)	
Challenger			.264 (.357)			-.178 (.381)			.798 (.806)
RRPP vote * Challenger			-.028 (.030)			-.006 (.033)			-.042 (.055)
Constant	-1.664 (2.812)	-1.649 (2.789)	-1.771 (2.883)	.853 (2.620)	.874 (2.617)	1.124 (2.698)	-5.451 (3.732)	-5.223 (3.733)	-5.206 (3.809)
Party fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
SE clustering	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	670	670	670	387	387	387	283	283	283
R <sup>2</sup>	.628	.628	.628	.636	.637	.636	.513	.513	.516
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.509	.508	.508	.505	.507	.503	.352	.352	.353

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01




Figure A5: Marginal Effects Plot (table A7; Model 4)

*Note:* The dashed lines indicate 90% confidence bands.

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