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An Experimental Study on the Social Trust and Cooperation of North Korean Refugees

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Abstract: Many of North Korean refugees in South Korea struggle to reconcile their different identities of: being a Korean who shares ethnicity with South Koreans vs. being a North Korean who fled from an estranged neighboring country. This paper shows that emphasizing the Korean unity can help their integration in South Korea, despite considerable differences caused by seven-decade long separation between the North and the South. The results of a behavioral experiment with 130 North Korean refugees conducted in this study suggest that the unified Korean identity stimulates the refugees' social trust with South Koreans, cooperation in South Korea, and their self-confidence.

JEL-Codes: D91, J15

Keywords: North Korean Refugees, Identity, Social Trust, Cooperation, Confidence, Integration

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1. Introduction

Currently, South Korea hosts almost 30,000 North Korean refugees who have left their country since the country's famine in the 1990s. While integrating the refugees is an important agenda in South Korea, North Koreans face discrimination and have difficulties in building positive identities in the South. In fact, they often struggle to reconcile their different identities: Korean vs. North Korean. The ethnic unity of being a Korean is formally emphasized in South Korea, however, North Koreans are indeed distinguishable from South Koreans in their accent, looks, habits, values, and experience (Kim et al. 2017, Haggard and Noland 2010). According to the social survey conducted by the Korea Hana Foundation (2015–2017), North Koreans attribute their difficulties in integration in South Korea to cultural and linguistic differences. This finding is somewhat surprising given their shared ethnicity, language, and cultural roots. It suggests that the seven-decade long separation between North and South Koreans (with little contact with each other) produced noticeable differences between the two groups. In fact, many North Korean refugees express that the vocabulary used in the South is considerably different from their own and note that the North Korean accent is often regarded as inferior, provoking prejudice against them in the South (Cho 2015). In light of such differences, some may argue that North Koreans should be treated as 'foreigners' (despite their legal status as eligible for South Korean citizenship), and their integration should be dealt with as an issue of multiculturalism instead of Korean unity. On the other hand, others doubt the effectiveness of such an approach because emphasizing differences over commonality may hinder social cohesion, hence the integration of North Korean refugees should remain an issue of building Korean solidarity.

Considering the complexity of North Korean refugees' identities, this paper empirically investigates whether the unified Korean identity can facilitate their integration by disentangling the relationship between social identities and social behaviors and attitudes that are crucial for the integration of the refugees in South Korea. Social identities are important because they provide a reference point for individuals' ways of thinking and deeds. In particular, North Korean refugees' identities play a key role in their integration in South Korea because it is necessary for them to adopt new modes of conduct, values, and life styles of their new home. In this study, the role of the unified Korean identity was examined by implementing a behavioral experiment with 130 North Korean refugees.

In this experiment, a method of identity-priming was used to distinguish the effects of different identities. Accordingly, each participant was primed with one of the two primary identities of North Korean refugees: unified Korean vs. North Korean. These two identities mirror two key aspects of North Koreans' status in South Korea that often conflict with each other. While the first underscores the ethnic unity and solidarity as 'Koreans' that North and South Koreans share, the second stresses North Koreans' differences from South Koreans and furthermore their social status as a minority (refugees) who fled from an estranged neighboring country. Upon priming the identities, participants were given certain circumstances and asked to decide on behavioral and attitudinal choices that are important for their integration – namely, choices of trusting, cooperating, and building confidence. Comparing the results of the two groups with different identities shows that emphasizing the unified Korean identity can stimulate North Korean refugees' social trust with South Koreans, cooperation in South Korea, and confidence about their decision-making and origin. These findings support the positive role of the unified Korean identity in North Korean refugees' integration, despite noticeable differences between North and South Koreans.

2. Research Method

2.1.Experiment Design

To empirically examine the relationship between social identities and social behaviors and attitudes of North Korean refugees, a behavioral experiment was designed by using an identity-priming method and surveying individuals' behavioral and attitudinal choices concerning trust, cooperation, and confidence. The procedure of the experiment is as follows. First, each participant was primed with one of the two identities (Korean vs. North Korean) by receiving specific questions that appealed to her/his assigned identity, following Shih et al. (1999)'s approach. For the group of (unified) Korean identity-priming, the following three questions were used to emphasize the ethnic and cultural unity of being a 'Korean'.

