

Welcome to Germany? How Society and Labor Market Deal With Immigration

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Who can become German? Xenophobia and Attitudes Towards Naturalization

by Claudia Diehl and Ingrid Tucci

Germans are opening up to the topic of immigration: According to the representative data of this report, less and less Germans without a migration background feel threatened by immigration. Also, their attitude towards naturalization has changed. The question "What is the decisive factor for granting German nationality?" is now answered differently than in the 1990s. A significant part of the population without migration background considers ethnic German descent as less important. More and more Germans, however, believe that individual behavior should be the decisive factor for naturalization. In contrast, this doesn't necessarily imply a decline of xenophobia: Persons placing high importance on behavior and cultural adaptation have equally frequent xenophobic tendencies as persons considering ethnicity to be more important. Still, the number of Germans feeling strong hostility towards strangers went down at large.

The fear of immigration is the first indicator for the openness of a society towards migrants. If a high number of persons without migration background¹ is strongly concerned about the phenomenon of immigration, social closure is at a high level. Data collected by the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)², which is connected to DIW Berlin and sponsored by the Leibniz-Gemeinschaft (WGL), allow a longitudinal analysis (see box). In 1999, about a third of all German citizens without migration background was strongly concerned about immigration; ten years later, this figure has gone down to a quarter (Figure 1). In contrast, the percentage of persons who are not concerned about immigration has increased from 16 to 32 percent between 1999 and 2009.

This tendency of decreasing concern can be observed in all analyzed groups—the only exception is the group of unemployed persons (Figure 2). The strongest decline can be found in the group of senior citizens. This can probably be attributed to cohort effects: A growing number of individuals in the old generation has grown up after the war and shows less xenophobic attitudes.³ All in all, the figure shows that people are less concerned about immigration the higher they rank in their professional hierarchy. Persons whose jobs strongly depend on economic ups and downs—such as manual labor or non-manual routine jobs⁴—worry most about immigration of potential workforce. This finding can partly be explained by the fact that a low level of educa-

¹ We define persons without migration background as persons of German nationality who have not immigrated themselves and whose parents have not immigrated either.

² Wagner, G.G. et al. (2008): Das Sozio-oekonomische Panel (SOEP): multidisziplinäres Haushaltspanel und Kohortenstudie für Deutschland—Eine Einführung (für neue Datennutzer) mit einem Ausblick (für erfahrene Anwender). AStA Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv, 2(4), 301-328.

³ See Rippl, S. (2008): Zu Gast bei Freunden? Fremdenfeindliche Einstellungen und interethnische Freundschaften im Zeitverlauf. In: F. Kalter (Hrsg.): Migration und Integration. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 48, 488-512.

⁴ Non-manual routine jobs are professions like clerks or cleaning staff.

Dataset and Method

The Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a representative survey of private households which is carried out annually by TNS Infratest Sozialforschung on behalf of DIW Berlin as part of the German research infrastructure. The survey was begun in 1984 in West Germany and since 1990 also includes East Germany. The SOEP collects data on socio-structural indicators as well as attitudes and concerns of respondents regarding specific topics and areas of life. In 2009, more than 20,000 persons above the age of 16, representing more than 10,000 households, took part in the survey.

Another survey belonging to the research infrastructure is the Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften (ALLBUS). It is conducted biannually on behalf of GESIS (Mannheim) and collects data on behavior and attitudes of the German population, with a specific focus for each survey. In 1996 and 2006, respondents were asked about their attitude towards foreigners and the importance of certain criteria for granting German nationality. This allows for example an analysis of a link between attitudes and changes over time. In this article, xenophobic attitudes are measured based on the following set of questions:

1. Foreigners living in Germany are a burden for the welfare system.
2. Foreigners living in Germany enrich the cultural life in Germany.
3. Foreigners living in Germany and their presence here cause problems on the housing market.
4. Foreigners living in Germany take away jobs from Germans.
5. Foreigners living in Germany commit crimes more often than Germans.

Answers were given on a scale from 1 to 7. For the calculation of the level of xenophobia, these answers were transformed into values from 0 to 6. Answers to the second question were rescaled to values from 6 to 0. Respondents with extreme values between 25 and 30 are considered as strongly xenophobic and receive the value 1. Others receive the value 0. This dichotomous indicator is then used as explaining variable.

The set of questions testing the attitudes towards naturalization was introduced with the following explanation: "I am going to list certain aspects which can play a role in the decision on granting German nationality. Please tell me with the help of the scale how important these aspects should be in this decision:

1. Whether the person was born in Germany,
2. is of German descent,
3. masters the German language,
4. has been living here for a long time,
5. is willing to adapt to German lifestyle,
6. is a member of a Christian church,
7. has not committed any crimes,
8. is able to earn their living."

These criteria underwent a so-called factor analysis. This way, two dimensions of belonging became clear: an ethnic dimension (questions 1, 2, and 4) and a civil-cultural dimension (questions 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8). From these dimensions based on the respective questions, four types were created: strong agreement in both dimensions, weak agreement in both dimensions, agreement predominantly in the ethnic dimension and agreement predominantly in the civil-cultural dimension. Strong agreement is considered as values of at least 5 on the scale from 0 to 6.

tion generally implies more skeptical attitudes towards immigration.⁵

On the whole, the level of concern was significantly lower in 2009 than in 1999. However, there were strong fluctuations within this ten-year period: Between 2001 and 2005, a considerable increase of concern was observed in all professional groups. This might go back to the rise of international terrorism and the discussions on

the integration of Muslims as well as political debates on migration: In 2001, the so-called immigration commission⁶ published their report, which intensified the public discussion of the need for immigration to Germany and the necessity of integration.⁷ From 2006 onwards—one year after the Immigration Act came into

⁵ See Coenders, M. and Scheepers, P. (2003): The Effect of Education on Nationalism and Ethnic Exclusionism: An International Comparison. *Political Psychology*, 24(2), 313-343.

⁶ See Bundesministerium des Inneren (Hrsg.) (2001): *Zuwanderung gestalten. Integration fördern. Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission „Zuwanderung“*, Berlin.

⁷ In this regard see also the report of the so-called immigration council: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2004) (Hrsg.): *Migration und Integration. Erfahrungen nutzen, Neues wagen. Jahresgutachten des Sachverständigenrates für Zuwanderung und Integration*. Nürnberg

force—the percentage of Germans who were strongly concerned about immigration went down. Even if it remains unclear which role the changed political treatment of this topic has really played: It is striking that nearly 40 percent of Germans are satisfied with their government regarding immigration and integration. This is a high value, both in comparison with general satisfaction with the government and in international comparison.⁸

Less and less persons show strongly xenophobic attitudes

The ALLBUS (Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften) dataset analyzed for 1996 and 2006 shows⁹ that the average level of xenophobia in both East and West Germany has somewhat decreased (see table). The share of German respondents¹⁰ with a strongly xenophobic attitude declined quite significantly: From nine to four percent in West Germany and from 15 to four percent in East Germany.¹¹ Obviously, there was a convergence of attitudes between West and East Germany on a generally lower level. It is especially striking that in 2006, less respondents stated that foreigners living in Germany were taking away jobs from Germans or causing problems on the housing market.

Earlier studies have shown a correlation between the degree of xenophobia and the legal or collective definition of national identity.¹² The concept of national identity has changed over the past years. The reform of nationality law may have contributed to this trend.

The new law, which came into force on January 1, 2000, introduced the birthplace principle, which was already

⁸ Own calculations based on data by Transatlantic Trends on Immigration, www.trends.gmfus.org.

⁹ This Weekly Report is mainly based on an already published contribution of the authors: see Diehl, C. and Tucci, I. (2010): *Ethnische Grenzziehung in Ost- und Westdeutschland: Konvergenz und Kulturalisierung*. In: Krause, P. und Ostner, I. (Hrsg.): *Leben in Ost- und Westdeutschland. Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Bilanz der deutschen Einheit 1990-2010*, 557-572.

¹⁰ This evaluation includes only respondents who stated they were German by birth.


¹¹ It should be noted that ALLBUS provides an old and a new set of questions for measuring xenophobic attitudes (for more information see Alba, R. and Johnson, M. (2000): *Zur Messung aktueller Einstellungsmuster gegenüber Ausländern in Deutschland*. In: Alba, R., Schmidt, P. und Wasmer, M. (Hrsg.): *Deutsche und Ausländer: Freunde, Fremde oder Feinde?* 229-253. If xenophobia is measured with the old foreigner items, a decline of strongly xenophobic attitudes can also be observed, while the average level remains quite stable (see also Diehl and Tucci (2010), l.c.).

¹² Regarding the correlation between the concept of nation and xenophobia see Hjerm, M. (1998): *National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four Western Countries*. *Acta Sociologica*, 41(4), 335-347 and Lewin-Epstein, N. and Levanon, A. (2005): *National Identity and Xenophobia in an Ethnically Divided Society*. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 7(2), 90-118.

Figure 1

Concern about Immigration

In Percent¹



¹ Persons without migration background.

Source: SOEP.


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Though a peak occurred in 2005, concern about immigration is generally on the decline.

Figure 2

Persons Strongly Concerned about Immigration, by Professional Status

Percentages¹



¹ Persons without migration background.

Source: SOEP.

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Persons in manual labor are more concerned about immigration.

Table

Attitudes Toward Preconditions for Naturalization and Xenophobia in 1996 and 2006

Scale from 1 to 7

	1996	1996	2006	2006
	West	East	West	East
	Germany		Germany	
Indicators for xenophobia				
Foreigners living in Germany...				
... are a burden for the welfare system ¹	4.0	4.6	4.0	4.7
... enrich the cultural life in Germany ^{1,2}	3.9	3.7	4.1	3.9
... cause problems on the housing market	4.3	4.0	2.7	2.1
... take away jobs from Germans	3.6	4.7	3.3	3.9
... commit crimes more often than Germans ^{1,2}	3.9	4.5	4.2	4.3
Total xenophobia (Scale from 0 to 30) ³	14.8	17.3	13.1	14.2
Percentage of strongly xenophobic attitudes	9.4	15.3	3.7	4.1
Preconditions for Naturalization				
Born in Germany ²	4.7	5.0	3.5	3.6
German descent ²	4.4	4.7	3.3	3.5
Master the German language ²	5.4	4.5	6.3	6.2
Living here for a long time ^{1,2}	5.5	5.2	5.0	5.1
Willingness to adapt German lifestyle	5.0	4.8	5.6	5.9
Member of Christian church ¹	2.2	1.8	2.5	2.0
No crimes committed ²	6.1	6.3	6.3	6.5
Earn their living ^{2,4}	5.7	5.8	6.0	6.0

1 Changes between 1996 and 2006 in East Germany are not statistically relevant.

2 Differences between East and West Germany in 2006 are not statistically relevant.

3 Rescaled to 0 – 6. The values of the second indicator are inverted.

4 Differences between East and West Germany in 1996 are not statistically relevant.

Source: ALLBUS 1996 and 2006.

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Strongly xenophobic attitudes are declining – more strongly in East Germany than in the West.

common in other European countries like France. Before 2000, children of migrants did not automatically receive German nationality when they were born in Germany. Since 2000, children of migrants receive German nationality upon their birth in Germany if at least one parent has been living here for eight years and possesses an unlimited residence permit. In some cases, children of migrants can keep both their German nationality and that of their parents.¹³ In other cases, they must choose one within five years after reaching maturity. Although the principle of preventing multiple nationality is kept with a number of exceptions, the introduction of the birthplace principle shows a deviation from Germany's traditional self-understanding as nation by descent. Additionally, other preconditions for

a possible right to German nationality were changed: The necessary length of stay for immigrants was reduced from 15 to eight years. From 2006 onwards, other criteria like sound knowledge of the German language and passing of a citizenship test were discussed. These were finally introduced when nationality law was changed again in August 2007.

Criteria for nationalization: Growing importance of cultural adaptation

Just like the legal framework has changed, the opinions of German-born citizens on the necessary preconditions for naturalization have undergone transformation too. The question “Who can become German?” is now answered differently than before.

