

**A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC PRIVATE
LAND-BASED INVESTORS IN AFRICA.
EVIDENCE FROM TANZANIA'S TIMBER RUSH**

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Justin Lusasi

PhD student

julusasi@gmail.com

Esbern Friis-Hansen

Senior Researcher

efh@diis.dk

Rasmus Hundsbæk Pedersen

Senior Researcher

rhp@diis.dk

DIIS · Danish Institute for International Studies

Østbanegade 117, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark

Tel: +45 32 69 87 87

E-mail: diis@diis.dk

www.diis.dk

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**Justin Lusasi, Esbern Friis-Hansen and Rasmus Hundsbaek
Pedersen**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	2
Theory and methodology	4
Land-based investments in Africa: a review	7
The empirical context: Tanzania's timber rush in the Southern Highlands	9
History of tree planting in the Southern Highlands up to mid-2000s	9
Timber Rush 2005–2019	9
Analysis: Towards a typology of domestic investors	11
Access mechanisms and the development of a typology	11
Urban-based investors	14
Resident villagers	16
Urban investors originating from the area	18
Government and religious organisations	19
The typology of domestic investors revisited	22
Conclusion	24
References	25

INTRODUCTION

Much attention has been paid to land-based investments – often termed ‘land grabbing’ – in Africa in recent years. Following in the wake of high global commodity prices in 2007–8, the early phases of NGO and research publications tended to focus on the investments of large-scale foreign investors (see, for instance, Zoomers 2010; Anseeuw et al. 2012). However, around 2012–13, academic researchers began revisiting established truths, as statistics on large-scale acquisitions had turned out to be inflated. Methodologies were revised as it was realised that processes were more complex and involved more actors than previously believed (Cotula 2012; Edelman 2013). The role of local and national political actors in mediating investments, or as investors themselves, was emphasised more strongly (Wolford et al. 2013; Pedersen & Buur, 2016). Research suggested that the scale of domestic investments may surpass that of foreign investors by far (Cotula 2013; Jayne et al. 2015). However, our knowledge about these investors – who they are and how they access land – is still limited.

Informed by empirical research into land acquired for timber investments in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania, this paper serves the dual purpose of developing a typology of domestic investors involved in tree planting activities in the Southern Highlands that may also help improve our understanding of the diversity of domestic land-based investments in Africa in general. For this purpose the paper applies a case study approach and analyses Tanzania’s Southern Highlands, with its boom in investments into tree planting activities, as an extreme case that sheds light on similar, but less intense, investment dynamics elsewhere in Tanzania and on the African continent.¹ Recent research on land ownership in Tanzania suggests that the agricultural land held by urban-based investors increased from 11.8% in 2005 to 32.7% in 2010 (Jayne et al. 2016). The Southern Highlands in particular has seen a proliferation of small- and medium-scale investors, who have now by far surpassed the foreign and government-owned larger plantations. The timber rush has given rise to transition within the forestry sector in the Southern Highlands and has dramatically changed the relative importance of the categories of tree growers. The overall trend is a shift away from government plantations and industrial private forestry towards non-industrial private forestry, which includes small-scale private forestry, mainly by resident investors. As a result of the timber rush, non-industrial private forestry now accounts for some 61% of the national forest area in the Southern Highlands or around 325,000 hectares (Milledge et al 2018). New, large-scale projects involving state actors are, however, currently underway.

¹ On strategies for using cases to generate theory and the selection of extreme cases for this purpose, see Flyvbjerg 2006.

The typology developed in this paper has a focus on how land is acquired. It points to significant diversity in this regard among domestic investors. In order to develop the typology, the paper draws on elements of Ribot and Peluso's 'A Theory of Access' (2003) and combines their approach with empirical research into land transactions in Tanzania's Southern Highlands. The paper identifies four major types of domestic investor, namely urban-based investors (with no pre-existing ties to the area), urban-based investors originating in the area, resident villagers and religious and government organisations. The 'Theory of Access' puts emphasis not only on how land is acquired, but also on how it is being used and the benefits it may bring. The present paper focuses on the access mechanisms that are most important for acquiring land in the context of a land rush like that in Tanzania's Southern Highlands, one characterised by evolving land transaction practices and growing land markets, namely by capital, social identity and authority. The four types of domestic investor use different combinations of access mechanisms to acquire land, but each type has one mechanism that is more important than the others. It should be noted that there is significant variation within the investor types, which will be discussed in more detail in the second half of the paper.

The ways in which domestic investor types acquire land have different implications for local populations. First, whereas much of the land grab literature has focused on the forceful incorporation of marginal or frontier areas into global capitalist relations due to FDI and world market demand, it is a key characteristic of Tanzania's timber rush that it has been a relatively autonomous process driven more by domestic and regional demand for timber products. Unlike, for instance, the crop booms in Southeast Asia that were driven by the production of crops like cocoa, coffee and palm oil for export markets and which therefore mainly involved global trading houses (Hall 2011), this means that the value chain in Tanzania, to a larger extent, seems to be controlled by local and national level actors. Whether this will, in the end, benefit the local populations is a case for further research in the timber rush research programme that this working paper is part of.

Secondly, much investment has taken place on land that used to be communally owned by villages, but which was often not intensively used. The rise in medium-scale farmers, therefore, seems more to derive from the expansion of farmland than from a reduction in the land controlled by smallholder farms, which for Tanzania as a whole has remained largely unchanged over the land rush period (Jayne et al. 2016, p. 202). While this does not mean that vulnerable groups like pastoralists, for instance, who may have used the land for grazing previously, are not affected, it is apparent that the processes related to land-based investments have to a larger extent been controlled from below than depicted in the early land grab literature. Thus, most of the non-industrial private forest (NIPF) activities² that can be observed in the Southern Highlands are characterised by thousands of

² Non-industrial private forest is characterised by individual ownership, whether by small individual farmers, local business people or urban-based investors but who, unlike industrial plantations, do not operate wood-processing plants (Harrison et al. 2002).

transactions between individual sellers and buyers or between buyers and local-level authorities. The development owes a great deal to Tanzania's land laws, which decentralise much responsibility for the management of land to the local level, as well as to a rapidly expanding market in land (Pedersen 2016). This does not imply that processes always follow the letter. There are examples of village authorities selling land without involving villagers and of individual transactions that bypass local-level authorities or that are bigger than allowed in the law.