Questions of Unified Korean Identity-priming:

- (i) When did you feel proud of being a Korean?
- (ii) In your opinion, what are the three most representative dishes of Korean cuisine?
- (iii) If you have a chance to introduce the Korean culture to a foreigner, what would you show first?

For the group of North Korean identity-priming, another three questions were asked to make their North Korean identity salient.

Questions of North Korean Identity-priming:

- (i) What is the most prominent memory from your life back in North Korea?
- (ii) In your opinion, which common strengths do North Koreans share, compared to South Koreans?
- (iii) Between the Kumgangsan (the Diamond Mountain) and Paektusan (Paektu Mountain) – the two most well-known mountains in North Korea – which one do you like more?

By thinking about answers of the questions, participants were assumed under the influence of the primed identity at least temporarily (i.e. during the experiment). Note that the assignment of the identities (the treatment of each identity-priming) was randomized to ensure no systematic difference in the characteristics of the two groups that may otherwise influence individual choices of trust behaviors. Once participants were primed with one of the two identities, they were given scenarios about trusting and cooperating with others and self-confidence and asked to decide how to respond to circumstances (the second part of the experiment). This part consists of two types of questions: (i) questions on social behaviors and attitudes, and (ii) questions on demographic backgrounds and personal experience. The first component (i) includes 14 main- and 25 sub-questions on participants' behavioral choices regarding social and personal trust and cooperation with North and South Koreans, respectively, as well as their confidence about decision-making and North Korean origin. In the second component (ii), 28 main- and 40 sub-questions were asked. They include questions on demographic characteristics (age, gender, residential areas in North and South Korea, education, occupation, income level, family status, etc.) and experience involving their fleeing the North and life in the South (reasons for escape from North Korea and life satisfaction, discrimination, and hope in South Korea).

2.2. Participant Recruitment

Recruiting North Korean refugees for the experiment is not an easy task because of their marginalized status as refugees and their fear of disclosing personal information due to

potential threats of prosecution of their family living in the North. To overcome this challenge, I utilized contacts of social organizations that have aided North Korean refugees and therefore gained their trust. Accordingly, the extensive networks of these organizations were used to recruit participants through a chain-referral method. These organizations include protestant churches, local social welfare centers, university student groups, and civil rights NGOs that provide assistance and advocacy for North Korean refugees in Seoul and the Kyunggi province (the most populous province of South Korea that is located near the capital, both Seoul and Kyunggi form the Seoul Capital Area, SCA). The information gathered through the experiment is treated as strictly confidential by maintaining anonymity and coding under randomly assigned ID numbers to prevent any personalized identity from being disclosed.

With the help of the aforementioned North Korean networks, a snowball sampling method was used to recruit 130 individuals for the experiment. In this approach, we tried to include diverse individuals who represent the main characteristics of the theoretical population of North Korean refugees in South Korea, especially in terms of age, gender, residential locations in South Korea, as well as years living in South Korea (the four key factors used for the stratification of the annual survey with North Korean refugees conducted by the Korea Hana Foundation, a government-chartered organization that supports the settlement of North Koreans in South Korea and provides the largest and longest panel data on this population). The comparison between the sample and population characteristics is presented in detail in Section 3.1. The experiment was implemented in 2019 in Seoul and Kyunggi in South Korea.

3. Empirical Findings

3.1. Demographic Characteristics of North Korean Refugees

Currently, there are almost 30,000 North Korean refugees who reside in South Korea. A crucial question on the validity of this empirical study involves whether the participants of the experiment can represent the entire population of North Korean refugees in South Korea. North Korean refugees are considered a ‘hidden population’ (Spren 1992) who are marginalized in society and therefore hard to reach for research purposes. Hence, recruiting participants relied on existing networks by using a snowball sampling method, as discussed in Section 2.2. Given that, it is necessary to verify how well the sampled group of participants resembles the population characteristics. To do this, the sample characteristics are compared with the total

population of North Korean refugees in South Korea provided by the Ministry of Unification (Government of the Republic of Korea 2017).