When looking at the average values of the indicators for more or less important preconditions for naturalization, it becomes clear that criteria like knowledge of the language and adaptation to German lifestyle are now (2006) regarded as more important than in 1996 countrywide. In contrast, the precondition of German descent has lost some importance.

In terms of the indicators for the assessment of naturalization criteria, two dimensions can be distinguished: The first dimension comprises the criteria birth in Germany, German descent and long duration of stay and is usually¹⁴ called ethnic dimension. The second dimension comprises indicators relating to behavior, including the need for civil and cultural adaptation (knowledge of the language, willingness to adapt to a “German lifestyle”, membership of a Christian church, impunity, economic independence).

Whereas 12 percent of Germans in West Germany and 17 percent in East Germany strongly agreed with ethnic criteria of national identity in 1996, this figure went down to four and three percent respectively ten years later (Figure 3). The percentage of those considering both ethnic and civil-cultural criteria as equally important declined in both parts of Germany too. However, the percentage of persons placing high value on civil-cultural preconditions has sharply increased: In 2006, 57 percent of respondents in West Germany and 54 percent in East Germany considered criteria linked to behavior to be especially important. A separate look at specific indicators tells us that this increase was highest for the cultural preconditions of language skills¹⁵ and lifestyle adaptation, although a slight increase could also be ob-

¹³ EU citizens and children with one German and one foreign parent are allowed to keep both nationalities.

¹⁴ Lewin-Epstein, N. and Levanon, A. (2005), l.c.

¹⁵ Language skills can be considered as civil and/or cultural precondition for naturalization.

served for the precondition of church membership, at least in West Germany, between 1996 and 2006. As a result of this development, the share of respondents not mentioning any specific preconditions for naturalization has gone down over time.

On the one hand, this clear shift points to a move away from ethnic criteria and to a more open concept of nation. On the other hand—and this finding is harder to evaluate—the more frequent demand for lifestyle adaptation shows a stronger culture-related perception of the boundary between so-called “natives” and “foreigners”. A possible explanation might be the demand for respect for universal achievements such as gender equality. If this were the case, the advocates of civil-cultural criteria for naturalization should be less frequently xenophobic than those arguing for ethnic criteria. If, however, the demand for cultural adaptation or an adaptation to German lifestyle were only a new and maybe socially more acceptable form of ethnic exclusion, their representatives should be equally often xenophobic as those supporting descent-based naturalization criteria.

Cultural advocates are no less xenophobic

In the usual approaches to explain xenophobic attitudes, a number of determining factors are taken into account: structural or socio-demographic aspects (age, sex, level of education, employment, household income), social contacts (contact to foreigners), values and political convictions, anomie¹⁶ and concerns. These factors are additionally included in the present multivariate analysis¹⁷ for the understanding of the concept of national belonging. The results of this analysis (Figure 4) show us to what extent the percentage of strongly xenophobic persons increases in relation to their concept of national identity. To this end, respondents placing high importance on civil-cultural and/or ethnic criteria for naturalization are compared with persons who only mildly agree with both types of preconditions.

On average, eight percent of persons without migration background showed strongly xenophobic tendencies in 1996 and 2006. This percentage increases by four percent for persons considering both ethnic and civil-cultural naturalization criteria as very important. But also for respondents considering especially civil-cultural preconditions as important, the share of persons with strongly xenophobic tendencies increases by two percent.


¹⁶ Anomie means a state of weakened social norms and rules causing the individual to feel a lack of orientation and emotional bonds.

¹⁷ The results for each factor are described in detail in Diehl and Tucci (2010), i.e.

Figure 3

Attitudes Toward Preconditions for Naturalization in 1996 and 2006

Percentages



Source: ALLBUS 1996 and 2006.

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Civil-cultural aspects dominate the attitudes towards preconditions for naturalization.

Furthermore, Germans preferring ethnic criteria are not significantly more xenophobic than advocates of purely civil-cultural criteria for naturalization.

Conclusions


Our findings show considerable dynamics in attitudes towards immigration and immigrants since the middle of the 1990s. Still, immigration has become an integral part of German economy: In 2009, nearly 80 percent of Germans affirmed the question whether Germany was an immigration country. The heated media debate on Thilo Sarrazin's book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” (“Germany Does Away With Itself”) hasn't changed much in this respect either.¹⁸ Although ethnic diversity seems to be part of German reality by now, demands for civil and cultural adaptation have sharply increased over the past decade; this is a development not easy to judge in its implications. It remains unclear whether lifestyle adaptation means sufficient language skills and respect for constitutional values such as equal rights for men and women, or if cultural assimilation goes beyond that. Even if this question cannot be fully answered,

¹⁸ This is backed by our own calculations based on data of Transatlantic Trends on Immigration, www.trends.gmfus.org, before and several weeks after Sarrazin's book was published.

Figure 4

Percentage of Respondents with Strongly Xenophobic Attitude

Deviation from overall average in percentage points



Source: ALLBUS 1996 and 2006.

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Persons placing high importance on all criteria for naturalization are generally more xenophobic.

red, our analysis shows a changed concept of national identity. However, the overall decline of xenophobic attitudes is not due to this changed understanding of national identity: Other than expected, advocates of civil-cultural conditions for naturalization are just as likely to have xenophobic tendencies as those defending traditional ethnic criteria.

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Dr. Ingrid Tucci, Research Associate of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) at DIW Berlin

SIX QUESTIONS TO INGRID TUCCI

“Germans are less worried about immigration”

1. Dr. Tucci, you have studied the Germans' attitude toward xenophobia and naturalization. Which requirements do foreigners have to fulfil in order to be eligible for naturalization in Germany? In 1999, there was a very important reform of German citizenship law which led to significant changes. Birthright citizenship was introduced, meaning that immigrant children who were born in Germany, would automatically be Germans. In most cases, they have to decide for either German citizenship or their parents' citizenship until the age of 23. Also, the necessary time of residence for immigrants was reduced from 15 to eight years. In 2007, additional criteria were introduced, such as commitment to the German Fundamental Law, sufficient command of the German language and passing a naturalization test.
2. Traditionally, ancestry used to be an important factor in Germany. Did that change? Yes. In our study, we observed that the importance of cultural adaption has increased for the interviewed persons between 1996 and 2006. This includes criteria such as adoption of German lifestyle or command of the German language. In contrast, so-called ethnic requirements, such as birth in Germany or German ancestry are considered less important than they used to be. We could say that there has been a culturalization of the border between “us” as Germans and “the others”, meaning those considered as strangers, since the 1990s. It is interesting though that persons who demand cultural adaption have just as strong xenophobic attitudes as persons who consider ethnic factors to be very important.
3. What is the Germans' attitude toward immigration? In 2009, there were less persons who worried about immigration issues a lot than persons who did not worry at all.
4. So the Germans are generally less afraid of immigration? Exactly! We also looked at the time between 1999 until 2009 and observed that the number of persons who claim to be very worried about immigration issues has decreased. What we observed as well however, is that this factor as well as attitude toward immigration is subject to strong fluctuation.
5. How about xenophobia in Germany? Has it decreased or increased? We found out that the number of persons who are very xenophobic has decreased between 1996 and 2006. The percentage of these persons used to be higher in the East of Germany. In 2006 however, this number does not differ much from the one in West Germany. We observed that the percentages of very xenophobic persons in East and West Germany have adjusted. Altogether, the level of xenophobia tends to have slightly decreased.
6. A classic position that could be overheard in any pub used to be: “The foreigners are taking away our jobs!” Is this attitude still relevant today? Yes, for some people it might be true. But the data tells us that in between 1996 and 2006, fewer and fewer people were willing to agree to this statement. This means that most people are not convinced by this point. After all, 80 percent of interviewed persons agree that Germany is an immigration country.

Dr. Tucci was interviewed by Erich Wittenberg.

Labor Mobility in Central and Eastern Europe: The Migration of Workers to Germany Has Been Limited in Scope

by Karl Brenke

The enlargement of the EU in 2004 has had numerous effects—and the German labor market has not been left untouched. Among migrant laborers coming to Germany, self-employment has been the most frequent form of labor market participation to date. Despite barriers to immigration and the need to acquire work permits, dependent employment among migrants from 2004 accession countries has also increased. On the whole, however, migrant workers from the accession countries have only added an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 workers to the German labor force since 2004.

Germany's attractiveness to migrant workers from the EU-8 countries has apparently declined in recent years. Since 2006, E-8 labor immigration and work permit issuance rates have been on the decline. While many migrants have been and remain willing to perform unskilled jobs despite having a vocational degree or university education, expectations seem to have risen. Data indicate that new laborers from Bulgaria and Romania have been increasingly pursuing the types of employment that migrants from the 2004 accession countries are now less willing to accept.

The consequences for the German labor market, now that restrictions to freedom of movement have been abolished, are difficult to forecast. There are almost no indications that a massive wave of workers from the EU-8 countries will arrive in Germany. Past experience with labor migration suggests that workers will move first and foremost to economically strong regions that are able to absorb new workers and hold out the promise of relatively high incomes.

In 2004, ten countries joined the EU: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (hereinafter referred to as the EU-8) as well as Malta and Cyprus. The accession of these countries has had little impact on crossborder trade, which was previously liberalized to large extent in bilateral treaties signed between the "old" EU and accession countries in the early 1990s. Labor markets, however, were not liberalized. Prior to accession in 2004, it was almost impossible for workers from the new member states to pursue employment in the EU.

Three "old" EU countries immediately opened their borders to workers from the new member states in 2004: the UK, Ireland, and Sweden. Other countries chose to impose a transitional period prior to allowing full mobility. The transitional period that was agreed upon in the accession treaties was implemented under the argument that the "old" member states should not be burdened by a potential wave of migrant workers. The transition period had three phases—lasting two years, three years, and two years, respectively. With the expiration of each phase, the EU countries that wished to make use of the next phase were required to justify their need for continued barriers to labor mobility before the EU Commission. After the first transitional phase ended in May 2006, Finland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece opened their labor markets. Restrictions were dropped in Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and France before the second period ended. Belgium and Denmark opened their labor markets in 2009 following the expiration of the second transitional phase. It was not until the expiration of the third phase on May 1, 2011, that Germany and Austria granted full mobility to workers from the EU-8.¹

¹ Workers from Malta and Cyprus were previously granted freedom of movement to Germany in May 2004.

