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ABSTRACT

External Monitors and Score Manipulation in Italian Schools: Symptomatic Treatment or Cure?*

We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to school institutes in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners, and is stronger for open-ended questions, for small school institutes, and for institutes located in the northern and central regions of the country. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that monitoring is a symptomatic treatment rather than a cure of score manipulation. We discuss learning, reputational concerns, peer pressure and teacher preferences as potential mechanisms behind our findings, and present some evidence on the role played by social capital and high stakes.

JEL Classification: H52, I2

Keywords: education, testing, external monitoring, long-run effects

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Introduction

The attractiveness of standardized assessment systems, which are designed to compare the performance of students in different schools and geographical areas, may be hampered by illicit behaviors of school principals, teachers and students, that often result in score manipulation. These behaviors include for instance copying, suggesting correct answers and manipulating the transcription of these answers. By undermining the reliability of test results, score manipulation invalidates the entire accountability system¹ and leads to wrong decisions both at the individual and at the aggregate level. For instance, students may fail to receive the remedial instruction they need or could be awarded grants that they do not deserve, and governments may overlook the necessity to intervene and improve school quality.

Even though incentives to cheat are clearly in place only in high stakes accountability systems, in which test results have important consequences for schools, teachers and students (Ahn and Vigdor, 2014), illicit actions that result in score manipulation are widespread also in low stakes systems. In fact, cheating scandals have emerged both in the US and Sweden, where tests are high stakes, and in Italy, where they are mostly low stakes (see Dimond and Persson, 2016, and Bertoni *et al.*, 2013, as well as Battistin, 2016, for a recent review).

A possible remedy to score manipulation is strict monitoring of the whole testing process by external examiners. Since monitoring is costly, it is important to quantify its benefits in terms of lower score manipulation. Focusing on the Italian experience, Lucifora and Tonello (2016) and Angrist *et al.* (2017) document that external monitors reduce score manipulation in classes where they are present. Bertoni *et al.* (2013) show that external monitoring not only

¹ See Battistin *et al.* (2017) for evidence on the effects of manipulation on regional score rankings in Italy.

negatively affects cheating in directly monitored classes, but has also positive spillover effects on other classes (not directly monitored) in the same school.

External monitoring is an intervention that lasts for the duration of a testing session. Do its effects also last only as much, or do they persist so as to affect future tests as well? Borrowing from the medical literature, is external monitoring only a symptomatic treatment, the effect of which disappears as the treatment is over, or is it also a cure, that reduces score manipulation in a persistent way?

Persistence might operate via different mechanisms. First, teachers may learn from examiners how to correct with diligence open-ended questions and fill in the answers sheets appropriately. Second, large fluctuations over time in test scores may foster suspicion that manipulation is afoot (see Jacob and Levitt, 2003), and increase the likelihood of being sanctioned by stakeholders or the central authority (see Lucifora and Tonello, 2016, for Italian evidence). A third mechanism is that teachers dislike sharp variations in test scores from one year to another, as these could make some of them look bad and possibly receive poorer evaluations from the principal.

In this paper, we investigate persistency empirically by examining successive waves of standardized math and literacy tests implemented in Italy on the universe of primary school children. Our research design exploits the fact that external examiners in Italy are randomly allocated to groups of schools (called school institutes) every year. These examiners have the task of monitoring the entire test administration process, both by monitoring students taking the test and by supporting school staff in transcribing and transmitting the scores to the government agency in charge of test management. While we mainly focus on the low stakes tests taken by 5th grade pupils in primary schools, we also consider tests taken by 8th grade students, for whom tests are high stakes.

We find evidence of short-term persistency: external monitoring reduces both the percentage of correct answers and an index of cheating propensity not only

in the current year but also in the following year. While the effect of lagged monitoring on the percentage of correct answers is relatively small (-0.7 percent for math and -0.5 percent for literacy), the effect on cheating propensity is sizeable (-11.7 percent for math and -8.5 percent for literacy). After two years, however, the effects of having had an external examiner fade away completely.

We also find that the effect of external monitoring in year $t-1$ on test scores in year t is much larger in small school institutes, that typically have one single class in the grade, than in institutes with many classes in the grade. We estimate that in small school institutes previous external monitoring reduces the percentage of correct answers by 4.4 percent in math and by 5.5 percent in literacy, and reduces the cheating index by as much as 62 percent in math and 53 percent in literacy. Even in these institutes, however, there is no statistically significant effect of external monitoring in year $t-2$ on test scores in year t , confirming that, in the specific context considered in our study, this is a symptomatic treatment rather than a cure for score manipulation.

Our paper contributes to a large literature spanning several areas of economics which is interested in understanding the long-term effects of public policies. Some examples include Baird *et al.* (2016) on de-worming policies in Kenya, Bloom *et al.* (2018) on management interventions in India, Chetty *et al.* (2016) on the US Moving to Opportunity Project, and Heckman and Karapakula (2019) on the Perry Preschool Project in Michigan. By providing evidence on the medium-term effectiveness of external monitors in the reduction of score manipulation, we contribute to the correct assessment of the cost-effectiveness of this policy.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the institutional background, Section 2 looks at the data and Section 3 introduces the empirical approach. Our baseline results and results by school institute size are in Sections 4 and 5. We discuss mechanisms in Section 6 and present evidence on the role

of social capital in Section 7. We report the estimates when tests are high stakes in Section 8. Conclusions follow.

1. Institutional background

Education in Italy is compulsory from ages 6 to 16, and consists of four main stages: primary school (grades 1 to 5); lower secondary (grades 6 to 8) and upper secondary school (grades 9 to 12 or 13) and university.² In the compulsory stages, schools are generally grouped in school institutes sharing the principal and several administrative services.³

Since school year 2009/2010, all students attending the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th and 10th grade have to take standardized tests assessing literacy and math skills. These tests, managed by the National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education System (INVALSI), a government agency placed under the control of the Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR), are generally low stakes, with the exception of the test in grade 8th, which contributes to the final exit grade and is therefore high stakes.

The results of these tests can be disclosed in aggregate form by school principals, who can share them with stakeholders.⁴ Although schools cannot be closed down and principals and teachers cannot be fired as a consequence of low test performance, these results can be used by principals to bolster the school reputation and attract new and “better” students.

As shown by Quintano *et al.* (2009)⁵ there is pervasive evidence of score manipulation, especially in Southern Italy. In an effort to obtain a snapshot of

² Before entering primary schools, pupils can attend daycare (age 0-2) and kindergarten (age 3-5), but these stages are not mandatory.

³ A school institute can group together schools located in different municipalities and even belonging to different stages of education.

⁴ Although school principals have also access to the individual data, only aggregate data (at the school or class level) can be made public.

⁵ For further details see Bertoni *et al.* (2013), Angrist *et al.* (2017), Pereda-Fernandez (2018) and the references therein.

the evolution of educational achievement across Italy that is not contaminated by score manipulation, INVALSI selects every year a sample of school institutes and classes where it enforces a strict protocol of monitoring. In those classes, the tests take place in the presence of an external examiner, usually chosen among retired teachers, who not only must check that the students do not cheat during the test, but also supervises teachers in the correction of open-ended questions (see Angrist *et al.*, 2017), reports the answers of students on machine-readable answer sheets and sends them to INVALSI.⁶ In non-sampled classes, on the other hand, the tests are managed by the school's teachers, selected among those not belonging to the class being tested and to the subject being assessed.

The sample is selected using two-stage stratified sampling. In a first stage, school institutes are randomly sampled within regions with probability of sampling proportional to the number of students enrolled at the beginning of the school year. In a second step, one or two entire classes are randomly selected for monitoring. In institutes with less than 100 pupils in the grade, external monitors observe a single class. In larger institutes, they observe at most two.

2. The data

Our data refer to the universe of Italian primary and lower secondary schools. Although these data are available from academic year 2009/10 until 2016/17, we only use the waves from 2013/14, the initial year when the INVALSI index of cheating propensity by class – one of our outcomes – became available. Since we wish to compare results across low and high stake tests, we select students in the 5th and 8th grade.⁷

We select our final sample as follows: first, we exclude schools located in Valle d'Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige, two smallish Northern regions which decided

⁶ See http://banner.orizzontescuola.it/Manuale_osservatore_esterno_2014.pdf.

⁷ We exclude second graders because of the limited available background information.

to have all their classes assigned to an external invigilator.⁸ Second, we drop classes with less than 10 enrolled students, which are often multi-grade classes; school institutes with less than 10 enrolled students in the grade in any year, which are excluded from the sampling of external examiners, and a handful of classes with missing data on cheating propensity. As the math and literacy tests are taken in different days, sample selection criteria are specific to each test. Finally, we only keep school institutes which are present in the data in years t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, because we want to assess the effect of the presence of examiners in the institute in those years on test scores in year t .

Because of these selection criteria, we start from 26,875 school institute-by-year observations in a population of 7,288 primary school institutes, and end up with 22,984 observations in 6,790 school institutes. For middle schools, we start from 23,232 school institute-by-year observations in a population of 6,181 school institutes, and end up with 20,205 observations in 5,734 school institutes.

In their analysis of the INVALSI monitoring program, Angrist *et al.* (2017) show that the protocol for the randomization of external examiners is valid across institutes. They also show that the assignment of monitors to classes within institutes is suspect of deviations from randomness. Because of this, we use school institutes as the unit of analysis, and define as treatment variables the presence of an examiner in the institute in year t , $t-1$ and $t-2$. For the sake of brevity, and with a slight abuse of language, we shall use the words “school institutes” and “schools” as synonymous hereafter.

As discussed in the previous section, every year INVALSI randomly selects a sample of schools that are subject to external monitoring. The sampling of schools happens within region, and the probability of being sampled is proportional to the number of students enrolled. Samples are drawn

⁸ In our analysis of 8th graders, we also drop 248 schools from Umbria, as for that region and grade we detect significant positive serial correlation in the probability of assignment to external monitors across years.

independently every year. Therefore, to grant conditional randomization, all our regressions include as randomization controls region-by-year dummies and the interactions of enrollment at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ with region-by-year dummies.

For both math and literacy tests, we investigate the dynamic impact of examiners on the following outcomes, computed at the school-by-year level: the average percentage of correct answers given by each student;⁹ the 25th, 50th and 75th quartile and the standard deviation of the score.¹⁰ As argued by Bertoni *et al.* (2013), the standard deviation of the score should be reduced by outright cheating, as results look more alike across students within schools. In addition, manipulation usually helps low performers more than top students, who would do well in any case.

