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The Soft Power of American Missionary Universities in China and of their Legacies: Yenching University, St. John’s University and Yale in China

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The Soft Power of American Missionary Universities in China and of their Legacies: Yenching University, St. John’s University and Yale in China

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Abstract

This paper analyses the historical ‘direct’ soft power of American missionary universities in China and their ‘reverse’ soft power towards American society until their nationalization in the early 1950s. The paper also addresses the soft power of the legacies of these historical universities. This analysis is based on the cases of St. John’s University, Yale-in-China and Yenching University.

American missionary universities were founded with the clear ‘direct’ soft power purpose of attracting the Chinese ‘other’ to Christianity. However, soft power resources often have unintended behavioral consequences and a particularly interesting one is ‘reverse’ soft power: Where the intended object society of soft power influences the originator society of soft power, for example, through education and advocacy. American missionary universities exercised substantial soft power both toward the Chinese host society and toward the American society. The institutions in China also left institutional legacies at American—and Canadian—universities which continue to hold soft power in the relationship between American and Chinese society.
The extent and limitation of this bidirectional soft power can be discerned from what attracted different actors to these universities and what those and other actors rejected about these universities; this is based on a detailed analysis of the relations between the universities and different public and private actors in the host society and the society of origin. These relations were characterized by the role of the universities as bridges between host society and society of origin carrying much information between societies, raising awareness and interest about the other society, moving elite-level human resources back and forth and raising large financial resources in the USA for education and research in China.

**Keywords:** Mission, education, university, soft power, inter societal relations.

**Introduction: Soft Power of Private Universities Abroad**

This paper studies the soft power held by American missionary universities in China in the interface between their American society of origin and their Chinese host society through the examples of St. John’s University, Yale-in-China and Yenching University. The paper examines the soft power of the institutional legacies of these universities after their nationalization in 1951 and 1952, namely St. John’s College at the University of British Columbia, Yale-China Association and Harvard Yenching Institute and Library.

The paper seeks to shed light on the historical as well as the current soft power of transnational non-state actors both toward their host society (China) and society of origin (USA), which are not sufficiently analysed in the literature. The paper addresses questions regarding the basis, extent and limitations of soft power of these transnational non-state actors.
The soft power of a nation consists to a large extent of the soft power of non-state actors beyond the control of the state. Joseph Nye states that ‘the fact that civil society is the origin of much soft power does not disprove its existence’, and he lists primarily non-state actors and resources as the basis of the soft power of the USA and other countries and regions (Nye 2004: 17, ch. 2, 3).

These observations raise questions about the basis and extent of the soft power of non-state actors and how it interacts with the state and national soft power. These questions are not addressed adequately in the literature which turns to the narrow soft power of the state pursued through public diplomacy (Ding 2008: 199, Guo 2008:, Hunter 2009: 373-398, Kurlantzick 2007: 306, Lai 2006:, Li 2008: 287-308, Li 2009: 275, Melissen 2005:, Potter 2009:, Rugh 2006: 211). The concept of soft power dates from 1990 (Nye 1990: 307). There is in subsequent literature a tendency to see it only as a current phenomenon, and there is a lack of historical studies of soft power and of the long-development of the phenomenon, which this paper seeks to address.

Nye defines soft power as when others adapt desired behaviour through attraction or co-optation. Soft power is at work when persuasion is achieved without threats or exchanges. The basis of soft power is the shaping of others’ preferences through, for instance, attraction to personality, culture, political values and institutions, policies viewed as legitimate (Nye 2004: 5-11). Power is always contextual (Baldwin 1979: 161-194), and soft power particularly so, due to its dependence on the reception by interpreters and audiences (Nye 2004: 1-5). This dependence dictates that soft power is rather with than over somebody. How this attraction works deserves close attention; Steven Lukes (2007: 83-97) and Janice Bially Mattern (2007: 98-119) raise the question of attraction through manipulation or coercion while Todd Hall questions the analytical category of attraction (2010: 189-211).
The soft power of the three universities analysed here is operationalized as behaviour by outsiders to the universities, which is desired by the universities and based on attraction or co-optation. Desired behaviour is first and foremost embracing the mission of the university, whether proselytizing in former times or later secular education according to American traditions. Acceptance of the universities, as well as moral, political and financial acceptance and support from a wide range of private and public actors in China and the USA underline important attitudes by outsiders that were desired by the universities. The motivations for the desired behaviour show the basis of the soft power of these universities. The absence of university soft power is displayed through rejection of the mission of the university, denial of support or political attacks on them.

Soft power is usually more effective in achieving what Arnold Wolfers (1962:) called milieu goals than possession goals (Nye 2004: 16-17). This difference is at the core of the soft power of these private universities. Chinese students and their families were attracted to quality English-language education while Chinese scholars and the state were attracted to research relevant to China and Chinese development. The original proselytizing agendas of the universities were rejected by Chinese society as well as Western domination and unequal treaties against which the students strongly protested. It is clear that the universities did not contribute to render unacceptable Western policies and behaviour, such as extraterritoriality or Western domination of China, more acceptable.

Methodology and Case Selection: Structured, Focused Comparison of Crucial Cases

The analysis of the soft power of these universities vis-à-vis different actors is conducted as a structured, focused comparison (George, Bennett 2005:...
of their soft power with Chinese students and the state and their reverse soft power in the American society of origin and relations with the US state. This comparison looks at actual—as opposed to potential—soft power because of the analysis of relations between universities and outside actors and the behaviour of these actors.

This structured, focused comparison is based on historical literature on the universities. The method of structured, focused comparison overcomes the lack of opinion data on the students of these universities or of views of these universities and steers the analysis clear of unstructured anecdotal evidence. Public opinion data is widely used in measuring soft power, for instance, by Nye (Nye 2004: 191).

American missionary universities in China provide particularly suitable material for the study of the soft power of transnational non-state actors and their interaction with the host society and the society of origin. American-origin education was well-known in elite circles in China, and the three universities here were leading universities in the country. They were, therefore, crucial cases (George, Bennett 2005: 121-122) for observing transnational non-state actors’ soft power. As crucial cases, these universities had to have soft power to render the soft power of transnational non-state actors’ soft power probable.

This paper looks at the cases of St John’s University in Shanghai (1879), Yale-in-China operating in Changsha and Hunan (1901) and Yenching University in Peking (1916), which are introduced individually below. The cases were selected because they were large, active and prominent American missionary universities in China, which held both soft power in the Chinese society and reverse soft power in American society. These institutions generated attention and debate on both sides of the Pacific and left a valuable source material.

