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ABSTRACT

Incentives to Identify: A Comment

Antman and Duncan (2014, 2015) document how racial identity responds to state affirmative action policy. The main contribution of our work was to show that racial identity responds to state affirmative action policy. A coding error was recently brought to our attention that resulted in 0.55% of our sample being misclassified in terms of their African ancestry. This paper provides details of the coding error and explores its implications. Although the error only affected a tiny percent of the overall sample, correcting it changes the conclusion of how multiracial blacks respond to state affirmative action bans, from a negative and statically significant effect to a small positive and statistically significant effect. Correcting the error does not change the conclusions for individuals with only or no African ancestry. None of the Asian ancestry classifications were affected by the coding error and thus none of the results for Asians were impacted. In addition, we present an updated analysis using more detailed ancestry classifications and more recent years of data. We continue to find that racial identity responds to state affirmative action policy, albeit with a different conclusion for multiracial blacks, and are now able to distinguish stronger effects for multiracial individuals with more distant connections to their minority group.

JEL Classification: J15, I28, Z13

Keywords: race, affirmative action, identity

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I. Introduction

Antman and Duncan (2015) linked data on racial self-identification from the 1990 census and 2000-2011 waves of the American Community Survey (ACS) to changes in state-level bans on the use of racial preferences in hiring, contracting, and admissions by state colleges and universities. The main contribution of our paper was to show that racial identity may respond to state policies. Specifically, we found evidence that multiracial individuals with some Asian ancestry were roughly 20 percent more likely to identify as Asian after a state banned affirmative action while relatively small impacts were exhibited by those with only Asian ancestry or no Asian ancestry. In contrast, we estimated that U.S.-born multiracial individuals with some black ancestry were about 30 percent less likely to self-identify as black once affirmative action policies were banned while small positive but mostly statistically insignificant effects were found for those with only black ancestry or those with no black ancestry. This comment reports a coding error that, when corrected, changes the conclusion regarding the effect of state affirmative action policies on multiracial individuals with some black ancestry from a negative and statistically significant effect to a small positive and statistically significant effect. All other conclusions remain consistent with the original findings.¹

In addition, we present an updated analysis using more detailed ancestry classifications and more recent years of ACS data. We find that after a state bans affirmative action, multiracial children with African ancestry are about 2.2 to 4.4-percent more likely to be identified as black, with the larger effect being among individuals who likely have more distant African relatives. We find that this effect is also positive, but essentially zero, for children with only African ancestry, nearly all of whom (99.3%) are identified as black/African American regardless of a state's

¹ The error and corrected results discussed here also apply to the working paper version of our article, Antman and Duncan (2014).

affirmative action policy. The results for adults with African ancestry are consistent with those for children, but are smaller, and often statistically insignificant.

The coding error did not affect the original analysis of individuals with Asian ancestry. Adding to the original analysis, we find the same pattern of results for individuals with Asian ancestry as for those with African ancestry: namely that the effect of a state's affirmative action policy is larger among multiracial individuals who are likely to have more distant Asian relatives. Moreover, we find positive and statistically significant effects for both adults and children with only Asian ancestry.

II. A coding error in Antman and Duncan (2015)

The ancestry question on the census and ACS questionnaires ask individuals about their ancestry, ethnic origin or descent, "roots," or heritage, and gives some specific examples, such as: Italian, Jamaican, African Am., Cambodian, and so on. Individuals may report up to two ancestries. Antman and Duncan (2015) classified a person as having Asian ancestry if the person listed an Asian ancestry such as Chinese. Individuals were classified as having black ancestry if they listed a sub-Saharan Africa ancestry, such as Nigerian, or North American African ancestry, such as "African-American" or "black". Individuals were further classified as having only black ancestry if they listed only a sub-Saharan and/or North American African ancestry, and having multiracial black ancestry if they listed one sub-Saharan or North American African ancestry along with another non-African ancestry.

It was recently brought to our attention that there was an error in the part of our code that was intended to classify a person's second ancestry as African when it was listed in the range of codes reserved for North American African ancestry.² We regret and apologize for this error. In

² We would like to acknowledge and thank Michael Brainard for finding this error in our code and bringing it to our attention.

our original code, a person’s second ancestry was coded correctly as an “African ancestry” when it was a sub-Saharan African ancestry, but not when it was a North American African ancestry. This error was isolated to the African ancestry classifications. None of the Asian ancestry classifications, and thus, none of the results for individuals with Asian ancestry, were affected in any way by the coding error.