Table 1

**Migration of Individuals Aged 18–64 to and from Germany:
Data from Germany's Resident Registration Offices**

Nationality	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Immigration to Germany							
Germany	118 019	131 752	92 953	77 082	78 212	79 282	84 273
Europe ¹	375 376	396 597	392 656	380 117	394 347	385 152	399 197
EU up to 2004 ¹	86 745	81 643	78 175	78 535	79 832	83 566	86 424
Poland	84 693	119 551	141 314	145 761	134 062	113 776	106 695
Hungary	13 790	16 834	18 026	18 111	21 514	24 341	24 276
Slovakia	10 006	11 053	11 395	10 933	8 979	8 361	8 134
Czech Republic	7 873	8 275	7 762	7 125	6 057	5 712	5 343
Slovenia	1 975	2 260	1 397	1 080	1 097	1 111	1 152
Estonia	738	667	635	529	595	530	765
Latvia	1 642	2 085	2 248	1 857	1 549	1 877	4 516
Lithuania	2 775	4 150	4 859	4 477	3 680	3 170	4 283
EU-8	123 492	164 875	187 636	189 873	177 533	158 878	155 164
Romania	22 329	22 203	22 052	22 532	41 379	45 580	53 553
Bulgaria	12 613	10 891	8 492	7 260	19 425	22 157	26 258
Turkey	41 908	36 275	30 002	26 059	23 366	22 752	23 300
Russia	25 671	23 168	19 072	14 274	13 222	12 741	13 160
Ukraine	14 005	12 171	9 091	6 520	6 400	6 013	6 126
Other continents ²	150 830	136 713	125 127	121 849	121 826	130 231	141 727
Total	644 225	665 062	610 736	579 048	594 385	594 665	625 197
Emigration from Germany							
Germany	98 535	118 228	110 749	118 091	121 287	131 532	116 270
Europe ¹	329 879	363 366	322 532	323 656	324 831	382 676	390 678
EU up to 2004 ¹	96 764	107 150	82 576	81 059	78 868	92 084	98 408
Poland	71 690	92 951	96 363	105 192	110 959	115 845	107 614
Hungary	14 560	16 041	15 310	14 685	16 521	20 946	21 512
Slovakia	9 200	9 813	8 873	9 237	8 072	9 064	7 835
Czech Republic	7 815	7 842	5 894	6 091	5 297	6 447	5 938
Slovenia	7 842	2 184	1 434	1 079	1 048	1 373	1 442
Estonia	470	705	432	469	424	635	575
Latvia	1 350	1 575	1 357	1 478	1 306	1 616	2 177
Lithuania	1 944	2 262	2 394	3 040	2 958	3 000	3 131
EU-8	114 871	133 373	132 057	141 271	146 585	158 926	150 224
Romania	18 695	19 307	19 718	20 905	23 667	36 378	42 416
Bulgaria	9 753	9 754	5 746	7 034	8 273	15 201	18 921
Turkey	30 258	30 609	27 236	25 178	23 425	26 964	26 967
Russia	11 577	11 808	10 706	10 196	9 562	11 955	11 476
Ukraine	5 869	5 711	5 092	4 738	4 409	5 732	5 142
Other continents ²	107 314	116 155	104 052	105 580	99 608	122 027	127 614
Total	535 728	597 749	537 333	547 327	545 726	636 235	634 562
Net migration							
Germany	19 484	13 524	-17 796	-41 009	-43 075	-52 250	-31 997
Europe ¹	45 497	33 231	70 124	56 461	69 516	2 476	8 519
EU up to 2004 ¹	-10 019	-25 507	-4 401	-2 524	964	-8 518	-11 984
Poland	13 003	26 600	44 951	40 569	23 103	-2 069	-919
Hungary	-770	793	2 716	3 426	4 993	3 395	2 764
Slovakia	806	1 240	2 522	1 696	907	-703	299
Czech Republic	58	433	1 868	1 034	760	-735	-595
Slovenia	-5 867	76	-37	1	49	-262	-290
Estonia	268	-38	203	60	171	-105	190
Latvia	292	510	891	379	243	261	2 339
Lithuania	831	1 888	2 465	1 437	722	170	1 152
EU-8	8 621	31 502	55 579	48 602	30 948	-48	4 940
Romania	3 634	2 896	2 334	1 627	17 712	9 202	11 137
Bulgaria	2 860	1 137	2 746	226	11 152	6 956	7 337
Turkey	11 650	5 666	2 766	881	-59	-4 212	-3 667
Russia	14 094	11 360	8 366	4 078	3 660	786	1 684
Ukraine	8 136	6 460	3 999	1 782	1 991	281	984
Other continents ²	43 516	20 558	21 075	16 269	22 218	8 204	14 113
Total	89 013	53 789	91 199	31 721	48 659	-41 570	-9 365

1 Excluding German nationals. 2 Including stateless persons and individuals of unknown nationality.

Sources: German Federal Statistical Office; calculations by DIW.

Prior to May 2011, Austria and Germany also made use of special rules in the service sector that restricted the ability of firms in the accession countries to render specific services—including construction, janitorial, and interior design services—in the Austrian and German markets. Nevertheless, it has been possible for individuals from the accession countries to pursue self-employment in Germany since May 2004. Furthermore, there were some options for individuals from accession countries to pursue normal employment in Germany prior to May of this year, despite numerous restrictions.

In this article, we will first look at how migration from EU-8 countries has developed since 2004. We will then discuss the forms of employment pursued by immigrants from EU-8 countries in Germany. Finally, we will take a brief look at the other states of the “old” EU. By viewing the developments in EU countries that have granted migrant workers full labor market access for some time, we can gain an impression of how Germany might be affected by the free movement of labor in coming months and years.

Low net migration to Germany from the EU-8

There are two sets of statistics maintained by the German Federal Statistical Office concerning foreign migration. The first set of statistics is derived from Germany’s resident registration offices (Einwohnermeldeämter) and includes data on individuals relocating within as well as emigrating from Germany. This data set is known as the “Bevölkerungsfortschreibung.” The second set of statistics comes from the Central Register for Foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister) and is based on resident registrations filed with Germany’s foreigner registration offices (Ausländerbehörde). This register was subjected to a comprehensive revision in 2004, and data on more than 600,000 individuals were removed. For this reason, only the migration data from 2005 onward can be used. Theoretically, the data from both sets of statistics with regard to Germany’s foreign population should correspond. Yet, this is not the case. Resident registration data from 2010 indicate that there were 7.2 million foreigners living in Germany. However, according to the Central Register for Foreigners, there are only 6.8 million foreigners in Germany. The cause of this discrepancy is unclear, and has certainly not been helped by the fact that the last official census in Germany prior to 2011 was conducted in 1964.² Furthermore, there are differences between the data sets concerning the scope

of migration over time. Nevertheless, both sets of data reveal similar patterns.

While net foreign immigration to Germany was strong at the end of the 1990s, it has fallen sharply since then. Among working-age foreigners from “old” EU countries, net immigration has been slightly positive according to resident registration data, and slightly negative according to the Central Register for Foreigners (Tables 1 and 2). Net immigration from non-EU countries has been positive but low. Net immigration gains from countries on the EU’s periphery have also been quite low; in the case of Turkish nationals, it appears that there have even been net losses. Among German nationals net migration has been strongly negative in recent years.

A jump in immigration from the EU-8 countries was experienced following the enlargement of the EU in 2004—this increase, however, was not strong. Net immigration gains from the EU-8 following 2004 were driven initially by immigration from Poland. There was also an increase in immigrants from Hungary. From other countries, however, immigration increased very little or not at all. In 2006, net immigration from Poland fell significantly. Since then, it has become even smaller. As emigration from Germany in past years has remained quite high and has shown a slight upward trend, net immigration gains from EU-8 countries have gradually diminished. In 2010 however, this downward trend reversed itself, and net immigration increased slightly once again.

A large jump in immigration from Bulgaria and Romania was experienced after these countries joined the EU in 2007. Net immigration from these two countries has grown continuously since 2007 and the surplus is now equal in size to net immigration from the EU-8.

According to the Central Register for Foreigners, there were some 500,000 working-age EU-8 nationals living in Germany at the end of 2010. The majority—nearly 70%—are Polish nationals (see Figure 1). The fact that Polish nationals comprise the largest immigrant group in Germany from new accession countries is not surprising when one considers that Poland is the most populous EU-8 state. If one places the immigrant populations in Germany in relation to the size of their respective countries of origin, Poland is also up front (see Figure 2). In per-capita terms, the Bulgarians move to Germany with nearly the same frequency as the Poles. Estonian and Czech nationals are the least willing to immigrate to Germany.

² Statistisches Bundesamt: Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit. Ausländische Bevölkerung. Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters. Fachserie 1, Reihe 2, Ausgabe 2010, 5.

Table 2

**Migration of Individuals Aged 15–64 to and from Germany:
Data from the Central Register for Foreigners**


Nationality	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Immigration						
Europe	247 253	232 433	246 761	241 141	237 867	278 705
EU up to 2004	53 215	51 667	54 700	57 641	55 990	61 103
Poland	71 368	75 383	70 158	60 397	53 885	56 844
Hungary	10 577	11 115	13 667	15 845	14 760	18 108
Slovakia	6 243	6 260	5 293	4 990	4 841	5 094
Czech Republic	4 995	4 536	4 217	3 942	3 584	3 821
Slovenia	728	623	667	668	657	892
Estonia	439	345	380	363	435	575
Latvia	1 450	1 177	973	1 060	2 539	3 953
Lithuania	3 458	3 043	2 424	2 079	2 733	3 702
EU-8	99 258	102 482	97 779	89 344	83 434	92 989
Romania	13 285	12 488	24 984	25 798	28 287	39 516
Bulgaria	6 317	4 998	12 052	13 600	15 096	21 077
Turkey	25 085	18 848	17 344	16 187	16 099	16 037
Russia	15 652	11 589	10 736	10 295	10 204	10 987
Ukraine	7 862	5 584	5 537	4 916	4 725	5 043
Other continents ¹	100 485	100 367	103 690	110 397	118 529	128 635
Total	347 738	332 800	350 451	351 538	356 396	407 340
Emigration from Germany						
Europe	183 250	169 641	174 856	195 127	195 633	185 895
EU up to 2004	51 055	47 249	48 681	53 317	54 965	48 151
Poland	39 341	41 365	47 552	50 380	45 942	39 051
Hungary	8 057	6 921	8 040	10 068	11 334	10 273
Slovakia	5 266	4 572	4 404	4 852	4 297	4 140
Czech Republic	3 368	3 327	3 113	3 606	3 320	2 899
Slovenia	759	627	618	795	767	727
Estonia	262	234	228	283	266	315
Latvia	751	715	649	651	881	1 631
Lithuania	1 531	1 689	1 701	1 574	1 649	1 946
EU-8	59 335	59 450	66 305	72 209	68 456	60 982
Romania	12 090	11 505	11 872	16 341	18 486	21 285
Bulgaria	6 639	5 181	4 574	7 431	8 244	10 362
Turkey	17 759	15 387	14 637	15 182	14 628	13 517
Russia	6 655	6 037	5 747	6 457	5 845	5 727
Ukraine	4 011	3 327	2 921	3 192	2 658	2 643
Other continents ¹	67 775	66 315	67 126	72 839	74 081	73 635
Total	251 025	235 956	241 982	267 966	269 714	259 530
Net migration						
Europe	64 003	62 792	71 905	46 014	42 234	92 810
EU up to 2004	2 160	4 418	6 019	4 324	1 025	12 952
Poland	32 027	34 018	22 606	10 017	7 943	17 793
Hungary	2 520	4 194	5 627	5 777	3 426	7 835
Slovakia	977	1 688	889	138	544	954
Czech Republic	1 627	1 209	1 104	336	264	922
Slovenia	-31	-4	49	-127	-110	165
Estonia	177	111	152	80	169	260
Latvia	699	462	324	409	1 658	2 322
Lithuania	1 927	1 354	723	505	1 084	1 756
EU-8	39 923	43 032	31 474	17 135	14 978	32 007
Romania	1 195	983	13 112	9 457	9 801	18 231
Bulgaria	-322	-183	7 478	6 169	6 852	10 715
Turkey	7 326	3 461	2 707	1 005	1 471	2 520
Russia	8 997	5 552	4 989	3 838	4 359	5 260
Ukraine	3 851	2 257	2 616	1 724	2 067	2 400
Other continents ¹	32 710	34 052	36 564	37 558	44 448	55 000
Total	96 713	96 844	108 469	83 572	86 682	147 810

¹ Including stateless persons and individuals of unknown nationality.
Sources: German Federal Statistical Office; calculations by DIW Berlin.

Figure 1

Migration of Individuals Aged 15–64 from the EU-8 Countries, 2010

In percent




Sources: German Federal Statistical Office; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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Polish nationals are by far the largest immigrant group from EU-8 countries in Germany.

Figure 2

Number of Foreigners Aged 15–64 Living in Germany in Relation to Home Country Size



The figures above indicate the number of individuals living in Germany with a given nationality in relation to every 100 individuals in each respective home country

Sources: German Federal Statistical Office; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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On a per-capita basis, the willingness of Polish nationals to immigrate to Germany is particularly strong, while the Bulgarians are not far behind.

Temporary immigration becoming more common

The migration behavior in evidence today is markedly different from past patterns, such as those witnessed du-

ring the colonization of America or the industrialization of Germany (when Polish nationals immigrated in great numbers to the Ruhr region). Previously, the decision to immigrate was usually a permanent one. The current era of immigration to Germany also differs fundamentally from the wave of “guest workers” who began to arrive at the end of the 1950s in order to satisfy the country’s immense hunger for labor during the post-war boom years. Although it was intended that these immigrants would only work in Germany for a limited period, many viewed Germany as a new home and they arranged for their families to immigrate as well. Today, however, there is a strong tendency for immigrants to only live abroad for several months or years before returning to their respective home countries.

