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## Should I Stay, Should I Go Back or Should I Move Further? Contrasting Answers under Diverse Migration Regimes

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# Should I Stay, Should I Go Back or Should I Move Further?

## Contrasting Answers under Diverse Migration Regimes

Michael Landesmann, Sandra Leitner and Isilda Mara





# Should I Stay, Should I Go Back or Should I Move Further?

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# Abstract

EU integration, the process of EU enlargement and further visa liberalisation have encouraged increased population movements across Europe, some of which have taken new forms compared to previous migration waves. In particular, some destination countries have experienced high levels of temporary migration from poorer parts of Europe. Using a new set of survey data, we seek to obtain a deeper understanding of the factors affecting migration decisions by comparing migrants from three different sending countries in three destination countries under different migration regimes: Poles in the UK, Romanians in Italy and Serbs in Austria. The surveys were conducted in 2011 and 2012 and cover migrants who migrated between 2004 and 2012, which for Polish migrants in the UK corresponds to a phase with free mobility and full access to the labour market; for Romanian migrants in Italy it coincides first with visa liberalisation and then with full access to the labour market starting with Romania's EU accession in 2007; lastly, for Serbian migrants in Austria this includes a visa liberalisation regime from 2010 onwards. The surveys undertaken in the different (host) countries were using an almost identical methodology, thereby allowing for a direct comparison of the factors underlying the decision to migrate. Thus, migration preferences with regard to permanent, return and out-migration under different migration regimes, restrictive versus free mobility, could be analysed. At individual country level results show the weaker preference for permanent migration amongst the highest skilled which points to a lower attachment to a particular destination country. Furthermore, a change in the migration regime towards freer mobility contributes to the intensification of temporary and outward mobility among the highly skilled.

**Keywords:** return, out-migration, permanent migration, EU enlargement, visa regime, labour mobility

**JEL classification:** J15, J61, C30



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# 1. Introduction

Free movement within the European Union and facilitation of mobility by lifting visa restrictions towards countries outside the EU have produced new migration/mobility patterns. The recent migration patterns after EU enlargement have been the subject of many studies which came up with cautious predictions regarding the size and the types of movements resulting from the gradual lifting of restrictions (see e.g. Zimmerman, 2009; Kahanec, 2013; Brücker, 2010; Nowotny, 2009).

The expansion of the EU in 2004 and 2007 was accompanied by migratory movements, particularly to destination countries with favourable labour market conditions and liberalised access such as the UK for Polish and Spain and Italy for Romanian migrants. For third-country nationals, including those from the Western Balkans, the right to live and work in the EU-27 remained subject to national and EU restrictions. Despite this, third-country migrants have contributed considerably to the flow of migrants into EU countries. The share of free movement workers (i.e. those from countries with free access to EU labour markets) in total permanent migration stood at 37% in 2009, according to OECD (2012). Intra- and extra-EU mobility is not a new phenomenon. The movement of people into and within the EU territory has been facilitated by bilateral agreements such as those on seasonal workers, quota regimes, liberalising migration and visa regimes. Moreover, free mobility and transitional arrangements for labour migration have played an important role in shaping the mobility map of EU countries so that traditional neighbourhood destination countries such as Germany and Austria were replaced in certain phases by other countries such as the UK, Italy, Ireland and Spain (Brücker et al., 2009). Generally, temporary migration has prevailed in the form of home returns but also out-migration to other destination countries. Furthermore, different labour market developments have generated diversion effects which, for instance, accounted for the recent increase in migration flows to Germany (Bertoli et al., 2013).

Liberalisation of migration/mobility regimes has led to an increase in the share of temporary migration, especially in the form of return migration but also circular migration (Brücker et al., 2009; Constant et al., 2013). In this context, a high demand for jobs which are seasonal, in combination with a scarce local labour supply, has led to an increasing number of migrants getting temporary jobs, consequently encouraging temporary migration. Furthermore, liberalisation has triggered both intra- and extra-EU mobility particularly among the younger age cohorts. Countries also develop schemes to provide for a selection process which would regulate permanent and temporary migration according to short- and long-term demand variations. The different phases of EU enlargement have encountered scepticism that massive and permanent migratory flows might destabilise national equilibria. However, the experience of the EU countries has shown that severely restrictive migration regimes might be counterproductive. Migrants who have the right to move freely or face fewer barriers within the territory of the EU tend to show more frequent movements and temporary stays, while migrants who face more legal constraints to return to a destination country are less mobile (Constant et al., 2013; Epstein, 2013). Consequently, changes in migration regimes – i.e. various stages towards full liberalisation – play an important role in influencing migration plans particularly with respect to permanent or temporary settlement in the destination country.

The determinants of migration plans have been the subject of investigation in many theoretical and empirical studies such as Sjastaad (1962), Harris and Todaro (1970) or Borjas (1991), who suggest that individuals move as a result of higher expectations in terms of earnings and better opportunities in different

locations. Institutional constraints which limit or favour free mobility give rise to crucial research questions about the type and characteristics of migrants attracted under certain migration regimes, the type of migration – permanent or temporary – or any possible impact on the scale and structure of migration. Migration decisions occur under uncertainty and a comparative investigation of migration plans under diverse migration regimes for different receiving and sending countries can be very informative also for policy design.

In this study, we make an attempt to investigate the effects of free mobility or visa regimes on migration plans and identify whether temporary as against permanent migration becomes more popular due to more porous borders. Besides, we also analyse the determinants of different forms of temporary migration – return and out-migration.

We try to address these issues by investigating migration plans of migrants originating from three different countries, who have migrated between 2004 and 2012 to three different receiving countries under three different migration regimes. The surveys cover examples of the mobility of EU-8 to EU-15 (Polish migrants in the UK), mobility of EU-2 to EU-15 (Romanian migrants in Italy) and movement of non-EU to EU (Serbian migrants in Austria).<sup>1</sup> The analysis uses unique and comparable survey data collected in Italy and the UK in 2011 and in Austria in 2012 which allow investigating the mobility of Poles in the UK under a migration regime of fully free mobility (from 2004 onwards); of the mobility of Romanian migrants in Italy before and after EU enlargement in 2007, where the earlier period (2004-2007) coincides with a period of free visa regime and the latter with free movement of workers; lastly of the mobility of Serbs in Austria under a restrictive (before 2010) and a free visa regime (after 2010).

The methodology adopted in this study will be in two parts: in the first part, we shall identify the determinants of the decision to stay permanently, return home or out-migrate through discrete choice modelling; in the second part, we shall attempt to identify the effect of a particular migration regime on the decision to migrate permanently by applying matching methods in the form of propensity score matching. While the former approach serves the purpose of assessing the determinants of return and out-migration versus permanent migration, the latter focuses on the effects of migration policy regime changes, such as free labour mobility or free visa regime, on permanent migration intentions.

As regards the issue of permanent vs. temporary migration, in the form of return or out-migration, the three-country analysis shows that reducing restrictions encourages temporary migration and releases migrants from the trap of choosing between permanent migration and no-migration. Especially the highly skilled migrants show a higher preference for temporary migration. Already independently of the migration policy regime, the study finds a weaker preference for permanent migration and a lower attachment of the highly skilled to a particular destination country. Also, in the matched sample analysis we find that less restrictive mobility or free visa regimes further contribute to the mobility among the highly skilled.

The paper is structured as follows: following this introduction, Section 2 provides background information, discusses survey data characteristics and potential shortcomings and discusses the main descriptive statistics of the different migration plans of three different migration groups in different migration regimes. Section 3 introduces the two different methodologies used to analyse migration plans of groups of migrants in different regimes. Section 4 discusses the main results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes.

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<sup>1</sup> EU-8: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (accessing in 2004); EU-2: Bulgaria, Romania (accessing in 2007).

## 2. Background information, survey data and descriptive statistics

The focus of the study is on three different groups of migrants, in three different countries of residence, facing different and changing mobility or visa regimes. Generally, the three countries considered differ in terms of initial conditions concerning migration push and pull factors such as the level of economic development, the level of unemployment or income, etc. The three countries of residence also differ in terms of national migration regimes, integration of migrants in the local labour market and openness towards migrants, local labour market characteristics and the like.

In particular, the study looks at Polish migrants in the UK under a migration regime of fully free mobility from 2004 onwards. The UK, which is characterised by highly flexible labour markets, was among the first EU Member States that fully liberalised access to its labour market for citizens originating from the EU-8. Polish migrants represent the largest community from the EU-8: in 2011, more than 658.000 Polish migrants resided in the UK, representing two thirds of migrants from the EU-8. Drinkwater et al. (2009) point out that the typical Polish migrant in the UK is young, relatively highly qualified but generally employed in low wage sectors, below his or her level of qualification. Moreover, almost half of post-enlargement migration is temporary taking the form of circular, seasonal or return migration.

Additionally, the study looks at Romanian migrants in Italy under two different regimes: (i) the free visa regime between 2004 and 2007 and (ii) free mobility thereafter. Italy experienced one of the largest increases in inflows of migrants from the EU-8 and the EU-2. The transitional arrangements implemented in 2004 diverted a great number of Romanian migrants to Italy with such rapid pace that Romanian migrants became the largest community within just a few years only. In 2010, Romanian migrants represented 22% of all migrants in Italy (more than 900.000 individuals). As pointed out by the OECD (2012), the typical Romanian migrant in Italy is relatively young, less educated than migrants from the EU-8 and employed mostly in elementary occupations compared to natives.

Finally, the study looks at Serbian migrants in Austria under two different visa regimes: (i) the restrictive visa regime before 2010 and (ii) the free visa regime thereafter. Immigration of Serbian migrants to Austria has a long tradition, and even though Serbian migrants who move to Austria face mobility restrictions, with 111.280 individuals in 2013 (or 1.3% of the total Austrian population (Statistik Austria, 2013), this community represents the third largest group after German and Turkish migrants. This network is quite important and plays an important role in directing migrants to those areas which offer better jobs in industry, tourism and the services sector (Biffl, 2009).

### 2.1 SURVEY DATA

The ensuing analysis uses unique and comparable survey data for Polish migrants in the UK, Romanian migrants in Italy and Serbian migrants in Austria who migrated to their respective countries of residence under different migration regimes. In particular, to ensure comparability, similar surveys were conducted in each of the three destination countries, addressing questions on migrants' demographic characteristics (such as age, gender, marital status, number of children, family composition, residency in

the host country, region of origin etc.), their employment status, previous and current occupation, level of earnings and remittance payments, their migration plans and main motives, pulling factors and outcomes affecting the choice of permanent or temporary migration, labour market characteristics etc. The surveys were conducted in 2011 in Italy and the UK and in 2012 in Austria and cover migrants who came to their current country of residence between 2004 and 2012. In order to capture regional differences, the surveys were conducted in different regions of the three countries of residence, particularly in those areas with the highest concentration of immigrants from the respective countries of origin. Given the uniform design of the surveys, the ensuing comparative analysis provides a very comprehensive picture of migratory movements under different stages of EU enlargement and allows assessment of migration plans and how migrants adapt their migration preferences to changes in migration regimes.<sup>2</sup> All in all, 700 Polish migrants were interviewed in the UK (equally distributed across seven main locations), 1,000 Romanian migrants were interviewed in Italy (in the three main cities of Turin, Rome and Milan which are characterised by the highest concentration of this group of migrants) and 700 Serbian migrants were interviewed in Austria (mainly in Vienna).