Table 1 shows the results of a cross tabulation of the misclassified black ancestry categories with the corrected classifications. The coding error resulted in 0.55% ($n = 197,050$) of the sample being misclassified in terms of black ancestry (the sum of the off-diagonal entries in Table 1). While the number of misclassified individuals was tiny as a percent of the overall sample, all of the misclassified individuals were either incorrectly included in the multiracial black ancestry group ($n = 132,596$), or incorrectly excluded from the multiracial black ancestry group ($n = 64,454$). Those incorrectly *excluded* were individuals who listed a non-black ancestry first and a North American African ancestry second. Those incorrectly *included* were individuals who listed a black ancestry first and a North American African ancestry second, or those who listed a non-black ancestry first and an Asian ancestry second.

III. The effect of state affirmative action bans on racial self-identification

Tables A1 through A4 in the Appendix are updated versions of Tables 2 through 5 that appear in Antman and Duncan (2015).³ The first three columns of Table A1 report the self-reported race of individuals with no black ancestry, multiracial black ancestry, or only black ancestry. There are no significant changes to the numbers in any of the tables for any group except for those with multiracial black ancestry, where the number of misclassifications was proportionately larger. The most notable change is the fraction of individuals with multiracial

³ Replication data are available from the authors upon request.

black ancestry who self-identify as black: 49.37% in the original table and 90.86% in the updated table.⁴

Table A2 reports the results from regressions where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual was identified as black/African American. Again, all of the coefficients are consistent with the original findings, with the exception of those for individuals with multiracial black ancestry. The estimates reported in Antman and Duncan (2015) suggested that, among individuals with black and nonblack ancestry, banning affirmative action reduced the probability of being identified as black by 11 to 16 percentage points, though estimates were only statistically significant for younger age groups. The coefficients reported in the updated Table A2 report that, among those with multiracial black ancestry, banning affirmative action is associated with an *increase* in the probability of being identified as black of about 1 to 5 percentage points, which is statistically significant for three of the five age groups.⁵

IV. Results using more detailed ancestry categories and more recent ACS years

Antman and Duncan (2015) categorized individuals as having no relevant ancestry, multiracial relevant ancestry, or only relevant ancestry. In analysis not reported in that paper, we further broke down individuals with multiracial ancestry into those who listed the relevant ancestry first, and those who listed the relevant ancestry second. These categories were created under the

⁴ The relatively smaller percentage of multiracial black individuals who self-identify as black in the original table led us to comment that, “this contrasts sharply with the purported one-drop rule in which individuals with any black ancestry are considered to be black.” For the record, we would like to retract this statement, as this conclusion was largely the result of the coding error.

⁵ As mentioned, all misclassified individuals were either incorrectly included or incorrectly excluded from the multiracial black ancestry group. Most of those excluded were individuals with non-Asian ancestry (83.6%). Correcting the misclassifications, except for those incorrectly excluded from the multiracial black ancestry group does not affect the coefficients reported in Table A2 in any meaningful way. On the other hand, most of those incorrectly included in the multiracial black ancestry group were individuals who listed a non-black/non-Asian ancestry first and an Asian ancestry second (58.3%). Misclassifying only these individuals causes the coefficients on $\text{Ban} \times \text{Multiracial black ancestry}$ in Table A2 to become negative and statistically significant, suggesting that it was the latter misclassified group of individuals who were driving the earlier results.

assumption that a person's second ancestry would likely represent more distant relatives than their first. However, this distinction did not seem to matter, and so the tables published in Antman and Duncan (2015) included the simplified three ancestry categories reported in the appendix tables.⁶

To further explore this aspect of racial identity, Table 2 reports the corresponding self-identified race of individuals by the four ancestry categories that distinguish between first and second ancestry for multiracial individuals. For example, Panel A reports that 93.7% of individuals who listed an African ancestry first and a non-African ancestry second are identified as black on the race question. This number falls to 85.3% for individuals who listed a non-African ancestry first and an African ancestry second. Since the publication of Antman and Duncan (2015), additional years of the ACS data have become available (Ruggles, et al. 2019). More significantly, two additional states have enacted affirmative action bans in recent years: New Hampshire in 2012 and Oklahoma in 2013. Panel B in Table 2 adds the 2012 through 2017 ACS data to the analysis. These additions have little effect on the summary statistics presented in Table 2.