St. John’s University in Shanghai represents one of the oldest and most successful missionary universities, and it created a legacy at the University of
British Columbia. Yale-in-China and Yenching were also highly successful universities and represent mobilization of American elite universities (Yale and Harvard) even until now. As such, the cases also represent three positive cases (a selection on the dependent variable), which help us identify potential causal pathways and variables which explain the outcome (George, Bennett 2005: 23-24).

The category of cases of American missionary universities offers promising possibilities to explore historical and current soft power working in multiple directions, due to the impact and reputation of American missionary activity and education. Around 1900, there were about 1000 missionaries in China, a number which had increased almost four times by the 1930s. The missionaries were the only Americans with extensive contact with ordinary Chinese people (Chu 1960: i).

The missionaries pioneered and influenced many areas of China, according to Philip West, through the spread of literature to ordinary people, the publications of journals and pamphlets, women’s education and equality, and the dissemination and adaptation of Western knowledge for Chinese society (West 1976: 6). The missionaries published magazines, such as, the Wan-kou kung-pao (Review of the Times), which in its classical Chinese written by Chinese editors, attracted an audience interested in Western geography and customs while trying to make sense of the outside world (Fairbank 1987: 129).

Christian educators maintained around 200 schools, colleges and other educational institutions in China (Fairbank 1983: 329). By 1927, the missionaries maintained sixteen universities and colleges, ten professional schools of college rank, four schools of theology and six schools of medicine. These institutions had around 4,000 students enrolled, a fact which illustrates their attractiveness to young Chinese and their families. The attraction these schools held vis-à-vis American donors is clear from the fact that they represented a property
investment of 19,000,000 USD and their annual current expenses amounted to 3,250,000 USD (Varg 1958: 216).

During their heyday, these colleges set the pace for the national Chinese university system and played a central role for the new order which modern China was trying to create. By the 1920s, there was considerable interchange of faculty between, for instance, Yenching University, the private Nankai University in Tientsin and Peking University (Fairbank 1987: 195-196). The attractiveness and influence of American education is illustrated by the fact that most of the Nationalist government ministers between 1927 and 1949 were educated in the USA and looked to American liberal arts education for designing Chinese higher education (West 1976: 124). All in all, 20,906 Chinese students had studied in the USA between 1854 and 1953, with a minuscule minority in religious studies (Ng et al. 2002: 96).

St John’s University—a Bridge to the USA and a Canadian Legacy

St. John’s University was the first modern higher education institution in Shanghai founded as a college in 1879 by William Jones Boone and Bishop Samuel Isaac Joseph Schereschewsky of Shanghai, combining two pre-existing Anglican colleges in Shanghai. The collegiate department opened in 1892, the university was incorporated in the USA in 1906, and conferred the first BA degrees in China in 1907. The university enjoyed high prestige and was known as the ‘cradle of diplomats in China’ or the ‘Harvard of the Far East’. It was nationalized and merged with regional national universities in 1952 (Lutz 1971: 481, Xu 2006: 24-25).

Alumni of St. John’s University—and of St. Mary’s Hall—in Taiwan in 1967 established a successor institution in business, science and technology, which has developed into the current St. John’s University (Taiwan) (St. John's
In 1901, Yale students and faculty founded the Yale Foreign Missionary Society, inspired by the religious revival of the time and the Student Volunteer Movement, with the purpose of conducting educational mission in China. This initiative led to extensive educational and healthcare activities in Changsha, Hunan, in Central China. From around 1913, these activities were commonly known as Yale-in-China, which in 1934 was incorporated as a secular organization and in 1975 changed its name to the Yale-China Association and remains highly active (Chapman, Plumb 2001:, Yale-China Association 2010:).

The missionary conference for Hunan asked the Yale missionaries to take care of the higher education activities in the region. So the Yale missionaries established the Yali Middle School in Changsha around 1912, and more importantly the Hsiang-Ya Hospital, the Hsiang-Ya School of Medicine and the Hsiang-Ya School of Nursing (today transliterated as Xiangya). In 1931, Yale-in-China together with other Christian groups founded the Huachung College in Wuhan, where Yale-in-China was responsible for the science division. In 1951, the assets of Yale-in-China were gradually confiscated by the regional government, and the last representative of the organization Dr. Dwight Rugh spent a year under house arrest before being expelled in May 1951. Yale-in-China remained active in East Asia after leaving the mainland and

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1 This paper focuses on USA-mainland China relations and therefore does not give attention to this successor school in Taiwan.
Yenching returned to Changsha in 2008 (Chapman, Plumb 2001:, Yale-China Association 2010:).

**Yenching University—a Bridge to Harvard**

Yenching University in Beijing is a valuable case for studying the soft power of American missionary universities in the Chinese host society and reverse likewise in the American society of origin. According to John Fairbank, it was the leading Christian college in China, and produced more than 3,000 graduates who provided leadership and influenced Chinese society on both sides of the Chinese civil war as well as Sino-Western relations. Yenching’s president John Leighton Stuart was the last American ambassador to China before the Communist takeover, and Yenching graduates as Huang Hua (Wang Rumei) served as the People’s Republic’s first ambassador to the United Nations and James C. H. Shen (Shen Jianhong) served as ambassador to the USA (Fairbank 1983: 329, West 1976: x). Yenching enjoyed highly privileged connections with American society most evidently through the Harvard Yenching Institute which even after the nationalization of Yenching was an influential legacy of sinology and Sino-American relations.

Yenching University was created by the fusion of four missionary colleges in the Beijing region between 1915 and 1920: the Methodist Peking University (not to be confused with the national Peking University), the North China Union College (founded by the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions, the Presbyterian Mission and the London Missionary Society), the North China Union College for Women (founded by Eliza J. Bridgman) and the school of theology which was a union of the theological seminary of the North China Educational Union and two Methodist theological schools in Beijing. The board of trustees in New York and the board of managers in Beijing were formed in 1916, which is regarded as the founding date. The university was nationalized in

**Soft Power of American Missionary Universities in the Chinese Host Society: Embracing Education, Research and Healthcare, while Rejecting Proselytizing and Foreign Domination**

The analysis shows that these private, American-origin universities in China as transnational non-state actors held soft power in their Chinese host society. This soft power was clear from their popularity among students and their acceptance by the Chinese host state. However, this soft power was also limited and took unintended turns in nature and direction. The host society rejected the core historical proselytizing mission of these universities and attacked and threatened their survival politically.