However, given the particular design of the survey, some data shortcomings emerge which potentially affect results and inferences drawn from them. Particularly, our survey data are characterised by two limitations: firstly, *attrition* is an issue as a certain share of migrants who came after 2004 may have already left their countries of residence, either to return home or to move to a third country. This group of migrants is therefore no longer observable at the time of the interview in 2011 or 2012. Moreover, this loss of temporary migrants in the sample is particularly relevant for early migrants, who migrated under more restrictive mobility or visa regimes. Hence, given the particular focus of the study on migrants' migration plans in terms of either temporary migration or permanent migration under different mobility or visa regimes, the absence of migrants in more restrictive regimes with temporary migration plans only, tends to bias the sample towards more permanent migrants, which could considerably distort results. In particular, as highlighted in Figure 1 below, attrition is particularly relevant for the following two groups of migrants: (i) those who initially came to their countries of destination with the plan to stay temporarily only and already left and (ii) those who migrated with the plan to stay permanently but also decided to stay temporarily only. While the extent of attrition is impossible to determine ex post, there is however reason to believe that it is limited since related empirical evidence (see e.g. Constant et al., 2013; Epstein, 2013) suggests that more restrictive mobility or visa regimes – which would be particularly affected by attrition in our sample – tend to constrain temporary migration.

**Figure 1 / The presence of attrition in the survey data**

<i>Migration plans</i>	Temporary migration	Permanent migration
Temporary migration	Gone	Still around
Permanent migration	Gone	Still around

Secondly, given the partly retrospective design of the survey, our data are affected by both *memory decay* as well as *cognitive dissonance*. In particular, the analysis uses two different indicators to capture migration plans of migrants. One captures *current plans*, at the time of the interview while the other one

<sup>2</sup> For more about the methodology and survey results see Landesmann and Mara (2012, 2013) for Romanians in Italy and Serbs in Austria, and Drinkwater (2013) for Poles in the UK.

captures migration plans *upon arrival*, which is based on migrants' retrospective answers to the question concerning their intentions with respect to temporary versus permanent migration when they entered the country years back. Memory decay may play a non-negligible role for the latter indicator as the period between the time of migration and the time of the interview may be as long as 8 years and people may forget initial plans over time. However, as demonstrated by Mara and Landesmann (2012), preferences, especially with regard to permanent migration, remain mostly stable over time and migrants only slightly revise their preferences with respect to length of stay, which suggests that the preference for permanent migration upon arrival could be representative of migration preferences in the long run. Similarly, *cognitive dissonance*, i.e. the mental stress or discomfort an individual experiences who holds two or more contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values at the same time as advocated by Leon Festinger (1957, 1962), may be important in the current context. Particularly, at the time of the interview, when migrants realise that initial plans and current plans (partly strongly) differ, the associated discomfort results in a shift in plans to match the current situation. More specifically, following Festinger (1957, 1962), migrants who initially planned to stay temporarily only but, at the time of the interview, find themselves in a situation of permanent migration may report permanent migration as their initial plans to reduce discomfort and align initial plans with the current situation. Hence, because of both memory decay and cognitive dissonance, original initial plans may deviate from what people remember about their initial plans, which can bias results.

## 2.2 MIGRATION PREFERENCES UNDER DIFFERENT MIGRATION REGIMES: STAY PERMANENTLY, RETURN HOME OR OUT-MIGRATE

Table 1 below provides a first glimpse of different migration preferences under different migration regimes. For Polish migrants in the UK it highlights that relative to permanent migration, temporary migration in the form of either return migration to the country of origin or out-migration to a third country dominates. A share of 55% of Polish migrants prefer to return to their country of origin, 13% are willing to out-migrate to another country of destination (mostly within the EU) and around 32% prefer to stay permanently in the UK. As concerns Romanian migrants who moved to Italy under the free visa regime, a higher preference for temporary than permanent migration is observable. Almost half of them prefer to return home, one fifth prefers out-migration and less than a third prefers to settle permanently. Romanian migrants who moved to Italy under free mobility show an even higher preference for temporary migration: 55% prefer out-migration, 22% return migration, while only one fourth prefers permanent migration. By contrast, Serbian migrants who moved to Austria under the restrictive visa regime show very similar preferences for permanent and temporary migration. Specifically, 50% prefer to settle permanently, more than one third prefers out-migration and only 12% prefers to return home. As for migrants who moved to Austria under the free visa regime, the preference for permanent migration still dominates (with 42%), however, it is slightly lower compared to restrictive visa regime migrants (with 50%). Moreover, with around 37%, their preferences for out-migration are similar across regimes while their preference for return migration is higher at around 21%. Overall, there is already first evidence that a shift to less restrictive mobility or visa regimes has contributed to temporary migration.

Furthermore, a cross-country comparison of migration preferences of migrants in similar regimes shows that, in general, temporary migration dominates but that different groups of migrants prefer different modes of temporary migration. For instance, a comparison of free mobility migrants in the UK with those in Italy reveals a strong preference for temporary migration. Similarly, a comparison of migration preferences of Romanian and Serbian migrants who migrated under the free visa regime again points to the dominance of temporary migration with, however, differences in the particular mode of temporary

migration. While out-migration dominates among Serbian migrants, return migration dominates among Romanian migrants.

**Table 1 / Migration preferences under diverse migration regimes**

		UK Free mobility	UK Free mobility	UK Free mobility	Italy Free visa regime	Italy Free mobility	Austria Restrictive visa regime	Austria Free visa regime
	Poles: Total sample		Poles who migrated between 2004 & May 2007	Poles who migrated between May 2007 & 2011	Romanians who migrated between 2004 & January 2007	Romanians who migrated between January 2007 & 2011	Serbs who migrated between 2004 & 2009	Serbs who migrated between January 2010 & 2012
<b>Migration preferences</b>	Stay permanently	31.93	38.46	27.57	32.99	24.69	50.00	41.75
	Out-migrate	12.97	14.57	11.89	18.58	21.76	37.72	37.63
	Return	55.11	46.96	60.54	48.43	53.56	12.28	20.62
	<b>Total</b>	<b>617</b>	<b>247</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>479</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>194</b>
<b>Intentions about length of stay upon arrival</b>	Less than 3 months							
		19.33	13.92	23.05	5.73	7.39	5.52	7.58
	Between 3 months & a year	30.67	32.99	29.08	9.11	16.26	4.50	8.08
	Between 1 & 3 years	15.34	17.01	14.18	20.31	21.67	3.68	9.09
	Between 3 & 5 years	6.93	4.12	8.87	12.50	15.27	4.70	9.09
	More than 5 years	11.97	13.40	10.99	27.08	25.12	7.77	13.64
	Permanently	15.76	18.56	13.88	25.26	14.29	73.82	52.53
<b>Total</b>	<b>476</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>282</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>489</b>	<b>198</b>	

Source: Survey data of Romanian migrants in Italy, Polish migrants in the UK, Serbian migrants in Austria; own calculations.

### 2.3 PREFERENCES CONCERNING LENGTH OF STAY UPON ARRIVAL UNDER DIFFERENT MIGRATION REGIMES

In addition to their migration preferences at the time of the interview (upper panel of Table 1), the survey also interviewed migrants about their plans concerning the length of stay upon arrival in the country of destination. The survey differentiates between 6 categories, according to length of stay: 3 months, 3-12 months, 1-3 years, 3-5 years, more than 5 years and permanently. The responses for the 6 different categories are presented in the lower panel of Table 1 which shows that at the moment of arrival, around 16% of Polish migrants in the UK intended to settle and stay permanently while 50% had shorter migration episodes in mind and only preferred to stay up to one year. Compared to their counterparts in Italy, similar preferences for permanent migration are found for free mobility migrants, at around 14%. Moreover, with 25%, Romanian migrants who reached Italy during the free visa regime have a higher preference for permanent migration than Romanian migrants who migrated to Italy under the free mobility regime. However, relative to their Serbian counterparts in Austria, Romanian migrants in Italy have a significantly lower preference to settle permanently. These comparisons suggest that free mobility is accompanied by weaker preferences for permanent and long-term migration while, in contrast, the preference for permanent migration is much higher under more stringent migration regimes.

## 3. Methodology and econometric specification

### 3.1 DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION PREFERENCES TO EITHER RETURN, OUT-MIGRATE OR STAY PERMANENTLY

Generally, the optimisation of migration decisions not only depends on individual characteristics, but also on opportunities which accrue from the decision to migrate (move freely or not), expectations of certain outcomes from migration (such as the realisation of expectations related to employment opportunities, income, savings etc.) and preferences associated with the move (whether to move temporarily or permanently). For instance, individuals who decide to migrate typically have some prior expectations about the outcome of their decision to move in mind. After the move, the individual may then compare prior expectations with realised outcomes of migration. And while a good match between expectations and realisations could be a good reason to settle permanently in the destination country, a bad match may induce individuals to move forward, for example by out-migrating to another destination country or by moving backward and correcting the first move by returning home to the country of origin (Kennan and Walker, 2013).

Moreover, even though migration is an individual choice, policy-makers have an additional role in this story, by either restricting or accommodating free mobility. Free mobility agreements have proven to spur temporary and circular migration while, in contrast, restrictive policy instruments such as immigration quotas or visa regimes have produced the opposite effect, transforming temporary migrants into permanent ones (Constant et al., 2013). In the current context, different migration regimes may have produced different migration patterns. Free mobility of Poles in the UK may have intensified their mobility, while prevailing barriers to labour markets in some EU-15 countries may have induced Romanian migrants to shift their migration routes to countries with less restrictive access to labour markets and stronger cultural or linguistic affinities such as Italy or Spain. Similarly, mobility restrictions of Serbs might have encouraged the overstaying of legal entry visas, increasing the number of migrants staying permanently in Austria.

Hence, to shed light on the determinants of different migration plans in the context of different mobility or visa regimes, the following multinomial logit model is estimated:

$$P(\text{strategy} = j | \beta, X) = \frac{\exp(\beta' X_j)}{\sum_{k=1}^p \exp(\beta' X_k)}$$

where *strategy* refers to one of three potential migration plans of migrants at the time of the interview, namely (i) to stay permanently in the current country of residence, (ii) to return home or (iii) to out-migrate to a third country. Furthermore,  $X_j$  is a vector of the following variables:

- › *female* is a binary variable which is equal to 1 if the respondent is female;
- › *age* is captured by different age groups, ranging from 16-24, 25-34 and 35-44 to 44+ with the latter group as reference group;



- › *migrated with partner and/or child/ren* is included to capture the role of the family-context of migration for migration plans;
- › *educational attainment* is measured in terms of primary, secondary, vocational or tertiary education, with primary education as reference group;
- › *current employment status* captures whether an individual is working full-time, part-time or is self-employed, with unemployed as reference group;
- › *qualification match* which is equal to 1 if the current job is adequate to the level of one's qualifications, or *earnings match* which is equal to 1 if earnings expectations and the current level of earnings match well and zero otherwise;
- › *networks and connections* with the community, family members and friends.

Moreover, the analysis also tests whether and how positive and negative experiences with, or outcomes of, migration affect migration plans:

- › *positive outcomes of migration* include: 'learned a new language and skills', 'made more money', 'found a better job than at home', 'improved household standard of living', 'paid off debts', 'helped family' and 'have more opportunities now'. These options were put in descending order according to importance;
- › *negative outcomes of migration* include 'insecurity regarding the future', 'negative impact on family relationships', 'doing a job below one's level of qualification' and 'faced discrimination'. These options were again put in descending order according to importance.

Finally, the effect of *satisfaction with life in migration* on migration plans is determined, captured in terms of 'neither nor satisfied', 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' with life in migration, with 'dissatisfied' as reference group. For a short description of characteristics of groups of migrants see Annex A.

### 3.2 EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN MIGRATION REGIMES ON THE PREFERENCE TO STAY PERMANENTLY UPON ARRIVAL

The analysis seeks to shed light on the effects of changes in the migration regimes on preferences of migrants to stay permanently upon arrival. In this way, the effects of a change in regime from more to less restrictive on migrants' plans to stay permanently can be evaluated. This part of the analysis focuses on migration plans upon arrival as such plans represent initial migration plans, conditional on prevailing migration regimes. Hence, migrants' initial plans are unaffected by activities such as educational upgrading, starting of a family or positive and negative experiences in the country of residence, which, in turn, may induce them to revise their initial plans, which is, however, unrelated to changes in migration regimes.