We also consider as outcome the cheating propensity index computed by INVALSI, a class-level probability of manipulation similar to the one estimated in Angrist *et al.* (2017) and computed by using information both on the percentage of correct answers and on the patterns of wrong answers.¹¹ To assess whether the presence of examiners affected the selection of the pool of tested students, we look also at the share of students who were absent in the day of the test. Finally, to dig into the mechanisms behind our uncovered effects, we use item-level data and compute the share of correct answers by school, distinguishing between open-answer and closed-answer (multiple choice) questions. We do so following Angrist *et al.* (2017), who argue that manipulation in the INVALSI tests arises mainly as a consequence of shirking by internal teachers, who devote low effort in correcting open-answer questions (which typically require careful interpretation).

⁹ In a robustness test, we also use the mean scores computed by INVALSI by applying the IRT Rasch model to students' answers in the tests to account for the fact that items vary in their difficulty.

¹⁰ Given that tests are managed and scores are marked at the level of the class, we first compute these outcomes by class and then average them by school using class-size weights.

¹¹ For a detailed description of the method see Quintano *et al.* (2009).

Our controls include the characteristics of students and schools in year t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ that we obtain by matching standardized test scores to information either contained in the student background questionnaires or provided by school staff when scores are submitted to INVALSI. We compute the number of students enrolled in each grade at the beginning of the school year and the school-by-year share of: (i) students who attended pre-primary schools; (ii) males; (iii) immigrants; (iv) pupils with parents having elementary, middle, high-school or college education; (v) irregular students (i.e. grade-repeaters or early-starters); (vi) students in a full-time (8am-4pm) vs. part-time (8am-1pm) schedule; (vii) missing values for each control.

The descriptive statistics of the outcome and control variables (including the treatment) are shown in Tables 1a and 1b, respectively.

3. The empirical approach

We examine the causal impact of external monitoring on average math and literacy test scores using school-by-year data and the following empirical specification:

$$\begin{aligned}
y_{it} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Monitored}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Monitored}_{it-1} + \beta_3 \text{Monitored}_{it-2} + \\
& + \delta_{1rt} \text{Size}_{it} + \delta_{2rt} \text{Size}_{it-1} + \delta_{3rt} \text{Size}_{it-2} + \mu_{rt} + \\
& + \gamma_1 X_{it} + \gamma_2 W_{it-1} + \gamma_3 Z_{it-2} + \varepsilon_{it}
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

In equation (1), the indices i , r and t are for school, region and year; y is the outcome variable – measured in year t ; Monitored_{it} , Monitored_{it-1} and Monitored_{it-2} are binary variables equal to 1 if external examiners proctored the test in school i in years t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, and to 0 otherwise.

On the one hand, if the current assignment of an external monitor reduces score manipulation (or cheating), coefficient β_1 should be negative for all our outcomes except the standard deviation of test scores (for which it should be

positive). On the other hand, if the assignment of an external monitor in year $t-1$ or $t-2$ has no persistent effect on current outcomes, coefficients β_2 and/or β_3 should be equal to zero.

We take into account the INVALSI randomization protocol, which samples schools independently every year at the regional level with a probability of being selected that is proportional to the number of students enrolled at the beginning of the school year, by including in the specification region-by-year dummies (μ_{rt}) and their interactions with school size in year t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ ($\delta_{1rt}Size_{it}$, $\delta_{2rt}Size_{it-1}$ and $\delta_{3rt}Size_{it-2}$).

In addition, X_{it} is a vector of control variables which includes the share of male and immigrant students; the share of mothers and fathers with an elementary, middle, high-school diploma and a degree; the share of students who attended pre-primary schools; the share of students following a full-day schedule and the share of irregular students. We further include in vector X_{it} the share of missing values for each of the covariates described above. The vectors W_{it-1} and Z_{it-2} contain the same variables included in the vector X_{it} , but measured in year $t-1$ and $t-2$ respectively. Finally, ε_{it} is an error term, that we allow to be clustered by school.

If the allocation of schools to external monitors was as good as random, the observables included in vectors X_{it} , W_{it-1} and Z_{it-2} should be balanced across schools with and without randomly assigned external examiners (see Angrist *et al.*, 2017; Bertoni *et al.*, 2013), and their inclusion in the model would be superfluous for identification but useful to increase precision.

We investigate whether this is the case in Tables 2a and 2b (for primary and lower secondary schools), which report the point estimates (with the corresponding level of significance) obtained from regressing each observable on current and lagged monitoring (both in year $t-1$ and $t-2$). In all regressions we add randomization controls and cluster standard errors by schools.

For a few covariates, we find that the differences between sampled and non-sampled schools are statistically significant, but that the point estimates are small and close to zero. Since the balancing of covariates is not perfect, and to increase precision, we add all covariates to the vector of controls in our regressions. Nevertheless, our results hold irrespective of whether we include or exclude covariates, lending further support to the internal validity of our research design.

A potential concern when estimating equation (1) is that the effect of previous monitoring on school performance in year t might be affected by the spurious correlation between $Monitored_{it}$, $Monitored_{it-1}$ and $Monitored_{it-2}$: although school i is randomly sampled by INVALSI and every sample is drawn from the population of schools independently in each year, the probability of being selected in year t might be affected by having already had an external invigilator at $t-1$ and $t-2$ for reasons that go beyond the formal assignment procedures. For instance, this might happen if principals bargained with INVALSI to avoid being monitored for two years in a row.

We verify whether this is a problem by regressing current on lagged monitoring, always controlling for the randomization variables. Tables 3a and 3b report our reassuring results (for primary and lower secondary schools), both without (see column 1) and adding covariates (see column 2), showing that the correlation between lagged monitoring (in year $t-1$ and $t-2$) and current monitoring (in year t) is small and not statistically significant.

4. Main results

Our baseline results for math and literacy are reported in Tables 4a and 4b, respectively.¹² Consistently with the previous literature, we find that the percentage of correct answers in schools where an external examiner was

¹² In Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix we report the same results without the controls in vectors X_{it} , W_{it-1} and Z_{it-2} .

present at the test taken in year t is 4.2 percent lower for literacy and 5.4 percent lower for math than in schools that did not have an external examiner – see column (1) in the tables.¹³

We can use these results to derive a rough estimate of the percent reduction in the share of correct answers in the class where the external examiner was in fact present. Let μ and μ_i be the average score in the school and class, and let α_i be the share of pupils in class i . Suppose that the external examiner in class i reduces the average score in the class from μ_i to $\beta\mu_i$, where $\beta < 1$. In the absence of spillover effects from one class to another, the average score in the school declines to $\hat{\mu} = \mu - (1 - \beta)\alpha_i\mu_i$. Therefore, the percent change in the school mean score due to the presence of an examiner in class i is $\frac{\hat{\mu} - \mu}{\mu} = \frac{(\beta - 1)\alpha_i\mu_i}{\mu}$. If $\mu_i \cong \mu$, the percent change in class i is 5.4 percent * 3.89 = 21.1 percent for math and 4.2 percent * 3.89 = 16.3 percent for literacy.

If the presence of an external examiner had only a temporary effect of average school test scores, having had an examiner in year $t-1$ or $t-2$ should have no effect on test scores in year t . Yet we find that schools which had an external examiner during the test taken at $t-1$ experience a statistically significant¹⁴ reduction in the percent of correct answers in the test taken in year t , ranging from 0.5 for literacy to 0.7 percent for math. This effect is roughly 1/7 of the current examiner’s effect.¹⁵

These findings might suggest that monitoring represents not only a symptomatic treatment affecting the “disease” but not its sources, but perhaps also a cure for some of the causes of manipulation. We hasten to stress, however, that this

¹³ Percent changes are computed by dividing the treatment effect by the mean outcome for the control group.

¹⁴ At the 5 or 10 percent level of confidence.

¹⁵ Our estimates do not change qualitatively when we replace the percentage of correct answers as dependent variable with the score computed by INVALSI using the IRT Rasch model to account for the fact that questions vary in their difficulty. Results are reported in Table A3 and A4 in the Appendix.

“curing” effect does not last long: the binary treatment in year $t-2$ does not produce a statistically significant effect on test scores at time t , implying that in the medium-run schools revert to their original behavior.¹⁶

We also evaluate the dynamic impact of the external examiner on the bottom, median and top quartile of the school-specific distribution of test scores (see columns (2), (3) and (4) of Tables 4a and 4b).¹⁷ If external examiners persistently affect the propensity to manipulate test scores, we expect a higher impact on the bottom part of the distribution of scores, because low-performing students are likely to benefit more from manipulation than top performers, who would have scored well in any case. This conjecture is in line with our findings for monitoring in both year t and $t-1$ and for the math test. Results for year $t-1$ are however less clear-cut for the literacy test.

Next, we consider the effect of external monitoring on the within-school standard deviation of scores. As discussed by Bertoni *et al.* (2013), manipulation is expected to reduce the variability of test results. Therefore, if the presence of an external examiner reduces manipulation, one expected outcome is increased dispersion in the performance distribution within schools. As shown in column (5) of both tables there is a significant and positive effect of monitoring in year t on the standard deviation of scores in year t . However, the impact of having had an external examiner in the school in year $t-1$ is only significant for the math test, and the effect of monitoring in year $t-2$ is always very close to zero.

In column (6) we turn our attention to the INVALSI cheating index. We find that schools being monitored in year t show a large reduction in the cheating index – ranging between 43 and 50 percent. Having been monitored in year $t-1$

¹⁶ We have explored whether having had the external monitor in the previous year improves the ability of the current monitor to prevent cheating (by interacting *Monitored in year t* with *Monitored in year $t-1$*), but have found no evidence that this is the case.

¹⁷ As discussed in footnote 10, we compute these outcomes by class and then average by school after weighting each class by its size.

also reduces the index, by 8.5 percent for literacy and by 11.7 percent for math. No effect is found instead for monitoring in year $t-2$.

In column (7) we investigate whether external monitoring affects test scores by limiting the opportunistic behavior of both teachers and principals, who have an incentive to manipulate the pool of test takers and induce poorly performing students not to show up at the test – see Bertoni *et al.* (2013) and Lucifora and Tonello (2016). We find that, while monitoring in year t reduces absences, monitoring in year $t-1$ and $t-2$ has no effect.

Finally, in columns (8) and (9) we consider as outcome variables the percentage of correct answers in open-ended and close-ended questions, respectively. As argued by Angrist *et al.* (2017),¹⁸ evaluating the first type of questions requires more effort and is more discretionary since teachers have to interpret and transcribe students' answers into the machine-readable sheet called “scheda risposta”. Because of this, the answers to these questions are more likely to be manipulated by dishonest or lazy teachers. This conjecture finds support in our estimates, showing that the negative effect of monitoring in year t and $t-1$ on the percentage of correct answers is larger in absolute value for open-ended than for close-ended questions. Monitoring in year $t-2$, however, has no effect on either type of questions.

5. Results by school size

The results presented above are based on data collapsed by school to bypass the threat to randomization induced by any discretion used by school principals in allocating the external inspector to classes.¹⁹ We have seen above that, when

¹⁸ See also Dee *et al.* (2019).