Contextual factors influence the actual soft power outcomes of these universities compared to the actors’ soft power aims. China was in a semi-colonized condition with formal sovereignty but concessions in the Treaty Ports, which opened the door for the missionaries. China was under immense pressure from outside powers, and foreigners in Chinese society were sometimes met with hesitance, hostility, even violence.

The most violent rejection of foreign influence and presence in China was the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, where foreigners and Christian Chinese were besieged in the foreign legation quarter in Beijing for eight weeks in the summer of 1900 and thousands of Chinese as well as 250 foreigners, mainly missionaries were killed throughout Northern China (Fairbank 1987: 138).

The Boxer Rebellion influenced the missionary movement and presence in China deeply and was a turning point where the usual proselytizing agenda was clearly counterproductive. It was clear that the Chinese were not interested in
conversion to Christianity. This realization made the American missionaries put greater emphasis on higher education and healthcare and to found colleges and medical schools (Hansen 2009:, Xu 2006: 23-49).

In the missionary colleges, universities and medical schools, the success of conversion was very disappointing, and in the beginning, students from humble backgrounds were attracted through free education, board and keep and sometimes even transportation to the school (Lutz 1971: 56). Students at the missionary universities were deeply involved in nationalist and communist activism and opposition to foreign domination of China (Lutz 1971: 212-213, West 1976: 92-95, 147-148).

The combination of choosing an American missionary higher education institution while rejecting both the religious component and Western policies allow us to identify what attracted young Chinese (where the university held soft power) and what these students rejected (where the university did not hold soft power). The unattractiveness of religious education and disappointing number of conversions demonstrate that the Christian proselytizing agenda of the universities was not attractive to most Chinese (Lutz 1971: 56, Varg 1958: 218-219, West 1976: 121), and thus diminished the soft power of these institutions. Likewise, the foreign presence and influence in Chinese society; and foreign control over educational institutions was strongly rejected, which was displayed in various rejections of and protests from students, faculty and outside against the special status and foreign control of the Christian colleges (Lutz 1971: 212-213, West 1976: 92-95, 147-148).

**Basis of Soft Power: Attraction to English-Language Education, Medical Services, and Chinese Scholarship**

The basis of attraction to and acceptance of the American missionary universities by Chinese students, their families, the state and the wider public
shows the basis of their soft power. It is clear that quality education, especially in English, medical services and relevant scholarship on China were the bases of the soft power of these universities in Chinese society. On the other hand, proselytizing and Western domination of China reduced this soft power as discussed below.

Since Christian education was less attractive to the Chinese, the first mission boarding schools were able to recruit students only by providing books, tuition, room, board, and sometimes clothes, beds and travel costs. However, in the late nineteenth century, the addition of English language courses by many of the Christian schools improved their attractiveness markedly and gave them new financial possibilities, but, at the same time, affected their original proselytizing mission (Lutz 1971: 56).

As the universities adopted and emphasized English teaching, they attracted a completely new clientele from wealthy merchant families. These families, typically in the treaty ports, understood the commercial value of learning English, i.e. that Chinese could obtain well-paid positions with Western and Chinese firms. As Jonathan Spence wrote about Yale-in-China, English language became ‘the chief medium of modern education’ (Spence 1980: 163).

Accordingly, Chinese became willing to pay for language training (Lutz 1971: 56, 70-71, 102). St. John’s introduced the study of English in 1881-1882 and eventually charged the second highest average educational fees per student. It soon acquired a reputation as the ‘rich boys’ school with many prominent alumni (Lutz 1971: 56).

With this development, St. John’s University was neither recruiting Christians, converting students to Christianity, nor supplying ministers and workers for the church. In 1891, St. John’s President Hawks Pott complained that many students leaving St. John’s entered the newly founded naval academy in Nanking. At least four individuals listed in *Who’s Who in China, 1925* had
attended St. John’s or Shanghai Anglo-Chinese College before going to one of the special government schools; three of these later entered government service and one went into business (Lutz 1971: 48).

St. John’s tried to compromise: it charged high tuition, but in order to maintain a certain proportion of Christian students, it offered loans and scholarships to preministerial students and to sons of Christian ministers and other religious workers (Lutz 1971: 168). However, St. John’s had-together with other colleges- stressed the development of general rather than religious education. The fact that St. John’s was among the four colleges that enrolled the lowest proportion of Christian students of any colleges in 1925 shows the limitation of Christianity as attraction compared to the soft power of English language and non-religious education (Lutz 1971: 163).

Medical services and education were other areas of soft power resources for the missionaries and their higher education institutions: they contributed significantly to drawing the Chinese public to them (Lutz 1971: 142-144, 517). Medical education had been established at St. John’s in 1896 by Dr. H. W. Boone, who offered a four-year course to graduates of St. John’s preparatory department (Lutz 1971: 152). In 1914 the University of Pennsylvania, which had been aiding medical education at Canton Christian College, transferred its work to St. John’s, and in 1920 the Rockefeller Foundation announced that it had abandoned its plans for Shanghai and offered US$ 80,000 to strengthen St. John’s work in science (Lutz 1971: 152). These resources enabled the medical school to improve its facilities, though both staff and student body remained small; between 1901 and 1920, 15 students received medical diplomas, and 25 received certificates. Among the alumni of St. John’s were also some of the most prominent men in the Chinese medical profession at the time, with many of them having pursued graduate work in the United States or England and enjoyed the prestige accorded to ‘returned students’ (Lutz 1971: 153).
Yale-in-China’s overall hope was to influence some of the ambitious students in Changsha, train them in Western science, humanities, and medicine; and bring them closer to God (Spence 1980: 165). Ever since arriving in 1905, its first president, Dr. Edward H. Hume, had looked forward to the establishment of a medical school as part of the Yale program in Changsha. This hope seemed a possibility in 1912 when a Yale alumnus offered to donate funds for a modern hospital. The conditions of the gift were that the hospital be supported by local Chinese and that it be an educational centre (Lutz 1971: 154).