Ideally, in such a context, the difference between the participants' outcome with and without treatment is known to draw proper policy inferences. However, both outcomes cannot be observed for the same individual at the same time. Hence, effects of such regime or policy changes are best addressed by matching methods such as propensity score matching (PSM) (Lozano and Steinberger, 2013; Rinne, 2013), which has been widely used in different disciplines to study causal treatment effects when using non-experimental or observational data. The major advantage of PSM is its ability to measure and account for the counterfactual, i.e. the potential outcome in the absence of treatment. In particular, the counterfactual framework, generally credited to Neyman (1923) and Rubin (1974, 1978, 1980, 1986),

indicates that the counterfactual can be assessed by comparing the average outcome of the treated participants with the average outcome of the non-treated participants.

In the current context, the aim is to identify the effect of a change in mobility or visa regime on the preference of migrants from different countries of origin to stay permanently in their countries of residence. The observable preference for permanent migration is captured by preferences of the so-called *treatment group*, which has received treatment in terms of migration during a new mobility or visa regime. The hypothetical preference for permanent migration – which is unobservable – can be identified from a so-called *control group*, which migrated under the previous mobility or migration regime. Hence, in general, the treatment indicator  $D_i$  is equal to 1 if individual  $i$  received treatment and zero otherwise. In the current context, the *treatment group* refers to (i) Romanian migrants who migrated to Italy under the free mobility regime (i.e.  $D_1^{ROM} = \text{free mobility}$ ), installed after 2007 or (ii) Serbian migrants who migrated to Austria under the free visa regime (i.e.  $D_1^{SERB} = \text{free visa}$ ), implemented after 2009. The *control group* refers to (i) Romanian migrants who migrated to Italy under the free visa regime (i.e.  $D_0^{ROM} = \text{free visa}$ ), in place until 2007 or (ii) Serbian migrants who migrated to Austria under the restrictive visa regime (i.e.  $D_0^{SERB} = \text{restricted visa}$ ), in place until 2009. Individuals of the same country of origin with similar characteristics, who, however, migrated under different regimes are then compared with respect to their preferences to stay permanently. The unexplained difference in the probability of choosing permanent migration between the treatment and the control group is attributed to the treatment effect or policy change (i) from free visa regime to free mobility (for Romanians in Italy) and (ii) from restrictive to free visa regime (for Serbs in Austria).

However, one drawback of our matching approach is that we explain past migration preferences for permanent migration using current demographic characteristics as controls. To make sure that such an approach would not bias our results we compare the compositional structure of main demographic characteristics both for Romanians in Italy and Serbs in Austria for the period under investigation. A major shift in the compositional structure of migrants' main demographic characteristics would then indicate that the approach taken produces biased results. As shown in Annex B, the data available for Romanian migrants in Italy between 2004 and 2011 confirm that the structure in terms of age, educational attainment and marital status has remained relatively stable among migrants who reached the country before and after full enlargement in 2007. Similarly, also for Serbian migrants in Austria, the available data between 2009 and 2013 confirm that the age, educational attainment and marital status structure of migrants who reached the country before visa liberalisation and those who reached it afterwards has not changed significantly. Hence, given the lack of major shifts in the demographic structure of Romanian migrants in Italy and Serbian migrants in Austria we are confident that our approach will not result in biased results.

Moreover, as is apparent from above discussion, the setup of the analysis deviates from the standard approach in the literature, which observes treated and untreated individuals in the same economic environment at the same time. But, since treatment and non-treatment are defined over two different time periods, the analysis has to address and deal with the issue of time-inconsistency. This issue will be addressed by incorporating a number of different controls which capture and control for differences in economic environments across regimes. In this respect, regional unemployment rates in both country of origin and country of destination are included to capture the employment situation on regional labour markets in both country settings. Generally, a high unemployment rate in the region of origin or a low unemployment rate in the region of destination is expected to foster migration as migrants choose to

migrate to a region which offers better employment opportunities. Similarly, the gap in GDP per capita (in PPPs) between country of origin and country of destination is included to account for differences in the standard of living across countries. A positive gap – a relatively higher GDP per capita in the country of destination – is expected to encourage migration, intended to improve migrants' standard of living. Finally, the response to the following question from the Eurobarometer is included: '*Generally speaking, do you think that (your country's) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is ...?': 'A good thing', 'A bad thing', 'Neither good nor bad', 'DK – Don't know'*. A dummy was then constructed which is equal to 1 if one's country's membership of the European Community is considered a good thing (and 0 otherwise). The response from this particular question in the country of origin is taken to capture two specific aspects: (1) whether migrants know a priori that after EU membership there will be free mobility and (2) the effect of a migration regime change after EU accession on migration preferences. However, this proxy is only available for Romania since Serbia is not an EU-member yet.

As is standard in this strand of literature, the effects of treatment are captured in terms of average gains from treatment for those who were actually treated. In the current context, the effect of a policy change (i) from free visa regime to free mobility (for Romanians in Italy) and (ii) from restrictive to free visa regime (for Serbs in Austria) on permanent migration for an individual  $i$  is defined as the difference in means between migrants who choose permanent migration with treatment and those who choose permanent migration without treatment. This is referred to as the average treatment effect on the treated<sup>3</sup> (ATT) and is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} ATT^j &= E(P_1^j - P_0^j | D^j = 1) \\ &= E(P_1^j | D^j = 1) - E(P_0^j | D^j = 1) \end{aligned}$$

where  $j = ROM, SERB$  which refers to either Romanian migrants in Italy or Serbian migrants in Austria and  $P_1$  and  $P_0$  are the probabilities of choosing permanent migration in the case of migration under the treatment regime and the control regime, respectively. More specifically, the probability of individual  $i$  of choosing permanent migration under treatment and control regimes, is estimated by the following Logit model:

$$P_k(\text{settle permanently}_i = 1 | X) = \Phi(x_{it}, y_{it-1}, Y_t)$$

where  $P_k$  is the probabilities of choosing permanent migration in the case of migration under the treatment regime ( $k = 1$ ) and the control regime ( $k = 0$ ) and  $\Phi$  is the normal cumulative distribution function. Furthermore, *settle permanently* is equal to 1 if migrants plan or prefer to settle permanently upon arrival, and zero otherwise. Information captured by *settle permanently* is derived from the retrospectively posed question about the intentions on the length of stay upon arrival. Generally, six categories were available, ranging from 3 months, 3-12 months, 1-3 years, 3-5 years and more than 5

<sup>3</sup> The evaluation of the effect of migration policy change on the preference for permanent migration requires satisfying some assumptions such as the ignorability or unconfoundedness assumption on the one hand and the support condition on the other. The unconfoundedness assumption assures that a treatment variable is exogenous, avoiding any omitted variable bias once covariates are included in the regression (Imbens, 2004). The support condition implies that the control and treated groups have comparable observed characteristics which guarantees a good match (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).

years to permanently (see Table 1 for an overview). Migrants who chose the last category are the ones that, upon arrival, planned to settle permanently in the destination country.

One of the fundamental assumptions which need to be satisfied to perform PSM is the so-called conditional independence assumption (CIA) which says that conditional on a set of observable covariates that are unaffected by treatment, potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment. This assumption implies that selection is solely based on observable characteristics and that only variables which simultaneously affect both the decision to migrate and the outcome of interest (i.e. settle permanently) but which are unaffected by participation should be included in the analysis. Hence, the following control variables are included in the analysis:  $x_{it}$  is a vector of individual demographic characteristics, comprising *gender* (equal to 1 if individual  $i$  is female), *age* (by age cohorts: 16-24 (as reference group), 25-34, 35-44 and the 44+ cohort), *educational attainment* (in terms of secondary, vocational or tertiary education, with primary as reference group), *marital status* (equal to 1 if individual  $i$  is married and 0 otherwise), *kids* (equal to 1 if individual  $i$  has kids and 0 otherwise) and *current employment status* (full-time, part-time, self-employed with out of labour force as reference group).  $y_{it-1}$  denotes a vector of pre-treatment characteristics, comprising *employment status prior to migration* (employed or studied prior to migration, and unemployed as reference group), *previous migration experience outside the current country of residence* (equal to 1 if individual  $i$  has previous migration experience and 0 otherwise), *previous migration experience in the current country of residence* (equal to 1 if individual has previous migration experience in the country of residence and 0 otherwise) and *motives of migration* (comprising searched for a job, higher earnings purposes, study purposes with 'other motives' as reference group) for Serbs or searched for a job, took a job offer and joined the family with 'other motives' as reference group for Romanians). Furthermore, to account and control for the apparent time-inconsistency problem inherent in the analysis, a number of controls are included which should control away differences in economic conditions/environments across different regimes. The vector  $Y_t$  comprises *regional unemployment rates* at the NUTS-2 digit level in the migrants' country of origin and the country of residence during the different regimes, *the gap in GDP per capita* (in PPPs) between destination country and country of residence as well as a question selected from the Eurobarometer survey which asks whether the *membership of the country of origin in the European Community* is considered a good thing. For a short description of characteristics of the two groups of migrants in different regimes see Annex A.

## 4. Empirical results

### 4.1 DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION PREFERENCES

In what follows, the analysis identifies the set of factors that determine different migration preferences in terms of either (i) out-migration to a third country, (ii) return migration or (iii) staying permanently in the current country of residence. In particular, the effects of a set of personal characteristics, positive and negative outcomes of and experiences with migration and satisfaction with life in migration on the aforementioned migration plans are identified for each group of migrants and each migration regime separately. As highlighted in section 2.1., attrition is a potential limitation of our sample since early migrants with temporary migration plans are absent from the data, which may distort results and lead to inaccurate policy conclusions and recommendations. However, in the ensuing analysis, attrition is no issue since determinants of current migration plans are identified for each regime separately, leaving results unaffected and unbiased. Results are reported in Annex Table A3 to A.5. Furthermore, an overview of overall findings is provided in Table 2 below.

#### 4.1.1 RESULTS FOR ROMANIAN MIGRANTS IN ITALY

The results for the different migration plans of Romanian migrants in Italy in terms of out-migration, return migration and permanent settlement under different regimes (i.e. free visa regime (2004-06) and free mobility (2007-11)) are presented in Annex Table A3. They demonstrate that relative to staying permanently, **out-migration** of Romanian migrants is more likely if migration was accompanied by negative experiences with migration in terms of an increase in insecurity concerning their future or if they faced discrimination. In particular, results highlight that the odds of out-migration are between two to three times higher for Romanian migrants who experienced an increase in insecurity concerning their future or faced discrimination than for those who did not experience such negative effects. This pattern seems to be relatively independent of the migration regime. Additionally, Romanian migrants who came under the free visa regime are also more likely to out-migrate if they hold a part-time job only, which probably provides little income only.

By contrast, for the sample as a whole, there is evidence that the preference for out-migration is age-specific. Particularly, older migrants aged 25 to 34 as well as those in the oldest age cohort 44+ are less likely to out-migrate than the very young migrants. Younger migrants are more generally found to be more inclined to out-migrate which suggests that young migrants who either migrated with their parents or migrated to pursue their studies, decide to out-migrate to further pursue their studies or work abroad. Furthermore, irrespective of the regime considered, out-migration is also less likely among Romanian migrants who migrated with a child: the odds of out-migration of Romanian migrants who migrated with a child is about 60% lower than for those who migrated without a child. Hence, there is strong and consistent evidence of a strong rooting effect of the family context. Furthermore, employment status matters for the decision to out-migrate: Romanian migrants are less likely to out-migrate if they hold a full-time job, which probably provides higher and more stable income and helps migrants support their families financially and increase the household standard of living. Additionally, positive outcomes of and

experience with migration deters migrants from out-migrating. In particular, for the sample as a whole, an improvement in the household standard of living makes out-migration less likely. Moreover, results consistently point to the strong role of satisfaction with life in migration for the decision to out-migrate. In particular, Romanian migrants who are satisfied (or very satisfied) with their lives in migration are less likely to out-migrate: their odds of out-migration are between 80% and 95% lower than the odds of those who are not satisfied with their lives in migration.