One-ninth of all foreigners who had immigrated to Germany at some point left the country in 2010 (see Table 3). The average period of residence in Germany among immigrants is just under nine years. This average value is strongly influenced by the fact that among those immigrants who leave Germany, a fairly significant number have lived in the country for an extended period—and, for example, only leave in order to retire. Such long-term residents include many members of the “guest worker” generation.

On the other side of the equation are those who only stay in Germany for a very short time. In 2010, one-fifth of all foreigners who left Germany had not lived in the country for longer than one year and two-thirds had lived in Germany for up to 6 years. The motives underlying the departure of these foreigners cannot be ascertained due to a lack of data. Alongside immigration for employment reasons, immigration for educational reasons plays a significant and increasingly important role.³ By contrast, immigration among seekers of political asylum has become much less prevalent.⁴

Short-term stays of only a few years are particularly common among immigrants from the EU-8 countries. One-fourth of foreigners from these countries residing in Germany and returning home in 2010 had stayed less than one year and three-quarters returned home after

³ According to the German Federal Statistical Office, the number of foreign students in Germany increased by 19,000, or 51%, over the ten-year period from the 1999–2000 to the 2009–10 winter semesters (see Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.1).

⁴ According to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 28,000 individuals sought asylum in Germany in 2009. Of this number, 11,400 were applications rejected, which as a rule leads to deportation, and another 7,800 applications were resolved in some other way. In the 1990s the number of individuals seeking asylum in Germany was between 8- and 35-times higher. See Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge: Migrationsbericht 2009, Nuremberg 2011.

less than six years. Among Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, the short-stay rates are even higher. Among these groups the fluctuation rate is also extremely high, exceeding 50%.

Mathematically speaking, one-half of all foreigners from these countries living in Germany are exchanged each year.⁵ The fluctuation rate is not much lower among Hungarian and Latvian nationals. Among Poles, the rate is 25%. The Slovenians exhibit a different pattern of behavior. Many came to Germany as guest workers while Yugoslavia still existed; they also have a lower willingness to migrate. A similar pattern of behavior is shown by foreigners from “old” EU countries. Nevertheless, among citizens of “old” EU countries who left Germany in 2010, half had resided in Germany for less than six years. By contrast, the rate of fluctuation among Turkish nationals is very low: Of those who left Germany in 2010, the vast majority had lived in Germany for an extended period.⁶

The often short-term duration of residence in Germany among EU-8 nationals witnessed prior to 2011 can be partially ascribed to the fact that many only received temporary work permits and were forced to return to their home countries once these permits had expired. It is likely that a fair portion of those departing Germany are so-called “circular migrants” who repeatedly leave only to return again.⁷

Only a small increase in the number of dependent employees in Germany from the new member states

Beginning in 2004, the number of foreigners from EU-8 countries working in jobs subject to social-insurance contributions increased noticeably and has continued to rise; the same upward trend can be observed for Bulgarian and Romanian employees in Germany starting in 2007 (Figure 3). This growth was not driven by the business cycle, for the number of employees in Germany subject to social-insurance contributions also grew across the broader economy. In total, the number of workers in regular employment has increased by approximately one-half for immigrants from the 2004 accession countries and by over one-third for the 2007 accession

Table 3

Fluctuation and Departures of Foreigners from Germany, 2010

Nationality	Fluctuation rate ¹ in 2010	Percentage of individuals among all foreigners departing in 2010 who had resided in Germany for less than ...		Average duration of residence in Germany among foreigners departing in 2010
		one year	six years	
Europe	10.0	21.7	61.0	10.2
EU up to 2004	8.1	11.4	49.0	
Poland	25.0	24.8	76.7	4.8
Hungary	45.4	28.2	76.9	4.7
Slovakia	37.7	30.5	79.3	3.9
Czech Republic	21.0	22.8	75.2	4.7
Slovenia	9.4	16.3	47.5	19.1
Estonia	22.6	30.2	86.4	3.9
Latvia	46.5	50.6	89.3	2.6
Lithuania	27.4	35.0	83.5	3.2
EU-8	27.6	26.6	77.0	
Romania	56.8	41.1	87.1	3.0
Bulgaria	50.5	40.1	86.3	2.9
Turkey	2.4	8.2	25.6	22.2
Russia	10.5	25.4	71.7	4.4
Ukraine	7.3	21.9	61.8	5.3
Other continents²	17.1	20.9	74.0	
Total	11.5	21.4	64.6	8.8

¹ Sum of arrivals and departures divided by the halved sum of the total immigrant population at the beginning and end of the year.

² Including stateless persons and individuals of unknown nationality.

Sources: German Federal Statistical Office; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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Temporary immigration: One-ninth of foreigners living in Germany left the country in 2010.

countries, yet, the absolute gains of 50,000 and 20,000 employees, respectively, are not large. The percentage of employees subject to social-insurance contributions from the EU-8 countries as well as Bulgaria and Romania does not even represent 1% of all employees subject to social-insurance contributions in Germany.

It is likely that growth has also been experienced among the marginally employed; data on such are not available, however. The scale of illegal employment is of course unclear. Nevertheless, illegal employment relationships existed before the EU's enlargement and there is no evidence that this problem has intensified since then. It is possible, however, that illegal forms of employment are gradually being supplanted by legal, marginal forms of employment and that this will soon be evident in official statistics.

Data available for 2006 onward concerning the number of work permits issued by the German Federal Employment Agency suggest that EU-8 nationals have had


⁵ The actual exchange of individuals could be lower, as it is possible for an individual to move back and forth several times within a given time frame.

⁶ The lower rate of departure among Turks is certainly attributable in part to the fact that emigration can lead to the loss of one's residency permit.

⁷ For more on circular migration from third-world countries to Germany, see Schneider, J., Parusel, B.: Zirkuläre und temporäre Migration. Empirische Erkenntnisse, politische Praxis und zukünftige Optionen in Deutschland. Working Paper der Nationalen Kontaktstelle des EMN und der Forschungsgruppe des Bundesamtes, Nr. 35 (2011).

Figure 3

Number of EU-8 plus Bulgarian and Romanian Nationals in Jobs Subject to Social-Insurance Contributions at the End of June in Each Respective Year



Sources: German Federal Statistical Office; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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The number of employees subject to social-insurance contributions in Germany from the new EU states has been increasing continuously.

Table 4

Work Permits Granted to Nationals from New EU States

Nationality	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Estonia	339	290	302	371	401
Slovenia	383	458	545	442	458
Latvia	523	582	710	994	1 429
Lithuania	1 484	1 701	2 054	1 941	2 119
Poland	40 547	43 118	46 123	40 577	25 113
Slovakia	5 203	4 834	4 626	4 232	3 886
Czech Republic	5 074	4 976	5 028	3 970	4 298
Hungary	4 003	4 626	6 111	6 320	7 587
EU-8 states	57 556	60 585	65 499	58 847	45 291
Bulgaria		5 169	8 434	9 312	11 130
Romania		13 711	19 824	21 070	20 421
Other ¹	389	313	396	484	670
Total	57 945	79 778	94 153	89 713	77 512

¹ Family members to whom a nationality cannot be assigned.

Sources: German Federal Statistical Office; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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Interest in working in Germany has declined as of late.

a declining interest in seeking employment in Germany. The number of work permits issued to Polish nationals has in particular been on the decline since 2008 (Table 4).⁸ Individuals from Slovakia also received fewer work permits.

By contrast, the number of work permits granted to workers from Hungary and the Baltic states has increased. The same applies to individuals from Bulgaria and Romania.

There has also been a considerable change in the types of work permits granted. A strong increase has occurred in the issuance of work permits that provide a nearly unlimited right to work in Germany (see Table 5). At the same time, there has been a considerable drop in the issuance of a category of lesser work permits known as *Arbeitserlaubnisse*. Generally, this type of permit is only valid for a limited period and is issued for the first job taken up by an immigrant in Germany. These issuance trends suggest that many workers from the new EU states have become more discriminating regarding the type of work they are willing to perform. They have become less willing to accept jobs that are time-limited—the very same jobs that are also likely to represent marginal forms of employment.

There is strong regional heterogeneity in the issuance of work permits by Germany's Federal Employment Agency to EU-8 nationals. When one looks at the permits granted for positions subject to social-insurance contributions according to the Federal Employment Agency's regional breakdown, a disproportionately large number of permits is issued in Bavaria and Hessen. In Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz, the relative frequency with which permits are issued is also high. Work permits were issued with an average degree of frequency in the Western and North German states and relatively less frequently in Eastern Germany. The pattern with which permits are issued is reflective of the distribution of economic strength within Germany. Germany's prosperous regions thus appear to attract foreigners most frequently—i.e. those regions that promise the highest incomes.

The number of seasonal workers from the EU-8 has been on the decline since 2004; the Hungarians represent the sole exception to this trend (see Table 6). This decline is also attributable to a lowered interest in a form of employment that is typically not that attractive in terms of work conditions or pay. This observati-

⁸ While the number of rejected applications has risen somewhat in recent years, this figure has not risen nearly as quickly as the number of approved applications has dropped.

Table 5

Work Permits Granted to Nationals from the New EU States According to the Federal Employment Agency's Regional Breakdown

Region	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	For comparison: % of all regularly employed EU-8 nationals
						2010
	Number					
Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Meckl.-Vorpommern	2313	3036	3476	3678	3232	
Lower Saxony, Bremen	4950	6823	7867	8474	7590	
North Rhine-Westphalia	8472	11918	13867	14045	12071	
Hessen	4591	6596	7875	8192	8745	
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland	5764	8634	8805	7271	5071	
Baden-Württemberg	9647	13690	15602	14116	13865	
Bavaria	15756	22282	28093	24705	19859	
Berlin-Brandenburg	3170	3717	4483	5146	4242	
Saxony-Anhalt, Thüringen	1645	1368	1135	2387	1021	
Saxony	1480	1516	1657	1461	1643	
Not specified	156	198	303	238	173	
Total	57944	79778	93163	89713	77512	
<i>Of this number:</i>						
Limited permits (Arbeitslaubnisse)	44885	58147	63248	54581	41798	
Full work permits	13059	21631	29915	35132	35714	
Full work permits as a percentage of all permits	22,5	27,1	32,1	39,2	46,1	
	Breakdown in percent					
Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Meckl.-Vorpommern	4,0	3,8	3,7	4,1	4,2	7,8
Lower Saxony, Bremen	8,5	8,6	8,4	9,4	9,8	9,9
North Rhine-Westphalia	14,6	14,9	14,9	15,7	15,6	21,1
Hessen	7,9	8,3	8,5	9,1	11,3	7,9
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland	9,9	10,8	9,5	8,1	6,5	5,7
Baden-Württemberg	16,6	17,2	16,7	15,7	17,9	14,0
Bavaria	27,2	27,9	30,2	27,5	25,6	16,4
Berlin-Brandenburg	5,5	4,7	4,8	5,7	5,5	6,8
Saxony-Anhalt, Thüringen	2,8	1,7	1,2	2,7	1,3	5,4
Saxony	2,6	1,9	1,8	1,6	2,1	5,1
Not specified	0,3	0,2	0,3	0,3	0,2	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Sources: German Federal Statistical Office; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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Employees from EU-8 countries are particularly common in Southern Germany.

on does not apply, however, to the Bulgarians and Romanians. The number of seasonal workers from these countries has been on the rise.

Self-employment is a frequent form of employment among foreign nationals


As self-employed individuals in the EU-8 states were immediately granted full freedom of movement in 2004, a large number made use of the opportunity to immigrate to Germany. An additional factor facilitating the emigration of self-employed foreigners to Germany was the reform of the German Trades Regulation Act in 2004,

which made it easier for German and foreign tradesman to start a business.