¹⁹ School principals might adopt opportunistic behavior in choosing classes monitored by the external invigilator in order to select those that usually perform better than others within the same school (Angrist *et al.*, 2017). In fact, the incentives of principals to select better classes are very strong, since they might be interested in achieving high scores in INVALSI tests to attract in the following years better stakeholders, such as high-skilled students or students whose

there are no spillover effects from one class to the other and pre-treatment means are similar across classes in the same grade, the percent change in the school mean score caused by the presence of the external examiner in one class can be written as $\frac{\hat{\mu} - \mu}{\mu} = (\beta - 1)\alpha_i$, where α_i is the share of pupils in the class (for a given grade). Since this share is inversely related to the number of classes, we expect the average effect of the external examiner in year t on the contemporaneous average score to be mechanically smaller in schools with many classes. This does not hold, however, for the effect of the external monitor at time $t-1$ or $t-2$, which does not necessarily apply to the single treated class.

We investigate whether the relationship between lagged monitoring and test scores varies with the size of school in Tables 5 (math) and 6 (literacy). We classify schools in three groups: (i) small, with at most 35 pupils in the grade,²⁰ corresponding to a median number of classes in the grade equal to 1; (ii) medium, with 36 to 75 pupils in the grade, corresponding to a median number of classes in the grade equal to 3; (iii) large, with more than 75 pupils and close to 6 classes in the grade (median value).

Our estimates show that the effect of having been monitored in year $t-1$ on current test outcomes is negative, often statistically significant and declining in absolute value with the size of schools. Monitoring in year $t-2$ instead often attracts a positive coefficient which is almost never statistically significant at the 5 or 10 percent level of confidence. The presence of an external examiner in year $t-1$ in schools with less than 35 pupils in the 5th grade generates a 4.4 percent reduction in current test performance for math and a 5.5 percent reduction for literacy. This effect declines in absolute value to 1.8 and 1.2 percent in medium-sized schools and is close to zero in larger schools.

parents have a stronger socio-economic background. In this case, principals' behavior would invalidate the randomization protocol of classes within the same school used by INVALSI.

²⁰ The number of pupils in the grade is the one registered in years t , $t-1$ and $t-2$.

When looking at the other outcomes of interest we also find differentiated effects by school size. Supporting the view that low performing students are those benefitting the most from manipulation, we find that in schools with less than 35 pupils in the grade the effect of both current and past monitoring ($t-1$) is larger in absolute value for the bottom quartile of the math and literacy score distribution (columns 2, 3 and 4 of Tables 5a and 6a) than for the median and top quartile. This difference is much less pronounced or even absent in medium and large size schools (columns 2, 3 and 4 of Tables 5b and 5c and Tables 6b and 6c).

We also find that in small schools both current and past monitoring (in year $t-1$) increase the within-school standard deviation of both math and literacy test scores (column 4 of Tables 5a and 6a) and reduce the cheating test index (column 6 of Tables 5a and 6a), suggesting that past monitoring affects current cheating. The latter effect is sizeable in small schools (-61.5 percent for math and -53 percent for literacy), almost half as big in medium schools (-32 percent for math and -24 percent for literacy) and lower than 10 percent in large schools. Yet, and independently of school size, monitoring in year $t-2$ never affects current test scores.²¹

6. Mechanisms

We have shown that: (i) the negative effects of external monitoring on average test scores extend beyond the current test and involve also the tests taken in the following year; (ii) these effects are stronger in smaller schools, (iii) but fade away after two years.

²¹ We check the robustness of these results by splitting our sample according to the number of classes in the 5th grade and by running separate regressions for schools with no more than one class in the grade, 2 to 3 classes and more than 3 classes in the grade. As shown in the appendix of the paper (Tables A4a, A4b, A4c, A5a, A5b, and A5c) we find results that are qualitatively very similar to those discussed above.

In this section, we discuss potential mechanisms that could explain short-term persistency. We start by noticing that the finding that external monitoring reduces tests scores points to teachers as the main source of manipulation. Angrist *et al.* (2017, p.11) point out that “...honest teacher-proctors should have the same deterrent effect as external monitors on cheating students: both are likely to catch cheaters, teachers even more so if they recognize cheating more readily. External monitoring should therefore have little effect on student cheating unless cheating is accomplished with the collaboration or at least assent of school staff...”.

In low stakes tests, the benefits from cheating include: (i) lower teacher effort in the transcription of results into machine-ready answer sheets, for instance by copying all or part of an answer key, especially when questions are open-ended; (ii) helping students and partially or entirely offsetting poor results that could be attributed to teaching deficiencies; (iii) avoid potential sanctions. Although the tests examined so far are formally low stakes, the fear of sanctions has been fueled by widespread expectations that results may be used at some point to evaluate teachers and schools (Bertoni *et al.*, 2013).

The costs of cheating include: (i) reputational loss in the event of detection. Starting from 2013, INVALSI has implemented a sanctioning policy based on a “fame and shame” mechanism, consisting of two measures: deflation of class test scores and non-return of test scores to the class and school when the computed cheating index was above a threshold (see Lucifora and Tonello, 2016); (ii) potential conflict with honest teachers or with teachers whose classes were proctored by the external examiner.

One potential mechanism driving the negative effect of having had an external examiner in year $t-1$ on test scores in year t is learning. In the treated classes, monitors supervise sheet transcription, a task completed by local school staff by the end of the test day. In non-treated classes, this task is not supervised. The teachers who interact with the examiner may learn how to code correctly the

answers to open-ended questions and eventually pass on this skill to other teachers. Since the probability that affected teachers are involved in the proctoring of tests in the next year is higher in smaller schools, this mechanism is consistent with the larger negative effect found both in these schools and for open-ended questions, but does not explain why the effect of the external examiner disappears after two years. Teacher turnover may be an explanation, yet less than 10% of teachers state that their tenure in the school is lower than 2 years in the self-reported data from the teachers' questionnaire administered by INVALSI.

Another mechanism is reputational concerns: teachers and school administrators might not revert in year t to the level of cheating they would have had without external monitoring in year $t-1$ because they are afraid that either INVALSI or other school stakeholders may identify them as cheaters. This is consistent with our findings that the impact of past monitoring is larger in small schools, that typically have only one class in the grade. In the absence of external monitoring, teachers and school administrators can "pretend" that the scores attained by their students reflect the effectiveness of their teaching efforts to bolster student skills. After the school has been monitored and test scores have been reduced by the external monitor, however, it becomes difficult for school operators to ignore this information.

The higher the reduction induced by the external monitor the more difficult it is to revert to previous results in the following year without running the risk of being identified. This is particularly true for small schools, where most if not all classes have been monitored in year $t-1$. For these schools, returning in year t to the pre-monitoring levels of cheating would produce a larger and therefore more noticeable swing in test scores. Smaller schools may also have higher reputational concerns, both because they typically draw students with higher socio-economic status and better educated parents – who are more likely to closely monitor schools – and because schools with higher average socio-

economic status are more likely to disclose information about previous test scores to external stakeholders.²²

Reputational concerns may explain why the effect of previous monitoring vanishes after two years, insofar as the relevant comparisons are made between neighboring years and considering that school principals might believe that an improvement in test scores realized two years after the external monitoring has taken place can be more easily justified by the improvement in the quality of school inputs and teaching practices.

A third mechanism is peer pressure and teacher preferences. Let us assume that cheating is widespread in the absence of the external examiner. When the latter walks in a class, the teacher of that class cannot engage in cheating and the expected class-specific score is lower. In order not to look bad, he/she may exert pressure on fellow teachers so that in the following year, when no external monitor is present in the school, there is no full reversion to original manipulation. Since teachers involved in the 5th grade within an school typically rotate, there may dislike sharp variations in test scores from one year to another in order to attain similar evaluations from the principal. These preferences, however, do not explain why the presence of an external monitor in year $t-2$ has no effect on current scores, unless there is a presumption of myopia and comparison of outcomes only across neighboring years.

7. The role of social capital

Italy is very heterogeneous both in terms of economic conditions and of social capital, with the North and Centre being richer and endowed with higher social capital than the South. We investigate whether the effect of previous external monitoring on current test scores varies by macro-area and find that external

²² We find that average ESCS (an indicator of student economic and social conditions, see Campodifiori et al., 2010, for a detailed description of this index) is above median in 74% of small institutes and in 45% of medium and large institutes. The probability that previous test scores are revealed to external stakeholders is 18% among institutes with above median ESCS and 14% among other institutes.

monitoring in year $t-1$ has a statistically significant effect on current test score only in the Northern and Central regions, in spite of the fact that current monitoring has a much larger effect on current test scores in the South (see Tables 7, and 8). This might be due to the fact that in the South the incentives to cheat are higher, and reputational concerns are less stringent both because of a lower endowment of social capital and because of lower average parental education and socio-economic conditions, suggesting that parents are less engaged in monitoring school quality.²³

Although the main difference in social capital endowment in Italy is between the Centre-North and the South, there are also differences within each area. To better capture these, we consider the following measures of the propensity to cooperate and to create collective goods: (i) voter turnout in referenda where voting is not mandatory and (ii) blood donation (already used by Guiso *et al.*, 2004).²⁴

Voter turnout refers to all the referenda that occurred in Italy between 1946 and 1989 (provincial level data from the World Value Social Survey),²⁵ and blood donation is measured by the number of blood bags (each bag containing 16 ounces of blood) per million inhabitants collected by AVIS, the national agency. The results presented in Table 9 highlight that the effect of past monitoring on current scores is statistically significant only for schools located in areas endowed with high social capital.²⁶ This evidence, albeit suggestive, is consistent with the view that the impact of past monitoring on cheating is due

²³ This evidence is also in line with the findings by Paccagnella and Sestito (2014) who document the negative correlation between school cheating and measures of social capital at the local level.

²⁴ See also Ferrer-Esteban (2013).

²⁵ These referenda cover a very broad set of issues, ranging from the choice between republic and monarchy (1946), divorce (1974), abortion (1981), from hunting regulation (1987), to the use of nuclear power (1987), to public order measures (1978, 1981).

²⁶ Notice, however, that differences between schools located in areas endowed with varying level of social capital are not statistically significant. Similar results (not reported but available upon request) obtain when using the voter turnout in European elections, which is available at municipal level.

to reputational concerns, which are felt especially in communities endowed with social values.

8. The impact of past monitoring on high stake tests

We expect the effect of the external examiner to be lower in absolute value when stakes are high, either because the incentives for students to cheat are much higher, which makes it more difficult for the external monitor to deter it, or because cheating is inherently more difficult due to more stringent controls on test procedures carried out in control classes by the involved stakeholders (the principal, other teachers, parents).