As for **return migration**, only age appears to matter for the decision to return home: among more recent migrants, those aged 44+ are more likely to return home than the very young ones. In particular, the odds of older migrants returning home are almost 6 times higher than the odds of very young migrants aged between 16 and 24.

There is again relatively consistent evidence of a rooting effect taking place, rendering return migration less likely if migrants migrated with either partner or child. This is particularly true for the sample as a whole as well as for migrants who came under the less restrictive free mobility regime. The results highlight that the odds of return migration are between 30% and 60% lower if migrants migrated with either partner or child. Moreover, the results demonstrate that the level of educational attainment matters for the decision to return. In general, more educated Romanian migrants turn out to be less likely to return home. However, differences across regimes emerge: while return migration is less likely among migrants with tertiary education only for those who came under the free visa regime, it is less likely among migrants with secondary, vocational and tertiary education who migrated under the less restrictive free mobility regime. Hence, the less restrictive regime appears to be more conducive to permanent settlement of an educationally more diverse group of Romanian migrants. Additionally, positive effects of migration such as the acquisition of new skills in terms of a new language but also good job–qualification matches render return migration less likely (particularly among migrants who came under the more restrictive free visa regime). Finally, there is again consistent evidence that satisfaction with life in migration is a strong deterrent of return migration among Romanian migrants.

#### 4.1.2 RESULTS FOR SERBIAN MIGRANTS IN AUSTRIA

Annex Table A4 presents the results for the different migration plans of Serbian migrants in Austria for the sample as a whole as well as for two different migration regimes (i.e. restrictive visa regime, 2004-2009, and free visa regime, 2010-2012). The results highlight that plans to **out-migrate** are strongly affected by negative outcomes of migration. The odds of out-migration of Serbian migrants in Austria are 7 to 11 times higher if migration was accompanied by an increase in insecurity concerning their future. In addition, the level of educational attainment is decisive for the decision to out-migrate. For the sample as a whole, out-migration is more likely among the more educated Serbian migrants: the odds of out-migration are around 2.5 times higher for migrants with vocational and tertiary education, relative to those with primary education only. Again, employment status is a decisive factor for the decision to out-migrate. In this respect, part-time employment renders out-migration of Serbian migrants more likely, particularly of those migrants who came under the free visa regime. And the level of satisfaction with life in migration matters, to a limited degree though, as the odds of out-migration are around 6 to 7 times higher for migrants who are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with their migration experience, particularly if they came under the restrictive visa regime.

In contrast, there is again relatively consistent evidence of a rooting effect of family context as migrants who came with their partners are less likely to out-migrate. In particular, their odds of out-migrating are almost 50% lower than the odds of migrants who migrated without partner. Furthermore, plans concerning out-migration are age-specific since, for the total sample, out-migration is less likely among the oldest age cohort 44+ while, for those who came under the free visa regime, out-migration is less likely among the younger age cohort from 25 to 34. Results emphasise that their odds of out-migrating are around 70% lower than the odds of the youngest age cohort (aged 16 to 24). Similarly, employment status is a good predictor for the preference to out-migrate: migrants with full-time employment are less likely to out-migrate, particularly those migrants who came under the restrictive visa regime. Moreover, there is evidence that positive effects of migration render out-migration less likely. In particular, higher income or improved household standard of living are strong deterrents of out-migration. In addition, a good job–qualification match renders out-migration of migrants who came under the free visa regime less likely. Results demonstrate that their odds of out-migrating are almost 80% lower than the odds of migrants with a bad job–qualification match.

**Return migration** of Serbian migrants in Austria is also age-specific. As compared to young migrants aged 16 to 24, older migrants aged between 25 and 44 are more likely to return home if they came under the restrictive visa regime. Their odds of returning home are about 2 times higher than for the young migrants. Again, both negative and positive outcomes of migration are found to affect the decision to return home. Surprisingly, irrespective of the regime considered, migrants who found a better job than at home are more likely to return home. Similarly, migrants who managed to make more money also prefer to return home, particularly the group of early migrants who came to Austria under the restrictive visa regime. These findings seem to suggest that probably the decision to migrate to Austria was driven by the aim to earn more money, which can more easily be accomplished by holding a better – and therefore also better-paid – job. Once the chief aim was accomplished and enough money was saved up, migrants prefer to return home. Similarly, the strong negative effect migration had on family relationships reported by Serbian migrants in Austria (see Annex Table A1) may also induce many to return home. By contrast, migrants who came under the less restrictive free visa regime are found to be more likely to return home if they have a job below their education or skill level. Their odds of returning are 12 times higher than for those who do not have a job below their education or skill level. Furthermore, migrants who came under the restrictive visa regime are more likely to return home if they are self-employed or have jobs with good job–qualification matches. Hence, in spite of stable and well-matched jobs, Serbian migrants prefer to return home, which may again reflect their wish to reduce the strain migration had on family relationships. Moreover, migrants who are very satisfied, satisfied or neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with migration are also more likely to return home, particularly if they came under the restrictive visa regime. This seems to suggest that the main motive of migration has been fulfilled and that, in spite of the good experiences with life in migration, Serbian migrants in Austria prefer to return home.

There is more consistent evidence that return migration is less likely if migrants migrated with their partners or children, which is a clear indication of the rooting effect of the family context. Employment status again acts as a good indication for the plans of Serbian migrants to return home: they are less likely to return home if they hold full-time employment. This pattern is particularly true for migrants who came under the restrictive visa regime. Additionally, migrants with vocational training who came under the free visa regime are found to be less likely to return home. Their odds of returning are around 70% lower than the odds of migrants with primary education only.

### 4.1.3 RESULTS FOR POLISH MIGRANTS IN THE UK

The results in Annex Table A5 refer to the migration plans of Polish migrants in the UK under the free mobility regime. For the sake of comparability with other results (i.e. free mobility of Romanians in Italy, starting with January 2007), the overall period is broken down into a pre- and a post-2007 period. Results highlight that only very few determinants render the decision of Polish migrants in the UK to **out-migrate** more likely. On the one hand, age is a decisive factor and out-migration is more likely among older migrants of the age cohort 44+ who came under the free mobility regime. Their odds of out-migration is almost 4 times higher than for the young migrants aged between 16 and 24. On the other hand, for the group of Polish migrants in the UK who came prior to 2007, out-migration is more likely even though their jobs are characterised by good job–qualification matches.

A more comprehensive set of demographic factors and experiences with migration renders the decision to out-migrate less likely. Specifically, the particular family context of migration as well as positive and negative outcomes of migration affect migrants' decision to out-migrate. Poles who migrated with a child under the free visa regime are less likely to out-migrate, a clear indication of the strong rooting effect of the family context taking place. Their odds to out-migrate are about 70% lower than for migrants who migrated without a child. Moreover, positive outcomes of migration in terms of either a better job than at home or an improved household standard of living renders out-migration less likely, particularly among the more recent Polish migrants to the UK. In spite of the negative impact on family relationships of the decision to migrate, Polish migrants are less likely to out-migrate (particularly early Polish migrants).

With respect to the decision to **return home**, the results demonstrate that – mainly in the case of more recent Polish migrants in the UK – migration with a partner did not exert any rooting effect since return migration is found to be more likely among migrants who migrated with their partners. Particularly, the odds of returning home are around 1.6 to 1.8 times higher for migrants who migrated with a partner than for those who migrated without a partner. Moreover, the decision to return home also depends on the level of educational attainment: return migration is more likely among Polish migrants with secondary or vocational education, particularly among early migrants. Relative to those with primary education only, the odds of returning home are around 11 and 20 times higher if they had secondary and vocational education, respectively. Again, a mix of negative and positive outcomes of migration affects the decision to return home, the specific pushing factors differ across groups of Polish migrants, however. Particularly among late Polish migrants who came after 2007, a negative impact on family relationships renders return migration more likely. On the contrary, even though early Polish migrants learned a new language, which is spoken internationally and could open up new job opportunities outside the UK, they prefer to return home. Similarly, although they made more money, return migration is more likely among more recent Polish migrants. Hence, if monetary considerations were a major driving force behind migration to the UK and sufficient money was saved up while working abroad, the major purpose of migration has been accomplished so that migrants tend to return home.

There is also clear and consistent evidence that employment status affects the decision to return home. In particular, similar to findings for Serbian migrants, Polish migrants with either full-time employment or self-employment have a stronger incentive to stay on and are therefore less likely to return home. More specifically, relative to those who are unemployed, Polish migrants with full-time employment have around 50% to 60% lower odds of returning home. Those with self-employment are even less likely to return home. Their odds of returning home are around 70% to 80% lower than the odds of those who are



unemployed. Again, the decision to return is strongly affected by a mix of negative and positive outcomes of migration. Generally, there is consistent evidence that Polish migrants who found a better job in the UK are less likely to return home: relative to those who did not manage to find a better job, those who did have around 70% lower odds of returning home. Hence, a better job is a strong incentive to stay on. Similarly, return migration is also less likely if migration resulted in a better household standard of living. Furthermore, return migration is also less likely among the group of early Polish migrants in the UK who faced or experienced discrimination, which therefore fails to act as a strong push-factor for return migration. Finally, a high level of satisfaction with life in migration renders early Polish migrants less likely to return. Particularly, early Polish migrants to the UK who are very satisfied with life in migration have 80% lower odds of returning home than those who are dissatisfied with their life in migration.

#### 4.1.4 A THREE-COUNTRY COMPARISON BY MIGRATION REGIME

The three country comparison points at contrasting results under different migration regimes. However, some consistencies emerge firstly for the group of migrants who moved under the free mobility regime and secondly for the group of migrants who moved under the free visa regime.

As for similar determinants of migration plans for migrants who moved under the *free mobility regime*, the family context of migration and outcomes of migration are important deterrents of out- and return migration. Furthermore, a higher level of satisfaction with life in migration is a strong motive to settle permanently.

With reference to common determinants of migration plans of migrants who moved under the *free visa regime* there is evidence of a strong rooting effect of family context, which makes out-migration less attractive and likely.

Overall, however, the results attained are insufficient to draw inferences as to the effects of migration regimes/policies on migration plans. One reason lies in the comparison of migration preferences of migrants who come from different countries of origin and have migrated to different countries of residence. Hence, given the strong sample heterogeneity, any straightforward comparison is difficult. So, in what follows, a more appropriate approach is used to evaluate the effects of migration regime changes on migration decisions.