Extending the analysis in Antman and Duncan (2015) to four ancestry categories, and including the additional years of the ACS data, we estimate the difference-in-differences regression:

⁶ Although Antman and Duncan (2015) did not present results broken down by four ancestry categories, the replication data included the code used to create these categories. The original coding error also affected these African ancestry classifications, but not the Asian ancestry classifications.

$$\begin{aligned}
Identifies_{ist} = & \pi_1(ban_{st} \times NoRelevantAncestry_{ist}) \\
& + \pi_2(ban_{st} \times MultiracialRelevantFirst_{ist}) \\
& + \pi_3(ban_{st} \times MultiracialRelevantSecond_{ist}) \\
& + \pi_4(ban_{st} \times OnlyRelevantAncestry_{ist}) \\
& + \pi_5MultiracialRelevantAncestry_{ist} + \pi_6OnlyRelevantFirst_{ist} \\
& + \pi_7OnlyRelevantSecond_{ist} + \mathbf{X}_{ist}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mu_s + \delta_t + \theta_s t + \varepsilon_{ist}
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $Identifies_{ist}$ is an indicator variable equal to one if person i in state s and year t identifies with the relevant racial identity (e.g. Black or Asian) and zero otherwise, and ban_{st} is a dummy variable equal to one if state s has an affirmative action ban in year t and zero otherwise. The indicator variables $NoRelevantAncestry_{ist}$, $MultiracialRelevantFirst_{ist}$, $MultiracialRelevantSecond_{ist}$, and $OnlyRelevantAncestry_{ist}$ are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories for no relevant ancestry reported, relevant ancestry reported first and non-relevant ancestry reported second, non-relevant ancestry reported first and relevant ancestry reported second, and only relevant ancestry reported, respectively. All regressions include state fixed effects (μ_s), year fixed effects (δ_t), and state-specific linear time trends ($\theta_s t$). The vector \mathbf{X}_{ist} includes controls for age and gender, the fraction of the state population that is foreign born, and the fractions of the state population that are black, Hispanic, and Asian. Robust standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Table 3 presents the results from the estimation of Eq. (1) with the dependent variable equal to 1 if the individual identifies as relevant race (black or Asian), where Panel A reports regressions that include the original sample years, and Panel B extends the sample to 2017. The estimates in the first two columns of Panel A suggest that, for multiracial children with a non-African first ancestry and an African second ancestry, banning affirmative action increases the likelihood of being identified as black by about 6.5 percentage points. Given that the overall rate of self-

identification for this group is just over 85 percent (Table 2), this represents a 7.7 percent increase. The estimated effects for multiracial children with an African ancestry listed first and a non-African ancestry second are smaller (3.5 percentage points, or about 3.8 percent). Finally, the effect on children with only African ancestry remains positive, but is small and statistically insignificant (about one percentage point or one percent), which is to be expected given that nearly all individuals with only African ancestry are identified as black (99.3%). Taken as a whole, these results suggest that state affirmative action bans had a larger effect on multiracial children with more distant African relatives, relative to those with closer African relatives. The pattern of results for adults with African ancestry in Panel A of Table 3 are consistent with those for children, but are generally smaller in magnitude. Expanding the sample to 2017 causes the coefficients to become smaller, and almost all become statistically insignificant, but the pattern of results, particularly for children, remains unchanged.

The last two columns of Table 3 present the corresponding regression coefficients for Asian identification by four Asian ancestry groups. The coefficients for the Asian ancestry groups reveal the same pattern as those for the African ancestry groups, except that they are larger in magnitude and more consistently statistically significant. For instance, the Panel B estimates suggest that, for multiracial children with a non-Asian first ancestry and Asian second ancestry, state affirmative action bans increase the likelihood of being identified as Asian by about 13 percentage points for both children and adults. This represents about a 21.4 percent increase ($13.18/61.73$). As it is for those with multiracial African ancestry, the effect is smaller among multiracial Asians who list a relevant ancestry first and a non-relevant ancestry second, as opposed to the other way around. Moreover, this pattern is similar in both magnitude and statistical significance for adults and children with Asian ancestry.

