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## Beliefs about Racial Discrimination and Support for Pro-Black Policies

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# Beliefs about Racial Discrimination and Support for Pro-Black Policies

## Abstract

We examine whether information about racial discrimination causally affects support for pro-black policies. Using representative samples of Americans, we elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about the extent of hiring discrimination against blacks. Relative to Republicans, Democrats think that blacks have to send out 47 percent more resumes than whites to receive a callback. An information treatment substantially narrows Republican–Democrat differences in beliefs, but fails to narrow differences in political behavior. Overall, the results demonstrate that correcting biases in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination is not sufficient to reduce political polarization in support for pro-black policies.

Keywords: racial discrimination, beliefs, pro-black policies, policy preferences.

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# 1 Introduction

Racial discrimination is a pervasive phenomenon that affects many spheres of society (Arrow, 1998; Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; List, 2004). In the United States, several studies have documented high levels of racial discrimination in various domains, such as the labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004), the housing market (Edelman et al., 2017), and the judicial system (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2014).

To deal with this large degree of racial discrimination, the US government has introduced policies aiming to actively counteract the effects of racial discrimination. However, Americans are deeply divided in their support for such policies. For instance, while 73 percent of Democrats support affirmative action programs for racial minorities, only 38 percent of Republicans support this.<sup>1</sup> There is a strong perception in the public debate that this political disagreement is rooted in differences in perceptions of the extent of racial discrimination in society (Newkirk, 2017). Similarly, in a seminal article on the drivers of opposition to pro-black policies, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) argue that it is necessary to correct people's biases in beliefs to gain support for pro-black policies.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between people's beliefs about racial discrimination against blacks and their support for pro-black policies. We address the following two questions: First, do Republicans and Democrats hold different beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in hiring? Second, does the provision of information about the extent of racial discrimination in hiring reduce political polarization in support for pro-black policies?

To study these questions, we introduce a new approach to elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about racial discrimination. With respondents from a high-quality, probability-based sample of the US household population, we elicited incentivized beliefs

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<sup>1</sup><https://news.gallup.com/poll/184772/higher-support-gender-affirmative-action-race.aspx> (accessed November 30, 2018).

about the results of a correspondence study testing for racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004).<sup>2</sup> Respondents were told that researchers sent out resumes that were identical in all respects except for the perceived race of the sender to help wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. After informing the respondents that resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out ten times to get one callback on average, we asked them how many times they thought that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average. In contrast to traditional survey questions, which typically ask about “how much discrimination is there” on a scale from “a lot” to “none at all,” this approach allows us to elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about racial discrimination in a precisely defined environment.

To examine whether information about racial discrimination in hiring causally affects people’s support for policies aiming to counteract the effects of racial discrimination in hiring, we introduced exogenous variation in people’s beliefs by informing a random subset of the respondents about the actual results from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), namely that white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names. To measure whether people update their beliefs about racial discrimination in response to this evidence, we elicited their beliefs about a second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination in the housing market (Edelman et al., 2017). In additional follow-up experiments we also measured more general non-incentivized post-treatment beliefs about whether there is racial discrimination against blacks. Furthermore, to measure whether the information provision affects people’s political behavior, respondents decided whether to receive money versus making a real donation to a pro-black civil rights organization. Finally, respondents answered a series of questions on self-reported views on pro-black policies.

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<sup>2</sup>While the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) was conducted in 2001 and 2002, a recent meta-analysis of field experiments on racial labor discrimination in the US shows no change in racial discrimination over time (Quillian et al., 2017).

We document several novel findings on beliefs about racial discrimination and support for pro-black policies in the United States. Our first finding is that there is substantial disagreement about the extent of racial discrimination against blacks. As illustrated in Figure 1, beliefs vary systematically by people’s self-identified party affiliation: Relative to Republicans, Democrats think that blacks have to send out 47 percent more resumes than whites to receive a callback. Second, using both incentivized and non-incentivized measures of people’s post-treatment beliefs, we document that both Republicans and Democrats strongly update their beliefs about racial discrimination in response to the research evidence. Third, we find that information about the extent of racial discrimination causally affects people’s political behavior: Treated respondents who underestimate the extent of racial discrimination in hiring increase their donations by 17 percent of a standard deviation. This effect size corresponds to almost one-third of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. However, since the increase in donations among those who underestimate discrimination is mostly driven by non-Republicans, the treatment fails to narrow the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. Fourth, examining treatment responses on self-reported attitudes towards pro-black policies, we find that these are mostly unresponsive to information.

[Insert Figure 1 here]

To shed light on mechanisms, we provide evidence on political differences in beliefs about the sources of discrimination. Conditional on believing that correspondence studies present evidence of discrimination, Republicans and Democrats alike tend to believe that discrimination is due to implicit discrimination or inaccurate statistical discrimination (Bertrand et al., 2005; Bohren et al., 2019b) rather than taste-based or accurate statistical discrimination. However, Republicans are much more likely than Democrats to distrust findings from correspondence studies.

To address concerns about social desirability bias, we conducted an additional ex-

periment where the main outcome questions on self-reported policy views were asked only one week later in an obfuscated follow-up study hiding the connection between the treatment provision and the main outcome questions. We find strong and persistent belief updating about the extent of racial labor market discrimination in response to the information. Yet although the information intervention strongly reduces political polarization in beliefs about racial discrimination against blacks, it fails to reduce political polarization in support for pro-black policies. If anything, we find some evidence that the treatment rather increases political polarization.

To shed light on the robustness of our results to the specific framing of the belief elicitation, we conducted a further experiment where we randomly assigned our respondents to one of three different ways of measuring quantitative beliefs about the extent of hiring discrimination against blacks. Reassuringly, we find that the correlations between beliefs about racial discrimination and support for pro-black policies as well as political affiliations are very stable across the three conditions. The exact fraction that overestimate discrimination is less robust across conditions, but treatment effects are generally insensitive to how beliefs are elicited.

Our main contributions are as follows: We collect the first incentivized measures of support for pro-black policies along with quantitative and incentivized data on people's beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market and in the housing market.<sup>3</sup> We introduce a new approach for measuring incentivized beliefs about hiring discrimination by leveraging correspondence studies, which function as a useful tool to elicit well-defined and incentivized beliefs. In contrast to traditional survey questions, our approach allows us to obtain a quantitative measure of people's beliefs about racial discrimination that is incentivized and easily comparable across respondents. Since incentives have been shown to reduce partisan bias in people's stated beliefs (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et

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<sup>3</sup>Our study is related to concurrent work by Kraus et al. (2017) who measure people's beliefs about racial income inequality in the US.



al., 2015), an incentivized belief elicitation is particularly important for highly contested issues such as racial discrimination.

Second, we provide the first causal evidence on the role of people's beliefs about racial discrimination on their demand for policies that try to counteract the effects of this discrimination.<sup>4</sup> We thereby inform the debate on the determinants of support for pro-black policies (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993; Harrison et al., 2006; Jacobson, 1985; Kluegel and Smith, 1983; Kuklinski et al., 1997; Tuch and Hughes, 2011) and redistributive policies more generally (Luttmer, 2001; Luttmer and Singhal, 2011). Our results are also related to the literature on the relevance of race for US politics (DellaVigna, 2010; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Norton and Sommers, 2011; Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014). Moreover, our results complement previous work on the determinants of discrimination (Bohren et al., 2019a; Burns et al., 2018; Bursztyn et al., 2017; Lowe, 2018; Rao, 2019) and recent papers examining whether the awareness of discrimination reduces biased judgments (Alesina et al., 2018a; Pope et al., 2018).

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental designs and samples. Section 3 provides descriptive data on people's beliefs about racial discrimination. Section 4 presents treatment effects of the provision of research evidence about the extent of racial discrimination against blacks on beliefs and policy views. Section 5 concludes. The Online Appendix provides additional results and the full set of experimental instructions.

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<sup>4</sup>More generally, we add to the literature on how information provision affects people's policy preferences (Alesina et al., 2018b; Cruces et al., 2013; Gilens, 2001; Grigorieff et al., 2016; Haaland and Roth, 2017; Karadja et al., 2017; Kuklinski et al., 2000; Kuziemko et al., 2015) and actual policy choices (Hjort et al., 2019).

## **2 Experimental design and samples**

We conducted three main complementary online experiments with different samples. In Experiment 1, we collected data on a probability-based sample of the US population in collaboration with NORC at the University of Chicago. In Experiment 2, we collected data on a US sample representative in terms of age, income, region and gender in collaboration with Research Now, a US market research company. In Experiment 3, we recruited a US sample representative in terms of age, income, region, gender and education, in collaboration with Lucid, a professional online panel provider.

### **2.1 Experiment 1: Main design with the probability-based sample**

The structure of Experiment 1 is as follows (Figure 2 provides an overview): We first measured our respondents' beliefs about the extent of racial labor market discrimination in the US. We then exposed half of our respondents to the information treatment. Subsequently, we measured people's support for policies to address racial discrimination in the labor market using both self-reports and a behavioral measure. We also elicited post-treatment beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market.

[Insert Figure 2 here]

#### **2.1.1 Pre-treatment beliefs about racial labor market discrimination**

We used a correspondence study to measure people's beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. Correspondence studies rely on fictitious resumes to study discrimination in the labor market (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017). Specifically, by manipulating whether a fictitious resume is assigned a minority name, researchers can study racial labor market discrimination by comparing the outcomes for resumes with and

without the perceived minority name. A seminal correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) found that white-sounding names were 50 percent more likely to receive a callback than black-sounding names; a finding that has been closely replicated in several subsequent correspondence studies (Bertrand and Duflo, 2017; Quillian et al., 2017). We rely on this study in our experiment. To familiarize our respondents with the study, we presented them with the following text:

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”. The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white or black.

We informed respondents that resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average ten times to get one callback for an interview. To measure their beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market, we then asked how many times they believe resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out on average to get one callback for an interview. Furthermore, we promised respondents a \$2 bonus if their answer was the same “as what the researchers found.”

Our belief elicitation has several advantages compared to qualitative survey questions that have traditionally been used to study beliefs about racial discrimination. First, we measure beliefs on a quantitative scale that is easily comparable across respondents and has the same interpretation for everyone. By contrast, many previous studies have

assessed beliefs about racial discrimination using a question from the General Social Survey about the amount of discrimination that blacks face in “getting good jobs,” which is measured on a 4-point scale from “none at all” to “a lot.”<sup>5</sup> One concern with using subjective response scales to measure beliefs is that different people may have different opinions about what, e.g., “some” or “only a little” discrimination means.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, in our setting, racial discrimination is precisely defined, allowing us to hold our respondents’ beliefs about the circumstances of racial discrimination constant. For qualitative survey questions, people may hold different beliefs about what constitutes “discrimination.” These beliefs might be correlated with demographics, which makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions on differences in beliefs about racial discrimination across demographic groups. Our measure avoids these confounds. Second, non-incentivized survey questions are more prone to the misreporting of beliefs. Indeed, small incentives for correct answers have been shown to strongly increase the accuracy of survey responses and to reduce gaps in reported beliefs across party lines (Bullock et al., 2015; Prior et al., 2015). Since our question has a factual answer, we can incentivize correct responses.

### **2.1.2 Introducing exogenous variation in beliefs**

Two central identification challenges when studying the impact of beliefs on policy preferences are omitted variable bias and reverse causality. We address these identification challenges by introducing exogenous variation in beliefs, namely by informing respondents in the treatment group about the extent of racial discrimination found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Specifically, we showed the following text to treated respondents:

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<sup>5</sup>Details about this variable are available at the following link: <https://gssdataexplorer.norc.umd.edu/variables/1244/vshow> (accessed November 30, 2018).

<sup>6</sup>For a discussion of problems associated with subjective response scales, see Bond and Lang (2018).

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.

By contrast, respondents in the control group did not receive any information and proceeded directly from the belief elicitation to the outcome questions.

### **2.1.3 Measuring support for pro-black policies: Behavioral measure**

A common critique of self-reported survey questions is that they might not be reflective of real political behavior and that they are prone to experimenter demand effects. To address these concerns, we collected a behavioral outcome measure, namely real donations to a pro-black civil rights organization. We told our respondents that they have the opportunity to financially support a civil rights organization that works to reduce discrimination against blacks in the labor market. We elicited the respondents' marginal rate of substitution between money for themselves and money for the civil rights organization through a multiple price list. The respondents chose between donating \$5 to the civil rights organization and money for themselves in \$1-increments from \$0 to \$5. One of the six choices was randomly implemented.<sup>7</sup>

### **2.1.4 Measuring support for pro-black policies: self-reported policy views**

In addition to the behavioral measure, we also collected some data on people's self-reported policy views. Since our treatment was tailored to shift beliefs about racial

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<sup>7</sup>The experiment involved no deception and we actually donated the relevant amount to the civil rights organization after the experiment.

discrimination in the labor market, we focused on labor market policies. We asked questions about three commonly-discussed policies attempting to counteract the effects of labor market discrimination. First, we asked respondents whether they “support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job.” Second, we asked respondents whether they “support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job.” Third, we asked respondents whether they “support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs.” For all three questions, respondents reported their answer on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support).

### **2.1.5 Measuring beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market**

To measure whether respondents updated their beliefs in response to the research evidence, we relied on a second correspondence study that tested for racial discrimination in the housing market (Edelman et al., 2017). We chose to focus on racial discrimination in a different domain out of a concern that demand effects, numerical anchoring, or a taste for consistency in survey responses could bias responses if we re-asked the question about discrimination in the labor market shortly after the information provision. The housing market is a good candidate for several reasons. First, racial discrimination in the housing market holds strong economic importance. Second, the study by Edelman et al. (2017), which serves as our benchmark for incentivizing beliefs, used the same names as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). This allows us to easily explain the methodology to respondents and makes the results across domains more comparable. Specifically, we used the following text to familiarize our respondents with the second study:

Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests

from invented accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental accommodations. The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the person who sent the request. Half of the requests came from typically white-sounding names, while the other half came from typically black-sounding names. The idea was that the hosts would use the applicants' name to infer whether the reservation requests came from white or black requesters.

We then told them that the researchers found that white-sounding names were accepted 49 percent of the time. To measure their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market, we then asked what percent of the time they believe that black-sounding names were accepted. We offered a \$2 bonus for answers that fall within “2 percentage points of what the researchers found.”

We purposefully designed the second belief elicitation to avoid potential bias stemming from numerical anchoring by (i) using a different response scale than the first belief elicitation, and (ii) using a scale in which higher values implied less racial discrimination. Since higher values implied more discrimination in the first belief elicitation, numerical anchoring would make finding evidence for belief updating in the expected direction less likely.

## **2.2 Experiment 2: Addressing social desirability bias**

A potential concern with collecting the main outcome measures immediately after administering the treatment, as done in Experiment 1, is that social desirability bias might differ between the treatment and control group. For instance, respondents may think that it is socially undesirable to express low support in pro-black policies after they have been informed that whites receive 50 percent more callbacks than blacks. To address this concern, we conducted a separate experiment in which we only asked the

main outcome questions in an obfuscated follow-up study one week after administering the treatment (Figure 2 provides a summary of the structure).

### **2.2.1 Design of the first wave**

We first elicited beliefs about racial discrimination in the same way as in Experiment 1. We also elicited confidence by asking respondents how sure they were on a scale of 1 (Very Unsure) to 5 (Very Sure) of their answer to the previous question.<sup>8</sup> Finally, we asked respondents whether they think that racial discrimination against blacks “is a serious problem.” We intentionally did not ask any of the main outcome questions in the first wave to minimize the risk that respondents would realize that the two waves were connected and to avoid people’s taste for consistency in survey responses biasing treatment effects (Falk and Zimmermann, 2013).

### **2.2.2 Design of the second wave**

Approximately one week after the first wave, respondents were invited to participate in the second wave. We chose to have one week between the two waves to strike a balance between testing for persistence of treatment effects and minimizing attrition.<sup>9</sup>

One general concern with information experiments is that the information provision could alter participants’ perceptions about how the experimenter expects them to behave. Even though recent evidence suggests that demand effects are not quantitatively important (de Quidt et al., 2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2018), we took several steps to obfuscate the purpose of the second wave. First, respondents received a generic invitation from the survey provider to participate in a five-minute survey which did not reveal that the two

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<sup>8</sup>We did not ask this question in Experiment 1 owing to budget constraints. The cost of adding questions to Experiment 1 was much higher than in Experiment 2 because it used a probability-based sample.