Table 2 / Main results from the three-country comparison

	UK, total sample	UK, Poles migrating between 2004- May 2007	UK, Poles migrating between May 2007- 2011	IT, total sample	IT, Romanians migrating between 2004-January 2007	IT, Romanians migrating between January 2007-2011	AT, total sample	AT, Serbs migrating between 2004-2009	AT, Serbs migrating between January 2010-2012
	Free mobility	Free mobility	Free mobility		Free visa regime	Free mobility		Restrictive visa regime	Free visa regime
Out-migrate vs stay permanently: more likely		good job–qualification match	aged 35-44	experienced an increase in insecurity concerning their future; face discrimination	part-time employment; experienced an increase in insecurity concerning their future; face discrimination	experienced an increase in insecurity concerning their future;	vocational and tertiary education; experienced an increase in insecurity concerning their future; neither-nor satisfied with migration experience	experienced an increase in insecurity concerning their future; made more money	migrated with child; employed part-time
Out-migrate vs stay permanently: less likely	aged 44+; migrated with child; found a better job than at home; improved household standard of living	female; migrated with child; negative impact on family relationships; found a better job than at home	migrated with child; found a better job than at home; improved household standard of living	female; aged 25-34 or 44+; migrated with child; employed full-time; experienced an improvement in the household standard of living; neither-nor satisfied, satisfied and very satisfied	migrated with child; neither-nor satisfied, satisfied and very satisfied	migrated with child; very satisfied with migration experience	aged 44+; migrated with partner; employed full time; made more money; improved household standard of living	employed full time; made more money	aged 25-34; good job–qualification match
Return vs stay permanently: more likely	migrated with partner; vocational education; negative impact on family relationships; learned a new language; made more money	Secondary & vocational education; strong network connections in the destination country; learned a new language	migrated with partner; negative impact on family relationships; made more money			aged 44+	self-employed; good match job-qualification; found a better job than at home; neither-nor satisfied with migration experience	aged 25-34 & 35-44; self-employed; good job–qualification match; found a better job than at home; made more money; neither-nor satisfied; satisfied and very satisfied with migration experience	having a job below education and skill level; found a better job than at home
Return vs stay permanently: less likely	employed full-time; self-employed; found a better job than at home; improved household standard of living; very satisfied with migration experience	employed full-time; self-employed; discrimination; found a better job than at home; improved household standard of living; very satisfied with migration experience	migrated with child; employed full-time; self-employed; found a better job than at home; improved household standard of living	migration with either partner or child; secondary, vocational and tertiary education level; good job–qualification matches; learned a new language; neither-nor satisfied; satisfied and very satisfied with migration experience	tertiary education level; good job–qualification matches; learned a new language; neither-nor satisfied, satisfied and very satisfied with migration experience	migration either with partner or child; secondary, vocational and tertiary education level; either do a job below their education or skill level or experienced discrimination; satisfied and very satisfied with migration experience	migrated with partner; employed full-time	migrated with partner; employed full-time	vocational education level

## 4.2 EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN MIGRATION REGIMES ON THE PREFERENCE TO STAY PERMANENTLY: A PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING APPROACH

As has been suggested by the literature (see e.g. Constant et al., 2013; Epstein, 2013), changes in migration regimes play a decisive role for migration plans of migrants. In particular, less restrictive regimes tend to be mobility-enhancing and more conducive to temporary settlement while, on the contrary, legal constraints of migrants to return to a country of destination tend to inhibit mobility. Against this backdrop, the question addressed here is whether the liberalisation of mobility or migration regimes makes permanent settlement of migrants less attractive and consequently temporary migration more sought after. The focus here is on regime changes in Italy from free visa regime to free mobility and in Austria from restrictive visa regime to free visa regime and on migration plans of Romanians migrating to Italy and of Serbs migrating to Austria.

For the purpose of the analysis, a propensity score matching approach is used which helps to shed light on causal effects of treatment – in terms of a new, more liberal regime – on migrants' plans to settle permanently in their countries of destination. Methodologically, different propensity score matching techniques were used to consistently estimate treatment such as 'one-to-one' matching, 'k-nearest-neighbour' matching and 'kernel matching' (Gaussian and Epanechnikov kernel density). Furthermore, a number of post-matching covariate balance tests were performed to determine the appropriate approach for the evaluation of the treatment. Eventually, nearest neighbour matching with 5 neighbours was applied for the evaluation, which produced the lowest average percentage bias after matching. The good quality of matching is also reflected in Annex Table A2 which, for each variable used in the analysis, reports p-values for the null hypothesis that means of the treated and control groups do not differ. It highlights that with very few exceptions only, variables are well levelled across treatment and control groups so that differences in settlement preferences across groups can solely be attributable to the particular mobility or visa regime.

However, the ensuing analysis may be affected by the issue of attrition inherent in the data, since migrants with temporary migration plans have left already, particularly those who migrated under more restrictive migration or visa regimes. However, as discussed in section 2.1, the extent of attrition is expected to be limited since more restrictive mobility or visa regimes tend to constrain temporary migration, leaving a reasonable sample of migrants with initially temporary migration plans in the pre-treatment group. In what follows, section 4.2.1 reports results for Romanian migrants in Italy while section 4.2.2 reports results for Serbian migrants in Austria.

### 4.2.1 RESULTS FOR ROMANIAN MIGRANTS IN ITALY

The results presented in Table 3 for Romanian migrants in Italy suggest that generally, the probability of choosing permanent migration under the free mobility regime is significantly lower (by around 7 percentage points) than under the more restrictive free visa regime, indicating that less restrictive mobility regimes are more conducive to mobility.

Moreover, broken down by sub-samples, significant differences in settlement behaviour or preferences become apparent. For instance, women who moved to Italy during the free mobility regime are less inclined to settle permanently. Specifically, under the free mobility regime, women are around 8 percentage points less likely to settle permanently than under the free visa regime. Differences in

settlement preferences are also related to age. Results show that middle-aged migrants in the age cohorts 25 to 34 and 35 to 44 are between 8 and 10 percentage points less likely to settle permanently under the free mobility regime than under the more restrictive free visa regime. Additionally, matching results by level of education indicate that a shift of regimes renders migrants with higher levels of education significantly less likely to settle permanently. In particular, migrants with secondary and tertiary education are 11 and 9 percentage points, respectively, less likely to settle permanently under the free mobility regime than under the more restrictive/free visa regime. This seems to suggest that the group of more highly educated migrants tend to prefer temporary rather than permanent migration if free mobility is granted. Preferences for permanent settlement also differ by family context. Both, migrants who are married or have children are around 7 percentage points less likely to settle permanently under the free mobility regime than under the free visa regime. Furthermore, preferences for permanent settlement are also associated with employment status and migrants with both full time and part time employment are 8 and almost 15 percentage points less likely to settle permanently under the less restrictive/free mobility regime than under the free visa regime. Finally, migrants with previous migration experience in Italy are also less likely to settle permanently under the free mobility regime than under the more restrictive/free visa regime.

**Table 3 / Average treatment effect on the treated, results for Romanian migrants in Italy**

Variable	ATT	AI Robust Std. Err.	Number of observations
Total sample	-0.071**	(0.023)	998
Female	-0.084**	(0.031)	590
Male	-0.064	(0.035)	408
Age 15-24	-0.043	(0.067)	155
Age 25-34	-0.081*	(0.041)	382
Age 35-44	-0.101**	(0.039)	319
Age 44+	-0.091	(0.057)	140
Primary education	-0.037	(0.035)	50
Secondary education	-0.110**	(0.042)	364
Vocational education	-0.051	(0.043)	351
Tertiary education	-0.093*	(0.047)	231
Married	-0.073*	(0.029)	557
Having children	-0.075*	(0.032)	519
Full time	-0.082*	(0.033)	489
Part time	-0.148**	(0.051)	168
Self employed	-0.102	(0.110)	80
Previous migration experience in Italy	-0.137*	(0.062)	196
Previous migration experience in other countries	-0.091	(0.062)	169

Note: Matching method applied is nearest-neighbour matching (5); Distance metric: Mahalanobis;

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

By contrast, no significant differences in settlement preferences – at conventional levels of significance – are found for male migrants, very young and older migrants (in the age cohorts 15-24 and 44+, respectively), migrants with primary or vocational education, self-employed migrants or those with previous migration experience in other countries, but Italy.

#### 4.2.2 RESULTS FOR SERBIAN MIGRANTS IN AUSTRIA

Results for Serbian migrants in Austria presented in Table 4 indicate that the probability of permanent migration is 2 percentage points lower among migrants who migrated under a less stringent (i.e. free visa) regime, again suggesting that less restrictive mobility regimes are more conducive to mobility.

**Table 4 / Average treatment effect on the treated, results for Serbian migrants in Austria**

	ATT	AI Robust Std. Err.	Number of observations
Total sample	-0.022***	(0.041)	700
Female	-0.286***	(0.056)	334
Male	-0.149*	(0.062)	364
Age 15-24	-0.117	(0.074)	155
Age 25-34	-0.150***	(0.044)	382
Age 35-44	-0.282***	(0.071)	186
Age 44+	-0.269**	(0.084)	109
Primary education	-0.148*	(0.068)	50
Secondary education	-0.206**	(0.068)	302
Vocational education	-0.015	(0.102)	148
Tertiary education	-0.378***	(0.080)	141
Married	-0.146**	(0.053)	323
Having children = 1	-0.256**	(0.084)	149
Full-time	-0.158**	(0.052)	410
Part-time	-0.407*	(0.158)	55
Self-employed	-0.133	(0.098)	14
Previous migration experience in Austria	-0.147	(0.140)	68
Previous migration experience in other countries	-0.314***	(0.092)	116

Note: Matching method applied is nearest-neighbour matching (5); Distance metric: Mahalanobis;

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ .

Significant differences in settlement preferences across regimes become apparent once sub-samples are considered. For example, both men and women are less likely to choose permanent migration under the less restrictive free visa regime. However, relative to male migrants, female migrants are considerably less likely to settle permanently under the less restrictive regime: under the free visa regime, the probability of settling permanently is around 29 percentage points lower for women but only 15 percentage points lower for men. Moreover, the preference for permanent settlement also differs by age groups. Except for the very young age cohort (aged 16-24), migrants are less likely to settle permanently under the less restrictive free visa regime. Furthermore, the preference to settle permanently differs across age-cohorts and is generally lower among older migrants. In this respect, migrants aged between 35 and 44 are least likely to settle permanently under the less restrictive free visa regime – they are around 28 percentage points less likely to settle permanently under the free visa regime. They are followed by the oldest age cohort 44+, whose likelihood to settle permanently under the free visa regime is 27 percentage points lower than under the restrictive visa regime. Finally, younger migrants aged between 25 and 34 are only 15 percentage points less likely to settle permanently under the free visa regime. There is again evidence that under a less restrictive regime more highly educated migrants prefer temporary to permanent migration. In particular, migrants with tertiary education are least likely to prefer permanent settlement: their probability of settling permanently under the free visa regime is around 38 percentage points lower than under the restrictive visa regime. Similarly, migrants with secondary education are 21 percentage points less likely to settle permanently

under the free visa than under the restrictive visa regime. In contrast, migrants with primary education are only around 15 percentage points less likely to prefer permanent settlement under the free visa regime than under the restrictive visa regime. Hence the shift in Austria towards the free visa regime stimulated stronger cross-country mobility and contained permanent settlement of better educated Serbian migrants. Again, preferences for permanent settlement are found to differ by family context. Migrants who are either married or have children are between 15 and 26 percentage points less likely to settle permanently under the free visa regime than under the restrictive visa regime. Employment status is again an important factor for migrants' preferences to settle permanently under different visa regimes. In this respect, migrants with part-time employment only are 41 percentage points less likely to settle permanently under the less restrictive free visa regime while those with full-time employment are only 16 percentage points less likely to prefer permanent settlement under the free visa regime. Finally, previous migration experiences also matters for migrants' settlement behaviour. In particular, Serbs with previous migration experience in a third country are 31 percentage points less likely to settle permanently under the less restrictive free visa regime.

By contrast, no significant differences in settlement preferences – at conventional levels of significance – are found for the group of very young Serbian migrants (aged between 15 and 24), those with vocational training, self-employed migrants as well as migrants with previous migration experience in Austria.

## 5. Main findings and conclusions

This study deals with the impact of the changes in the migration regimes accompanying EU accession and following EU enlargement and investigates whether less restrictive migration policies contribute to the shifting of migration plans towards more temporary forms of migration of recent migrants. The study uses data supplied by three comparable surveys undertaken amongst recent migrants in three EU economies in 2011 and 2012: Polish migrants in the United Kingdom, Romanian migrants in Italy and Serbian migrants in Austria. Over the period 2004 to 2012, different migration regimes could be observed in these economies (full liberalisation of access for Polish migrants to the UK since May 2014; a regime of visa liberalisation for Romanian migrants in Italy before Romania's EU accession in 2007 followed by full liberalisation after accession; and a restrictive visa regime for Serbian migrants in Austria until 2010 followed by a liberalised visa regime thereafter) and hence an analysis of the impact of the different migration regimes could be conducted in relation to different waves of migrants (distinguished by the time of entry).