To investigate whether this is the case, we estimate equation (1) using data for the 8th grade. The scores in the math and literacy tests taken in that grade are part of the final exit exam that students need to pass in order to enroll in upper secondary education and eventually college. Using the same specifications as in Table 4, we report our findings in Tables 10a and 10b for math and literacy, respectively. These findings confirm our expectations. First, the impact of the current external examiner on the average percent of correct answers is much smaller than in low stakes tests (-0.9 percent in math versus -5.4 percent in the fifth grade and -0.4 percent in literacy versus -4.2 percent in the fifth grade). Second, we find no evidence that having had an external examiner in year $t-1$ or $t-2$ affects current test scores.

Conclusions

Standardized tests that measure and compare students' cognitive skills have become common in many countries. While in some countries these assessments are used mainly to provide external comparisons with no formal consequences on schools or students, in other countries they are used either to evaluate teachers or select students applying for different educational tracks.

A well-known problem with testing is score manipulation, which happens both in low and high stakes tests, and undermines the reliability of results and the

possibility of using them to compare schools and countries and to support accountability policies.

External monitoring has been shown to be effective in reducing manipulation problems. However, the existing literature has exclusively focused on the immediate effects of monitoring, with the implicit assumption that these effects will vanish once external invigilators leave the school. In this paper, we have questioned this assumption by investigating whether the presence of external examiners can impact also on future test scores.

Using the repeated random assignment of external examiners to Italian primary schools, we have found that external monitoring reduces average test scores and cheating not only currently but also in the year after its implementation.

We have discussed potential mechanisms that could explain short-term persistence, including learning, reputational concerns and peer pressure, and provided suggestive evidence on the role played of social capital and high stakes. We have also found that the presence of an external examiner in the school has no effect on test scores after two years, suggesting that the uncovered persistency is short-lived.

We believe that our results provide useful input for the correct assessment of the costs and benefits of policies that try to reduce score manipulation by using external monitors. They show that considering only the current impact of external invigilators is likely to under-estimate the benefits, especially in small schools.

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Tables

Table 1a. Descriptive Statistics – outcome variables

	(1)				(2)			
	Primary schools				Middle schools			
	N = 22,984				N = 20,205			
	Math		Literacy		Math		Literacy	
	Mean	Std. dev	Mean	Std. dev	Mean	Std. dev	Mean	Std. dev
<i>Within-school score distribution:</i>								
Mean	61.73	10.95	63.97	8.83	57.26	8.19	65.87	6.26
Std. dev	15.25	3.54	15.16	3.24	16.51	2.99	15.35	2.45
25 th percentile	51.17	13.35	53.77	11.16	45.31	9.51	55.59	7.82
50 th percentile	62.31	11.79	65.22	9.48	57.07	9.08	67.24	6.86
75 th percentile	72.86	9.87	76.18	7.74	69.19	8.51	77.36	5.89
Cheating index	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.07
% absent students	14.41	11.77	14.96	12.58	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.07
% correct open-ended questions	61.75	12.34	64.03	11.58	53.26	8.75	58.68	7.99
% correct close-ended question	60.41	12.09	63.88	8.60	59.36	8.38	68.31	6.36

Note: INVALSI SNV data.

Table 1b. Descriptive Statistics – controls (in year t)

	(1)		(2)	
	Primary schools N = 22,984		Middle schools N = 20,205	
	Mean	Std.dev	Mean	Std.dev
<i>Panel A. School and area</i>				
Monitored in year t	0.10	0.30	0.23	0.42
Monitored in year $t-1$	0.10	0.30	0.23	0.42
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.11	0.32	0.22	0.41
# students enrolled in year t	78.84	43.12	97.58	56.29
# students enrolled in year $t-1$	77.82	42.78	97.84	56.66
# students enrolled in year $t-2$	76.61	42.63	97.47	56.85
South	0.37	0.48	0.37	0.48
<i>Panel B. Student in year t</i>				
% Male students	0.50	0.07	0.51	0.08
% Fathers with a middle school diploma	0.28	0.17	0.32	0.17
% Fathers with a high school diploma	0.38	0.18	0.36	0.17
% Fathers with a degree	0.13	0.14	0.10	0.11
% Mothers with a middle school diploma	0.23	0.16	0.27	0.16
% Mothers with a high school diploma	0.43	0.19	0.41	0.19
% Mothers with a degree	0.16	0.15	0.12	0.11
% Regular	0.95	0.08	0.89	0.08
% Immigrants	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.09
% Kindergarten	0.78	0.35	0.75	0.36
% Daycare	0.24	0.21	0.19	0.17
% Full-time	0.07	0.22	0.08	0.22
<i>Panel C. % Missing in year t</i>				
% Male students missing	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.04
% Fathers' education missing	0.18	0.29	0.19	0.28
% Mothers' education missing	0.16	0.29	0.17	0.28
% Regular missing	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.05
% Immigrants missing	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.06
% Kindergarten missing	0.12	0.28	0.11	0.26
% Daycare missing	0.27	0.38	0.22	0.36
% Full-time missing	0.01	0.08	0.22	0.41

Notes: to save space we only report descriptive statistics for student characteristics in year t . Descriptive statistics for covariates in year $t-1$ and $t-2$ are available from the authors. The omitted category for parental education is primary education.

Table 2a. Balancing tests – Primary schools. Fifth grade.

Covariate in year	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	<i>t</i>	<i>t-1</i>	<i>t-2</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>t-1</i>	<i>t-2</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>t-1</i>	<i>t-2</i>
Monitored in year	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
	<i>t</i>	<i>t-1</i>	<i>t-2</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>t-1</i>	<i>t-2</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>t-1</i>	<i>t-2</i>
% Male students	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001
% Fathers with a middle school diploma	-0.004	-0.005	-0.001	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003	-0.006	-0.005	0.003
% Fathers with a high school diploma	0.003	-0.002	0.001	-0.008*	0.006	-0.005	0.000	-0.007*	0.011***
% Fathers with a degree	0.002	-0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.002	0.002
% Mothers with a middle school diploma	-0.001	-0.004	0.000	-0.004	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	0.003
% Mothers with a high school diploma	0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.009**	0.005	-0.006	-0.004	-0.009**	0.011***
% Mothers with a degree	0.002	-0.002	-0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	0.003
% Regular	0.002*	0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.003***	-0.001	0.002*	-0.000	0.001
% Immigrants	-0.002	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.003
% Kindergarten	-0.003	-0.020**	-0.010	-0.013	-0.009	-0.013	-0.004	-0.016*	0.004
% Day care	-0.002	-0.006	-0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002	0.002	-0.009**	0.001
% Full-time	0.004	0.002	-0.006	0.004	0.002	-0.005	-0.001	0.007	0.000
% Male students missing	-0.002**	-0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.002***	-0.000	-0.002***	-0.001*	-0.001*
% Fathers' education missing	-0.001	0.009	0.001	0.012*	-0.004	0.009	0.006	0.014*	-0.018**
% Mothers' education missing	-0.002	0.009	0.001	0.013*	-0.004	0.009	0.007	0.015*	-0.018**
% Regular missing	-0.002**	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.002***	0.000	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**
% Immigrants missing	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001*	-0.002**	-0.000	0.002	-0.005**	-0.010***
% Kindergarten missing	0.005	0.011*	0.003	0.015**	0.010	0.010*	0.003	0.017**	-0.002
% Day care missing	0.007	0.022**	0.004	0.018*	0.015*	0.011	0.009	0.028***	0.004
% Full-time missing	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	0.002	-0.005**	-0.009***

Note: The table reports the coefficients of balancing regressions of each covariate on monitored in year t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ and randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment). Separate regressions are run for each covariate measured in year t , $t-1$ or $t-2$. As a result, for each row and column, sub-columns a, b, and c report coefficients from the same regression. Different rows and columns refer instead to different regressions. Standard errors clustered by school are omitted to save space. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence. The number of observations is 22,984.

Table 2b. Balancing tests – Junior high schools. Third grade.

Covariate in year	(1)			(2)			(3)		
	<i>t</i>	<i>t-1</i>	<i>t-2</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>t-1</i>	<i>t-2</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>t-1</i>	<i>t-2</i>
Monitored in year	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(a)	(b)	(c)
% Male students	-0.003**	0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.001
% Fathers with a middle school diploma	0.001	-0.003	0.000	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.001	-0.002
% Fathers with a high school diploma	0.004	0.002	-0.004	0.004	0.000	-0.004	0.003	0.001	-0.001
% Fathers with a degree	0.004*	0.002	-0.001	0.003*	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001
% Mothers with a middle school diploma	0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.002
% Mothers with a high school diploma	0.004	-0.000	-0.004	0.004	0.000	-0.007**	0.004	0.002	-0.001
% Mothers with a degree	0.004**	0.002	-0.001	0.003*	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001
% Regular	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002	-0.001	-0.001
% Immigrants	-0.003*	-0.002*	0.000	0.000	-0.003**	-0.003*	-0.004***	-0.001	-0.004***
% Kindergarten	0.003	0.004	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.007
% Day care	0.005	0.001	-0.002	0.004	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.004
% Full-time	-0.002	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	0.002	-0.006**	-0.001	-0.002	0.000
% Male students missing	-0.001	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001
% Fathers' education missing	-0.008	-0.001	0.005	-0.005	-0.001	0.005	-0.007	-0.002	0.002
% Mothers' education missing	-0.008*	-0.001	0.005	-0.006	-0.000	0.005	-0.006	-0.002	0.002
% Regular missing	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001
% Immigrants missing	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001*	0.000	-0.001	-0.001
% Kindergarten missing	-0.003	-0.006	0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.000	-0.007	0.001
% Day care missing	-0.000	0.001	0.003	-0.006	0.006	0.007	0.000	-0.002	0.010
% Full-time missing	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.001

Note: The table reports the coefficients of balancing regressions of each covariate on monitored in year t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ and randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment). Separate regressions are run for each covariate measured in year t , $t-1$ or $t-2$. As a result, for each row and column, sub-columns a, b, and c report coefficients from the same regression. Different rows and columns refer instead to different regressions. Standard errors clustered by school are omitted to save space. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence. The number of observations is 20,782.