<sup>9</sup>1 week is a short time-horizon, but the attrition rate in online panels like the one we used increases substantially if the time span between the main survey and the follow-up is more than 2 weeks.



waves were connected (Figure A.11 provides a screenshot of the invitation from wave 1).<sup>10</sup> Second, we used different Qualtrics accounts for the two studies: in wave 1, the Qualtrics account was from the University of Oxford; in wave 2, the Qualtrics account was from the NHH Norwegian School of Economics. We also varied the layout of the survey between the waves. Third, we asked respondents several obfuscation questions about their views on investment and religion before asking our main outcome questions.

Following the obfuscation questions, we asked the same questions on self-reported policy views as in Experiment 1: support for (i) a preference for hiring qualified black candidates over equally qualified white candidates, (ii) assistance programs for blacks in getting a job; and (iii) name-blind recruitment. We also asked a series of questions to examine mechanisms. Possible mechanisms include the belief that affirmative action programs are ineffective in improving the lives or general opportunities of blacks, which could engender opposition to those initiatives. To examine whether the treatment affects beliefs about the effectiveness of affirmative action, we asked respondents whether they think that affirmative action programs over the last fifty years have “have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other.” We also elicited beliefs about whether racial inequalities are mainly due to racial discrimination or mainly due to differences in the work ethics of blacks and whites. Near the end of the survey, we elicited posterior beliefs about the extent of racial labor market discrimination using the same correspondence study as in the first wave. As in the first wave, we incentivized correct answers with a \$2 bonus. Since we use the same belief elicitation across the two waves, it is natural to assume that respondents realized that the two waves are connected at this point.

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<sup>10</sup>The actual number of days between wave 1 and wave 2 varied between one and 19 days for all respondents, with an average of eight days.

### **2.3 Experiment 3: Robustness to framing and incentives**

While there are several advantages to our approach to elicit quantitative and incentivized beliefs about research results, there are also some disadvantages. One potential concern is that respondents might believe that researchers are liberally biased. Incentives for accuracy then encourage respondents to report a combination of their true beliefs about discrimination in hiring and their beliefs about researcher bias. A second, and more general, concern is that the results from the belief elicitation might depend on specific design choices in the elicitation of the beliefs. Finally, a concern with measuring belief updating about research results is that the treatment might differentially affect beliefs about whether researchers are liberally biased. To address these three concerns, we ran Experiment 3 with the following key design features: (i) non-incentivized belief elicitations, (ii) three different ways of framing the belief elicitation, and (iii) measures of post-treatment beliefs about hiring discrimination against blacks that are not related to research results and thus unrelated to beliefs about researcher bias.

Experiment 3 proceeds as follows: We first randomized respondents into one of three different ways of measuring prior beliefs about the extent of hiring discrimination. In contrast to the two previous experiments, we elicited these beliefs without any incentives for accuracy. Except for the lack of incentives, the first belief elicitation is identical to the belief elicitation in the main experiment; i.e., we provided information about the true number for whites and then elicit beliefs about the number of times a resume with a black-sounding name had to be sent out to get one callback on average. In the second belief elicitation, we changed the framing by providing respondents with the true number for blacks and then elicit beliefs about the number of times a resume with a white-sounding name had to be sent out to get one callback on average. In the third case, we first asked respondents whether resumes with white-sounding names or resumes with black-sounding names were more likely to receive callbacks. In a second step, we asked

respondents to estimate how many percent more callbacks resumes with white-sounding or black-sounding names received (depending on their answer to the first question).

After eliciting beliefs, we randomly assigned half of the respondents to an information treatment in which treated respondents were told that white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names. We then measured attitudes towards pro-black policies using the same questions as in Experiments 1 and 2. To measure trust in correspondence studies, we then asked whether they agree that sending out fictitious resumes is a reliable method to detect discrimination in hiring. Finally, we measured non-incentivized post-treatment beliefs about discrimination in hiring without relating the belief elicitation to results from research studies. Specifically, respondents were asked whether there is discrimination against blacks, against whites, or whether there is no discrimination in hiring using a probabilistic belief elicitation.

## 2.4 Sample characteristics

**Experiment 1: NORC AmeriSpeak** For Experiment 1, we recruited 1366 respondents through NORC’s AmeriSpeak panel in June and July 2017.<sup>11</sup> AmeriSpeak is a probability-based panel of the US population. The panel uses NORC’s National Frame, which is designed to provide at least 97 percent sample coverage of the US population. The NORC National Frame is used for several landmark studies in the US, including the General Social Survey (GSS), which is one of the most frequently-analyzed data sets in the social sciences.<sup>12</sup> Table A.2 provides summary statistics for this sample.

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<sup>11</sup>NORC does not force their respondents to answer any questions on their surveys. For some questions we therefore have less than 1538 observations, e.g. only 1382 respondents gave an answer to the question on the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent. There are no significant differences between Republicans and Democrats or between blacks and whites in not responding to this question. Our main specification includes only respondents who completed the question on beliefs about racial discrimination. In Experiments 2 and 3, all respondents are forced to respond to this question, and we find similar patterns, suggesting that selection into this question is of no major concern.

<sup>12</sup>More information about the panel is available at the following web page: <https://amerispeak.norc.org/about-amerispeak/Pages/Panel-Design.aspx> (accessed November 30, 2018).

Observations in the treatment and control group are balanced in terms of observables (Table A.3).<sup>13</sup>

**Experiment 2: Research Now** In Experiment 2, in collaboration with Research Now, one of the leading marketing research companies in the US, we successfully recruited 2075 respondents for the first wave of the experiment in June 2017. The first wave was the second component of a follow-up study from another experiment that we also conducted with Research Now.<sup>14</sup> Out of these 2075 respondents, 1720 also completed the second wave. Table A.2 provides summary statistics for the Research Now sample. The sample is broadly representative of the US population in terms of several important observable characteristics, such as race, household income, region of residence, and political affiliation. There is balance across treatment arms (Tables A.4 and A.5). Treatment status is not correlated with completing the follow-up (Table A.6).

**Experiment 3: Lucid** Experiment 3 was conducted in collaboration with Lucid, a provider of representative online panels, in June 2019. We recruited a sample of 2130 respondents broadly representative of the US population in terms of age, income, region, and gender. Table A.2 provides summary statistics for the Lucid sample and Table A.7 shows that there is balance across the treatment and control group.

### **3 Beliefs about racial discrimination: Descriptives**

This section uses data from Experiment 1 with NORC to provide representative evidence of people's beliefs about racial discrimination. We first explore heterogeneity in people's beliefs regarding the extent of racial discrimination in the US and investigate whether

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<sup>13</sup>We did not ask any questions about demographics or political affiliation as part of the experiment. This data was appended by NORC.

<sup>14</sup>In the first wave, respondents also answered demographic questions, questions about their views on the role of the government, and questions about their views on immigration.

these beliefs correlate with some key background characteristics. We then examine whether beliefs about racial discrimination correlate with people's policy preferences.

### **3.1 Heterogeneity in beliefs about racial discrimination**

Figure A.2 provides representative evidence of people's beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor and housing markets. Panel A shows the cumulative distribution function for beliefs about how many resumes with black-sounding names had to send out to get one callback on average (respondents were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was ten). This quantitative belief elicitation allows us to assess the fraction of respondents who overestimate and underestimate racial discrimination in society. Taking as given the results from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004), who found that resumes with black-sounding names needed to be sent out 15 times before receiving one callback on average, we find that 35 percent of our respondents underestimate racial discrimination in the labor market, 10.3 percent have correct beliefs, and the remaining 54.7 percent overestimate the extent of racial discrimination in the labor market.<sup>15</sup>

Panel B of Figure A.2 shows the cumulative distribution function for beliefs about the rejection rate of reservation requests from black-sounding names on Airbnb (respondents were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 51 percent). Taking as given the results from Edelman et al. (2017), who found that requests from black-sounding names were rejected 59 percent of the time, we find that 19 percent of our respondents underestimate racial discrimination in the housing market and the remaining 81 percent overestimate the extent of racial discrimination in the housing market.

The data also allows for the measurement of the share of respondents who think that there is discrimination against whites, discrimination against blacks, and the fraction who think that there is no racial discrimination at all. For the labor market, 23 percent

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<sup>15</sup>A recent meta-analysis of field experiments on racial labor discrimination in the US shows no change in racial discrimination over time (Quillian et al., 2017)

of our respondents believe that there is discrimination against whites, nine percent believe that there is no discrimination, and the remaining 68 percent believe that there is discrimination against blacks. For the housing market, 12 percent think that there is discrimination against whites, two percent believe that there is no racial discrimination, and the remaining 86 percent think that there is discrimination against blacks.

Figure 3 examines whether beliefs about racial discrimination vary systematically by people's background characteristics. Panel A shows correlations between background characteristics and beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. We find especially pronounced differences in beliefs based on people's political affiliation: Relative to Republicans, Democrats believe that seven additional resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average ( $p < 0.01$ ). Relative to Republicans, Democrats think that blacks have to send out 47 percent more resumes than whites to receive a callback (see also Panel A of Figure 4). Beliefs about racial discrimination also correlate significantly with college education and income. Relative to those with no college education, college-educated respondents believe that four additional resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get to get one callback on average ( $p < 0.01$ ). Relative to respondents with below median income, above-median income respondents believe that 1.7 additional resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average ( $p < 0.05$ ). Surprisingly, we find no significant differences between blacks and whites in their beliefs about discrimination in the labor market ( $p = 0.85$ ).

[Insert Figure 3 here]

Concerning beliefs about the housing market (Panel B of Figure 4), we also find pronounced differences based on people's political affiliation: Relative to Republicans, Democrats think that reservation requests from black-sounding names were 5.7 percentage points more likely to be rejected ( $p < 0.01$ ). Taking the results from Edelman et al.

(2017) as given, Republicans on average overestimate housing market discrimination by 14 percent, whereas Democrats overestimate housing market discrimination by 27 percent. While we do not find evidence of differences in beliefs in the housing market across people with different education levels, we find significant racial differences: Relative to whites, blacks think that reservation requests from black-sounding names were 6.5 percentage points more likely to be rejected ( $p < 0.05$ ). Given all of the findings discussed above, our first main result is as follows:

**Result 1.** *There is a large disagreement about the extent of racial discrimination against blacks. A substantial fraction of Americans overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor and housing market. Democrats think that there is more racial discrimination against blacks than Republicans.*

[Insert Figure 4 here]

**Robustness to framing of prior beliefs** While we find that the majority of Americans overestimate racial discrimination in both the labor market and in the housing market, a natural concern is that these results might be sensitive to the way the belief elicitation is framed (Eriksson and Simpson, 2012). In Experiment 3, we find that a second way of framing the belief elicitation that directly asks for the percent difference in callback rates between blacks and whites yields a very similar estimate of the fraction of overestimators compared to our main elicitation (40 percent overestimators in both cases; see Figure A.1).<sup>16</sup> However, a third belief elicitation that provides respondents with the true number for black-sounding names and asks for the number of resumes with white-sounding names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average yields a significantly larger fraction of overestimators compared to the two other elicitations (73

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<sup>16</sup>The lower fraction that overestimate discrimination in Experiment 3 using the same belief elicitation as in Experiment 1 might reflect sample differences (only Experiment 1 used a probability-based sample) or the lack of monetary incentives in Experiment 3.

percent, Figure A.1). Taken together, these estimates highlight that while the exact levels of overestimation of discrimination depend on how the belief elicitation is framed, the finding that a substantial fraction of the US population overestimate the extent of racial discriminating in hiring is robust.

Data from Experiment 3 highlights the robustness of the correlational patterns to the exact way of eliciting beliefs about racial discrimination. Figure A.7 highlights that the patterns are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar, indicating that the correlations are very stable and robust. For example, the gap in beliefs between Republicans and Democrats is highly robust across the different elicitations.

### **3.2 The association between beliefs and policy preferences**

Table 1 provides evidence control group respondents in Experiment 1 on whether our measure of beliefs about racial labor discrimination correlates with some of our key outcome measures. Column 1 of Panel A shows a regression of people's actual donations to the pro-black civil rights organization on their beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. A one standard deviation increase in beliefs is associated with 0.22 of a standard deviation higher donations to the pro-black civil rights organization ( $p < 0.01$ ). This corresponds to 36 percent of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations to the pro-black civil rights organization. Including controls in the regression reduces the estimated association to 0.17 of a standard deviation ( $p < 0.01$ , Column 1 of Panel B).

Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show significant associations between beliefs about racial discrimination and support for preference in hiring and job assistance for blacks, respectively. Column 4 shows that a one standard deviation change in beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market is associated with a 0.22 of a standard deviation change in beliefs about discrimination in the housing market. Furthermore, column 5 shows that our belief measure is also predictive of whether people think that racial



discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a “serious problem.” Data from Experiment 3 underscores that these correlational patterns between beliefs and policy views are robust to various elicitation designs (see Table A.18). Our next main result is as follows.

[Insert Table 1 here]

**Result 2.** *Beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market are strongly associated with higher donations to a pro-black civil rights organization and self-reported support for pro-black policies.*

One concern with our measures of support for pro-black policies is that they could be affected by social desirability bias. A way to measure social desirability bias is to identify individuals who support the policy, but do not donate to the organization.<sup>17</sup> Reassuringly, Figure A.6 shows that none of the covariates in our sample is correlated with this measure of social desirability bias.

Overall, the results presented in this section suggest that our belief measure has high external validity. Not only does it predict responses to qualitative survey questions, it also predicts real donations to a pro-black civil rights organization. But naturally, these correlations need to be interpreted cautiously. The estimated effect of beliefs on donations and self-reported policy views could be confounded due to measurement error, reverse causality, and omitted variable bias.

## 4 Treatment effects on beliefs and policy views

This section presents treatment effects of the research evidence about the results from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). We first outline our

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<sup>17</sup>Under the assumption that individuals trust that the money is actually donated to the organization and think that the donations will be a useful tool to lower discrimination.

empirical strategy and then present three sets of results: First, we investigate whether people update their beliefs in response to the treatment. Second, we analyze how the treatment affects people’s political behavior as measured by incentivized donations. Third, we analyze how the treatment affects people’s self-reported policy preferences on pro-black policies.

## 4.1 Empirical strategy

We pre-specified the analysis of the experiments in separate documents uploaded to the AEA RCT Registry prior to starting the data collection. The empirical strategy outlined in this section follows the pre-analysis plans, which may be accessed with the following link: <https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/2273>. The Online Appendix includes all pre-specified results that are not discussed in the main text.

**Main specification** Since we expect different treatment effects based on whether the respondents initially overestimate or underestimate racial discrimination, our main specification is the following equation, which we estimate using OLS:

$$y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Treatment}_i + \alpha_2 \text{Treatment}_i \times \text{overestimate}_i + \alpha_3 \text{overestimate}_i + \alpha_4 \mathbf{x}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where  $y_i$  is the outcome of interest;  $\text{Treatment}_i$  is an indicator for whether respondent  $i$  received the research evidence;  $\text{overestimate}_i$  is an indicator for initially overestimating discrimination (i.e., for having pre-treatment beliefs that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average)<sup>18</sup>;  $\mathbf{x}_i$  is a

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<sup>18</sup>Since those with accurate pre-treatment beliefs (i.e., 15) should become more confident in their beliefs, and thus should increase support for pro-black policies, we decided to group them in the same category as those who strictly underestimated racial discrimination. In the Online Appendix, we also report results omitting those who had accurate pre-treatment beliefs about racial discrimination.

vector of pre-specified controls<sup>19</sup>; and  $\varepsilon_i$  is an individual-specific error term. We also report results using the continuous measure of pre-treatment beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination. We use robust standard errors for inference. Throughout the section, we refer to respondents who initially underestimate and overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market as “underestimators” and “overestimators,” respectively.

## 4.2 Do people update their beliefs about racial discrimination?

**Experiment 1: Beliefs about discrimination in the housing market** We first examine whether people use the information about racial discrimination in the labor market to update their beliefs about racial discrimination in the housing market.<sup>20</sup> Column 1 of Table 2 shows that treated underestimators increase their estimate of the rejection rate of black-sounding names by 4.2 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ). By contrast, treated overestimators decrease their estimate of the rejection rate for black-sounding names by 5.8 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ). These estimates are significantly different from each other ( $p < 0.01$ ). Column 2 shows that there is also a highly significant interaction effect between our continuous measure of pre-treatment beliefs and the treatment indicator ( $p < 0.01$ ; see also Panel A of Figure A.5). While there is a large and significant correlation between beliefs about discrimination in the labor market and in the housing market among control group respondents, there is no significant correlation among treated respondents, indicating that respondents strongly update their beliefs about housing market discrimination in response to the research evidence. There is no significant treatment heterogeneity in belief updating between Republicans and non-Republicans

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<sup>19</sup>For Experiment 1, we include the following controls: gender (binary), age (in years), two ethnicity indicators (non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks); three regional indicators; household size (continuous); log household income (continuous); an indicator for having college degree; and indicator for being employed; and two party affiliation indicators (Republicans and Democrats).