Furthermore, large-scale land acquisitions by government and religious organisations have at times involved some degree of pressure, a fact compounded by Tanzania's Land Acquisition Act of 1967, which provides particular government institutions with a great deal of discretionary power to compulsory purchase land for development purposes. The paper therefore also includes domestic large-scale state actors, who have re-emerged as important land-based investors in the country in recent years under post-liberalisation (Pedersen & Kweka 2017). However, even in these cases much effort seems to have gone into obtaining local consent prior to the acquisition of land. Because of the long-term nature of tree planting for timber production it only includes rental markets to a limited extent so, while their importance is growing in Africa (Deininger et al. 2017), they do not feature strongly in Tanzanian timber production.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In section two we discuss the theory and methodology that allow us to develop a theoretically informed and empirically grounded typology of investors. Inspired by Ribot and Peluso's 'Theory of Access' (2003) the paper identifies the three access mechanisms that are most important for acquiring land in our context, namely: capital, social identity and authority. Section three reviews the literature on access and land-based investors in Africa. Section four analyses the empirical and historical context of investments in private forestry in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania based on extensive fieldwork and with reference to existing technical reports. In section five the proposed new typology of investors is presented. Section six discusses how the proposed typology contributes to the current literature on domestic investors by distinguishing between authority from below and above. Finally, section seven draws conclusions.

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

The paper is based on a combination of a review of the literature on access and land-based investors in Africa combined with field research into the Southern Highlands in mainland Tanzania. Even though the literature on land-based investments has long pointed to the need to develop a better understanding of domestic investors, research in this regard is still in its infancy. Various papers apply different criteria when drawing up typologies. In an early contribution, based on an inventory and a survey in four francophone West African countries, Hilhorst et al. focused on the rising number of investors from outside the community, who typically had acquired their land through interaction with

customary landholders rather than through inheritance (Hilhorst et al. 2011). In a more recent contribution Jayne et al., drawing on available national population surveys in four anglophone African countries, focused on changes in landholdings in the brackets 0–5 hectares, 5–100 hectares, and above 100 hectares respectively, and identified a reduction in the average size of smaller landholdings and a major increase in the medium-scale ones, typically owned by urban-based households (Jayne et al. 2015). Finally, recent research into petroleum-related investments has pointed to an increase in acquisition of land by state organisations, allegedly for ‘public purposes’ but often of a rather speculative nature (Pedersen & Kweka 2017).

Whereas each of the above mark important contributions to an improved understanding of domestic investors, they tend to be delimited, focusing on specific groups. Developing a typology requires the systematic analysis of the configuration of elements that allow for more overall generalisations about different types of actors. Given the current state of existing research, this paper aims to contribute to the theory building on domestic investors by developing a theoretically informed and empirically grounded typology of investors. Each of our four typologies of investor is composed of a group of actors with sufficient similarity among them to distinguish them from the other three types.³ Towards the end of the paper, we discuss and refine the understanding of authority in order to develop a framework that better encompasses the diversity of domestic investors, but we stop short of developing a typological theory, which would require a larger degree of cross-case analysis and theorisation.

In order to develop a more systematic approach to studying the acquisition of land, this paper draws on Ribot and Peluso (2003), who point to different access mechanisms through which land and natural resources may be acquired and utilised. Access theory has its origins in Marxist debates of the 1970s focusing on how to alter the relations between the poor and the state (Lamb 1975; Nelson 1979; Schaffer & Lamb 1981). With time, it came to focus more on elements of power other than those derived from the state. In the 1980s Piers Blaikie introduced the concept into the study of natural resources, arguing that in order to access land, other resources than state-sanctioned property rights were required, for instance capital to buy farm inputs or technology to make use of the land (Blaikie 1981; Blaikie 1985; Blaikie 1989). Along similar lines, Ribot and Peluso’s access theory emphasises that access is not merely about rights, but also about the ability to benefit from things. They list eight different ‘structural and relational mechanisms of access’ that allow for this (technology, capital, markets, labour, knowledge, authority, social identity and social relations).

In this paper we focus more on the three access mechanisms that are most important for acquiring land in our context, namely; capital, social identity and authority. There are several reasons for the choice of the focus on these three access mechanisms. First, our aim is to contribute to the literature on the land rush

³ For more on typologies and typological theory, see George, A. L. & A. Bennett (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

and therefore our main focus is on how land for tree planting activities is acquired rather than on later benefits derived from it. The three mentioned access mechanisms were the ones that emerged most strongly during fieldwork. Benefits will be analysed in greater detail in later papers in the timber rush research programme. Secondly, Ribot and Peluso uphold a basic distinction between 'legal access' (which in some ways is similar to the concept of property, which emphasises how land is held, the rights it entails and how landholdings are sanctioned by socially legitimate institutions – see Sikor & Lund 2009; and Lund 2011), and eight other types of access mechanism. Analytically, however, there are significant overlaps between 'legal access' and some of the access mechanisms. In our context, we can observe particularly strong overlaps with the access mechanism of authority, but also often those of capital (with government-sanctioned markets in land) and social identity (with decentralised management of land and recognition of customary laws and authorities). Finally, the emphasis on legality is to some extent misplaced in a context of evolving and at times rather autonomous land transaction practices as these need not directly involve formal institutions.

This does not imply that the other access mechanisms are completely irrelevant for acquiring land. Without the increased market demand for timber products from Tanzanian and Kenyan urban centres, tree planting in the Southern Highlands would have continued to be mostly for household consumption. Changes to sawmill technology in recent years, for instance the production of cheap mobile sawmills produced in China, have helped spread the timber rush to remote areas. Labour opportunities first drew rural Tanzanians to urban areas and then provided the capital for many of the investments by urban-based investors. However, with our focus on how land is acquired, there are different types of knowledge that are relevant to different types of investors depending on their predominant access mechanisms; whereas urban-based investors often pay more heed to procedure and to some extent laws and regulations guiding land sales, resident village investors will use their knowledge about village land allocation processes, and government organisations focus on the regulatory framework guiding land for development purposes. Thus, knowledge is important to all types of investor and therefore less useful in the development of a typology. Finally, the access mechanism 'other social relations', which includes residual elements like trust, friendship and patronage, does play a role, in particular for the urban-based investors, who use middle-men with a stronger social identity to acquire land. Finally, there are frequent rumours of corruption and nepotism related to investors acquiring land, which are however hard to ascertain at a more general level.

This study on investor typology draws on fieldwork conducted in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania which comprises three regions; Iringa, Njombe and Ruvuma. Geographically, the area is mountainous with a cold climate and volcanic soils. The Southern Highlands receives enough annual rainfall to create appropriate conditions for plantation agriculture of coffee, tea, pyrethrum, and pine and eucalyptus trees. Thus, the main economic activities in the Southern Highlands are crop cultivation and timber business. The precipitous increase in

tree planting activities in the Southern Highlands involving pine and eucalyptus species was the justification for its selection as a case.

The process of identifying people who access land for tree planting was pioneered by Olwig et al. (2015) but our team did not succeed in implementing this and we concluded that tree growers are an ambiguous category. Neither the village councils nor the district councils had a complete database of domestic investors, which compelled the research to identify land owners, land sellers and middlemen which eventually revealed land buyers. Land owners and hence land sellers include village councils, individual villagers and families that have inherited land under customary systems. Thus, purposive sampling and snowballing were the main approaches we used to identify domestic investors. To characterise domestic investors, in-depth interviews were held with village authorities and domestic investors. In some instances, the interviews were supplemented with field visits to woodlots of respective domestic investors.