Table 3a. Correlation between current and lagged monitoring. Primary schools, fifth grade. With and without additional controls

Outcome variable	(1) Monitored in year t	(2) Monitored in year t
Monitored in year $t-1$	0.007 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)
Monitored in year $t-2$	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
Observations	22,984	22,984
Other controls	No	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes

Note: Each regression includes randomization controls (region by wave dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment). Column (2) also includes the additional controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 3b. Correlation between current and lagged monitoring. Junior high schools, third grade. With and without additional controls

Outcome variable	(1) Monitored in year t	(2) Monitored in year t
Monitored in year $t-1$	0.011 (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.005 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)
Observations	20,205	20,205
Other controls	No	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes

Note: Each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment). Column (2) also includes the additional controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 4a. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools. Math - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	3.372*** (0.195)	-4.057*** (0.231)	-3.606*** (0.214)	-2.938*** (0.187)	0.626*** (0.054)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.002)	-4.282*** (0.225)	-2.567*** (0.185)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.440** (0.204)	-0.560** (0.244)	-0.546** (0.223)	-0.307 (0.190)	0.130** (0.059)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.565** (0.235)	-0.348* (0.195)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.172 (0.196)	0.160 (0.236)	0.131 (0.214)	0.170 (0.182)	-0.001 (0.059)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.088 (0.233)	0.207 (0.184)
Observations	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	62.11	51.62	62.70	73.17	15.17	0.046	0.144	62.20	60.70
Mean for control group at $t-1$	61.85	51.31	62.43	72.93	15.22	0.045	0.143	61.87	60.51
Mean for control group at $t-2$	61.69	51.13	62.27	72.81	15.25	0.045	0.143	61.87	60.27
% change for monitored at t	-0.054	-0.078	-0.057	-0.040	0.041	-0.426	-0.031	-0.068	-0.042
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.007	-0.010	-0.008	-0.004	0.008	-0.117	0.006	-0.009	-0.005
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.002	-0.001	0.028	0.003	0.001	0.003

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect by the mean outcome for the control group. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 4b. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools. Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.690*** (0.155)	-3.381*** (0.196)	-2.768*** (0.171)	-2.145*** (0.139)	0.718*** (0.054)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.005** (0.002)	-4.376*** (0.208)	-2.127*** (0.146)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.312* (0.163)	-0.297 (0.208)	-0.387** (0.177)	-0.304** (0.144)	0.024 (0.057)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.626*** (0.219)	-0.210 (0.155)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.135 (0.158)	0.192 (0.201)	0.096 (0.172)	0.126 (0.137)	0.009 (0.058)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.036 (0.214)	0.180 (0.150)
Observations	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	64.27	54.15	65.53	75.41	15.07	0.040	0.149	64.49	64.13
Mean for control group at $t-1$	64.07	53.89	65.33	75.26	15.13	0.038	0.149	64.17	63.97
Mean for control group at $t-2$	63.99	53.80	65.25	75.19	15.14	0.038	0.149	64.12	63.89
% change for monitored at t	-0.041	-0.062	-0.042	-0.028	0.047	-0.499	-0.035	-0.067	-0.033
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	0.001	-0.084	0.004	-0.009	-0.003
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.019	-0.010	-0.001	0.002

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect by the mean outcome for the control group. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 5a. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with at most 35 pupils in the grade. Math - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-7.300*** (1.595)	-8.849*** (1.843)	-7.671*** (1.698)	-6.946*** (1.537)	1.046** (0.445)	-0.063*** (0.015)	0.005 (0.013)	-8.520*** (1.883)	-6.459*** (1.482)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-2.924* (1.497)	-3.801** (1.774)	-3.555** (1.631)	-1.963 (1.371)	1.031** (0.441)	-0.055*** (0.013)	-0.010 (0.013)	-3.119* (1.672)	-2.635* (1.484)
Monitored in year $t-2$	1.357 (1.192)	1.937 (1.491)	1.191 (1.282)	0.821 (1.041)	-0.585 (0.458)	0.020 (0.019)	-0.008 (0.010)	1.408 (1.488)	1.205 (1.169)
Observations	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	66.01	56.88	66.64	75.80	13.57	0.090	0.098	66.72	63.85
Mean for control group at $t-1$	65.90	56.74	66.53	75.69	13.58	0.090	0.099	66.63	63.71
Mean for control group at $t-2$	65.78	56.59	66.42	75.61	13.62	0.088	0.098	66.55	63.58
% change for monitored at t	-0.111	-0.156	-0.115	-0.091	0.077	-0.694	0.055	-0.128	-0.101
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.044	-0.067	-0.053	-0.025	0.075	-0.615	-0.096	-0.046	-0.041
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.020	0.034	0.017	0.010	-0.042	0.220	-0.085	0.021	0.019

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 5b. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with 36 to 75 pupils in the grade. Math - fifth grade

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Outcome variable	Mean	Bottom quartile	Median	Top quartile	Standard deviation	Cheating index	Percent absent in the test	Mean open-ended questions	Mean close-ended questions
Monitored in year t	-4.407*** (0.506)	-5.467*** (0.595)	-4.643*** (0.563)	-3.768*** (0.499)	0.980*** (0.142)	-0.026*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.006)	-5.685*** (0.572)	-3.272*** (0.487)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-1.130** (0.498)	-1.395** (0.598)	-1.298** (0.545)	-0.904* (0.477)	0.200 (0.147)	-0.012*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.007)	-1.246** (0.587)	-1.108** (0.468)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.491 (0.493)	0.600 (0.589)	0.499 (0.539)	0.473 (0.474)	-0.086 (0.148)	0.005 (0.004)	0.003 (0.007)	0.510 (0.600)	0.488 (0.452)
Observations	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	61.76	51.28	62.34	72.81	15.17	0.040	0.164	61.60	60.50
Mean for control group at $t-1$	61.50	50.96	62.07	72.58	15.22	0.039	0.162	61.24	60.33
Mean for control group at $t-2$	61.25	50.64	61.80	72.37	15.29	0.037	0.162	61.13	59.98
% change for monitored at t	-0.071	-0.107	-0.074	-0.051	0.064	-0.655	-0.101	-0.092	-0.054
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.018	-0.027	-0.020	-0.012	0.013	-0.317	0.006	-0.020	-0.018
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.008	0.011	0.008	0.006	-0.005	0.136	0.016	0.008	0.008

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 5c. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with more than 75 pupils in the grade. Math - fifth grade

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Outcome variable	Mean	Bottom quartile	Median	Top quartile	Standard deviation	Cheating index	Percent absent in the test	Mean open-ended questions	Mean close-ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.570*** (0.223)	-3.064*** (0.263)	-2.778*** (0.244)	-2.206*** (0.212)	0.464*** (0.061)	-0.014*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-3.239*** (0.254)	-1.955*** (0.212)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.064 (0.241)	-0.111 (0.289)	-0.087 (0.263)	0.026 (0.224)	0.083 (0.067)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.140 (0.272)	-0.015 (0.231)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.354 (0.238)	0.359 (0.286)	0.384 (0.257)	0.340 (0.218)	-0.054 (0.065)	0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.262 (0.274)	0.349 (0.228)
Observations	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	60.65	49.47	61.21	72.39	16.00	0.030	0.135	60.58	59.62
Mean for control group at $t-1$	60.35	49.11	60.90	72.13	16.05	0.029	0.135	60.19	59.41
Mean for control group at $t-2$	60.10	48.82	60.64	71.93	16.12	0.028	0.134	60.20	59.02
% change for monitored at t	-0.042	-0.061	-0.045	-0.030	0.029	-0.452	-0.016	-0.053	-0.032
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.005	-0.071	-0.020	-0.002	-0.001
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.004	-0.003	0.063	0.001	0.004	0.005

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 6a. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with at most 35 pupils in the grade. Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-6.410*** (1.347)	-7.330*** (1.677)	-6.684*** (1.443)	-5.522*** (1.238)	1.483*** (0.451)	-0.065*** (0.010)	0.008 (0.013)	-9.874*** (1.841)	-5.228*** (1.258)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-3.673*** (1.235)	-4.570*** (1.617)	-3.957*** (1.295)	-2.628** (1.079)	1.277*** (0.470)	-0.039*** (0.014)	-0.006 (0.013)	-4.343*** (1.646)	-3.482*** (1.206)
Monitored in year $t-2$	1.055 (1.030)	1.185 (1.312)	0.889 (1.086)	1.084 (0.847)	-0.215 (0.424)	0.011 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.011)	1.212 (1.325)	0.987 (1.061)
Observations	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752	3,752
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	67.53	58.57	68.79	77.52	13.64	0.074	0.098	69.21	66.90
Mean for control group at $t-1$	67.45	58.49	68.71	77.44	13.65	0.074	0.098	69.09	66.83
Mean for control group at $t-2$	67.36	58.38	68.62	77.37	13.67	0.073	0.098	69.00	66.74
% change for monitored at t	-0.094	-0.125	-0.097	-0.071	0.109	-0.867	0.076	-0.143	-0.078
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.054	-0.078	-0.057	-0.033	0.093	-0.529	-0.056	-0.062	-0.052
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.015	0.020	0.013	0.014	-0.015	0.146	-0.134	0.017	0.014

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 6b. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with 36 to 75 pupils in the grade. Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.929*** (0.378)	-3.991*** (0.484)	-2.991*** (0.424)	-2.036*** (0.354)	0.985*** (0.134)	-0.024*** (0.002)	-0.014** (0.007)	-5.353*** (0.518)	-2.154*** (0.357)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.758* (0.395)	-0.867* (0.502)	-0.849* (0.434)	-0.695* (0.356)	0.087 (0.140)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.007)	-1.255** (0.534)	-0.591 (0.377)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.338 (0.392)	0.433 (0.498)	0.213 (0.432)	0.340 (0.351)	-0.109 (0.149)	0.004 (0.004)	0.005 (0.007)	0.340 (0.551)	0.319 (0.367)
Observations	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842	4,842
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	63.74	53.55	64.94	74.89	15.10	0.035	0.167	63.83	63.63
Mean for control group at $t-1$	63.57	53.30	64.78	74.79	15.18	0.033	0.166	63.50	63.51
Mean for control group at $t-2$	63.40	53.11	64.61	74.64	15.21	0.032	0.165	63.34	63.34
% change for monitored at t	-0.046	-0.074	-0.046	-0.027	0.065	-0.691	-0.084	-0.083	-0.033
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.011	-0.016	-0.013	-0.009	0.005	-0.239	-0.018	-0.019	-0.009
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.005	0.008	0.003	0.004	-0.007	0.120	0.027	0.005	0.005

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 6c. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with more than 75 pupils in the grade. Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.096*** (0.178)	-2.610*** (0.227)	-2.144*** (0.195)	-1.742*** (0.159)	0.515*** (0.063)	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	-3.512*** (0.245)	-1.613*** (0.167)
Monitored in year $t-1$	0.020 (0.194)	0.095 (0.248)	0.021 (0.209)	0.043 (0.171)	0.030 (0.066)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.319 (0.261)	0.136 (0.182)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.307* (0.186)	0.365 (0.237)	0.339* (0.200)	0.285* (0.162)	-0.023 (0.064)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.230 (0.250)	0.310* (0.176)
Observations	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096	9,096
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	63.33	52.72	64.63	75.02	15.73	0.026	0.144	62.79	63.44
Mean for control group at $t-1$	63.08	52.39	64.38	74.82	15.79	0.025	0.144	62.40	63.24
Mean for control group at $t-2$	62.97	52.27	64.27	74.73	15.82	0.025	0.144	62.31	63.13
% change for monitored at t	-0.033	-0.049	-0.033	-0.023	0.032	-0.488	-0.028	-0.055	-0.025
% change for monitored at $t-1$	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.037	-0.019	-0.005	0.002
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.004	0.006	0.005	0.003	-0.001	0.039	-0.025	0.003	0.004