As regards the general factors (apart from the migration regime) which influence the mode of migration chosen by migrants, the analysis demonstrates that the decision to settle permanently, out-migrate or return home is a complex one, affected by a number of different, partly opposing, factors. But although the focus is on three different groups of migrants in different regional and institutional settings, some commonalities emerge. For instance, while no clear uniform pattern exists with respect to either age or gender, a clear rooting effect prevails: migration with a child and/or a partner renders out-migration as well as return migration less likely (except for Poles in the UK). Moreover, job status is a good indicator of migration plans: migrants with full-time jobs or self-employed migrants tend to favour permanent settlement. Migration plans are also strongly affected by experiences with and outcomes of migration. Even though migration plans are determined by a mix of positive and negative experiences with migration, the results highlight that positive experiences tend to render permanent settlement more likely while negative ones tend to encourage out-migration or return migration. Furthermore, the level of satisfaction with life in migration strongly affects migration plans as migrants who are satisfied or very satisfied with life in migration tend to be less likely to out-migrate (particularly in the case of Romanians in Italy) or to return home (particularly among Poles in the UK or Romanians in Italy). By contrast, the level of satisfaction appears to matter little for the migration plans of Serbs in Austria.

As to the second part of the analysis, which attempts to evaluate the impact of changes in the migration regime on the mode of migration (i.e. preference for temporary migration vs. permanent settlement in the destination country), this is generally a challenging undertaking as data on this issue are scarce and it is difficult to isolate the impact of a policy change. However, decomposing the treatment effect into individual components allowed us to disentangle the effects of different migration policy changes on the preference for temporary or permanent settlement at least upon arrival. One limitation of our data set was that migrants who entered the country at different points in time were all interviewed at the same point in time (i.e. in 2011 and 2012). Hence for comparative purposes we had to rely on the retrospective answers to the question on what their intentions were with regard to temporary vs. permanent settlement when they entered the country. This allowed us to identify the impact of different migration regimes on

their migration intentions as different regimes were in place when the different waves of migrants entered. Because of the varying length of time between interview and time of entry across these different waves of migrants, the analysis could not control for biases in memory amongst the individual waves. However, as shown elsewhere (see Mara and Landesmann, 2013), preferences, especially with regard to permanent migration, remain mostly stable over time, suggesting that the preference for permanent migration upon arrival could be representative of migration preferences in the long run.<sup>4</sup>

The comparative analysis demonstrated that there is less of a lock-in effect towards permanent migration under the free access and free visa regimes compared to restrictive migration regimes. Furthermore, the decomposition of the treatment effect by education level revealed important findings with respect to preferences of more highly skilled relative to low-skilled migrants. In general, a preference for permanent migration is more prevalent among low-skilled migrants while highly skilled migrants tend to have a higher preference for temporary migration. Also more highly skilled migrants show a significantly lower preference for permanent migration under the less stringent migration regimes. Hence this group of migrants tends to be more mobile, takes fuller advantage of free mobility within the EU and shows less attachment to a particular country.

The results obtained are thus relevant for the discussion relating to the impact of more liberalised migration regimes in Europe on mobility patterns towards and within the EU: one is the contribution which more liberalised migration/mobility regimes can make to the mode of labour mobility (i.e. permanent settlement vs. temporary migration) within the EU more generally and the other is the issue of the encouragement of 'brain circulation' more specifically.

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<sup>4</sup> See Carling (2013) related to the accuracy/validity of retrospective migration histories.



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## Annex A

### Descriptive statistics of the three groups of migrants by migration regime

An overview of average characteristics of the three groups of migrants as a whole as well as in different migration regimes is provided in Table A1. It shows that, as for the average demographic characteristics of the total sample of **Romanian migrants in Italy**, about 60% are female, the majority is middle-aged (between 25 and 44), about 60% migrated with their partners but only about 35% migrated with a child or children, almost 40% have secondary and about 35% have vocational training education as their highest level of educational attainment and 50% hold full-time jobs. Furthermore, about 40% each report good matches between job and qualification or income expectations. As for the negative and positive effects of migration, Romanian migrants in Italy hardly report any negative effects of migration. On the contrary, about 35% report that they learned a new language and about 23% each report that they either found a new job or made more money. Finally, Romanian migrants appear to be rather satisfied with their migration experience: about 30% state that they are satisfied with their life in migration while about 42% state that they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with their life in migration.

In addition, the two sub-samples of Romanian migrants in Italy show some interesting differences. As compared to the migrants who came under the free visa regime, those who came under the free mobility regime are more likely to be female. Furthermore, free visa regime migrants tend to be younger, are characterised by stronger family context as more migrated either with their partner or a child, have lower levels of education, and fewer are unemployed. Also, a larger share reports good matches between job and qualification on the one hand and income expectations on the other. With respect to negative effects of migration, a smaller proportion reports a negative impact on family relationships or insecurity regarding their future as major negative effects of migration. Furthermore, more report positive effects of migration. However, they tend to be less satisfied with their lives in migration than Romanian migrants who came under the free mobility regime.

As for the average demographic characteristics of the sample of **Serbian migrants in Austria**, almost half are female, the majority is aged between 25 and 44, about 50% have migrated with their partner but only about 30% have migrated with a child, almost 45% of them hold secondary education, 22% have vocational training and 21% report tertiary education as their highest level of educational attainment, about 60% are currently employed full-time while only about 8% and 2% hold part-time employment or are self-employed, respectively. Furthermore, almost 55% of the sample of Serbian migrants in Austria report good job–qualification and income expectation matches. However, Serbian migrants in Austria are most strongly affected by the strain their decision to migrate exerts on their families: almost 85% report a negative impact on family relationships as the most important negative effect of migration. As for the answers regarding positive effects of migration, about 28% and 23% report that they ‘made more money’ and ‘learned a new language’, respectively, as the most important positive effects of migration. Furthermore, Serbian migrants in Austria appear to be very satisfied with their life in migration: almost 65% report that they are very satisfied with their life in migration.

In terms of demographic characteristics, relative to early Serbian migrants who migrated under the restrictive visa regime, Serbian migrants who migrated under the free visa regime tend to be younger, are more likely to be female, and have a lower family context of migration. They also tend to be more highly educated but a smaller portion holds a job, suggesting that students make up a larger share of the sample. In addition, fewer report good job–qualification or income expectation matches. Interestingly, irrespective of the time of migration – in terms of the particular migration regime under which they moved to Austria – Serbian migrants consistently report a negative impact on family relationship as the most negative effect of their decision to migrate. Moreover, Serbian migrants who migrated under the free visa regime also report stronger negative effects of migration in terms of insecurity regarding their future or of doing jobs below their education or skill level. In contrast, they report the acquisition of a new language as the most important positive impact of their migration decision. Finally, they tend to be relatively less satisfied with their life in migration than earlier migrants.

Overall, almost half of the sample of **Polish migrants in the UK** is female. Polish migrants tend to be younger: only about 20% of them are older than 34 years. While about 50% migrated with a partner, only about 23% migrated with a child or children. The sample is more strongly dominated by migrants with relatively low levels of education: about 51% hold secondary education as their highest level of education while only about 22% each have either vocational or tertiary education as their highest level of educational attainment. Moreover, almost 60% hold full-time jobs while only about 10% each are either in part-time employment or self-employed. A relatively small share reports good matches between job and qualification or between actual and expected income. With respect to negative effects of migration, the negative impact on family relationships and holding jobs below education and skill level dominate. On the other hand, more than 50% report either higher income, the acquisition of a new language or an improved household standard of living as the most important positive effects of their decision to migrate. Finally, Polish migrants in the UK appear to be happy with their lives in migration: almost 80% report that they are either very satisfied or satisfied with their lives in migration.

Furthermore, the group of early migrants who migrated prior to 2006 tends to differ from the group of more recent migrants who migrated after 2006 (i.e. during the global financial crisis). The group of more recent migrants is characterised by a higher proportion of female migrants. More recent Polish migrants also tend to be younger and have a weaker family context. A larger share has vocational training as their highest level of education but a smaller share holds jobs, suggesting that they are either unemployed or pursuing their studies. Furthermore, fewer report good matches in terms of job and qualifications or actual and expected income. With respect to negative effects of migration, more recent Polish migrants are more affected by poor job–skill matches and insecurity concerning their future. Fewer recent migrants report positive effects of migrations, either in terms of better jobs, the acquisition of a new language, higher income or improved household standard of living. Finally, relative to early Polish migrants, recent migrants appear less satisfied with their lives in migration.

### **Descriptive statistics of Romanians and Serbs by migration regime**

The differences in observable characteristics of the two groups of migrants and in migration regimes are presented in Table A2. It points to significant differences across regimes of Romanian migrants in Italy and of Serbian migrants in Austria. For instance, Romanian migrants in Italy who migrated under the less restrictive free mobility regime (from 2007 onwards) are less likely to prefer permanent settlement upon arrival, are younger, more likely to have primary education only and less likely to have secondary

education, are less likely to be married but more likely to have children, are less likely to be self-employed or to have full-time employment and are more likely to have previous migration experience (in Italy or a third country). Moreover, their motives for migration also differ from those migrants who migrated under the more restrictive/free visa regime: they are less likely to have migrated for the purpose of job-search but more likely to have migrated to take up a job or to be re-united with their family.

Similar significant differences across regimes are observable for Serbian migrants in Austria. Serbian migrants who migrated under the less restrictive/free visa regime are less likely to prefer permanent migration upon arrival, are younger, have less vocational training, are less likely to be either married or have children, are less likely to be employed full-time or part-time but more likely to be self-employed, are more likely to have been studying prior to migration and are more likely to have migrated for the purpose of studying but less likely to have migrated for higher income purposes.