LAND-BASED INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA: A REVIEW

In the wake of rising commodity prices around 2007-8 the land grab terminology proliferated and became a powerful tool to criticise what was perceived to be a crisis in contemporary capitalism (Tokar & Magdoff 2009). Not only did NGOs use the term, but also many activist scholars, in particular linking it to investments into biofuel production at the time. Foreign corporate investments were depicted as grabs that posed a threat to African smallholders' food security and livelihoods (Borras et al. 2010; Vermeulen & Cotula 2010; Zoomers 2010). The literature drew on existing scholarly traditions, most importantly the access literature, which as part of a growing critique of the structural adjustment programmes imposed by the World Bank facilitating privatisation and markets in land, had pointed out that reforms were incompatible with bottom-up user perspectives and therefore often not being implemented (Berry 1993; Scott 1998). A number of African scholars emphasised that contemporary neoliberal land tenure regimes are but one example of a much longer tradition of land alienation propagated by foreigners (Shivji 1998; Manji 2006; Moyo 2011).

Around 2012-13, however, discussions about the scale of land grabbing as well as the methodological issues behind the study of it, began to take place as database records turned out to have been inflated. Initial estimates of global deals at around 200 million hectares (Anseeuw et al. 2012) were revised downwards to closer to 30 million hectares (Farmlandgrab & Coalition 2013). Methodologies were revisited and there was a call for greater attention to context and for more grounded methods (Edelman et al. 2013; Scoones et al. 2013). The drivers, actors and outcomes of land acquisitions were also revisited. Although most scholars continued emphasising the drift towards greater foreign corporate agribusiness involvement due to the expansion of capitalism and growing world market demand, the role of other actors was nevertheless emphasised more.

A major change in emphasis happened with the depiction of the state and state authorities as it became clear that they often actively facilitated or partnered in large-scale land transactions. Scholars increasingly stressed the importance of unbundling the role of different state actors (Borras et al. 2012; Wolford et al. 2013; Lavers & Boamah 2016). A wide variety of reactions among host country governments towards the increasing global demand for land could be observed, some seeking to mitigate it through, for instance, land ceilings, while others were more facilitative. Often, it turned out, acquisitions were if not always following the letter of the law then 'broadly consistent with national law' (Cotula 2013, p. 11; see also Levien 2018). Consequently, terms like 'land rush' became increasingly in vogue as an alternative to the grab terminology with its connotations of illegality and theft (Hall 2013; Pedersen & Buur 2016). South–South investments also increasingly came onto the radar (Borras et al. 2012; Margulis et al. 2013).

The role of domestic investors also became more prominently examined in the literature. They have a much longer history in Africa (Baglioni & Gibbon 2013), but their significance vis-à-vis foreign investors had been downplayed in the early land grab literature. However, it turned out that even if the deals they were involved in were typically smaller than those of transnational investors, their accumulated amount of land often surpassed that acquired by foreign investors by far (Cotula 2013). Research into the composition of these investors and their means of accessing land is still limited. Early research from West Africa suggested that urban-based elite groups consisting of businessmen, politicians and government officials featured prominently among the buyers, but this was based on the premise that 'agro-investors come from outside the community and have not acquired land by heritage or gifts' (Hilhorst et al. 2011). Often, the size of landholding has been used as a defining feature of the categorisation of such 'emergent' farmers, as they tend to be bigger than resident smallholders, but smaller than large-scale domestic investors. Jayne suggests that they typically hold between 5 and 100 hectares of land (Jayne et al. 2015).

Whereas the focus on domestic, urban-based investors was a welcome addition to the field of research it came with limitations as it left out the acquisition of land from below involving resident smallholder actors. This has been identified as part of social differentiation processes at the very local level linked to gradually specialised and marketized production systems (Greco 2015; Boamah 2015; see also Hall 2011). These processes could be linked to investment and foreign capital on a larger scale (Sulle 2016; Hall et al. 2017), but they did not always have to be. Indeed, a slowdown in large-scale foreign investments could be observed as commodity prices began falling – for agricultural products this happened after 2011 – without necessarily affecting national and local investment patterns (Cotula & Berger 2018). Often, they could be driven by processes related to higher local commodity prices of certain commodities, improved market access from improved infrastructure or simply by population growth that increased pressure on – and the value of – land (Brockington et al. 2018; Östberg et al. 2018).

THE EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: TANZANIA'S TIMBER RUSH IN THE SOUTHERN HIGHLANDS

History of tree planting in the Southern Highlands up to mid-2000s

Tree planting in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania is traceable back to the 1800s when the land was under colonial administration (Ngaga 2011; Pedersen 2017; Ahlback 1986). The German settlers planted trees as a cash crop and also as an amenity around their offices and houses, a practice that was imitated by locals who worked for them as employees. Later on, the British invested in large-scale tree planting by setting aside land for forestry, opening large plantations including the current largest state-owned Sao Hill forest plantation that was established in 1939 (Ngaga 2011). Alongside the colonial government were several private companies investing in tree planting on state land. These include Tanganyika Wattle Company Limited (TANWAT) that was owned by Commonwealth Development Corporation CDC, Tanganyika Development Finance Company Limited TDFL and FORESTAL (Ahlback 1986).

The Tanzanian government imposed 'Ujamaa' socialism with the Arusha Declaration in 1967 and peasants, through cooperatives, came to own the means of production that is land and forests. With the forced resettlement of the rural population into nuclear villages in 1974, the Ujamaa policy became mandatory for the rural population, the outcome of which led to overconsumption, disintegration and degradation of existing forest resources around village settlements (Friis-Hansen 1987). The environmental impacts of Ujamaa and villagization were severe and as a reaction the government and donor agencies promoted intensive afforestation campaigns in the late 1970s and early 1980s and encouraged people to grow trees in their vicinities (Hurst 2004). Donor support (in particular from Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark) for tree planting on village land continued into the 1990s and funded tree planting initiatives like Misituni ni Mali ('forests are wealth'), Hifadhi Mazingira HIMA ('conserve the environment'), Tanzania Forest Conservation Group TFCG, WWF, Care International and NGOs like Tanzania Association of Foresters (TAF) promoted tree planting activities (Ahlback 1986; Ngaga 2011). Donor support for tree planting by small-scale farmers on village land aimed at improving the environment, protecting water sources, and improving local access to firewood. In the end of the 1990s the aim shifted to supporting tree planting as a private business.

Timber Rush 2005–2019

In spite of the assistance from donors, tree planting on village land only expanded slowly in the Southern Highlands from late-1970s to the mid-2000s. The total area planted with trees in Njombe and Mufindi districts (the two districts with most tree planting) in 2005 was 6,700 hectares (Data from district forest officers in Njombe and Mufindi 2017). The slow pace of tree planting on village land dramatically increased during the following decade and, by 2017, the tree cover on village land had increased to 174,000 hectares (assessment based on satellite images, Milledge et al 2018). The tree growers involved in this timber rush on

village land are resident small-scale farmers as well as a new group of non-resident domestic investors. Resident farmers by far outnumber the non-resident domestic investors, while the domestic investors dominate in terms of area with trees planted.