This support materialized in the summer of 1913, when Governor Tan Yankai, with the support of prominent members of the Hunanese gentry, signed what was called the Hsiang-Ya Agreement, which was ratified by The Executive Committee in New Haven in August 1914 (Chapman, Plumb 2001: 40). The agreed division of labour reflects the soft power resources at play: Yale-in-China would build and equip the hospital and furnish the salaries and expenses of 15 Western-trained doctors; Hunan would construct the school buildings, purchase the necessary land and provide an annual subsidy (Spence 1980: 171).

The appeal or soft power of the hospital was apparent in dealings with the shifting rulers of the time. After it was completed in February 1917, the hospital became a regular sanctuary for fleeing officers and politicians, while new men in power would summon the Western doctors to attend them. ‘We were, in reality, medical aides to the various generals,’ Hume admitted. According to Jonathan Spence, it was probably this linkage with the military, the only resource in time of civil war, that brought Yale-in-China safely through (Spence 1980: 171-173).

Educating Chinese students in health care and medicine, and attracting the Chinese power elite by providing medical services based on Western education, resources and technology reflects an important basis of the soft power of Yale-in-China. In The Yale-China Association, Nancy E. Chapman states that ‘The most valuable innovations that the West had to offer at the turn of the
century were in the areas of surgery and public health’ (Chapman, Plumb 2001: 20).

Besides English teaching and medical services, the third important basis of soft power for these universities was Chinese scholarship. Yenching’s reputation rose rapidly in the 1920s supported by three factors, which contribute to explain the university’s soft power in Chinese society: The reform of the Chinese curriculum in 1924, the establishment of the Guoxue Yanjiusou (Graduate Institute for National Learning) in 1926, thereafter incorporated into the Graduate Institute of Letters in 1927, and finally the founding of the Yenching Institute (later Harvard Yenching Institute) in 1928 (West 1976: 138). By the late 1920s, Yenching had the third highest academic reputation in China after Peking University and Tsinghua University, and in the 1930s it received more research grants from the ministry of education than any other university in China (West 1976: 118). A prosaic measure of Yenching’s attractiveness to Chinese society was the employment success of its graduates, while half of all college graduates in China remained unemployed in the mid 1930s (West 1976: 142-143).

The role and influence of Yenching in Chinese society can be illustrated by some of the Chinese intellectuals it attracted and influenced. Such examples are the writers Bingxin (Xie Wanying) (1900-1999), Xu Dishan (1893-1941) and the playwright Xiong Foxi (1900-1965), who were all important in the history of Chinese literature; they had graduated from Yenching, studied further in the USA and returned to teach at Yenching. Other famous Chinese intellectuals in the late 1920s were the historian Gu Jiegang (1893-1980)—the father of Chinese folklore studies—and the philosopher and famous interpreter of Western philosophy Zhang Dongsun (1886-1973) (West 1976: 90). The journalism department graduated some of China’s leading journalists of the 1930s and 1940s. In addition, well-known American journalists such as Edgar Snow, Num Wales and F. McCracken ‘Mac’ Fisher worked there in the 1930s (West 1976: 125). Edgar Snow, for example, wrote *Red Star over China*, the first book on the Chinese
Communist party and one of the two most influential books on China in the West at the time (Hayford 2008:).

Limitations to Soft Power: Struggle with Chinese Nationalism

Besides the rejection of proselytizing, the Christian colleges and universities struggled increasingly with Chinese nationalism (Lutz 1971: 251-252, Ng et al. 2002: 146, West 1976: 147-148); this constrained their attractiveness or soft power in Chinese society. At the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919, ‘China’s rights were disregarded and wealth and power obviously triumphed over right’ (Fairbank 1987: 184). This led to the 4 May Movement of 1919 and China began to go through a political revolution, called the Nationalist Movement (Fairbank 1987: 183).

Limitations to the soft power or attractiveness of the universities was clear from the political activism and opposition against the universities by students and others. Protest against foreign exploitation, humiliation of China and foreign control of the universities often merged. Students at the Christian colleges were involved in nationalist or communist agitation and engaged in strikes, or protested against the universities or instances of foreign humiliation of China (Lutz 1971: 212-213, 243-244, 248-249, 257, 263, West 1976: 147-148). There were demands inside and outside the universities for their nationalization and criticism of their foreign control, deemed unacceptable due to the importance of education for national aims, ideals and ‘cultivation of unique Chinese characteristics’ (Lutz 1971: 251-252).

Yenching students were at the forefront of patriotic and nationalist action throughout the 1920s. The university was affected by the anti-Christian movement which set out with student protests against the World Student Christian Federation Conference scheduled at Tsinghua University in April 1922. According to Philip West, it may have been because of fear of being overly
influenced by foreign ideas (West 1976: 147). This opposition continued the year after in the Movement to Restore Educational Rights, which demanded a unified Chinese national educational system and an end to the independent status of missionary institutions, (West 1976: 93). Anti-Christian movements and sentiments contributed to tilting the number between Christian and non-Christian students at Yenching and to the modernization and secularization of the institution (Fairbank 1974b: 233-234).

In the summer of 1924, some of the Chinese teachers at Yale-in-China openly called for ‘recovery of educational right’, which meant ‘the replacement of foreign administrators by Chinese nationals, the elimination of special privileges for foreign staff members, and the elimination of “cultural imperialism”’. The critics charged Yale-in-China for not having promoted Chinese faculty to leadership positions; and for compensating Chinese and Americans differently when hired (Chapman, Plumb 2001: 29). According to Spence, as the agitation in Changsha and on the Yale-in-China campus grew increasingly strident, President Hume began to see that Yale-in-China was not confronting just a few radicals, but rather the whole force of Chinese nationalism (Spence 1980: 175-176).

In October 1924, the National Federation of Provincial Educational Associations demanded immediate registration of all schools in China, discrimination against students in non-registered schools and an end to religious instruction and practice in all schools (Lutz 1971: 251-252). The association and the National Association for the Advancement of Education repeated these demands in 1925, and the influential Zhonghua jiaoyujie devoted its February 1925 issue to the educational rights movement (Lutz 1971: 251-252).

In the response to the 30 May (1925) incident, when British police in Shanghai fired upon student demonstrators killing some, St. John’s students received permission to go on strike. For about ten days in early June 1925 they held campus meetings twice a day, published a daily newspaper, and conducted
educational campaigns in neighbouring villages. In time, St. John’s administrators began to feel that the student activities were placing the school in an embarrassing position. As Lutz writes: ‘Here was an institution on Chinese soil with extraterritorial rights, and its students were using the campus for a campaign against government officials and policies (Lutz 1971: 212-213).’