<sup>20</sup>While respondents were asked about the acceptance rate of black-sounding names (i.e., what percent of the time they thought reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted), we recoded the responses such that higher numbers imply more discrimination. The results show beliefs about implied rejection rates instead.

(Columns 1 and 2 of Table A.9), but looking at point estimates, we find larger updating for Republicans among underestimators and larger updating for non-Republicans among overestimators.<sup>21</sup>

**Experiment 2: Posterior beliefs about the labor market** In Experiment 2, we elicited posterior beliefs about racial discrimination in the one-week follow-up. Column 3 of Table 2 shows that treated underestimators increase their estimate of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average by 2.3 resumes ( $p < 0.05$ ). Treated overestimators, by contrast, decrease their estimate by 11 resumes ( $p < 0.01$ ). These estimates are significantly different from each other ( $p < 0.01$ ). Column 4 shows that there is also a negative and significant interaction effect between the continuous measure of pre-treatment beliefs and the treatment ( $p < 0.01$ ). As in Experiment 1, we find that the treatment strongly weakens the correlation between pre-treatment beliefs and post-treatment beliefs (see also Panel B of Figure A.5). We do not find any significant treatment heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans (columns 3 and 4 of Table A.9). In Experiment 2, we also elicited confidence in pre-treatment beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market. Treatment effects on posterior beliefs are stronger for respondents with less confidence in their pre-treatment beliefs (as shown in Table A.20), consistent with genuine belief updating.

**Experiment 3: Non-incentivized beliefs about racial discrimination in hiring** In Experiment 3, we elicited non-incentivized probabilistic beliefs about whether there is racial discrimination against blacks, whites, or no discrimination hiring. Column 5 of Table 2 shows that treated underestimators increase their perception of the likelihood

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<sup>21</sup>As described in the pre-analysis plan, we made an ex ante decision to focus on heterogeneity between Republicans and non-Republicans. We did this for two main reasons. First, political affiliation is a stronger predictor of support for pro-black policies than all other demographics, including race (<http://pewrsr.ch/2wAjUGP>; accessed February 4, 2019). Second, the Republican/non-Republican split allows us to include all respondents in the heterogeneity analysis, maximizing statistical power.

that there is hiring discrimination against blacks by 5.6 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ). By contrast, we find no evidence that overestimators change their beliefs in response to the treatment. While the belief elicitation in the first two experiments measured quantitative beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination, the belief elicitation in the third experiment only measures beliefs about whether there is discrimination against blacks. Given that overestimators already held a qualitatively correct belief (namely that there is discrimination against blacks), it is theoretically ambiguous whether they should adjust their beliefs about whether there is discrimination against blacks in response to the information. However, the interaction between the continuous prior and the treatment indicator is statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ , column 6), highlighting that the extent of updating depends on people's prior beliefs about discrimination. Exploring political heterogeneity in treatment responses (columns 3 and 4 of Table A.9), we find that the main effect on underestimators is mostly driven by Republican respondents who increase their perception of the likelihood that there is hiring discrimination against blacks by 11.1 percentage points ( $p < 0.01$ ). The large updating among Republicans could arise from them having lower prior beliefs that there is discrimination against blacks. Given the estimates from this section, our next main result can be summarized as follows:

**Result 3.** *Beliefs about racial discrimination are responsive to research evidence from correspondence studies. Across three experiments that used different ways of measuring post-treatment beliefs about discrimination against blacks, we consistently find evidence of large belief updating and a strong reduction in political polarization in beliefs.*

[Insert Table 2 here]

### 4.3 Does the information affect donations?

Table 3 shows treatment effects on donations to a pro-black civil rights organization.<sup>22</sup> In the regressions, we z-score the number of donations using the mean and standard deviation of the control group.

Column 1 of Table 3 shows that treated underestimators increase their donations to the civil rights organization by 0.16 of a standard deviation ( $p < 0.05$ ).<sup>23</sup> This effect size corresponds to 29 percent of the Democrat–Republican difference in donations. It also corresponds to about one-half of the difference in donations between those who initially overestimate and those who initially underestimate racial discrimination. By contrast, treated respondents who overestimate racial discrimination do not respond to the information; the treatment effect estimate is close to zero and not statistically significant ( $p = 0.97$ ). While the treatment effects on overestimators and underestimators are not significantly different from each other ( $p = 0.12$ ), the interaction term between the continuous prior and the treatment indicator is statistically significant (column 2,  $p < 0.05$ ). One explanation for the lack of response to the information among overestimators could be that they think that discrimination is still sufficiently prevalent to justify donations even though they were informed that discrimination is less prevalent than they thought.

Columns 3 to 6 of Table 3 examine political heterogeneity in treatment effects on donations. While we do not detect any significant political heterogeneity in treatment responses, the patterns in the data are generally consistent with stronger treatment effects for non-Republicans and weaker treatment effects for Republicans. Among non-Republicans, treated underestimators increase their donations by 0.21 of a standard

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<sup>22</sup>We only collected data on donations for respondents in Experiment 1. Respondents could choose between varying amounts of money for themselves or donating \$5 to *The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights*, one of the nation's leading civil rights legal organizations. It was founded in 1963 and its principal mission is to fight racial discrimination faced by African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities.

<sup>23</sup>A subset of respondents only completed a subset of the choices in the multiple price list. If we restrict the sample to respondents who made all six choices in the multiple price list, the estimated effect sizes are virtually unchanged.

deviation ( $p < 0.05$ , column 3) and we observe a highly significant interaction effect between the continuous prior and the treatment indicator ( $p < 0.01$ , column 4). Among Republicans, by contrast, we only observe very modest effects of the information on subsequent donations (columns 5 and 6). The muted response among Republicans who underestimated discrimination is especially striking considering that this group most strongly updated their beliefs in response to the information (column 1, Table A.9). Thus, even though the treatment strongly reduced political polarization in beliefs, it failed to reduce political polarization in donations. Our next main result can be stated as follows:

**Result 4.** *Information about racial discrimination causally affects donations to a civil rights organization lobbying for blacks in the labor market. The results are driven by non-Republicans, and the treatment thus fails to reduce political polarization in donation behavior.*

[Insert Table 3 here]

#### 4.4 Does the information affect policy views?

Table 4 shows treatment effects on self-reported support for different policies to counteract the negative effects of racial discrimination in hiring. In the regressions, we pool data across the three main experiments to maximize statistical power.<sup>24</sup> All outcomes are z-scored and coded such that higher values imply higher support for the policies.

The first column shows treatment effects on support for mandatory name-blind recruitment, a “non-preferential” policy to reduce discrimination in hiring. The next two columns show support for two “preferential treatment” policies specifically designed to help blacks in the labor market, namely support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job (column 2) and support

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<sup>24</sup>The Online Appendix reports result separately for each experiment and several additional specifications to assess the robustness of our main findings.

for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job (column 3). The results from columns 1–3 show that there is essentially no impact of the treatment on support for any of these three policies. The point estimates for all three outcomes are close to zero and precisely estimated due to our large number of observations. The lack of response holds both for people initially overestimating and underestimating the extent of racial discrimination in hiring. The results in columns 5–7, where we examine interaction effects between the treatment indicator and the continuous prior, confirm the overall very muted impacts of the information on policy views. Our next main result is as follows:

**Result 5.** *Views on pro-black labor market policies, such as black preference in hiring and job assistance programs for blacks, are unresponsive to information about the extent of discrimination against blacks in the labor market.*

**Heterogeneity in treatment responses** Table A.12 examines treatment effects on all main outcomes separately for each experiment. While there is generally no impact on the treatment on policy preferences in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, we see significant decreases in support for pro-black policies among underestimators in Experiment 2. This “backfire” effect is almost entirely driven by Republican underestimators who reduce their support for pro-black policies by 30 percent of a standard deviation ( $p < 0.01$ , column 8 of Panel C). An explanation for the backfire effect on pro-black policies could be that the treatment simultaneously changes people’s beliefs about how effective affirmative action programs have been in helping blacks. We do indeed find evidence that treated Republican underestimators are more likely to think that affirmative action programs have hurt blacks ( $p < 0.01$ , column 1 of Table A.22). Furthermore, it could be the case that the backfire effect only arises in the obfuscated follow-up because Republican underestimators in the two other experiments did not feel it was socially acceptable to express very low support for pro-black policies immediately after being informed by the experimenter that discrimination is more prevalent than their initial estimates.



Table A.10 shows treatment effects separately for Republicans and non-Republicans pooling data across all three experiments. For non-Republicans, we observe similar patterns as in the full sample with overall very muted effects of the information on policy preferences.<sup>25</sup> Among Republicans, however, we find some suggestive evidence that the treatment decreases support for name-blind screening among underestimators and increases support for pro-black policies among overestimators, but these results are not robust to using the specification with the continuous prior (columns 6–10) and the patterns are also not consistent across experiments (as shown in Table A.12).

**Stability of treatment effects** Using data from Experiment 3, Table A.19 examines whether the treatment effects vary by the exact elicitation of prior beliefs. Overall, we find fairly comparable treatment effects across elicitation techniques: There are no significant treatment effects on any of the outcomes across elicitation techniques, and the estimated treatment effects are not statistically different from each other. Naturally, the minimum detectable effect size differences from this exercise are quite large and more work is needed to examine the stability of treatment effects to variations in the design (DellaVigna and Pope, 2019).

[Insert Table 4 here]

## 4.5 Beliefs about correspondence studies

While we consistently find that respondents strongly update their beliefs about racial discrimination, we see little movement on support for pro-black policies. Furthermore, while the treatment strongly narrows political polarization in beliefs, it consistently fails to narrow political polarization in policy views and donations. To better understand these results, we collected a series of questions to shed light on how people interpret the

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<sup>25</sup>Table A.11 shows very similar results if we omit Independents from the regressions.

evidence from correspondence studies.

**Beliefs about the reasons for differences in callback rates** How beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination affect support for pro-black policies may critically depend on beliefs about the underlying sources of the discrimination. One reason for why people may not react to information about the extent of discrimination is that they might consider discrimination to be socially efficient. For instance, if blacks on average are less productive than whites and resume characteristics are insufficient to perfectly assess worker productivity, statistical discrimination is efficient in the sense of being profit-maximizing. The interpretation and effects of the research evidence thus critically hinge on people's beliefs about the sources of callback differences between blacks and whites.

In Experiment 4 (N=1,060), conducted with a sample representative of the US population in terms of gender, age, region, education, and income, we measured people's beliefs about the reasons for differences in callback rates for resumes with white-sounding names and black-sounding names. After explaining the design of the correspondence study and the findings from the study, we asked our respondents what they think is the main reason for why employers are more likely to call back applicants with white-sounding names. We designed the possible responses to match the most commonly cited theoretical reasons for differences in callback-rates as closely as possible. Specifically, we examine whether people think that lower callback rates are due to taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957), accurate statistical discrimination due to lower average productivity of blacks (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972), statistical discrimination due to blacks having a higher variance of unobserved skills (Aigner and Cain, 1977), inaccurate discrimination due to biases in beliefs (Bohren et al., 2019b), or implicit discrimination due to subconscious negative stereotyping of blacks (Bertrand et al., 2005).

Figure A.10 highlights that the largest fraction of respondents (38 percent) thinks that employers subconsciously rely on negative stereotypes about blacks. 7 percent think

that the callback difference arises due to taste-based discrimination, i.e. employers not wanting to hire black candidates because they dislike interactions with blacks. 7 percent believe that employers think that the resume credentials are more informative about the skills of white job applicants than about the skills of black job applicants. 7 percent of our respondents think that employers engage in accurate statistical discrimination, while 15 percent of our respondents think that employers engage in inaccurate statistical discrimination; i.e., they incorrectly think that blacks on average tend to be less productive than whites (Bohren et al., 2019b). The remaining 22 percent of the respondents distrust the research evidence and say they do not think it is generally the case that whites receive more callbacks than blacks. Given that only a small fraction of respondents think callback differences are due to accurate statistical discrimination, we find it very unlikely that the muted treatment effects on policy views are due to respondents believing that discrimination is efficient.

Figure A.10 also shows political differences in beliefs about the sources of discrimination. Conditional on believing that correspondence studies present evidence of discrimination, Republicans and Democrats alike tend to believe that discrimination is due to implicit discrimination or inaccurate statistical discrimination rather than taste-based or accurate statistical discrimination. However, Republicans are much more likely than Democrats to distrust the research evidence; 42 percent of Republicans say they do not think it is generally true that employers are more likely to call back white applicants compared to only 15 percent of Democrats. While we generally find that Republicans strongly update their beliefs in response to the research evidence, this result suggests that there is strong heterogeneity among Republicans in the extent of belief updating.

**Beliefs about the consequences of callback differences** Another reason for why people may not respond to the information treatment could result from a belief that the differences in callback rates do not hurt blacks in the labor market. For instance, if

discrimination is due to prejudiced employers, people might think that racial segregation of labor markets allows blacks to avoid contact with prejudiced employers. Correspondence studies have therefore been criticized for surveying the average firm rather than the marginal discriminatory firm (Heckman, 1998). People might also think that blacks easily can compensate for lower callback rates by sending out more resumes.

Using data from Experiment 4, we shed light on this issue by asking our respondents whether they think that the lower callback rate for black-sounding names hurts blacks in the labor market. We find that 94 percent of respondents respond either that the differences in callback rates strongly hurt (40 percent), hurt (29 percent) or somewhat hurt (24 percent) blacks in the labor market. Even 87 percent of Republicans think that the differences in callback rates strongly hurt (22 percent), hurt (28 percent) or somewhat hurt (37 percent) blacks in the labor market (Figure A.10). Overall, these results demonstrate that it is very unlikely that respondents do not respond to the information because they think that the callback differential does not hurt blacks in the labor market.

**Trust in correspondence studies and willingness to pay for research evidence** To assess trust in correspondence studies, we asked respondents whether they thought that sending out fictitious resumes to assess whether white-sounding names or black-sounding names receive more callbacks for interviews is a reliable method to detect racial discrimination in hiring. The majority of respondents agree with this statement, but we find that Republicans are less likely to agree with the statement than non-Republicans (Figure A.10). In Experiment 1, Republicans were also significantly less likely than non-Republicans to agree that the results from the correspondence study were evidence of discrimination against blacks.

One concern with the previous measures of trust in the research evidence is that they are self-reported. To receive an additional incentivized measure, we also elicited willingness to pay for the research evidence through a multiple price list at the end of

Experiment 2 for control group respondents. Whites, males and republicans exhibit a lower willingness to pay for the research evidence (Table A.23). The gap in willingness to pay for the research evidence between Republicans and non-Republicans is consistent with the gap in self-reported trust in correspondence studies. These estimates are consistent with the finding that Republicans are less likely to interpret correspondence studies as evidence of discrimination against blacks.

#### **4.6 Are policy preferences elastic to other types of information?**

Although the provision of the research evidence strongly reduces political polarization in beliefs about racial discrimination, it does not reduce political polarization in views on pro-black policies. This finding raises the question of whether attitudes towards pro-black policies are elastic to other types of information. In two additional experiments, we explored whether information about racial stereotypes or information about party views on affirmative action would affect political polarization in attitudes towards pro-black policies.<sup>26</sup>

Experiment 5 (N=2,999) was motivated by strong correlational evidence suggesting an important role of beliefs about differences in work ethic between blacks and whites for explaining views on pro-black policies. In this experiment, we provided our respondents with information challenging the stereotype that blacks have a worse work ethic than whites (Gilens, 2009). The experiment reveals that people who receive information about racial differences in work ethic do not adjust their views on pro-black policies.

Experiment 6 (N=4,000) sheds light on a different prominently discussed causal determinant of policy views and political polarization, namely political identity (Bursztyn et al., 2019) and the importance of party cues (Brader and Tucker, 2012). We show that providing information about how the Republican and Democratic parties differ in

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<sup>26</sup>Appendix D describes the two experiments in more details.

their support for affirmative action does not affect Democrat–Republican differences in self-reported policy views. Overall, these two additional experiments corroborate our finding that self-reported attitudes towards pro-black policies are generally hard to move with information, suggesting that these may have an important “cultural” component that is very stable over time (Luttmer and Singhal, 2011).