Common incentives for the timber rush include a strong market demand as a consequence of a national supply deficit of wood. State-owned forest plantations and a few large-scale private plantations were, in the mid-2000s, the main sources of timber in the country. However, these were unable to meet the demand, a development fuelled by a long period of consistent high economic growth (Pedersen 2017; Ngaga 2011). Qualitative fieldwork reveals that the factors that initiated the timber rush in the mid-2000s differ for resident and non-resident domestic investors.

Difficult physical access to markets for trees is the key explanation for why planting of wood lots by resident villagers progressed at a slow pace until the mid-2000s. To access the market resident farmers had to fell their trees using manual saws, manually transport the four-metre-long tree trunks to the road and hire a private truck to transport the trees to private sawmills that were largely located in Mufindi district linked to Sao Hill state forest. Kikwete's presidency from 2005 opened for import of cheap mobile sawmills and chainsaws from China that allowed businessmen to buy trees from the farmers while in the fields and process the trees into planks on location. By 2011 more than 1000 mobile sawmill units were operating in the Southern Highlands (INDUFOR 2011). This direct access to the market led to an increase in the sale of mature trees planted by resident villagers in the 1980s and 1990s. Qualitative interviews indicate that a main driver of the timber rush among resident villagers was the experience of how early tree growers became well-off from selling their mature trees to mobile sawmill operators after 2005 (Friis-Hansen et al. 2019).

The precipitous rise of non-resident domestic investors in Tanzania's Southern Highlands was also driven by President Kikwete's support for speeding up implementation of the Village Land Act of 1999. A domestic market in land had emerged in the 1980s when the policies of African Socialism collapsed and liberalisation allowed for private investments in land (Sundet 1997). This led to a surge in land conflicts and paved the way for a land tenure reform in the form of two acts, the Land Act and the Village Land Act of 1999, that sought to regulate land markets, decentralised authority over rural land to the local level, recognised existing rights to land, and facilitated the establishment of a new formal land court system (URT 1994; Pedersen 2016). While this, *de jure*, restricted informal transactions in land, it potentially also provided for more security for small- and medium-scale investors acquiring village land.

Different categories of investors emerged; foreign and domestic, small- and large-scale (industrial), private and public – all dived into the tree growing business. Although the Tanzanian government forest policy provides for the need to incorporate private sector actors in forestry (URT 1998), the rise of domestic investors in the Southern Highlands happened without any direct support from

the government (Pedersen 2007). Government support in various forms was, on the other hand, visible in the facilitation of other, foreign, large-scale investors, for instance Green Resources Limited from Norway and the UK-based New Forest Company (Olwig et al. 2015). Development partners (DPs) were involved in facilitating both FDI and the smaller domestic investors.

As will be clear below, different types of land were accessible for different types of actors in the Southern Highlands' timber rush. In 2007 all village governments were requested by the district commissioners to identify land available for domestic investors. The vast majority of land identified as suitable for domestic investors belonged to the land use category locally known as 'mahame', referring to land that was left behind unused when farmers were forcibly resettled into nuclear village settlements in 1974 during what is known as 'Operation Sogeza' or the villagization policy (Friis-Hansen 1987). This mahame land had little use value for its owners, as it is located far from the village settlements. In the early years (2007–2010) when most land transactions took place, urban-based domestic investors took advantage of the lack of local awareness of the value of land and acquired land cheaply.

ANALYSIS: TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC INVESTORS

Access mechanisms and the development of a typology

This paper develops its categories of domestic investors who make up the typology using how land has been acquired for tree planting activities as the main criteria. The typology is both empirically grounded and theoretically informed. Theoretically it draws on the three access mechanisms as set out in Ribot and Peluso's (2003) 'theory of access' that are most relevant in this regard, namely 'capital', 'social identity' and 'authority'. These access mechanisms are more important for the identification of differences in how land is acquired than the other five mechanisms in Ribot and Peluso's framework. Their theory is also concerned with 'ability to benefit from things', and the other mechanisms relate more to this. The three mechanisms are discussed in more detail in this section, which also draws on other literature that can help analyse how land is acquired under a resource rush. As will become clear in the following sections, there is much diversity within each type leading to several sub-types, each of which combines access mechanisms in different ways. However, the main reason for the establishment of each of the four overall investor types is that the sub-types within a type share the same main access mechanism, either capital, social identity or authority.

The context is a rush for land for tree planting activities in the Southern Highlands in Tanzania. This contributed to speeding up changes in existing land tenure systems. Traditionally, social identity has been more important for access to land in sub-Saharan Africa, often in some combination with traditional authority. Social identity in Ribot and Peluso's theory is about custom and kinship or other types of

local belonging, and in Africa this often overlaps with customary land tenure systems. This element was often overlooked in land tenure reform efforts aimed at formalising how land is held, which subsequently proved to be hard to implement at the local level due to local resistance (Berry 1993, 1994). A host of studies has focused on the subsequent negotiability of rights at the local level due to the institutional competition and legal pluralism (Juul & Lund 2002; Sikor & Müller 2009; Sikor & Lund 2009; see also Peters' critical assessment of this agenda in Peters 2004).

The advent of markets in land and the use of capital as an access mechanism affects the role and importance of social identity in different ways depending on the type and strength of local authority structures (Peluso & Lund 2011). A large variety of access mechanisms may be found that render processes of land access more contingent (Hall 2011). Previously, land was often accessed either through the right of the axe, that is, the cutting of trees and bushes in a certain area, or through traditional authorities (Kauzeni et al. 1998). Whereas accessing the latter could also involve pecuniary transactions, in its nature it was often more about social identity. Capital, by contrast, more easily mediates relations between strangers. Capital is, moreover, important for what the access literature terms the 'ability to benefit' from the land, that is for making use of the land, for instance through the purchase of seedlings and inputs and for maintenance (Ribot & Peluso 2003).

Finally, authority continues to play an important role in many transactions. Authority may include customary authorities as well as state-backed authorities. Boone makes a key distinction between neo-customary and statist land tenure systems in Africa, the former granting a bigger role for ethnicity and customary institutions and the latter a bigger role for central state institutions (Boone 2014). Research by Lavers and Boamah into large-scale foreign investments in Ghana with its strong customary land tenure institutions and Ethiopia with a more statist system suggests that existing land authorities may use investments to strengthen their power (Lavers & Boamah 2016; see also Peluso & Lund 2011). Less research has been carried out into the interrelationship between small- and medium-scale domestic investors and authority. However, we do know that hybrid forms of land tenure and authority emerge with the advent of land markets. The term 'informal formalisation' has been coined to describe how in the context of increasing pressure on land and the absence of accessible formal services, existing local-level authorities often invent documents that resemble formal documents (Mathieu 2001; Benjaminsen et al. 2008).