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 7a. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools in Northern and Central Italy. Math - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.225*** (0.183)	-2.725*** (0.220)	-2.365*** (0.208)	-1.884*** (0.184)	0.467*** (0.056)	-0.011*** (0.001)	-0.005* (0.002)	-2.965*** (0.212)	-1.578*** (0.175)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.476** (0.213)	-0.580** (0.256)	-0.633*** (0.236)	-0.401** (0.203)	0.107* (0.065)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.653*** (0.245)	-0.301 (0.203)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.055 (0.185)	-0.032 (0.225)	0.065 (0.207)	0.149 (0.179)	0.067 (0.058)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.041 (0.224)	0.106 (0.176)
Observations	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	61.11	49.84	61.66	72.91	16.06	0.024	0.133	60.38	60.54
Mean for control group at $t-1$	60.98	49.68	61.53	72.80	16.09	0.024	0.133	60.20	60.44
Mean for control group at $t-2$	60.80	49.47	61.34	72.64	16.13	0.023	0.132	60.19	60.18
% change for monitored at t	-0.036	-0.054	-0.038	-0.025	0.029	-0.456	-0.035	-0.049	-0.026
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.007	-0.011	-0.010	-0.005	0.006	-0.137	-0.010	-0.010	-0.004
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.002	0.004	-0.038	-0.004	-0.001	0.001

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 7b. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools in Southern Italy. Math - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-4.856*** (0.380)	-5.783*** (0.448)	-5.218*** (0.409)	-4.304*** (0.356)	0.828*** (0.100)	-0.031*** (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	-5.978*** (0.437)	-3.854*** (0.360)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.377 (0.386)	-0.510 (0.460)	-0.407 (0.418)	-0.166 (0.354)	0.154 (0.108)	-0.008** (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.429 (0.442)	-0.398 (0.368)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.359 (0.404)	0.468 (0.484)	0.243 (0.434)	0.200 (0.366)	-0.120 (0.118)	0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.292 (0.474)	0.369 (0.379)
Observations	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	63.88	54.79	64.54	73.63	13.59	0.086	0.163	65.45	61.00
Mean for control group at $t-1$	63.39	54.22	64.02	73.18	13.66	0.083	0.162	64.83	60.62
Mean for control group at $t-2$	63.27	54.05	63.91	73.11	13.71	0.082	0.162	64.82	60.43
% change for monitored at t	-0.076	-0.106	-0.080	-0.058	0.061	-0.362	-0.028	-0.091	-0.063
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.005	-0.009	-0.006	-0.002	0.011	-0.094	0.023	-0.006	-0.006
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.005	0.008	0.003	0.002	-0.008	0.060	0.011	0.004	0.006

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 8a. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools in Northern and Central Italy. Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-1.766*** (0.146)	-2.275*** (0.191)	-1.707*** (0.166)	-1.394*** (0.135)	0.520*** (0.057)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.005* (0.003)	-3.405*** (0.212)	-1.223*** (0.136)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.352** (0.164)	-0.410* (0.213)	-0.433** (0.183)	-0.288* (0.149)	0.087 (0.063)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.908*** (0.231)	-0.169 (0.154)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.048 (0.154)	0.089 (0.201)	0.013 (0.172)	0.083 (0.136)	0.048 (0.060)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.166 (0.222)	0.104 (0.144)
Observations	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515	14,515
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	64.03	53.49	65.36	75.64	15.62	0.021	0.141	62.96	64.31
Mean for control group at $t-1$	63.93	53.35	65.27	75.56	15.65	0.021	0.140	62.77	64.24
Mean for control group at $t-2$	63.86	53.26	65.20	75.51	15.67	0.020	0.140	62.71	64.17
% change for monitored at t	-0.027	-0.042	-0.026	-0.018	0.033	-0.541	-0.034	-0.054	-0.019
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006	-0.003	0.005	-0.154	-0.003	-0.014	-0.002
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003	-0.019	-0.029	-0.002	0.001

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 8b. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools in Southern Italy. Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-3.895*** (0.299)	-4.819*** (0.373)	-4.164*** (0.324)	-3.131*** (0.267)	0.960*** (0.097)	-0.031*** (0.002)	-0.006 (0.004)	-5.618*** (0.392)	-3.313*** (0.283)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.246 (0.314)	-0.115 (0.395)	-0.306 (0.334)	-0.324 (0.276)	-0.064 (0.104)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.234 (0.409)	-0.255 (0.300)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.277 (0.318)	0.364 (0.400)	0.230 (0.342)	0.203 (0.274)	-0.053 (0.114)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.005)	0.188 (0.419)	0.299 (0.306)
Observations	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469	8,469
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	64.70	55.34	65.82	74.99	14.08	0.073	0.165	67.22	63.81
Mean for control group at $t-1$	64.34	54.86	65.43	74.72	14.20	0.070	0.163	66.65	63.51
Mean for control group at $t-2$	64.24	54.75	65.33	74.63	14.21	0.069	0.163	66.60	63.39
% change for monitored at t	-0.060	-0.087	-0.063	-0.041	0.068	-0.421	-0.039	-0.083	-0.051
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.044	0.013	-0.003	-0.004
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.004	0.006	0.003	0.002	-0.003	0.036	0.012	0.002	0.004

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 9a. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with high social capital (Blood Donation). Math - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.506*** (0.228)	-3.006*** (0.274)	-2.655*** (0.255)	-2.215*** (0.222)	0.450*** (0.066)	-0.013*** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.003)	-3.188*** (0.261)	-1.894*** (0.214)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.473* (0.248)	-0.675** (0.300)	-0.594** (0.275)	-0.327 (0.235)	0.170** (0.075)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.743*** (0.287)	-0.266 (0.237)
Monitored in year $t-2$	-0.036 (0.225)	-0.162 (0.274)	-0.053 (0.251)	0.092 (0.217)	0.095 (0.071)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.245 (0.272)	0.096 (0.211)
Observations	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	61.05	49.72	61.60	72.93	16.12	0.024	0.130	60.26	60.53
Mean for control group at $t-1$	60.90	49.55	61.45	72.78	16.14	0.023	0.129	60.05	60.42
Mean for control group at $t-2$	60.72	49.33	61.26	72.64	16.19	0.023	0.129	60.06	60.15
% change for monitored at t	-0.041	-0.060	-0.043	-0.030	0.027	-0.523	-0.034	-0.052	-0.031
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.007	-0.013	-0.009	-0.004	0.010	-0.149	0.030	-0.012	-0.004
% change for monitored at $t-2$	-0.001	-0.003	-0.001	0.001	0.005	-0.052	-0.015	-0.004	0.001

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 9b. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with low social capital (Blood Donation). Math - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-4.185*** (0.307)	-5.070*** (0.361)	-4.483*** (0.333)	-3.607*** (0.290)	0.807*** (0.083)	-0.027*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-5.259*** (0.353)	-3.242*** (0.293)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.440 (0.316)	-0.510 (0.377)	-0.534 (0.343)	-0.328 (0.290)	0.103 (0.090)	-0.007*** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.439 (0.361)	-0.443 (0.302)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.375 (0.316)	0.466 (0.379)	0.328 (0.340)	0.244 (0.287)	-0.096 (0.092)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.416 (0.371)	0.307 (0.298)
Observations	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	63.19	53.56	63.82	73.42	14.20	0.070	0.158	64.20	60.87
Mean for control group at $t-1$	62.82	53.12	63.43	73.09	14.27	0.068	0.157	63.73	60.59
Mean for control group at $t-2$	62.69	52.96	63.30	73.00	14.31	0.067	0.157	63.72	60.38
% change for monitored at t	-0.066	-0.094	-0.070	-0.049	0.056	-0.382	-0.026	-0.081	-0.053
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.007	-0.009	-0.008	-0.004	0.007	-0.101	-0.015	-0.006	-0.007
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.005	0.008	0.005	0.003	-0.006	0.048	0.016	0.006	0.005

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 9c. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with high social capital (Blood Donation). Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-1.944*** (0.175)	-2.553*** (0.230)	-1.905*** (0.195)	-1.500*** (0.157)	0.559*** (0.068)	-0.012*** (0.001)	-0.006** (0.003)	-3.452*** (0.248)	-1.451*** (0.165)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.371* (0.194)	-0.481* (0.255)	-0.511** (0.217)	-0.241 (0.175)	0.165** (0.074)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.914*** (0.263)	-0.197 (0.185)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.036 (0.180)	0.069 (0.232)	0.049 (0.198)	0.015 (0.159)	0.001 (0.069)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.232 (0.259)	0.108 (0.168)
Observations	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344	11,344
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	63.88	53.29	65.21	75.52	15.66	0.021	0.136	62.74	64.18
Mean for control group at $t-1$	63.76	53.13	65.10	75.43	15.69	0.020	0.135	62.55	64.09
Mean for control group at $t-2$	63.69	53.03	65.02	75.38	15.72	0.020	0.136	62.48	64.01
% change for monitored at t	-0.030	-0.047	-0.029	-0.019	0.035	-0.556	-0.047	-0.055	-0.022
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.005	-0.009	-0.007	-0.003	0.010	-0.154	0.027	-0.014	-0.003
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.029	-0.021	-0.003	0.001

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 9d. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with low social capital (Blood Donation). Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-3.373*** (0.246)	-4.136*** (0.306)	-3.549*** (0.269)	-2.728*** (0.221)	0.869*** (0.081)	-0.027*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)	-5.204*** (0.324)	-2.751*** (0.232)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.319 (0.253)	-0.204 (0.318)	-0.360 (0.270)	-0.411* (0.223)	-0.082 (0.086)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.398 (0.336)	-0.292 (0.241)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.248 (0.252)	0.304 (0.320)	0.160 (0.273)	0.259 (0.217)	0.013 (0.092)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	0.194 (0.335)	0.260 (0.242)
Observations	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509	11,509
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	64.68	55.05	65.86	75.30	14.47	0.059	0.162	66.28	64.08
Mean for control group at $t-1$	64.41	54.69	65.58	75.10	14.56	0.057	0.162	65.84	63.87
Mean for control group at $t-2$	64.32	54.60	65.49	75.00	14.56	0.057	0.161	65.80	63.77
% change for monitored at t	-0.052	-0.075	-0.053	-0.036	0.060	-0.456	-0.023	-0.078	-0.042
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.004	-0.003	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.063	-0.015	-0.006	-0.004
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.003	0.005	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.017	0.001	0.002	0.004

