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April 2004
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ABSTRACT

Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?∗

This paper reviews the recent evidence on U.S. immigration, focusing on two key questions: (1) Does immigration reduce the labor market opportunities of less-skilled natives? (2) Have immigrants who arrived after the 1965 Immigration Reform Act successfully assimilated? Looking across major cities, differential immigrant inflows are strongly correlated with the relative supply of high school dropouts. Nevertheless, data from the 2000 Census shows that relative wages of native dropouts are uncorrelated with the relative supply of less-educated workers, as they were in earlier years. At the aggregate level, the wage gap between dropouts and high school graduates has remained nearly constant since 1980, despite supply pressure from immigration and the rise of other education-related wage gaps. Overall, evidence that immigrants have harmed the opportunities of less educated natives is scant. On the question of assimilation, the success of the U.S.-born children of immigrants is a key yardstick. By this metric, post-1965 immigrants are doing reasonably well: second generation sons and daughters have higher education and wages than the children of natives. Even children of the least educated immigrant origin groups have closed most of the education gap with the children of natives.

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Over the past two decades the perception of immigrants in the U.S. labor market has shifted. In the 1970s, immigrants were viewed in a mainly positive light. Chiswick (1978) found that immigrant men earned as much as natives, despite having less education, and concluded that investments in informal training made up for the gap in formal schooling. Grossman (1982) examined the impact of immigration on native wages and concluded that the effects were small. Subsequent research – most notably by Borjas (1985, 1995, 1999, 2003) – has chipped away at both conclusions and gradually led to a more negative picture of U.S. immigration. The shift in perceptions has closely tracked changes in the national origin of U.S. immigrants, often attributed to the 1965 Immigration Reform Act, and a widening gap between the language and culture of natives and immigrants (Borjas, 1999; Lazear, 1999). Concerns over immigration have also been heightened by the decline in low-skilled wages in the U.S., and the belief that some of this may be due to immigrant competition (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1997).

This paper presents an overview and update of the U.S. immigration literature, focusing on two central questions: (1) Do immigrants harm the labor market opportunities of less skilled natives? (2) How do today’s immigrants perform in the U.S. labor market, and are they successfully “assimilating”? These questions are at the heart of the debate about immigration in many other countries – including most European nations – and insights from the recent U.S. literature may prove useful in answering the questions elsewhere. My conclusion is that the “revisionist” view of recent U.S. immigration is overly pessimistic. The evidence that immigrants harm native opportunities is slight, while the fear that post-1965 immigrants will never assimilate is belied by the educational success of their children.

I. The Characteristics of Immigrants

Most of the immigrants in Chiswick’s (1978) study had entered the U.S. under the provisions
of the Immigrant and Nationality Acts of 1924, which established national origin quotas with a strong bias in favor of Northern Europeans.\(^1\) In the 1970 data analyzed by Chiswick, 63 percent of immigrants were born in Europe or Canada (Card, DiNardo and Estes, 2000, Table 6.3). The vast majority of working age immigrants in the U.S. today arrived after the 1965 Immigration Act, which relaxed the quota system and established preferences for people with family members already in the country. The new law, coupled with declining supplies of potential immigrants from traditional source countries such as Britain, Germany, and Italy, and increasing potential supplies from Mexico, Central America, and Asia, have led to a shift in the ethnic composition of immigrants.\(^2\) In 2000, only 13.6 percent of adult immigrants in the U.S. were born in Europe, while 32 percent were born in Mexico, 16 percent in Central America or the Carribean, and 26.6 percent in Asia.

As emphasized by Borjas (1985, 1995), the skill characteristics of immigrants in the U.S. are strongly related to their country of origin. In fact, country of origin dummies explain 30 percent of the variation in average education levels among immigrants in the 2000 Census.\(^3\) Reflecting the high fraction of immigrants from countries like Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, and El Salvador (all of which supply relatively low-education immigrants) immigrants as a whole have lower average schooling than natives. Table 1 compares the education distributions of natives and two subgroups

\(^1\)The law was influenced by research of Carl Brigham (1923), who classified immigrants into four racial categories: “Nordic”, “Alpine”, “Mediterranean” and “Asian”, and argued that members of the Alpine and Mediterranean races had lower intelligence than Nordics. The influence of Brigham’s work is illustrated by a headline announcing the new law in the *Los Angeles Times* (13 April 1924): “Nordic Victory is seen in Drastic Reduction.”

\(^2\)The 2000 U.S. Census has information on exact arrival year, and I used this information to examine changes in the fraction of immigrants from different countries before and after 1965. The fraction of Mexican immigrants, for example, is 20.1 percent for 1963-65 arrivals and 20.1 for 1966-68 arrivals. A sharp impact of the law is not discernable in these data, though there is a trend between 1950 and 1975.

\(^3\)Education levels of immigrants are correlated with education levels in the home country, but there are many interesting exceptions. For example, immigrants from India have the highest average education (average of 15.6 years of completed schooling). Immigrants from Russia are a very close second.
of immigrants - those who had been in the U.S. at least 5 years at the time of the 2000 Census, and those who had arrived more recently. The recent arrival group is not very different from the earlier arrivals, reflecting the relative stability of immigrant inflow composition since the late 1970s. Nevertheless, both groups have a much higher fraction of people with very low schooling than natives. The excess concentration of immigrants in the “less than high school” category is balanced by relative shortfalls in the number who completed high school but have no further formal schooling (24 percent of immigrants versus 39 percent of natives) and the number with 1-3 years of college (about 15 percent of immigrants versus 24 percent of natives). At the upper end of the education distribution immigrants and natives are very similar, though immigrants are slightly more likely than natives to hold an advanced degree.