Based on the observation that in the wake of high global commodity prices capital as an access mechanism was becoming more important than the early land grab, the concepts of capital accumulation and accumulation by dispossession were introduced. This draws on the work of Marx and David Harvey, with the latter maintaining the focus on capital as the driver, but also increasingly emphasising the active facilitation by the state (Harvey 2016; see also Hall 2013). However, as has been pointed out by Derek Hall (2011), this should not obscure the fact that smallholders may actively take part in land markets. Furthermore, the

commoditisation of access to land does not necessarily extinguish other access mechanisms, but rather leads to an increased intermingling of these. In fact, it has been observed that the intensification of globalisation has often led to an upsurge of claims of autochthony, that is, a bigger emphasis on localised social identity, also when it comes to access to land (Ceuppens & Geschiere 2005; Chauveua & Colin 2010).

Indeed, in the case of the timber rush in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania, for many smaller land acquisitions by domestic investors, capital may not always be the most important access mechanism, state authority may be pretty absent, and social identity continues to play an important role. However, in line with Boone's findings on the effects of Tanzania's rather statist land tenure system, our paper suggests that ethnicity may play a less overt role in Tanzania than in many other African countries (Boone 2015). Table 1 below shows the importance of different access mechanisms for different investor types. The values are relative, that is, they are based on assessments of the relative importance of different access mechanisms based on explorative research. Thus, for instance, the fact that authority is least important for urban-based investors does not imply that it is not important. Indeed, whereas they tend to access land through capital often facilitated by middlemen, urban-based investors often also seek to formalise their ownership through land titling using formal authorities.

Table 1. Typology of domestic investors in non-industrial private forest in Southern Highlands, Tanzania, by access mechanisms

Typology of domestic investors	Access mechanisms		
	Capital	Social identity	Authority
DI 1: Urban-based investors	1	2	3
DI 2: Resident villagers	3	1	2
DI 3: Urban investors originating from area	1/2	1/2	3
DI 4: Govt. and religious organisations	3	2	1

1: more important; 2: less important; 3: least important

Whereas we do know that the amount of agricultural land held by urban households has increased significantly in recent years and that the number of tree growers owning more than 5 hectares has also increased (FDT 2015; Jayne et al. 2016; PFP 2017), the exact distribution of land held by the different categories is hard to establish based on existing statistics. The typology therefore focuses more on how land is acquired than on the scale of the different types. However, the proportion of land in the Southern Highlands held by smaller landowners that is being used for non-forestry crops is greater than among larger landholders. This suggests that for resident village investors land plays a bigger role in basic livelihood provision than is the case for other investors, who focus more on business opportunities. More research into these livelihood aspects of the timber rush is needed.

Here it is worth noting that the domestic investor type 3 stands out because of the ambivalence around the importance of capital and social identity respectively. This is due to significant variation among this type with regard to access

mechanism, where some get information on available village land from relatives but pay relatively much for it, while others acquire land as cheaply as villagers do. When compared to other urban-based investors the role of social identity is furthermore different because it is more about kinship. Other urban-based investors often 'borrow' social identity from middlemen, who originate from the area or have strong local connections, who increasingly have come to mediate land transactions. Middlemen are well informed about rural settings and are on good terms with land owners and village authorities. It could be argued that a further one of Ribot and Peluso's access mechanisms, namely 'other social relations' should have been included in the table, but since it is not that relevant for the other investor types it is instead counted under 'social identity' for urban-based investors.

Urban-based investors

There has been a significant increase in the proportion of agricultural land held by urban households in Tanzania (Jayne et al. 2016). Urban-based investors are characterised by their strong financial resources that facilitate their investment processes, not only when acquiring land, but also for the hiring of people to work in their woodlots; hence they often own large woodlots compared to resident village investors. They typically acquire land for business purposes. In our context in the Southern Highlands this generally means land for tree planting. However, there has also been speculation that some tracts of land have been acquired as investments in and of themselves and tree planting has been secondary. A survey thus suggests that a larger proportion of land owned by medium- and large-scale landholders in the Southern Highlands is unused when compared to smallholders (FDT 2015). This may also, however, relate to a more systematic approach to establishing plantations by larger investors, who stagger their planting to allow for continuous future annual harvesting.

The group of urban-based investors is diverse, and we divide it into two sub-categories: private companies, businessmen and central government employees, and local government employees. Due to their location in urban centres, businessmen and central government employees do not have strong local social relations in the villages that can facilitate access to land. Instead, they often involve middlemen, who mediate in land transactions between land sellers, buyers and village government. In these cases, the investors themselves are not in direct contact with villagers or village government in the early stages of investment, but use these middlemen to mediate most of the activities and processes on their behalf. Thus, for them, financial capital is the most significant mechanism for accessing village land and the establishment of an investment. Similarly for local government employees, capital is the most important access mechanism, although they often possess knowledge of the area and are in direct contact with villages, villagers and village government due to their location in the areas of investment. Their position as government employees thus puts them in a superior position vis-à-vis village governments, although this rarely helps them avoid paying for the land at market rates.

Because of their lack of local social relations that can help mediate in cases of conflict, urban-based investors often prefer to have their land registered by the village government and later go for title deeds. This, they claim, helps their woodlots be recognised by the villagers and village governments and thus increases their security of tenure. In so doing, they typically make sure that their land purchases are documented at the village government and witnesses to land transactions and names of neighbours bordering the purchased land are listed in documents. The urban-based domestic investors are expected to contribute to village development activities, and some do as a way to gain acceptance in the village. Some complain about the ad hoc and non-transparent system guiding the contribution by or involvement of domestic investors, which makes it unpredictable and at times feel like blackmail. On the other hand, many investors do not contribute and some of those who have accessed land through village allocations do not even fulfil the promises they made as part of the payment for the land.

Private companies, businessmen and central government employees

This is the group of actors who come from outside the rural areas. Most are government employees, business people and/or entrepreneurs, but also a few private companies investing in land can be found. Regarding the latter, we do not include the large-scale plantations that are foreign-owned and tend to have a much longer history in the Southern Highlands. Overall, the group of urban-based investors rely on capital to gain access to village land and capital is also important for utilising the land, for instance for buying inputs, sowing and harvesting. The capital facilitates both formal, informal or, at times, outright illegal acquisition of plots of land. Domestic businessmen, private companies and high-level central government employees access land to make a profit out of it: *'If you calculate how much money you can make in one acre of woodlot, and compare to the money you invest, you will find that tree planting is a good business to go into. There are less running costs involved, no chemicals for fumigation, no fertilisers, just money for making fire breaks and wait for trees to mature'* (interview with local businessman in Iringa, 24 November 2017). This is how businessmen perceive tree planting investment.