## **5 Concluding remarks**

In this paper, we provide novel evidence of the determinants of people’s support for pro-black policies with a particular focus on the role of beliefs about the extent of hiring discrimination against blacks. We first provide representative evidence of people’s beliefs about racial discrimination in hiring. We document strong heterogeneity in beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in hiring and find that people strongly update their beliefs in response to information about the results from a correspondence study (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). However, although the treatment strongly reduces differences in beliefs about racial discrimination between Democrats and Republicans, we do not observe a similar convergence in support for pro-black policies to combat racial discrimination. Almost three decades ago, Bobo and Kluegel (1993) pointed out “the need to address the denial of contemporary racial discrimination [...] if policies addressing persistent racial inequalities are to be pursued.” Our results suggest that providing information about racial discrimination is not sufficient to reduce political differences in support for pro-black policies, and we think more work is needed to better understand the causal drivers of the polarization in support for pro-black policies.

Our paper introduces a new approach of measuring beliefs about discrimination by leveraging correspondence studies to measure beliefs. The advantage of this approach is that it allows for the elicitation of quantitative and incentivized beliefs that are easily comparable across respondents. Furthermore, this approach allows for the provision of

research evidence based on clean causal evidence. Our study demonstrates the feasibility of this approach by showing that correspondence studies can easily be explained to and understood by a general population sample. We also provide evidence on how people interpret the evidence from correspondence studies. The approach could be useful for researchers who wish to study beliefs about discrimination in other domains, such as discrimination against women. Finally, the approach could also be used to measure beliefs and change beliefs about the returns to human capital investments with credible research evidence.

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
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## Main figures


Figure 1: Political differences in beliefs and preferences




Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). **Panel A** shows the mean of beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview, separately for Democrats and Republicans (the dashed line indicates the correct answer, as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Respondents were informed that resumes with white-sounding names on average had to be sent out ten times to get one callback on average. **Panel B** shows the mean of the number of times control group respondents preferred to give \$5 to the pro-black civil rights organization over money for themselves in \$1 increments from \$0 to \$5 for Democrats and Republicans separately. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

Figure 2: Overview of experiments

### Experiment 1: NORC



### Experiment 2: Research Now



### Experiment 3: Lucid






Figure 3: Correlates of beliefs about racial discrimination



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). The dots indicate the mean values of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. The dependent variable in **Panel A** is people's beliefs about the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview on average. The dependent variable in **Panel B** is people's beliefs about the percent of time reservation requests from black-sounding names on Airbnb were rejected. Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.



Figure 4: Republican–Democrat differences in beliefs about racial discrimination



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). **Panel A** shows, separately for Republicans and Democrats, data on beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. Respondents were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding names was ten (as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). **Panel B** shows, separately for Republicans and Democrats, using only control group respondents, beliefs about the rejection rate on reservation requests sent from accounts with black-sounding names. Respondents were initially asked about the percent of acceptances of reservation requests for black-sounding names on Airbnb (true rate is 41 percent, as found in the study by Edelman et al., 2017). They were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 49. We have recoded the values to implied rejection rates by subtracting each estimate from 100. In both panels, the dashed vertical line indicates the correct answer.

## Main tables

Table 1: The association between beliefs and preferences

	(1) Donations to NGO	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Disc. housing	(5) Disc. ser. problem
<b>Panel A: Without controls</b>					
Beliefs about discrimination	0.219*** (0.040)	0.241*** (0.036)	0.246*** (0.035)	0.217*** (0.039)	0.294*** (0.035)
<b>Panel B: With controls</b>					
Beliefs about discrimination	0.171*** (0.041)	0.167*** (0.034)	0.169*** (0.035)	0.213*** (0.040)	0.231*** (0.031)
N	653	676	677	673	679

*Note:* This table show OLS regressions from control group respondents in Experiment 1 (NORC). In **Panel A**, we regress the outcome indicated in each column on standardized beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor market (i.e., beliefs about the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to receive one callback on average). In **Panel B**, we also include pre-specified controls in the regressions (gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views). *Donations to the NGO* refers to the number of times the respondents preferred to donate \$5 to the pro-black civil rights organization over money for themselves (responses range from 0 to 6). For the outcomes *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job) and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). *Disc. housing* refers to beliefs about the rejection rate of black-sounding names in the housing market (elicited on a scale from 0 to 100). *Disc. ser. problem* refers to the question of whether “racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem” which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Not a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). All outcomes are z-scored.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2: Belief updating

	Housing market (NORC)		Labor market (RN)		Labor market (Lucid)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment (a)	4.17*** (1.54)	-1.36 (0.92)	2.14** (1.01)	-3.69*** (0.77)	5.61*** (1.74)	3.10*** (1.15)
Overestimate × Treatment (b)			-13.15*** (1.62)		-4.64** (2.35)	
Overestimate			14.13*** (1.33)		14.85*** (1.69)	
Prior × Treatment		-5.31*** (1.00)		-8.43*** (0.98)		-3.12** (1.49)
Prior		4.31*** (0.78)		9.03*** (0.85)		9.41*** (0.91)
Linear combination: a + b	-5.77*** (1.12)		-11.01*** (1.26)		0.97 (1.58)	
N	1366	1366	1701	1701	2098	2098
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable	71.1	71.1	19.3	19.3	52.0	52.0

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are post-treatment beliefs about what percent of the time reservation requests from black-sounding names were rejected on Airbnb (columns 1–2; Experiment 1 with NORC), post-treatment beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average (columns 3–4; wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now), and post-treatment beliefs about the percent chance that there is racial discrimination in hiring decisions against blacks (columns 5–6; Experiment 3 with Lucid). We include pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views) in all specifications. For post-treatment beliefs about the labor market (columns 3 and 4), we also include confidence in prior beliefs as a control. “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average). “Prior” is a z-scored measure of pre-treatment beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination (i.e., the number of resumes with black-sounding names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average).

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Treatment effects on donations

	Full sample		Non-Republicans		Republicans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment (a)	0.16** (0.08)	0.07 (0.05)	0.21** (0.09)	0.08 (0.06)	0.07 (0.12)	0.07 (0.11)
Treatment $\times$ Overestimate (b)	-0.14 (0.11)		-0.21* (0.13)		0.01 (0.21)	
Overestimate	0.27*** (0.07)		0.27*** (0.09)		0.31** (0.14)	
Prior $\times$ Treatment		-0.12** (0.05)		-0.15** (0.06)		-0.05 (0.12)
Prior		0.17*** (0.04)		0.17*** (0.04)		0.15* (0.08)
Linear combination: a + b	0.02 (0.08)		-0.01 (0.08)		0.09 (0.17)	
N	1327	1327	1023	1023	304	304
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the number of donations to the pro-black civil rights organization (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they could choose between money for themselves and \$5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in increments of \$1 from \$0 to \$5). The dependent variable has been z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. We include the following pre-specified controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. “Prior” is a z-scored measure of pre-treatment beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4: Treatment effects on attitudes towards pro-black policies: Pooled across experiments

	(1) Name-blind screening	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind screening	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)
Treatment (a)	-0.019 (0.039)	0.003 (0.036)	-0.016 (0.038)	-0.007 (0.036)	0.019 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.027)	0.008 (0.027)	0.004 (0.027)
Treatment × Overestimate (b)	0.057 (0.053)	-0.018 (0.050)	0.033 (0.052)	0.007 (0.050)				
Overestimate	0.093** (0.038)	0.086** (0.036)	0.152*** (0.036)	0.131*** (0.035)				
Prior × Treatment					0.030 (0.029)	-0.042 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.030)	-0.033 (0.030)
Prior					0.087*** (0.019)	0.104*** (0.021)	0.150*** (0.020)	0.142*** (0.021)
Linear combination: a + b	0.038 (0.036)	-0.015 (0.035)	0.017 (0.035)	0.000 (0.034)				
N	5224	5223	5220	5217	5224	5223	5220	5217
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

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*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results pooling observations across Experiments 1, 2 and 3. For the outcomes *Name-blind screening* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. We include the following controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). We also include experiment fixed effects. “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. “Prior” is a z-scored measure of pre-treatment beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Online Appendix:

**Beliefs About Racial Discrimination and  
Support for Pro-Black Policies**

Ingar Haaland and Christopher Roth

**Summary of the Online Appendix**

Section A provides all the appendix tables. Section A.1 provides an overview of all experiments, summary statistics for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, as well as evidence of covariate balance and results on attrition. Section A.2 provides additional results on robustness and heterogeneity of treatment effects. Section A.3 provides treatment effects on some mechanisms questions. Section A.4 provides additional pre-specified tables. Section B provides all the appendix figures. Section C provides screenshots of the consent forms for Experiment 2 and the recruitment email from Research Now. Section D describes Experiments 5 and 6 in more detail. Finally, Section E provides experimental instructions for all the experiments.

# A Appendix tables

## A.1 Overview, summary statistics, balance and attrition

Table A.1: Overview of experiments

Experiment	Sample	Treatments Arms	Main outcomes	Pre-analysis plans
Experiment 1 (June and July 2017)	NORC (N=1,542)	<b>Treatment:</b> Information about results from the correspondence study <b>Control:</b> No information	Donations to NGO; incentivized post-treatment beliefs; self-reported policy views	Pre-analysis Plan II
Experiment 2: Wave 1 (June 2017)	Research Now (N=2,073)	<b>Treatment:</b> Information about results from the correspondence study <b>Control:</b> No information	None (elicited in wave 2)	Pre-analysis Plan I
Experiment 2: Wave 2 (June and July 2017)	Research Now (N=1,720)	No treatments (administered in wave 1)	Incentivized post-treatment beliefs; self-reported policy views	Pre-analysis Plan I
Experiment 3 (June 2019)	Lucid (N=2,135)	<b>Treatment:</b> Information about results from the correspondence study <b>Control:</b> No information	Non-incentivized beliefs and self-reported policy views	Pre-analysis Plan V
Experiment 4 (June 2019)	Lucid (N=1,060)	No treatments	Beliefs about the reasons for differences in callback rates; self-reported policy views	Pre-analysis Plan VI
Experiment 5 (October 2018)	MTurk (N=2,999)	<b>Treatment:</b> Information about inaccurate racial stereotypes <b>Control:</b> No information	Self-reported policy views	Pre-analysis Plan IV
Experiment 6 (July 2018)	Research Now (N=4,000)	<b>Treatment:</b> Information about party views on affirmative action <b>Control:</b> No information	Self-reported policy views	Pre-analysis Plan III

*Notes:* This table provides an overview of the different experiments conducted.

Table A.2: Summary statistics

	(1) Experiment 1	(2) Experiment 2	(3) Experiment 3
Male	0.465	0.506	0.493
Age	48.2	47.9	45.1
Household income	68157	73461	76989
African American/Black	0.112	0.062	0.089
Non-Hispanic white	0.672	0.485	0.779
College (at least 2-year degree)	0.807	0.819	0.744
Full-time employee	0.627	0.599	0.414
Republican	0.230	0.260	0.345
Democrat	0.358	0.383	0.344
Northeast	0.158	0.233	0.186
West	0.221	0.237	0.204
Midwest	0.295	0.187	0.199
South	0.326	0.344	0.411
Overestimate discrimination	0.547	0.460	0.577
Observations	1382	1720	2143

*Note:* This table displays summary statistics for the three main experiments: Experiment 1 with NORC, Experiment 2 with Research Now (the obfuscated follow-up survey), and Experiment 3 with Lucid.



Table A.3: Balance: Experiment 1 (NORC)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
Respondent age	49.06	47.27	0.047	1382
Male	0.45	0.48	0.156	1382
Non-Hispanic black	0.11	0.11	0.916	1382
Non-Hispanic white	0.68	0.66	0.508	1382
Northeast	0.16	0.15	0.721	1382
Midwest	0.27	0.32	0.034	1382
South	0.33	0.32	0.668	1382
West	0.24	0.20	0.127	1382
Household size	2.65	2.73	0.297	1382
Log household income	10.86	10.82	0.298	1382
At least some college	0.83	0.78	0.025	1382
Paid employee	0.53	0.52	0.851	1382
Self-employed	0.10	0.11	0.655	1382
Overestimate	0.54	0.55	0.708	1382
Prior (continuous, top-coded at 50)	20.53	19.72	0.300	1382
Republican	0.23	0.23	0.969	1382
Democrat	0.36	0.35	0.744	1382

*Notes:* This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group for Experiment 1 (NORC). “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of the covariates is  $p=0.164$ .

Table A.4: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; baseline survey)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
Respondent age	47.19	47.66	0.493	2073
Male	0.50	0.49	0.844	2073
Non-Hispanic black	0.06	0.05	0.335	2073
Non-Hispanic white	0.49	0.48	0.812	2073
Household size	2.42	2.50	0.228	2073
Log household income	10.92	10.94	0.691	2073
At least 2-year college degree	0.83	0.82	0.609	2073
Overestimate	0.47	0.45	0.350	2073
Confidence in prior	3.31	3.36	0.295	2073
Republican	0.25	0.26	0.643	2073
Democrat	0.38	0.37	0.799	2073
West	0.22	0.24	0.225	2073
South	0.35	0.35	0.947	2073
Northeast	0.24	0.22	0.281	2073
Midwest	0.19	0.19	0.940	2073

*Notes:* This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (wave 1 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. “Confidence in prior” (i.e., confidence in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure). The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of the covariates is  $p=0.918$ .

Table A.5: Balance: Experiment 2 (Research Now; obfuscated follow-up)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
Respondent age	47.53	48.33	0.284	1720
Male	0.51	0.50	0.759	1720
Non-Hispanic black	0.07	0.06	0.502	1720
Non-Hispanic white	0.49	0.48	0.695	1720
Household size	2.43	2.45	0.751	1720
Log household income	10.92	10.94	0.703	1720
At least 2-year college degree	0.82	0.82	0.944	1720
Overestimate	0.47	0.45	0.422	1720
Prior (continuous, top-coded at 50)	17.06	17.13	0.916	1720
Confidence in prior	3.31	3.37	0.221	1720
Republican	0.25	0.27	0.569	1720
Democrat	0.39	0.38	0.730	1720
West	0.23	0.25	0.286	1720
South	0.34	0.35	0.786	1720
Northeast	0.24	0.22	0.306	1720
Midwest	0.19	0.18	0.701	1720

*Notes:* This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. “Confidence in prior” (i.e., confidence in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very Sure). The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of the covariates is  $p=0.961$ .

Table A.6: Experiment 2: Correlates of attrition

	Completed Follow-up	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment	-0.025 (0.017)	-0.027 (0.017)
Republican		0.049** (0.023)
Independent		0.041** (0.021)
Log(Income)		-0.001 (0.012)
College		-0.051** (0.024)
Black		0.036 (0.036)
White		-0.007 (0.019)
Prior (dummy)		0.016 (0.018)
Confidence in Prior		0.005 (0.009)
Male		0.042** (0.018)
Age		0.001 (0.001)
Response rate	0.806	0.806
Observations	2073	2073

*Notes:* The outcome variables takes value one if our respondent completed the follow-up study (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). “Treatment” takes value one if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. “Confidence in prior” (i.e., confidence in the answer to the question of how many times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average) was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very sure). \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.7: Balance: Experiment 3 (Lucid)

	Treatment (T)	Control (C)	P-value(T - C)	Observations
Respondent age (cont.)	44.71	45.52	0.235	2143
Male	0.48	0.51	0.235	2143
African American/Black	0.09	0.09	0.956	2143
Non-Hispanic White	0.78	0.78	0.781	2143
Log household income	10.94	10.99	0.160	2143
At least some college	0.74	0.75	0.613	2143
Overestimate discrimination against blacks	0.57	0.59	0.342	2143
Republican	0.34	0.35	0.715	2143
Democrat	0.34	0.35	0.784	2143
West	0.20	0.21	0.319	2143
South	0.41	0.41	0.973	2143
Northeast	0.19	0.18	0.721	2143
Midwest	0.20	0.19	0.537	2143

*Notes:* This table displays covariate means for the treatment and control group (Lucid). “Prior (dummy)” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate racial discrimination in the labor market. The p-value of a joint F-test of a regression of the treatment indicator on all of the covariates is p=0.461.