The patterns in Table 1 point to two important conclusions. First, labor market competition from immigrants is most intense for natives with the lowest levels of education. While immigrants comprised only 13 percent of the working age population in 2000, they made up 28 percent of the population with less than a high school diploma, and over half of all those with less than 8 years of schooling. For this reason, most studies of immigrant competition have focused on the impacts on very low skilled natives. Second, the positive effect of immigrants on the relative supply of the people with the lowest levels of education is offset by negative effects on the relative supply of people in the middle of the education distribution, with no effect on the relative supply of those with a bachelor’s degree or higher. Arguably, then, immigrant inflows have exerted upward pressure on the wage gap between high school graduates and dropouts, and downward pressure on the college-high school wage gap.

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4If immigrants had the same education and other skill characteristics as natives, and if capital is elastically supplied to the relevant labor market, then standard economic models would predict no impact on native wages – see Altonji and Card (1991).
II. Immigrant Competition and the Labor Market Outcomes of Low Skilled Natives

a. Conceptual Issues

There are two main approaches in the literature to estimating the impact of immigration on native workers. The first – pioneered by Grossman (1982) – relates differences in the relative structure of wages in different local labor markets to differences in the relative supply of immigrants. The advantage of this approach is that there are many local labor markets in the U.S. with different fractions of immigrants, and samples from the Decennial Censuses can be used to estimate relatively rich models of the local wage structure. The disadvantage is that cities are not isolated economies: people, goods, and services all flow between cities, and depending on how sensitive these flows are to differences in local wages or prices, comparisons across cities may reveal a lot or little about the underlying parameters that theoretically determine the effects of immigration on native opportunities. The second approach is a time series methodology, relating changes over time in immigrant densities to economy-wide measures of relative labor market outcomes. The advantage of this approach is that it can potentially reveal the impact of immigration even when the local markets approach “fails” because of intercity factor mobility or trade (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1996). The disadvantage is the absence of a clear counterfactual. Inferences from the macro time series approach rely on assumptions about the trends in factors like the degree of skill bias in recent technological change.

Early studies using the local labor markets approach (Grossman, 1982; Borjas, 1987; Altonji

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5This approach is closely related to work on internal migration and local wage structures, including Sjaastad (1962), Topel (1986), and Dahl (2002).

6Of course the same arguments about intercity trade and factor mobility also apply across countries. Models of international trade often imply that relative wages in a country are independent of the relative supplies of different skill groups, at least in some range. See Kuhn and Wooten (1991).
and Card, 1991; Lalonde and Topel, 1991) treated “immigrants” as one type of labor and distinguished between various subgroups of natives in the same city. While simple and intuitively appealing, there are problems with this framework. A key issue is immigrant heterogeneity: in some cities immigrants are actually more highly skilled than natives, whereas in others the reverse is true.\textsuperscript{\textcircled{7}} Thus, it is important to classify the immigrant populations in different cities according to their skill levels. Moreover, most models suggest that immigrants should only affect relative wages to the extent they distort the relative supplies of different skill groups. If inflows of unskilled immigrants cause unskilled natives to move out, for example, there may be little discernable effect of immigration on the local wage structure, even though relative demand curves at the local level are downward sloping.

A potentially better way to model the impact of immigration is to assign immigrants and natives to skill groups and to assume that within skill groups, immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes (e.g., Card, 2001).\textsuperscript{\textcircled{8}} Following this approach, the first step in evaluating the impact of immigration is to assess the effect of immigrants on the relative supplies of different skill groups in different cities. The second step is to then relate the relative wages for different skill groups to the relative supplies in the local labor market. The maintained assumption – that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes within skill groups – can be tested by examining the stability of immigrant-native wage differences across different labor markets.\textsuperscript{\textcircled{9}}

\textsuperscript{7}Card (2001, page 23) notes that immigrant men earned more than native men in one third of the largest U.S. cities in 1990.

\textsuperscript{8}An alternative approach is to assume that workers with different characteristics sell “bundles” of skills, where the number of latent skills is small. This approach has been suggested to study the structure of wages by age and education (e.g., Welch, 1969) but becomes complex once allowance is made for non-linear pricing of the bundles (Heckman and Scheinkman, 1987).

\textsuperscript{9}Under the perfect substitutes assumption, for example, the wage gap between immigrants with less than 12 years of schooling and native high school dropouts should be constant (controlling for age, time in
b. Effects of Immigration on Relative Supply of Low-Skilled Labor

Some indication of the impact of immigration on the relative size of the high school dropout labor force in different cities is presented in Table 2. The table shows the fractions of immigrants in all cities and in 15 selected cities in 1980 and 2000, along with the fractions of immigrants with less than 12 years of completed schooling and the overall fractions of the working age population in each city with less than 12 years of schooling. The data for all cities in the first row of the table shows three interesting facts. First, the fraction of immigrants in U.S. cities has roughly doubled since 1980, from 9.5 percent to 18 percent. Second, in both 1980 and 2000, just under 40 percent of immigrants had less than a high school education. Since the overall fraction of urban residents with less than high school education was 24 percent in 1980, the increase in immigrant density has exerted upward pressure on the relative supply of dropouts. Third, in parallel with trends for the overall U.S. population, the fraction of natives in cities with less than a high school education has fallen sharply (from 23 percent in 1980 to 13 percent in 2000), more than offsetting the inflow of less-educated immigrants.