From 2004 to the end of 2010, the number of businesses in handicraft run by EU-8 nationals increased sharply to approximately 40,000 businesses, a figure representing 4% of all handicraft firms in Germany (see Figure 4). Three-quarters of such businesses with owners from EU-8 countries offer services which do not require master certification, meaning they fall under Appendix B1 of the German Trades Regulation Act, which was first

Figure 4

Number of Firms Offering Tradesman Services with Owners from the 2004 Accession Countries
Number at the end of each year




Sources: Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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Many Eastern Europeans circumvented barriers to immigration by working as self-employed tradesman.

Figure 5

Number of Firms with Owners from the 2004 Accession Countries as a Percentage of All Firms Offering Tradesman Services, Breakdown by German State, 2010



Sources: Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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In Hamburg and Hessen, one-eighth of all businesses offering tradesman services are run by an EU-8 national.

created in 2004.⁹ One-seventh of firms offering tradesman services not subject to certification requirements in Germany were run by an EU-8 national in 2010. Furthermore, many firms offering handicraft-like services are owned by EU-8 nationals.

By contrast, there are hardly any skilled workers from the EU-8 states working in trades that require a German master certificate.¹⁰ Thus, self-employed immigrants from the EU-8 are clustered in a small range of trades; in the tile-laying, janitorial and steel-fixing trades, one-quarter of all businesses in Germany are run by EU-8 nationals (see Table 7). EU-8 nationals also make up a sizeable portion of businesses in the screed, parquet and cable installation trades, as well as in the dry wall and structure treatment and preservation trades. Incidentally, all of these trades are economic activities for which the free movement of services is not guaranteed under EU law. To circumvent this hurdle, many have simply registered a business in Germany.

Craftsmen from EU-8 countries have moved with particular frequency to Bavaria and Hessen (see Figure 5). They are also strongly represented in Rheinland-Pfalz and Bremen and particularly in Hamburg. In East Germany, however, they are hardly found at all—with the exception of Berlin. This heterogeneity is reflective of regional income disparities in Germany. An additional relevant effect is that immigrants often choose to locate their businesses in large cities, as large cities typically contain an ethnic community from the immigrant's home country, which helps to ease day-to-day life and business activities.

The majority of immigrants from the EU-8 have vocational training or a university education ...

The German Microcensus provides us with additional information about EU-8 immigrants residing in Germany. Data assessments are only available up to 2008, however. For our analysis, we examined foreigners who immigrated to Germany from 2004 onward and who continued to live in the country in 2008, as well as EU-8 nationals who moved to Germany between 1999 and 2003.

⁹ Among the tradesmen that fall under this appendix are, in particular, tilers, floorers, shoemakers, janitors, clothing cleaners, instrument builders, and goldsmiths.

¹⁰ Workers requiring a journeyman's certificate include masonry workers, roofers, cabinetmakers, carpenters, scaffold workers, bakers, butchers, and hairdressers.

The labor participation rate of EU-8 immigrants in Germany is comparable to that of resident foreign nationals from the “old” EU countries. Some 60% participate in the labor market; one-fifth are students (see Table 8). Similar figures apply to immigrants from EU-8 countries who arrived in Germany between 1999 and 2003. Among other groups of immigrants, the labor participation rate is significantly lower—in the case of foreigners from outside the EU, this is attributable to the fact that many are in Germany to pursue university studies. Of the EU-8 nationals who arrived in Germany after 2004, one-eighth are unemployed. This number is higher than the share of unemployed immigrants from the “old” EU, but lower than the share of unemployed immigrants from other parts of Europe or other continents.

Among EU-8 immigrants—particularly those who are employed—it is noteworthy that in comparison to other groups of immigrants, a much larger percentage possess an upper-secondary school leaving certificate or vocational training degree. Very few have no vocational or university education, although the percentage of individuals with university degrees is comparatively low. There are no differences in terms of educational attainment between EU-8 nationals who entered Germany between 1999 and 2003 and those who arrived later.

Among EU-8 nationals who have immigrated to Germany since 2004, the high percentage of self-employed individuals—nearly 40%—is quite noteworthy. However, a closer inspection of the data reveals that these individuals are self-employed not only in manual trades, but across a wide spectrum of professions. EU-8 nationals work in retail, the transport sector and in “higher” professions (e.g. academia, creative industries). However, the self-employment ratio is much lower among EU-8 nationals who immigrated between 1999 and 2003, as well as among other groups of immigrants who arrived in Germany after 2004. This confirms that a new channel for immigration was opened up by the enlargement of the EU and introduction of freedom of movement for self-employed immigrants. However, we cannot say whether the statistics are capturing true self-employment in all cases. Particularly in the construction industry, there are indications that some companies incorrectly designate employees as independent contractors (thus leading to “pseudo self-employment”), but the prevalence of this practice is unknown.

... Yet they are often employed in unskilled or low-skilled jobs

A relatively large percentage of the EU-8 nationals immigrating since 2004 perform manual jobs and are

Table 6

Seasonal Workers According to Country of Origin

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Poland	271 907	286 623	279 197	236 267	228 807	194 288	187 507	177 010
Slovakia	9 578	8 995	7 502	6 778	5 122	4 322	3 700	3 569
Czech Republic	2 235	1 974	1 625	1 232	1 087	858	740	757
Hungary	3 504	2 784	2 305	1 806	1 800	1 947	1 993	2 149
Slovenia	223	193	159	141	119	111	119	100
EU-8 countries	287 447	300 569	290 788	246 224	236 935	201 526	194 059	183 585
Bulgaria	1 434	1 249	1 320	1 293	1 182	2 914	3 083	3 520
Romania	24 559	27 190	33 083	51 190	58 893	76 534	93 362	101 820

Sources: German Federal Employment Office; German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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The number of seasonal workers from all EU-8 countries has fallen considerably except in the case of Hungary; the number of seasonal workers from Romania and Bulgaria has also been on the rise.

Table 7

Number of Firms Offering Tradesman Services with Owners from the 2004 Accession Countries

End of 2010

	Number of firms overall	Percentage thereof with an EU-8 owner
Tiling, paving	15 604	25
Janitorial	9 111	24
Interior design	2 672	11
Installation of standardized components	2 582	5
Wood and structure preservation, protection	1 747	8
Flooring	1 069	7
Cosmetician	757	2
Steel fixing	733	24
Screed installation	719	14
Parquet installation	671	10
Cable installation in building construction	432	13
Masonry, concrete services	314	1
Clothing alterations	246	2
Gap and joint filling in building construction	226	4
Tailoring	193	2
Painting, coating services	174	0
Hairdressing	166	0
Building drying services	142	8

Source: Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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These figures confirm the German cliché of the Polish tiler.

Table 8

Breakdown of Foreigners Aged 15–64 Who Immigrated in 2004 or Later (data from 2008)

	Total	Breakdown by region of origin				For comparison: EU-8 nationals who immigrated between 1999 and 2003
		EU 8	EU up to 2004	Rest of Europe	Other Continents	
Population						
Educational attainment (in %)						
No vocational training/university degree	50	33	39	55	60	32
Vocational degree	25	49	23	28	11	47
University degree	25	18	38	17	29	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Labor participation						
Labor participation rate ¹	51	62	66	49	39	62
Employment rate ²		54	61	39	32	55
Unemployment rate ³		12	8	20	19	11
Trainee/student rate	26	20	21	22	36	24
Educational attainment among the employed						
No vocational training/university degree	37	27	30	45	45	24
Vocational degree	32	54	26	35	15	52
University degree		19	44	20	40	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Occupational form						
Self-employed	17	38	16	10	9	10
Employee	77	58	80	83	82	84
Trainee		4	4	8	9	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Type of employment						
Unskilled or low-skilled manual work	28	38	13	38	25	27
Skilled manual work		17	10	17	12	14
Unskilled or low-skilled non-manual work		17	16	18	20	23
Skilled non-manual work	24	19	35	19	22	27
Professionals, engineers, executives	16	10	27	8	21	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

1 Percentage of population participating in work force. 2 Working population as a percentage of the overall population. 3 Unemployment rate as a percentage of the labor force. 4 Including family members who provide assistance.

Source: German Microcensus; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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EU-8 immigrants differ from other immigrant groups: The labor participation rate is high, many are self-employed, and there are few unskilled individuals.

particularly active as tradesmen.¹¹ The same observation holds true for immigrants from the rest of Europe; this group includes many workers from Romania and

Bulgaria. Correspondingly, a smaller percentage of workers from EU-8 countries who have immigrated since 2004 work in the service sector. In general, the percentage with skilled jobs in this group is relatively low—despite the fact that these immigrants have a comparatively better educational attainment profile.

Thus, a large percentage of EU-8 immigrants who completed vocational training are employed in unskilled or

¹¹ Job activities have been classified according to exercised profession. The classification scheme developed by Blossfeld, as revised by Schimpl-Neimans, was used. See Bernhard Schimpl-Neimans: Umsetzung der Berufsklassifikation von Blossfeld auf die Mikrozensus 1973–1998. ZUMA-Methodenbericht Nr. 10/2003.

low-skilled jobs (see Table 9). This is also true in the case of a significant number of university graduates. This mismatch between education and employment can also be observed among immigrants who arrived in recent years from countries outside Europe as well as among immigrants from Bulgaria, Romania and non-EU European countries. The situation is quite different with respect to immigrants from “old” EU countries, however: education and employment are aligned among such immigrants with much greater frequency.

A number of explanations have been suggested for why many immigrants from EU-8 countries with vocational training or a university degree perform unskilled or low-skilled jobs. One explanation is that regulations for exercising a profession or bureaucratic hurdles in Germany prevent immigrants from entering certain occupations. Non-recognition of foreign degrees in Germany may also play a role. However, this cannot be the sole reason for even EU-8 immigrants in countries such as Sweden or the UK perform unskilled or low-skilled work with greater frequency than their educational attainment would suggest. This, in turn, causes EU-8 immigrants to have relatively lower income levels.¹² There is substantial evidence suggesting that EU-8 immigrants tend to work in segments of the labor market and service sector that are easily and quickly accessible and that also offer an attractive earnings potential (at least when measured in terms of wage levels in their home countries).

Significant immigration following EU labor market liberalization experienced by the UK only

Some countries that opened their labor markets early on—particularly the UK (see Table 10)—have experienced a significant wave of immigration. In relative terms, Ireland has also been affected quite significantly—while the absolute number of immigrants in Ireland is modest, the country’s labor market is small. The number of EU-8 immigrants working in Ireland fell considerably as a result of the economic crisis, which was acutely felt in Anglo-Saxon countries. In the UK, the number of workers from the EU-8 dropped somewhat for a short period and is now growing again.

Table 9

Educational Attainment of Employed Foreigners Who Immigrated to Germany in 2004 or Later and Who Perform an Unskilled or Low-Skilled Job (data from 2008)

Region of origin	Percentage of individuals performing an unskilled or low-skilled job as a share of all ...		
	employed individuals	employed individuals with vocational training	employed individuals with a university education
EU-8	37	39	14
EU up to 2004	13	12	2
Rest of Europe	38	42	11
Other Continents	25	40	7
<i>For comparison:</i>			
All employed individuals	18	18	3

Source: German Microcensus; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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The EU-8 immigrants are well qualified, but they tend to perform unskilled or low-skilled jobs.

In almost all other EU countries, the number of EU-8 workers has been on the rise, yet absolute immigration is rather low. With the exception of the UK and Ireland, EU-8 immigrants play a marginal role in the labor markets of the “old” EU. Interestingly, Germany and Austria—two countries that only recently fully opened their borders to EU-8 workers—are among the remaining “old” EU countries with the highest percentage of EU-8 nationals in the labor forces. In no country aside from the UK and Ireland has the removal of restrictions to migrant workers led to a significant increase in the number of EU-8 nationals in the domestic work force.

Forecasting future trends

The enlargement of the EU to new countries in Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 has had little impact on the German labor market. The number of self-employed immigrants working in Germany has increased significantly, as barriers to the migration of the self-employed were lifted with enlargement. By contrast, growth in the number of immigrants working as regular employees has been fairly minimal. Although some advantages were enjoyed by EU-8 workers who wished to migrate to Germany in comparison to their non-EU counterparts between 2004 and 2011, on the whole there were still many restrictions to working in Germany. It is highly probable that many workers only chose to become self-employed because they were barred from pursuing normal employment. Available employment data and other statistics indicate that since 2004, the number of EU-8 nationals working in Germany has grown by an estimated 100,000 to 150,000.