## A.2 Robustness and additional heterogeneity

Table A.8: Treatment effects on donations: Results without controls

	Full sample		Non-Republicans		Republicans	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	0.159** (0.075)	0.074 (0.053)	0.206** (0.093)	0.083 (0.062)	0.070 (0.123)	0.066 (0.111)
Overestimate	0.269*** (0.075)		0.268*** (0.088)		0.307** (0.142)	
Treatment $\times$ Overestimate	-0.139 (0.107)		-0.215* (0.125)		0.015 (0.211)	
Prior		0.166*** (0.040)		0.172*** (0.045)		0.148* (0.083)
Treatment $\times$ Prior		-0.123** (0.055)		-0.147** (0.062)		-0.050 (0.122)
N	1327	1327	1023	1023	304	304
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No

*Note:* The table shows data from Experiment 1 where the dependent variable is the number of donations to the pro-black civil rights organization (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they could choose between money for themselves and \$5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in increments of \$1 from \$0 to \$5). The dependent variable has been z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group). In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-specified controls: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average).

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.9: Belief updating: Heterogeneity by political views

	Housing market (NORC)		Labor market (RN)		Labor market (Lucid)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Panel A: Non-Republicans</b>						
Treatment (a)	2.84 (1.84)	-2.35** (1.05)	1.67 (1.21)	-3.90*** (0.88)	1.45 (2.27)	1.47 (1.46)
Overestimate × Treatment (b)	-9.36*** (2.20)		-13.04*** (1.88)		-0.99 (2.96)	
Overestimate	6.71*** (1.76)		14.27*** (1.57)		15.97*** (2.14)	
Prior		3.96*** (0.87)		9.65*** (0.99)		10.18*** (1.11)
Prior × Treatment		-4.78*** (1.11)		-9.03*** (1.14)		-2.50 (1.87)
Linear combination: a + b	-6.52*** (1.20)		-11.38*** (1.45)		0.46 (1.90)	
N	1052	1052	1255	1255	1375	1375
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable	72.3	72.3	20.1	20.1	59.2	59.2
<b>Panel B: Republicans</b>						
Treatment (a)	7.61*** (2.89)	1.26 (2.03)	3.52* (1.86)	-2.37 (1.55)	11.18*** (2.66)	5.88*** (1.94)
Overestimate × Treatment (b)	-10.65** (4.21)		-12.98*** (3.27)		-8.65** (3.89)	
Overestimate	9.83*** (3.34)		13.17*** (2.58)		11.58*** (2.77)	
Prior		5.76*** (1.80)		6.57*** (1.58)		7.73*** (1.49)
Prior × Treatment		-7.03** (2.75)		-6.02*** (1.90)		-3.25 (2.56)
Linear combination: a + b	-3.04 (2.90)		-9.46*** (2.63)		2.53 (2.83)	
N	314	314	446	446	723	723
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean: Dependent variable	67.2	67.2	17.3	17.3	38.7	38.7

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are post-treatment beliefs about what percent of the time reservation requests from black-sounding names were rejected on Airbnb (columns 1–2; Experiment 1 with NORC) and post-treatment beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback on average (columns 3–4; wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). In even-numbered columns, we include pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average). “Prior” is a z-scored measure of pre-treatment beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination in hiring.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.10: Pooled results: Political heterogeneity

	(1) Name-blind screening	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind screening	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)
<b>Panel A: Non-Republicans</b>								
Treatment	0.039 (0.047)	0.023 (0.043)	-0.004 (0.045)	0.012 (0.043)	0.039 (0.032)	-0.018 (0.031)	-0.019 (0.031)	-0.021 (0.031)
Treatment × Overestimate	-0.015 (0.062)	-0.091 (0.059)	-0.042 (0.059)	-0.077 (0.058)				
Overestimate	0.173*** (0.044)	0.149*** (0.042)	0.232*** (0.041)	0.212*** (0.041)				
Prior × Treatment					-0.007 (0.033)	-0.062* (0.034)	-0.041 (0.033)	-0.058* (0.034)
Prior					0.108*** (0.023)	0.103*** (0.025)	0.152*** (0.023)	0.142*** (0.025)
N	3725	3724	3722	3719	3725	3724	3722	3719
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Panel B: Republicans</b>								
Treatment	-0.141** (0.070)	-0.040 (0.065)	-0.037 (0.070)	-0.044 (0.066)	-0.022 (0.054)	0.037 (0.051)	0.078 (0.055)	0.064 (0.052)
Treatment × Overestimate	0.211** (0.105)	0.187** (0.095)	0.235** (0.106)	0.237** (0.097)				
Overestimate	-0.099 (0.074)	-0.098 (0.065)	-0.069 (0.074)	-0.096 (0.068)				
Prior × Treatment					0.093 (0.059)	-0.007 (0.057)	0.045 (0.059)	0.021 (0.059)
Prior					-0.010 (0.036)	0.021 (0.038)	0.063* (0.034)	0.047 (0.037)
N	1499	1499	1498	1498	1499	1499	1498	1498
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results pooling observations across Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Panel A shows results for Non-Republicans, while Panel B shows results for Republicans. For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. We include the following pre-specified controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average). “Prior” is a z-scored measure of pre-treatment beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Table A.11: Pooled results: Political heterogeneity with Democrats and Republicans only

	(1) Donations NGO	(2) Name-blind screening	(3) Black preference	(4) Black assistance	(5) Problack (Index)	(6) Donations NGO	(7) Name-blind screening	(8) Black preference	(9) Black assistance	(10) Problack (Index)
<b>Panel A: Democrats</b>										
Treatment	0.265* (0.152)	-0.032 (0.067)	-0.004 (0.065)	-0.002 (0.064)	-0.000 (0.063)	0.136 (0.096)	0.018 (0.043)	-0.032 (0.043)	-0.051 (0.041)	-0.045 (0.041)
Treatment × Overestimate	-0.134 (0.194)	0.103 (0.085)	-0.038 (0.085)	-0.072 (0.081)	-0.064 (0.080)					
Overestimate	0.155 (0.136)	0.119** (0.060)	0.096 (0.061)	0.272*** (0.058)	0.204*** (0.058)					
Prior × Treatment						-0.111 (0.090)	0.033 (0.040)	-0.013 (0.045)	-0.025 (0.042)	-0.022 (0.044)
Prior						0.115* (0.064)	0.101*** (0.029)	0.062* (0.035)	0.158*** (0.031)	0.122*** (0.034)
N	482	1880	1881	1880	1880	482	1880	1881	1880	1880
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Panel B: Republicans</b>										
Treatment	0.091 (0.122)	-0.141** (0.070)	-0.040 (0.065)	-0.037 (0.070)	-0.044 (0.066)	0.088 (0.115)	-0.022 (0.054)	0.037 (0.051)	0.078 (0.055)	0.064 (0.052)
Treatment × Overestimate	0.002 (0.211)	0.211** (0.105)	0.187** (0.095)	0.235** (0.106)	0.237** (0.097)					
Overestimate	0.300** (0.144)	-0.099 (0.074)	-0.098 (0.065)	-0.069 (0.074)	-0.096 (0.068)					
Prior × Treatment						0.019 (0.125)	0.093 (0.059)	-0.007 (0.057)	0.045 (0.059)	0.021 (0.059)
Prior						0.124 (0.087)	-0.010 (0.036)	0.021 (0.038)	0.063* (0.034)	0.047 (0.037)
N	304	1499	1499	1498	1498	304	1499	1499	1498	1498
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: The table shows OLS regression results pooling observations across Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Panel A shows results for Democrats, while Panel B shows results for Republicans. For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. We include the following pre-specified controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average). “Prior” is a z-scored measure of pre-treatment beliefs about the extent of racial discrimination.

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.12: Results separately for each experiment with political heterogeneity

	Experiment 1 (NORC)				Experiment 2 (Research Now)				Experiment 3 (Lucid)			
	(1) Name-blind screening	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind screening	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)	(9) Name-blind screening	(10) Black preference	(11) Black assistance	(12) Problack (Index)
<b>Panel A: Main specification</b>												
Treatment (a)	0.014 (0.076)	-0.028 (0.070)	-0.015 (0.077)	-0.024 (0.071)	-0.126** (0.064)	-0.087 (0.059)	-0.135** (0.062)	-0.124** (0.060)	0.067 (0.064)	0.112* (0.060)	0.092 (0.061)	0.116** (0.059)
Treatment × Overestimate (b)	0.074 (0.101)	-0.038 (0.093)	0.058 (0.099)	0.008 (0.094)	0.248*** (0.094)	0.062 (0.087)	0.120 (0.093)	0.101 (0.088)	-0.111 (0.085)	-0.097 (0.081)	-0.085 (0.081)	-0.104 (0.079)
Overestimate	0.086 (0.073)	0.194*** (0.068)	0.233*** (0.071)	0.237*** (0.067)	-0.017 (0.066)	-0.097 (0.062)	0.081 (0.065)	-0.015 (0.062)	0.200*** (0.060)	0.179*** (0.057)	0.162*** (0.057)	0.194*** (0.055)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720	2126	2126	2126	2126
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.19	0.29	0.49	0.80	0.08	0.69	0.83	0.72	0.44	0.78	0.89	0.81
<b>Panel B: Non-Republicans</b>												
Treatment (a)	0.112 (0.089)	-0.063 (0.085)	-0.073 (0.091)	-0.076 (0.087)	-0.093 (0.076)	-0.022 (0.068)	-0.054 (0.071)	-0.042 (0.068)	0.129 (0.080)	0.125* (0.074)	0.095 (0.075)	0.125* (0.072)
Treatment × Overestimate (b)	-0.085 (0.115)	-0.080 (0.109)	0.033 (0.112)	-0.031 (0.109)	0.207* (0.108)	-0.043 (0.099)	-0.005 (0.103)	-0.028 (0.098)	-0.173* (0.102)	-0.152 (0.098)	-0.148 (0.096)	-0.171* (0.094)
Overestimate	0.200** (0.082)	0.202** (0.079)	0.266*** (0.076)	0.260*** (0.076)	0.082 (0.076)	-0.015 (0.073)	0.196*** (0.072)	0.096 (0.071)	0.253*** (0.073)	0.253*** (0.070)	0.228*** (0.069)	0.274*** (0.067)
N	1060	1059	1057	1054	1272	1272	1272	1272	1393	1393	1393	1393
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.71	0.04	0.55	0.12	0.14	0.37	0.43	0.32	0.50	0.67	0.38	0.46
<b>Panel C: Republicans</b>												
Treatment (a)	-0.169 (0.147)	0.099 (0.120)	0.143 (0.151)	0.134 (0.121)	-0.192 (0.118)	-0.235** (0.117)	-0.308** (0.123)	-0.304** (0.119)	-0.043 (0.109)	0.063 (0.101)	0.080 (0.106)	0.082 (0.102)
Treatment × Overestimate (b)	0.459** (0.222)	0.091 (0.185)	0.250 (0.233)	0.187 (0.193)	0.372* (0.190)	0.378** (0.181)	0.492** (0.205)	0.488*** (0.188)	-0.004 (0.157)	0.068 (0.140)	0.061 (0.151)	0.073 (0.143)
Overestimate	-0.243 (0.164)	0.127 (0.130)	0.054 (0.181)	0.103 (0.151)	-0.327** (0.135)	-0.374*** (0.122)	-0.295** (0.142)	-0.381*** (0.129)	0.110 (0.107)	0.011 (0.096)	0.027 (0.100)	0.021 (0.095)
N	318	318	317	317	448	448	448	448	733	733	733	733
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.07	0.17	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.30	0.26	0.21	0.67	0.17	0.18	0.12

Note: The table shows OLS regression results for each experiment separately. Panel A shows results for all respondents, Panel B shows results for non-Republicans only, and Panel C show results for Republicans only. For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. We include the following pre-specified controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average).

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.13: Results separately for each experiment with political heterogeneity without controls

	Experiment 1 (NORC)				Experiment 2 (Research Now)				Experiment 3 (Lucid)			
	(1) Name-blind screening	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind screening	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)	(9) Name-blind screening	(10) Black preference	(11) Black assistance	(12) Problack (Index)
<b>Panel A: Main specification</b>												
Treatment (a)	0.028 (0.079)	-0.015 (0.077)	0.010 (0.082)	-0.004 (0.079)	-0.101 (0.066)	-0.047 (0.066)	-0.102 (0.065)	-0.083 (0.066)	0.059 (0.065)	0.106* (0.064)	0.081 (0.065)	0.107* (0.064)
Treatment × Overestimate (b)	0.058 (0.106)	-0.072 (0.104)	0.029 (0.106)	-0.026 (0.104)	0.224** (0.098)	0.018 (0.096)	0.088 (0.098)	0.057 (0.096)	-0.088 (0.087)	-0.064 (0.086)	-0.050 (0.086)	-0.065 (0.086)
Overestimate	0.170** (0.076)	0.304*** (0.075)	0.354*** (0.075)	0.367*** (0.075)	-0.008 (0.068)	-0.095 (0.067)	0.107 (0.068)	0.000 (0.068)	0.239*** (0.061)	0.235*** (0.061)	0.221*** (0.061)	0.259*** (0.061)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720	2126	2126	2126	2126
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
P-value: a + b = 0	0.22	0.21	0.57	0.66	0.09	0.67	0.84	0.72	0.61	0.46	0.58	0.46
<b>Panel B: Non-Republicans</b>												
Treatment (a)	0.145 (0.092)	-0.038 (0.092)	-0.037 (0.096)	-0.042 (0.094)	-0.071 (0.078)	0.009 (0.075)	-0.034 (0.074)	-0.013 (0.073)	0.136* (0.081)	0.141* (0.079)	0.102 (0.078)	0.138* (0.078)
Treatment × Overestimate (b)	-0.130 (0.119)	-0.129 (0.118)	-0.014 (0.119)	-0.085 (0.119)	0.193* (0.112)	-0.062 (0.106)	-0.017 (0.107)	-0.046 (0.105)	-0.176* (0.105)	-0.158 (0.104)	-0.148 (0.101)	-0.174* (0.101)
Overestimate	0.274*** (0.085)	0.269*** (0.085)	0.352*** (0.080)	0.346*** (0.082)	0.065 (0.078)	-0.050 (0.076)	0.186** (0.074)	0.070 (0.075)	0.294*** (0.074)	0.313*** (0.074)	0.289*** (0.072)	0.343*** (0.072)
N	1060	1059	1057	1054	1272	1272	1272	1272	1393	1393	1393	1393
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
P-value: a + b = 0	0.84	0.03	0.46	0.08	0.13	0.48	0.50	0.43	0.55	0.80	0.47	0.58
<b>Panel C: Republicans</b>												
Treatment (a)	-0.261* (0.148)	0.027 (0.124)	0.116 (0.147)	0.079 (0.123)	-0.190 (0.120)	-0.222* (0.128)	-0.301** (0.129)	-0.293** (0.130)	-0.051 (0.108)	0.073 (0.104)	0.075 (0.107)	0.084 (0.105)
Treatment × Overestimate (b)	0.673*** (0.219)	0.246 (0.189)	0.325 (0.229)	0.321 (0.198)	0.325 (0.198)	0.284 (0.193)	0.423** (0.209)	0.395** (0.198)	0.010 (0.154)	0.045 (0.145)	0.071 (0.152)	0.066 (0.147)
Overestimate	-0.354** (0.160)	0.053 (0.131)	0.021 (0.176)	0.042 (0.149)	-0.300** (0.136)	-0.371*** (0.129)	-0.258* (0.145)	-0.359*** (0.134)	0.110 (0.107)	0.046 (0.100)	0.042 (0.103)	0.050 (0.100)
N	318	318	317	317	448	448	448	448	733	733	733	733
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
P-value: a + b = 0	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.39	0.67	0.46	0.50	0.71	0.24	0.17	0.14

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results for each experiment separately. Panel A shows results for all respondents, Panel B shows results for non-Republicans only, and Panel C show results for Republicans only. For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcome are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. We include the following pre-specified controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to send out more than 15 resumes to get one callback on average).