However, when the students requested suspension of the academic work for the rest of the term so that they could give full time to political activities, the administration ended the academic year and closed the school without examinations or graduation ceremonies (Lutz 1971: 212-213). St. John’s became the centre of political activism before most of the other Christian colleges with open conflict between Western administrators and Chinese students including a series of clashes between President Hawks Pott and the St. John’s students over their role in the movement of 30 May. The school suffered as a result of unfavourable publicity and loss of students, which constrained and decreased its soft power (Lutz 1971: 248).

Nationalistic Chinese demands inside and outside Yenching led to the government registration of the university in 1928 with a Chinese constitution and Chinese chancellor, while John Leighton Stuart remained president. This registration led to the strange situation whereby Yenching had a Chinese constitution satisfying Chinese law and sentiments and an American one doing the same toward American constituents. Under the American constitution, every year the US consulate in Peking certified the annual report to be sent to the Regents of the University of New York and the board of trustees in New York (Fairbank 1983: 330, West 1976: 99).

Relations with the Chinese State—Registration and Nationalization

Under the nationalist government and the impulse of nationalist politics and protest by students and others, the key question in the relationship between
the American missionary universities and the Chinese state was registration. The universities gradually registered with the Chinese government, which on its part was favourable to the American missionary universities.

Following President Hawks Pott’s retirement from St. John’s in 1939, the University fell in step with the other Christian colleges and registered with the Chinese government in 1947 (Lutz 1971: 408-409). In 1952, St John’s was also broken up as a consequence of the Chinese government policy. Most of its faculties were incorporated into regional national universities (Lutz 1971: 481, St. John’s University, Republic of China (Taiwan) 2009:).

The nationalization of Yale-in-China and its Hsiang-Ya Medical College happened earlier than the two other universities. Due to the attacks from the Japanese army in the late 30s, Hsiang-Ya Medical College was relocated westward to Guiyang in Guizhou province (Chapman, Plumb 2001: 55). The two biggest sources of income in Changsha had been subsidies from the Hunan government and payments at the Hsiang-Ya Hospital, but since both disappeared after the move to Guyiang, Yale-in-China faced serious financial problems and was unable to make up the shortfall. As a consequence, the director, Dr. H.C. Chang, and the faculty appealed to the national Ministry of Education, offering to consider nationalizing the medical college. The Chinese Ministry of Education announced the nationalization of the Hsiang-Ya Medical College in June of 1940, before Dr. Chang had a chance to discuss the change with Yale-in-China’s trustees (Chapman, Plumb 2001: 58-59).

The Communist victory in China 1949, the relationship with the USA, US and PRC government policy, and the Korean War became the ultimate undoing for these universities through Communist nationalization. As this paper shows, for instance, the US board of trustees of Yenching was fairly understanding towards the People’s Republic of China and willing to continue working and funding even under Communist rule (West 1976: 201-203). However, the US
government froze Communist Chinese assets in the US and blocked transfers to Mainland China, which made it impossible for the US board of trustees to continue their support. Under the nationalization, the faculty of Yenching suffered political persecution, and the Chinese communist state would not have tolerated the private American missionary universities. However, the fact that these American missionary universities were integrated into the leading national Chinese universities by the communist state was a testimony to their attractiveness and reputation, or soft power, based on education and research (Lutz 1971: 474).

The fall of Yenching in the context of the Communist takeover of power and the Korea War shows the important extents and limitations of the soft power of the university both in China and in the USA. The region of the university came under Communist control in December 1948, the university was nationalized in February 1951 and merged with national universities in September 1952. What is of interest here is the initial Chinese willingness to tolerate Yenching as an independent bicultural bridge to the USA, the American private willingness to continue supporting Yenching financially, and the initial acceptance of such support by the US government (West 1976: 195-243).

The Yenching faculty itself was optimistic in 1949 and 1950 that Yenching would maintain a role to play in China even under Mao’s New Democracy and the Soviet influence. Until October 1950 the new Communist government had given repeated assurances to Yenching about its continued existence, which eventually ceased after November of that year. The turning point for Yenching became the American-Chinese clash in the Korea War from October 1950 (West 1976: 196-202).

After their regional takeover in December 1948, the communists protected public and private schools and encouraged personnel there to stay at their posts in order to win over the intellectuals. Communist acceptance of Yenching at this
time was illustrated by that—according to President Lu Zhiwei—the university had more invited participants at the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in September 1949 than any other educational institution (West 1976: 202-204). The participants totalled nine altogether.

After the formation of the new national government in October 1949, the state became much more involved in Yenching through a much more active ministry of education, political education, and the formation of a Communist party branch and unions on campus. However, it is important to note that the authorities gave no indication that Yenching did not have a role for the future. President Lu Zhiwei of Yenching saw that Yenching could no longer be a Christian university alongside the government educational system, and the trustees concurred in this. The faculty led by President Lu Zhiwei embraced the new times and organizations and defended them to the board of trustees, who accepted them (West 1976: 202-208).

1 September 1950, the ministry of education asked President Lu Zhiwei to reorganize the board of managers of Yenching to serve as connection with the ministry. On 19 October 1950, Yenching received a 34,000 USD grant from the government. Nine days later on 28 October 1950, Premier Zhou Enlai personally assured President Lu Zhiwei that Yenching would be allowed to receive financial support from abroad, although using highly derogatory terms about the board of trustees in New York (West 1976: 195-201).

This Communist tolerance of Yenching came to an end in November 1950 with the Resist America Aid Korea movement (KangMei yuanChao yundong), which spread to the campus and caused great disturbance that continued for two years. Its main purpose was to root out any ‘worship America’ or ‘fear America’ sentiments. Freedom, individuality and the bicultural nature of Yenching were destroyed during this period, especially with the Three Anti campaign (against waste, corruption and bureaucracy) launched in December 1951. This campaign
saw extensive self-analysis and self-criticism sessions culminating at all-university sessions where the faculty and administration of the university was denounced and harassed even by their closest family members. In September 1952, Chinese higher education was reorganized and Yenching merged with Peking University and Tsinghua University and ceased to exist as an individual institution (Lutz 1971: 469-473, 478-479, West 1976: 200-201, 232-243).