There is a lot of cross-city variation in these patterns, however. The dramatic increase in the fraction of low-education immigrants in Los Angeles, for example, led to a rise in the fraction of high school dropouts in the local population. In Pittsburgh and Cleveland, on the other hand, immigrant densities have fallen over the past two decades and the fractions of dropouts in the local population declined sharply. Most high-immigration cities, including New York, Houston, San

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11 This is largely a cohort effect, reflecting the steady rise across cohorts in the fraction of high school graduates until cohorts born in the 1950s. See Card and Lemieux (2000, 2001).
Francisco, and Miami, experienced relatively small declines in the fraction of dropouts between 1980 and 2000, whereas most low-immigration cities, including Philadelphia, Detroit, and Atlanta, experienced bigger reductions.

The question of whether inflows of unskilled immigration have systematically affected the relative supply of dropout labor in different cities is addressed in Figure 1. As motivation for this figure, note that the share of dropouts in the local working age population ($s^d$) is the sum of the share of native dropouts ($s^d_n$) and the share of immigrant dropouts ($s^d_i$). An interesting descriptive regression relates the overall dropout share in a city to the share of immigrant dropouts:

$$s^d = \alpha + \beta s^d_i + \epsilon,$$

where $\epsilon$ is a residual. If inflows of less educated immigrants are offset by outflows of native dropouts (or if less educated immigrants tend to move to cities where there is a bigger positive trend in the educational attainment of the native population), immigration will have little impact on the overall dropout share and the coefficient $\beta$ will be close to 0. If mobility flows of native dropouts (and trends in native educational attainment) are uncorrelated with the inflow rate of low skilled immigrants, the coefficient $\beta$ will be close to 1.

As suggested by the data in Table 2, the scatter of points in Figure 1 is more consistent with a value of $\beta=1$ than $\beta=0$. For reference, the graph shows a restricted regression line in which the slope is set to 1. This benchmark provides a reasonable fit, although it tends to under-predict the fraction of dropouts in cities with few immigrant dropouts. In fact, a univariate regression across 325 cities yields an estimate of $\beta$ equal to 0.79 (with a standard error of 0.03). When controls are added for city size and the fraction of blacks in the city population, the estimate of $\beta$ rises to 1.01.
Findings similar to those in Figure 1 are reported in Card (2001), using data for 175 cities from the 1990 Census, and defining low skilled workers as those who are predicted to work in low wage occupations based on their age, education, gender, race, ethnicity, and country of origin. In that paper I looked specifically at mobility responses of natives to recent immigrant inflows, and concluded that each new immigrant in the lowest skill group adds about 1 to the net supply of low skilled workers in a city. Focusing on longer term mobility, Card and DiNardo (2000) use a three skill group taxonomy to examine the effect of immigrant inflows on native migration rates between 1980 and 1990. Again, the conclusion is that native mobility has virtually no offsetting effect on the relative supply shocks created by immigration. Indeed, once controls are introduced for city-specific trends in native population growth, the data suggest that native mobility responses may slightly reinforce the relative supply effects of immigration (Card and DiNardo, 2000, Table 2).

A concern with the interpretation of the data in Figure 1 is that unskilled immigrants may be drawn to cities where the relative demand for dropout labor is increasing. One way to partially address this concern is to use historical immigration patterns as instruments for current inflows (Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 2001). For example, Card and Dinardo (2000, Table 2) report models in which low skilled immigration inflows between 1980 and 1990 are instrumented by the fraction of Mexican immigrants in the city in 1970. These models give no indication that the OLS estimates are biased by local demand shocks.

Although the results in Figure 1 suggest that immigration has a powerful effect on local labor markets, some researchers have argued the opposite. Borjas Freeman and Katz (1997), for

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The size controls are the log of the adult population and its square. The regressions are estimated by weighted least squares using the size of the population as weights.
example, claim that native mobility effectively undoes any local impact of immigrant inflows.\(^{13}\)

Importantly, however, Borjas Freeman and Katz (1997) focus only on total population, not on the relative size of different skill groups. Looking at the California and Texas cities in Table 2 it is very hard to argue that immigration has not had at least some impact on the fraction of less-educated people in the local labor market. To the best of my knowledge, all studies that have looked at the relative supply impacts of immigration find very large effects on local labor markets.

c. Impacts on Less Skilled Natives

Once it is established that low-skilled immigration increases the relative supply of unskilled workers in local labor markets, the next step is to measure the effects on the relative labor market outcomes of less skilled workers. A simple theoretical framework for this analysis consists of a local production function and a set of per-capita labor supply functions for members of each skill group.\(^{14}\) Such a model implies that the relative wages and relative employment rates of workers in any two skill groups depend on the relative fractions of the groups in the local population. For example, comparing high school graduates to dropouts, a relative supply/demand model implies that

\[
\begin{align*}
\log (w_d/w_H) &= a_1 + b_1 \log (s_d/s_H) + u_1 \\
\log (E_d/E_H) &= a_2 + b_2 \log (s_d/s_H) + u_2,
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{13}\)Likewise Frey (1995, 1996) reports a strong correlation between immigrant inflows and native outflows. Wright, Ellis, and Reibel (1997) re-examine Frey’s specifications and show that his results disappear once controls for city size are added to the model.