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 9e. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with high social capital (Referenda Turnout). Math - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.011*** (0.213)	-2.494*** (0.257)	-2.123*** (0.241)	-1.674*** (0.213)	0.422*** (0.066)	-0.009*** (0.001)	-0.005* (0.003)	-2.688*** (0.243)	-1.383*** (0.207)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.535** (0.242)	-0.673** (0.295)	-0.636** (0.267)	-0.513** (0.230)	0.127 (0.077)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.665** (0.283)	-0.426* (0.226)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.105 (0.211)	0.066 (0.257)	0.114 (0.239)	0.175 (0.208)	0.019 (0.069)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.029 (0.257)	0.105 (0.201)
Observations	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	60.90	49.41	61.46	72.92	16.31	0.019	0.124	59.85	60.62
Mean for control group at $t-1$	60.78	49.26	61.35	72.84	16.34	0.018	0.123	59.70	60.55
Mean for control group at $t-2$	60.59	49.03	61.15	72.67	16.39	0.018	0.123	59.68	60.27
% change for monitored at t	-0.033	-0.050	-0.034	-0.023	0.025	-0.472	-0.037	-0.044	-0.022
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.008	-0.013	-0.010	-0.007	0.007	-0.142	-0.016	-0.011	-0.007
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	-0.056	-0.030	0.001	0.001

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 9f. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with low social capital (Referenda Turnout). Math - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-4.236*** (0.288)	-5.056*** (0.340)	-4.537*** (0.313)	-3.729*** (0.272)	0.758*** (0.077)	-0.027*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-5.275*** (0.332)	-3.331*** (0.272)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.379 (0.300)	-0.486 (0.357)	-0.483 (0.326)	-0.182 (0.276)	0.126 (0.084)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.506 (0.343)	-0.294 (0.287)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.256 (0.301)	0.271 (0.361)	0.189 (0.324)	0.198 (0.274)	-0.026 (0.088)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	0.174 (0.354)	0.307 (0.282)
Observations	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	63.09	53.41	63.70	73.37	14.25	0.069	0.160	64.10	60.76
Mean for control group at $t-1$	62.71	52.96	63.30	73.02	14.31	0.067	0.159	63.62	60.47
Mean for control group at $t-2$	62.58	52.80	63.17	72.93	14.35	0.066	0.159	63.62	60.27
% change for monitored at t	-0.067	-0.094	-0.071	-0.050	0.053	-0.389	-0.024	-0.082	-0.054
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.006	-0.009	-0.007	-0.002	0.008	-0.105	0.014	-0.007	-0.004
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.002	-0.001	0.043	0.021	0.002	0.005

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 9g. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with high social capital (Referenda Tunrout). Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-1.529*** (0.169)	-1.978*** (0.225)	-1.451*** (0.192)	-1.186*** (0.155)	0.464*** (0.068)	-0.010*** (0.001)	-0.005* (0.003)	-3.075*** (0.245)	-1.016*** (0.158)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.405** (0.184)	-0.498** (0.242)	-0.522** (0.208)	-0.306* (0.168)	0.149** (0.074)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.935*** (0.263)	-0.226 (0.172)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.236 (0.175)	0.335 (0.232)	0.205 (0.195)	0.212 (0.152)	-0.013 (0.070)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.006* (0.003)	0.123 (0.252)	0.266 (0.163)
Observations	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990	9,990
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	63.80	53.09	65.16	75.60	15.84	0.017	0.130	62.34	64.21
Mean for control group at $t-1$	63.71	52.98	65.08	75.53	15.87	0.016	0.130	62.17	64.14
Mean for control group at $t-2$	63.63	52.87	65.01	75.47	15.90	0.016	0.130	62.08	64.07
% change for monitored at t	-0.024	-0.037	-0.022	-0.015	0.029	-0.551	-0.040	-0.049	-0.015
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.006	-0.009	-0.008	-0.004	0.009	-0.179	-0.018	-0.015	-0.003
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.003	0.006	0.003	0.002	-0.001	0.027	-0.044	0.001	0.004

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 9h. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with low social capital (Referenda Turnout). Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-3.434*** (0.228)	-4.274*** (0.285)	-3.613*** (0.249)	-2.754*** (0.205)	0.878*** (0.075)	-0.027*** (0.002)	-0.005 (0.003)	-5.193*** (0.302)	-2.842*** (0.215)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.255 (0.242)	-0.149 (0.305)	-0.319 (0.259)	-0.332 (0.213)	-0.075 (0.081)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.403 (0.319)	-0.212 (0.231)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.106 (0.239)	0.119 (0.301)	0.066 (0.259)	0.111 (0.207)	0.026 (0.086)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.080 (0.320)	0.154 (0.228)
Observations	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863	12,863
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	64.66	55.01	65.83	75.26	14.45	0.058	0.164	66.23	64.07
Mean for control group at $t-1$	64.38	54.64	65.55	75.06	14.54	0.056	0.163	65.79	63.85
Mean for control group at $t-2$	64.30	54.55	65.45	74.97	14.54	0.056	0.163	65.75	63.75
% change for monitored at t	-0.053	-0.077	-0.054	-0.036	0.060	-0.455	-0.028	-0.078	-0.044
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.060	0.013	-0.006	-0.003
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.015	0.010	-0.001	0.002

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 10a. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Junior high schools. Math - third grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-0.502*** (0.113)	-0.576*** (0.129)	-0.600*** (0.128)	-0.491*** (0.120)	0.074** (0.036)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.649*** (0.123)	-0.431*** (0.116)
Monitored in year $t-1$	0.174 (0.115)	0.195 (0.132)	0.183 (0.128)	0.208* (0.120)	-0.012 (0.037)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.177 (0.128)	0.190 (0.116)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.033 (0.117)	0.051 (0.135)	0.047 (0.131)	0.046 (0.123)	0.004 (0.037)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.006 (0.130)	0.074 (0.118)
Observations	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	57.36	45.42	57.18	69.27	16.48	0.036	0.089	53.33	59.47
Mean for control group at $t-1$	57.24	45.29	57.04	69.14	16.49	0.035	0.089	53.19	59.36
Mean for control group at $t-2$	57.30	45.36	57.10	69.20	16.48	0.035	0.090	53.26	59.41
% change for monitored at t	-0.008	-0.012	-0.010	-0.007	0.004	-0.012	0.018	-0.012	-0.007
% change for monitored at $t-1$	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.003	-0.001	0.027	0.015	0.003	0.003
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.030	-0.002	0.001	0.001

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table 10b. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Junior high schools. Literacy - third grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-0.264*** (0.086)	-0.288*** (0.109)	-0.241*** (0.093)	-0.261*** (0.080)	0.091** (0.036)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.329*** (0.104)	-0.250*** (0.089)
Monitored in year $t-1$	0.144 (0.090)	0.167 (0.115)	0.128 (0.097)	0.151* (0.083)	-0.057 (0.037)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.074 (0.107)	0.178* (0.093)
Monitored in year $t-2$	-0.139 (0.088)	-0.193* (0.113)	-0.139 (0.095)	-0.102 (0.082)	0.026 (0.037)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.214** (0.107)	-0.115 (0.090)
Observations	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205	20,205
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	65.86	55.58	67.22	77.35	15.33	0.040	0.089	58.59	68.33
Mean for control group at $t-1$	65.80	55.51	67.16	77.28	15.35	0.040	0.089	58.52	68.26
Mean for control group at $t-2$	65.88	55.61	67.23	77.35	15.33	0.041	0.090	58.58	68.34
% change for monitored at t	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003	0.005	0.016	0.018	-0.005	-0.003
% change for monitored at $t-1$	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.001	-0.003	0.026	0.015	0.001	0.002
% change for monitored at $t-2$	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	0.001	-0.021	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Appendix

Table A1. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools. Math - fifth grade. Without controls.

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-3.355*** (0.201)	-4.042*** (0.237)	-3.589*** (0.220)	-2.918*** (0.194)	0.630*** (0.055)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.005** (0.002)	-4.268*** (0.231)	-2.545*** (0.191)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.433** (0.209)	-0.553** (0.250)	-0.542** (0.228)	-0.302 (0.194)	0.130** (0.060)	-0.005*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.551** (0.238)	-0.345* (0.200)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.168 (0.201)	0.158 (0.241)	0.123 (0.219)	0.167 (0.186)	-0.000 (0.059)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.078 (0.236)	0.206 (0.190)
Observations	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	62.11	51.62	62.70	73.17	15.17	0.046	0.144	62.20	60.70
Mean for control group at $t-1$	61.85	51.31	62.43	72.93	15.22	0.045	0.143	61.87	60.51
Mean for control group at $t-2$	61.69	51.13	62.27	72.81	15.25	0.045	0.143	61.87	60.27
% change for monitored at t	-0.054	-0.078	-0.057	-0.039	0.041	-0.431	-0.034	-0.068	-0.041
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.007	-0.010	-0.008	-0.004	0.008	-0.115	0.006	-0.008	-0.005
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.033	0.004	0.001	0.003

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table A2. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools. Literacy - fifth grade. Without controls.

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.653*** (0.165)	-3.334*** (0.206)	-2.726*** (0.182)	-2.116*** (0.149)	0.708*** (0.054)	-0.020*** (0.001)	-0.006** (0.002)	-4.337*** (0.216)	-2.090*** (0.157)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.303* (0.172)	-0.289 (0.217)	-0.378** (0.186)	-0.297* (0.152)	0.024 (0.058)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.606*** (0.225)	-0.204 (0.164)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.132 (0.165)	0.189 (0.209)	0.095 (0.180)	0.125 (0.144)	0.012 (0.059)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.046 (0.220)	0.178 (0.158)
Observations	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	64.27	54.15	65.53	75.41	15.07	0.040	0.149	64.49	64.13
Mean for control group at $t-1$	64.07	53.89	65.33	75.26	15.13	0.038	0.149	64.17	63.97
Mean for control group at $t-2$	63.99	53.80	65.25	75.19	15.14	0.038	0.149	64.12	63.89
% change for monitored at t	-0.041	-0.061	-0.041	-0.028	0.047	-0.501	-0.039	-0.067	-0.032
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.004	-0.005	-0.005	-0.003	0.001	-0.088	0.004	-0.009	-0.003
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.021	-0.009	-0.001	0.002

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table A3. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools. Math and Literacy – fifth grade. Rasch scores.