Table A1 / Descriptive statistics – by migration or visa regime

Variable	Italy						Austria						UK					
	Total sample		Free visa regime (2004-2006)		Free mobility (2007-2011)		Total sample		Restrictive visa regime (2004-2009)		Free visa regime (2010-2012)		Total sample		Free mobility (2004-2006)		Free mobility (2007-2011)	
	N=704		N=472		N=232		N=648		N=454		N=194		N=616		N=246		N=370	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Female	0.606	0.489	0.616	0.487	0.586	0.494	0.471	0.500	0.461	0.499	0.495	0.501	0.474	0.500	0.451	0.499	0.489	0.501
Age 25-34	0.389	0.488	0.392	0.489	0.381	0.487	0.343	0.475	0.368	0.483	0.284	0.452	0.393	0.489	0.431	0.496	0.368	0.483
Age 35-44	0.325	0.469	0.357	0.480	0.259	0.439	0.275	0.447	0.287	0.453	0.247	0.433	0.106	0.307	0.106	0.308	0.105	0.307
Age 44+	0.135	0.342	0.146	0.354	0.113	0.317	0.163	0.370	0.178	0.383	0.129	0.336	0.101	0.301	0.106	0.308	0.097	0.297
Migrated with partner	0.613	0.487	0.695	0.461	0.448	0.498	0.468	0.499	0.500	0.501	0.392	0.489	0.508	0.500	0.598	0.491	0.449	0.498
Migrated with child	0.343	0.475	0.384	0.487	0.259	0.439	0.329	0.470	0.379	0.486	0.211	0.409	0.229	0.420	0.285	0.452	0.192	0.394
Education level: secondary	0.389	0.488	0.407	0.492	0.351	0.478	0.420	0.494	0.406	0.492	0.454	0.499	0.506	0.500	0.537	0.500	0.486	0.500
Education level: vocational	0.337	0.473	0.311	0.463	0.389	0.489	0.218	0.414	0.243	0.430	0.160	0.367	0.216	0.412	0.159	0.366	0.254	0.436
Education level: tertiary	0.227	0.419	0.246	0.431	0.188	0.392	0.208	0.406	0.197	0.398	0.232	0.423	0.235	0.425	0.260	0.440	0.219	0.414
Employed full-time	0.501	0.500	0.543	0.499	0.418	0.494	0.608	0.489	0.682	0.466	0.433	0.497	0.570	0.496	0.618	0.487	0.538	0.499
Employed part-time	0.166	0.372	0.167	0.373	0.163	0.370	0.077	0.267	0.088	0.283	0.052	0.222	0.080	0.271	0.085	0.280	0.076	0.265
Self-employed	0.085	0.279	0.106	0.309	0.042	0.201	0.020	0.140	0.013	0.114	0.036	0.187	0.093	0.290	0.106	0.308	0.084	0.277
Good match job–qualification	0.383	0.486	0.413	0.493	0.322	0.468	0.526	0.500	0.588	0.493	0.381	0.487	0.276	0.447	0.293	0.456	0.265	0.442
Good match income expectations	0.405	0.491	0.441	0.497	0.335	0.473	0.535	0.499	0.645	0.479	0.278	0.449	0.401	0.490	0.419	0.494	0.389	0.488
Strong network	0.564	0.496	0.564	0.496	0.565	0.497	0.343	0.475	0.336	0.473	0.361	0.481	0.732	0.443	0.659	0.475	0.781	0.414
Negative impact on family relationship	0.107	0.310	0.104	0.306	0.113	0.317	0.848	0.360	0.860	0.348	0.820	0.386	0.240	0.428	0.264	0.442	0.224	0.418
Job below education and skill level	0.134	0.341	0.148	0.356	0.105	0.307	0.055	0.229	0.048	0.215	0.072	0.259	0.206	0.405	0.179	0.384	0.224	0.418
insecurity regarding the future	0.148	0.355	0.140	0.347	0.163	0.370	0.029	0.169	0.026	0.160	0.036	0.187	0.125	0.331	0.110	0.313	0.135	0.342
Discrimination	0.096	0.295	0.102	0.303	0.084	0.277	0.042	0.200	0.042	0.200	0.041	0.199	0.120	0.325	0.163	0.370	0.092	0.289
Found better job	0.220	0.415	0.240	0.428	0.180	0.385	0.169	0.375	0.195	0.397	0.108	0.311	0.323	0.468	0.366	0.483	0.295	0.456
Learned a new language	0.351	0.478	0.353	0.478	0.347	0.477	0.228	0.420	0.178	0.383	0.345	0.477	0.563	0.496	0.646	0.479	0.508	0.501
Made more money	0.230	0.421	0.238	0.426	0.213	0.411	0.282	0.450	0.314	0.464	0.206	0.406	0.586	0.493	0.598	0.491	0.578	0.494
Improved household standard of living	0.085	0.279	0.084	0.277	0.088	0.284	0.128	0.334	0.149	0.357	0.077	0.268	0.515	0.500	0.598	0.491	0.459	0.499
Very satisfied	0.074	0.262	0.075	0.264	0.071	0.258	0.643	0.479	0.662	0.473	0.598	0.492	0.401	0.490	0.423	0.495	0.386	0.488
Satisfied	0.304	0.460	0.284	0.451	0.343	0.476	0.237	0.426	0.226	0.419	0.263	0.441	0.378	0.485	0.386	0.488	0.373	0.484
Neither nor satisfied	0.423	0.494	0.430	0.496	0.410	0.493	0.086	0.281	0.079	0.270	0.103	0.305	0.149	0.357	0.114	0.318	0.173	0.379

Table A2 / Descriptive statistics – Romanians and Serbs by migration or visa regime

		Italy				Austria			
		Means Treated: Migrated after 2007	Means Control: Migrated before 2007	Pre-match p-values of t-tests	Post-match* p-values of t-tests	Means Treated: Migrated after 2010	Means Control: Migrated before 2010	Pre-match p-values of t-tests	Post-match* p-values of t-tests
<b>Dependent variable</b>	Permanent migration	0.082	0.151	0.002	0.002	0.512	0.726	0.000	0.075
<b>Controls</b>									
Gender	Female	0.573	0.601	0.349	0.650	0.493	0.471	0.601	0.846
Age	Age 15-24	0.230	0.114	0.000	0.747	0.340	0.143	0.000	0.454
	Age 25-34	0.390	0.379	0.658	0.262	0.286	0.384	0.014	0.222
	Age 35-44	0.258	0.354	0.002	0.700	0.246	0.274	0.458	0.647
	Age 44+	0.118	0.153	0.129	0.610	0.128	0.167	0.198	0.441
Educational attainment	Primary education	0.076	0.036	0.006	0.941	0.133	0.141	0.785	0.965
	Secondary education	0.329	0.385	0.068	0.992	0.453	0.423	0.458	0.870
	Vocational training	0.382	0.335	0.117	0.603	0.158	0.233	0.025	0.929
	Tertiary education	0.208	0.245	0.185	0.696	0.227	0.191	0.289	0.848
Family characteristics	Married	0.486	0.598	0.001	0.199	0.345	0.509	0.000	0.769
	Having children	0.562	0.497	0.058	0.858	0.493	0.744	0.002	0.404
Employment status	Full time	0.424	0.526	0.002	0.707	0.424	0.652	0.000	0.344
	Part time	0.152	0.178	0.292	0.495	0.049	0.091	0.066	0.878
	Self employed	0.048	0.098	0.005	0.583	0.035	0.014	0.081	0.344
Previous migration experience	Previous migration experience in Italy (Austria)	0.303	0.137	0.000	0.855	0.074	0.107	0.185	0.547
	Previous migration experience in other countries	0.202	0.151	0.040	0.857	0.172	0.163	0.761	0.707
Pre-migration characteristics	Unemployed before migration	0.258	0.218	0.152	0.981	0.325	0.390	0.106	0.968
	Studied before migration	0.177	0.174	0.927	0.885	0.300	0.183	0.000	0.969
Motives of migration	Searched for a job	0.480	0.581	0.002	0.766	0.084	0.127	0.104	0.897
	Took a job offer	0.205	0.125	0.001	0.526	-	-	-	-
	Joined the family	0.093	0.061	0.063	0.679	-	-	-	-
	Higher earnings purpose	-	-	-	-	0.143	0.300	0.000	0.910
	Study purposes	-	-	-	-	0.266	0.139	0.000	0.319
Macroeconomic indicators	Regional unemployment rates in Italy/Austria	-0.057	-0.060	0.028	0.742	3.046	2.894	0.000	0.000
	Regional unemployment rate in Romania/Serbia	-0.067	-0.069	0.032	0.270	1.453	1.527	0.000	0.004
	Gap in GDP per capita between destination and sending country (PPPs)	1.859	2.350	0.000	0.013	1.234	1.449	0.000	0.005
EU membership	Considered positive for the country	0.650	0.650	0.906	0.940	-	-	-	-
<b>No of observations</b>		<b>356</b>	<b>642</b>	<b>998</b>	<b>998</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>700</b>	<b>700</b>

Note: \* t-values after nearest neighbourhood matching.

**Table A3 / Multinomial logit estimation results for Romanian migrants in Italy: odd ratios**

	Out-migration vs. permanent migration	Out-migration vs. permanent migration	Out-migration vs. permanent migration	Return migration vs. permanent migration	Return migration vs. permanent migration	Return migration vs. permanent migration
	Total sample	Free visa regime 2004-2006	Free mobility 2007-2011	Total sample	Free visa regime 2004-2006	Free mobility 2007-2011
Female	0.562** (0.155)	0.656 (0.226)	0.695 (0.399)	0.938 (0.207)	0.903 (0.240)	1.324 (0.663)
Age 25-34	0.524* (0.194)	0.586 (0.291)	0.470 (0.301)	1.019 (0.326)	1.024 (0.454)	1.315 (0.705)
Age 35-44	0.644 (0.254)	0.721 (0.376)	0.528 (0.379)	1.548 (0.525)	1.683 (0.762)	1.511 (0.936)
Age 44+	0.267** (0.154)	0.326 (0.230)	0.554 (0.724)	1.926 (0.791)	1.796 (0.946)	5.598* (5.50)
Migrated with partner	0.754 (0.224)	0.947 (0.368)	0.624 (0.364)	0.651* (0.163)	0.659 (0.210)	0.379* (0.194)
Migrated with child	0.395*** (0.122)	0.450** (0.167)	0.219** (0.147)	0.620** (0.147)	0.770 (0.219)	0.321** (0.167)
Education level: secondary	1.926 (1.48)	4.023 (4.90)	0.508 (0.629)	0.395* (0.195)	0.782 (0.492)	0.0912** (0.0904)
Education level: vocational	0.793 (0.614)	1.684 (2.08)	0.163 (0.204)	0.419* (0.206)	0.948 (0.603)	0.0642*** (0.0637)
Education level: tertiary	2.194 (1.72)	3.722 (4.58)	1.136 (1.50)	0.221*** (0.117)	0.325* (0.218)	0.157* (0.174)
Employed full-time	0.558* (0.191)	0.533 (0.225)	0.562 (0.410)	1.121 (0.322)	0.971 (0.352)	1.448 (0.873)
Employed part-time	1.807 (0.682)	2.366* (1.17)	0.838 (0.569)	1.359 (0.465)	1.884 (0.869)	0.574 (0.354)
Self employed	0.536 (0.262)	0.433 (0.258)	0.711 (0.778)	0.955 (0.390)	1.067 (0.513)	0.389 (0.447)
Good match job–qualification	0.731 (0.223)	0.681 (0.249)	0.876 (0.619)	0.587** (0.140)	0.519** (0.148)	0.690 (0.393)
Good match income expectations	0.959 (0.283)	0.778 (0.282)	1.230 (0.763)	1.348 (0.312)	1.548 (0.435)	1.021 (0.520)
Strong network	0.698 (0.182)	0.658 (0.211)	0.753 (0.401)	0.872 (0.185)	0.909 (0.235)	0.743 (0.341)
<b>Negative impact</b>						
Negative impact on family relationship	1.088 (0.497)	1.946 (1.06)	0.309 (0.310)	0.925 (0.335)	0.830 (0.379)	0.593 (0.415)
Job below education and skill level	1.567 (0.634)	1.749 (0.872)	1.125 (0.944)	0.942 (0.331)	1.351 (0.571)	0.193** (0.157)
Insecurity regarding the future	2.670*** (1.01)	2.572** (1.20)	3.709* (2.86)	1.088 (0.346)	0.979 (0.379)	1.169 (0.794)
Discrimination	2.023* (0.833)	2.629** (1.29)	0.598 (0.541)	0.908 (0.327)	1.074 (0.449)	0.245* (0.209)
<b>Positive impact</b>						
Found better job	0.886 (0.406)	1.234 (0.738)	0.547 (0.505)	1.112 (0.436)	0.785 (0.390)	1.728 (1.36)
Learned a new language	0.521 (0.215)	0.597 (0.334)	0.377 (0.281)	0.534* (0.195)	0.373** (0.178)	0.703 (0.487)
Made more money	0.727 (0.353)	0.434 (0.288)	1.260 (1.17)	1.207 (0.488)	0.837 (0.425)	1.398 (1.19)
Improved household standard of living	0.345* (0.212)	0.453 (0.333)	0.000 (0.000)	0.782 (0.360)	0.499 (0.297)	1.211 (1.09)
<b>Level of satisfaction with life in migration</b>						
Neither nor satisfied	0.214* (0.18)	0.131* (0.15)	0.352 (0.47)	0.173** (0.13)	0.0840** (0.09)	0.376 (0.46)
Satisfied	0.110*** (0.09)	0.076** (0.09)	0.126 (0.16)	0.071*** (0.05)	0.045*** (0.05)	0.089** (0.11)
Very satisfied	0.046*** (0.04)	0.035*** (0.04)	0.043** (0.06)	0.022*** (0.02)	0.011*** (0.01)	0.034*** (0.04)
Arrived between 2004 & 2006	1.081 (0.30)			1.188 (0.27)		
Constant	26.56*** (32.01)	29.921 (22.81)	135.6*** (256.6)	89.86*** (89.84)	97.77*** (133.7)	400.5*** (677.0)
No of obs.	704	472	232	704	472	232