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.14: Treatment effects on donations: heterogeneity by those who underestimate, overestimate and hold correct beliefs

	(1) Full sample	(2) Non-Republicans	(3) Republicans
Treatment	0.161* (0.085)	0.201* (0.105)	0.090 (0.138)
Treatment $\times$ Accurate	-0.127 (0.192)	-0.105 (0.240)	-0.152 (0.308)
Treatment $\times$ Overestimate	-0.141 (0.114)	-0.209 (0.135)	-0.007 (0.220)
Accurate	0.271* (0.148)	0.261 (0.186)	0.240 (0.242)
Overestimate	0.315*** (0.078)	0.310*** (0.091)	0.354** (0.146)
N	1327	1023	304
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the number of donations to the pro-black civil rights organization (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they could choose between money for themselves and \$5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in increments of \$1 from \$0 to \$5). The dependent variable has been z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. We include the following pre-specified controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average). “Accurate” takes the value one for respondents who correctly guess the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback on average).

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.15: Treatment effects on policy preferences: heterogeneity by those who underestimate, overestimate and hold correct beliefs

	(1) Name-blind	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)
Treatment	-0.058 (0.043)	0.001 (0.040)	-0.021 (0.042)	-0.011 (0.040)
Treatment × Accurate	0.178* (0.098)	0.090 (0.091)	0.029 (0.098)	0.070 (0.091)
Treatment × Overestimate	0.104* (0.056)	-0.024 (0.053)	0.035 (0.055)	0.005 (0.052)
Accurate	0.005 (0.073)	-0.168** (0.065)	0.099 (0.069)	-0.045 (0.062)
Overestimate	0.086** (0.039)	0.087** (0.037)	0.196*** (0.038)	0.156*** (0.037)
N	5224	5223	5220	5217
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results pooling observations across Experiments 1, 2 and 3. For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. We include the following pre-specified controls in all specifications: gender, age, race (indicators for blacks and whites), region (three indicators), household size, income, education (indicator for having at least a two-year college degree), employment (indicator for having full-time work), and self-reported political affiliation (indicators for Republicans and Democrats). “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average). “Accurate” takes the value one for respondents who correctly guess the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback on average).

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.16: Treatment effects on policy preferences for each experiment: Continuous prior

	Experiment 1 (NORC)				Experiment 2 (Research Now)				Experiment 3 (Lucid)			
	(1) Name-blind screening	(2) Black preference	(3) Black assistance	(4) Problack (Index)	(5) Name-blind screening	(6) Black preference	(7) Black assistance	(8) Problack (Index)	(9) Name-blind screening	(10) Black preference	(11) Black assistance	(12) Problack (Index)
<b>Panel A: Main specification</b>												
Treatment	0.048 (0.050)	-0.057 (0.047)	0.007 (0.050)	-0.030 (0.047)	-0.003 (0.047)	-0.049 (0.044)	-0.069 (0.046)	-0.066 (0.044)	0.004 (0.042)	0.056 (0.040)	0.045 (0.040)	0.058 (0.039)
Prior × Treatment	0.003 (0.050)	-0.105** (0.045)	-0.034 (0.047)	-0.080* (0.045)	0.113** (0.050)	0.051 (0.047)	0.072 (0.050)	0.069 (0.049)	-0.003 (0.045)	-0.048 (0.046)	-0.041 (0.043)	-0.050 (0.046)
Prior	0.095*** (0.036)	0.180*** (0.033)	0.179*** (0.034)	0.200*** (0.033)	0.021 (0.034)	-0.024 (0.033)	0.054 (0.034)	0.014 (0.034)	0.086*** (0.029)	0.104*** (0.034)	0.129*** (0.028)	0.132*** (0.033)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720	2126	2126	2126	2126
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Panel B: Political heterogeneity</b>												
Treatment	0.061 (0.057)	-0.108** (0.055)	-0.065 (0.055)	-0.098* (0.054)	0.013 (0.054)	-0.031 (0.050)	-0.046 (0.052)	-0.043 (0.049)	0.033 (0.050)	0.038 (0.049)	0.012 (0.047)	0.028 (0.046)
Prior × Treatment	-0.050 (0.054)	-0.101** (0.051)	-0.019 (0.050)	-0.068 (0.050)	0.107* (0.056)	0.002 (0.053)	0.020 (0.055)	0.012 (0.055)	-0.044 (0.055)	-0.045 (0.059)	-0.059 (0.054)	-0.059 (0.058)
Republican × Treatment	0.010 (0.122)	0.225** (0.108)	0.309** (0.130)	0.298*** (0.113)	-0.056 (0.109)	-0.032 (0.101)	-0.052 (0.113)	-0.047 (0.104)	-0.071 (0.093)	0.053 (0.086)	0.108 (0.089)	0.091 (0.085)
Prior × Republican × Treatment	0.263** (0.129)	0.037 (0.111)	0.013 (0.144)	0.029 (0.119)	0.007 (0.124)	0.212* (0.111)	0.228* (0.127)	0.248** (0.116)	0.093 (0.097)	0.003 (0.097)	0.065 (0.095)	0.038 (0.099)
Prior	0.151*** (0.039)	0.197*** (0.037)	0.183*** (0.036)	0.212*** (0.036)	0.050 (0.040)	0.040 (0.038)	0.108*** (0.038)	0.081** (0.039)	0.116*** (0.037)	0.100** (0.047)	0.135*** (0.039)	0.133*** (0.045)
N	1378	1377	1374	1371	1720	1720	1720	1720	2126	2126	2126	2126
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: The table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variables are indicated in each column. In columns 1–4, we present results from Experiment 1; in columns 5–8, we present results from Experiment 2. For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. *Prior* refers to prior beliefs about the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average (the question was elicited on a scale from 1 to 100, and in line with the pre-analysis plan we have top-coded responses at 50). In Panel B, only the treatment indicator and the treatment interaction terms are shown in the table.

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.17: Treatment effects on discordance

	(1) Black preference	(2) Black assistance
<b>Panel A: Main effects</b>		
Treatment	-0.009 (0.009)	0.014 (0.016)
N	1473	1473
Controls	Yes	Yes
Control group mean: Dep. var.	0.036	0.094
<b>Panel B: Heterogeneity</b>		
Treatment (a)	-0.008 (0.015)	0.007 (0.023)
Overestimate × Treatment (b)	-0.001 (0.019)	0.009 (0.032)
Overestimate	-0.006 (0.015)	0.006 (0.023)
N	1327	1327
Controls	Yes	Yes
Control group mean: Overestimate	0.547	0.547
P-value: a + b = 0	0.432	0.477

*Note:* This table uses data from Experiment 1. The outcome variable takes value one for respondents who decide not to donate anything to the pro-black civil rights organization, but state that they support programs giving preference to blacks (Column 1), and state that they support assistance programs for blacks (Column 2). *Treatment* takes the value one for respondents who received the information treatment. *Overestimate* takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. We include pre-specified controls in all regressions (the controls are listed in Table 2).

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.18: The association between beliefs and policy views: Robustness across elicitation techniques

	(1) Black preference	(2) Black assistance	(3) Name-blind screening	(4) Disc. against blacks
<b>Panel A: Anchor: Black</b>				
Beliefs about discrimination	0.208*** (0.067)	0.190*** (0.056)	0.224*** (0.041)	0.389*** (0.042)
N	347	347	347	342
<b>Panel B: Anchor: White</b>				
Beliefs about discrimination	0.017 (0.046)	0.082** (0.035)	0.001 (0.045)	0.157*** (0.046)
N	371	371	371	365
<b>Panel C: Percent difference</b>				
Beliefs about discrimination	0.126** (0.052)	0.120** (0.053)	0.040 (0.058)	0.427*** (0.043)
N	346	346	346	342

*Note:* This table uses data from Experiment 3. For the outcomes *Name-blind recruitment* (support for mandatory name-blind recruitment), *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). *Disc. against blacks* is the percent chance that there is racial hiring discrimination against blacks. These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. Panel A shows results from the prior beliefs which we anchored beliefs with the number of resumes with black-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. Beliefs about discrimination is the z-scored estimate of number of resumes with white-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. Panel B shows results from the prior beliefs for which we anchored beliefs with the number of resumes with white-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. Beliefs about discrimination is the z-scored estimate of number of resumes with black-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. Panel C shows the results for prior beliefs in which we directly measured beliefs about differences in callback rates between white-sounding names and black-sounding names.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.



Table A.19: Treatment effects by prior elicitation techniques

	Anchor: Black		Anchor: White		Percent difference	
	(1) Black preference	(2) Black assistance	(3) Black preference	(4) Black assistance	(5) Black preference	(6) Black assistance
<b>Panel A: Main effects</b>						
Treatment	0.043 (0.077)	0.161** (0.077)	-0.013 (0.080)	-0.051 (0.076)	0.162** (0.080)	0.025 (0.081)
N	700	700	708	708	726	726
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean: Dep. var.	2.67	3.33	2.66	3.38	2.60	3.36
<b>Panel B: Heterogeneity</b>						
Treatment (a)	0.125 (0.098)	0.211** (0.101)	0.105 (0.154)	-0.076 (0.145)	0.134 (0.102)	0.016 (0.105)
Overestimate $\times$ Treatment (b)	-0.212 (0.158)	-0.131 (0.155)	-0.163 (0.179)	0.035 (0.171)	0.064 (0.162)	0.021 (0.163)
Overestimate	0.357*** (0.113)	0.436*** (0.110)	0.313*** (0.114)	0.195* (0.109)	0.101 (0.121)	0.096 (0.121)
N	700	700	708	708	726	726
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control group mean: Overestimate	0.422	0.422	0.728	0.728	0.411	0.411
P-value: $a + b = 0$	0.482	0.493	0.528	0.645	0.117	0.769

*Note:* This table uses data from Experiment 3. For the outcomes *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job), and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Treatment* takes the value one for respondents who received the information treatment. *Overestimate* takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. We include pre-specified controls in all regressions (the controls are listed in Table 2). Columns 1 and 2 show results from the elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes with black-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. Columns 3 and 4 show results from the elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes with white-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. Columns 5 and 6 show results for the elicitation where we directly measured beliefs about differences in callback rates between white-sounding names and black-sounding names.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.20: Belief updating: Heterogeneity by confidence in prior beliefs

	Labor market	
	(1)	(2)
<b>Panel A: Main specification</b>		
Treatment	2.25** (1.02)	2.10** (1.02)
Prior × Treatment	-13.27*** (1.62)	-13.09*** (1.62)
Prior	14.64*** (1.33)	14.09*** (1.34)
N	1701	1701
Controls	No	Yes
<b>Panel B: Heterogeneity by confidence</b>		
Treatment	11.20*** (4.17)	11.94*** (4.12)
Prior × Treatment	-22.85*** (6.23)	-23.35*** (6.13)
Confidence × Treatment	-2.63** (1.22)	-2.89** (1.20)
Prior × Confidence × Treatment	2.81 (1.86)	3.01* (1.82)
Prior	19.61*** (5.03)	19.02*** (5.01)
Prior × Confidence	-1.47 (1.50)	-1.45 (1.49)
Confidence	1.22 (0.94)	1.35 (0.94)
Confidence		
N	1701	1701
Controls	No	Yes

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is post-treatment beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out to get one callback on average (wave 2 of Experiment 2 with Research Now). In column 2, we include pre-specified controls (including gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, and political views). “Over-estimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market (i.e., who thought pre-treatment that resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out more than 15 times to get one callback on average). “Confidence” refers to confidence in pre-treatment beliefs (measured instantly after the belief elicitation), which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Very unsure) to 5 (Very sure).

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

### A.3 Mechanisms

Table A.21: Experiment 1: Treatment effects: Views on whether discrimination is a “serious problem”

	Experiment 1 (NORC)		Experiment 2 (RN)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Panel A: Main specification</b>				
Treatment (a)	0.178** (0.083)	0.157** (0.072)	0.127** (0.062)	0.108* (0.056)
Overestimate × Treatment (b)	-0.046 (0.105)	-0.019 (0.092)	-0.017 (0.086)	-0.001 (0.078)
Overestimate	0.429*** (0.076)	0.302*** (0.067)	0.326*** (0.060)	0.325*** (0.055)
N	1379	1379	2073	2073
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.040	0.016	0.061	0.049
<b>Panel B: Political heterogeneity</b>				
Treatment (a)	0.170* (0.099)	0.141 (0.090)	0.197*** (0.070)	0.189*** (0.066)
Overestimate × Treatment (b)	-0.092 (0.119)	-0.042 (0.109)	-0.082 (0.095)	-0.083 (0.090)
Republican × Treatment (c)	0.010 (0.156)	0.051 (0.147)	-0.257* (0.135)	-0.280** (0.127)
Republican × Overestimate × Treatment (d)	0.283 (0.221)	0.166 (0.212)	0.207 (0.189)	0.283 (0.178)
N	1379	1379	2073	2073
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.242	0.113	0.070	0.090
P-value: a + c = 0	0.137	0.098	0.602	0.403
P-value: b + d = 0	0.303	0.496	0.444	0.191
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.009	0.024	0.575	0.310

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variable is agreement to the statement that “racial disagreement against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem.” Columns 1 and 2 show responses from Experiment 1 (NORC), whereas columns 3 and 4 show responses from the first wave of Experiment 2 (Research Now). In both experiments, answers were given on a scale from 1 (Not a problem at all to) to 5 (A very serious problem). The outcome has been z-scored by the mean and standard deviation of the control group. “Overestimate” takes the value one for respondents who overestimate the extent of racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market. Even-numbered columns include pre-specified controls (as listed in Table 2). Only the treatment indicator and the treatment interaction terms are shown in the table.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.22: Experiment 2: Treatment effects – mechanism questions

	(1) Affirmative action hurts	(2) Inequality due to effort	(3) Inequality due to disc.	(4) Disc. ser. problem
<b>Panel A: Main specification</b>				
Treatment (a)	0.054 (0.066)	0.015 (0.061)	0.048 (0.062)	-0.022 (0.063)
Overestimate × Treatment (b)	-0.083 (0.095)	-0.121 (0.087)	-0.081 (0.090)	0.189** (0.089)
Overestimate	0.022 (0.067)	-0.080 (0.062)	0.465*** (0.064)	0.105* (0.063)
N	1720	1719	1715	1715
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.669	0.087	0.607	0.008
<b>Panel B: Political heterogeneity</b>				
Treatment (a)	-0.076 (0.074)	-0.046 (0.071)	0.089 (0.076)	0.017 (0.076)
Overestimate × Treatment (b)	0.080 (0.104)	0.003 (0.100)	-0.099 (0.104)	0.081 (0.105)
Republican × Treatment (c)	0.441*** (0.155)	0.205 (0.139)	-0.137 (0.132)	-0.131 (0.134)
Republican × Overestimate × Treatment (d)	-0.592** (0.240)	-0.488** (0.204)	0.032 (0.211)	0.440** (0.194)
N	1720	1719	1715	1715
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.953	0.543	0.891	0.182
P-value: a + c = 0	0.007	0.184	0.664	0.302
P-value: b + d = 0	0.018	0.006	0.716	0.001
P-value: a + b + c + d = 0	0.383	0.013	0.442	0.001

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results where the dependent variables are indicated in each column. Responses were elicited in the second wave of Experiment 2 (the obfuscated follow-up study). *Affirmative action hurts* refers to the question of whether “affirmative action programs for the past fifty years have helped blacks” which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Strongly helped) to 7 (Strongly hurt). *Inequality due to effort* refers to the question of whether “differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks” which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). *Inequality due to disc.* refers to the question of whether “differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks” which was elicited on scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree). *Disc. ser. problem* refers to the question of whether “racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem” which was elicited on a scale from 1 (Not a problem at all) to 5 (A very serious problem). All responses are z-scored using the mean and the standard deviation of the control group. Controls include gender, age, race, region, income, education, employment, political views, and confidence in prior beliefs. Only the treatment indicator and the treatment interaction terms are shown in the table.