¹² See David G. Blanchflower, Helen Lawitt: The Impact of the Recent Expansion of the EU on the UK Labor Market. In: Martin Kahanec, Klaus F. Zimmermann (eds.): EU Labor Markets After Post-Enlargement Migration, Heidelberg, Berlin 2010. Nicola Doyle, Gerard Hughes, Eskil Wadensjö: Freedom of Movement for Workers from Central and Eastern Europe, Sieps Working Report No. 5 (2007). For Germany see Karl Brenke, Mutlu Yuksel, Klaus F. Zimmermann: EU Enlargement under Continued Mobility Restrictions: Consequences for the German Labor Market. In: Kahanec, Zimmermann, *ibid.*

Table 10

EU-8 Workers¹ in Europe

Country in which work is performed (in parenthesis: year in which labor market was opened)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
In thousands						
Ireland (2004)		107.6	149.3	153.0	114.2	103.6
Sweden (2004)	11.4	9.4	10.7	15.8	18.8	19.7
UK (2004)	159.6	289.0	437.5	511.5	506.2	575.1
Finland (2006)	5.9	7.4	8.6	8.7	9.5	11.7
Greece (2006)	14.0	13.8	12.6	15.4	14.7	10.7
Portugal (2006)	0.3	0.4	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.4
Spain (2006)	41.0	34.2	45.7	55.2	46.7	46.8
Italy (2006)	27.7	45.1	44.2	56.0	63.3	77.5
Netherlands (2007)	7.4	9.0	11.8	12.7	15.0	17.8
Luxembourg (2007)	0.5	2.1	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.7
France (2008)	17.4	16.0	15.5	16.4	20.9	30.4
Belgium (2009)	8.5	8.7	14.5	19.0	21.1	29.1
Denmark (2009)	2.8	4.1	5.7	5.9	9.8	11.1
Germany (2011)	214.1	230.1	262.3	285.4	316.0	310.4
Austria (2011)	48.5	48.7	54.1	56.5	50.7	54.6
EU up to 2004	559.3	825.5	1076.4	1215.2	1210.3	405.2
<i>For comparison:</i>						
Norway	2.9	3.6	5.4	8.0	11.5	20.1
Switzerland	10.3	11.1	13.2	14.3	18.0	14.9
Percentage of overall work force in each country						
Ireland (2004)		5.3	7.1	7.3	6.0	5.6
Sweden (2004)	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4
UK (2004)	0.6	1.0	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.0
Finland (2006)	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5
Greece (2006)	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2
Portugal (2006)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Spain (2006)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3
Italy (2006)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
Netherlands (2007)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Luxembourg (2007)	0.3	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2
France (2008)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Belgium (2009)	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6
Denmark (2009)	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4
Germany (2011)	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8
Austria (2011)	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.3
EU up to 2004	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8
<i>For comparison:</i>						
Norway	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.8
Switzerland	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5

¹ Workers who are EU-8 nationals, including Malta and Cyprus.
Source: Eurostat; calculations by DIW Berlin.

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Across Europe, immigration from the new EU countries has been extensive to the UK and Ireland only.

A number of forecasts have been made about the scale of immigration that will be experienced due to the opening of the German labor market earlier this year, but these predictions are all highly speculative. There is simply a lack of relevant historical data that would allow reasonable predictions. Due to the impossibility of forecasting the immigration that Germany will experience, we

must confine ourselves to discussing points of evidence that speak for or against increased immigration.

If we believe that the UK's experience is representative, then high levels of immigration can be expected. Yet, the UK is not directly comparable to Germany. First of all, it is reasonable to assume that a significant share of

Past Legal Restrictions to the Immigration of Workers

A complex network of laws and regulations used to be applied to workers who were not granted freedom of movement. Citizens from the new EU member states enjoyed certain residency rights not granted to persons from non-member states, as set forth in EU law pertaining to freedom of movement.

There was a host of specific regulations governing the hiring of employees. These regulations continue to apply to workers from Romania and Bulgaria, who will only be granted freedom of movement at the beginning of 2014 at the earliest. Work migration from non-EU states is possible, but the hurdles are even higher than for persons from the new EU member states. Granting of a residency permit and employment authorization must conform to the "requirements of the place of economic activity in Germany, under consideration of the labor market and the need to effectively combat unemployment," (Section 18, para. 1 of the German Immigration Law). Hiding behind this vague formulation is the intention that hiring immigrants should not have a negative effect on the labor market opportunities of German workers or those with equivalent rights.¹

Work permits may be issued with time limitations and only for a given firm, or without such restrictions. Most of the time, approval by the Federal Employment Agency is required, but not always. In part, the rules are based upon bilateral agreements between countries, and in part they represent unilateral initiatives by the German legislature – for example, to counteract shortages in the labor market.

¹ These are foreigners who are already living in Germany and have residence rights as well as foreigners from those EU states for which freedom of movement has already been in effect for a long time, who may not be living in Germany but are available to the German labor market.

The regulations are directed particularly toward specific jobs or groups of workers. In general, the higher the education level required for performing a job, the lower the hurdles for obtaining a work permit.

Most well-known is the chance for workers to obtain seasonal employment in the German agricultural or tourist industry; there are also seasonal workers of this kind in the traveling carnival industry. Employment of seasonal workers from the EU-8 nations has been widespread since the 1990s. Otherwise, access for employees with jobs that require no specialized education is almost impossible. Exceptions include au-pair workers or assistants in households requiring nursing care.

Occupations requiring Federal Employment Agency approval include caregivers (for the elderly and the sick), teachers providing classes in their maternal languages, specialty cooks and certain social work professionals. Approval is also required for employees with recognized university degrees or IT workers with recognized degrees, executives and specialists.² Opportunities for employment without a permit requirement exist for management staff, highly qualified workers and research personnel at universities and research institutions. Employment is also possible for specific occupational groups, such as journalists, professional athletes, models and specialists temporarily sent by a firm headquartered abroad (for example, to install or assemble machinery), short-term commercial employees and for persons performing voluntary community services. Additional specific regulations apply to many cross-border commuters.

² Work permits are only granted to such workers if they earn above the contribution limit for social insurance (currently 66,000 euros annually).

the EU-8 nationals willing to emigrate have already done so. Furthermore, there must be specific reasons for why so many EU-8 nationals moved to the UK and Ireland but not to Sweden, which also opened its doors to immigrants in 2004. This preference for the UK and Ireland is certainly not attributable to low wages in Sweden or a weak ability of the Swedish labor market to absorb new workers. Language, however, does suggest itself as a possible explanation. If language skills are a key factor in migrational decisions, then Germany is most certainly a second-choice country, for knowledge of German in the EU-8 countries is far less prevalent than knowledge

of English. The situation might be somewhat different in areas bordering Germany, however.

Additional evidence for the non-applicability of the British and Irish experience to Germany is furnished by worker migration to the "old" EU states that opened their labor markets in 2006: The scale of migration to Southern Europe, France, the Benelux states, and Scandinavia has been very small. In this case as well, low wages cannot be the explanation, for the wage levels in virtually all of these countries are higher than they are in Eastern Europe. Admittedly, in the case of Southern Eu-

rope poor labor market conditions may have acted as a brake on immigration.

Migration behavior is without a doubt strongly affected by the economic situation both at home and abroad. The EU-8 countries have put the economic crisis behind them and output is rising once again. Most EU-8 immigrants in Germany come from Poland, a country that was virtually untouched by the crisis and which has been enjoying strong growth. While the EU-8 countries have relatively high levels of unemployment, economic growth at home is likely to have a positive effect on worker expectations for the future, thus placing a check on emigration. On the other hand, the German economy is booming at present and jobs are being created. The current ease with which employment can be found in Germany could drive higher levels of immigration.

Much of the immigration that occurs today is temporary and circular in nature; this means that immigrants only leave their home countries for a limited—and often short—time period. Yet, anecdotal evidence indicates that discussion of “temporary” and “circular” migration does accurately capture the true behavior of many immigrants in Germany from the EU-8 states. It appears that many immigrants have a place of residence in Germany and return to their home countries with some degree of frequency.

Indeed, in many instances immigrants return home regularly on the weekends. There are also workers who reside in Germany on a seasonal basis—and who travel back and forth multiple times during this stay. This type of inter-regional mobility also exists within Germany, and is becoming increasingly common. Of course, frequent travel leads to costs which must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the benefits of working away from home. Thus, it is not surprising that EU-8 workers choose first and foremost to move to the economically strong regions of Germany where high incomes can be attained. Similarly, the commuting pattern within Germany is reflective of regional economic differences.

If the opening of Germany’s labor market does lead to increased immigration, then we can expect it to be concentrated in regions of Germany where unemployment is low and where the labor market is particularly able to absorb new workers. An additional factor shaping immigration is the existence of ethnic networks that facilitate entrance to the labor market and ease other day-to-day challenges such as the need to find an apartment, obtain daycare or visit government offices. Thus, immigrants often move to locations where friends or close relatives live. Frequently, this means moving to large cities.

Factors that would tend to facilitate greater immigration to Germany include the comparatively favorable location of Germany within Europe, particularly for immigrants from EU-8 countries who wish to travel home frequently. It is not unreasonable to expect that workers who are prepared to accept the costs and difficulties of traveling back and forth would also have a comparatively high level of motivation in the workplace. As we have seen, in recent years EU-8 workers have become more discriminating about the types of jobs they are willing to accept. This is not surprising in light of the fact that the wage differential between Germany and the EU-8 countries has gotten smaller. EU-8 nationals are less and less willing to perform low-wage work. Due to the fact that EU-8 immigrants move first and foremost to regions with low unemployment, increased immigration is unlikely to place any significant strain on the German labor market. Consequently, one should not view the opening of Germany’s labor market as a threat, but rather as a factor supporting the integration of Europe’s nation states—of which the regional mobility of workers is just one part.

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Alliance '90/The Greens at the crossroads: On their way to becoming a mainstream party?

by Martin Kroh and Jürgen Schupp

The Greens have been riding high in the polls for months now. In Baden-Württemberg, a stronghold of the Christian-Democratic Party (CDU), Winfried Kretschmann became the first Green party candidate to be elected Minister-President of any German state. This article looks beyond the current political climate to analyze longer-term trends in Green party support. The data used come from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) Study, carried out by DIW Berlin in cooperation with TNS Infratest, Munich. The data are especially well suited to the in-depth analysis of party identification for two reasons: First, the SOEP has interviewed the same individuals on their party support for 27 consecutive years. Second, the SOEP provides a uniquely rich set of data on the question of who these Green partisans are—how much they earn, what educational qualifications they possess and what their occupational status is.

Our results show that the successes of Alliance '90/The Greens in recent elections are the product of long-term changes in the party's electorate. From the 1980s until today, the Greens have enjoyed the over-proportional and uninterrupted support of younger voters. The party has also been successful in maintaining voter loyalty even as their supporters grow older. Furthermore, the results show that a large proportion of individuals who supported the Greens in their youth are now high-income earners, civil servants, salaried employees and self-employed. Because of this, Alliance '90/The Greens are now competing with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP) to represent the interests of affluent middle-class voters.¹

¹ The Greens' official name has changed over the course of time. In their founding phase, the terms "Green List" or "Alternative List" were frequently used at the local and state levels, and correspondingly, the Association of Greens in Hamburg still go by the name "Green-Alternative List." When the Greens and Alliance 90 merged in 1993, they changed their name to Alliance 90/The Greens. For economy of language, we primarily use "the Greens" throughout this article in addition to the full official name.