The Reverse Soft Power of American Missionary Universities in China in the American Society of Origin

This paper applies the novel term of reverse soft power (Bertelsen 2009:). The reverse soft power of these American missionary universities was desired behaviour by the American society of origin based on attraction. This behaviour was mostly in the form of academic, moral, political and financial support of the universities and their contributions to education, healthcare and development in their Chinese host society. These universities were also advocates of Chinese interests and positions.

These universities developed privileged connections with American society, and to a large extent became advocates and educators on behalf of their Chinese host society towards American society. These universities and the missionary activities surrounding them were the main educational and information source for American society at large on China. They successfully channelled much information about their Chinese host society into their American society of origin and attracted the interest and money of resourceful actors in a crowded marketplace for attention. This reverse soft power is clear from the multitude of actors in American society with whom they established strong relationships. These relationships are discussed in the forthcoming paragraph.

The strong relationship between the American missionary universities in China and American society was to some extent an unintended consequence,
since these missionary universities were established to proselytize among the locals and to influence their society—a one-way street arrangement, soft power.

**American Missionary Societies: The Initial Mobilization of American Civil Society**

The extent to which American civil society was mobilized for the causes of education and other causes overseas through missionary societies is a prime example of how these educational institutions held reverse soft power on behalf of their host societies toward the American society of origin. Through these missionary societies, significant human and financial resources were attracted to the causes of education, research, healthcare and social development in overseas societies. These missionary societies and the communities surrounding them were also the primary vehicles for informing American society about the foreign host societies and raising interest for and awareness about these societies.

Jessie Gregory Lutz clearly outlines such reverse soft power: ‘Missionaries served as interpreters of China to hundreds of thousands of church members in the West. The period of active dialogue between China and the West coincided precisely with the climax of Protestant missionary movement, and the image of China held by the average American before World War II was largely the creation of the missionary (Lutz 1971: 493). And Clayton H. Chu concurs with Lutz, stating that ‘[a]s a special interest group the missionaries also contributed, over many decades, to shaping American public opinion and the policy of the United States government in China and the Far East (Chu 1960: i).’

The great expansion of American Protestant missionary education overseas, so prominent in East Asia—and the Middle East—, was motivated by the religious revival in the USA in the late 1800s (Fairbank 1974a: 231, Lutz 1971: 98, Makdisi 2008: 262). The early roots of this missionary activity were in
the early to mid-1800s, when the first missionaries left for these regions, but the great expansion of colleges and medical schools took place around 1900. These colleges, universities and medical school shared important traits with lessons on the reverse soft power they held on behalf of their foreign host societies toward the American society of origin.

The driving forces behind these colleges were often children of early missionaries who had returned to the USA for education. It is thus clear, that these missionary circles produced outstanding human resources that combined intimate knowledge of the host societies, including language skills, with a deep commitment to these societies, and this must be noted. These individuals committed themselves to spend lifetimes in foreign, sometimes hostile, societies, when international communication and travel was very difficult. These pioneers managed to mobilize American civil society through missionary societies or create missionary societies at prominent universities. This mobilization was through, for instance, the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, which inspired organizations such as the Yale Foreign Missionary Society and the Oberlin Band (Lutz 1971: 99).

To carry forth these endeavours, boards of trustees were recruited among the ‘learned, wealthy and pious’ from American centres of industry and commerce (Murphy 1987: 1). From these societies and their boards of trustees, the driving spirits behind these future colleges and universities raised the necessary money and human talent for the establishment of their institutions. Throughout the existence of these higher education institutions, these societies and the boards of trustees raised the majority of the budgets and recruited faculty and administrators. Subsequently, the colleges in China formed associations in the USA after the First World War to increase awareness and raise funds, such as the Association of Christian Colleges and Universities in China founded in 1919 (Lutz 1971: 116).
However, the above mentioned shift in emphasis from proselytizing to education also meant a shift in reverse soft power in the USA. This shift meant that missionary circles and boards of trustees became unhappy with and unconvinced by the secularized education and emphasis on Chinese studies instead of religious education (Fairbank 1974a: 213-218, Lutz 1971: 102, Ng et al. 2002: 147).

**American Universities and Academia: Educating and Creating Interest about China and Raising Academic Resources**

The American missionary universities in China were integrated parts of American academia through the exchange of knowledge and research as well as individuals, whether administrators, faculty or students. These universities abroad recruited senior administrators and faculty from leading American universities, who sometimes returned to American academia. Likewise some of their graduates pursued graduate studies at prominent universities in the USA.

The missionary universities produced and published knowledge about their host society and region that was accredited by an American-standard university and often in English. Initially, integration with American academia was based on the missionary reverse soft power of these universities towards American colleges and universities inspired by similar Protestant religious beliefs and missions. With the secularization of both the universities abroad and at home, the motivation became academic.

The turn to emphasis on excellence in Chinese studies at the missionary universities in China was a paradox, since it clashed with the original objective of the colleges of proselytizing and religious education (soft power from the American society of origin to the Chinese host society). However, by the 1920s and 1930s, most schools had established guoxue programs on Chinese classics and philosophy and some were outstanding centres of scholarship on Chinese
This development can be seen in light of both the soft power and reverse soft power of these colleges and universities. To be accepted by the Chinese host society (soft power), they turned toward Chinese culture to reassert Chinese identity, to appear as part of nationalistic and cultural education, and to adapt to Chinese society and what it emphasized. This emphasis was especially true after the 4 May (1919) movement. The shift was also a function of reverse soft power in the American society of origin and the demands and interests of American academia and foundations. Scholars and universities were seeking scholarship on China, and foundations were willing to support such research and education (Ng et al. 2002: 146).

Individuals and institutions associated with Yenching illustrate this reverse soft power in American society and how it educated and informed the USA on China and Chinese society and took part in shaping American views and policies toward China. Yenching had privileged relations with prominent American universities through individuals and institutions, which illustrate the working of reverse soft power. (The Harvard Yenching Institute and Library are treated further below with regard to the legacy of Yenching).

Lucius Chapin Porter (1880-1958) was, according to Philip West, the second most important Western figure at Yenching after John Leighton Stuart. He held a B.D. from Yale Divinity School from 1906 and had studied a year in Britain and Germany on a Yale fellowship. This background reminds us of the quality of American human resources, the missionary universities attracted to the cause of education in China. How missionary university faculty contributed to Chinese scholarship and teaching at American universities is also well illustrated by Porter. 1922-1924, he was the Dean Lung Professor of Chinese at Columbia University, and a lecturer in Chinese philosophy at Harvard University 1928-1929.
and 1931-1932. Porter played an important role in building the Harvard-Yenching Institute and served as the institute’s executive secretary in China from 1928 to 1939 (West 1976: 27-29).