\(^{14}\)See e.g., Card (2001). Specifically, consider a production function for local output

\[
y = \sum_i (eN_i)^{(\sigma-1)/\sigma} s_i^{1-1/\sigma}
\]

and supply functions \(\log (N_i/P_i) = \epsilon \log w_i + \Phi_i\), where \(N_i\) is the number of people employed in skill group \(i\), \(w_i\) is the wage of group \(i\), \(e_i\) is a relative demand shock, \(P_i\) is the population of skill group \(i\), and \(\Phi_i\) is a local supply shock. These equations imply a relative labor demand curve

\[
\log (N_d/N_H) = -\sigma \log (w_d/w_H) + (\sigma-1) \log (e_d/e_H),
\]

and a relative labor supply curve

\[
\log (N_d/N_H) = \log (P_d/P_H) + \epsilon \log (w_d/w_H) + \Phi_d - \Phi_H.
\]
where $w^d$ and $w^H$ are the mean wages of dropouts and high school graduates in a city, $E^d$ and $E^H$ are the mean employment-population rates of the two groups, and $s^d$ and $s^H$ are the shares of dropouts and high school graduates in the local population. The coefficients $b_1$ and $b_2$ depend on the elasticity of substitution between skill groups ($\sigma$) and on the elasticity of the per-capita labor supply functions ($\epsilon$):

$$b_1 = -1/(\sigma + \epsilon), \quad b_2 = -\epsilon/(\sigma + \epsilon) .$$

If local labor supplies are perfectly inelastic ($\epsilon=0$) then equation (1a) reduces to the familiar model used in studies of education-based wage gaps (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992).

Apart from the potential problem posed by unobserved relative demand and supply shocks, the key problem for interpreting estimates based on equations (1a) and (1b) is that the slope of the local relative demand curve may be uninformative about the degree of substitutability between skill groups. In particular, a Hecksher-Olin style model of local economies suggests that relative wages may be uncorrelated with relative labor supplies, even though at the national level relative wages are negatively related to relative supplies. I return to this point below.

Some simple “reduced form” evidence on the impact of unskilled immigration on relative wages and relative employment of low-skilled natives is presented in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 shows the gap in mean log wages between native male high school graduates and native male dropouts in each of the 175 largest U.S. cities in 2000, plotted against the fraction of immigrant dropouts in the local labor market. Figure 3 shows the log of the ratio of the employment-population rates of high school graduates and dropouts, also plotted against the fraction of

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15The wage gaps were estimated as follows. First, separate models were estimated for mean log wages of native male dropouts and high school graduates, including unrestricted city dummies (for 325 MSA’s) a quartic function of age, dummies for black race and Hispanic ethnicity, and interactions of the black and Hispanic dummies with age and ages squared. The wage gaps are estimated as the differences in the city dummies from these two models (re-normalized to have the same mean as the raw data).
immigrant dropouts. The graph for relative wages shows little connection between native wages and the fraction of immigrant dropouts, while the graph for relative employment suggests a slightly positive correlation. Estimated regression models fit over all 325 cities confirm this impression: the estimated regression slope for wages is statistically insignificant (slope = -0.06; standard error = 0.06) while the estimated slope for relative employment is significantly positive (slope = 0.07, standard error = 0.02), suggesting a small negative impact of more unskilled immigrants on native dropout employment.

Formal estimation results for the local demand/supply system are presented in Table 3, which shows both ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates and instrumental variables (IV) estimates using the fraction of immigrant dropouts as an instrument for the relative supply of high school versus dropout labor. The IV results are quite similar to the OLS results, and nearly as precise, reflecting the strong “first stage”. The estimates suggest there is no relationship between the relative supply of high school dropouts and their relative wages, but point to a small negative impact of relative supply on relative employment. These findings are quite similar to the results in Card (2001) using data for 1990 and occupation-based skill groupings. As in most of the previous work looking at local labor market impacts of immigration, there is a surprisingly weak relationship between immigration and less-skilled native wages (see Friedberg and Hunt, 1995 and Borjas, 1994).

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16 The local employment population rates of the two groups were estimated as the city dummies in separate linear probability models for the event of working in the previous year, in models with the same control variables as the first stage wage models.

17 The coefficient of the fraction of immigrant dropouts in a model for the log relative supply of high school versus dropout labor is -6.10, with a standard error of 0.20 (F-statistic = 902). The fraction of immigrant dropouts explains 74 percent of the variation in the relative supply variable across the 325 MSA’s in the 2000 Census.

18 In my 2001 study I presented estimates for 6 occupation groups in 175 cities. Interestingly, the estimated relative supply effects were typically smaller when the sample was restricted to low-skilled occupations.
This pattern has persisted despite steady inflows of relatively unskilled immigrants that have created ever greater differences across cities in the relative supply of dropouts over the past two decades.

\[ u_1 = \frac{(\sigma - 1)}{(\sigma + \epsilon)} \log \left( \frac{e^d}{e^H} \right) - \frac{(\Phi^d - \Phi^H)}{(\sigma + \epsilon)}. \]

\[ \text{d. Explaining the Absence of Local Labor Market Impacts} \]

A variety of explanations have been offered for the finding that wages of less skilled natives are insensitive to the relative supply pressure created by unskilled immigrants. The first is unobserved relative demand shocks, which enter the relative wage and employment equations and are potentially correlated with the relative share of low skilled workers.\(^{19}\) The leading solution to this problem is to instrument relative supply (or the relative number of low skilled immigrants) with information on historical immigration patterns. Immigrants from a given source country tend to go to the same places they went many years ago, and relative skill levels of the immigrants from a country are highly correlated over time, so instruments based on historical immigration patterns have reasonable predictive power. My reading of the evidence is that instrumenting sometimes moves the coefficients in the “right direction”, but does not change the basic conclusion that immigrant impacts are small (see for example, Lewis (2003) who analyzes changes in relative wages in major cities between 1980 and 1990 using OLS and IV methods).