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table A.23: Correlates of willingness to pay for research evidence

	Willingness to pay	
	Raw	z-score
Republican	-0.482** (0.221)	-0.172** (0.079)
Age	0.012* (0.007)	0.004* (0.002)
Log(Income)	0.020 (0.126)	0.007 (0.045)
Black	-0.420 (0.413)	-0.150 (0.147)
White	-0.490** (0.209)	-0.175** (0.075)
College	0.309 (0.256)	0.110 (0.091)
Male	-0.459** (0.192)	-0.164** (0.069)
Prior	0.009 (0.007)	0.003 (0.002)
Confidence in prior	0.023 (0.100)	0.008 (0.036)
Mean	3.318	-0.001
Observations	861	861

*Notes:* This table shows OLS regressions using control group respondents from Experiment 2 (Research Now). We offered control group respondents the option to buy information about the results from the correspondence study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). Willingness to pay to receive the information was elicited using a multiple price list where respondents could choose between receiving the information or varying amounts for themselves (between 10 cents and \$1). “Willingness to pay” is the number of times individuals prefer to receive information over receiving money (on a scale from 0 to 7). Column 1 shows the raw score, whereas column 2 shows the z-score (standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the responses). “Prior” is beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding names that had to be sent out to get one callback on average. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

## A.4 Additional pre-specified tables

Table A.24: Pre-specified regressions: Experiment 1 (NORC)

	Racial discrimination is a serious problem	Preference for blacks	Assistance for blacks	Pro-black policy index	Name-blind screening	Racial discrimination: housing market	Donation NGO
<b>Panel A: Main Effect</b>							
Treatment	0.147*** (0.045)	-0.049 (0.047)	0.019 (0.050)	-0.015 (0.042)	0.054 (0.050)	-0.065 (0.047)	0.082 (0.053)
Observations	1379	1377	1374	1371	1378	1366	1327
<b>Panel B: Republican</b>							
Treatment × (A) Republican	0.126 (0.103)	0.238** (0.106)	0.289** (0.124)	0.265*** (0.097)	-0.051 (0.123)	0.285** (0.115)	-0.016 (0.118)
Treatment (B)	0.118** (0.052)	-0.104* (0.055)	-0.048 (0.055)	-0.077 (0.048)	0.066 (0.057)	-0.131** (0.053)	0.086 (0.062)
Pr(A+B)=0 Observations	0.006 1379	0.143 1377	0.031 1374	0.026 1371	0.894 1378	0.133 1366	0.489 1327

*Notes:* For the outcome **Racial discrimination is a serious problem**, answers were given on a scale from 1: “Not a problem” at all to 5: “A very serious problem”. For the outcomes **Support preference for blacks**, **Support assistance for blacks**, and **Support name-blind recruitment**, answers were given on a scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly support”. Policy preference index is an unweighted mean of people’s (z-scored) support for giving blacks (i) preference in the hiring process and (ii) assistance programs. For **Racial discrimination — housing market**, answers were given on a scale from 0 to 100 (higher values imply more discrimination). For **Donation NGO**, we count the number of times the respondent preferred money for the NGO over money for self (scale 0–6). The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. “Treatment” takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. “Republican” takes value 1 if our respondent identifies as a Republican. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.


Table A.25: Pre-specified regressions: Experiment 2 (Research Now)

	Racial discr: serious problem		Preference	Assistance	Pro-black	Name-blind	Posterior:	Racial Inequality due to		Affirmative
	main	follow-up	for blacks	for blacks	policy index	screening	Belief	Effort	Discrimination	action hurts
<b>Panel A: Main Effect</b>										
Treatment	0.110*** (0.039)	0.068 (0.044)	-0.050 (0.043) [0.284]	-0.073 (0.046) [0.284]	-0.061 (0.039)	-0.004 (0.047)	-3.982*** (0.815)	-0.036 (0.043)	0.007 (0.045)	0.025 (0.048)
Observations	2073	1716	1721	1721	1721	1721	1702	1720	1716	1721
<b>Panel B: Republican</b>										
Treatment × (A) Republican	-0.153* (0.091)	0.038 (0.098)	-0.064 (0.102)	-0.087 (0.112)	-0.075 (0.093)	-0.071 (0.108)	2.642 (1.798)	0.014 (0.102)	-0.119 (0.103)	0.191 (0.119)
Treatment (B)	0.149*** (0.044)	0.059 (0.052)	-0.033 (0.049)	-0.051 (0.052)	-0.042 (0.043)	0.014 (0.054)	-4.672*** (0.951)	-0.039 (0.049)	0.037 (0.052)	-0.025 (0.052)
Pr(A+B)=0	0.959	0.247	0.278	0.164	0.152	0.546	0.188	0.773	0.362	0.120
Observations	2073	1715	1720	1720	1720	1720	1701	1719	1715	1720

Notes: For the outcome **Racial discrimination serious problem**, answers were given from a scale from 1: “Not a problem” at all to 5: “A very serious problem”. For the outcomes **Support preference for blacks**, **Support assistance for blacks**, and **Support name-blind recruitment**, answers were given on a scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly support”. Policy preference index is an unweighted mean of people’s (z-scored) support for giving blacks (i) preference in the hiring process and (ii) assistance programs for blacks. “Racial inequality due to effort” is people’s agreement to the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks.” “Posterior belief” is people’s estimate of the number of times a resume with black-sounding name had to be sent to get one callback. “Racial inequality due to discrimination” is people’s agreement to the following statement: To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks.” Responses to these questions are on a 7-point scale where (1) means “strongly disagree” and (7) means “strongly agree”. “Affirmative action hurts” is people’s response to the question: “Overall, do you think affirmative action programs for the past fifty years have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other?” People answer this question on a 7-point scale ranging from (1) strongly helped to (7) strongly hurt. The outcome variables are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. “Treatment” takes value 1 if the respondent received information about the results from the correspondence study. “Republican” takes value 1 if our respondent identifies as a Republican. \* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

## B Appendix figures


Figure A.1: Descriptives across elicitation techniques



Notes: This figure shows data from Experiment 3. “Anchor black” shows results from the elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes with black-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. “Anchor white” shows results from the elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes with white-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. “Percent difference” shows results for the elicitation where we directly measured beliefs about differences in callback rates between white-sounding names and black-sounding names. The black bar indicates the fraction of respondents who thought that whites received less callbacks than blacks. The grey bar indicates the fraction of respondents who thought that blacks received equally many callbacks as whites. The blue bar indicates the fraction of respondents who thought that whites received more callbacks than blacks. The green bar indicates the fraction of respondents who thought that blacks got less callbacks compared to the findings in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004).




Figure A.2: Beliefs about racial discrimination in the labor and housing market




Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (the NORC sample). **Panel A** shows data on beliefs about how many times resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview. Respondents were informed that the corresponding number for resumes with white-sounding names was ten (as found in the study by Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). **Panel B**, using only control group respondents, shows data on beliefs about the rejection rate on reservation requests sent from accounts with black-sounding names. Respondents were initially asked about the percent rate of acceptances of reservation requests for black-sounding names on Airbnb (true rate is 41 percent, as found in the study by Edelman et al., 2017). They were told that the corresponding number for white-sounding names was 49. We have recoded the values to implied rejection rates by subtracting each estimate from 100. In both panels, the **short-dashed** lines indicate the true level for whites and the **long-dashed** lines indicate the true level for blacks.

Figure A.3: Republican–Democrat differences in donations behavior




Notes: The figure, which uses data from control group respondents in Experiment 1 (NORC), shows distributions of the number of donations to the pro-black civil rights organization for self-identified Democrats and Republicans separately (the respondents were given a multiple price list where they could choose between money for themselves and \$5 to the pro-black civil rights organization in increments of \$1 from \$0 to \$5). The figure only includes respondents who completed all choices in the multiple price list.

Figure A.4: Belief updating in response to the research evidence




Notes: In **Panel A**, which uses data from Experiment 1 (NORC), answers are given on a scale from 0 to 100 and indicate beliefs about the acceptance rate of black candidates for Airbnb requests (higher values imply less discrimination). In **Panel B**, which uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now), answers are given on a scale from 1 to 100 and indicate people’s beliefs about the number of resumes with black-sounding resumes that had to be sent to get one callback (higher values imply more discrimination). The errors bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

Figure A.5: Belief updating in response to the research evidence



Notes: **Panel A**, which uses data from Experiment 1 (NORC), shows a scatterplot with between prior beliefs about racial discrimination in hiring and posterior beliefs about racial discrimination in housing separately for the treatment and the control group. **Panel B**, which uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now), shows a scatterplot with between prior beliefs about racial discrimination in hiring and posterior beliefs about racial discrimination in hiring one week later separately for the treatment and the control group. Lines indicate fitted values with 95 percent confidence intervals.


Figure A.6: Correlates of discordance



N=723.


Notes: This table uses data from Experiment 1. The outcome variable takes value one for respondents who decide not to donate anything to the pro-black civil rights organization, but state that they support programs giving preference to blacks (**Panel A**), or state that they support assistance programs for blacks (**Panel B**). The dots indicate the mean values of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure A.7: Correlates of beliefs about racial discrimination across elicitation techniques




Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 3. **Panel A** shows correlates of beliefs about callback rates in the correspondence study for the three different elicitation techniques. “Anchor black” shows results from the elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes with black-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. “Anchor white” shows results from the elicitation where beliefs were anchored with the number of resumes with white-sounding names that needed to be sent out for one callback. “Percent difference” shows results for the elicitation where we directly measured beliefs about differences in callback rates between white-sounding names and black-sounding names. **Panel B** shows correlates of more general beliefs about the percent chance that there is hiring discrimination against blacks. The dots indicate the mean values of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure A.8: Correlates of beliefs about correspondence studies



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 1 (NORC; Panel A) and Experiment 3 (Lucid; Panel B). The outcome variable in **Panel A** is people’s agreement with the interpretation that the findings from the correspondence study are clear evidence of discrimination against blacks in the labor market. The outcome variable in **Panel B** is people’s agreement with the following statement: “Sending out fictitious resumes to assess whether white-sounding names or black-sounding names receive more callbacks for interviews is a reliable method to detect racial discrimination in hiring.” For both questions, people respond on a 5-point scale (Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree), and the outcomes are z-scored. The dots indicate the mean values of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.


Figure A.9: Correlates of attitudes towards pro-black policies



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 2 (Research Now). The dots indicate the mean values of the estimated multiple regression coefficients. The dependent variable in **Panel A** is support for giving black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. The dependent variable in **Panel B** is support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job. Both outcomes are z-scored. “Inequality: discrimination” and “Inequality: effort” are agreements to the statements that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are primarily the result of, respectively, “discrimination against blacks” and “whites working harder than blacks.” Lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.



Figure A.10: Results from Experiment 4



Notes: This figure uses data from Experiment 4. In **Beliefs about source**, respondents were asked “What do you think is the main reason that employers are more likely to call back applicants with white-sounding names?”. The possible answers were as follows: “They don’t want to hire black candidates because they don’t like to interact with blacks” (Taste-based) “They think the resume credentials are more informative about the skills of white job applicants than about the skills of black job applicants” (Statistical: Variance) “They correctly think that blacks on average tend to be less productive than whites” (Statistical: Accurate) “They incorrectly think that blacks on average tend to be less productive than whites” (Statistical: Inaccurate) “They subconsciously rely on negative stereotypes about blacks” (Implicit) “I don’t think it’s generally true that employers are more likely to call back applicants with white-sounding names” (No discrimination). For **Lower callback rates hurts blacks**, respondents were asked: “Do you think the lower callback rate for black-sounding names hurts blacks in the labor market?” For **Good method to detect discrimination**, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement: “Sending out fictitious resumes to assess whether white-sounding names or black-sounding names receive more callbacks for interviews is a reliable method to detect racial discrimination in hiring.” For **Black preference in hiring**, respondents were asked: “Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?”

## C Screenshots

Figure A.11: Invitation emails sent out for the experiments with Research Now




Figure A.12: Consent form in waves 1 and 2 of Experiment 2 (Research Now)

This study has received ethics clearance by the Oxford University Institutional Review Board.

If subjects have questions about this study or their rights, or if they wish to lodge a complaint or concern, they may contact us at the following email: christopher.roth@economics.ox.ac.uk

Next >>

0% 100%

**Consent form**

- I have read the information provided on the previous page.
- I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.
- I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time.
- I understand how to raise a concern or make a complaint.
- I understand that I can only participate in this experiment once.
- I understand that close attention to the survey is required for my responses to count.

If you are 18 years of age or older, agree with the statements above, and freely consent to participate in the study, please click on the "I Agree" button to begin the experiment.

I agree I disagree

Next >>

0% 100%

This survey is conducted by a researcher from NHH Norwegian School of Economics.

In this survey, you will be asked questions on a broad range of different topics. Please pay close attention to all questions.

By continuing this survey, you acknowledge your consent to participate and that you are at least 18 years of age.

>>

## **D Information about stereotypes and party views**

This section discusses Experiments 5 and 6 that were discussed in Section 4.6 in the main text.

### **D.1 Beliefs about differences in work ethic**

A centuries-old negative stereotype of blacks is the belief that they are “lazy, shiftless, and unambitious” (Gilens, 2009). One reason for why Democrats and Republicans differ in their views on pro-black policies could be that they differ in the extent to which they hold this negative stereotype.<sup>1</sup>

In Experiment 2, we asked respondents several questions to shed light on mechanisms, including two questions on whether differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks were primarily the result of “racial discrimination against blacks” or primarily the result of “whites working harder than blacks.” Using data from control group respondents, we show that believing that racial inequality is due to “whites working harder than blacks” is, by a large margin, the strongest predictor of attitudes towards pro-black policies (as displayed in Figure A.9). Agreeing to the statement that racial inequalities are due to “whites working harder than blacks” is associated with a 0.87 of a standard deviation lower support for black preference in hiring, conditional on controls for demographics and party affiliations ( $p < 0.01$ ). To shed light on whether negative stereotyping of blacks causally affects attitudes towards affirmative action policies, we ran an additional experiment in which we challenge this stereotype with an information intervention.

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<sup>1</sup>For a formal model of stereotypes, see Bordalo et al. (2016).

**Experimental design and sample** We recruited approximately 3000 American respondents from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online platform commonly used in economic experiments (Cavallo et al., 2016; Horton et al., 2011; Kuziemko et al., 2015). We ran the experiment in October 2018 and submitted a pre-analysis plan to the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiments before we started the data collection.

In the experiment, we first elicited people’s beliefs about which factors they think blacks and whites rate as least important for them in a job. We then randomized respondents into a treatment and control group. Respondents in the treatment group received information that blacks and whites both rate short working hours as the least important characteristic in a job. Respondents in the control group did not receive any information. Subsequently, we measured people’s support for pro-black policies using the same self-reported questions as in the main study.

**Results** In line with negative stereotyping of blacks (Gilens, 2009), the respondents think that whites are 20 percent more likely than blacks to place least weight on short working hours in a job (Table A.26). Furthermore, only 25 percent have correct beliefs that blacks actually placed the lowest weight on short working hours. But while having incorrect beliefs predicts greater opposition to pro-black policies, the information treatment does not affect support for pro-black policies. The information treatment also does not shift beliefs about whether differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are “primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks,” suggesting that the treatment is ineffective in challenging the stereotype of “lazy blacks.” Given our large sample size, we take this as suggestive evidence that beliefs governing racial stereotypes are much less responsive to new information than beliefs about racial discrimination. Furthermore, this result emphasizes that views on pro-black policies are generally very unresponsive to new information.

Table A.26: Experiment 5: Treatment effects of information about racial stereotypes

	(1) Black preference	(2) Black assistance	(3) Problack (Index)	(4) Inequality: effort
<b>Panel A: Main specification</b>				
Treatment	-0.001 (0.032)	0.012 (0.033)	0.006 (0.028)	0.040 (0.032)
<b>Panel B: Heterogeneity</b>				
Treatment (a)	0.02 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)
Prior × Treatment (b)	-0.09 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)
Prior	0.18*** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
N	2999	2999	2999	2999
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
P-value: a + b = 0	0.29	0.61	0.37	0.43

*Note:* The table shows OLS regression results from Experiment 5 (MTurk). The dependent variables are indicated in each column. For the outcomes *Black preference* (support for giving qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job) and *Black assistance* (support for giving qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job), answers were given on a scale from 1: “Strongly oppose” to 5: “Strongly support.” These outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. *Problack (index)* is the mean of *Black preference* and *Black assistance*; this index was pre-specified. For the outcome “Inequality: effort” (agreement to the statement that differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are due to whites working harder than blacks), answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) and then z-scored. *Prior* is indicator taking the value one for respondents who thought that blacks were most likely to rank “Working hours are short, lots of free time” as the least important characteristic in a job. Controls were pre-specified and include the prior, two racial indicators (black and white), a gender indicator, a college indicator, age, log income, and two indicators for political status (Democrats and Republicans).

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

## **D.2 Information about party views on on affirmative action**

During the last four decades, political polarization in beliefs about whether differences in economic outcomes between blacks and whites are “mainly due to discrimination” has strongly increased (Smith et al., 2014). This shift in beliefs is part of a broader trend in which American politics has become more polarized along partisan lines than at any point in recent history.<sup>2</sup> This experiment sheds light on the role of political identity (Bursztyn et al., 2019) and the importance of party cues (Brader and Tucker, 2012) in shaping policy views by providing information about how the Republican and Democratic parties differ in their support for affirmative action policies.