Note: Odd ratios are reported, standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



**Table A4 / Multinomial logit estimation results for Serbian migrants in Austria: odd ratios**

	Out-migration vs. permanent migration Total sample	Out-migration vs. permanent migration Restrictive visa regime 2004-2009	Out-migration vs. permanent migration Free visa regime 2010-2012	Return migration vs. permanent migration Total sample	Return migration vs. permanent migration Restrictive visa regime 2004-2009	Return migration vs. permanent migration Free visa regime 2010-2012
Female	0.855 (0.235)	0.619 (0.231)	1.538 (0.766)	0.946 (0.182)	0.784 (0.184)	1.392 (0.533)
Age 25-34	0.905 (0.329)	1.702 (0.817)	0.301* (0.216)	1.434 (0.402)	2.338** (0.846)	0.776 (0.413)
Age 35-44	0.725 (0.304)	0.901 (0.518)	0.288 (0.229)	1.368 (0.420)	2.235** (0.910)	0.810 (0.466)
Age 44+	0.326* (0.187)	0.607 (0.411)	0.000 (0.000)	1.223 (0.419)	1.969 (0.861)	0.937 (0.624)
Migrated with partner	0.537* (0.179)	0.534 (0.227)	0.334 (0.247)	0.512*** (0.114)	0.458*** (0.125)	0.545 (0.247)
Migrated with child	1.524 (0.556)	1.510 (0.696)	9.983** (10.29)	0.657* (0.159)	0.669 (0.190)	0.857 (0.481)
Education level: secondary	0.691 (0.343)	0.609 (0.379)	1.055 (1.03)	1.075 (0.293)	1.494 (0.508)	0.635 (0.332)
Education level: vocational	2.570* (1.27)	2.466 (1.44)	2.465 (2.62)	0.846 (0.265)	1.068 (0.406)	0.306* (0.207)
Education level: tertiary	2.508* (1.28)	1.395 (0.901)	5.414 (5.66)	1.016 (0.327)	1.436 (0.573)	0.543 (0.336)
Employed full-time	0.334** (0.143)	0.243*** (0.133)	0.735 (0.719)	0.529** (0.168)	0.377** (0.153)	0.818 (0.484)
Employed part-time	1.082 (0.533)	0.687 (0.423)	12.17* (16.30)	0.528 (0.232)	0.446 (0.225)	0.741 (0.880)
Self employed	0.875 (0.412)	0.813 (0.446)	1.133 (1.43)	1.786** (0.434)	1.597* (0.444)	2.617 (1.61)
Good match job–qualification	1.163 (0.461)	2.048 (1.06)	0.123* (0.132)	1.548* (0.410)	1.847* (0.610)	0.945 (0.506)
Good match income expectations	0.647 (0.223)	0.594 (0.244)	0.811 (0.630)	0.769 (0.182)	0.658 (0.192)	1.094 (0.509)
Strong network	0.624 (0.181)	0.938 (0.358)	0.377 (0.224)	0.896 (0.179)	0.978 (0.242)	0.858 (0.351)
<b>Negative impact</b>						
Negative impact on family relationship	2.105 (1.59)	1.207 (1.13)	7.977 (12.09)	2.135 (1.28)	1.561 (1.18)	8.817 (11.88)
Job below education and skill level	2.562 (2.28)	1.287 (1.49)	21.520 (21.52)	2.402 (1.70)	1.535 (1.37)	11.99* (17.94)
Insecurity regarding the future	6.633** (6.31)	10.87* (13.25)	1.900 (3.66)	1.779 (1.51)	1.143 (1.31)	6.636 (10.82)
Discrimination	1.432 (1.37)	1.126 (1.30)	4.091 (8.64)	2.013 (1.48)	1.836 (1.69)	7.998 (12.64)
<b>Positive impact</b>						
Found better job	1.321 (0.580)	1.082 (0.574)	4.325 (4.46)	2.224** (0.747)	2.338** (0.950)	5.249** (4.44)
Learned a new language	0.874 (0.318)	0.638 (0.332)	0.838 (0.519)	0.989 (0.304)	1.271 (0.536)	0.805 (0.408)
Made more money	0.358* (0.188)	0.286* (0.185)	0.843 (0.931)	1.603 (0.487)	1.925* (0.732)	1.339 (0.820)
Improved household standard of living	0.329* (0.193)	0.356 (0.233)	0.000 (0.000)	1.075 (0.376)	1.333 (0.568)	0.483 (0.371)
<b>Level of satisfaction with life in migration</b>						
Neither nor satisfied	7.340** (5.79)	6.177* (5.97)	13.060 (29.46)	3.491* (2.37)	17.44** (20.81)	0.623 (0.720)
Satisfied	1.776 (1.28)	0.995 (0.878)	9.270 (20.11)	1.747 (1.06)	8.566* (9.59)	0.317 (0.322)
Very satisfied	1.494 (1.05)	0.963 (0.836)	4.973 (10.50)	1.313 (0.775)	6.356* (7.04)	0.231 (0.225)
Arrived between 2004 & 2009	1.328 (0.396)			1.057 (0.229)		
Constant	0.241 (0.262)	0.606 (0.763)	0.0228 (0.0635)	0.308 (0.265)	0.0573** (0.0780)	0.723 (1.26)
No of obs.	648	454	194	648	454	194

Note: Odd ratios are reported, standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.


**Table A5 / Multinomial logit estimation results for Poles in the UK: odd ratios**

	Out-migration vs. permanent migration			Return migration vs. permanent migration		
	Total sample	Free mobility 2004-2006	Free mobility 2007-2011	Total sample	Free mobility 2004-2006	Free mobility 2007-2011
Female	0.843 (0.256)	0.414* (0.213)	1.150 (0.491)	0.859 (0.185)	0.633 (0.234)	1.003 (0.300)
Age 25-34	1.100 (0.357)	1.101 (0.591)	0.955 (0.428)	0.912 (0.219)	1.464 (0.615)	0.610 (0.198)
Age 35-44	2.070 (1.03)	1.006 (0.865)	3.591* (2.64)	1.239 (0.482)	0.515 (0.352)	2.061 (1.23)
Age 44+	0.124* (0.132)	0.249 (0.292)	0.000 (0.000)	1.370 (0.501)	2.104 (1.24)	0.957 (0.506)
Migrated with partner	0.694 (0.223)	0.926 (0.449)	0.610 (0.291)	1.577* (0.369)	1.422 (0.564)	1.798* (0.592)
Migrated with child	0.270*** (0.128)	0.236* (0.175)	0.285* (0.189)	0.719 (0.189)	1.542 (0.660)	0.332*** (0.129)
Education level: secondary	1.420 (0.882)	3.165 (3.22)	0.744 (0.650)	2.324 (1.25)	10.58** (12.45)	1.345 (0.978)
Education level: vocational	1.011 (0.717)	0.904 (1.15)	0.973 (0.923)	3.721** (2.10)	20.35** (25.13)	3.055 (2.34)
Education level: tertiary	1.795 (1.22)	2.398 (2.63)	1.496 (1.44)	2.567 (1.48)	7.520 (9.30)	1.902 (1.49)
Employed full-time	1.116 (0.448)	1.426 (1.10)	1.129 (0.609)	0.560** (0.151)	0.416* (0.208)	0.464** (0.173)
Employed part-time	1.032 (0.613)	1.032 (1.16)	0.846 (0.676)	0.733 (0.304)	0.460 (0.335)	0.668 (0.384)
Self employed	1.348 (0.711)	0.667 (0.630)	1.515 (1.12)	0.246*** (0.103)	0.165** (0.120)	0.157*** (0.0927)
Good match job–qualification	1.194 (0.404)	3.188** (1.75)	0.621 (0.317)	1.084 (0.270)	1.345 (0.587)	0.843 (0.287)
Good match income expectations	0.967 (0.302)	0.992 (0.484)	1.026 (0.466)	1.017 (0.227)	0.998 (0.388)	1.085 (0.336)
Strong network	0.991 (0.322)	0.918 (0.453)	0.849 (0.431)	1.263 (0.293)	2.180** (0.824)	0.840 (0.288)
<b>Negative impact</b>						
Negative impact on family relationship	0.820 (0.308)	0.297* (0.203)	1.592 (0.828)	1.884** (0.475)	1.910 (0.782)	2.024* (0.740)
Job below education and skill level	1.084 (0.440)	0.649 (0.553)	1.384 (0.720)	1.345 (0.383)	1.751 (0.920)	1.202 (0.460)
Insecurity regarding the future	0.966 (0.467)	0.213 (0.203)	2.000 (1.30)	0.637 (0.217)	0.390 (0.227)	0.730 (0.352)
Discrimination	0.875 (0.375)	1.013 (0.658)	1.160 (0.823)	0.596 (0.194)	0.292** (0.158)	1.481 (0.783)
<b>Positive impact</b>						
Found better job	0.412*** (0.139)	0.291** (0.156)	0.372** (0.176)	0.329*** (0.0773)	0.314*** (0.129)	0.260*** (0.0859)
Learned a new language	1.580 (0.503)	1.066 (0.566)	1.717 (0.744)	1.563** (0.352)	2.510** (0.985)	1.370 (0.412)
Made more money	1.121 (0.354)	1.230 (0.659)	1.046 (0.473)	1.810*** (0.409)	0.647 (0.253)	3.723*** (1.22)
Improved household standard of living	0.591* (0.179)	0.728 (0.362)	0.427* (0.185)	0.472*** (0.104)	0.517* (0.196)	0.425*** (0.130)
<b>Level of satisfaction with life in migration</b>						
Neither-nor satisfied	2.099 (1.64)	0.650 (0.795)	3.354 (4.12)	0.956 (0.466)	1.023 (0.900)	0.786 (0.510)
Satisfied	2.354 (1.72)	0.479 (0.503)	5.184 (6.18)	1.095 (0.483)	0.446 (0.339)	1.237 (0.749)
Very satisfied	1.528 (1.12)	0.198 (0.222)	3.809 (4.54)	0.384** (0.171)	0.119*** (0.0964)	0.452 (0.271)
Arrived between 2004 & 2006	0.953 (0.287)			1.557** (0.335)		
Constant	0.315 (0.318)	1.326 (1.99)	0.238 (0.372)	1.048 (0.748)	0.620 (0.800)	3.411 (3.39)
No of obs.	616	246	370	616	246	370

Note: Odd ratios are reported, standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1.


## Annex B

**Figure B1 / Serbian migrants in Austria – 2009-2013, age structure**




Source: Statistik Austria (2014), Mikrozensus-Arbeitskräfteerhebung.

**Figure B2 / Serbian migrants in Austria – 2009-2013, educational structure**




Source: Statistik Austrian (2014), Mikrozensus-Arbeitskräfteerhebung.


**Figure B3 / Serbian migrants in Austria – 2009-2013, marital status**




Source: Statistik Austrian (2014), Mikrozensus-Arbeitskräfteerhebung.

**Figure B4 / EU-2 migrants in Italy – 2005-2011, age structure**

Source: EU-LFS (2013), own calculations.

**Figure B5 / EU-2 migrants in Italy – 2005-2011, educational structure**

Source: EU-LFS (2013), own calculations.

**Figure B6 / EU-2 migrants in Italy – 2005-2011, marital status**

Source: EU-LFS (2013), own calculations.



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