A second explanation is that, as predicted by a Hecksher-Olin (HO) model, variation in the relative supply of unskilled labor across local labor markets is absorbed by changing industry structure. Lewis (2003) presents a enlightening empirical analysis of the magnitude of HO-style adjustments, using data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the Census of Population. Lewis starts from the identity that the employment of skill group \( j \) in a given city \((N_j)\) consists of the

\[ 19\text{For example, using the model outlined in footnote 14, the residual in the relative wage equation is} \]

\[ u_1 = \frac{(\sigma - 1)}{(\sigma + \epsilon)} \log \left( \frac{e^d}{e^H} \right) - \frac{(\Phi^d - \Phi^H)}{(\sigma + \epsilon)}. \]
sum of employment in each industry \( i \) \((N^i_j)\). Therefore the proportional change in group \( j \) employment from a base period 0 can be written as 
\[
\frac{\Delta N^i_j}{N^i_{j0}} = \sum_i \lambda^i_{j0} \Delta \frac{N^i_j}{N^i_{j0}},
\]
where 
\[
\lambda^i_{j0} = \frac{N^i_{j0}}{N^i_0}
\]
is the initial share of group \( j \) employment in industry \( i \). Next, letting \( Y_i \) represent output of sector \( i \), Lewis decomposes employment growth in sector \( i \) into a component due to the change in scale of the sector, a component due to a change in skill-group intensity in the sector, and a residual (or interaction):
\[
\Delta \frac{N^i_j}{N^i_{j0}} = \Delta \frac{Y_i}{Y_{i0}} + \Delta \left[ \frac{N^i_j}{Y_i} \right] / \left( \frac{N^i_{j0}}{Y_{i0}} \right) + \text{interaction}.
\]
The proportional growth in employment of skill group \( j \) in a city can is therefore decomposed as
\[
(2) \quad \Delta \frac{N^i_j}{N^i_{j0}} = A + B + C
\]
where 
\[
A = \sum_i \lambda^i_{j0} \Delta \frac{Y_i}{Y_{i0}}
\]
\[
B = \sum_i \lambda^i_{j0} \Delta \left[ \frac{N^i_j}{Y_i} \right] / \left( \frac{N^i_{j0}}{Y_{i0}} \right)
\]
\[
C = \text{interaction}.
\]
The first term \( A \) is a sectoral growth term, reflecting the rate of growth of different industries, weighted by the fraction of group \( j \) employed in each sector in the base year. The simplest version of HO suggests that this term should vary across cities to fully offset any differences in the relative growth of different skill groups. The second term \( B \) is a within-industry relative employment growth term. If relative wages are constant and the technology of each sector is fixed, this term should be 0, as should the interaction term \( C \).

Lewis implements a “test” of HO by estimating the skill-group-specific sectoral growth component \( A(j,c) \) for each of 4 education groups (dropouts, high school graduates, people with some college, and people with a bachelor’s degree of more), using 1980 and 1990 data for major cities. Treating this as the dependent variable, he estimates models like:
\[
A(j,c) = \mu_c + \eta_j + \gamma \frac{P^c_i}{P^c_{i0}} + \nu_c,
\]
where $\Delta \frac{P_j}{P_{j0}}$ represents the proportional increase in the population of skill group $j$ in city $c$ between 1980 and 1990, $\mu_c$ and $\eta_j$ are city and skill group fixed effects, and $\nu_{jc}$ is a residual. Note that the coefficient $\gamma$ has a simple interpretation as the fraction of relative population growth absorbed by HO-style shifts in industry structure. Lewis reports both OLS and IV estimates of this model, using predicted immigrant inflows based on historical immigration patterns as instruments. He also reports results separately for manufacturing industries (for which output measures are readily available) and for all industries, using total employment as a measure of industry scale.

In Lewis’ specifications, the sectoral growth component is only weakly related to local skill-group-specific population growth: his estimates of $\gamma$ for manufacturing industries (which are arguably best able to respond to local factor availability) are very close to 0, while his estimates for all industries range from 0 to 0.08. He also reports parallel specifications in which the dependent variable is the within-industry relative employment growth term. Within-industry changes are much more strongly correlated with relative population growth, accounting for over 90 percent of the adjustment to skill-group specific relative supply shocks. Surprisingly, the changes in industry structure emphasized by the simplest HO model play almost no role in explaining how cities like Los Angeles were able to absorb massive inflows of relatively uneducated immigrant workers over the 1980s. Instead, less-educated labor was absorbed by city-specific within-industry increases in dropout intensity, which took place despite the absence of city-specific changes in the relative wages of dropout workers.

One possible explanation for this pattern is that local relative demand shocks for dropout workers are “caused” by the presence of low skilled immigrants. For example, models of endogenous technological change (Acemoglu, 1998) suggest that firms will innovate in a direction to take advantage of more readily available factors. Beaudry and Green’s (2003) model of
technological adoption has a similar flavor. Future work is needed to compare modes of production of similar industries in cities with different relative supplies of unskilled labor.

e. Aggregate Evidence on Relative Wages of Dropouts

The available evidence suggests that the two main mechanisms that are supposed to diffuse the impact of immigration-based supply shocks across cities – mobility of workers and HO-style realignments of local industry structure – are relatively unimportant, and that adjustments to the supply pressure created by unskilled immigration have occurred within industries in high immigrant cities. Nevertheless, some researchers – notably Borjas, Katz and Freeman (1996, 1997) and Borjas (2003) – have argued that time series analyses are required to measure the full impacts of immigration on native wages. A complete analysis of aggregate trends is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in light of the data in Table 1 showing the relative education distribution of immigrants, it is useful to briefly examine trends in the relative wages of high school dropouts.