In this comparison, four criteria were used following the approach of the most generalized survey of North Korean refugees conducted by the Korea Hana Foundation. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the Settlement Survey of the Korea Hana Foundation (2011–2017) selected four most important categories of North Korean refugees' characteristics to stratify its sample: gender, age, years of living in South Korea, and current residential areas in the South. By using these four criteria, the sample and population characteristics are compared to one another, with the subsequent results presented in Table 1.

The sample used in this study resembles the entire population of North Korean refugees to a large extent in terms of their gender composition, age structures, and duration of living in South Korea. The sample represents slightly more women, people in their 20s and 50s, and newcomers – those living in South Korea for less than three years – than the population. However, the overall distributions of gender, age, and the duration of living in South Korea mirror the population characteristics fairly well. On the other hand, most individuals in the sample are residents of the Seoul Capital Area (Seoul and the Kyunggi province), despite the fact that this area comprises less than two-thirds of the North Korean refugee population in South Korea. This is because the experiment was conducted in the capital area. Thus, a cautious interpretation is required in applying the findings of the study nationwide.

3.2. Personal and Social Trust

This experiment incorporates several questions on different types of trust (personal and generalized social trust) to reveal North Korean refugees' trust behaviors in various circumstances. First, participants were asked to think about three close friends from North Korea and choose their response if one of their friends asked to borrow money for important personal reasons (note that the respondent was assumed to have the amount of money requested). This question was formulated to assess the level of personalized trust North Korean refugees have towards their North Korean acquaintances. Among 129 valid answers, 55 (42.64%) selected '*willingly lending money to a North Korean friend*' (see Table 2.1). Also, 14.73% answered that they would lend money under the conditionality of a document of

obligation signed. Altogether, more than 57% chose to lend money to their North Korean friends.

The outcomes of the experiment further show whether their choice of money-lending was influenced by the identity primed to them. The unified Korean identity (KOR) does indeed boost willingness to lend money to a North Korean friend without conditionality compared to the North Korean identity (NK): 46.67% vs. 39.13%. The share of refusals is also lower in the KOR group (40%) than in the NK group (44.92%). This result tentatively suggests a positive role of the unified Korean identity in trust behaviors.

On the other hand, when the participants were asked about lending money to their South Korean friends (after thinking about their three closest South Korean friends), they showed a significantly lower level of willingness to do so (Table 2.2). Only 28.68% were willing to lend money without conditionality (compared to 42.64% to a North Korean friend). Instead, conditional lending was preferred when they lent money to a South Korean friend: 24.03% (higher than the 14.73% who chose the conditional lending to a North Korean friend). In addition, more than 47% of them refused to lend money to their South Korean friends (the share of rejection is lower than 43% for lending money to a North Korean friend). Apparently, North Korean refugees expressed a higher level of personalized trust towards friends who were also from the North than their South Korean counterparts. In addition, when the outcomes of the groups of the different identities are compared, the unified Korean identity does not boost North Koreans' trust towards their South Korean friends – different from increasing trust with North Korean friends. The share of those choosing to willingly lend is similar between the KOR and NK groups: 29.51% and 27.94%. But, the rejection rate is significantly higher in the KOR group (50.82%) than in the NK group (44.12%).

So far, the results do not provide a robust indication that emphasizing the unified Korean identity facilitates trusting behaviors in North Korean refugees, as far as personalized trust is concerned. The unified Korean identity is associated with a higher level of trusting other North Korean friends but a lower level of trusting South Koreans.

In addition, a test comparing the levels of the refugees' trust towards North and South Koreans is conducted by subtracting the choice of trusting South Korean friends from North Korean ones to calculate the net difference between the trust levels. This test also helps reduce the

effect of individual heterogeneity that may influence one's behavioral choices because the baseline trust level, which is likely determined by individual characteristics, is balanced out by the subtraction. The results of this exercise show that more than 72% of respondents have the same level of trust towards their North and South Korean friends (Table 2.3). Nonetheless, one-fifths show a higher level of willingness to lend money to North Koreans, while only 6% of the participants have such a preference for South Koreans. Examining the outcomes of the different identity groups, most participants in both groups maintain the equal choice of lending money to North and South Koreans: 70% of the KOR group and 75% of the NK group. However, a substantial share of people shows their preference of lending money to North Korean friends over South Koreans, and this preference is more strongly pronounced in the KOR group (26.67%) than the NK group (16.18%).