Table 4 presents coefficient estimates from Eq. (1) for children ages 0 through 17 by their family's total income as a percentage of the poverty threshold broken into five bins. The largest statistically significant effects of state affirmative action bans on multiracial African children are for those with a family income that is more than 200 percent above the poverty line (point estimates ranging from .0258 to .0524). The estimates for multiracial African children below 200 percent of the poverty line are generally smaller and not statistically significant. Conversely, the point estimates for multiracial Asian children remain statistically significant at all poverty threshold levels. This pattern of results suggests that the response to state affirmative action bans varies by income for multiracial children with African, but not Asian, ties.

V. Conclusion

This comment corrects a coding error in Antman and Duncan (2015) and expands the analysis to include more detailed ancestry classifications and additional years of the ACS data. We continue to find that racial identity responds to state affirmative action policy. However, in contrast to our original results, we find that after a state bans affirmative action, multiracial children with African ancestry become slightly more likely to be identified as black/African American, and that this effect is larger among individuals who likely have more distant African relatives. The coding error did not affect the analysis of individuals with Asian ancestry. In our updated analysis, we find that individuals with multiracial African ancestry become about 2.2 to 4.4 percent more likely to be identified as black once affirmative action policies are banned, where the larger effect is among multiracial individuals who are likely to have more distant African relatives. This pattern of results is the same for individuals with Asian ancestry, but is significantly larger, with corresponding estimates of 12.3 to 21.4 percent.

These results suggest that racial identity becomes stronger among minority groups when affirmative action policies are repealed. This may be the product of an increased discussion surrounding race resulting from the repeal of affirmative action. Alternatively, there may be social costs to racial self-identification under affirmative action policies that discourage some multiracial individuals with weaker ties from identifying with their minority group, and thus increase their willingness to identify when affirmative action is banned. At the same time, individuals from some groups are economically incentivized to identify with their minority groups under affirmative action policies while others are disincentivized. Thus, the latter groups display a stronger willingness to identify as a minority group when these policies are repealed. Finally, the fact that affirmative action policies appear to have a greater impact on individuals with weaker ties to a minority group is consistent with race being more malleable for individuals with multiracial ancestry, especially for those with more distant connections to a minority group. The combination of these potentially conflicting economic and social incentives explains why the effects of state affirmative action bans are larger for those with Asian ancestry, and also explains why they are larger for those with more distant ties to a minority group.

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Table 1 – Misclassification of black ancestry

Misclassified	Corrected Black Ancestry		
Black Ancestry	None	Multiracial	Only
None	89.59% [32,415,865]	0.16% [56,890]	n/a
Multiracial	0.35% [125,502]	0.36% [130,445]	0.02% [7,094]
Only	n/a	0.02% [7,564]	9.51% [3,440,683]

Source: 1990 and 2000 Census data, 2001–2011 ACS data.

Notes: Number of observations in brackets. In the original data, 197,050 (0.55%) individuals were misclassified.

Table 2 – Racial identification of individuals aged 0-59, by 1st and 2nd ancestry classification

	African Ancestry				Asian Ancestry			
	No African	Other 1 st African 2 nd	African 1 st Other 2 nd	Only African	No Asian	Other 1 st Asian 2 nd	Asian 1 st Other 2 nd	Only Asian
Panel A: 1990 – 2011: Self-Reported Race								
Black	2.09	85.26	93.73	99.31	12.03	10.47	4.99	0.91
Asian	2.28	4.81	4.61	0.06	0.28	57.14	70.68	93.65
White	91.82	41.93	26.15	1.52	84.06	71.94	69.56	14.52
Sample Size	32,541,367	66,054	128,845	3,447,777	35,433,613	84,508	87,409	578,513
Panel B: 1990 – 2017: Self-Reported Race								
Black	2.31	86.51	94.75	99.33	12.29	9.84	4.41	0.63
Asian	2.62	4.41	4.04	0.06	0.36	61.73	75.43	94.70
White	91.41	47.52	29.91	1.50	83.89	74.61	71.18	11.70
Sample Size	43,174,078	117,304	234,379	4,498,585	46,914,250	134,000	145,222	830,874

Source: 1990 and 2000 Census data, 2001-2017 ACS data. The samples include U.S.-born individuals aged 0-59 with the indicated ancestry. Individuals with an allocated race or Hispanic origin are excluded.