Figure 4 plots two measures of the wage gap between high school dropouts and high school graduates: the mean log wage differential between the groups, and the average return per year of schooling among those with 12 or fewer years of schooling, multiplied by 4. These wage gaps refer to the hourly earnings of men age 18-64 in the 1980-2002 March Current Populations Survey (CPS), and are estimated from models that include controls for a cubic in potential experience and dummies for black race and Hispanic ethnicity. For reference Figure 4 also plots the college-high school wage premium, estimated from samples of men with 12 or 16 years of schooling. Since 1979 the wage premium for high school graduates relative to dropouts has fluctuated in the range of 25 to 30 percent, with a modest rise in the early 1980s and more or less steady declines since then. The return per year of schooling for those with 0-12 years of school has fluctuated between 7 and 8
According to the data in Table 1, the presence of immigrants increased the relative supply of dropouts in 2000 by about 21 percent, reduced the relative supply of high school graduates by about 5 percent, and had no net effect on the relative supply of people with a college degree or more. Assuming that the elasticity of substitution between education groups is -1.4 (Borjas, 2003; Katz and Murphy, 1992) and ignoring labor supply effects, the presence of immigrants in the U.S. labor market raised the wage premium for high school graduates relative to dropouts by about $26/1.4 = 18$ log points.

In the 1980 Census, 26.3 percent of the population age 18-64 were dropouts, 39.2 percent had exactly 12 years of schooling, 19 percent had some college, and 15.6 had a college degree or more. Comparing these numbers to those in Table 1 there was a 35 percent decline in the log relative supply of dropout versus high school labor between 1980 and 2000.
II. Assimilation of Immigrants

While immigrant men in the 1970 Census earned about as much as natives, a wage gap opened up over the 1970s and has persisted. Currently, immigrant men’s hourly wages are about 20 percent lower than natives’, while immigrant women’s wages are about 10 percent lower.\(^{22}\) Given the gap in education between immigrants and natives, and the importance of education in the U.S. wage structure, this is not too surprising. Moreover, the quality of education in many of the major immigrant sending countries is arguably below the quality in the U.S. (Bratsberg and Terrell, 2002), and many immigrants have limited English skills, implying that immigrant human capital is even lower than observed education would suggest.

Following Chiswick (1978) there is an extensive literature on the question of whether the immigrant-native earnings gap narrows with time in the U.S. Such “earnings assimilation” could be due to formal or informal training, acquisition of language skills, or a variety of other processes.\(^{23}\) Borjas (1985, 1995) noted that a synthetic cohort analysis like Chiswick’s will overstate earnings growth if more recent immigrant arrival cohorts have lower unmeasured skill characteristics than earlier arrivals, as seems to have been true in 1980 and 1990. Moreover, many immigrants return to their home country within a few years, and others move back and forth, further complicating inferences from cross sectional data. Limited evidence from true longitudinal data (Lubotsky, 2000) suggests that immigrant earnings rise with time in the U.S., though the gains (about 10-15 percent in the first 20 years in the U.S.) are not enough to offset the 35-40 percent immigrant-native earnings

\(^{22}\)These numbers come from an analysis of March CPS data from 1995 to 2002.

\(^{23}\)Cortes (2004) shows that recent immigrant arrivals have relatively high rates of participation in schooling. She finds that 1975-80 immigrant arrivals show a gain in English proficiency between 1980 and 1990. Manning (2003, chapter 6) notes that some fraction of life cycle earnings growth is due to accumulated “search capital”. Immigrants may start off with less efficient search and gradually catch up to natives.
gap at arrival.

Although the precise magnitude of immigrant earnings assimilation will probably be debated for many years (see Duleep and Regets, 2002 for a recent analysis) it seems safe to conclude that the large fraction of immigrants who arrive in the U.S. as adults with very low levels of schooling will never earn as much as average natives. Likewise, the 22 percent of immigrants with a college degree or more will earn more than average natives. In my opinion, a more interesting question is how well the U.S.-born children of immigrants are doing. Focusing on the status of immigrants’ children is important for a number of reasons. Second generation immigrants are a growing fraction of the population, accounting for 10 percent of teenagers nationwide. Nearly all of them will spend their entire lives in the U.S., and will pay taxes and receive income support payments. Thus, the success of immigrant children is an important component of the long run costs and benefits of immigration. Finally, one could argue that the relative success of the second generation provides the best gauge of the extent to which their parents assimilated into the U.S.

Table 4 presents some simple descriptive regression models showing the relative status of immigrants and second generation immigrants in the 1995-2002 CPS. (I define second generation immigrants as people born in the U.S. with at least one foreign-born parent). The upper panel of the table shows results for men, while the lower panel shows results for women. The first two columns shows models for years of schooling and the probability of working in the previous year, fit over the entire population of 21-64 year olds, while columns 3-6 show models for log hourly wages,

24 Using March CPS data for 1995-2002, I estimate that immigrants with at least a college degree earn about 30 percent more than average natives.

25 Since 1994, the CPS has asked individuals where their parents were born. Using March 1995-2002 CPS files, I estimate that about 11 percent of people age 16-19 were born in the U.S. with at least one immigrant parent.
fit to workers only.