Where personalized trust is concerned, the social identity of Korean unity can stimulate North Koreans' trust of other North Koreans and their preference towards North Koreans over South Koreans. This finding creates a puzzle: why does the unified Korean identity have a positive effect on trusting North Koreans but not South Koreans? Such a puzzle might have been triggered because personal trust may not have a straightforward relationship with social identities, depending more so on (unobserved) personal relationships with acquaintances. Instead, it may be social trust with broader ranges of people in society that can more directly mirror the influences of social identities. Hence, additional questions were asked to address trust with more generally defined, wider ranges of people (generalized, social trust): namely, concerning whether one is willing to lend money to a North (South) Korean colleague or neighbor in general.

Basically, the baseline level of social trust is lower than the level of personal trust, but the differentiated levels of trusting North and South Koreans show similarity with those of personal trust above. A significantly higher number of participants answered that they were willing to lend money without conditionality to other North Koreans than to South Koreans: 27.13% vs. 8.46% (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Additionally, North Koreans are more inclined to lend money to South Koreans with the conditionality of signing a document of obligation (24.62%) compared to the conditional lending to North Koreans (12.40%). Overall, North Korean refugees decided to lend money – with/without conditionality – more to other North Koreans (39.53%) than South Koreans (33.08%).

When outcomes are compared between the two different identity groups, the findings reveal the more positive role of the unified Korean identity – different from in the case of personal trust. Under the unified Korean identity, the share of lending money to South Koreans is higher than that under the North Korean identity: 36.07% vs. 30.44%. Also, participants in the KOR group chose equally often to lend money (with/without conditionality) to North and South Koreans: 35% (to North Koreans) and 36.07% (to South Koreans). In contrast, other participants in the NK group demonstrate a significantly higher level of willingness to lend money to other North Koreans over South Koreans: 43.48% vs. 30.44%.

The different behavioral patterns of the KOR and NK groups are further corroborated when differences in lending decisions for North and South Koreans are estimated (Table 2.6). Emphasizing the unified Korean identity results in maintaining the same level of trust (lending) towards North and South Koreans more often (63.33%) than pronouncing the North Korean identity (59.42%). Also, participants in the KOR group express similar levels of preferences regarding lending more willingly to North and South Koreans, respectively: 20% vs. 16.67%. By contrast, participants in the NK group are considerably more willing to lend money to North Koreans (30.43%) than South Koreans (10.15%).

Overall, the findings of generalized social trust suggest a more positive role of the unified Korean identity in the choice of trust behaviors. North Korean refugees who were primed with ‘being a Korean’ increased their trust with South Koreans, and trust North and South Koreans more equally than others assigned with the identity of ‘being a North Korean’.

In addition to the questions on behavioral choices of lending money, participants were asked another mode of a question on trust, in that participants rated on a 10-point scale in which society – either North or South Korean – one can trust others more. This question was designed to evaluate the refugees’ attitudes of trusting the two societies in a more abstract way (compared to the specific circumstances used to reveal one’s behavioral choices above). Moreover, this question can also reflect which society is more ‘trustworthy’ for participants – strictly speaking, *trustworthiness* of others is different from one’s *trusting* others. Table 2.7 shows the distribution of scores, with a lower score representing a higher level of trust towards

South Korea over North Korea.¹ The mean score is 5.34 (with a standard error of 0.25) – i.e. participants demonstrate a slightly higher level of trust towards North Korean society (also the median value is a score of 6, skewed towards the North). Examining it more closely by the identity group, participants in the KOR group show a higher level of trust towards South Korea (mean = 4.71, standard error = 0.37), while others in the NK group evaluate that one can trust others more in North Korea (mean = 5.86, standard error = 0.34). The result of a median test confirms that this difference between the two identity groups is significant (Appendix A.1) because the null-hypothesis of no difference is rejected at a 5%-level. One can infer from this finding that the unified Korean identity can promote trust towards the refugees' new home in the South and thus presumably help their integration in South Korean society. This piece of evidence adds to the positive role of the unified Korean identity that was suggested to boost the refugees' trust with South Koreans.