Several private companies or organisations are investing in tree planting in the Southern Highlands. Although on a varying scale, all companies rely on finance capital as a mechanism to acquire village land for tree planting. Companies acquire both communal and individual village land from village councils and villagers respectively. In Isaula village, the company called Kahawa Timber Ltd. has acquired 140 hectares of land, some of which is planted with eucalyptus and some with pine trees. Similarly, Matekeleza Chang'a & Co. Ltd, a large-scale domestic investor, owns more than 6000 hectares of tree plantations in different villages of the Southern Highlands. Private companies, businessmen and central government employees often hire middlemen to acquire land for investments, whether it is purchase of village land from the village government (the commons) or from individual villagers. Typically originating in the area, the middlemen often possess the social identity that the investor lacks. They also often manage the investment on their behalf, which can be time-consuming if you run a business or

are employed by the government: *'The problem is time. You cannot run your business in town and at the same time manage tree planting by yourself. If you have time, it is better to go by yourself, not to use middlemen. In that way villagers will know you, which is a good thing'* (interview with businessman in Makambako, 29 April 2018).

The status of the middlemen is unclear as they often work for both the buyer and the land seller. There are therefore also risks associated with the involvement of middlemen for both buyers and sellers, as some middlemen misuse the trust, giving one of the parties a bad deal. The land is acquired either by observing all formal laws and procedures sanctioned by the state, customs and societies; through informal means where transactions are not recorded by authorities; or by *twisting* formal laws to enable illicit gain, and maintain control of access to land, mainly through corruption and bureaucracy (illegal access). Domestic investors often later apply for title deeds for permanent land ownership.

Local government employees

These are employees from various sectors; teachers, medical doctors, district officers, administrators, directors and the like, who, although they have some local relations and authority, rely on finance capital to acquire village land for tree planting. Apart from their salaries, local government employees may secure money from financial institutions like banks. Some of this capital is used to acquire land to establish plantations. This is land areas of varying sizes, at times in different villages. When asked about where local government employees acquire village land for tree planting, an investor working for local government (a chairman of an urban-based tree growers association) had this to say, *'It depends, most of investors get land from individual villagers but a few get from the village government'* (Interview at Mafinga, 10 April 2018). The salaries of local government employees are lower than those of businessmen and central government employees and their average sizes of landholding are smaller, which demonstrates the importance of capital as a mechanism of village land access.

Resident villagers

Resident villagers are a group of domestic investors with very strong local relations within the villages. Typically, they own land already from inheritance or clearance. At times they may have claims to land outside existing villages which was used by their parents or grandparents but left vacant during the villagization in the 1970s. The status of such land is unclear in Tanzania's land laws, but feelings of ownership are often strong and tend to resurface when land is to be put into active use again (Sundet 1997). Resident village investors are, furthermore, well connected in the villages due to their social identity. This social status enables their access to additional land more cheaply than outsiders.

While some resident village investors access land through social arrangements in families, including inheritance from ancestors, some also acquire land through allocations of little used land. Ethnicity may play some role, but due to Tanzania's statist land tenure system this is less pronounced than in other African countries (Boone & Nyeme 2015). Instead, local residency is an important criterion during

allocations. Typically, locals pay a fee for survey and demarcation only. Some may also buy land from fellow villagers at higher rates, though these still tend to be below what non-resident investors pay. Unlike non-resident investors, resident villagers are not regarded as investors by other villagers and they are therefore not obliged to contribute to development activities in cash or in kind to the same extent.

Resident villagers accessing land from village government

This is a group of village-based investors, who acquire communal village land from the village council either as individuals or as groups. Thus, in villages with enough communal land individuals may apply for land from the village council during village allocation processes. To gain access to land one often needs to contribute survey fees, which cost many times less than the normal price for acquiring land. The better-off villagers can meet such an amount, but not all who can manage the fees get a piece of land; other mechanisms such as how connected you are, how influential you are, and your consequent ability to access controllers, determine who gets land and who does not. It is through distribution of communal village land that most villagers became NIPF actors.

In the Southern Highlands an important group of resident domestic investors in this regard is the Tree Growers Association (TGA). Members of the TGA are villagers who acquire communal village land from village councils as a requirement for donor-supported tree growing activities under the donor-funded Private Forest Program (PFP). Depending on the availability of surplus land, not all villagers interested in tree planting gain access to land. Thus, social relations and one's relation to village leaders (those with authority and control of access to land) determine who gains access to land and its associated benefits from involved donors. Village-based members of TGAs are readily accessible, identified and so contribute labour to tree plantations when needed.

Villagers with surplus land

Like elsewhere in Africa, rural land in Tanzania is still dominated by smallholder family farming units. Most often, this land has been accessed through inheritance. The size of landholdings differs widely from one location to another. In Tanzania's Southern Highlands the average lots of resident farmers are relatively small, but many have multiple plots, and some are located outside the village settlements. Some villagers also have claims to land outside the villages that was used by themselves or their families prior to the relocations to nuclear villages during Ujamaa. This land is often remote and little used, on steep slopes, or is fields that used to be hired out to poorer farmers in the village with limited landholdings. As prices for their forest and agricultural products go up, or access to markets improves, the cultivation of this land can be intensified.

Within the Southern Highland villages land is commonly very unequally distributed. A survey from 2015 covering 3,285 respondents found that two thirds of resident tree growers own more than 2 hectares (and 11% more than 4 hectares), while two thirds of resident farmers who did not grow trees owned less than 2

hectares (FDT 2015). The survey further shows that the average amount of land owned by resident tree growers is 2.4 hectares, of which 42% is planted with trees. By comparison, the average landholding of resident farmers who do not grow trees is 1.2 hectares. Qualitative interviews confirm that resident tree growers on average have relatively small woodlots (average 1 hectare) compared to the non-resident domestic investors. There are, however, large variations within the village as well as between districts.

Resident villagers who buy land from others

Some few well-off individuals in villages depicted as 'rich fellows' or village elites, who run small businesses within the village environment, buy land from other villagers. They own assets such as good houses, motorbikes, bicycles and sometimes cars. Their wealth and status are enablers to gain access to land through purchasing, normally at low prices. They are in a position to accumulate vast amounts of land from different villagers through normal buying and selling of land or by lending money in exchange for land as security. Unlike other villagers, this group formalises its land ownership and despite having much land from inheritance, does not sell land to others unless circumstances force them to. When asked to describe the position of land sellers in the village and to comment on whether he would sell land to other people, a resident investor said, *'It depends on the problem you are facing. If you have a problem you will be forced to sell land. These people are different. Some people sell land but they don't have any problem to solve, but others have problems to solve including taking care of big families'* (interview conducted at Isaula village on 13 March 2018).

Urban investors originating from the area

Although they don't live there, urban investors originating from the area of investment tend to be most similar to resident investors when accessing land. Their importance differs from one locality to another, but it is generally growing. In our case area, the Southern Highlands, they play a big role. Parts of the region were designated labour reserves from which labour for plantations elsewhere could be drawn during colonial times. Structural adjustment in the 1990s, furthermore, undermined strong agricultural production and pushed many young men and women to migrate to urban centres (Friis-Hansen 2000).

Even if they are second or third generation migrants, they see themselves as being from the village and are often perceived as such by resident villagers. These perceptions provide for strong relations to villagers tied to social identity. They either inherit land or acquire it cheaply through village allocations.