Looking first at the education models, immigrants have about 1.2 - 1.4 fewer years of education than natives, standardizing for their age. (The raw gaps are a little smaller). On the other hand, second generation immigrants have 0.3-0.4 years more education than people whose parents were born in the U.S. (the “third and higher” generation). Among men, immigrants are only slightly less likely to work than members of third and higher generation, while second generation men are a little more likely to work. Among women there is a larger immigrant gap in the probability of working (a 13.6 percent lower annual employment rate than natives) but again second generation women are a little more likely to work than third and higher generation natives.

The models in columns 3 and 4 present wage models that control for age and geographic location, but not for education. Among men, immigrants have 18-23 percent lower wages than third and higher generation natives, while second generation immigrants have 4-8 percent higher wages. The wage gaps for second generation women are about the same as for second generation men, but for immigrant women the wage gap is smaller than for immigrant men, perhaps reflecting the relative selectivity of labor force participation among immigrant women. When controls are added for education, the wage gap for immigrant men falls to about 11 percent while the gap for immigrant women falls to 7 percent. The wage gaps for second generation men and women also fall, to under 2 percent in each case. Thus, the higher wages of second generation immigrants are largely explained by their geographic location and their higher education.

The models in the final column of Table 4 add two additional controls for black race and Hispanic ethnicity. Reflecting the fact that many immigrants are Hispanic, and that third and higher generation Hispanics earn a little less than non-Hispanics, these added controls reduce the immigrant wage gaps slightly, to 8 percent for men and 5 percent for women, and slightly increase
the wage advantage of second generation immigrants.

The results in Table 4 suggest a couple of conclusions. First, immigrant workers in the U.S. labor market today (over 90 percent of whom arrived after 1965) earn less than natives, but the magnitude of the wage gaps are not enormous. After controlling for education, which explains about an 11 percent gap in immigrant earnings for both men and women, the gaps are under 10 percent—comparable to the wage gaps for blacks or native Hispanics. Second, the children of immigrants do well, on average, with most of their wage advantage relative to natives attributable to higher education. Despite the lower education of their parents, children born to immigrant parents seem to catch up and even surpass the levels of children born to U.S. natives.

An interesting perspective on this catch-up phenomenon is provided by examining differences across parental source countries (Borjas, 1993; Card Dinardo and Estes, 2000). Looking in the recent CPS data, one can identify second generation men and women whose parents were from different countries, and compare the earnings or educational attainment of each second generation group against the corresponding outcomes for their parents. This idea is illustrated in Figures 5a and 5b, which show mean education levels for second generation younger adults (age 21-40) in the 1995-2002 March CPS by country of origin of their father, plotted against mean levels of education for fathers of children age 0-15 from the same source country in the 1980 Census. For reference, I have also shown the point representing members of the third and higher generation, and the estimated regression line across the 39 country of origin groups shown in the figures.26

The figures suggest that there is a strong intergenerational correlation in education that is

26I selected countries of origin with at least 50 observations for second generation sons and daughters. The largest group is Mexico (4998 second generation children). Italy, Canada, Cuba, Germany and the Philippines also have at least 500 second generation children. The smallest origin groups are Panama (54 observations), Austria (53 observations) and Israel (51 observations).
similar for sons and daughters. Indeed, the coefficient estimates and R-squared statistics are nearly identical for sons and daughters (slope=0.30 for men with R-squared=0.77; slope=0.29 for women with R-squared=0.77). Interestingly, the coefficient of 0.3 for the effect of fathers education on either sons or daughters is almost identical to the estimates obtained in a micro level regression using samples of men and women from the General Social Survey. Thus, the intergenerational transmission of education is about the same for families of immigrants as for other families in the US. In particular, there is no evidence that second generation immigrants’ education outcomes regress toward the mean more slowly than other children.

Even more interestingly, in both Figure 5a and 5b the fitted line for the second generation group over-predicts the outcomes for natives: by 0.71 years for men and by 0.77 years for women. This means, for example, that second generation sons whose fathers had as little as 10.4 years of schooling (2.3 years below the average for native fathers) ended up ahead of their third generation peers. Even sons of Mexican immigrants, whose fathers had 5.5 years of schooling less than native-born fathers in 1980 (7.3 years versus 12.8 years for native-born fathers) ended up with 12.2 years of schooling, closing 80 percent of the education gap faced by their fathers.

These results paint a relatively optimistic picture of the success of post-1965 immigrants. Conditional on their parents’ human capital, the U.S.-born children of these immigrants have done remarkably well. Indeed, of the 39 largest country-of-origin groups, sons from 33 groups and daughters from 32 groups have higher average educational attainment than the children of natives.

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27I used the 1972-1996 GSS. The sample has 6667 men and 7745 women between the ages of 21 and 45 with observed father’s education. In a regression controlling for age and age-squared, the effect of father’s education is 0.32 for men (standard error 0.01) and 0.30 for women (standard error 0.01).

28The mean level of education of third and higher generation sons is 13.29 (14.4 for daughters), while the mean level of education of second generation Mexican sons is 12.19 (12.41 for daughters).
III. Conclusions

Immigration is becoming a major policy concern in many countries around the world. Two important questions that economic research can answer concern the impact of immigrants on the labor market opportunities of natives, and the relative success of immigrants in integrating into the domestic economy. Economists have struggled with both questions for the past couple of decades, with varying degrees of success, and the lessons from the U.S. literature provide potentially valuable lessons to researchers in other contexts.