3.3.Cooperation and Confidence

In addition to trust, participants were asked to evaluate their cooperative attitudes and self-confidence – both of which are also important for their integration in South Korea. First, participants were asked to decide in which society – either North or South Korean – one can cooperate more with others. Participants selected a score on a 10-point scale, with a smaller score indicating a higher level of cooperation in the South (the same procedure as the evaluation of trust level above).

Overall, North Korean refugees evaluated North Korea more highly than South Korea in cooperating with others – with a mean score of 5.37 (standard error = 0.27). This finding is comparable to the results of trust level in Section 3.2, in that North Korean refugees also rated North Korea slightly above South Korea. One may be surprised with such preferences towards North Korea expressed by the refugees given the political unrest and institutional weakness of the country. However, these responses should be understood as evaluation based on personal experience, considering that North Korean refugees often face discrimination and exclusion in South Korea. In the later part of this experiment, related questions were asked regarding their

¹ Specifically, a score of 1 indicates that one can trust others completely more in South Korea than North Korea. – vice versa for a score of 10. Accordingly, a score of 5 represents that the trust levels of both societies are equal.

experience of discrimination and life dissatisfaction in South Korea. Indeed, the majority of respondents answered that South Koreans' prejudice and cultural and institutional differences were the main causes of hardship in their life in the South. Supposedly, such challenges discourage the refugees from trusting and cooperating with others in South Korea.

Nonetheless, a larger number of North Koreans have more positive attitudes towards cooperation in South Korea than their assessment of trust in the South, as the largest number of respondents answered that they could cooperate with others equally in North and South Korea (the median value of the cooperation score is 5, while the median trust level is 6, skewed to North Korea). Apparently, North Koreans expressed a higher level of willingness to cooperate with others in South Korea than the level of their trusting South Koreans, possibly because of the necessity of cooperation to maintain and manage their life in their adopted home in the South.

The results further show that North Koreans' reluctance to cooperate in South Korea can be mitigated by emphasizing the unified Korean identity. By comparing the outcomes of the KOR and NK groups (Table 3.1), participants in the KOR group placed South Korea above the North in pursuing cooperation with others (mean = 4.81, standard error = 0.41). In contrast, others in the NK group evaluated North Korea more positively with a mean score of 5.81 (standard error = 0.34).² More specifically, 46.56% of participants in the KOR group responded that it was easier to cooperate with others in South Korea than North Korea, while only 28.36% in the NK group answered this way.

The positive role of priming the unified Korean identity is also found in boosting one's confidence. Participants were asked to think about three important decisions they made after arriving in South Korea. Then, they were asked to choose how much they were satisfied with themselves with the following four choices: (i) I am generally satisfied with my decisions, (ii) I think my decisions are often second-best because there is no better alternative, (iii) I generally regret my decisions because there is usually an alternative, and (iv) I generally regret my decisions but there is no alternative. Overall, a considerably high share of people expressed satisfaction about their decision-making in South Korea. 76.74% chose the answer, *I am*

² Also, the median test (Appendix A.2) shows that the difference between the KOR and NR groups is significant at a 10%-level.

generally satisfied with my decisions (Table 3.2).³ The share of the positive response is even greater among those in the KOR group, with 81.67% answering that they were satisfied with their decisions. This is significantly higher than that of the NK group: 72.46%.

Additionally, North Korean refugees' confidence level was further assessed by asking whether one has an intention to hide his/her North Korean origin. The share of those who intended to disguise their origin is substantial: yes (intention to hide) = 50%, no (no intention) = 50%, Table 3.3). The most often stated reasons for hiding the origin are 'do not want to further explain about the North Korean origin' and 'feel uncomfortable with others' reaction'. This shows that North Koreans often experience unfavorable responses and questions when their Northern origin is revealed and therefore try not to disclose it. However, the reluctance to reveal their origin became smaller when the unified Korean identity was primed. In the KOR group, the majority (52.54%) answered 'no', while 52.17% in the NK group chose 'yes'. Interestingly, emphasizing the unified Korean identity can stimulate one's confidence about his/her North Korean origin. This finding offers an implication that social unity can be used to form solidarity among people of different backgrounds, increasing the level of tolerance and acceptance of being different.

4. Conclusion

The findings of this experiment with North Korean refugees show that emphasizing the unified Korean identity helps their integration by strengthening their social trust and cooperation in South Korea. These results also highlight the positive role of the unified Korean identity in boosting the refugees' confidence – especially about their Northern origin. This suggests the unified identity as a facilitator of social cohesion between people of different backgrounds, likely owing to the fact that such unity is regarded as solidarity between people.