The shifting electoral fortunes of the Green Party from 1980 to the present

Alliance '90/The Greens have experienced a surge in popularity over the last few months: Some pollsters even suggest that they lie head to head with the SPD. At the federal level, top Green politicians have claimed leadership of the opposition. At the state level, the Greens are experiencing sustained success as well. And for the first time since their founding in 1980, the party saw the first Green Minister-President at the states level in Baden-Württemberg and has a chance of seeing a Green Governing Mayor elected in the upcoming states elections of Berlin, respectively.

A number of political analysts have attributed this phenomenon entirely to temporary shifts in the political climate. They argue that the current weakness of other parties, particularly the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the ongoing public discussions of nuclear phase-out and climate change and the increased levels of citizen participation in such initiatives as the "Stuttgart 21" protests have bolstered support for the Greens. However, this is only a temporary development, the current political climate does not, in their view, reflect longer-term trends.


In recent discussions, an opposing view has been gaining ground: the idea that Alliance 90/The Greens is becoming one of Germany's major broad-based mainstream parties.² According to this view, Green party support has increased and remained so resilient over the last thirty years that this (former) anti-party movement can now be described as a truly broad-based mainstream party—which in its early days would have been considered very mixed praise given their anti-party history. This development cannot remain without consequences for the party system as a whole. For one, formerly "small" parties such as the Greens now no longer

² See Oliver Hoischen, "Wie grün ist das denn?" Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, November 14, 2010, 6.

Figure 1

Support for Alliance '90/The Greens

Share (in percent)



Sources: Federal Election Commissioner, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen; Politbarometer; SOEP.

DIW Berlin 2011

Over the last three decades, there has not been a linear increase in support for the Greens.

serve to ensure parliamentary majorities for the CDU and SPD; rather, in Germany's five-party system, these parties are claiming a role as equal partners in a range of different government coalitions.³ As the Greens continue expanding their support base, they will also have to pay more attention to the diverse interests of their growing base of supporters while avoiding the risk of renewed infighting.

As Figure 1 shows, the party's current spike in popularity is not the result of a constant upward trend over the last thirty years.⁴ As early as the 1980s, political commentators were already sounding the death knell for the newly founded Green party. Their argument was that the Greens were merely the expression of growing fears of unemployment among recent college graduates—fears that would dissipate as soon as the labor market situa-

tion improved.⁵ Others claimed that the Greens were a passing phenomenon in a generation shaped by debates on Chernobyl, acid rain and the nuclear arms race. Future generations, it was claimed, would have different priorities and the Greens would disappear as quickly as they had emerged on the scene.

As the figures show, the Greens have frequently found themselves teetering on the edge of political ruin. After their first elections to the Bundestag in 1983 and 1987, the Greens missed the five percent threshold in 1990⁶ and were mired in bitter infighting between the fundamentalist ("Fundis") and realist ("Reals") factions of the party. This dispute over the party's direction was also marked by the departure of numerous high-profile founding members, who either resigned or switched to other parties.

³ See also M. Kroh and T. Siedler, "Die Anhänger der 'Linken': Rückhalt quer durch alle Einkommensschichten," DIW Wochenbericht 41, 2008.

⁴ For an overview of the evolution of the Greens and their support base, see W. Hulsberg, *The German Greens: A social and political profile* (London: Verso, 1988); J. Raschke, *Die Grünen. Wie sie wurden was sie sind* (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1993); J. Raschke, *Die Zukunft der Grünen. So kann man nicht regieren* (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2001); J. W. Falter, M. Klein, *Der lange Weg der Grünen. Eine Partei zwischen Protest und Regierung* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2003).

⁵ W. Bürklin, "Governing left parties frustrating the radical non-established left: The rise and inevitable decline of the Greens," *European Sociological Review* 4, 1987, 161-166.

⁶ The 5 percent of second votes in 1990 reported in Figure 1 is the total of second votes for the Greens and Alliance 90, which at that time were running separately.

The Vote Choice, Voting Intention and Party Identification

Three indicators have been used here to measure support for the Greens in the German population (Figure 1): first, the percentage of (second) votes¹ for the Greens in Bundestag elections between 1980 and 2009 (red dots). Second, the percentage of intended votes for the Greens (gray line) surveyed on a monthly basis by Politbarometer, a major pollster in Germany. Third, the percentage of party identifications for the Greens (green dots) surveyed on an annual basis by the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study.

Long-term party identification (political affiliation) is measured in the German electoral research with the question: "Many people in Germany lean towards one party in the long term, even if they occasionally vote for another party. Do you lean towards a particular party?" If respondents answer yes, they are asked to state which party.² In contrast to voting intention, which gives indications about the current political climate, party identification reveals longer-term trends in political affiliations.

A common finding in many Western countries is the decreasing importance of traditional political affiliations.³ At present,

¹ The German voter has two votes: the first is for a direct candidate and the second is for a party list. The proportion of second votes (Zweitstimmen) determines the distribution of seats in the Bundestag to the parties, which then fill the seats from their electoral lists.

² J. Falter, H. Schoen, and C. Caballero, "Dreiig Jahre danach. Zur Validierung des Konzepts 'Parteidentifikation' in der Bundesrepublik," 50 Jahre Empirische Wahlforschung in Deutschland. Entwicklungen, Befunde, Perspektive, Daten, eds. M. Klein, W. Jagodzinski, E. Mochmann, and D. Ohr (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), 1-34.

³ Dalton, R. J., and Wattenberg, M. (eds). *Parties without partisans*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000.

around 50 percent of respondents to the annual SOEP survey state that they have a long-term identification with a particular party. In the 1980s, this percentage was five to ten percentage points higher. This does not mean, however, that the other 50 percent of respondents have no party loyalties. Many respondents vacillate between political independence and stated party preference from one survey to the next. Looking at the SOEP survey results from a longer-term perspective (2006-2010), nearly 70 percent of all respondents stated party identification at least once. In the period 1984-1988, 80 percent of all respondents did so.

A unique feature distinguishing the Socio-Economic Panel from many other political surveys is that not only registered voters are surveyed—that is, individuals above the age of 18 with German citizenship—but also individuals without German citizenship and all household members aged 17 and older. All of the results presented in this Weekly Report cover this broad group of individuals aged 17 and older in Germany. The probability of answering "yes" to the question of whether one leans toward a particular party "in the long term" is initially lower among young people and immigrants but rises steadily with increasing experience with the German political system.⁴

⁴ On the time up to first mention of party preferences in young people, see M. Kroh and H. Schoen, "Politisches Engagement," in *Leben in Ost- und Westdeutschland: Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Bilanz der deutschen Einheit 1990-2010*, eds. P. Krause and I. Ostner (Campus: 2010). On the time up to first mention of party preferences in first-generation immigrants, see M. Kroh and I. Tucci, "Parteienbindungen von Migranten: Parteien brauchen erleichterte Einbürgerung nicht zu fürchten," *DIW Wochenbericht* 47, 2009.

The Greens experienced massive declines in popularity during their first term in the federal government under the Schröder administration (1998-2002). They had succeeded in pushing through a decision to phase out the use of nuclear energy—a central principle of the Green platform—but had also turned away from their pacifist doctrines to support German military engagement in Kosovo and Afghanistan after then-Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had committed the party to this line. The result was not just fierce ideological debate within the party, but also a dramatic loss in support for the Greens among the broader population. In 1999, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, one of the major public opinion research groups in Germany, reported the lowest levels of voting intention for the Greens since 1981—just one

year after the Greens first joined the ruling coalition at the federal level (see Politbarometer, Figure 1).

A longer-term examination of the fluctuations in Green party support confirms the temporary nature of the current spike in popularity, as reflected in the approximately 20 percent of the population reporting the intention to vote for the Greens if elections were held next Sunday (see text box above). Support for the Greens was also relatively high, at 15 percent, in the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that these monthly fluctuations in responses to the voting intention question conceal a longer-term trend that would justify the Greens' future designation as a broad-based mainstream party. In the following, we explore these long-term trends based on data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) Study:

Table 1

Changes in Party Identification 2009-2010

In thousands

	2010							
	Independent	SPD	CDU/CSU	FDP	B90/The Greens	The Left	Other	Total
Independent	31 754	2 992	2 624	654	1 146	777	473	40 420
SPD	1 532	6 668	117	46	320	176	95	8 954
CDU/CSU	1 397	171	8 827	115	34	32	114	10 690
FDP	566	47	356	906	71	14	83	2 043
B90/The Greens	436	262	14	8	2 322	80	65	3 187
The Left	242	94	9	0	25	1 418	48	1 836
Other	216	125	177	50	58	9	535	1 170
Total	36 143	10 359	12 124	1 779	3 976	2 506	1 413	68 300

Example: Of the 68.3 million people in Germany over the age of 17, 2.322 million identified with Alliance '90/The Greens in both 2009 and 2010. Of those who stated that they supported the Greens in 2010, 1.146 million had described themselves as independents in the previous year.

Sources: SOEP; authors' calculations.

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Of the three smaller parties, the Greens currently have by far the most loyal constituency.

Here, the focus is not on current political attitudes but on longer-term party identifications and on the socio-demographic changes affecting party support.

Little movement between the parties

SOEP respondents are asked to state whether and to what extent they tend to lean toward a particular party consistently from a long-term perspective. This more lasting party identification should therefore be clearly distinguished from the current preference for a political party as measured with the "Sunday Question" (Sonntagsfrage, see box).

Most respondents who report lasting party identification remain faithful to that party over subsequent surveys (Table 1). Of the estimated 3.2 million supporters of Alliance '90 /The Greens in 2009, around 2.3 million supported the same party in the following year. Approximately 440,000 Greens supporters in 2009 reported not (or no longer) to lean toward any particular party in 2010. The remaining 430,000 supporters of the Greens in 2009 had switched to another party by 2010—the large majority to the SPD (262,000). The departures of former Green supporters to other parties were countered by more than one million new supporters who had formerly reported no political leanings. Further additions to the Greens' supporters between 2009 and 2010 came from former supporters of other parties (500,000), the relative majority of whom were former SPD voters (320,000). Overall, Alliance '90 /The Greens increased their base of support between 2009 and 2010 from 3.2 to 4 milli-

on. Shifts in membership between parties and particularly between left and right are rare: 84 percent of the Green supporters from 2009 who reported political party leanings in 2010 still supported the Greens. For comparison: The figure was 95 percent for the CDU/CSU, 90 percent for the SPD, 89 percent for the Left Party and 61 percent for the FDP (Table 1).

Since people who report party identification usually remain loyal to that party in the longer term and only change loyalties for limited periods of time,⁷ only a small portion of the gradual increase in Green party identification to currently 13 percent among all those who reported party identifications can be attributed to fluctuating party loyalties (see Figure 1). Figure 2 presents the total changes in party identification among respondents who switched affiliations between parties from one year to the next since 1985. Although the figure does show a strong overall shift in party identification from the SPD to the Greens, it also reveals that the Greens have not gained steadily from the SPD, but have lost many supporters to the SPD, particularly in times of political crisis (e.g., during the Fundi-Realo conflict and the debates on military deployment in the late 1990s). The movements of members between the Greens and the traditionally middle-class, center-right parties (CDU/CSU, FDP) and the PDS/Left Party are of significantly lower importance in absolute terms (Figure 2). In 2010, the Greens gained supporters from the ranks of the SPD and FDP, but lost supporters to the Left Party (approximately 60,000 each, see Table 1).

Demographic change favors growth in Greens support

If the increase in support for the Greens cannot be explained primarily by defections from other parties, a plausible alternative explanation is that a steady stream of new members from new birth cohorts is providing the Greens the stable base of support that characterizes the traditional mainstream parties. It is a well established empirical finding that large percentages of Greens supporters can be found among teenagers and young adults. A frequently discussed result in electoral research is that the median age of Greens supporters has increased gradually since the 1990s: Whereas the


⁷ The high stability in party identification has also been noted in other Western countries; see, e.g., D.P. Green and B. Palmquist, "How stable is party identification?" *Political Behavior* 16, 1994, 437–466; D.P. Green, B. Palmquist, and E. Schickler, *Partisan hearts and minds. Political parties and the social identities of voters* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2002); A.S. Zuckerman, *The social logic of partisanship* (Philadelphia: Temple), 2005; A.S. Zuckerman, J. Dasovic, and J. Fitzgerald, *Partisan families: the social logic of bounded partisanship in Germany and Britain* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 2007.