Outcome variable	(1) Mean Math	(2) Bottom quartile Math	(3) Median Math	(4) Top quartile Math	(5) Standard deviation Math	(6) Mean Literacy	(7) Bottom quartile Literacy	(8) Median Literacy	(9) Top quartile Literacy	(10) Standard deviation Literacy
Monitored in year t	-0.211*** (0.012)	-0.221*** (0.013)	-0.211*** (0.013)	-0.203*** (0.013)	0.007** (0.003)	-0.154*** (0.009)	-0.169*** (0.010)	-0.150*** (0.009)	-0.138*** (0.009)	0.017*** (0.003)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.034*** (0.013)	-0.034** (0.013)	-0.039*** (0.013)	-0.031** (0.013)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.017 (0.010)	-0.024** (0.010)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.002 (0.003)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.010 (0.013)	0.009 (0.013)	0.007 (0.013)	0.012 (0.013)	0.002 (0.003)	0.011 (0.010)	0.012 (0.011)	0.006 (0.010)	0.012 (0.009)	0.003 (0.003)
Observations	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984	22,984
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	0.376	-0.228	0.359	0.962	0.898	0.271	-0.284	0.281	0.832	0.839
Mean for control group at $t-1$	0.360	-0.244	0.343	0.947	0.898	0.259	-0.298	0.270	0.823	0.841
Mean for control group at $t-2$	0.358	-0.247	0.341	0.945	0.898	0.258	-0.299	0.269	0.820	0.841
% change for monitored at t	-0.561	0.970	-0.588	-0.211	0.007	-0.567	0.593	-0.532	-0.166	0.020
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.094	0.139	-0.113	-0.032	0.001	-0.083	0.056	-0.089	-0.030	-0.002
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.028	-0.034	0.020	0.012	0.002	0.041	-0.039	0.023	0.014	0.003

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by schools within parentheses. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table A4a. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with at most one class in the grade. Math – fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open-ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-8.622*** (1.940)	-10.602*** (2.232)	-8.933*** (2.076)	-7.851*** (1.829)	1.388*** (0.521)	-0.068*** (0.017)	0.006 (0.011)	-10.002*** (2.254)	-7.579*** (1.821)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-3.145* (1.696)	-3.990** (1.996)	-4.025** (1.852)	-2.125 (1.563)	0.999** (0.500)	-0.053*** (0.015)	0.009 (0.012)	-3.254* (1.864)	-3.050* (1.718)
Monitored in year $t-2$	1.588 (1.413)	2.349 (1.759)	1.155 (1.529)	0.747 (1.220)	-0.971* (0.550)	0.034 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.010)	1.540 (1.782)	1.670 (1.384)
Observations	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	66.45	57.41	67.09	76.14	13.43	0.092	0.084	67.17	64.27
Mean for control group at $t-1$	66.31	57.25	66.95	76.01	13.45	0.092	0.084	67.05	64.11
Mean for control group at $t-2$	66.18	57.08	66.83	75.92	13.49	0.090	0.084	66.95	63.98
% change for monitored at t	-0.130	-0.185	-0.133	-0.103	0.103	-0.736	0.069	-0.149	-0.118
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.047	-0.069	-0.060	-0.028	0.074	-0.578	0.110	-0.048	-0.047
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.024	0.041	0.017	0.009	-0.072	0.371	-0.019	0.023	0.026

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table A4b. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with two to three classes in the grade. Math - fifth grade

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Outcome variable	Mean	Bottom quartile	Median	Top quartile	Standard deviation	Cheating index	Percent absent in the test	Mean open-ended questions	Mean close-ended questions
Monitored in year t	-4.904*** (0.699)	-6.026*** (0.821)	-5.068*** (0.763)	-4.420*** (0.686)	0.858*** (0.202)	-0.029*** (0.005)	0.001 (0.007)	-6.230*** (0.800)	-3.654*** (0.669)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.987 (0.696)	-1.369 (0.854)	-1.144 (0.758)	-0.617 (0.648)	0.236 (0.216)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.001 (0.007)	-1.442* (0.810)	-0.839 (0.648)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.419 (0.623)	0.709 (0.741)	0.484 (0.678)	0.425 (0.605)	-0.089 (0.191)	0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	0.590 (0.740)	0.331 (0.597)
Observations	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	62.43	52.10	63.06	73.29	14.96	0.044	0.136	62.43	60.99
Mean for control group at $t-1$	62.19	51.82	62.83	73.06	15.00	0.043	0.136	62.14	60.81
Mean for control group at $t-2$	62.02	51.59	62.65	72.94	15.05	0.043	0.135	62.07	60.58
% change for monitored at t	-0.078	-0.116	-0.080	-0.060	0.057	-0.639	0.009	-0.099	-0.059
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.015	-0.026	-0.018	-0.008	0.015	-0.144	0.004	-0.023	-0.013
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.006	0.013	0.007	0.005	-0.005	0.033	0.016	0.009	0.005

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table A4c. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with more than 3 classes in the grade. Math - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.767*** (0.207)	-3.266*** (0.245)	-2.983*** (0.229)	-2.415*** (0.198)	0.493*** (0.057)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-3.469*** (0.239)	-2.128*** (0.198)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.252 (0.224)	-0.301 (0.267)	-0.310 (0.244)	-0.179 (0.208)	0.105* (0.063)	-0.003** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.332 (0.255)	-0.174 (0.214)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.237 (0.218)	0.176 (0.263)	0.284 (0.237)	0.272 (0.202)	-0.013 (0.061)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.179 (0.255)	0.241 (0.207)
Observations	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	60.77	49.71	61.33	72.38	15.85	0.033	0.154	60.71	59.66
Mean for control group at $t-1$	60.49	49.38	61.03	72.14	15.90	0.031	0.153	60.33	59.46
Mean for control group at $t-2$	60.25	49.10	60.78	71.94	15.96	0.031	0.153	60.33	59.10
% change for monitored at t	-0.045	-0.065	-0.048	-0.033	0.031	-0.446	-0.041	-0.057	-0.035
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.004	-0.006	-0.005	-0.002	0.006	-0.110	-0.005	-0.005	-0.002
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.003	-0.001	0.015	-0.001	0.002	0.004

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table A5a. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with at most one class in the grade. Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-7.089*** (1.618)	-8.336*** (1.996)	-7.349*** (1.701)	-6.034*** (1.484)	1.544*** (0.524)	-0.075*** (0.013)	0.012 (0.011)	10.831*** (2.247)	-5.777*** (1.493)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-4.004*** (1.378)	-4.709*** (1.782)	-4.260*** (1.451)	-2.819** (1.231)	1.543*** (0.535)	-0.039** (0.017)	0.017 (0.012)	-4.522** (1.813)	-3.844*** (1.360)
Monitored in year $t-2$	1.625 (1.188)	1.998 (1.536)	1.688 (1.242)	1.252 (0.975)	-0.527 (0.471)	0.019 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.010)	2.188 (1.569)	1.458 (1.230)
Observations	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114	3,114
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	68.04	59.19	69.33	77.98	13.55	0.076	0.083	69.78	67.39
Mean for control group at $t-1$	67.95	59.08	69.23	77.89	13.56	0.075	0.083	69.66	67.30
Mean for control group at $t-2$	67.85	58.96	69.13	77.82	13.59	0.075	0.083	69.54	67.22
% change for monitored at t	-0.104	-0.141	-0.106	-0.077	0.114	-0.980	0.146	-0.155	-0.085
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.058	-0.079	-0.061	-0.036	0.114	-0.513	0.199	-0.064	-0.057
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.023	0.033	0.024	0.016	-0.038	0.254	-0.056	0.031	0.021

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table A5b. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with two to three classes in the grade. Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-3.358*** (0.542)	-4.303*** (0.687)	-3.412*** (0.611)	-2.446*** (0.504)	1.044*** (0.191)	-0.031*** (0.004)	0.006 (0.008)	-5.387*** (0.712)	-2.706*** (0.519)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-1.181** (0.567)	-1.593** (0.724)	-1.490** (0.615)	-1.132** (0.511)	0.227 (0.201)	-0.012*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.008)	-1.856** (0.759)	-0.973* (0.547)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.523 (0.499)	0.663 (0.639)	0.362 (0.540)	0.378 (0.446)	-0.220 (0.201)	0.007 (0.005)	0.005 (0.007)	0.387 (0.689)	0.546 (0.477)
Observations	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816	3,816
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	64.47	54.57	65.68	75.42	14.83	0.039	0.140	64.72	64.31
Mean for control group at $t-1$	64.33	54.39	65.55	75.33	14.88	0.038	0.140	64.48	64.20
Mean for control group at $t-2$	64.21	54.24	65.43	75.23	14.92	0.037	0.139	64.37	64.08
% change for monitored at t	-0.052	-0.078	-0.052	-0.032	0.070	-0.769	0.045	-0.083	-0.042
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.018	-0.029	-0.022	-0.015	0.015	-0.319	0.005	-0.028	-0.015
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.008	0.012	0.005	0.005	-0.014	0.175	0.038	0.006	0.008

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.

Table A5c. The effects of external monitoring on test scores. Primary schools with more than 3 classes in the grade. Literacy - fifth grade

Outcome variable	(1) Mean	(2) Bottom quartile	(3) Median	(4) Top quartile	(5) Standard deviation	(6) Cheating index	(7) Percent absent in the test	(8) Mean open- ended questions	(9) Mean close- ended questions
Monitored in year t	-2.228*** (0.164)	-2.797*** (0.209)	-2.280*** (0.181)	-1.822*** (0.147)	0.559*** (0.057)	-0.014*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.003)	-3.754*** (0.224)	-1.714*** (0.155)
Monitored in year $t-1$	-0.074 (0.180)	0.014 (0.229)	-0.072 (0.193)	-0.082 (0.160)	-0.001 (0.062)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.305 (0.244)	0.009 (0.168)
Monitored in year $t-2$	0.141 (0.173)	0.154 (0.220)	0.113 (0.188)	0.162 (0.150)	0.027 (0.060)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.062 (0.234)	0.194 (0.163)
Observations	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821	11,821
Other controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Randomization controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean for control group at t	63.27	52.72	64.53	74.86	15.62	0.028	0.162	62.89	63.32
Mean for control group at $t-1$	63.02	52.39	64.29	74.67	15.69	0.027	0.161	62.48	63.14
Mean for control group at $t-2$	62.92	52.29	64.19	74.58	15.71	0.027	0.162	62.44	63.03
% change for monitored at t	-0.035	-0.053	-0.035	-0.024	0.035	-0.493	-0.048	-0.059	-0.027
% change for monitored at $t-1$	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.059	-0.009	-0.004	0.001
% change for monitored at $t-2$	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001	-0.011	-0.029	-0.001	0.003

Note: each regression includes randomization controls (region-by-year dummies and their interactions of with current and lagged enrolment) and the other controls in vectors X, W and Z. Standard errors clustered by school within parentheses. Percent changes for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$ are obtained by dividing the treatment effect for the mean outcome for the control group for monitored at t , $t-1$ and $t-2$, respectively. ***, **, * for statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level of confidence.