**Experimental sample and design** We recruited 4000 respondents in collaboration with Research Now, the same market research company as used in Experiment 2. The sample was constructed to be representative of the US population in terms of age, sex, and region. We ran the experiment in July 2018, and we submitted a pre-analysis plan to the same AEA RCT Registry trial as the main experiments before we started the data collection.<sup>3</sup>

We randomly assigned respondents into a control group and a treatment group. For respondents in the treatment group, we added the following introductory sentence to the question on whether they support affirmative action in hiring: “In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on race.” In the main specification, we focused on the 2,737 respondents who self-identify as either Democrats or Republicans. We hypothesized in the pre-analysis plan that this treatment would polarize attitudes by making Democrats more supportive of pro-black policies while making Republicans less supportive.

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<sup>2</sup><http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public>, accessed November 30, 2018.

<sup>3</sup>Instructions are provided in Section E.4 of the Online Appendix.

**Results** The treatment has essentially no impact on attitudes for either Democrats or Republicans (Table A.27). Given our large sample size and the importance of political identity and party cues documented in previous research (Brader and Tucker, 2012; Cappelen et al., 2017), this finding again underscores the point that views on pro-black policies are hard to move with information.

Table A.27: Experiment 6: Treatment effects of information about party views

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Republicans	-0.61*** (0.05)	-0.61*** (0.05)	-0.20*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.05)
Treatment × Republicans	-0.06 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)
Democrats			0.41*** (0.05)	0.44*** (0.05)
Treatment × Democrats			0.08 (0.07)	0.06 (0.07)
N	2737	2737	4000	4000
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

*Note:* The table shows OLS regressions from Experiment 6 (Research Now). The dependent variable is support for “government and private programs that give qualified black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job.” Answers were given on a scale from 1 (Strongly oppose) to 5 (Strongly support). We have z-scored the responses by the mean and standard deviation in the control group. In the treatment group, we informed respondents about party views on affirmative action as follows: “In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on race.” In even-numbered columns, we include the following pre-specified controls: gender, age, and education. In line with the pre-analysis, we exclude Independents from the regression in columns 1–2 as the treatment was tailored to affect attitudes for Republicans and Democrats. In columns 3–4, we add interaction terms between the treatment and Democrats and add Independents to the regressions. The sample was recruited from Research Now and is representative of the US population on the following observable characteristics: age, sex, and region.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses.

## E Instructions

### E.1 Experiment 1 (NORC)

#### E.1.1 Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”. The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with white-sounding names had to be sent out on average 10 times to get one callback for an interview.

What do you think?

How many times do you think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out  times to get one callback for an interview.

If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a bonus of \$2 (2,000 AmeriPoints) in addition to your current incentive of 2,000 AmeriPoints.



### **E.1.2 Treatment screen**

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.

### **E.1.3 Self-reported outcomes**

In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem? [A very serious problem/A problem/A problem/A small problem/Not a problem at all]

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

*Name-blind recruitment* has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes. Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

#### E.1.4 Behavioral measure: Donation

In Washington, D.C., several civil rights organizations work to protect individuals from discrimination in society. One of these organizations, the *Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights*, tries to help African Americans. One of the organization's key initiatives aims to reduce racial discrimination in the workplace by lobbying for political reforms.

Below, you are given the opportunity to financially support the *Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights*.

##### Your decision

For each of the 6 choices below, you decide whether the *Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights* should get money or whether *you* should get money (\$1 equals 1000 AmeriPoints).

We will randomly implement your decision for *one* of these choices, which involve real money, so please consider each choice carefully. Each decision has the same chance of being implemented.

- |                          |                       |                       |            |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| \$5 for the organization | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | \$0 for me |
| \$5 for the organization | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | \$1 for me |
| \$5 for the organization | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | \$2 for me |
| \$5 for the organization | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | \$3 for me |
| \$5 for the organization | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | \$4 for me |
| \$5 for the organization | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | \$5 for me |

Note: NORC is a non-partisan research organization and has no association with the *Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights*. NORC and the AmeriSpeak Panel do not endorse political or charitable causes.

### **E.1.5 Belief extrapolation: Discrimination in the housing market**

Researchers from Harvard Business School conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the rental market by sending out reservation requests from invented accounts to hosts on Airbnb, a website for private rental accommodations.

The requests were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the person who sent the request. Half of the requests came from typically white-sounding names, while the other half came from typically black-sounding names. The idea was that the hosts would use the applicants' name to infer whether the reservation requests came from white or black requesters.

The researchers found that reservation requests from white-sounding names were accepted 49 percent of the time.

What do you think?

How many percent of the time do you think reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted?

I think reservation requests from black-sounding names were accepted  percent of the time.

If your answer is within 2 percentage points of what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a bonus of \$2 (2,000 AmeriPoints) in addition to your current incentive of 2,000 AmeriPoints.

### **E.1.6 Beliefs about strength of the evidence: Treatment group only**

The researchers behind the study on labor market discrimination described earlier in this survey interpreted their findings as clear evidence of discrimination against blacks in the labor market.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with this interpretation of their findings?  
[Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]

## **E.2 Instructions: Experiment 2 – first wave (Research Now)**

### **E.2.1 Consent Form**

**This study has received ethics clearance by the Oxford University Institutional Review Board.**

**If subjects have questions about this study or their rights, or if they wish to lodge a complaint or concern, they may contact us at the following email:**

**christopher.roth@economics.ox.ac.uk.**

*{page break}*

#### **Consent form**

I have read the information provided on the previous page.

I understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time.

I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study.

I understand how to raise a concern or make a complaint.

I understand that I can only participate in this experiment once.

**I understand that close attention to the survey is required for my responses to count.**

If you are 18 years of age or older, agree with the statements above, and freely consent to participate in the study, please click on the “I agree” button to begin the experiment.

I agree

I disagree

### **E.2.2 Elicitation of beliefs about racial discrimination**

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”.

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with **white-sounding** names had to be sent out on average **10 times** to get one callback for an interview.

#### **What do you think?**

How many times do you think resumes with **black-sounding** names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out  times to get one callback for an interview.

If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a **bonus of \$2** in panel currency.

### **E.2.3 Confidence in priors**

How sure are you about your answer to the previous question?

Very sure

Sure

Somewhat sure

Unsure

Very unsure

### **E.2.4 Treatment screen**

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out **15 times** to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were **50 percent** more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names than applicants with black-sounding names.

### **E.2.5 Perceptions of discrimination**

In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem? [A very serious problem/A problem/A small problem/Not a problem at all]

### **E.3 Instructions: Experiment 2 – second wave (Research Now)**

#### **E.3.1 Introduction**

This survey is conducted by a researcher from NHH Norwegian School of Economics.

In this survey, you will be asked questions on a broad range of different topics. Please pay close attention to all questions.

By continuing this survey, you acknowledge your consent to participate and that you are at least 18 years of age.

#### **E.3.2 Obfuscation: Views on investments**

Which of the following do you think is the best long-term investment: bonds, real estate, saving accounts, stock or mutual funds, or gold? [Bonds, Real estate, Saving accounts, Stock or mutual funds, Gold]

*{page break}*

Do you, personally, or jointly with a spouse, have any money invested in the stock market right now – either in an individual stock, a stock mutual fund, or in a self-directed 401-K or IRA? [Yes, No, Do not know]

#### **E.3.3 Obfuscation: Views on religion**

How important would you say religion is in your own life – very important, fairly important, or not very important? [Very important, Fairly important, Not very important]

*{page break}*

At the present time, do you think religion as a whole is increasing its influence on American life or losing its influence? [Increasing/Decreasing/No opinion]

#### **E.3.4 Self-reported outcomes**

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

*{page break}*

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

*{page break}*

*Name-blind recruitment* has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes. Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

#### **E.3.5 Mechanisms**

Overall, do you think affirmative action programs for the past fifty years have helped blacks, hurt them, or had no effect one way or the other? [Strongly helped/Helped/Somewhat helped/Neither helped nor hurt/Somewhat hurt/Hurt/Strongly hurt]

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of racial discrimination against blacks.” [Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks.” [Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat



disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]

*{page break}*

In the United States today, do you think that racial discrimination against blacks in the labor market is a serious problem? [A very serious problem/A problem/A problem/A small problem/Not a problem at all]

### **E.3.6 Elicitation of posterior about labor market discrimination**

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”.

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with **white-sounding** names had to be sent out on average **10 times** to get one callback for an interview.

#### **What do you think?**

How many times do you think resumes with **black-sounding** names on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

I think resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out  times to get one callback for an interview.

If your answer is the same as what the researchers found, you will be rewarded a **bonus**

of \$2 in panel currency.

### E.3.7 Confidence in posteriors

How sure are you about your answer to the previous question? [Very sure/Sure/Somewhat sure/Unsure/Very unsure]

### E.3.8 Willingness to pay for the information (control group only)

We just explained to you the details of a study which tested for racial discrimination in the labor market.

For each of the seven choices below, you decide whether you would like to receive more information about the results from the study or whether you would like to receive money.

If you decide to receive the information about the results of the study, we will provide you with a short summary of the results, including information on the number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out in order to get one callback. If you decide to receive the information about the results of the study, we will also provide you with a link to the research study which further describes the methodology, implementation of the experiment, and discusses the research results.

We will randomly implement your decision for *one* of these choices after the study has ended, so please consider each choice carefully. Each decision has the same chance of being implemented.

Information

Information

Information

Information

Information

Information

Information

\$0.10 for me

\$0.20 for me

\$0.50 for me

\$0.30 for me

\$0.75 for me

\$0.40 for me

\$1 for me

### **E.3.9 Information provision (depending on people's choices)**

The researchers found that resumes with black-sounding names on average had to be sent out 15 times to get one callback for an interview.

Since resumes with white-sounding names on average only had to be sent out 10 times to get one callback for an interview, this means that employers were 50 percent more likely to give callbacks to applicants with white-sounding names compared to applicants with black-sounding names.

[http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ321/orazem/bertrand\\_emily.pdf](http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ321/orazem/bertrand_emily.pdf)

## E.4 Experiment 3 (Lucid)

### E.4.1 Elicitation: Anchor black

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out over 4800 fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”.

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with **black-sounding** names had to be sent out on average 15 times to get one callback for an interview.

#### What do you think?

How many times do you think resumes with **white-sounding names** on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

I think that a resume with a white-sounding name on average had to be sent out  times to get a callback for an interview.

### E.4.2 Elicitation: Anchor white

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out over 4800 fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”.

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white or black.

Resumes with **white-sounding** names had to be sent out on average **10 times** to get one callback for an interview.

### **What do you think?**

How many times do you think resumes with **black-sounding names** on average had to be sent out to get one callback for an interview?

I think that a resume with a black-sounding name on average had to be sent out  times to get a callback for an interview.

### **E.4.3 Elicitation: Percentage difference**

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out over 4800 fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers.

The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”.

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white

or black.

**What do you think that the study found?**

I think that white-sounding names received more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names.

I think that black-sounding names received more callbacks for interviews than white-sounding names.

**E.4.4 Percentage differences: Screen for respondents who thought white-sounding names were more likely to get a callback**

You said that you think that white-sounding names received more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names. How many percent more callbacks for interviews do you think white-sounding names received?

I think white-sounding names received  percent more callbacks.

**E.4.5 Percentage differences: Screen for respondents who thought black-sounding names were more likely to get a callback**

You said that you think that white-sounding names received more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names. How many percent more callbacks for interviews do you think white-sounding names received?

I think black-sounding names received  percent more callbacks.

**E.4.6 Information treatment**

For your information, the study found that **white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks** for interviews than black-sounding names.

#### **E.4.7 Views on pro-black policies**

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

Name-blind recruitment has been suggested as a way to reduce racial discrimination in the labor market by hiding the names of the job applicants from their resumes.

Do you support or oppose mandatory name-blind recruitment for hiring in public and private jobs? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

#### **E.4.8 Beliefs about correspondence studies**

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Sending out fictitious resumes to assess whether white-sounding names or black-sounding names receive more callbacks for interviews is a reliable method to detect racial discrimination in hiring." [Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]

#### **E.4.9 Post-treatment beliefs about discrimination**

What would you say is the likelihood that...

(Please note: The numbers need to add up to 100%)

there is discrimination against blacks in hiring. %

there is discrimination against whites in hiring. %

there is no racial discrimination in hiring. %

## **E.5 Instructions: Experiment 4: Interpretation of correspondence studies**

### **E.5.1 Beliefs about sources of discrimination**

Researchers from Harvard University and the University of Chicago conducted an experiment to study racial discrimination in the labor market. They did so by sending out over 4800 fictitious resumes to help-wanted ads in Boston and Chicago newspapers. The resumes were exactly the same except for one thing: the name of the job applicant. Half of the resumes had typically white-sounding names like “Carrie” and “Todd”. The other half of the resumes had typically black-sounding names like “Tanisha” and “Kareem”.

The idea was to make sure that the applicants were seen as having identical qualifications, but that the employers would use the applicants’ names to infer whether they were white or black.

The researchers found that white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks for interviews than black-sounding names.

What do you think is the main reason that employers are more likely to call back applicants with white-sounding names?

They don’t want to hire black candidates because they don’t like to interact with blacks

They think the resume credentials are more informative about the skills of white job applicants than about the skills of black job applicants



They correctly think that blacks on average tend to be less productive than whites

They incorrectly think that blacks on average tend to be less productive than whites

They subconsciously rely on negative stereotypes about blacks

I don't think it's generally true that employers are more likely to call back applicants with white-sounding names

### **E.5.2 Beliefs about whether correspondence studies is a good method**

To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "Sending out fictitious resumes to assess whether white-sounding names or black-sounding names receive more callbacks for interviews is a reliable method to detect racial discrimination in hiring." [Strongly agree/Agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]

### **E.5.3 Beliefs about whether discrimination hurts blacks**

Employers are on average 50 percent more likely to call back applications with white-sounding names than applicants with black-sounding names. Do you think the lower callback rate for black-sounding names hurts blacks in the labor market? [Strongly hurts/Hurts/Somewhat hurts/Does not hurt/Does not hurt at all]

### **E.5.4 Policy preferences**

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]


## E.6 Instructions: Experiment 5: Racial stereotypes

### E.6.1 Pre-treatment beliefs

In this survey, we will ask you some questions about whites and blacks in America.

Throughout this survey, we will refer to non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks as whites and blacks, respectively.

{page break}



The General Social Survey (GSS) is a large and representative survey of Americans.

In the survey, people were asked to rank the importance of the following five job characteristics (from least important to most important):

- High income
- No danger of being fired
- Working hours are short, lots of free time
- Chances for advancement
- Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

Among **whites**, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job?

High income

No danger of being fired

Working hours are short, lots of free time

Chances for advancement

Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

Among **blacks**, which response do you think was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job?

High income


No danger of being fired

Working hours are short, lots of free time

Chances for advancement

Work that is important and gives a feeling of accomplishment

### E.6.2 Information treatment



The actual results on which response people most commonly chose as **least** important characteristic of a job were as follows:

Among **whites**, the response “Working hours are short, lots of free time” was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job.

Among **blacks**, the response “Working hours are short, lots of free time” was most commonly chosen as the **least** important characteristic of a job.

*Source: The General Social Survey*

### **E.6.3 Views on pro-black policies**

We will now ask you a few questions about your attitudes towards policies to help blacks in the labor market.

*{page break}*

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

*{page break, note: We randomize the order of these two questions}*

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black candidates assistance in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

### **E.6.4 Post-treatment beliefs**

To what extent do you agree with the following statement:

“Differences in economic outcomes between whites and blacks are primarily the result of whites working harder than blacks.” [Strongly agree/Agree/Somewhat agree/Neither agree nor disagree/Somewhat disagree/Disagree/Strongly disagree]

## **E.7 Instructions: Experiment 6: Political identity and party cues**

### **E.7.1 Treatment group**

A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. In contrast to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party generally opposes all forms of special treatment based on race. We are interested in what you think about this issue.

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]

### **E.7.2 Control group group**

A much debated issue is whether blacks and other racial minorities should get preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job. We are interested in what you think about this issue.

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job?

### **E.7.3 Outcome measure**

Do you support or oppose government and private programs that give qualified black and other racial minority candidates preference over equally qualified white candidates in getting a job? [Strongly support/Support/Neither support nor oppose/Oppose/Strongly oppose]