In this experiment, the treatments of different identity-priming were randomized among participants to minimize the influence of individual heterogeneity. However, the robustness of the findings of this study should be further examined through an extended analysis that

³ This result is similar to the high level of life satisfaction found in the social survey of integration of North Korean refugees in South Korea conducted by the Korea Hana Foundation (2015-2017).

explicitly accounts for individual heterogeneity; thus, a more precise net effect of the primed identity can be identified. The tentative findings so far provide policy suggestions for the integration of North Korean refugees by supporting the role of the Korean unity and solidarity.

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Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of North Korean Refugees
– Sample and Population

	Gender	Age	Years of Living in South Korea	Current Residential Area
Sample of this Study (2019) n = 130	F: 80.77% M: 19.23%	15–19: 2.44% 20s: 24.39% 30s: 20.32% 40s: 26.02% 50s: 21.95% 60s+: 4.88%	under 3: 17.6% 3–5: 10.4% 5–10: 44.4% 10+: 25.6%	Seoul and Kyunggi (SCA): 96%
Population of North Korean Refugees in South Korea (2017) n = 26,430	F: 74.9% M: 25.1%	15–19: 2.4% 20s: 17.9% 30s: 25.6% 40s: 31.4% 50s: 13.8% 60s+: 8.9%	under 3: 12.4% 3–5: 10.6% 5–10: 48.2% 10+: 28.8%	Seoul and Kyunggi (SCA): 63.3%

**Table 2. Personal and Social Trust of North Korean Refugees,
Unified Korean and North Korean Identities**

Table 2.1. Lending money to a North Korean friend (close relationship)

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
Willingly lending	55 (42.64%)	28 (46.67%)	27 (39.13%)
Conditional lending with a document of obligation	19 (14.73%)	8 (13.33%)	11 (15.95%)
Cordially refuse	44 (34.11%)	23 (38.33%)	21 (30.43%)
Refuse and keep distance from the person	11 (8.53%)	1 (1.67%)	10 (14.49%)
Total number of answers	129	60	69

Table 2.2. Lending money to a South Korean friend (close relationship)

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
Willingly lending	37 (28.68%)	18 (29.51%)	19 (27.94%)
Conditional lending with a document of obligation	31 (24.03%)	12 (19.67%)	19 (27.94%)
Cordially refuse	43 (33.34%)	24 (39.34%)	19 (27.94%)
Refuse and keep distance from the person	18 (13.95%)	7 (11.48%)	11 (16.18%)
Total number of answers	129	61	68

Table 2.3. Difference in the choice of lending money between North and South Korean friends

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
Lending to North Korean friends more willingly	27 (21.09%)	16 (26.67%)	11 (16.18%)
Same choice	93 (72.66%)	42 (70%)	51 (75%)
Lending to South Korean friends more willingly	8 (6.24%)	2 (3.33%)	6 (8.82%)
Total number of answers	128	60	68

Table 2.4. Lending money to a North Korean (in general)

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
Willingly lending	35 (27.13%)	16 (26.67%)	19 (27.54%)
Conditional lending with a document of obligation	16 (12.40%)	5 (8.33%)	11 (15.94%)
Cordially refuse	61 (47.29%)	32 (53.33%)	29 (42.03%)
Refuse and keep distance from the person	17 (13.18%)	7 (11.67%)	10 (14.49%)
Total number of answers	129	60	69

Table 2.5. Lending money to a South Korean (in general)

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
Willingly lending	11 (8.46%)	7 (11.48%)	4 (5.80%)
Conditional lending with a document of obligation	32 (24.62%)	15 (24.59%)	17 (24.64%)
Cordially refuse	69 (53.08%)	32 (52.45%)	37 (53.62%)
Refuse and keep distance from the person	18 (13.84%)	7 (11.48%)	11 (15.94%)
Total number of answers	130	61	69

Table 2.6. Difference in the choice of lending money between North and South Koreans

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
Lending to North Koreans more willingly	33 (25.58%)	12 (20%)	21 (30.43 %)
Same choice	79 (61.24%)	38 (63.33%)	41 (59.42%)
Lending to South Koreans more willingly	17 (13.18%)	10 (16.67%)	7 (10.15%)
Total number of answers	129	60	69

Table 2.7. In which society can one trust others more? (rate on a scale from 1 to 10, a smaller score represents a higher level of trust in South Korea than North Korea).