Thus, due to their origin, some enjoy good relationships with village leaders, who may even facilitate access by dodging some legitimate steps of acquiring land. Social identity allows them to bypass laws and bureaucracy and reduce the price of land. *'I belong to the leadership family, a grand grandson of Chief Mkwawa's warrior Kigwamumembe, who was a chief in command responsible for Mufindi area. Everybody around here knows our family'* (interview with urban-based investor in his village of origin, 5 April 2018). This was stated by an investor originating from the village,

who bought an estimated 80 hectares of land and also received an extra 8 hectares as a gift because he was a grand grandson of Chief Mkwawa's warrior.

Finally, some acquire land cheaply through their local relations, typically relatives with information about land markets in the villages. When asked how they know about land availability in the village, an investor said, *'I got a phone call from my mother in the village who told me that someone is selling land for tree planting at a cheap price, then I told her to hold it for me'*. Their social relations give them a better position to access land than other outsiders, even when the third party potentially could pay a higher price for the land.

In terms of how they are holding land, however, the urban investors originating from the area are often more similar to other urban-based investors. Being absent from the village for long stretches of time makes them feel insecure about their tenure and they therefore often seek to formalise their ownership by going through the process of obtaining certificates or a title deed. In addition, they feel under greater pressure to put the land to productive use. In the Southern Highlands, the planting of trees therefore often plays a dual role; firstly, as a means to secure tenure security and secondly as an investment opportunity. A businessman working with importation of cars in Dar es Salaam who inherited land in his village of origin Maliwa in Makete district stated: *'Planting (pine) trees on the fields that I inherited from my father is a good way to benefit from the land without having to be present in the village. I realised that growing trees is a good business and bought additional land [former common grazing area] from the village government to plant trees'* (Domestic investor, interview 25 August 2017).

Government and religious organisations

These organisations can be both local and central government entities as well as religious ones. They own large tracts of village land, in our case areas typically land set aside for establishing woodlots. The size of their land holdings varies significantly. Village councils allocate common village land for various public purposes, for instance local public schools, and these tend to be rather limited land allocations. Villages and district councils themselves may also set aside or acquire land as their own investment. By comparison, government organisations closer to the central state often seek to acquire much larger tracts of land for business purposes. In between are the landholdings of religious institutions, either for their own use or for investment purposes.

Often, local organisations apply for a share of communal village land and the village council, with the consent of the village assembly, can allocate a bigger or smaller share of village land. There are normally few costs involved in the allocation process itself. Since the acquisition does not involve much money, the titling of land ownership also varies for different public institutions, with public primary schools being less motivated to obtain titles while religious and central government institutions, who operate from a distance, take the second step and seek to establish formal landownership through title deeds.

Local leaders of government and religious organisations often also acquire land using their authority. Village chairpersons often own large tracts of village land for tree planting. Although they are not salaried, they are typically among the wealthier villagers. Their role as managers of village land endows a privileged position to acquire land from the commons and from other villagers with surplus land. Religious leaders also receive respect and favours from the village government; hence they acquire land for tree planting from village government, with their believers and followers also getting land for free or at lower prices. Like other resident village investors, local leaders do not contribute towards village development but enjoy all the services provided to domestic investors. As leaders, they know the procedures to secure documents for their landholdings, hence most of their land is registered in village offices.

Government organisations and leaders

In the Southern Highlands, many government organisations own village land for tree plantations. Public institutions acquire communal village land through allocation by the village council as a local and, at times, national public good. This combined with the authority they possess make capital less important for accessing land. When asked about how the village acquires land for itself or for schools, which may include woodlots, one village chairman in the Southern Highlands had this to say, *'The village does not need to pay for land acquisition, the land is hers, and you cannot buy your property'* (interview with village chairman in Lugolofu, 16 November 2018). For such local public purposes, the villagers often participate in establishing and maintaining woodlots by contributing their labour called *'Maendeleo ya kijiji'* meaning village development, and anyone who fails to show up is hit with a financial penalty.

Organisations closer to the central state tend to acquire far larger tracts of land for investment purposes. This is a practice that has become important in Tanzania in recent years. In the Southern Highlands the Tanzania Forest Service (TFS), a state agency under the Ministry of National Resources and Tourism that holds and manages forests on behalf of the state, has thus acquired three plots encompassing a total of around 17,000 hectares of village land in the Southern Highlands. It sees itself as different from private investors: *'Our approach as TFS is to acquire land from the villages and we work more on this land that is considered public. There is very big land. So, we just take this land and make it part of the government land (...). and not allow everybody to go to individuals in the village and take pieces of land from individuals. That would be bad'* (interview with TFS official, 1 May 2017).

Similarly, Sokoine University of Agriculture has recently acquired 10,000 hectares for tree planting that is seen as a reliable source of income when government funding is unstable. The latter was invited to buy the land by the regional commissioner, who stated that there was plenty available in the area.

There is some opacity around the rights and procedures related to such large acquisitions of land, which are often framed as important for the development of the nation. Whereas much effort is made to persuade the villages to allocate the land voluntarily, there is often an inherent threat of compulsory acquisition (see

also Pedersen & Kweka 2017). Whereas capital is not a direct part of the deal, the land is not completely free. The institutions often contribute to the villages in kind, decided through negotiation processes, often in the form of the construction of roads, school classrooms or the like: *'to acquire land you have to give something to the villages. We as TFS said we would give gravity water project'* (interview with government official, 8 December 2018). Such CSR-like exchanges are not necessarily finite and can be ongoing. TFS has also set in motion the making of land-use plans in order to facilitate acquisitions. Typically, central government institutions seek to acquire formal title deeds.

Local politicians and village leaders are authoritative individuals who may not have money to buy land from individual villagers but do have powers to influence land distribution and land transactions through which they get a share of land plots. Their position as authorities provides a mechanism to acquire land in many villages through village allocations and they often own large tracts. Their knowledge about availability and prices on the land market is an additional advantage. When asked about the low prices for the land he bought, a politician answered, *'I am a home boy'* meaning that he is a local, the prices for him cannot be the same as for outsiders. When asked about how villagers regard him, one village chairman said, *'I am just like other villagers, I have bought land from different villagers, but villagers do not know how much land I own'* (interview with village chairman, Isaula, 13 April 2018).

Religious institutions

Religious institutions, likewise, have much authority embedded in people's beliefs. As the most respected institution, churches have accumulated vast tracts of land. As authoritative organs, churches are rarely questioned or accused of misconduct and this allows them enjoyment of benefits from the land. Most of the land owned by these institutions is, consequently, acquired through allocations from village councils, gifted and as shares, or bought at low prices from villagers.

Christianity prevails in most of the Southern Highlands and the Roman Catholics lead in acquiring land for tree planting. When asked how religious institutions acquire village land for tree planting, a village chairman explained: *'Our churches don't have money to buy land, so we help them with land just like the government does in other church issues, like importation of goods'* (interview with a village chairman, Lugolofu village, 16 November 2018). Other denominations include Lutherans, Pentecostals and the New Life in Christ Church, all of which also own land beyond their church premises. Similar to the cases of land held by the village government and public schools, religious institutions are also not obliged to contribute to village development.