Notes: All numbers are percentages. Race categories are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive.

Table 3 – Effect of state affirmative action bans on the racial identification of children and adults with and without African or Asian ancestry

	African Ancestry		Asian Ancestry	
	Children	Adults	Children	Adults
Panel A: 1990 – 2011:				
Ban × No relevant ancestry	-.0011 (.0008)	.0013 (.0008)	-.0034*** (.0012)	-.0012** (.0005)
Ban × (Other ancestry 1 st , relevant 2 nd)	.0654*** (.0149)	.0172* (.0100)	.1779*** (.0433)	.1592*** (.0468)
Ban × (Relevant ancestry 1 st , other 2 nd)	.0352** (.0160)	.0139** (.0062)	.1210*** (.0332)	.1118** (.0438)
Ban × Only relevant ancestry	.0101 (.0106)	.0104*** (.0037)	.0392*** (.0122)	.0648*** (.0099)
Sample size	11,734,878	24,449,165	11,734,878	24,449,165
Panel B: 1990 – 2017				
Ban × No relevant ancestry	-.0009 (.0013)	.0003 (.0010)	-.0043* (.0022)	-.0022* (.0013)
Ban × (Other ancestry 1 st , relevant 2 nd)	.0378** (.0178)	.0061 (.0102)	.1318*** (.0329)	.1291*** (.0376)
Ban × (Relevant ancestry 1 st , other 2 nd)	.0206 (.0193)	.0092 (.0069)	.0928*** (.0261)	.0983*** (.0346)
Ban × Only relevant ancestry	.0079 (.0146)	.0089 (.0060)	.0262** (.0103)	.0520*** (.0108)
Sample size	15,381,977	32,642,369	15,381,977	32,642,369

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

Source: 1990 and 2000 Census data, 2001-2017 ACS data.

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. The samples include U.S.-born children aged 0-17 and adults aged 18-59. Individuals with an allocated race or Hispanic origin are excluded. All regressions include controls for age and gender, the fraction of the state population that is foreign born, the fraction of the state population that is black, Hispanic, and Asian, state and year fixed effects, and state specific linear time trends. Controls for the two multiracial black categories and only black ancestry are also included as level effects. No relevant ancestry (African or Asian), the two multiracial relevant ancestry, and only relevant ancestry are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.

Table 4 – Effect of state affirmative action bans on the racial identification of children with and without African or Asian ancestry, by poverty threshold

	Poverty threshold				
	100% or lower	101 – 200%	200 – 300%	401 – 500%	500% or higher
African Ancestry:					
Ban × No African ancestry	-.0135*** (.0039)	-.0031* (.0017)	<.00001 (.0014)	-.0005 (.0009)	.0007 (.0010)
Ban × (Other ancestry 1 st , African 2 nd)	.0336 (.0260)	.0237 (.0261)	.0477*** (.0177)	.0524*** (.0159)	.0503*** (.0141)
Ban × (African ancestry 1 st , other 2 nd)	.0260 (.0283)	.0118 (.0252)	.0196 (.0166)	.0258* (.0154)	.0322** (.0136)
Ban × Only African ancestry	.0309 (.0265)	.0076 (.0222)	.0035 (.0142)	.0031 (.0077)	-.0037 (.0032)
Sample size	2,635,035	3,152,429	2,890,587	3,704,333	2,848,457
	Poverty threshold				
	100% or lower	101 – 200%	200 – 300%	401 – 500%	500% or higher
Asian Ancestry:					
Ban × No Asian ancestry	-.0026 (.0017)	-.0030* (.0016)	-.0037** (.0018)	-.0053** (.0026)	-.0070** (.0035)
Ban × (Other ancestry 1 st , Asian 2 nd)	.1200*** (.0271)	.1278*** (.0323)	.1515*** (.0286)	.1544*** (.0433)	.0866*** (.0261)
Ban × (Asian ancestry 1 st , other 2 nd)	.1221*** (.0298)	.1167** (.0493)	.0972*** (.0244)	.0900*** (.0301)	.0529*** (.0130)
Ban × Only Asian ancestry	.0361** (.0140)	.0406*** (.0118)	.0439*** (.0125)	.0271** (.0119)	-.0054 (.0067)
Sample size	2,635,035	3,152,429	2,890,587	3,704,333	2,848,457

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

Source: 1990 and 2000 Census data, 2001-2017 ACS data. The sample is limited to children ages 0 to 17.