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
Score 1 (South Korea)	20 (16.53%)	12 (21.82%)	8 (12.12%)
Score 2	3 (2.48%)	2 (3.64%)	1 (1.52%)
Score 3	7 (5.79%)	3 (5.46%)	4 (6.06%)
Score 4	14 (11.57%)	9 (16.36%)	5 (7.58%)
Score 5	18 (14.88%)	8 (14.55%)	10 (15.15%)
Score 6	19 (15.70%)	7 (12.73%)	12 (18.18%)
Score 7	12 (9.92%)	5 (9.09%)	7 (10.61%)
Score 8	9 (7.44%)	3 (5.45%)	6 (9.09%)
Score 9	7 (5.79%)	3 (5.45%)	4 (6.06%)
Score 10 (North Korea)	12 (9.9%)	3 (5.45%)	9 (13.63%)
Mean (standard errors)	5.34 (0.25)	4.71 (0.37)	5.86 (0.34)
Total number of answers	121	55	66

**Table 3. Cooperation and Confidence of North Korean Refugees,
Unified Korean and North Korean Identities**

Table 3.1. In which society can one cooperate with others more? (rate on a scale from 1 to 10, a smaller score represents a higher level of cooperation in South Korea than North Korea).

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
Score 1 (South Korea)	24 (19.20%)	16 (27.59%)	8 (11.94%)
Score 2	3 (2.40%)	2 (3.45%)	1 (1.49%)
Score 3	6 (4.80%)	1 (1.72%)	5 (7.46%)
Score 4	13 (10.40%)	8 (13.79%)	5 (7.46%)
Score 5	23 (18.40%)	10 (17.24%)	13 (19.40%)
Score 6	11 (8.80%)	5 (8.62%)	6 (8.96%)
Score 7	11 (8.80%)	1 (1.72%)	10 (14.93%)
Score 8	5 (4.00%)	3 (5.17%)	2 (2.99%)
Score 9	17 (13.60%)	7 (12.07%)	10 (14.93%)
Score 10 (North Korea)	12 (9.60%)	5 (8.63%)	7 (10.45%)
Mean (standard errors)	5.37 (0.27)	4.81 (0.41)	5.81 (0.34)
Total number of answers	125	58	67

Table 3.2. Think about three important decisions you made after arriving in South Korea. Choose one of the following four statements that best describe yourself ('yourself' who currently live in South Korea).

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
I am generally satisfied with my decisions	99 (76.74%)	49 (81.67%)	50 (72.46%)
I think my decisions are often second-best because there is no better alternative	19 (14.73%)	8 (13.33%)	11 (15.94%)
I generally regret my decisions because there is usually an alternative	7 (5.43%)	2 (3.33%)	5 (7.25%)
I generally regret my decisions but there is no alternative	4 (3.10%)	1 (1.67%)	3 (4.35%)
Total number of answers	129	60	69

Table 3.3. Do you have an intention to hide your North Korean origin?

	Total Number (%)	Group of Korean Identity	Group of North Korean Identity
Yes	64 (50%)	28 (47.46%)	36 (52.17%)
No	64 (50%)	31 (52.54%)	33 (47.83%)
Total number of answers	128	59	69

Appendix

Appendix A. Median Test

A.1. Question: In which society can one trust others more? Rate on a scale from 1 to 10, a smaller score represents a higher level of trust in South Korea than North Korea).

Greater than the median	Number, unified Korean identity group	Number, North Korean identity group	Total number
No	34	28	62
Yes	21	38	59
Total number	55	66	121

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 4.5163$ Pr = 0.034

A.2 Question: In which society can one cooperate with others more? Rate on a scale from 1 to 10, a smaller score represents a higher level of cooperation in South Korea than North Korea).

Greater than the median	Number, unified Korean identity group	Number, North Korean identity group	Total number
No	37	32	69
Yes	21	35	56
Total number	58	67	125

Pearson $\chi^2(1) = 3.2311$ Pr = 0.072