Figure 2


Shifts in Support between the Greens and Other Parties

In ten thousands


CDU/CSU




FDP



The Left



SPD



Source: SOEP.

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For the Greens, the largest gains and losses in party affiliation have occurred with the SPD.

Greens supporters in the Socio-Economic Panel were 28 years old on average (median) between 1984 and 1989, today they are 42.⁸

According to a common argument, which also corresponds to the present data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the first generations of young Greens sup-

porters from the 1980s (the 1950/59 and particularly the 1960/69 age cohorts) were still faithful to the party by and large thirty years after its founding (Table 2). In the 1960/69 cohort, the percentage of Greens supporters was 19 percent when these individuals were aged 20; when they had reached the age of 40 or older, the percentage of Greens was still 16 percent. The figures do show a slight decline in party support for the Greens over the life course, but the difference between cohorts is substantially stronger: Older birth cohorts born up to approximately 1950 show a significantly below-average level of support for the Greens, whereas support in younger birth cohorts (born after 1950) is between 10 and 19 percent.

If we adjust for the aforementioned negative life-cycle effect in the percentage of Greens supporters among all those reporting party identification, we find a constant high level of Greens support, at 18 percent, in the birth

⁸ On the debate over the "graying" of the Greens, see W. Bürklin and R.J. Dalton, "Das Ergrauen der Grünen," in *Wahlen und Wähler: Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl 1990*, eds. H.D. Klingemann and M. Kaase (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), 264–302; M. Klein and K. Arzheimer, "Grau in Grau. Die Grünen und ihre Wähler nach eineinhalb Jahrzehnten," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 49, 1997, 650–673; U. Kohler, "Zur Attraktivität der Grünen bei älteren Wählern," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 50, 1998, 536–559; M. Klein, "Die Entwicklung der grünen Wählerschaft im Laufe dreier Jahrzehnte: eine empirische APK-Analyse," in *Politik-Wissenschaft - Medien. Festschrift für Jürgen W. Falter zum 65. Geburtstag*. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, eds. H. Kaspar, H. Schoen, S. Schumann, and J. W. Winkler (Opladen, 1999); M. Spiess and M. Kroh, "A selection model for panel data: the prospects of Green party support," *Political Analysis* 18, 2010, 172–188.

Table 2

Percentage of Green Party Supporters by Cohort and Age Group

Age	Birth Cohort								
	Up to 1909	1910–1919	1920–1929	1930–1939	1940–1949	1950–1959	1960–1969	1970–1979	1980–1993
17-20							19	19	17
21-30						16	17	15	18
31-40					7	12	15	19	
41-50				2	5	12	16		
51-60			1	2	4	9			
61-70		1	1	2	4				
71+	0	1	1	3					
Total ¹	4	4	5	6	7	14	18	18	18

¹ Estimated median support for the Greens in cohorts controlling for age effects.

Sources: SOEP; authors' calculations.

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The Greens have been able to rely on a loyal base of voters from the post-war generation.

cohorts of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. To the same extent as the importance of the pre-1950 birth cohorts relative to the post-1950 cohorts has declined over time, the percentage of Greens supporters in the population has increased. Demographic change therefore acts as a structural advantage for the Greens and has been crucial in enabling the party to approach the 20 percent mark in upcoming elections.

From the radical left to the Green establishment

Since the majority of young Greens supporters from the 1980s have remained faithful to the party as they have gotten older, not only the median age of Green party supporters but also their socio-structural status has changed dramatically over the last three decades.

The affluent Greens

The Green party's support base is comprised almost exclusively of individuals who completed academic-track Gymnasium (obtaining the Abitur university entrance qualification), with approximately 18 percent of all such individuals since 1984 reporting identification with the Green party. Among those who completed lower secondary school forms (Volksschule / Hauptschule), support for the Greens is low at approximately 3 percent. This relation has not changed since the 1980s (Table 3).

Although many Green party supporters completed their education in the 1980s, they still had not started working at that time: From 1984 to 1989, 26 percent of students in post-secondary education or training and only 5–8 percent of self-employed or employed people and civil

servants supported the Greens. Since then, support for the Greens in the latter three occupational groups has grown steadily, or to be more precise: Supporters of the Greens have grown into these occupational groups.

Today, 20 percent of civil servants and as many as 18 percent of self-employed and employed people are Green supporters. Among retired people, other non-employed people and blue-collar workers, however, the Greens have never had a substantial base of support. The share of Green party supporters among the unemployed has indeed been declining over the last few decades.

The occupational evolution of Green party supporters is also expressed in their income. Between 1984 and 1989, the Greens experienced their highest relative level of support in the lowest disposable income quintile—at around 10 percent—and an only average level of support—at 6 percent—in the highest quintile. This picture was reversed in the years that followed. In the period from 2008 to 2010, the share of Green party supporters in the lowest quintile of the income distribution was average (9 percent). The highest share of support was in the highest income quintile (16 percent).

With regard to the socio-structural status of their supporters, the Greens today enjoy their highest level of support among the affluent, educated middle-class. Their success with self-employed people and among individuals with above-average incomes has undermined the prior dominance of the CDU and FDP as sole representatives of this electorate. The lack of Green party support among blue-collar workers, the less educated and the unemployed suggests that the Greens—despite their self-perception as “leftist”—are not competing with the SPD or the Left Party for members from the traditional working class.

Green party supporters typically live in cities

The traditional base of support for Alliance '90/The Greens is concentrated in cities. Furthermore, the percentage of Green party support in the population is increasing much more strongly in urban than in rural areas. The Greens' efforts to promote conservation and ecologically oriented agriculture thus appear not to have paid off in terms of party identification, at least not in the rural electorate.

In the “new” German states of the former GDR, support for the Greens is also below-average. This East-West distinction also remains intact when controlling for other factors relevant to Green party identification, such as occupation, income and education. Individuals

with an immigration background differ little from those without in their support for the Greens. Additional analyses show higher than average levels of support for the Greens among immigrants from Western countries and second-generation immigrants.⁹

Green party identification higher among women

The Greens introduced a women's quota at an early stage in their history and have achieved the highest proportion of women of all of the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag at more than 50 percent. This, and their clear position on gender equality policy, are plausible reasons why the Greens have succeeded in gaining more supporters among women than among men in their last three decades (Table 3).

Over the party's history, party strategists came to view their identification with a limited number of issues such as pacifism, ecology and the phasing out of nuclear energy as ever more problematic. To appeal to broader segments of the population, the Green party platform was therefore expanded and today covers a wide range of social and economic issues. With regard to their ecological orientation, the Greens' supporters still differ significantly from supporters of other parties: From 1984 to 1989, support for the Greens was 10 percent among people who reported being "very concerned" about the environment and just 1 percent among those who reported being "not concerned at all." Today, the ratio is 18 to 8 percent (Table 3). Almost identical distributions of party support are manifested in concerns about the impacts of climate change, surveyed in the SOEP study in 2009 and 2010 (not reported in Table 3). The percentage of Greens supporters among those who were "very concerned" about climate change was approximately twice as high as among those who were not concerned at all. In the 1980s, there was also an above-average percentage of Greens among those who worried about maintaining peace. In the meantime, however, this difference has disappeared. For several years now, the Greens are no longer perceived as advocates of pacifism. With their approval of troop deployments under the government of Gerhard Schröder, the Greens relinquished this role to the Left Party.

Since 1984, the SOEP has surveyed respondents regarding their concerns about the overall economic situation, and since 1992 about crime—questions that correspond to "classic" middle-class policy fields of growth

Table 3

Percentage of Green Party Supporters by Voter Characteristics Between 1984 and 2010

	1984-1989	1990-1995	1996-2001	2002-2007	2008-2010
Education					
Lower secondary	3	3	3	3	4
Intermediate secondary	6	7	7	7	8
Academic-track secondary	17	17	18	18	20
Occupation					
Laborer	5	5	5	5	5
Civil servant	6	9	12	17	20
Self-employed/freelancer	5	10	11	14	18
Employed	8	9	13	14	18
Education/training	26	23	24	19	23
Unemployed	10	10	7	7	7
Economically inactive	5	6	10	11	10
Retired	1	1	1	2	3
Income quintile					
1	9	8	8	8	9
2	6	6	7	7	8
3	6	6	7	7	9
4	6	8	8	10	12
5	6	7	9	11	16
Size of municipality					
up to 2,000	5	7	7	6	5
2 000-20 000	5	6	6	6	9
20 000-100 000	5	5	7	8	8
100 000-500 000	7	9	10	11	14
500 000+	9	9	12	14	18
East/West					
West	6	7	8	9	12
East		9	6	6	9
Migration background					
No	6	6	8	9	11
Yes	9	11	10	9	11
Gender					
Male	6	6	7	8	10
Female	6	7	9	10	13
Environment					
no/low concerns	1	3	5	6	8
strong concerns	10	10	14	15	18
Climate change					
no/low concerns					9
strong concerns					18
Peace					
no/low concerns	4	6	8	8	11
strong concerns	9	8	8	10	11
Economic situation					
no/low concerns	6	7	9	11	13
strong concerns	6	6	6	6	7
Crime					
no/low concerns		7	12	13	15
strong concerns		5	5	4	4
Total	6	7	8	9	11

All figures are the percentage of Greens supporters among individuals in the respective groups or periods who report long-term affiliation with a particular party.

The income quintile figures are based on needs-weighted net household income.

Sources: SOEP; authors' calculations.

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In the last three decades, the Greens have developed a large base of support among affluent, highly educated city dwellers.

⁹ See M. Kroh and I. Tucci, "Parteienbindungen von Migranten: Parteien brauchen erleichterte Einbürgerung nicht zu fürchten." DIW Wochenbericht 47, 2009.

and security. Individuals who express serious concerns in these two areas are found increasingly rarely among Green party supporters, despite their broader party platform. Green supporters made up only 4 percent of those who reported concerns about crime and 7 percent of those who reported concerns about the economy (Table 3). Green party supporters therefore tend to be unconcerned about either of these two policy areas. Or to put it differently: Individuals who see a need for action in these two policy areas seldom seek answers from Alliance '90/The Greens.

Conclusion

The Greens used to represent a party of well-educated and ecologically oriented but rather poorly paid young people. In recent years, however, they have succeeded in maintaining a base of support among their early supporters and in achieving above-average levels of support among first-time and young voters. Today, the Greens are the party of middle-aged, environmentally conscious, educated and affluent civil servants and self-employed people living in urban areas. An almost negligible percentage of less-educated, lower-paid and unemployed people support the Greens. One can therefore conclude that Greens do not need to give these voters primary consideration in designing their labor market and economic policies. The rise of the Greens is, according to the data from the SOEP longitudinal study, anything but a short-term phenomenon; rather, the Greens appear to have a solid and enduring base among educated middle-class voters.

A long-term examination of the SOEP data reveals, along with socio-structural changes in the ranks of Green supporters, a decline in the importance of peace as a policy issue. There has not been an above-average percentage of individuals with strong concerns about peace among Green supporters since the late 1990s. The substantial increase in support for the Greens among women, on the other hand, may indicate a positive response to the Greens' focus on gender equality as a policy priority.

Whereas the Greens focused on a limited number of issues in their founding years, creating an image of themselves as a one-issue party, developing a broader base of support requires more nuanced political responses. At present, the Greens have achieved broader support base, but still, their supporters remain relatively homogeneous with regard to their socio-structural status and the issues that matter to them. Direct competition for leadership on specific policy issues comes from the SPD and Left Party—but only the SPD actually competes with the Greens for supporters. Interestingly, the results show that the Greens are now competing with

the traditional middle-class, center-right parties to represent the interests of higher-income individuals. The aim of gaining recognition across all social classes will be a litmus test for the Greens: To earn the designation as a broad-based mainstream party, they will have to learn to effectively defend unpopular decisions made in government to a broader electorate and thus to prevent a gradual decline in support.

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