Other examples of American faculty and administrators who contributed in important ways to build academic bridges between the USA and China, were Howard Spilman Galt (1872-1948) and John Stewart Burgess (1883-1948). Galt had been drawn to the Student Volunteer Movement at Tabor College in Iowa and at Columbia University. He went to Harvard in 1925 and received his Ed.D. degree in 1927. His work *The History of Chinese Educational Institutions* has been regarded as a standard work in Chinese education (West 1976: 31).

Burgess was drawn to the Student Volunteer Movement during his college years at Princeton, and went to Japan to work for the YMCA and teach English with a Japanese government scholarship. He received his PhD in sociology from Columbia in 1928, where he had first arrived in 1907. Burgess contributed importantly to forge ties between Yenching and the YMCA in Peking and Princeton, and he worked for the Princeton-in-Peking Foundation and Princeton-Yenching Foundation. A very important contribution by Burgess was his introduction of modern sociology to China and sociological research on China (West 1976: 32-33).

Burgess and another Princeton alumnus, Sidney D. Gamble, pioneered social studies and work in Peking while at Yenching. In 1923, Princeton-in-Peking transferred most of its work to Yenching, offered to support two instructors in sociology and raised 145,000 USD from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund (Lutz 1971: 312). In 1929, Princeton was both creating its own School of Public and International Affairs and the Princeton-Yenching Foundation with a desire to exchange fellows with Yenching and develop a College of Public Affairs in Beijing, as well as graduate programs in economics, political science and sociology. Princeton fellows went to Yenching in 1931, but it was suspended
because of the depression. The College of Public Affairs at Yenching was established and about a third of students majored there (Lutz 1971: 312-313).

Chinese faculty members at Yenching also contributed to Chinese studies at universities in the USA. Liu Tingfang (1891-1947) was initially educated at St John’s University in Shanghai and went to the USA for studies at, initially, the University of Georgia and Columbia University. He completed a B.D. degree in 1918 at Yale and received his PhD in psychology and education from Columbia in 1920, where he was president of the Chinese Student Christian Association and associate editor of the *Chinese Student’s Monthly* (West 1976: 60). Xu Baoqian (1892-1944), who taught at Yenching, first went to the USA in 1921 for two and a half years of study at Union Theological Seminary in New York and at Columbia, where he returned in 1930 and received a PhD in 1933. In America, he spoke more than a hundred times to church groups on Chinese culture and the Chinese Christian movement (West 1976: 67). William Hung (Hong Ye) (1893-1980) was the first Chinese dean of the college at Yenching from 1924-1927 and later excelled as a scholar and editor of the Harvard-Yenching Sinological Index Series. For four decades, he played an important role in the Harvard-Yenching Institute in China and Cambridge, MA, where he stayed after 1946 (West 1976: 74-77).

**American Private Philanthropies: Raising Resources for Education, Research, Healthcare and Development in China**

In the USA, philanthropies, such as the Rockefeller and Ford and other foundations represent great resources, prestige and influence and have been and remain very important for the work of universities. Shifting to secular missions of education and research, the American missionary universities attracted significant philanthropic support for their operations, which subsidized
local university teaching, research, healthcare and social development. Foundations, such as the American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation became interested in the educational and research mission and started generous financial support. The support of these philanthropies, which was coveted, and whose resources and attention was limited, showed the reverse soft power of these universities (Fairbank 1974a: 213-218, Lutz 1971: 102, Ng et al. 2002: 147).

Boards of Trustees in the USA: Mobilizing American Elites for China

The boards of trustees were central leadership and governance instruments for these universities. The importance of the quality of the boards cannot be overstated. They provided the universities with leadership and impetus and were ultimately responsible for their operation and finances. The missionary universities recruited prominent board members among the ‘learned, wealthy and pious’ (Murphy 1987: 1), bringing to the table strong networks and philanthropic resources. How these universities were able to attract the attention, time and money of sought-after individuals for the causes of education, research, healthcare and development was one of the most striking examples of the contribution these universities made in connecting American and Chinese society at high level and of their reverse soft power.

The actions of the New York board of trustees of Yenching during its final years illustrate how the board could be a staunch defender of China, even when China turned anti-American and was at war with the USA. These actions show how Yenching continued to hold important reverse soft power in American society during the time of Communist takeover. Even under Communist rule, Yenching remained largely American funded throughout 1949 and 1950, and its financial ties with the USA were not cut by Chinese authorities. It was the US government, which on 17 December 1950 froze all Communist Chinese assets in
the USA and made it unlawful to remit funds to Communist China except with special permission. The board of trustees immediately applied for such a permit, which was rejected. On 2 January 1951, the board of trustees, despite the widespread fear of Communist China in the USA, approved the budget for the semester ending 30 June 1950 and was prepared to send the 84,476 USD; on 25 January the board of trustees voted to continue funding of Yenching (West 1976: 201-203). In the meantime, cut off from US funds, the majority of the Yenching faculty on 3 January expressed support for nationalization, and the university was formally taken over by the ministry of education on 12 February (West 1976: 201-202).

US Government and Politics: Informing Policy

The American missionary universities in China did not get the chance to benefit from US government support. Not before the 1950s did the US government become a significant supporter of the other classic American missionary universities overseas, the American University of Beirut and the American University in Cairo through USAID funding, peaking in the 1970s and 1980s.

However, the missionaries sought to inform and influence American policy, where a notable example was Yenching president John Leighton Stuart, who was particularly outspoken on and involved in US China policy. After the 30 May (1925) massacre, he publicly called for the USA to give up all special privileges under the unequal treaties (Ng et al. 2002: 177). Later in face of Japanese aggression, Stuart stated publicly that only forceful resistance would stop this aggression and called on the USA and Britain to side with the Nanking government (Lutz 1971: 343).