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Regressions include same sample and controls reported in Panel B of Table 3 (see Table 3 notes for details).

APPENDIX A

Table A1 – Updated version of Antman and Duncan (2015) Table 2: Descriptive statistics for individuals aged 0-59, by ancestry

Self-Reported Race	Black Ancestry			Asian Ancestry		
	None	Multiracial	Only	None	Multiracial	Only
Black	2.09	90.86	99.31	12.03	7.68	0.91
Asian	2.28	4.68	0.06	0.28	64.02	93.65
White	91.82	31.50	1.52	84.06	70.73	14.52
Sample size	32,541,367	194,899	3,447,777	35,433,613	171,917	578,513

Source: 1990 and 2000 Census data, 2001-2011 ACS data. The samples include U.S.-born individuals aged 0-59 with the indicated ancestry. Individuals with an allocated race or Hispanic origin are excluded.

Notes: All numbers are percentages. Race categories are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive.

Table A2 – Updated version of Antman and Duncan (2015) Table 3: Affirmative action bans and black identification among individuals with and without black ancestry, by age group

	Age 0-9	Age 10-17	Age 18-25	Age 26-34	Age 35-59
Ban × No black ancestry	-.0011 (.0012)	-.0012 (.0014)	.0012 (.0014)	.0018 (.0012)	.0012* (.0006)
Ban × Multiracial black ancestry	.0471*** (.0161)	.0436*** (.0155)	.0147 (.0110)	.0210*** (.0065)	.0105 (.0069)
Ban × Only black ancestry	.0095 (.0105)	.0105 (.0109)	.0102 (.0083)	.0076* (.0042)	.0106*** (.0028)
Sample size	6,456,827	5,278,051	4,486,068	5,109,783	14,853,314

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

Source: 1990 and 2000 Census data, 2001-2011 ACS data.

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. The samples include U.S.-born individuals in the indicated age range. Individuals with an allocated race or Hispanic origin are excluded. All regressions include controls for age and gender, the fraction of the state population that is foreign born, the fraction of the state population that is black, Hispanic, and Asian, state and year fixed effects, and state specific linear time trends. Controls for multiracial and only relevant ancestry are also included as level effects. No relevant ancestry, multiracial relevant ancestry, and only relevant ancestry are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.

Table A3 –Antman and Duncan (2015) Table 4 (no changes): Affirmative action bans and Asian identification among individuals with and without Asian ancestry, by age group

	Age 0-9	Age 10-17	Age 18-25	Age 26-34	Age 35-59
Ban × No Asian ancestry	-.004** (.002)	-.003*** (.001)	-.002*** (.0004)	-.002** (.001)	-.001* (.0003)
Ban × Multiracial Asian ancestry	.150*** (.038)	.149*** (.039)	.136*** (.042)	.145*** (.040)	.115* (.062)
Ban × Only Asian ancestry	.035*** (.011)	.047*** (.015)	.054*** (.012)	.065*** (.012)	.074*** (.011)
Sample size	6,456,827	5,278,051	4,486,068	5,109,783	14,853,314

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

Source: 1990 and 2000 Census data, 2001-2011 ACS data.

See Notes below Table A2.

Table A4 – Updated version of Antman and Duncan (2015) Table 5: Affirmative action bans and racial identification among college-aged individuals 18-25, by college enrollment

	Black Ancestry		Asian Ancestry	
	Not in College	In College	Not in College	In College
Ban × No relevant ancestry	.0002 (.0013)	.0028 (.0021)	-.001** (.001)	-.003*** (.001)
Ban × Multiracial relevant ancestry	.0161 (.0110)	.0058 (.0103)	.134** (.052)	.124*** (.036)
Ban × Only relevant ancestry	.0088 (.0072)	.0077 (.0094)	.095*** (.016)	.034*** (.010)
Sample size	1,717,251	1,466,532	1,717,251	1,466,532

*Statistically significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level.

Source: 1990 and 2000 Census data, 2001-2011 ACS data.

Notes: The samples include U.S.-born individuals aged 18-25 with a high school or GED degree, but not a bachelor's degree. See additional notes below Table A2.