On the question of immigrant competition the U.S. has a structural advantage, since there are many large U.S. cities, with widely varying levels of immigration, and samples from the Decennial Censuses can be used to develop detailed models of local labor market outcomes. New evidence from the 2000 Census re-confirms the main lesson of earlier studies: Although immigration has a strong effect on relative supplies of different skill groups, local labor market outcomes of low skilled natives are not much affected by these relative supply shocks. Recent evidence on the response of local industry structure to immigration-induced supply shocks shows that the absorption of unskilled immigrants takes place within industries in high-immigrant cities, rather than between industries, as implied by simple trade models. It remains a fascinating question how firms in a given industry can adapt their production technology so closely to local supplies of different types of labor without substantial changes in relative wages.

As the evidence has accumulated over the past two decades that local labor market outcomes are only weakly correlated with immigrant densities, some analysts have argued that the cross-city research design is inherently compromised by intercity mobility of people, goods, and services. Underlying this argument is the belief that labor market competition posed by immigration has to affect native opportunities, so if we don’t find an impact, the research design must be flawed.
The alternative to a local labor market approach is a time series analysis of aggregate relative wages. Surprisingly, such an analysis shows that the wages of native dropouts (people with less than a high school diploma) relative to native high school graduates have remained nearly constant since 1980, despite pressures from immigrant inflows that have increased the relative supply of dropout labor, and despite the rise in the wage gap between other education groups in the U.S. economy. While the counterfactual is unknown, it is hard to argue that the aggregate time series evidence points to a negative impact of immigration unless one starts from that position \textit{a priori}.

On the question of immigrant assimilation, a major constraint in the U.S. literature has been the absence of true longitudinal data. Nevertheless, a narrow focus on immigrant earnings is arguably misplaced. Few of the 40 percent of immigrants who come to the U.S. without completed high school education will ever catch up with the average earnings of natives. Most of their U.S.-born children, however, will catch up with the children of natives. Evidence on the intergenerational progress of immigrants’ children is now becoming available, and points to above-average levels of educational attainment, even for children whose fathers had much lower schooling than native-born fathers. The relatively strong educational progress of second generation immigrants, together with the limited evidence of adverse effects on less skilled natives, suggest that the new immigration may not be so bad after all.
References


Table 1: Educational Attainment of Natives and Immigrants in 2000 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest Education:</th>
<th>All Natives</th>
<th>All 5+ Yrs.</th>
<th>In US &lt; 5 Yrs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dropouts</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8 Years Completed Schooling</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11 Years Completed Schooling</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Diploma</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College (including Associates Degree)</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors Degree</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Degree</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters Degree</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Degree</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctorate</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Based on tabulations of individuals age 18-64 in 2000 Census. High school diploma group includes people with less than 1 year of college (8 percent of the overall sample).
Table 2: Immigrant Densities and the Relative Fraction of Less-Educated Workers, Selected Cities in 1980 and 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent Immigrant</td>
<td>Percent Immigrant Dropouts</td>
<td>Percent Immigrant</td>
<td>Percent Immigrant Dropouts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Cities</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington DC</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Effects of Relative Supply on the Relative Wages and Employment of Native Male Dropouts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Outcomes of Native Male Dropouts:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraction Employed Last Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Log Hourly Wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Relative Supply of Dropouts vs. High School Graduates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All models fit to sample of 325 Metropolitan Statistical Areas using weighted least squares. City data are derived from the 2000 Census public use files and pertain individuals age 18-64. Outcomes are adjusted differences in employment-population or mean log wages between high school dropouts and high school graduates -- see text. Instrument is fraction of low education immigrants in city.
Table 4: Education and Earnings Gaps Between Immigrants, Second Generation, and Others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fit to All Individuals:</th>
<th>Fit to Workers Only:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Years of Education (1)</td>
<td>Percent Working (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimates for Men:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>-1.24 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.6 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>0.45 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.8 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls for Age</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls for Region/Urban</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control for Education</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control for Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimates for Women:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>-1.37 (0.01)</td>
<td>-13.6 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>0.31 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.5 (0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls for Age</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls for Region/Urban</td>
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<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control for Education</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control for Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models estimated on pooled sample of 1995-2002 March Current Population Surveys. Samples include individuals age 21-64 only. Hourly wage is estimated from data on wage and salary earnings last year, weeks worked last year, and usual hours per week last year. Wages are censored below at $2/hour (in 2002 dollars) are set to $2 and above at $200 per hour in 2002 dollars. Controls for Region/urban are 8 region dummies and dummy for living in Metropolitan Area. Control for education is linear term in years of education. Controls for race/ethnicity are dummies for black race and Hispanic ethnicity.
Figure 1: Fraction of Immigrant Dropouts and Overall Fraction of Dropouts

Note: line with slope = 1 shown
Figure 2: Relative Wage of High School Grads and Dropouts vs. Fraction Low Education Immigrants

Mean Log Wage High School Grads - Dropouts

Los Angeles

Chicago

NYC

national average=0.22
Figure 3: Relative Employment of High School Grads and Dropouts vs. Fraction Low Education Dropouts

Fraction of Immigrant Dropouts in Local Adult Population

Log Employment Rate HS Grads/Dropouts

Miami

Los Angeles

Chicago

NYC

national average = 0.20
Figure 4: College/High School and High-School/Dropout Wage Gaps (March CPS)
Figure 5a: Father-Son Intergenerational Correlation in Education

- Natives
- Mexico
- India
Figure 5b: Father-Daughter Intergenerational Correlation in Education

The scatter plot illustrates the average education levels of fathers (1980) versus the average education levels of daughters (1995-2002) for different countries. The trend lines suggest a positive correlation, indicating that higher education levels among fathers are associated with higher education levels among their daughters. The countries represented are Mexico and India, with 'Natives' indicating the local population's education level.