John Leighton Stuart was recruited from Union Theological Seminary in Nanking as president of Yenching in 1919, which he continued to serve as until
1946, when he was appointed US ambassador to China. He was a clear example of the second generation of missionaries, brought up in China with superb local knowledge and linguistic competencies. He rejected the one-way-street proselytizing of his parents’ generation and chose to serve as cultural mediators between East and West through education. Stuart’s standing with Chinese authorities was illustrated by his appointment in 1928 to the boards of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Culture and Education and of Tsinghua University. He advocated accommodation with successive Chinese governments, the Nanking government in the 1920s and to the Communists in 1948, when the Communist takeover of power was imminent. After he was denounced by Mao Zedong, Stuart turned strongly anti-Communist. His last wish was to be buried in China, where his ashes were brought in 2008 (Fairbank 1974b: 240-241, The New York Times 2008:, West 1976: 23, 48-49).

The Transpacific Legacies of the American Missionary Universities in China

The universities studied left legacies in the USA and Canada, which continues to hold soft power in the relationship between China and the outside world, especially the USA and Canada.

St. John’s College, University of British Columbia—the Legacy of Alumni Activity spanning over 40 Years

St. John’s alumni, called Johanneans, remained active and organized after the dissolution of the institution in Shanghai in 1952, which was, for instance, reflected in the establishment of a successor institution in Taiwan. In 1988, the Alumni Association of Hong Kong organized the first worldwide
meeting of Johanneans from Asia and North America, where the wish to re-establish the university on its original campus in Shanghai was expressed. This wish turned out to be impossible. Instead the opportunity presented itself in the form of a joint venture with the University of British Columbia to establish an Oxbridge style residential graduate college, St. John’s College. This college was funded by Johanneans while the land, logistics and academic support was offered by UBC. Construction started in 1996, it commenced operation in 1997 and was officially recognized in 1999. The aim of the college is characteristically—and of interest to this paper—to act as a bridge between Chinese and Western culture (St. John’s University (Shanghai) Alumni Association, University of British Columbia 2010:).

Yale-in-China and the Yale-China Association—Ivy League Engagement in China since 1901

As described earlier, Yale-in-China had been very active in Changsha and Hunan from the beginning of the 1900s to the nationalization in 1951. After the nationalization of its properties in 1951, Yale-in-China first turned to supporting Chinese students at Yale due to the turmoil on the mainland and in Taiwan. Yale-in-China’s attention was also directed to refugee groups in Hong Kong, and in 1954 Yale-in-China started close collaboration with the newly established New Asia College, which became one of the constituent colleges of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Yale-in-China offered both significant financial assistance and built institutional capacity, which included fellowships for college faculty at Yale, English training in Hong Kong and sending Yale graduates as English teachers (Lutz 1971: 484-486, Yale-China Association 2010:).
With the normalization of US-PRC relations in the 1970s, Yale-in-China (renamed the Yale-China Association in 1975) looked at the mainland again, and in 1979 a delegation from Yale visited the old areas of Yale-in-China in Changsha, Wuhan and Hunan. This visit quickly led to collaboration especially in exchanging medical doctors and sending Yale graduates to teach English. Today, the Yale-China Association is involved throughout China in the fields of medicine, English language instruction, American studies, legal studies and services to American and Chinese student (Yale-China Association 2010:).

The Legacy of the Harvard Yenching Institute and Library

One of the clearest illustrations of the reverse soft power of Yenching towards American society and particularly American academia and philanthropy is the Harvard Yenching Institute and the Harvard Yenching Library. These institutions show how Yenching held important reverse soft power during its existence and raised important financial and moral support for Chinese scholarship as well as educated American society on East Asia. The institute and the library at Harvard survived Yenching and continue to be American and global centres for Chinese and East Asian studies.

The founding of the Harvard Yenching Institute clearly illustrates the ability of Yenching to mobilize American academic and philanthropic resources. President Stuart had pursued the estate of Charles Martin Hall, the founder of Alcoa, for financial support since the early 1920s without result. In 1925, the dean of the Harvard Business School and chairman of Harvard’s fundraising committee, Wallace B. Donham, was also pursuing these funds, and Arthur Davis, trustee of the estate, suggested to Donham to work with Stuart. In 1926, Donham and Stuart together submitted a proposal for an institute with centres at Harvard and Yenching to develop Chinese studies with American critical methods. They received the 60,000 USD they had asked for, and in 1928
Yenching received another 1,500,000 USD from the Hall estate (West 1976: 189-190).

The institute at Yenching achieved great academic prominence and became a major centre of Chinese studies with much research and publication activity. It attracted leading Chinese sinologists who rose to great prominence in Chinese academia (soft power). The institute at Harvard lagged behind the institute in Beijing, but was the one to survive. In the USA, the Harvard institute became the first American centre for East Asian studies: at the beginning, it attracted leading European orientalists such as Paul Pelliot and Serge Elisseef, who in 1937 established the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations at Harvard. Also at Harvard, the institute spurred great publication activity such as the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* and accompanying monograph series. The institute also led to the creation of the Harvard Yenching Library, a leading library on East Asian studies. After the Communist takeover, the institute at Harvard lost connection with mainland China, but built up relations with other East Asian societies as well as received and continues to receive a large number of doctoral students and faculty from East Asia as fellows (President and Fellows of Harvard College 2010:, West 1976: 193-194).

**Conclusion: Attraction in China and the USA based on Education, Healthcare and Chinese Scholarship, Chinese Rejection of Proselytizing and Domination**

Much national soft power is based on the soft power of non-state actors beyond the control of the state. However the soft power of non-state actors and its basis has not received adequate attention in the literature, which has been focused on the narrow contemporary soft power of states through public diplomacy. Also, the literature has not addressed soft power as a historical phenomenon.
American missionary universities in China and their legacies as transnational non-state actors supply crucial cases to study the soft power of such actors and its basis. The analysis in this paper demonstrated the extent and limitations of the soft power of these universities both toward Chinese host society and state and toward American society and state.

Education, research, healthcare and social development provided by the American missionary universities was attractive (held soft power) to Chinese society, which rejected proselytizing and foreign domination. The Chinese were willing to pay high tuition for quality English-language education, Chinese intellectuals were attracted to sophisticated research environments on Chinese culture, and the population embraced Western medicine and healthcare.

The American missionary universities in China held and their legacies continue to hold important reverse soft power in American society, and thus, played and play an important role as bridge between American and Chinese society. This reverse soft power was originally based on missionary fervour and proselytizing, which, however, disappeared with time. The basis for the reverse soft power with American academia and foundations was the possibility of advanced research on China and Chinese culture and society. Again we see the attractiveness of high quality education and research, as with the soft power of these universities in China.
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