Like religious organisations, religious leaders are strongly connected to villagers through beliefs. As such, priests and pastors from churches possess some authority embedded in people's beliefs, which enables them to access land at low prices (if cost is involved at all) and receive lands as offerings from believers. When asked about the motives for planting trees in the village, a pastor said, *'We are the church, we need land to plant trees that will help us run the institution without*

depending much on people's offerings. We don't have a branch in this village, but we think in the coming years, these people might be members of our church' (interview with the pastor in Mafinga, 9 April 2018).

THE TYPOLOGY OF DOMESTIC INVESTORS REVISITED

The paper has developed a new typology for domestic small- and medium-scale private land investors based on a combination of a literature review into the literature on the land rush that has occurred in Africa over the last decade and empirical research into a crop boom, namely the timber rush in Tanzania's Southern Highlands, driven by domestic and regional demand for timber for the construction sector. While recent research suggests that such domestic investors are more important than has been acknowledged in the early phase of the land grab literature, knowledge about their composition and how they access land is limited (Cotula 2013). Drawing on Ribot and Peluso's 'Theory of Access', the present paper has identified a number of actors based on how they acquire land for tree planting activities. Whereas previous literature has tended to focus on categories of non-resident investors (Hilhorst et al. 2011) and the size of landholdings (Jayne et al. 2015), this paper's typology includes a wider variety of domestic investors.

A main difference from large-scale, foreign investors is the fact that access to land for small- and medium-scale domestic investors is, to a lesser extent, facilitated by the state and unlike many other crop booms not primarily driven by export markets (see Hall 2011). Instead, three different access mechanisms, namely capital, social identity, and authority are identified as the most important. Different types of domestic investors use different combinations of these access mechanisms. As we have discussed, this does not mean that the other five access mechanisms identified by Ribot and Peluso – technology, markets, labour opportunities, knowledge, and other social relations – are unimportant, but rather that they are more relevant for the 'ability to benefit'.

It is worth noting that there are some overlaps in the access mechanisms in Ribot and Peluso's framework that deserve discussion in order to advance our understanding of domestic investors in the context of a land rush characterised by growing land markets and rapidly evolving land transaction practices. Thus, Ribot and Peluso make a basic distinction between 'legal/illegal access' and the other access mechanisms. However, as demonstrated in the paper, the overlaps between issues of legality and, in particular, authority as an access mechanism are significant. In order to unpack domestic investors and develop a typology a focus on legality may therefore not be the most important one. This insight is similar to the research on property, which puts a bigger emphasis on how land is held, the rights this entails and how landholdings are sanctioned by socially legitimate institutions rather than on legality per se (see for instance Sikor & Lund 2009; and Lund 2011). This does point to an intimate relation between land and authority. Rather than choosing between legality and legitimacy we suggest that a more

fruitful distinction analytically is between authority derived from below – linked to autochthony – and authority derived from above – linked to more universal claims related to state, citizenship and religion – as suggested in the model below.

	Social identity	Capital
Authority from below	Resident villagers, having social identity as main access mechanism.	Urban-based investors originating from area, combining social identity and capital.
Authority from above	Government and religious institutions, using authority as main access mechanism.	Urban-based investors using capital as main access mechanism. Often formalised landholding.

The model shows the different types of domestic investors as functions of different access mechanisms with a basic distinction between authority derived from claims of an autochthonous and those of a more universal nature. By authority related to claims of autochthony, we mean authority related to specific groups, which may be ethnic, class or place-specific ones. By authority related to claims of a more universal nature, we mean authority related to what is often perceived as modern systems like state bureaucracies that claim to provide for the inclusion of all citizens irrespective of their origin.⁴ With the growth of markets in land, obviously capital has become more important for accessing land, and this in turn tends to increase the demand for universal authority that can help document ownership and settle disputes for non-autochthones. However, the commoditisation of land does not necessarily extinguish other access mechanisms, but rather leads to an increased intermingling of these. This is not least the case in a statist land tenure system like Tanzania's, which at the same time retains an important role for the central state in regulating land while decentralising much control to local-level authorities (Boone & Nyeme 2015; Pedersen 2016). The model demonstrates a great diversity in how land is acquired. Rather than treating autochthonous and universal authority as binaries, this suggests that they should be seen as the outcomes of processes of mutual transformation (see also Pedersen 2012).

The model points to a diversity in how land is acquired that is important for several reasons. First, just as motives for acquiring land are likely to differ among different types of investors, so will their investments lead to different outcomes in terms of social and economic development. Whereas investments have resulted in gains in wealth and livelihood opportunities for many, they are also associated with processes of social differentiation where some may be left worse off (see also Sulle 2016). Individualisation of the ownership of land limits land available for grazing of the livestock of pastoralists. It is often also gendered in that women may lose access to firewood or water sources previously available (Giovarelli

⁴ For inclusion and exclusion of social systems, see Luhmann, N. (2002). 'Inklusion og eksklusion' Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 3(1): 121–39.

2009). In order to develop the model and its implications for development and livelihood outcomes further, more in-depth as well as comparative research is needed.

Secondly, whereas much attention has been paid to improving transparency of large-scale investors in particular, for instance the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security under the FAO (FAO 2018), the small- and medium-scale transactions have stayed under the radar. However, given that the scale of the latter may by far surpass that of land acquired by foreign actors, their impact on local livelihoods is no less profound. Similarly, the ways in which state and religious organisations acquire land have received limited attention. More attention to these different types of transactions is needed to improve land-use planning and increase transparency.

CONCLUSION

This paper serves the dual purpose of developing a typology of domestic investors involved in tree planting activities in the Southern Highlands that may also help improve our understanding of resource rushes elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. It draws on a combination of a review of the literature on the land rush on the continent, empirical research into investments in the Southern Highlands and access theory, and points to a greater diversity of domestic investors than often acknowledged in the literature. In this regard Tanzania's Southern Highlands serve as an extreme case that may shed light on similar, but less intense, investment dynamics elsewhere in Tanzania and on the African continent.

The paper identifies four main types of investor, namely urban-based investors, resident village investors, urban-based investors originating from the area and state and religious institutions. Each of these draws on specific combinations of access mechanisms of which capital, social identity and authority are the most important. Statistics suggest that the urban-based investors in particular have increased investments, though this has been more through expansion of the use of land than through dispossession. Capital, thus, has become more important for acquiring land but this does not extinguish the other access mechanisms. Rather, it is the intermingling of access mechanisms for different investor types that is important. The paper therefore revisits the understanding of authority in order to refine the typology. By way of unpacking the diversity of investors the paper suggests that the impact of these investors on local livelihoods differs at the local level. Social differentiation processes are taking place, where wealth is created on the one hand, but vulnerable groups may be left worse off with less land access than in the past. Whereas urban-based investors may contribute to village development in various ways, they do increase the pressure on land significantly. More research into the scale and impact of the different types of domestic investors is needed.

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